1

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ AND RONALD
MUNOZ, Petitioners, v. MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA)in CA G.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez,
and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.cralawred

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an
altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty.
Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty.
Generoso reside.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOI Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched
SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SP02
Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel
Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation 6 and they
saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police
officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At the inquest proceeding,
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. 10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder
allegedly committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about the 20th day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified
with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt
acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but
said accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is,
said complainant was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took
place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime.
They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was
improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant
to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on
the RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation. 16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA
ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of
a command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of
Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so
that an inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was
based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had
sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.cralawred

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.cralawred

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY
INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.cralawred

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID
FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever
issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They
even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited."

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112,
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers
actually arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless
arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the RTC's Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.cralawred

The Court's Ruling

3

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its
resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the
proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this
case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the
Rules for the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present
case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable
interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902 19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term
"seizure."23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke 24 and The Great
Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. 25 The Magna Carta
Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain
liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war. 27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna
Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.28 It provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free

Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to
no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right. 30 [Emphasis supplied]

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision
does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test
of reasonableness.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests.
The Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the
Court, were not different from the Spanish laws. 34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless
arrests based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the
Philippines.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the
Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as
the City of Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under
statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers
established under the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a
warrant in the Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based
4

on common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then
Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of
public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law
for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which
states that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section S(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.44chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) - the provision applicable in the present case.
This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its
interpretation in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited
Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons
whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the
authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27. Second. A person charged
with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that
of conjinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption
5

that he would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives
sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may
reasonably be presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested,
although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following
circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act,
amounting to a crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person
arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 37 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that
certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and
arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace.

In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace. officer may arrest persons
walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a
crime, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for
an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable
man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good
faith is another requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable
even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not
necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What
was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person
sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings
that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the
warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its
breach.48chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In The U.S. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the
arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act
or circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on
warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable
suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has
participated in its commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the
arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting officer's
determination of probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as
follows:50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
6

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant -When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940
Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the
warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable
suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person
to be arrested has committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be
actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's
"reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person
to be arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted
the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules
of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-
worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced
under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the
commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just
7

committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for
purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of
Section S(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by
the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be
arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on
his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have objectified" the previously subjective determination of the
arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests
based on mere suspicion or hearsay. 51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element
of probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the
arresting officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime.

i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of ''probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting
officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of
determining whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable

cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment
limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is
not whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the
time of the arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable
cause" and "reasonable grounds."55chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
8

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest
situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at
the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later. 56chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical
questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic
question to be determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the
particular offense involved. 57chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession,
his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the
requirements of showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as
personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a
victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such
information.58chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita III v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113

of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the
crime and should be held for trial.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause
as the existence of facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and
his witnesses.62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of
arrestis defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to
be arrested.

Hence, before i suing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not
yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause 63 to issue a warrant
9

of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or
circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, 64 or an actual belief
or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. 65chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the
same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination
on the evidence submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable
cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court
held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise
the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper
investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the
criminal.67chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows
that these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless
arrests that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense
has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.
10

However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80 "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the
determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This
required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers
would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the
crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and
subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited
to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited
period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as
the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid
warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present
for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the
facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable
cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the
Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with,
namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer
have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime?
and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the
petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder
of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?

We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
11

present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in
the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrests of the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged
crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police
Station. The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20,
2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.

The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one
hour from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, . the CA finding that the arrest took place
two (2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene
of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows
from petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, 83 although they asserted that they did
it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by
East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty.
Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings:
"Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital
hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth
digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of 7th rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no
visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso
of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty.
Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than
one (1) hourafter the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty.
Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners 85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the
same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers,
they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a
different version of what transpired.87chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the
time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time
of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty.
12

Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the
persons who mauled him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners
agreed to go with the police officers.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily
went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have
been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what
transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to
consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section S(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination
of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.

The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. 90 This fact
alone negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that
a crime had been committed the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited
provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police
officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its
occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that
took place, the immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the
inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is

construed to mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second
issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus,
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of
arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.92chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso's account. SP02 Javier did not need to
apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an
alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired
13

personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the
petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in
connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the
time of their arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.94chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

V. The Order denying the motion for

preliminary investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the RTC Order denying the petitioners'
urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution 95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.96chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the
evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and
convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to
pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in
resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed
evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the triaL

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is
only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only
prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the
validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision
dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners.

People v Delos Reyes

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.

No. 01733, which affirmed with modification the Decision [2]dated September 23, 2003 of Branch 214

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-00-2375-D. The Court

of Appeals found accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes (Reyes) guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 21 of Article IV, in relation to Section 16 of Article III,

of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon

them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:

14

On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,

Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal

possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a

regulated drug commonly known as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, in

its Resolution dated March 3, 2000, found probable cause to indict accused-appellants, together with

Emmanuel de Claro, for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary

investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned. The criminal information against accused-

appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, filed with the RTC, reads:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO DELOS REYES y SANTOS
@ BOTONG, RAYMUNDO REYES y GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and EMMANUEL DE CLARO y
ENRIQUEZ @ COCOY of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL. TO SEC.
16 ART. III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED, committed in the manner herein narrated as
follows:

That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in the City of

Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, commit to sell, deliver,
distribute and/or transport a carton of ten (10) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with
the following grams, to wit: 99.2, 94.9, 99.6, 93.5, 98.3, 99.5, 99.6,
99.5, 98.4 and 98.4 grams or a total of 980.9 grams, which substance
when submitted for drug examination, were found positive to the test
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license and prescription. [3]

On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom,

insisting on their innocence, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC, which said trial

court granted in an Order[4] dated March 15, 2000.

After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated April 3, 2000,

recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel

de Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-

Tom. The Office of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events presented by the

parties during the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation (except accused-appellant Reyes who

did not participate in the proceedings), which it summarized as follows:

In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of the

Intelligence and Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the National
Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) claims that on 17 February 2000 a confidential
informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the
parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City; that they were dispatched to
verify the reports and conduct police operations; that about 2:00 p.m. after meeting
with the confidential agent, they strategically positioned themselves at the vicinity
15

parking area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a.
Mac-Mac, on board a white Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes, a.k.a. Botong, on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived with accused/respondent
Reyes subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes calling accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de
Claro through his cellular phone; that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and
[Emmanuel] de Claro then proceeded to the latters parked Mazda car where
respondent Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic
bag was taken, which accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes in turn handed the box in a plastic bag to accused/respondent Reyes; that the
arresting officers accosted the accused/respondents who according to the arresting
officers admitted having in their possession illegal drugs; that the recovered items
containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic bags of white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 980.9 grams turned positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

In his Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay, accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes

claims that on 17 February 2000, he went to Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City,
together with a neighbor, one Marlon David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was to
pay his indebtedness; that while looking for a parking space, several men with
firearms suddenly appeared, with one shouting, buksan mo ang pintuan ng sasakyan
at kung hindi babasagin ko ito; that he and Marlon David were forced out of their
vehicle with one of the armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart,
asking where the said bag allegedly containing shabu came from; that
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes answered hindi ko alam, that he and
Marlon David were blindfolded when forcibly taken to the groups vehicle and
continuously asked who the source of the shabu was, with respondent/accused
[Rolando] delos Reyes replying, hindi ko alam at wala akong kinalaman diyan; that
Marlon David was separated from accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and later
released on 18 February 2000; that when accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes
blindfold was removed, he found himself at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila.

xxxx

To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes claim, that he was arrested in

Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and not in the vicinity of Whistletop Bar and Restaurant
in Mandaluyong City, respondent/accused [Emmanuel] de Claros spouse submitted a
certified true xerox copy of barangay blotter of Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City,
reflecting the entry on 19 February 2000 made by Mrs. Delos Reyes, on the incident
reported to by Marlon David thus:

BLOTTER

Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng. Virginia

Delos Reyes, upang ipagbigay alam ang pagkawala ng kanyang asawa
na si Mr. Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa 17 ng Pebrero taong
dalawang libo (2000) na ayon sa batang pamangkin na si Marlon
David, ay hinuli ng mga hindi kilalang lalaki sa Buenas Market,
Manggahan, Pasig City nais niyang alamin kung ang nasabing
insidente ay coordinated dito sa himpilan o tanggapan ng Barangay.

(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes

Nagpapahayag

The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs. [Virginia] Delos
Reyes of the incident upon his release on 18 February 2000. Another witness, one Joel
16

Navarro, claims having seen the actual incident confirming the events as narrated to
by accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and Marlon David.

Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife, respondent

Lantion-Tom, submitted their separate Counter-Affidavits jointly denying the charges
and claiming that they were at the Whistlestop Bar and Restaurant to talk to
respondent Lantion-Toms accountant Ms. Daisy Milan regarding the Mayors Permit,
Business Location Clearance issued by the Office of the Barangay Captain, insurance
documents, BIR Certificate of Registration of her business; that they were with
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claros brother, Roberto and a friend, James, with
the two remaining outside the restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom went to
accompany Ms. Milan, while accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro was left inside;
that after Ms. Milan left, respondent Lantion-Tom was suddenly surrounded by men
who introduced themselves as police officers and were arresting them for being the
source of shabu in a drug deal; that all of them, accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de
Claro, Roberto and James were likewise arrested and continuously questioned on their
complicity in the drug deal; that they were taken to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro
Manila and subjected to further investigation; that Roberto and James were released
the following day. Both respondents maintain that the allegations of the arresting
officers as to the circumstances on the alleged drug deal leading to their arrest are
unfounded and purely fabricated.

During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000, the arresting

officers manifested that they are going to submit reply-affidavit on 29 March
2000. However, no such reply-affidavit was submitted. [5]

The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police officers failed to refute

accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-La

Plaza in Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in Cainta,

Rizal, as corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective sworn

statements (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office of the City Prosecutor also

observed that Lantion-Tom was merely in the company of the other respondents without performing

any overt act showing her to be part of the illicit transaction and her drug test revealed negative

results. On the other hand, it considered the conflicting claims of Emmanuel de Claro (i.e., that he was
illegally arrested and that the drug deal was a mere fabrication) and the arresting officers ( i.e., that

Emmanuel de Claro was the seller/pusher in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his vehicle)

would be best ventilated during the trial on the merits.

In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed with the RTC a motion with leave of

court to admit amended information.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-appellants, maintaining that:

I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAVE

ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
17

II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS VALID SINCE IT FALLS
SQUARELY UNDER RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION MORE THAN SUFFICE TO CONVICT
APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

V. MERE DENIAL AND HULIDAP, WITHOUT MORE, CANNOT EXCULPATE APPELLANTS FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER

SECTION 3(M) OF RULE 131 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT HAD NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY
DEFENSE EVIDENCE.

VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION.[58]

Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers statements, as pointed out by
accused-appellants, are trivial and do not affect the weight of their testimonies; while accused-
appellants defenses of denial and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus, should be looked
upon with disfavor. Moreover, there is no need for proof of consideration for the illegal drug deal,
since consideration is not an element of the crime charged.

Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a crime or in
flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act of distributing, without
legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, on the night of
February 17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. In addition, in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, the warrantless arrests executed by the police officers
enjoy the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to the facts
surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary investigation and
reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-
Tom from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of the Office of
the City Prosecutor: dropping the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding probable cause
against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes. [59]

Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its Decision[60] dated September 23,
2003, the RTC initially convicted accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting on Emmanuel
de Claros motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in its Order [61] dated January 12, 2004, totally
reversed itself and acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the RTC gave more weight to the
evidence presented by the defense

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro
by the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime
charged. Despite the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of Appeals speciously ratiocinated in its
18

assailed decision that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial courts assessment
is entitled to great weight.[62]

Guided by the settled rule that where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one
consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to
meet the test of moral certainty,[63] we find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its
subsequent Order[64] dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in
keeping with the evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were
presented against Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict

Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul are
unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In its Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC correctly
observed that:

Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the insistence by the accused-
movant [Emmanuel de Claro] that a reevaluation or reassessment of the evidence by the prosecution
be considered, this court has decided to revisit the evidence put forward by the prosecution through
the crucible of a severe testing by taking a more than casual consideration of every circumstance of
the case.

It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and that of the defense are
diametrically opposed to each other. While this court had already made its conclusion that the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Yumul are given full faith
and credit and reject the frame-up and alibi story of the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro],
nonetheless, upon reassessment of the same it appears that the court erred.

In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them police
officers, with regard to the material facts of how the crime was allegedly committed engenders doubt
as to their credibility. Firstly, the court noted that these police officers gave identical
testimonies of the events that happened from the moment they arrived at 2 oclock in the
afternoon until the arrest of the accused at 10:30 oclock in the evening at the EDSA
Shangri-La premises. This uniform account given by these witnesses cannot but generate
the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a
well thought-out and prefabricated story.Because of the close camaraderie of these
witnesses who belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them to make the same
story. Furthermore, their testimonies are so general which shows only too clearly that they
testified uniformly only as to material facts but have not given the particulars and the
details having relation with the principal facts. While they testified that they were at
Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to 10 in the evening, they were not able to tell the court
how their group positioned strategically at the premises without being noticed by their
target. They could not also gave (sic) an explanation how their confidential informant was
able to obtain information regarding the drug deal that was supposed to take place on that
date involving several personalities. Except for their bare allegation that they have that
information regarding the drug deal they were not able to present any proof of such report,
say, entry in their logbook of such confidential report and a spot report. Even their
operation is not recorded as no documentary evidence was presented. Worth remembering in
this regard is People v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, where it is said that: . . . [i]t often happens with
fabricated stories that minute particulars have not been thought of. It has also been said that an
honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot be
safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case incomplete, but throws doubt
upon the accuracy of the statements made.Such a witness may be honest, but his testimony is not
reliable.[65] (Emphasis supplied.)
19

There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn statements following
accused-appellants arrest and their testimonies before the RTC.The police officers attested in their
Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 that upon sensing suspicious transactions being
undertaken thereat, team leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted the suspects and
introduced themselves as Police Officers and after that, subject persons deliberately admitted that
they have in their possession illegal drugs and thereafter showed the same to the herein undersigned
arresting officers thus they were placed under arrest. [66] Yet, during trial before the RTC, the police
officers uniformly testified that they brought accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-
Tom to the police office after arresting the four suspects in flagrante delicto, without mention at all of
the suspects purported admission.

We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement even
when, according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first person to deliver
the shabu. This seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of February 17,
2000.

In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their defenses,
which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testified
that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La Plaza
in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate themselves for
possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon Davids testimony and
Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and
Roberto de Claro consistently testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan, Lantion-Toms
accountant, regarding documents for a business permit (photocopies of the said documents were
presented during trial); and that they were illegally arrested without warrant and forced to admit
criminal liability for possession of shabu. These pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate to
overthrow the presumption of regularity in the performance by the arresting police officers of their
official duties and raise reasonable doubt in accused-appellants favor.

Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that took place on the night
of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante
delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental to their
arrests, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants possession.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in Section 3, paragraph 2 of
Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus:

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)
20

The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations. [67]

The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer
or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in
flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another (arrest of escaped prisoners).[68]

In People v. Molina,[69] we cited several cases involving in flagrante delicto arrests preceding the
search and seizure that were held illegal, to wit:

In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting
officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to,
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.

As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone,

absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view
of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify
an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant
was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so
or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of
the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension."

Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting from side to side . . .
[while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court,
21

"[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had
just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the
arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada, the Court ruled that no probable cause is
gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.

Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his
eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' In
declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going
to be committed.

It went on to state that

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk.Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not
creating any commotion or trouble . . .

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"
"inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu.

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[70](Emphases supplied.)

Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of evidence in this case to justify the in
flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the arrests.

A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal that
they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal drug deal
was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City. Without
any other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass from one to another a
white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was already able to conclude that the
box contained shabu and sensed that an illegal drug deal took place.

Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched
the latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro
momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton
inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt
acts indicative of a felonious enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior
knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to
actually identify the suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There
is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No
22

effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton
inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu. The police officers were
unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention,
as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug
deal.

Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the integrity of
the shabu purportedly seized from accused-appellants

In People v. Sy Chua,[74] we questioned whether the shabu seized from the accused was the same one
presented at the trial because of the failure of the police to mark the drugs at the place where it was
taken, to wit:

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-
appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that
the initial field test where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP
headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were
taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of
the confiscated items since they were not marked at the place where they were seized, thus

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not
conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as
to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana marked by
the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory. [75] (Emphases
supplied.)

In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the RTC
that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the white
plastic bag, immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before proceeding
to the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-examination [76] that he saw
the shabu for the first time at the police office. At any rate, all three police officers recounted that
the shabu was marked by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of
accused-appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from
accused-appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in
evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the
acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.

As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua[77]:

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more
cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither can
the presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the process
when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In People v.
Nubla, we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a mere
23

presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as binding
truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not
undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly
disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the
rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as
such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that
sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. [78]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo
Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released
from custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.

MIGUEL E. COLORADO, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658

Before us is a sworn letter-complaint[1] dated January 31, 2001 of Miguel E. Colorado (complainant)
charging Judge Ricardo M. Agapito (respondent), Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Laur, Nueva Ecija, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority relative to
Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G, entitled People v. Miguel Colorado, with Grave Slander and
Grave Threats.

Complainant alleges: He is the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases. The cases were directly
filed with the court without first passing the Office of the Barangay Chairman, although he and private
complainants are permanent residents of Barangay Bagong Sikat, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. Respondent
ignored the glaring deficiency in private complainants filing of the cases without attaching the requisite
certifications to file action from the barangay. On the date the two cases were filed, respondent
immediately issued two warrants for his arrest. He was arrested on a Friday and languished in the
municipal jail for two days and two nights. He posted bail and filed a motion to inhibit respondent from
hearing the case, but the same was not acted upon. He received an envelope from the court with
nothing inside and found out later that the same was supposed to be a notice of hearing; thus, he was
ordered arrested in view of his non-appearance in court.

On February 22, 2001, respondent compulsorily retired from the judiciary.

In a 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2001, respondent was directed to file his comment on the
complaint. A 1st Tracer dated October 17, 2001 was sent to respondent giving him a non-extendible
period of five days to file his comment. However, the said tracer was returned unserved due to
respondents retirement from the judiciary.Another Tracer dated July 30, 2002 was sent to respondent
in his residential address giving him a chance to file his comment, but none was filed.

Acting on the complaint, the Court, in its Resolution of March 24, 2003, required respondent to
manifest whether he was willing to submit the administrative matter against him for resolution without
his comment. Respondent failed to comply with the Court Resolution. Thus, in the Resolution
of January 26, 2005, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for failure to manifest and to comply with the Resolution of March 24,
2003. Still, respondent failed to comply with the Resolution of January 26, 2005. In the Resolution
24

of August 24, 2005, the Court imposed upon respondent a fine of P1,000.00 and deemed respondent
to have waived the filing of a comment on the complaint.

In the Agenda Report[2] dated October 12, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
respondent guilty as charged and recommended that he be fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

On November 8, 2005, respondent paid the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on him in the Resolution
of August 24, 2005 and submitted his Comment on the complaint.

In his Comment[3] dated October 31, 2005, respondent denied the allegations contained in the
complaint reasoning that he acted in good faith and within the scope of his duties. He further
contends: Based on Administrative Circular No. 140-93, the crimes committed by the accused are not
within the Katarungan Pambarangay Law because the imposable penalty exceeds one year. Both cases
are within the original jurisdiction of the court and, finding a probable cause against the accused, the
court issued the warrant of arrest. There is no law or circular issued by this Court that a court cannot
issue a warrant of arrest on Friday. If the accused was not able to post bail on time, it is not his fault
or of the court. The motion for inhibition filed by complainant must be set for hearing. But in spite of
several settings to hear the motion, complainant failed to appear. In the hearing of both cases,
complainant failed to appear in court; thus, the assistant provincial prosecutor moved for the arrest of
the complainant. At the hearing of November 17, 2000 and January 5, 2001, complainant failed to
appear in court, and orders of arrest were issued against him, but said orders were reconsidered by
the court. In spite of all the orders of the court for the arrest of complainant, none of the orders were
implemented. Neither was the accused arrested and detained in jail. And if the complainant received
an envelope from the MCTC of Laur without content, complainant should have immediately informed
the court of the said circumstance so that proper action may be done on the employee in charge of
the mailing of notices.

In the Resolution of March 29, 2006, the Court referred back the instant administrative matter to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a letter[4] dated November 21, 2005, respondent requested the Court that his retirement benefits
be released subject to the withholding of P20,000.00 pending resolution of the present complaint.

In the Resolution[5] of June 28, 2006, the Court granted the partial release of respondent's compulsory
retirement benefits and withheld therefrom the amount of P20,000.00 to answer for whatever liability
respondent may incur in the present administrative case.

In the Agenda Report dated August 30, 2006, the OCA submitted its evaluation and recommendation,
to wit:

The charges against respondent judge are summarized as follows

1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the case in view of the absence
of the requisite certificate to file action issued by the Barangay as a mandatory requirement of
the Katarungan Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code

2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to

ensure complainants incarceration for two days.

3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases and for failure to act on
the motion for inhibition
25

4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants appearance in court by sending

an envelope, with a supposed notice of hearing but with nothing inside.

xxxx

Respondent judge argued that under Administrative Circular No. 14-93 dated August 3, 1993 issued
by this Court as Guidelines for the Implementation of the BarangayConciliation Procedure, based on
the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1992, one of the
exceptions to the coverage of the circular is Offense[s] for which the law prescribes a maximum
penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). Considering that the offenses for which accused was charged have corresponding
penalties of more than one year there is no need for a certification to file action from the Barangay.

There was likewise no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of warrant of arrest. The subject
criminal cases were within the original jurisdiction of the MTC and after finding probable cause against
the accused, respondent issued the questioned warrant of arrest. Respondent pointed out that there is
no law or circular issued by the Honorable Court prohibiting the issuance of a warrant of arrest on
Friday.

With regard to the charge of grave abuse of discretion relative to the motion for inhibition, respondent
submitted that there should be a hearing on the motion before it could be acted upon. But in spite of
the several settings of said motion the complainant as accused failed to appear.

Respondent contended that if it were true that complainant received an envelope from the MCTC
of Laur, Nueva Ecija, without any contents, he should have immediately informed the court about it so
that the proper action could have been done.

Lastly, respondent invited the Courts attention to the fact that complainant was also accused of Grave
Slander by Darlito Urbano and Violeta Urbano which case were docketed as Criminal Case No. 3648-G
and 3649-G, MCTC Laur-Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. It is argued that this shows the character of Miguel
Colorado.

After careful evaluation of the record of the case, the undersigned finds merit in the neglect of
respondent judge to resolve the pending issue of the motion for inhibition which was not acted upon
up to the time of his compulsory retirement from the service.

It should be noted that respondent never gave any valid justification for the delay in the filing of his
comment. It seems that he believed that the mere payment of the fine obliterated the charge of
contumacious refusal to obey the order of this Court. Respondent's conduct cannot be left unnoticed
by the Court. Judges are the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people draw
the will and inclination to obey the law (Moroo v. Lomeda, 316 Phil. 103, July 14, 1995) How can the
respondent judge expect others to respect the law when he himself cannot obey orders as simple as
the show-cause resolution? {Longboan v. Hon. Polig (A.M. No. R-704-RTJ, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA
557) cited in the case of Bonifacio Guintu v. Judge Aunario L. Lucero, A.M. No. MTJ-93-794, August
23, 1996}.

In a catena of cases this Court has unhesitatingly imposed the penalty of dismissal on those who have
persistently failed to comply with orders requiring them either to file comment or to show cause and
comply. Respondent's belated filing of his comment cannot cure or obliterate[d] his shortcomings with
26

this Court. The fact remains that he ignored the lawful directive of the Court and in fact offered no
valid justification or excuse for it. This Court could have imposed the penalty of dismissal and
forfeiture of all of respondent's retirement benefit had it not been for this Courts compassion in
allowing him to retire with the mere retention of P20,000.00. Respondents comment should not have
been received in the first place as the same was already considered waived pursuant to the Resolution
of the Honorable Court dated 24 August 2005.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully recommends to the Honorable Court
that

1. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, former judge of MCTC, Laur, Nueva Ecija be found guilty of gross
neglect for failure to act on the motion for inhibition filed by accused-complainant and for his failure to
promptly comply with the lawful order of Court and not offering a valid excuse therefor and should
be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000); and

2. The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) shall be considered the payment of
the fine.[6]

We agree in toto with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution
Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the Judiciary fromBaseless and Unfounded Administrative
Complaints, which took effect on November 3, 2003.

Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against

members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which provides:

2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or
Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and (c)
shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for
dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to
file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report
and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act
on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not
possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the
gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring judge or justice to be dismissed
outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six
months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have
occurred at least a year before such filing; and (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to
harass the respondent.

In the present case, the first two requisites are present. The sworn letter-complaint was received by
the Office of the Court Administrator on January 31, 2001. The respondent retired compulsorily from
the service barely three weeks after or on February 22, 2001; and the ground for disciplinary action
alleged to have been committed by the respondent occurred five months before the respondents
separation from the service

As to the third requirement, although the first and second charges against
respondent are outrightly without merit as aptly found by the OCA, the complaint that respondent
failed to act on his motion for inhibition and intentionally prevented complainant from appearing in a
27

scheduled hearing was not prima facie shown to be without merit; nor was the filing thereof shown to
be intended merely to harass the respondent. [7] Thus, the OCA correctly proceeded with the
administrative case against respondent.

Moreover, the fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallo v.
Cordero,[8] citing Zarate v. Judge Romanillos:[9]

The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by
the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court
retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.

We now go to the four charges against respondent.

1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the case in view of the absence of
the requisite certificate to file action issued by the barangay as a mandatory requirement of
the Katarungan Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.

As we earlier stated, the Court finds that the OCA is correct in not finding respondent administratively
liable therefor. Complainant is charged with grave slander, the maximum penalty for which is 2 years
and 4 months under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, respondent is not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in taking jurisdiction over said criminal case, considering that prior recourse
to barangay conciliation is not required where the law provides a maximum penalty
of imprisonmentexceeding one year.

2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure complainants
incarceration for two days.

Complainant faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday, causing him to languish in jail for
two days and two nights. Respondent cannot be held administratively liable for this particular matter.

Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an arrest may be made
on any day and at any time of the day or night

It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a Friday, because it is clear
from the foregoing that an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what day the warrant of
arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find that a warrant of arrest
issued on a Friday is prohibited.

Granting that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not without recourse, as he could have
posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of Supreme Court Circular No. 95-96 [10] dated December
5, 1996, providing for a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. primarily to act on
petitions for bail and other urgent matters. And on Saturday afternoons, Sundays and non-working
holidays, any judge may act on bailable offenses. Thus, we agree with the OCA that respondent did
not commit grave abuse of authority for issuing the warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not being
prohibited by law
28

3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases and for failure to act on
the motion for inhibition.

While there is no evidence in support of the claim that respondent committed grave abuse of authority
and bias in continuing the hearing of cases, we find respondent liable for failure to act
upon complainants motion for inhibition.

As borne by the records, complainant filed his motion for respondent's inhibition sometime in
September 2000 but up to the time of respondents compulsory retirement from the judiciary
on February 22, 2001, the same remained unacted upon. Verily, the undue delay of respondent by
five months in resolving the pending incident before his court erodes the peoples faith in the judiciary
and the same is tantamount to gross inefficiency. Respondents explanation that despite the fact that
the motion was set for hearing several times, complainant repeatedly failed to appear thereat, is
untenable. Respondent must know that he may act motu proprio on the motion for inhibition without
requiring the attendance of complainant. A judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, may
disqualify himself from sitting on a case for just or valid reasons. [11]

Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, [12] mandates
judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness. Similarly, Supreme Court Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987 directs
judges to observe unscrupulously the periods prescribed by the Constitution in the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted to their court.

In Visbal v. Buban,[13] the Court held that failure to decide cases and other matters within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring magistrate.[14] Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a
judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. [15] Further, such delay constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates that a judge should dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. As a trial judge, respondent is a
frontline official of the judiciary and should at all times act with efficiency and with probity.[16] Undue
delay in the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the
judiciary and unnecessarily blemishes its stature. [17]

4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants appearance in court by sending an

envelope, with a supposed notice of hearing but with nothing inside.

Suffice it to be stated that in the absence of evidence to show that the sending of an empty envelope
to complainant was malicious on the part of respondent, he cannot be held liable therefor.

Section 9 (1) and 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
classifies gross neglect or undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge which
carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. We adopt the recommendation of the OCA that respondent should be imposed
a fine in the amount of P20,000.00.[18]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ricardo M. Agapito guilty of gross neglect and
is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).The withheld amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0) from respondents retirement benefits is considered as payment of the
fine.