EN BANC said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent
in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK,
ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE HONG
HOK, petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse
a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower
court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens
Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What
makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual
support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot
through accretion was rejected by respondent Court of
Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely
on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by
unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by
the government through the appropriate public
officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested in them by
law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but
implied, that land not otherwise passing into private ownership
may not be disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at
war with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot
receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of
the lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification
for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the
disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by
respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he
"acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application in accordance with which an order of award
and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of
Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area
of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the
Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the
Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued
by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee
Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the
Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with
opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate
and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent,
the land covered thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question
concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud
should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance
of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not
a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the
public character thereof for having been formed by
reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the
appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud committed by
defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase
of the land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the
Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033,
because everything was done in the open. The notices
regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the
actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not
clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the
Government. The application was merely a renewal of his
deceased wife's application, and the said deceased occupied
the land since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a
different conclusion is likely to be attended with frustration. The
first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place,
notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals,
would seek to disregard what was accepted by respondent
Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by
reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further
consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to
respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines
preclude a party other than the government to dispute the
validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible
character of a public land patent after one year, is possessed
of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no
justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by
petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the
exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the
Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is,
furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the
Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of
Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31,
1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties
like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title
issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by
appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered
lands or public lands over which vested rights have been
acquired but notwithstanding such fact the Land Department
Page 1 of 64
subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants."5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above
excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a restatement of a
principle that dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908
decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the
grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which
the government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant can not question it.
The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and
the government."7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals.8 Bereft as petitioners
were of the right of ownership in accordance with the findings
of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes
v. Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10 The
second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of
outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in public law
between the government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty,
and its capacity to own or acquire property, it is not
inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes
under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The
use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by
the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural
resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that
existed during the medieval era between such two concepts,
but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary
to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was concerned, there
was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular
Government, 12 a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its
earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation
of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which was adopted by the
present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the
state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by
Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion
of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v.
Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited
was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias 16 in these words: "We having acquired full sovereignty
over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or
in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it
is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true
deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to
us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for
public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places
which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their
present condition, but also their future and their probable
increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what
they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest
of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular
Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands
constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is
vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that
character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as
in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly
categorized as public land is undeniable. 21What was held in
Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application.
Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in
question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be
public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government." 24 It is indispensable then that
there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode
of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent
restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having failed to
establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No.
463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no
showing that the same has been acquired by any private
person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
the property is and remains part of the public domain." 27 To
repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of
the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of
Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David
and during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his
favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse
claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the
registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate
certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of
Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question
concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud
should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance
of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile
themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting
such an attitude, they railed to accord deference to controlling
precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The
proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the
provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same
in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of
judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration
issued is conclusive and final." 30Such a view has been
followed since then. 31 The latest case in point is Cabacug v.
Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that
decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land
acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than
that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free
patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition
the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the
right to repurchase within a period of five years." 33 It is quite
apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally
indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of
January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are
affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
Page 2 of 64
 [G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C.
TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE,
VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA
SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T.
TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T.
TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA
CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO
CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L.
MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T.
TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of
Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA
MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA
CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES, respondents/intervernors.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition[1] seeks to set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals,[2] dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No.
25597, which declared null and void the Decision[3] dated
January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179,
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of
land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the
land registration court an application for registration of a parcel
of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters
or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for brevity). The Lot is situated in
Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo,
Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to
the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-
Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado
filed an Amended Application to include additional co-
applicants.[4] Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively
referred to as petitioners for brevity).[5]
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal
Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to
petitioners application. In due course, the land registration
court issued an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since
time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed
in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-
interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the
Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real
estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-
owners in pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the
hearings, petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there
have been nine transfers of rights among them and their
predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known
predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who
was in actual, open, notorious and continuous
possession of the property in the concept of
owner. He had the property surveyed in his
name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1
testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987
and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando
Leyva, who inherited the property. He had
the property resurveyed in his name on May
21-28, 1928 (Exhibit X and X-1; testimony of
Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property
from Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese
Occupation of the Philippines during World War
II. He owned and possessed the
property until 1958. He declared the property for
tax purposes, the latest of which was under Tax
Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February
1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from
Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of
Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the
ownership of the property by Angelina
Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of
Sesinando Leyva, the previous owner, attended
to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property
in her name under Tax Declaration No.
7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax
Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August 1965,
under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15
December 1975, and under Tax Declaration
No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from
Angelina Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through
a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from
Myrna Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April
1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS,
JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE
TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who
bought portions of the property from Edna
Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November
1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).
Page 3 of 64
 8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ,
DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS,
FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA,
CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR.,
RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA,
NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION,
CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS,
PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE,
DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO
TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M.
MALAPAD bought portions of the property in
a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-
3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO
TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA
MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new
OWNERS GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA
CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and
FIDELITO ECO through a Deed of Sale dated
18 January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9).[6]
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant
provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor
General. For failure of the oppositors to present their evidence,
the land registration court issued an order considering the case
submitted for decision based on the evidence of the
petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the
hearing to January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the
evidence of the oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors
failed to appear again despite due notice. Hence, the court
again issued an order submitting the case for decision based
on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners,
the land registration court held that petitioners had adduced
sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights over the
Lot.Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the
imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of
the courts decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the
testimony of the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the
property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious
possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial and said possession had been testified
to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio
Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-
examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the
Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the previous
owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the
Applicants and the previous owners and said property was
planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to palay and portions
used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient
evidence to establish registrable title over said property applied
for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina
Watershed, the Court can only add that all Presidential
Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals,
120 SCRA 734, 1983 private rights is proof of acquisition
through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195,
by private rights means that applicant should show clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired
by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from
the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title,
or any other means for the acquisition of public
lands xxx (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above
stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to which the
Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by
the applicants that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of
Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied
for was verified to be within the area excluded from the
operation of the Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order
No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283
promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-
boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No.
1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K).[7]
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor
General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision
dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final
after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on
February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration
court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the
necessary decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration
court had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the
Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However,
the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April
23, 1991 a copy of the land registration courts decision dated
January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by
petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration
court issued an order directing the Land Regulation Authority to
issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of the
petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that
there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it
subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees
Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of
Page 4 of 64
stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated
Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-
In-Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and
asserted that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they
are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates
of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree
planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene
verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6,
1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as
represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only
issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of
the public domain.[8]
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals
granted the petition and declared null and void the decision
dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The
Court of Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935
(Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987
Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents
herein, for registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands
vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public
land and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA
376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any
evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in
Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public
domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable
and disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-
162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge,
Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the
application of private respondents, categorically stated that
"This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the National
Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988,
submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-
A. These documents readily and effectively negate the
allegation in private respondent Collados application that said
parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any
form of title, nor any public land application and are not within
any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis
supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the
import of these vital documents which are binding upon the
courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department to classify public lands. They should
have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming
jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners
are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who
has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and
Environment), and not the courts. x x x Even assuming that
petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before
the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest
Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a
forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action
must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof,
no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private
property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands
within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of
Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasissupplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law
(Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA
339).[9]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF
THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY
THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR INTERVENTION
WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Page 5 of 64
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over
the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33
for brevity) dated July 26, 1904[10] established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (MWR for brevity) situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that
the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of
petitioners claim over the Lot is that all Presidential
proclamations like the proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They point
out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations
are subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Petitioners
contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way back to
1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando
Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the Lot. They claim that
the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land
possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are
agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable. They
conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva
before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State.[11] The Spaniards first introduced the
doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and
the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias[12] which laid the
foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain.[13] Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions
in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[14]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles
and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of
1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law as
well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the
adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise
the lands would revert to the state.[15]
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the national
territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act
No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as
follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The
law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine
Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles,
and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public
Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term
public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title
still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.[16]
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act
No. 926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for brevity) amended Act
2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the
existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and
mineral lands.[17]
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of
registration by which recorded title becomes absolute,
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took
effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands
in the Philippines under the Torrens system. [18] The Torrens
system requires the government to issue a certificate of title
stating that the person named in the title is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to liens and encumbrances
annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel
of land are quieted upon issuance of the certificate. [19] PD
1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted on
June 11, 1978,[20] amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the
Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the
King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain.[21]Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion
in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,[22] explained thus:
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There
was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State
ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary
starting point to secure recognition of the states power to
control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very
well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and
natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however,
they were not certain whether it was continued and applied by
the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved
the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.
Page 6 of 64
 Thus, Section 1, Article XIII[23] of the 1935 Constitution, on
Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the State could
alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian
doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV[24] on the National Economy
and the Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution
reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII [25] on
National Economy and Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of
the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
policy.Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all
natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution
belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas,
oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also,
features which supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential
to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational purposes.[26]
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[27] the Court had occasion to discourse on
watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the
parcel of land which the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is
exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL for brevity).
[28]
The Court defined watershed as an area drained by a river
and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which
separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court
also recognized that:
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a
watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water
which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The
protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water
for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not
only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection
of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs
to be answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067)
provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any
surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared
by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected
area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such
Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners
or occupants thereof within the protected area which may
damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or
ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control,
protection, management or administration of such waters.
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need
to protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated
in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the
barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the
activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil
and water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the
vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double
edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean
direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water
impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this
would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as
recharged areas of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that
the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of the
Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less even if it would
be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a
most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants
directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds
come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with
sound watershed management. More so, the introduction of
earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of
permanent infrastructures.Unless the pernicious agricultural
activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it
would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be
of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the
livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward
this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed
development policy and program be immediately formulated
and implemented before the irreversible damage finally
happens.
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture
and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and
determine the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to
resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers
posed by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed
reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population growth
and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked
human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and
future generations.Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural
resources remain to this day inalienable properties of the
State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did
petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights
over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33
segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public
domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant
registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An
imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants
such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or
special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title,
or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.[29] Or, that he
has had continuous, open and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a
Page 7 of 64
bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding
the filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA
141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25,
1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners application for
registration was filed on April 25, 1985.[30] As amended, Section
48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated
that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
the following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued.[31]
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the
Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon
continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and
enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the
required period of possession, whether under the original
Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or
under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in
1904, petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot
either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the
State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904,
Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two
years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land
in the manner and for the number of years required by law for
the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and
disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33
reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became
non-disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has
been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior
to the filing of petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in
1904 could no longer be counted because as a watershed
reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy,
disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA
141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including
watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the
possession of forest lands or other inalienable public lands
cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court declared
that inalienable public lands -
x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, does
not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals[33] is in
point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the
land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the
Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No.
573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners
in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573
itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior to the
reservation. They claim to have established their private rights
to the subject land. The Court ruled:
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a
title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did
not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent
only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the
issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time,
the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve,
was no longer open to private ownership as it has been
classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in
Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a
title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant had occupied
and cultivated the property for so many number of years,
declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the
corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the
government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is]
continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the
government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge
that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to
1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession
required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as
amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the private
rights recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of
Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection
of private rights to exclude his land from a military or forest
Page 8 of 64
reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence
that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means
for the acquisition of public lands.
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has
complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well
as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public
lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year
period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains
to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim
an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open and notorious possession.
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights
had attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of
the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the
public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable
when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283
expressly excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR
and made the area part of the Boso-boso Townsite
Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small
part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend
that town sites are considered alienable and disposable under
CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF
1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED
RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A
CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN
AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER WITH THE
ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN,
FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me
by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive
Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established
the Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of
land embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the
adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite
purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Public Land
Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future
subdivision survey in accordance with the development plan to
be prepared and approved by the Department of Local
Government and Community Development, which parcels are
more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a
portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the
municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon,
beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-30
E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal;
thence N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W
1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4;
thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W
1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7;
thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W
1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10;
thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point
13; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point
16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East
1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point
19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due
South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to
point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence
Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00
m. to point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26;
thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West
636.56 m. to point of beginning.Containing an area of three
thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or
less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a
portion of alienable and disposable portion of public domain)
situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island
of Luzon.Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan being N
74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo,
Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4;
thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West
1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point
10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due
North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to
point 13; thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43
25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to
point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30
50 E 503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to
point 19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m to point of
beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred
twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on
future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of June, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by
Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation
Page 9 of 64
No. 1637 revised the area and location of the proposed
townsite.According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot
claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and
reverted it to MWR coverage.[34] Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21,
1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE
TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF
ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND
REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND
EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT
RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT
SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974
which established the townsite reservation in the municipalities
of Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon,
by increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions
of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any
there be, which parcel of land is more particularly described as
follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762
establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation)
situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and
Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the
E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-
19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-
12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo;
on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities
of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-
33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed
Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the Topographic
Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner
38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based
on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered
areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is
hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the
Executive Department is needed to declassify land which had
been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.[35] Unless and until the land classified as such
is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[36]
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove
the private character of the Lot is the Certification of the
Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the
Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The
Certification reads:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square
meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof,
surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for
Angelina C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded
from the operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation
established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904
per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974,
which established the Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation,
amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977
known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan
Site under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the
exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal
Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum dated
March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
Page 10 of 64
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a
reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by
the reclassification, is contradicted by several documents
submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration
court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration
court a Report[37] dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator
Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot
described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus
recommended the dismissal of the application for
registration. The Report states:
COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court
respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620
situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for
registration of title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal
Index Map it was found that a portion of the SW,
described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was
previously the subject of registration in Land
Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-
55948 and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on
April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et
al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for
Issuance of the Decree dated February 8, 1984
and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the
remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside
IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully
submitted to the Honorable Court for its
information and guidance with the
recommendation that the application in the
instant proceedings be dismissed, after due
hearing (Underlining supplied).
Likewise, in a letter[38] dated November 11, 1991, the
Deputy Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo,
Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The
letter states:
That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro
(Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766)
hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is
within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the
Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
xxx
That the land sought to be registered is not a private
property of the Registration Applicant but part of the public
domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by
Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry
Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is recommended for
rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is attached
herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to
petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original applicant] application is
the technical description[39] of the Lot signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the
Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated
that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and
insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been
officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a
watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that
the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear
and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is
shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither
petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had
been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974, petitioners
possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985
would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance
of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if
we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed
the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in
1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18,
1977. According to then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite
reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back
to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are
now fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by
petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by
analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest
lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms
and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.[40]
Page 11 of 64
 Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of
judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due
course to the Republics petition for annulment of judgment
which was filed long after the decision of the land registration
court had allegedly become final and executory. The land
registration court rendered its decision on January 30, 1991
and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on
April 23, 1991.[41]Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General
filed with the Court of Appeals the petition for annulment of
judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 [42] only on
August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become
final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that
the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the
land registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing
the Land Registration Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the
decision on the ground that the land registration court had no
jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot which was
not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained
that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of
judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the
principle of res judicata. They insist that the land registration
court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private
land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from
questioning the land registration courts jurisdiction considering
that the Republic participated in the proceedings before the
court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed
reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The
evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly
show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be
a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of
the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view
of this, the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of
the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the
land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the
Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the
Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,
[43]
as follows:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-
registrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which
are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as
regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the
name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly
or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any
prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case
override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,[44] which involved the
registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the
Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to
silence the Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:
It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or
laches does not apply when the Government sues as a
sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or
laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy,
and that res judicata is to be disregarded if its application
would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or
reconveyance to the State of the public properties registered
and which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is
proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by
the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed
with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of
the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the
parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied,
developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a
petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land
to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest
Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of the
aforementioned area from the MWR for development under the
DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding
1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the
same under the DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program.
Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED
JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA
WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY
EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED
THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN,
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me
by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines,
do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No.
33, which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation,
certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein
situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay
San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal and place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry
Program of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described
as follows:
Page 12 of 64
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan, being identical to corner 1
of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty
(1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order
No. 33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this
Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.)
CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of
the Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF
Unit, acting through the Regional Executive Director of the
DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between the years 1989
to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide
residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as
qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded
were intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually
contracts of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of
parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-
five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years.
[45]
The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF
participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the
other barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants
the DENR had conducted.[46]
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31,
1991 about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they
filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in
Intervention before the land registration court to assert their
rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition,
intervenors learned that the land registration court had already
rendered a decision on January 30, 1991 confirming petitioners
imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the
decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate
judgment and for new trial before the land registration court.
According to intervenors, the land registration court could not
act on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land
registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by
the Solicitor General in its petition for annulment of
judgment. The intervenors were thus constrained to file a
petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which
allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[47] provides
in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the inertvenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed
at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of
judgment by the trial court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly
provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this
rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of
Appeals[48] reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs.
Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for
intervention even when the case had already reached this
Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed
by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had
already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for
certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for
decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly
late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule
12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose
and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully
and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure
is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It
was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the
thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain
that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the
actual status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not
in issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates of
stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed
inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact,
intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a
declaration that the Lot in question remains inalienable land of
the public domain. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for
allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival groups a
peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has
already claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute
between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and
those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a
number of criminal cases between the two rival groups
including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict
application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more
important picture.
Page 13 of 64
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and
void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71,
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC
Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2832 November 24, 1906
REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic
administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal
representative of the general interests of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva
Caceres,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-
rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial Church
of Lagonoy, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF
LAGONOY,Defendants-Appellants.
Manly & Gallup for appellants.
Leoncio Imperial and Chicote, Miranda & Sierra for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the
pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since
1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent
were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There
was evidence that this was done by the order of the provincial
governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was
performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the
cabeza debarangay. Under the law then in force, each man in
the pueblo was required to work for the government, without
compensation, for forty days every year. The time spent in the
reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the
forty days. The material necessary was brought and paid for in
part by the parish priest from the funds of the church and in
part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the
completion of the church it was always administered, until
November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic
Communion and all the people of the pueblo professed that
faith and belonged to that
church.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff
parish priest, took possession of the church on the 5th of July,
1901. he administered it as such under the orders of his
superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor
having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this
defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and
cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money,
and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written
document of that date, refused to make such delivery. That
document is as follows:
At 7 o'clock last night I received through Father Agripino Pisino
your respected order of the 12th instant, wherein I am advised
of the appointment of Father Pisino as acting parish priest of
this town, and directed to turn over to him this parish and to
report to you at the vicarage. In reply thereto, I have the honor
to inform you that the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction with the
parish priest thereof, has seen fit to sever connection with the
Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and
join the Filipino Church, the head of which is at Manila. This
resolution of the people was reduced to writing and triplicate
copies made, of which I beg to inclose a copy
herewith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable to obey
your said order by delivering to Father Agripino Pisino the
parish property of Lagonoy which, as I understand, is now
outside of the control of the Pope and his representatives in
these Islands. May God guard you many
years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Lagonoy, November 14, 1902.
(Signed) VICENTE
RAMIREZ.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT.
The document, a copy of which is referred to in this letter, is as
follows:
LAGONOY, November, 9, 1902. chanrobles virtual law library
The municipality of this town and some of its most prominent
citizens having learned through the papers from the capital of
these Islands of the constitution of the Filipino National Church,
separate from the control of the Pope at Rome by reason of
the fact that the latter has refused to either recognize or grant
the rights to the Filipino clergy which have many times been
urged, and it appearing to us that the reasons advanced why
such offices should be given to the Filipino clergy are evidently
well-founded, we have deemed it advisable to consult with the
parish priest of this town as to whether it would be
advantageous to join the said Filipino Church and to separate
from the control of the Pope as long as he continues to ignore
the rights of the said Filipino clergy, under the conditions that
there will be no change in the articles of faith, and that the
sacraments and other dogmas will be recognized and
particularly that of the immaculate conception of the mother of
our Lord. But the moment the Pope at Rome recognizes and
grants the rights heretofore denied to the Filipino clergy we will
return to his control. In view of this, and subject to this
condition, the reverend parish priest, together with the people
of the town, unanimously join in declaring that from this date
they separate themselves from the obedience and control of
the Pope and join the Filipino National Church. This assembly
and the reverend parish priest have accordingly adopted this
resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to send a copy
thereof to the civil government of this province for its
information, and do sign the same below. Vicente Ramirez,
Francisco Israel, Ambrosio Bocon, Florentino Relloso, Macario
P. Ledesma, Cecilio Obias, Balbino Imperial, Juan Preseada,
Fernando Deudor, Mauricio Torres, Adriano Sabater.
At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this
document was adopted, there were present about 100 persons
of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that the
population of the pueblo was at that time 9,000 and that all but
20 of the inhabitants were satisfied with the action there taken.
Although it is of no importance in the case, we are inclined to
think that the testimony to this effect merely means that about
Page 14 of 64
100 of the principal men of the town were in favor of the
resolution and about 20 of such principal men were opposed to
it. After the 14th of November, the defendant, Ramirez,
continued in the possession of the church and other property
and administered the same under the directions of his superior,
the Obispo Maximo of the Independent Filipino Church. The
rites and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the
same after the 14th day of November as they were before, but
the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the
defendant had been entirely
severed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the
defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the
Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building,
the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property
belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the
possession thereof and that the defendant render an account
of the property which he had received and which was retained
by him, and for other
relief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general
denial of the allegation of the complaint, admitted that he was
in the possession and administration of the property described
therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of
the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the
said property. After this answer had been presented, and on
the 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy
filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case
and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein.
This petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of
December filed an answer in which it alleged that the
defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property
described in the complaint under the authority and with the
consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such
municipality was the owner
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and
the case was tried and final judgment in entered therein in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The
defendants then brought the case here by a bill of
exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
That the person in the actual possession of the church and
other property described in the complaint is the defendant,
Ramirez, is plainly established by the evidence. It does not
appear that the municipality, as a corporate body, ever took
any action in reference to this matter until they presented their
petition for intervention in this case. In fact, the witnesses for
the defense, when they speak of the ownership of the
buildings, say that they are owned by the people of the pueblo,
and one witness, the president, said that the municipality as a
corporation had nothing whatever to do with the matter. That
the resolution adopted on the 14th of November, and which
has been quoted above, was not the action of the municipality,
as such, is apparent from an inspection
thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of the
church by the people of the pueblo to the defendant, Ramirez,
but there is no evidence in the case of any such delivery. Their
testimony in regard to the delivery always refers to the action
taken on the 14th of November, a record of which appears that
in the document above quoted. It is apparent that the action
taken consisted simply in separating themselves from the
Roman Catholic Church, and nothing is said therein in
reference to the material property then in possession of the
defendant, Ramirez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be
affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
(1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took
possession of the property as the servant or agent of the
plaintiff. The only right which he had to the possession at the
time he took it, was the right which was given to him by the
plaintiff, and he took possession under the agreement to return
that possession whenever it should be demanded of him.
Under such circumstances he will not be allowed, when the
return of such possession is demanded by him the plaintiff, to
say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and is not
entitled to have it delivered back to him. The principle of law
that a tenant can not deny his landlord's title, which is found in
section 333, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and
also in the Spanish law, is applicable to a case of this kind. An
answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in which he alleged that he
himself was the owner of the property at the time he received it
from the plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo was the
owner of the property at that time, would constitute no defense.
There is no claim made by him that since the delivery of the
possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has
acquired the title thereto by other means, nor does he is own
behalf make any claim whatever either to the property or to the
possession thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer, claims as such,
to be the owner of the property. As we have said before, the
evidence shows that it never was in the physical possession of
the property. But waiving this point and assuming that the
possession of Ramirez, which he alleges in his answer is the
possession of the municipality, gives the municipality the rights
of a possessor, the question still arises, Who has the better
right to the present possession of the property? The plaintiff, in
1902, had been in the lawful possession thereof for more than
thirty years and during all that time its possession had never
been questioned or disturbed. That possession has been taken
away from it and it has the right now to recover the possession
from the persons who have so deprived it of such possession,
unless the latter can show that they have a better right thereto.
This was the preposition which was discussed and settled in
the case of Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 1 No. 1748, decided
June 1, 1906. That decision holds that as against one who has
been in possession for the length of the plaintiff has been in
possession, and who had been deprived of his possession,
and who can not produce any written evidence of title, the
mere fact that the defendant is in possession does not entitle
the defendant to retain that possession. In order that he may
continue in possession, he must show a better right
thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality
has, as such, any right of whatever in the property in question.
It has produced no evidence of ownership. Its claim of
Page 15 of 64
ownership is rested in its brief in this court upon the following
propositions: That the property in question belonged prior to
the treaty of Paris to the Spanish Government; that by the
treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the
Government of the United States; that by section 12 of the act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property was transferred to
the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that by the
circular of that Government, dated November 11, 1902, the
ownership and the right to the possession of this property
passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If, for the purposes of
the argument, we should admit that the other propositions are
true, there is no evidence whatever to support the last
proposition, namely that the Government of the Philippine
Islands has transferred the ownership of this church to the
municipality of Lagonoy. We have found no circular of the date
above referred to. The one of February 10, 1903, which is
probably the one intended, contains nothing that indicates any
such transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy, therefore, it is
very clear that it has neither title, ownership, nor right of
possession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership
ever admitting that the Spanish Government was the owner of
the property and it has passed by the treaty of Paris to the
American Government. But this assumption is not true. As a
matter of law, the Spanish Government at the time the treaty of
peace was signed, was not the owner of this property, nor of
any other property like it, situated in the Philippine
Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the
parish churches in the Philippine Islands were built by the
Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation
of the Laws of the Indies is, in part, as follows:
Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parish houses
of the Spaniards and natives of our Indian possessions from
their discovery at the cost and expense of our royal treasury,
and applied for their service and maintenance the part of the
tithes belonging to us by apostolic concession according to the
division we have made.
Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial
churches such as the one in question. That law is as follows:
The parish churches which was erected in Spanish towns shall
be of durable and decent construction. Their costs shall be
divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal treasury,
another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the
place where such churches are constructed, and the other part
by the Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a city,
village, or place there should be any Indians incorporated to
our royal crown, we command that for our part there be
contributed the same amount as the residents
and encomenderos, respectively, contribute; and the residents
who have no Indians shall also contribute for this purpose in
accordance with their stations and wealth, and that which is so
given shall be deducted from the share of the Indians should
pay.
Law 11 of the same title is as follows:
We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the
fund for the erection of churches shall be given to their
superintendents to be expended for those things necessary for
these churches with the advice of the prelates and officials,
and by their warrants, and not otherwise. And we request and
charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in the
collection and disbursement thereof, but to guard these
structures.
Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:
In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shall
be erected a church where mass can be decently held, and it
shall have a donor with a key, notwithstanding the fact that it
be the subject to or separate from a parish.
Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected
by the King and under his direction, but it was made unlawful
to erect a church without the license of the King. This provision
is contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows:
Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, and
maintain all cathedrals, parish churches, monasteries, votive
hospitals, churches, and religious and pious establishments
where they are necessary for the teaching, propagation, and
preaching of the doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith,
and to aid to this effect with out royal treasury whenever
possible, and to receive information of such places where they
should be founded and are necessary, and the ecclesiastical
patronage of all our Indies belonging to us: chanrobles virtual
law library
We command that there shall not be erected, instituted,
founded, or maintained any cathedral, parish church,
monastery, hospital, or votive churches, or other pious or
religious establishment without our express permission as is
provided in Law 1, title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book,
notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by our viceroy
or other ministers, which in this respect we revoke and make
null, void, and of no effect.
By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the
Crown of Spain, all tithes in the Indies were given by the
former to the latter and the disposition made the King of the
fund thus created is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which
is as follows:
Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us
by the apostolic concessions of the supreme pontiffs, we
command the officials of our royal treasury of those provinces
to collect and cause to be collected all tithes due and to
become due from the crops and flocks of the residents in the
manner in which it has been the custom to pay the same, and
from these tithes the churches shall be provided with
competent persons of good character to serve them and with
all ornaments and things which may be necessary for divine
worship, to the end that these churches may be well served
and equipped, and we shall be informed of God, our Lord; this
order shall be observed where the contrary has not already
been directed by us in connection with the erection of
churches.
That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the
Indies was continued to the present time is indicated by the
Page 16 of 64
royal order of the 31st of January, 1856, and by the royal order
of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the construction
and repair of churches, there being authority for saying that the
latter order was in force in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This church, and other churches similarly situated in the
Philippines, having been erected by the Spanish Government,
and under its direction, the next question to be considered is,
To whom did these churches belong? chanrobles virtual law
library
Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of
things and, after discussing what can be called public property
and what can be called private property, speaks, in Law 12, of
those things which are sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as
follows:
Law XII. - HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT
BE OWNED BY ANY
PERSON.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of
God, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor can it
be considered as included in his property holdings. Although
the priests may have such things in their possession, yet they
are not the owners thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians
or servants, or because they have the care of the same and
serve God in or without them. Hence they were allowed to take
from the revenues of the church and lands what was
reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging
to God, was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as the
feeding and clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, the
marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women
because of their poverty, and for the redemption of captives
and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices,
clothing, books, and others things which they might be in need
of, and other similar charitable purposes.
And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in
to which this law has divided these things, it defines in Law 13,
title 28, third partida, consecrated things. That law is as
follows:
Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by the
bishops, such as churches, the altars therein, crosses,
chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all other things which
are in tended for the service of the church, and the title to
these things can not be alienated except in certain specific
cases as we have already shown in the first partida of this
book by the laws dealing with this subject. We say further that
even where a consecrated church is razed, the ground upon
which it formerly stood shall always be consecrated ground.
But if any consecrated church should fall into the hands of the
enemies of our faith it shall there and then cease to be sacred
as long as the enemy has it under control, although once
recovered by the Christians, it will again become sacred,
reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it and shall
have all the right and privileges formerly belonging to it.
That the principles of the partida in reference to churches still
exist is indicated by Sanchez Roman, whose work on the Civil
Law contains the following statement:
First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical.
A. Spiritual. - From early times distinction has been made by
authors and by law between things governed by divine law,
called divine, and those governed by human law, called
human, and although the former can not be the subject of civil
juridical relations, their nature and species should be
ascertained either to identify them and exclude them from such
relations or because they furnish a complete explanation of the
foregoing tabulated statement, or finally because the laws of
the partida deal with them.
Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly
established by God for his service and sanctification of men
and which are governed by divine or canonical laws. This
makes it necessary to divide them into spiritual things, which
are those which have a direct influence on the religious
redemption of man such as the sacrament, prayers, fasts,
indulgences, etc., and corporeal or ecclesiastical, which are
those means more or less direct for the proper religious
salvation of man.
7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or ecclesiastical
things (sacred, religious, holy, and temporal belonging to the
church). - Corporeal or ecclesiastical things are so
divided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
( a) Sacred things are those devoted to God, religion, and
worship in general, such as temples, altars, ornaments, etc.
These things can not be alienated except for some pious
purpose and in such cases as are provided for in the laws,
according to which their control pertains to the ecclesiastical
authorities, and in so far as their use is concerned, to the
believers and the clergy. (2 Derecho Civil Espaol, Sanchez
Roman, p. 480; 8 Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish
Civil Code, p. 636; 3 Alcubilla, Diccionario de la Administracion
Espaola, p. 486.)
The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the
public in general and what belonged to private persons. In the
first group churches are not named. The present Civil Code
declares in article 338 that property is of public or private
ownership. Article 339, which defines public property, is as
follows:
Property of public ownership is - chanrobles virtual law library
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State,
and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of similar
character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
2. That belonging exclusively to the state without being for
public use and which is destined to some public service, or to
the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and
mines, until their concession has been granted.
Page 17 of 64
The code also defines the property of provinces and of
pueblos, and in defining what property is of public use, article
344 declares as follows:
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains,
and public waters, the promenades, and public works of
general service supported by the said towns or
provinces.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall
be governed by the provisions of this code, unless otherwise
prescribe in special laws.
It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any
mention made of churches. When the Civil Code undertook to
define those things in a pueblo which were for the common use
of the inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the
State, while it mentioned a great many other things, it did not
mention churches.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the
Execution of the Mortgage Law indicates that churches belong
to the State and are public property. That article is as follows:
There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of
the law: chanrobles virtual law library
First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent
domain of the State, and which is for the use of all, such as the
shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon
roads, and the roads of all kinds, with the exception of
railroads; streets, parks, public promenades, and commons of
towns, provided they are not lands of common profit to the
inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads,
and any other analogous property during the time they are in
common and general use, always reserving the servitudes
established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of
navigable rivers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.
A reading of this article shows that far from proving that
churches belong to the State and to the eminent domain
thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had belonged to the
State, they would have been included in the first paragraph
instead of being placed in a paragraph by
themselves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of
the Philippines to the United States, churches and other
consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce
of man. They were not public property, nor could they be
subjects of private property in the sense that any private
person could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of
property distinctive characteristic of which was that it was
devoted to the worship of
God.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But, being material things was necessary that some one
should have the care and custody of them and the
administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom,
under the Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and
administration? For the purposes of the Spanish law there was
only one religion. That was the religion professed by the
Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that religion
and for the observance of its rites that this church and all other
churches in the Philippines were erected. The possession of
the churches, their care and custody, and the maintenance of
religious worship therein were necessarily, therefore, intrusted
to that body. It was, by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only
body which could under any circumstances have possession
of, or any control over, any church dedicated to the worship of
God. By virtue of those laws this possession and right of
control were necessarily exclusive. It is not necessary or
important to give any name to this right of possession and
control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church
buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to
show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the
buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to the exclusive
possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its
creation, existed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with
reference to the churches in the Philippines, did not give him
any right to interfere with the material possession of these
buildings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies
treats Del Patronazgo Real de las Indias. There is nothing in
any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which in
any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the
churches in the Indies because he had constructed them.
These laws relate to the right of presentation to ecclesiastical
charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the title
commences as follows:
Because the patronage and right of presentation of all
archbishops, bishops, dignitaries, prevents, curates, and
doctrines and all other beneficiaries and ecclesiastical offices
whatsoever belong to us, no other person can obtain or
possess the same without our presentation as provided in Law
1 and other laws of this title.
Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage
vesting in private persons, but there is nothing in any one of its
fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the private patron
is the owner of the
church.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of
Spain, it is not intended to say that the Government and had
no power over it. It may be that by virtue of that power of
eminent domain which is necessarily resides in every
government, it might have appropriated this church and other
churches, and private property of individuals. But nothing of
this kind was ever attempted in the
Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Page 18 of 64
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of
Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive
right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right
to administer the same for the purposes for which the building
was consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful
possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these
rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear.
That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as
follows:
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as
the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can
not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, or
provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having
legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid
territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or
whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that
treaty. Neither the Government of the United States, nor the
Government of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way
to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church
had in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the
Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been
caused by private individuals, acting without any authority from
the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any
distinction should be made between the church and the
convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the church
and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the
Compilation of the Laws of the Indies would apply. That law is
as follows:
We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall
construct such houses as may be deemed sufficient in which
the priests of such towns or barrios may live comfortably
adjoining the parish church of the place where that may be
built for the benefit of the priests in charge of such churches
and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian
parishioners, and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any
other purpose.
The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the
cemetery. It is always mentioned in connection with the church
and convent and no point is made by the possession of the
church and convent, he is not also entitled to recover
possession of the cemetery. So, without discussing the
question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are all
respects applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the purpose of
this case that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery
that he has to the
church.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic
Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This
suggestion, made with reference to an institution which
antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in
Europe, and which existed "when Grecian eloquence still
flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in the
temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration. In
the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical
obligations, presented by Montero Rios to the Cortes on the
1st of October 1871, speaking of the Roman Catholic Church,
he says:
Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of
its existence up to the time of Galieno, who was the first of the
Roman emperors to admit it among the juridicial entities
protected by the laws of the Empire, it existed until then by the
mercy and will of the faithful and depended for such existence
upon pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the third
century, and more particularly since the year 313, when
Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of
protection for the church, the latter gradually entered upon the
exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition,
preservation, and transmission of property the same as any
other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. (3 Dictionary
of Spanish Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal
order of the 4th of December, 1890, 3 Alcubilla, 189.)
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of
twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in
accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be
remanded to the court below for execution. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote. chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library
chanrobles virtual law library
CARSON, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library
I am in entire accord with the majority of the court as to the
disposition of this case, but I can not adopt the reasoning by
which some of the conclusions appear to have been obtained,
nor accept without reserve all of the propositions laid down in
the majority opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Profoundly as I respect the judgment of my associates, and
distrustful as I ought to be of my own, the transcendant
importance of the issues involved seems to impose upon me
the duty of writing a separate opinion and stating therein as
clearly as may be the precise grounds upon which I base my
assent and the reasons which forbid my acceptance of the
majority opinion in its
entirety.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I accept the argument and authority of the opinion of the court
in so far as it finds: That the Roman Catholic Church is a
juridical entity in the Philippine Islands; that the defendant,
Page 19 of 64
Ramirez, can not and should not be permitted in this action to
deny the plaintiff's right to the possession of the property in
question, because he can not be heard to set up title thereto in
himself or a third person, at least until he has first formally
surrendered it to the plaintiff who intrusted it to his care; that
the municipality of Lagonoy has failed to show by evidence of
record that it is or ever was in physical possession of the
property in question; and that the possession of the defendant
Ramirez, can not be relied upon as the possession of the
municipality because the same reason which estops Ramirez
from denying the right of possession in the plaintiff estops any
other person claiming possession through him from denying
that right. I agree, furthermore, with the finding that the
defendant municipality failed to establish a better right to the
possession than the plaintiff in this action, because, claiming to
be the owner by virtue of a grant from the Philippine
Government, it failed to establish the existence of such grant;
and because, furthermore, it was shown that the plaintiff or his
predecessors had been in possession and control of the
property in question for a long period of years prior to the treaty
of Paris by unlawful authority of the King of Spain, and that
since the sovereignty of these Islands has been transferred to
the United States the new sovereign has never at any time
divested or attempted to divest the plaintiff of this possession
and control.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Thus far I am able to accept the reasoning of the majority
opinion, and these propositions, supported as they are by the
law and the evidence in this case, completely dispose of the
question before us and establish the right of the plaintiff to a
judgment for possession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
I am not prepared, however, to give my assent to the
proposition that prior to the Treaty of Paris "The King of Spain
was not the owner of the property in question nor of any other
property like it situated in the Philippine Islands," and
inferentially that the United States is not now the owner thereof
and has no property rights therein other than, perhaps, the
mere right of eminent
domain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
I decline to affirm this proposition, first, because it is not
necessary in the decision of this case; and second, because I
am of opinion that, in the unlimited and unrestricted sense in
which it is stated in the majority opinion, it is inaccurate and
misleading, if not wholly
erroneous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
That it is not necessary for the proper disposition of this case
will be apparent if we consider the purpose for which it is
introduced in the argument and the proposition which it is
intended to controvert. As stated in the majority opinion, the
claim of ownership of the defendant municipality -
It is rested upon the following propositions: That the property in
question belonged, prior to the treaty of Paris, to the Spanish
Government; that by the treaty of Paris the ownership of
thereof passed to the Government of the United States; that by
article 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property
was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and that by a circular of that Government dated November 11,
1902, the ownership and the right to the possession of this
property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy.
It is evident that if any of these propositions is successfully
controverted, the defendants' claim of ownership must fall to
the ground. The majority opinion finds (and I am entire accord
as to this finding) that neither the Government of the United
States nor the Philippine Government had ever made, or
attempted to make, such transfer, and in making its finding it
completely, conclusively, and finally disposes of defendants'
claim of ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
All the acts of the Government of the United States and of the
present Government of the Philippine Islands which can have
any relation to the property in question are before us, and so
short a period of years has elapsed since the transfer of the
sovereignty of these Islands to the United States that it is
possible to demonstrate with the utmost certainty that by no act
of the United States or of the Government of the Philippine
Islands has the ownership and possession of this property
been conferred upon the defendant municipality; it is a very
different undertaking, however, to review the legislation of
Spain for the three centuries of her Philippine occupation for
the purpose of deciding the much-vexed question of the
respective property rights of the Spanish sovereign and the
Roman Catholic Church in State-constructed and State-aided
churches in these Islands; and if I am correct in my contention
that a holding that the King of Spain was not." and, inferentially,
that the Government of the United States is not, "the owner of
this property or any other property like it is situated in the
Philippine Islands" is not necessary for the full, final, and
complete determination of the case at bar, then I think that this
court should refrain from making so momentous a finding in a
case wherein the United States is not a party and has never
had an opportunity to be
heard.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But the mere fact that a finding that the King of Spain had no
right of ownership in this property which could pass to the
United States under the provisions of the treaty of Paris is not
necessary in my opinion for the disposition of the case at bar,
would not impose upon me the duty of writing a separate
opinion if it were in fact and a law a correct holding. I am
convinced, however, that when stated without limitations or
restrictions, as it appears in the majority opinion, it is
inaccurate and misleading, and it may not be improper,
therefore, to indicate briefly my reasons for doubting
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As stated in the majority opinion, "it does not admit of doubt
that the parish churches in the Philippines were built by the
Spanish Government," and it would seem therefore that prior to
their dedication, the beneficial ownership, the legal title, the
possession and control of all this property must be taken to
have been vested in that Government. But it must be admitted
that after this property was dedicated, the ownership, in
contemplation of Spanish law, was said to have been in God,
and there can be no doubt that the physical possession and
control of these churches for the purposes for which they were
dedicated was given to the Roman Catholic Church - not, as I
think, absolutely and conclusively, but limited by and subject to
the royal patronage ( patronato real) which included the right to
intervene in the appointment of the representatives of the
church into whose hands the possession and control of the
Page 20 of 64
sacred editors were to be
intrusted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The anomalous status thus created might well have given rise
to doubts and uncertainties as to the legal title and beneficial
ownership of this property had not the grantor and the lawgiver
of Spain expressly and specifically provided that neither the
Roman Catholic Church nor any other person was or could
become the owner thereof, and that all these sacred edifices
were to be regarded as beyond the commerce of men.
No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of
God, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor it can
be considered as included in his property holdings. Although
the priests may have such things in their possession, yet they
are not the owners thereof. They hold them thus as guardians
or servants, or because they have the care of the same and
serve God in or with them. Hence they were allowed to take
from the Revenues of the church and lands what was
reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging
to God, was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as the
feeding and clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, the
marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women
because of their poverty; and for the redemption of captivers
and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices,
clothing, books, and other things which they might be in seed
of, and other similar charitable purposes. (Law 12, title
28, partida 3.)
It is difficult to determine, and still more difficult to state, the
precise meaning and legal effect of this disposition of the
ownership, possession, and control of the parish churches in
the Philippines; but since it was not possible for God, in any
usual or ordinary sense to take or hold, to enforce or to defend
the legal title to this property, it would seem that a grant to Him
by the King or the Government of Spain could not suffice to
convey to Him the legal title of the property set out in the grant,
and the truth would seem to be that the treatment of this
property in contemplation of Spanish law as the property of
God was a mere arbitrary convention, the purpose and object
of which was crystallize the status of all such property in the
peculiar and unusual mold in which it was cast at the time of its
dedication.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
So long as church and state remained united and so long as
the Roman Catholic Church continued to be the church of the
State, this convention served its purpose well; indeed, its very
indefiniteness seems to have aided in the accomplishment of
the end for which it was adopted, and on a review of all the
pertinent citations of Spanish law which have been brought to
my attention, I am satisfied that the status created by the
above-cited law 12 of the partidas continued without
substantial modification to the date of the transfer of
sovereignty from the King of Spain to the United States. But
this transfer of sovereignty, and the absolute severance of
church and state which resulted therefrom, render it necessary
to ascertain as definitely as may be the true meaning and
intent of this conventional treatment of the parish churches in
the Philippines as the property of God, and it is evident that for
this purpose we must look to the substance rather than the
form and examine the intention of the grantor and the object he
sought to attain, rather than the words and conventional terms
whereby that intent was symbolically
expressed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It is not necessary to go beyond the citations of the majority
opinion to see that the objects which the grantor sought to
attain were, first, and chiefly, to advance the cause of religion
among the people of the Philippine Islands and to provide for
their religious instruction and edification by furnishing them
with parish churches suitable for the worship and glorification
of God; second, to place those sacred edifices under the
guardian care and custody of the church of the State; and,
third, to deny to that church and to all others the right of
ownership in the property thus dedicated; and since God could
neither take nor hold the legal title to this property, the
declaration of the King of Spain as set out in the above-cited
law, that when dedicated these churches became in some
peculiar and especial manner the property of God, was in
effect no more than a solemn obligation imposed upon himself
to hold them for the purposes for which they were dedicated,
and to exercise no right of property in them inconsistent
therewith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
This declaration that these churches are the property of God
and the provisions which accompanied it, appear to me to be
precisely equivalent to a declaration of trust by the grantor that
he would hold the property as trustee for the use for which it
was
dedicated - that is, for the religious edification and enjoyment
of the people of the Philippine Islands - and that he would give
to the Roman Catholic Church the physical possession and
control thereof, including the disposition of any funds arising
therefrom, under certain stipulated conditions and for the
purposes expressly provided by law. In other words, the people
of the Philippine Islands became the beneficial owners of all
such property, and the grantor continued to hold the legal title,
in trust nevertheless to hold the property for the purposes for
which it was dedicated and on the further trust to give the
custody and control thereof to the Roman Catholic Church. If
this interpretation of the meaning and intent of the convention
of Spanish law which treated God as the owner of the parish
churches of the Philippine Islands be correct, a holding that the
King of Spain had no right to ownership in this property which
could pass to the United States by virtue of the treaty of Paris
can not be maintained; and it is to withhold my assent from this
proposition that I have been compelled to write this separate
opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For the purposes of this opinion it is not necessary, nor would it
be profitable, to do more than indicate the line of reasoning
which has led me to my conclusions, nor to discuss at length
the question of ownership of this property, because whether it
be held to be in abeyance or in God or in the Roman Catholic
Church or in the United States it has been shown without
deciding this question of ownership that the right to the
possession for the purpose for which it was dedicated is in the
Roman Catholic Church, and while the complaint in this action
alleges that the Roman Catholic Church is the owner of the
property in question, the prayer of the complaint is for the
possession of this property of which it is alleged that church
has been unlawfully deprived; and because, furthermore, if I
am correct in my contention that the legal title to the State-
constructed churches in the Philippines passed to the United
States the virtue of the treaty of Paris, it passed, nevertheless,
subject to the trusts under which it was held prior thereto, and
Page 21 of 64
the United States can not at will repudiate the conditions of that
trust and retain its place in the circle of civilized nations; and as
long as the property continues to be used for the purposes for
which it was dedicated, the Government of the United States
has no lawful right to deprive the Roman Catholic Church of
the possession and control thereof under the terms and
conditions upon which that possession and control were
originally granted
G.R. No. L-47661 July 31, 1987
JUANITO CARIO and CIRILA VICENCIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO ENCABO and JUANITA DE
LOS SANTOS, and LAND AUTHORITY,respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for certiorari filed by the spouses Juanito Cario and
Cirila Vicencio, seeking the review and reversal of the
decision* of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 15 November
1977, in CA-G.R. No. 49495-R which affirmed the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, Civil Case
No. 57861, and its resolution, dated 6 January 1978, denying
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The facts derived from the records are as follows:
On 22 January 1954, Pablo Encabo formally applied with the
Land Estates Division, Bureau of Lands, to purchase a parcel
of land designated as Lot 1, Block 4, Plan Psd-24819, which
was a part of the Tuason Estate purchased by the government
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 539, for
resale to bona fide tenants or occupants who are qualified to
own public land in the Philippines.1
Thereafter, Encabo, through petitioner Cirila Vicencio,
supposedly as "agent, " came to an agreement with Josue
Quesada transferring rights over the lot to the latter,
conditioned on approval by the Land Tenure Administration
(LTA, for short). The husband of Cirila Vicencio (Juanito
Cario) is a relative of Quesada; Cirila Vicencio is also a
"comadre" of Quesada's wife.2 The transfer of rights by Encabo
to Quesada was not put in writing but payment of the price for
the rights transferred was evidenced by receipts (Exhibits "A"
and "B") on which Cirila Vicencio signed as a witness.
On 30 July 1957, the LTA, unaware of the transfer of rights by
Encabo to Quesada, adjudicated the lot in favor of Encabo,
and the LTA and Encabo signed an "Agreement to Sell" (Exh.
"G-1"). LTA later came to know about the "transfer" of rights
from Encabo to Quesada. It disapproved the same on the
ground that Quesada was not qualified to acquire the lot
because he is already a lot owner.3 However, before the LTA's
disapproval of the transfer of Encabo's rights to Quesada, the
latter had entered into possession of the lot in question.
Quesada had also allowed Cirila Vicencio to enter into
possession and occupancy of the same lot.4
In November (undated) 1958, Encabo executed a Deed of Sale
of House and Transfer of Rights (Exh. "D-1"), purportedly
conveying to herein petitioners (Juanito Cario and Cirila
Vicencio), his rights over the lot, subject to approval of the LTA.
On 17 December 1958, Encabo wrote a letter to the LTA (Exh.
"1") requesting permission to transfer his rights. Another such
request was made on 20 April 1960 (Exh. "2") but without
making mention of who the transferee would be, just like in the
first letter. On 18 April 1960, however, Encabo and Quesada
executed a document wherein the latter purportedly resold to
the former (Encabo) the house and the rights over the lot.5
On 19 April 1960, Juanito Cario filed a petition with the LTA
seeking approval of the transfer to herein petitioners of rights
to the lot in question on the basis of the Deed of Sale of House
and Transfer of Rights executed by Pablo Encabo (Exh. "D-1").
The petition of Juanito Cario was docketed as LTA Case No.
490, to which respondent Pablo Encabo objected and filed an
Answer in opposition thereto.
Essentially, both parties in LTA Case No. 490 (Encabo and the
spouses Cario) claimed the right to purchase the lot in
question from the LTA. After the submission of their respective
pleadings and evidence, the LTA rendered a decision holding
that the status quo should be maintained. It reasoned out that
"the authenticity of the alleged deed (Exh. "D-1") is not for this
office to decide, as only the courts have that prerogative."6
The Carios appealed the decision of the LTA to the Office of
the President, which affirmed it. Motions for reconsideration
were filed by the Cario's but were denied, the last denial
being contained in a letter dated 22 March 1963, signed by
Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Juan S. Cancio.7
The Carios refused to give up the possession of the lot
despite the rulings of the LTA and the Office of the President;
thereafter, the Encabos filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to declare them as the owners of the lot and
for the Carios to deliver the possession of the lot itself, and to
pay rentals for their occupancy of the properties plus attorney's
fees. After hearing and trial, the lower court rendered decision
in favor of the plaintiffs therein the Encabos now private
respondents, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:8
WHEREFORE, the court renders judgment holding
that the plaintiffs Pablo Encabo and his wife Juanita
de los Santos Encabo are entitled to Lot No. 1, Block
4, Plan Psd-24819; that the deed of sale executed by
the Land Authority on April 18, 1967, in favor of said
spouses is hereby upheld; that the registration of the
said deed of sale by the Register of Deeds of Manila
and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
87826 in favor of the plaintiffs Encabo are also
upheld; that the order of this Court dated September
8, 1967, cancelling and declaring the said deed of
sale without any effect is hereby set aside; that in the
event that the Register of Deeds, has already
cancelled Certificate of Title No. 67825 as ordered by
this Court in its order of September 8, 1967, the said
Register of Deeds, upon payment of the required
legal fees, is ordered to register again the Deed of
Sale of Lot 1, Block 4, Plan Psd-24819 executed by
the Land Authority on April 18, 1967, in favor of the
plaintiffs Pablo Encabo and his wife Juanita de los
Santos Encabo and issue in their favor a new
certificate of title for the lot in question; that if Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 87826 has not been cancelled
by the Register of Deeds, the same shall remain valid
and in full force and effect.
Page 22 of 64
 The defendants spouses Juanito Cario and Cirila
Vicencio are declared the owners of the house
constructed on the lot in question. They should
remove the same within sixty (60) days after this
judgment shall become final, otherwise, the same
shall be ordered demolished.
Plaintiffs and the Land Authority will recover costs
from defendants Cario.
Not satisfied with the aforementioned decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, the herein petitioners (as defendants
therein) appealed the same to the Court of Appeals which, as
earlier stated, affirmed the decision of the trial court in all
respects. Hence, this petition for review filed by the petitioners.
As a rule, factual-findings of the Appellate Court are binding on
this Court.9 As held in Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc. and Jose Layson, et al.:10
. . . . factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
binding on the Supreme Court, but said findings are
subject to scrutiny if such are diametrically opposed to
those of the trial court.
In the present case, the findings of fact and conclusions of the
Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals are not at
variance; the same is true with the findings of fact of the LTA as
submitted by the public respondent Land Authority.11 As was
held in Buyco v. People,12 this Court on appeal by certiorari
from the Court of Appeals, could not find otherwise where the
Amnesty Commission, the Court of First Instance and the
Court of Appeals all found, in effect, that the evidence did not
show that the appellant had acted in the manner contemplated
by Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, after he had been given an
opportunity to bring the homicide with which he was charged
within its terms.
As we see it, the only legal question that stands as the basis of
this petition centers on whether the respondent Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding
that the Deed of Sale of House and Transfer of Rights (Exhibit
D-1 "), on which the petitioners have based their application
over the questioned lot, is simulated and, therefore, an
inexistent deed of sale.
This Court finds that there is substantial and convincing
evidence that Exhibit "D-1" was a simulated deed of sale and
transfer of rights, to warrant the affirmance of the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals. The characteristic of
simulation is the fact that the apparent contract is not really
desired or intended to produce legal effects nor in any way
alter the judicial situation of the parties.13 Under the
circumstances surrounding their transaction, the parties knew
that the document Exhibit "D-1" was at once fictitious and
simulated where none of the parties intended to be bound
thereby.
The testimony of Cirila Vicencio during her direct examination
was grossly inconsistent with her statements in the LTA
administrative case which she previously filed. She testified in
the lower court that she paid the Encabos five hundred pesos
(P500.00) for the lot, whereas, in the LTA administrative case
she said that it was one thousand pesos (P1,000.00).14 Aside
from the purported Deed of Sale (Exhibit "D-1"), there is no
other document which evidences the payment of a sum of
money by Cario to the Encabos for the disputed lot. Cirila
Vicencio also testified in the lower court that Exhibit "D-1" was
signed by Pablo and Juanita Encabo in Cario's house at 4214
K Int. 8, Sociego, Sta. Mesa, whereas, in the LTA
administrative case, she testified that it was signed in Las
Pinas, Rizal, the residence of the Encabos.15 These
inconsistencies in the testimony of the Carios are badges of
untruthfulness, showing that no actual and real sale of the lot in
question took place between the Encabos and the Carios.
The testimony of a witness does not merit credibility or inspire
confidence where it is inconsistent and incompatible with his
statements on other occasions concerning the same fact.16
Strongly indicative of the simulated character of Exhibit ,"D-1"
is the fact that the Carios could not produce the receipts
evidencing their alleged payments to the Land Authority for the
disputed lot, nor were they able to produce the Agreement to
Sell (Exhibit "G-1"). According to Cirila Vicencio, Juana Encabo
took from her the Agreement to Sell and the receipts of
payments to the Land Authority in order to mortgage the land.
The Carios, who are the supposed vendees, did not even
remonstrate or offer a word of objection to this act of the
Encabos. Cirila Vicencio, on cross-examination, testified thus:
Q. Do you have the receipts evidencing your
payment?
A. I have but Juana Encabo got them from me.
Q. Why did she get the receipts from you?
A. SHE REQUESTED ME TO SEND HER THE
AGREEMENT TO SELL AND THE RECEIPTS FOR
THE MONTHLY RENTALS BECAUSE ACCORDING
TO HER SHE WOULD MORTGAGE THE
DOCUMENTS. 17
xxx xxx xxx
Q. If you claim to have purchased the property in
question, why did you still permit the Encabos to
mortgage the property?
Atty. Olandesca:
Objection, the question is vague.
Court:
Witness may answer.
A. BECAUSE I AM THE KOMADRE OF THE YOUNG
ENCABOS, SO I TRUSTED THEM. 18
Previously, on direct examination, the testimony of Cirila
Vicencio, was quite different. She testified thus:
Q. Do you have th receipts evidencing your payment?
Page 23 of 64
 A. I have but Juana Encabo got them from me.
Q. Why did she get the receipts from you?
A. She requested me to lend her the Agreement to
Sell and the receipts for the monthly rentals because
according to her she would mortgage the documents.
Q. When did she borrow the documents from you?
A. About 1960.
Q. And what did you tell her?
A. I got angry and was so worried about it.
Q. Why were you worried?
A. Because I was being embarassed to my neighbors.
When they arrived in our house they brought a
document with them and asked me to sign said
document.
Q. I am showing to you a document dated April 1960
marked as Ex. 4 (a Deed of Resale) between the
Encabos and the Carios) consisting of an original
and three duplicate copies, do you recognize this
document?
A. This is the document they brought to me for
signature.
Q. When Juana Encabo went to see you asking you
to sign the document, Exhibit 4 and you said that you
were angry and embarassed, what did you do?
A. I fainted because of my anger and embarassment.
Q. Did you file any complaint with the LTA because of
that?
A. Yes, sir. 19
According to Cirila Vicencio, the receipts were borrowed one
(1) week before the case was filed on 19 April 1960.20It would
appear then that she delivered to Mrs. Encabo all the papers
relative to the disputed lot so that the latter can mortgage the
same, despite the fact that there was already an obvious
misunderstanding as to who was the real owner of the house
and lot. If these papers relative to the lot were really in her
possession, the reasons she gave for delivering them to the
Encabos are varied. A more credible reason for the surrender
of the papers was the one cited by the Carios in their petition
to the LTA (Exhibit 100), wherein they alleged "that due to
evident machinations employed by the respondent upon the
petitioner and by taking undue advantage of the latter's
innocence and good faith in his dealings with the former, the
respondent herein has maneuvered the petitioner into
releasing to him the official receipts issued to the petitioner for
the corresponding payments made on the lot. But these
allegations were never pursued by the petitioners in the lower
court. Instead, they gave different versions which all the more
weakened their stand.
Granting that the papers relative to the lot were really in the
possession of the Carios, the fact that they were delivered by
Cirila Vicencio to Juana Encabo, amounted to an act of
complete ownership and control of the property by the
Encabos. As held in Serrano v. CA,21 this Court finds it strange
that respondent (Macaraya) would allow petitioner (Serrano) to
receive the fruits of the subject property several months after
he acquired absolute ownership of the same. This is contrary
to the principle of ownership.
The respondent Court also found as a fact that the names of
the Carios were not mentioned as the proposed transferees in
the two applications with the LTA filed by Pablo Encabo for
transfer of rights (at a time when the alleged "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights," Exhibit "D-1" was already executed in favor
of the Carios). These applications with the LTA were mere
speculations on the part of the Encabos if they should desire to
sell the lot later on (these applications were later withdrawn by
the Encabos in a letter dated May 9, 1960 [Exhibit 113] and no
inference can be made that they intended to transfer the lot
specifically to the Carios. If there were really an intent, then
there was no reason which would stop the Encabos from
putting the name of the Carios as transferees, just like in the
application to transfer to Quesada wherein the latter's name
was specifically mentioned. All these appear to clearly indicate
a positive lack of intention of the Encabos to transfer any right
to the petitioners (Carios).
Another factor which leads the Court not to disturb the
respondent Court's finding that Exhibit "D-1" is a simulated
document is the fact that such document was executed in
November 1958 while the Carios petitioned the LTA to
approve the transfer in their names of Encabos' rights to the lot
on the basis of such deed of sale, only on 19 April 1960. The
application was made just a day after 18 April 1960 when
Josue Quesada resold to Encabo, for the same consideration
of P1,500.00 the house and rights to the lot previously
conveyed by the latter to the former, pursuant to a previous
agreement between Quesada and the Encabos, providing for
such a resale should the transfer to Quesada of the Encabos'
rights to the lot be disapproved by the LTA. Why did it take the
petitioners that long to wait before they appealed with the LTA if
they really believed that Exhibit "D-1" was valid and effective
right from the time it was executed in November 1958? Such
lack of eagerness on the part of the Carios to apply with the
LTA for the transfer of the lot into their name reveals their own
conviction that the Deed of Sale is not real and effective
between them and the Encabos.
There is merit to the Encabos' claim that the simulated deed of
sale in favor of the Carios was executed in order to protect
the money Quesada invested in the purchase of the rights to
the lot in question, which transfer of said lot to his name was
later on disapproved by the LTA. As can be gleaned from the
testimony of Josue Quesada, he did this by putting Cirila
Vicencio as the vendee in the stipulated Deed of Sale, when in
fact, Encabo and Quesada meant her only as a dummy for the
latter. To this effect Quesada testified, despite the warning
given to him by the court that his statement might incriminate
him.22 Such candor in the testimony of Quesada gives
credibility to the Encabos claim.
Page 24 of 64
From the testimonies of the witnesses, it can be deduced that SO ORDERED.
Cirila Vicencio was privy to all the transactions relating to the
sale of the disputed lot between Encabo and Quesada so that
it is entirely possible for Cirila Vicencio to have been used by
Encabo and Quesada as their dummy in the simulated deed of
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
sale and for Cirila Vicencio herself to lend a hand in the
scheme so as to protect the interests of Quesada, and in the
process, protect herself as she was occupying the disputed lot
at the instance of Quesada. Even at the start, it was Cirila
Vicencio who introduced Quesada to the Encabos in ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.
connection with a house and the right to the lot, which SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
according to Cirila Vicencio, was being sold by Juanita de los RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
Santos-Encabo. Not only that, Cirila Vicencio signed as a MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
witness on Exhibits "A" and "B" which are the receipts of COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
payment for the disputed lot by Quesada to Encabo.1avvphi1 COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the document HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN,
Exhibit "D-1" as recounted by the petitioners are bereft of BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN,
credence. They are so weak that they lead to the conclusion BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM
that indeed, there was no real and actual Deed of Sale entered TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A.
into. The petitioners herein have nothing else to support their GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
claim over the disputed lot except for the Deed of Sale, Exhibit DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE
"D-1" which is even unnotarized, and the exact date of MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
execution, unknown. Whereas, on the other hand, the private BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
respondents clearly have a preponderance of evidence DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
negating the validity of such deed. DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN
where the price, which appears therein as paid, has in fact B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI,
never been paid by the vendee to the vendor.23 A sale of land DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-
without consideration, but intended merely to protect a party to LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
a joint venture for the cash advances he was to make for the REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T.
realty subdivision that the parties wanted to put up, is null and PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L.
void.24 The law is clear on this matter. The Civil Code provides: SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY,
VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
void from the beginning: ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G.
PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
xxx xxx xxx SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious; ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
xxx xxx xxx
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
Furthermore, even without going into the merits and/or validity MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
of Exhibit "D-1", it is clear that there has been no legal transfer LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO
of rights in favor of the Carios because neither the LTA nor the S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
Land Authority has approved or given due course to such SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY,
transfer of rights.25 The LTA never waived its right to approve JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
the transfer of rights. It only ruled that the status quo will be VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM
maintained so long as the Court has not yet ruled on the MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG
authenticity of document Exhibit "D-1". The ownership of the lot AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
by the Carios is still contingent on the approval of the LTA MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY
upon their compliance with all the requirements of the latter. DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
Since no approval or due course has yet been given by the LTA BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D.
or LA to such transfer of rights, the document Exhibit "D-1" is EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO
not enforceable against the latter. SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL
Costs against the petitioners.
MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO
Page 25 of 64
 MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by
her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL
FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES
EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON
FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this
suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court
required respondents to comment.[1] In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions,
filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in
which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray
that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership
over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that
the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors,
composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of
112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their
Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending
the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the
petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as
Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who
are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for
the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.),
filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter,
the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in
which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and
coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which
provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of
the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b)
which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of
the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and
the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples
the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas,
forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the
IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
Page 26 of 64
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground
that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the
process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP
the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon
certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property
rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and
that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation
thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, which provides that the administrative relationship of the
NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes
upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57,
58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and
invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of
1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus
commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of
carrying out the States constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the
Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan
filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with
the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated
by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional.Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the
separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
Page 27 of 64
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA
for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation (AMARI for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila
Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a
new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the
Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD
No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. [1] On the same date,
then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay[2] under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a
memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP,
so that [A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA. Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which
stated:
(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and
such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by
the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit
price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon,
subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and
conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the
financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and
hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the
rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the
areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of
December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred
or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas
consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center
Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three
Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at
varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located
outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood
Unit.[3]
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to
PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing
a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters. Subsequently,
on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311,
and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty
One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the
Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA
through negotiation without public bidding.[4] On April 28, 1995,
the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA. [5] On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V.
Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA.[6]
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto
Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a
result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of
their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.[7] Among the conclusions of their report
are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI
under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA
in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of
the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice,[8] the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel,[9] and the Government Corporate
Counsel.[10] The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the
JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate
Committees.[11]
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going
renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued
by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports,
PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and
retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating
panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the
JVA. The Court dismissed the petition for unwarranted
Page 28 of 64
disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling
of the case before the proper court.[12]
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner
for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of
any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II,
and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right
of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of
the public domain to private corporations. Finally, petitioner
asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in
properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time, [13] PEA and
AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June
25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to
submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b)
for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the
case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative
Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the
Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA, for
brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under
the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada
approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of
the President, petitioner now prays that on constitutional and
statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null
and void.[14]
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA [15] and AMARI[16] are
as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED
FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT
EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS
DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS
STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL
AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN
LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER
FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Courts Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the
petition are moot and academic because of subsequent
events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
and conditions of the on-going negotiations for a new
agreement. The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA
from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any
new agreement with AMARI.
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and
academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21,
1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms
and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA
has satisfied petitioners prayer for a public disclosure of the
renegotiations. Likewise, petitioners prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and
AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30,
1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the
Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the
constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and
approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional
issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and
AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to
moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA
and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The
prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on
constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners principal
basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
government from alienating lands of the public domain to
private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the
effects of such unconstitutional contract.
Page 29 of 64
 The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract
but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5
hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of
Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes
more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national
patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision
if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant
case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the
Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain in the name of
AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had made
the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal
or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.[17]
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All
previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
1973 Constitution,[18] covered agricultural lands sold to private
corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The
transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim
the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect
titles[19] under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 (CA No. 141
for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from
PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged
areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD
No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain
undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the
consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can
claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands
covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be
reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June
12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December
31, 1987.[20]
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the
constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the
possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and
ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the
Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the
latters seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed
areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even
allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed
area to raise financing for the reclamation project.[21]
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for
failing to observe the principle governing the hierarchy of
courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial
hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The
principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases
involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court
cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant
case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public.[22] The Court can resolve this case
without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also,
the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under
the originaljurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction
over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in
compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain information without
first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims
petitioners direct resort to the Court violates the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule
that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v.
Tuvera[23] where the Court granted the petition
for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially
demand from the Office of the President the publication of the
presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the
Executive Department had an affirmative statutory
duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code [24] and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 638[25] to publish the presidential
decrees. There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners
in Taada to make an initial demand from the Office of the
President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative
statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its
renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court
must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner
here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands
held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79 of
the Government Auditing Code,[26]2 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public
bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to
the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its
lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure
even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA
failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA,
like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated
contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an
affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and
was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to
seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue,
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional
question.[27] The principal issue in the instant case is the
capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the
public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the
instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring
this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to
institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional
Page 30 of 64
right to information without a showing that PEA refused to
perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the
Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown
that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayers suit
because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues
involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA
to disclose publicly information on the sale of government
lands worth billions of pesos, information which the
Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The
thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in
violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental
importance to the public. In Chavez v. PCGG,[28] the Court
upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayers suit on matters
of transcendental importance to the public, thus -
Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental
importance to the public. He asserts that ordinary taxpayers
have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the
validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of paramount public
interest, and if they immediately affect the social, economic
and moral well being of the people.
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes
several decisions of this Court which have set aside the
procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue
concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to
obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is
sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in
the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the
aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to
be informed on matters of public concern, a right then
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in
connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners'
legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to
be enforced is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada,
further declared that when a mandamus proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen
and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the
right.
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of
public funds may not have been involved under the questioned
contract for the development, management and operation of
the Manila International Container Terminal, public interest
[was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the
subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial consideration
involved. We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure
provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the
people to information and access to official records, documents
and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a
Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic
requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2)
espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar
should be allowed.
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a
citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural
resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the
peoples right to information on matters of public concern in this
manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest reinforces the peoples right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is
expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
(Emphasis supplied)
Page 31 of 64
 These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to exercise effectively other constitutional
rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of
freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its
official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever
citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are
also essential to hold public officials at all times x x x
accountable to the people,[29] for unless citizens have the
proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right information,
citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As
explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.[30]
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to
the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to
the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31] that in cases of
on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to
definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains the
right does not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated
or are in the exploratory stage.
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the
right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the
transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the
following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
Mr. Suarez. And when we say transactions which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?
Mr. Ople: The transactions used here, I suppose is generic
and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract
and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on
the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract
before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government
officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage
will degrade the quality of decision-making in government
agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their
real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds
of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on
public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and
information the constitutional right to information requires PEA
to release to the public. Before the consummation of the
contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from
anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property.These include the size, location,
technical description and nature of the property being disposed
of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties
qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar
information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose
them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long
before the consummation of the contract, because the
Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA
fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA
this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or
review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under the right
to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going,
there are no official acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids
or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the
part of the government. From this moment, the publics right to
information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-
proprietary information leading to such definite
proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,[33] the Court ruled as follows:
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we
believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain
to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily
to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
exploratory stage. There is need, of course, to observe the
same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as
discussed earlier such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARIs contention, the commissioners of the
1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading
to the consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of
the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its
defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in
the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes
a fait accompli.This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which
Page 32 of 64
the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a
requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the
public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively
truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can
allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a
retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.
The right covers three categories of information which are
matters of public concern, namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions
and decisions; and (3) government research data used in
formulating policies. The first category refers to any document
that is part of the public records in the custody of government
agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents
and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming,
supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or officials. The third
category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or
processed, owned by the government and used in formulating
government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the
renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of
meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to
such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the
right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation
of the JVA.[34] The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to
inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy
the records, documents and papers at his expense. The
exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
and how to conduct the inspection and copying.[35]
The right to information, however, does not extend to
matters recognized as privileged information under the
separation of powers.[36] The right does not also apply to
information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of
the accused, which courts have long recognized as
confidential.[37] The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded
by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation
of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-
door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress,[38] are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a
co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked
to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.[39] This
is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order.[40] Congress has
also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in
several legislations.[41]
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for
the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and
submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which
holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public
domain.Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[42] The King, as the
sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and
owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those
he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the
Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the
King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain.The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-
honored principle of land ownership that all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain.[43] Article 339 of the Civil Code of
1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950,
incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory
law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed
lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine
Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. Later, on
November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act
No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease,
but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the
National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but
not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this
day as the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of
1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores,
bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of
the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public
use.[44] The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the
reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as
follows:
Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of
works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
Page 33 of 64
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea
belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation, provided
the government issued the necessary permit and did not
reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of
public dominion as follows:
Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which,
without being of general public use, is employed
in some public service, or in the development of
the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses,
and other works for the defense of the territory,
and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for
use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public
service referred to property used for some specific public
service and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property
devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but
employed to develop the national wealth. This class of
property constituted property of public dominion although
employed for some economic or commercial activity to
increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-
classification of property of public dominion into private
property, to wit:
Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted
to public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a
part of the private property of the State.
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The
legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must
declare the property no longer needed for public use or
territorial defense before the government could lease or
alienate the property to private parties.[45]
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act
No. 1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore
lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as
defined in existing law, and the title to all Government or
public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by
dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine
Islands, shall be retained by the Government without
prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights
conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all
Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided
into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways
located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such
surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-
General shall give notice to the public that such parts of
the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for
public purposes will be leased for commercial and
business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to
the highest and best bidder therefore, subject to such
regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may by
executive order prescribe. (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should
retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The
Act also vested in the government control and disposition of
foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by
the government only if these lands were no longer needed for
public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the
lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made
government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other
public lands which the government could sell to private parties,
these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private
parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit
private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea
by private parties with government permission remained
private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature
enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act. [46] The salient
provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as
follows:
Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-
General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession
under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being
neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable
Page 34 of 64
for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or
other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession,
shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and
not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be
classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by
dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing
classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of
section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-
General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the
same are not necessary for the public service and are
open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included
in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the
provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-
General to classify lands of the public domain into x x x
alienable or disposable[47] lands. Section 7 of the Act
empowered the Governor-General to declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession. Section 8 of the Act limited
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been officially delimited and classified.
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands disposable
under this title[48] shall be classified as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these
lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial or other productive non-
agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the
Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the
public domain into disposable lands of the public domain.
These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to
classify further such disposable lands of the public domain into
government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public
domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that
disposable lands of the public domain classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands shall be disposed of
to private parties by lease only and not otherwise. The
Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to
private parties, must formally declare that the lands were not
necessary for the public service. Act No. 2874 reiterated the
State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first
enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that the
government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is
obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public
lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent
potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the
government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of
these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other
non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under
Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural
purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus,
under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private
parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their
sale.[49]
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from
reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea
by private parties with government permission remained
private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon
its ratification by the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in
adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article
XIII, that
Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease
for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only
natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore
lands, considered part of the States natural resources, became
inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25
years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could
alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed
and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the
classification of public agricultural lands.[50] However,
government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only
be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No.
2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring
ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the
Page 35 of 64
legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935
Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from
acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under
existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution provided as follows:
Section 2. No private corporation or association may
acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess
of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any
individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of
one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one
thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess
of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not
exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an
individual, private corporation, or association. (Emphasis
supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature
did not repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to
private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the
public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the
long established State policy of retaining for the government
title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National
Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the
public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day
the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and
mineral lands.[51]
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to
classify lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable[52] lands of the public domain, which prior to such
classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to
declare what lands are open to disposition or concession.
Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can
declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are
officially delimited and classified. Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No.
141 read as follows:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands
from one class to another,[53] for the purpose of their
administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition
of alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed,
and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x.
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands
of the public domain, the President must first officially classify
these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them
open to disposition or concession. There must be no law
reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain,
are as follows:
Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which,
being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be
used for residential purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession,
shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter
and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be
classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by
dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable
lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be
leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation,
or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for
agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of
section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall
declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The
lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or
lease under the provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity
of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting
the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are
intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only
the lease of such lands to private parties. The government
could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59
(d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes
not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands,
however, became inalienable under the 1935 Constitution
which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private
parties.
Page 36 of 64
 Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that
disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural shall be disposed of under the provisions of
this chapter and not otherwise. Under Section 10 of CA No.
141, the term disposition includes lease of the land. Any
disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply
with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, [54] unless a subsequent
law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case
of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[55]
Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on
this matter, as follows:
Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for
public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the government by
dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the
control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water
remained in the national government. Said law allowed only
the leasing of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919
and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed
by the government were to be disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise. Before leasing, however, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that
the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public
service. This requisite must have been met before the land
could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and
lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was
only by lease. The land remained property of the
State. (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at present.
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands
of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus
reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took
effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however,
became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution.
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of
the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified
as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they
would fall under the classification of government reclaimed
lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain
continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties.
[56]
These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain the government could
not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government
can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to
pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not
authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section
59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only
alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that
the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires
congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the
government previously transferred to government units or
entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No.
141 declares that
Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as
shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes
for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed
one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That
this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers
made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government for the purposes deemed by said entities
conducive to the public interest; but the land so granted,
donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a
manner affecting its title, except when authorized by
Congress: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No.
141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section 56 of
Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section
60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities from
the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from
the State. These government units and entities should not just
turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation
of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer
of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and
entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations
on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be
used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the
sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes
by operation of law a lien on these lands.[57]
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public
domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63
and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA
No. 141 provide as follows:
Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this
chapter are not needed for public purposes, the Director of
Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
(now the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to
dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the
Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in
the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of
agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding;
and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public
auction all leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain.[58]
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141
did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with
government permission. However, the reclaimed land could
Page 37 of 64
become private land only if classified as alienable
agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition
under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the
definition of property of public dominion found in the Civil Code
of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state
that
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national
wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.
Again, the government must formally declare that the
property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use
or public service, before the same could be classified as
patrimonial property of the State.[59] In the case of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the
declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of
their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA
No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950
included as property of public dominion those properties of the
State which, without being for public use, are intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth.
Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State,
even if not employed for public use or public service, if
developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as
property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17,
1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources with the exception of agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public
domain. In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation
of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
However, the term public agricultural lands in the 1935
Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential
and resettlement lands of the public domain.[60] If the land of
public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall
under the classification of agricultural land of the public
domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore,
prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of
lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of
the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by
Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable
lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935
Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
declared that
Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account
conservation, ecological, and development requirements of the
natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the
public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or
leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association,
and the conditions therefor. No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area
nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five
hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant,
in excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or
association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit,
timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in
excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such
area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations
could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of
the public domain, and private corporations became
absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to
all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain, while the
statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly
government owned and controlled corporation with a special
Page 38 of 64
charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only
following purposes and powers: lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands
of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority
Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the
following purposes: public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only
means, or to acquire reclaimed land; benefit private individuals.
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or
operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973
be necessary for the efficient, economical and beneficial
Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The
utilization of the above properties.
1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources
are owned by the State, and except for alienable agricultural
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be
shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is created, have alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
the following powers and functions: state that
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
of the area permitted to private corporations by
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
statute.
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across,
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch,
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
flume x x x.
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
xxx
and supervision of the State. x x x.
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may
be necessary for the attainment of the purposes and objectives
herein specified. (Emphasis supplied) Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore
classified by law according to the uses which they may be
and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore areas
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
tide.[61] Submerged areas are those permanently under water
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide.[62] Foreshore and
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
submerged areas indisputably belong to the public
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
domain[63] and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five
longer needed for public service.
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not
apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology,
government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
as it still applies now, only to private corporations and reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands
associations. PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA to hold of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held,
lands of the public domain even in excess of the area or leased and the conditions therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
permitted to private corporations by statute. Thus, PEA can
hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the
public domain.
1973 Constitution banning private corporations from
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
No.141, which states Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable
lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred
to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
authorized by Congress; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Page 39 of 64
 The rationale behind the constitutional ban on
corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable
lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have
reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area.
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935
Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973
Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from
acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not been very
clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some
of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that
the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that
the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni
Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not
allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a
chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in
violation of this. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,[64] the Court explained the rationale
behind this constitutional ban in this way:
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against
purchases of public agricultural lands by private corporations is
to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to prevent
a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings
by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest.
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge
landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the
size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations
could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the
1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the
1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic
family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation
would be more effective in preventing the break-up of
farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would
inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels
of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of
farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to
the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the
constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more than
the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain.Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public
domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation
is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional
limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the
public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the
provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public
lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing
population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence
to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of
the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is
the practical benefit arising from the constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its
second Whereas clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. [T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially
eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo
Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro
Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441
square meters;
2. [A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters
contiguous to the three islands; and
3. [A]t AMARIs option as approved by PEA, an
additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed
area.[65]
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves the development
of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250
hectares x x x, plus an option granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x.[66]
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of
750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of
the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part
of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the
sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEAs actual cost in partially
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at
its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of
all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be
reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70
percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area
which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed
area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to
AMARIs share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares,
will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of the
Amended JVA provides that
Page 40 of 64
x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the
necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining
to AMARIs Land share based on the Land Allocation
Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then
cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates
of title covering AMARIs Land Share in the name of
AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent
(70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI,
PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the
titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a
corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining
to PEA has been titled. (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire
and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land
which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the
unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEAs statutory
authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended
JVA states that
PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and
privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal
Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby
granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority
and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the
Master Development Plan.
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the
original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental
agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private
corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA
367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in
Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which state that:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, x x x.(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged
Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from
foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,
[67]
PEA admits that
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed
lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain:
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be
classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government
by dredging, filling, or other
means;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force[68] constituted under
Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its
Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V.
Ramos, [R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.[69] The Legal Task
Force concluded that
D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by
statutory authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over
reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of
which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any
qualified person without violating the Constitution or any
statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations
from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,
[70]
1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose
ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources and consequently owned by the State. As such,
foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienated, unless
they are classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not
convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must
be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands
cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.[71]
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that only those lands
shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified.[72] The President has
the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,
[73]
the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi
property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine
Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy.Although the Chancery had transferred to another
location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under
Page 41 of 64
Article 422[74] of the Civil Code, a property of public dominion
retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The
Court ruled that
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long
time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert
it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if
the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it
from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]. (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the
issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA
from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On
January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84
hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom
Islands.Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds
of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311
and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD
No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title
corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of
title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual
issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom
Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquinos issuance of a
land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom
Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands
although subsequently there were partial erosions on some
areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no
longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park
lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under
the classification of agricultural lands of the public
domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the
public domain are the only natural resources that the State
may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural
resources, such as the seas or bays, are waters x x x owned
by the State forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands
because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the
islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that if the
ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party
constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed
lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate.[75] Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as
follows:
Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of
works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless
otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866,
private parties could reclaim from the sea only with proper
permission from the State. Private parties could own the
reclaimed land only if not otherwise provided by the terms of
the grant of authority. This clearly meant that no one could
reclaim from the sea without permission from the State
because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant
that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the
reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from
which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private
person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the
State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which
would remain property of public dominion like the sea it
replaced.[76] Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that all
lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[77]
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read
together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of
public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the
public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These
lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.
[78]
Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government
was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not
have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a
private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973,
revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under
water and revested solely in the National Government the
power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding,
the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or
inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any
person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x.
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could now
be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person
contracted by the National Government. Private parties may
reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National
Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided
in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979,
designated PEA as the National Governments implementing
arm to undertake all reclamation projects of the government,
which shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
Page 42 of 64
contract executed by it with any person or entity. Under
such contract, a private party receives compensation for
reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the
contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of
the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind
only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or
disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no
longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands,
but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still
submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no
legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged
areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not
covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no
dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public
domain, and in their present state are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea,
these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, waters x x
x owned by the State, forming part of the public domain and
consequently inalienable.Only when actually reclaimed from
the sea can these submerged areas be classified as public
agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed
and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government
may then officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition.Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for
public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be
considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEAs reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its
charter to undertake public services that require the use of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084,
the functions of PEA include the following: [T]o own or operate
railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x
x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of
sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain
and operate such storm drains as may be necessary. PEA is
empowered to issue rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of
the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its
properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their
use. Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use
or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its
charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides
that PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government. The same section also
states that [A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the
President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed
by it with any person or entity; x x x. Thus, under EO No. 525,
in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the
primary implementing agency of the National Government to
reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public
domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the government entity
to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their
maximum utilization in promoting public welfare and
interests.[79] Since large portions of these reclaimed lands
would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a
formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer
needed for public service from those still needed for public
service.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands
reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA,
could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands
into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
of the public domain would automatically become alienable
once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable
or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law
than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for
brevity) the following powers and functions:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest
lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control,
impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such
form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration,
development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the
issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease
agreements and such other privileges concerning the
development, exploration and utilization of the countrys
marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all
aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to
oversee, supervise and police our natural resources;
cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-
compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all
other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of
natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management
and disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve
as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-
classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with
appropriate agencies.[80] (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural
resources of the State, DENR exercises supervision and
control over alienable and disposable public lands. DENR also
exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain. Thus, DENR
decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or
not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR
before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay,
or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the
disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR
decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified
as alienable under Sections 6[81] and 7[82] of CA No. 141. Once
Page 43 of 64
DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so
classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of
a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that
then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned
Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the
reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with the
power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under
water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is
also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the
President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or
lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of
foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much
less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by
the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA
does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands
are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service,
lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public
domain. Only such an official classification and formal
declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition
under the Constitution, Title I and Title III[83] of CA No. 141 and
other applicable laws.[84]
PEAs Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands
shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public
Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that
reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the
government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: x x x.[85] (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,[86] the Court cited Section 48 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states that
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real
Property. Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by
the following: x x x.
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any
real property belonging to the Government. The Court declared
that -
It is not for the President to convey real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence. (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525
constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977,
provides that
The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of
Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and
construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated
November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation
covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed
and assigned to the ownership and administration of the
Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No.
1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and
respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the
rights and assume the obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or
incident to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the
Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity
with an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be
deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of
the Public Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or
agreements, including appropriate agreements with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines,
as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the
Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the Public
Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent
transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion
or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as
provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the
basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission
shall issue the corresponding certificate of title. (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on
February 14, 1979, provides that -
Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA which shall be responsible for its
administration, development, utilization or disposition in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the
sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085
or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085
merely transferred ownership and administration of lands
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared
Page 44 of 64
that lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by
PEA. EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of
its reclaimed lands in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084, the charter of PEA.
PEAs charter, however, expressly tasks PEA to develop,
improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease
and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government. [87] (Emphasis
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted
to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties
its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter
free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain does not apply to the sale of PEAs patrimonial
lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain to private individuals since, with the
legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition
against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations
since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly
prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including
government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the
reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the contractor
or his assignees (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to
private corporations but only to individuals because of the
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085
would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed
lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have
to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these
lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67
of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law
exempting PEA from holding a public auction. [88] Special Patent
No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority
of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. This is an
acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the
disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain
unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,
[89]
which authorizes PEA to determine the kind and manner of
payment for the transfer of its assets and properties, does not
exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No.
654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment,
whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA
to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is
required to sell valuable government property through public
bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
Section 79. When government property has become
unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall,
upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be
inspected by the head of the agency or his duly authorized
representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if
found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in
their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at
public auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of
the proper committee on award or similar body in the presence
of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of
the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the
Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive
days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the
value of the property does not warrant the expense of
publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three
public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In
the event that the public auction fails, the property may be
sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the
same committee or body concerned and approved by the
Commission.
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is
allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve
the selling price.[90] The Commission on Audit implements
Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular
No. 89-296[91] dated January 27, 1989. This circular
emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only
through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted
to only in case of failure of public auction.
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are
qualified to bid for PEAs reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are
barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the
Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a
condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250
hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the
Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional
reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder.[92] No one,
however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the
Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another
public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on
December 10, 1991.[93]
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered
not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares
still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to
reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated
contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.
[94]
The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991,
involving only 407.84 hectares,[95] is not a valid justification for
a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area
publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding
happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years
before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The
economic situation in the country had greatly improved during
the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code
Page 45 of 64
 The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear: Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease, x x x. Even Republic Act
No. 6957 (BOT Law, for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as
legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties,
recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957
states
Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction,
operation and maintenance of any infrastructure projects
undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer
arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions
of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid
in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other
non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant
of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to
the constitutional requirements with respect to the
ownership of the land: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical
reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also
mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments
in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer
in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation,
and Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private
Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates,
the repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or
percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate
constructed.
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not
contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the
constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically
apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local
Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government
Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can
only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed
land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of
the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares [96] of non-
agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in
view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This
is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the act of conveying the
ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA
transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands.
This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the
issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance
of title takes the subject land away from the land of public
domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private
property. In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the
issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding
certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the
Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In
support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following
rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,[97] where the
Court held
Once the patent was granted and the
corresponding certificate of title was issued, the
land ceased to be part of the public domain and
became private property over which the Director
of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,[98] where the Court
declared -
After the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title based
on a public land patent, the land covered
thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the
safeguards provided therein.
3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose
Aliwalas,[99] where the Court ruled -
While the Director of Lands has the power to
review homestead patents, he may do so only
so long as the land remains part of the public
domain and continues to be under his exclusive
control; but once the patent is registered and a
certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be
part of the public domain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction.
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[100] where
the Court held
When the lots in dispute were certified as
disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents
were issued covering the same in favor of the
private respondents, the said lots ceased to be
part of the public domain and, therefore, the
Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same.
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,[101] where the Court
stated
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of
President Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Medical Services, Department of Health, of the
whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration
under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant
is constitutive of a fee simple title or absolute
title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center.Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which
governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that Whenever
public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging
to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippines are alienated,
granted or conveyed to persons or to public or
Page 46 of 64
 private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land
Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become
registered lands.
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the
land patents and the corresponding certificates of titles issued
to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the
Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that
upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically
comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves
the registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare
public land granted by the National Government to Mindanao
Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of
Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare
public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and
other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a
public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-
hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center
under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example
of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the
land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title
issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to
any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to
cancel PEAs patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of
the instant petition is that PEAs certificates of title should
remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates,
being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold
to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529
does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of
the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but
is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of
the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration
does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration. [102] The registration of
lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself,
cannot convert public lands into private lands.[103]
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or
issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land cannot
apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of
the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the
provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent
No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the
Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby
granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the
aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which
are hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom
Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of
CA No. 141 prohibits, except when authorized by Congress,
the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are
transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA
No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a
statutory lien affecting title of the registered land even if not
annotated on the certificate of title. [104] Alienable lands of the
public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of
CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law
authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot
authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain because of the
constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in
accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into
private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public
domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands,
before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if
Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or
patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked
to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations
to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of
lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central
implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim
foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus,
EO No. 525 declares that
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency
Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are
ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in various parts of
the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with
national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to
the Governments declared policy to provide for a coordinated,
economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all
reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under proper
contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of
the National Government which shall ensure a
coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of
lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public
Estates Authority as a government corporation to
undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum
utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President
with continuing authority to reorganize the national government
including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and
offices.
Page 47 of 64
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do
hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of
the National Government. All reclamation projects shall be
approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA,
and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided,
that, reclamation projects of any national government agency
or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
xxx.
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed
lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are
not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it
disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private
lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when
qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands
become private lands. In the hands of the government
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are
still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEAs charter expressly states that
PEA shall hold lands of the public domain as well as any
and all kinds of lands. PEA can hold both lands of the public
domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable
lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are
transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of
title in PEAs name does not automatically make such lands
private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now
done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several
hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the
constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the
ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among
Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can acquire x
x x any and all kinds of lands. This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the
guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private
lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge
landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the
very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to
prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of
constitutional development in this country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more
than 1,024 hectares of public lands.[105] The 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of
public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally
reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once
registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically
become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws
authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the
Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without
losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No.
496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as
follows:
Act No. 496
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the x x x Government of the Philippine Islands are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or
private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands.
PD No. 1529
Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land
is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any
person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase conveyed to any
person in Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of
public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain granted, donated, or
transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision
of the Government, as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141,
may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to
Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is
expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141
that the land shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress. This provision refers to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain
that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or
encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The
need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the
public domain from becoming private land that can be
disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also
recognizes that lands of the public domain may be registered
under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of
the Code states
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real
Property. Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance
shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality,
Page 48 of 64
by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government
for expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the name of a
government corporation regulating port operations in the
country. Private property purchased by the National
Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in
the name of the government agency tasked to administer the
airport.Private property donated to a municipality for use as a
town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the
name of the municipality.[106] All these properties become
properties of the public domain, and if already registered under
Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is
no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-
registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use
under its power of eminent domain become unquestionably
part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No.
1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of
the National Government new certificates of title covering such
expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any
registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or taken by
eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising
such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a
certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or interest
expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the
nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest
taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register
of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate
shall be issued in favor of the National Government,
province, city, municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The
legal expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or
issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of
the authority taking the land or interest therein. (Emphasis
supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of
the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing
laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not
a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be
reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words
of AMARI, the Amended JVA is not a sale but a joint venture
with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost
incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction
works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the
Republic. Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint
venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA
to cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title
conveying AMARIs Land Share in the name of AMARI.[107]
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations
shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease. The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly
means that AMARI will hold the reclaimed lands other than by
lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a disposition of the
reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation
under CA No. 141,[108] the Government Auditing Code,[109] and
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal
system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the
public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public
domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to
law into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government
are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike
other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their
inherent potential as areas for public use or public
service. Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly
becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed
equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such
equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have
barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of
inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to
circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the
public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered
by certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private corporations
but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution
and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources
of the public domain until classified as alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service.
The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state,
the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas
are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares[111] of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may
reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
Page 49 of 64
 government can classify the reclaimed lands as Respondents. October 8,
alienable or disposable, and further declare 2008
them no longer needed for public service. Still,
the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of x---------------------------------------------
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view -----x
of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
domain. THE LANDOWNERS OF
BORACAY SIMILARLY
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409[112] of the ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to Petitioners,
law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are
inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must
perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and - versus -
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to
REGIONAL TECHNICAL
raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is grossly
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
disadvantageous to the government.
MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, AKLAN,
the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a Respondents.
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public x---------------------------------------------
Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development -----x
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is DECISION
hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED. REYES, R.T., J.:
EN BANC

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
their occupied lands.
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present:
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI,
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J.,
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING, There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R.
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO, No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that [2] of the
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,*
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES, Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA, petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR., Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
AUTHORITY, REYES,
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
BRION, JJ.
- versus - 1064[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated: The Antecedents
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Page 50 of 64
 Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time

G.R. No. 167707 immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and

paid realty taxes on them.[10]

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan,

with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No.

waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination.The 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay

island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants [4] who live in the beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified
[5]
bone-shaped islands three barangays. as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private

ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA)

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the

and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial

Reservation Survey of Boracay confirmation of imperfect titles.

Island,[6] which identified several lots as being occupied or

claimed by named persons.[7] The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was

Marcos issued Proclamation an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of
[8]
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not

caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential

marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, [11] as

Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the amended.

[9]
issuance of PTACircular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to

implement Proclamation No. 1801. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants

reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was

and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an governed by CA No. 141 and PD No.

application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable

of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen

Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, into ownership.

and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with

the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and

the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with

doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut

lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were

predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-

exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in

Page 51 of 64
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax ownership of lands.[19] The trial court cited Sections 87[20] and

purposes.[12] 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private

ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest

resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 reserve.[22]

posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the

lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion

submit the case for resolution upon submission of their was denied.[23] The Republic then appealed to the CA.

respective memoranda.[13]

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in

The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30,

WHEREFORE, in view of the
Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in
No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S.
this case and AFFIRMING the decision of
Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and the lower court.[24]

5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.

[15]
The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.[16] The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be

prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since

RTC and CA Dispositions time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was

favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading: similarly denied.[25] Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

WHEREFORE, in view of the

G.R. No. 173775
foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners
and those similarly situated to acquire title to On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No.
their lands in Boracay, in accordance with
the applicable laws and in the manner 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
prescribed therein; and to have their lands
Proclamation No. 1064[26] classifying Boracay Island into four
surveyed and approved by respondent
Regional Technical Director of Lands as the hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
approved survey does not in itself constitute
a title to the land. purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)

SO ORDERED.[17] hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The

Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for

their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for

Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned forest land protection purposes.

that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the

subject of disposition.[18] The Circular itself recognized private

Page 52 of 64
 On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr.
[27] [28] [29]
Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in G.R. No. 167707

Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,

mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.[30] They The OSG raises the lone issue of whether

allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any

rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated,

possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]

immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in

developing their lands and building internationally renowned

first class resorts on their lots.[31]

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural

I.
land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED
POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE
TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST
[32]
Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC
imperfect title.
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED
BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED
BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their

occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS
public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR
705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are OCCUPIED PORTIONS
OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public
III.
domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF
THEIR AREAS AS
for a positive government act in order to release the lots for ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SE
disposition. C 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-
REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO
OBTAIN TITLE UNDER
THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the
IV.
consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION
same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33] 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED
Issues BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE

Page 53 of 64
 CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION
1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141,
OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?
[35]
(Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private
claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to
secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin
petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not
involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive
acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902[36] in relation to Act No. 926,
later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No.
141;[37] (b) Proclamation No. 1801[38] issued by then President
Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 [39]
issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the
power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber. [40] Meanwhile, the
1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as
may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great leeway
for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the
1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be alienated.
[44]
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22,
2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and
administratively classified under any of these grand
divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
[47]
Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
State as part of the inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it
is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will
be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the
agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients
of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles
in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian
Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian
doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Page 54 of 64
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the and by lease (leasehold system). [62] It also provided the

public domain.[51] definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.

[63]
Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular

Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Government:[64]

Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles

and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]

x x x In other words, that the
phrase agricultural land as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly
from Spain which are not timber or
amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the mineral lands. x x x[65](Emphasis Ours)

Indies. It established possessory information as the method of

legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature

conditions which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration

Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or Act. The act established a system of registration by which

possessory information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and

Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.[66]

after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession

which must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine

its inscription.[57] However, possessory information title had to Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public

be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made

or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of

State.[58] imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It

permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the

regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive,

various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands

(2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was

estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]

purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory

information title. [59] On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926

was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the

The first law governing the disposition of public lands second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law

in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and

Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos

in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,

divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time

lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the disposal of immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]

mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)

Page 55 of 64
 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. an official proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land

141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In

CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable

governing the classification and disposition of lands of the lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited

public domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and and classified.[82]

privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the

under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who

the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable

1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act or disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption,
[72]
(RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land

prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
[73] [84]
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public

now provides for possession and occupation of the land domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
[74]
applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. subject of an application for registration is alienable, the

applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the

[75]
The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, government such as a presidential proclamation or an

1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
[76]
registration proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a

Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from

lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the the government that the land claimed to have been possessed

effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by

Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive

by Act No. 3344. order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was

presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied

updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration by private claimants were subject of a government

Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.Absent

registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot

the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants

chattel mortgages.[79] were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land

classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call

A positive act declaring land as alienable and for proof.[87]

disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of

State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of

that there must be a positive act of the government, such as Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands. Private

Page 56 of 64

claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There
is a statement in these old cases that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De
Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of
converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through
which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber,
mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when
the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands
of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At
that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.[91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late
Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,[92] in which it stated, through Justice
Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist
that a particular land need not be formally
released by an act of the Executive before it
can be deemed open to private ownership,
citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v.
Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were
decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by
the Philippine Commission on October 7,
1926, under which there was no legal
provision vesting in the Chief Executive or
President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber and agricultural so that the
courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were
vested with implicit power to do so,
depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.[93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases
under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a
presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum
in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the
lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown.[94]
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption
in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the
public domain had been automatically reclassified as
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of
imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those
already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and
disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and
totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches
only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of
Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No.
Page 57 of 64

926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their
land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end,
dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better
suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as
a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron,
this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General
admitted in effect that whether the particular
land in question belongs to one class or
another is a question of fact. The mere fact
that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to
declare that one is forestry land and the
other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the
minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for agriculture,
forestry, and mineral lands, and that in each
case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe
to say that in order to be forestry or mineral
land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which
it contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
(Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to
show that there exists some trees upon the
land or that it bears some mineral. Land may
be classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the
timber or mineral, be classified as
agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa,
by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the
discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be
differently classified tomorrow. Each case
must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its
present or future value for one or the
other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a majority of the lands
in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is
forestry or mineral land must, therefore,
be a matter of proof. Its superior value for
one purpose or the other is a question of
fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient
for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may
perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first
instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself
what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such
reservation is made. In the latter case,
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government,
by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148),
may decide for itself what portions of the
public domain shall be set aside and
reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos
vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson
vs. Director of Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis
ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine
the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except
those that have already became private lands.[96] Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No.
141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then,
courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied,
to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.[97]
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco
Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,[98] did not present a
justiciable case for determination by the land registration court
of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural
lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in
1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having
been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot
bank on Act No. 926.
Page 58 of 64
 We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707
Act No. 926, the
mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,[100] which first Public Land Act, was
passed in pursuance of
was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
the provisions of the
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was Philippine Bill of 1902. The
law governed the
already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular disposition of lands of the
public domain. It
Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, prescribed rules and
[102] regulations for the
and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]
homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the
public domain of the
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and
involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue conditions to enable
in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the persons to perfect their
titles to public lands in
general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether the Islands. It also
provided for the issuance
an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands,
an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 for the establishment of
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of of imperfect titles, and for
the cancellation or
the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural. confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in
the Islands. In short, the
Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that
Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands
mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to remained in the
government; and that the
the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
governments title to public
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other
apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did subsequent treaties
between Spain and the
not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, United States. The term
public land referred to all
or mineral.
lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in
Private claimants continued possession under the government and are
thrown open to private
Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is appropriation and
settlement, and excluded
alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued the patrimonial property of
the government and the
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite
friar lands.
period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 [106] ipso
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
may apply for a title in their name. possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court the lands are alienable and disposable.
[108]
(Emphasis Ours)
in Collado v. Court of Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate

opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.

Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

Page 59 of 64
 Except for lands already covered by existing
titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified
lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The
DENR[109] and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land
of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized
all unclassified lands of the public domain as
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as
a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose
and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered
public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a
forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with
the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been
partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have
[111]
built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;
island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public
forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and
the Constitution[112] classifying lands of the public domain
into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
[113]
underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. Forest lands do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
public
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified
as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. Unless
and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply. [115] (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a
dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of lands
of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a
legal status, a classification for legal purposes. [116] At any rate,
the Court is tasked to determine the legal status
of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence,
even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not
been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
that the agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No.
1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that
Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in
1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
Page 60 of 64
tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the
island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did
not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in
[117]
Circular No. 3-82 to private lands and areas declared as
alienable and disposable[118] does not by itself classify the
entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes
reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public
forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands
may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands
are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both
private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can
be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its
powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular
recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority
to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable
when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas
declared as alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed
the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify
the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also
explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island,
together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of
the public and private sectors in the development of the areas
tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the
marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.[119]
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not
only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves,
and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa
and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in
Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the
designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801,
all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide
open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is
clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which
positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and
opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of
CA No. 141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department head, who has the
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.[121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to
her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject
to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
[122]
Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified
until released and rendered open to disposition.[123]
Page 61 of 64

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400
hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of
agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-
meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and
trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was
nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about
the classification of Boracay Island made by the President
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to
make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No.
6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under
PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an
agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No.
6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
More specifically, the following
lands are covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and
disposable lands of
the public domain
devoted to or suitable
for
agriculture. No recla
ssification of forest
or mineral lands to
agricultural lands
shall be undertaken
after the approval of
this Act until
Congress, taking into
account ecological,
developmental and
equity
considerations, shall
have determined by
law, the specific limits
of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest
under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later
converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained
an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,[124] the Court stated that
unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land
classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests,
the fact that they were unclassified lands
leads to the same result.In the absence of
the classification as mineral or timber land,
the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition.
[125]
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only
to a reclassification of land. If the land had never been
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be
no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree
with the opinion of the Department of Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct
application of the prohibition in Section 4(a)
is the word reclassification. Where there has
been no previous classification of public
forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of
the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining
which are needed for forest purposes and
which are not] into permanent forest or
forest reserves or some other forest uses
under the Revised Forestry Code, there can
be no reclassification of forest lands to
speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in
Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural
Page 62 of 64
 lands without a prior law delimiting the limits
of the public domain, does not, and cannot, agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
apply to those lands of the public domain,
element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
denominated as public forest under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not been possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
previously determined, or classified, as
needed for forest purposes in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Forestry
Code.[127] We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the

petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for with the requisite period of possession.

judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No.

141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied The tax declarations in the name of private claimants

lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of

namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent

possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this

through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of Court that the period of possession and occupation

ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and commenced on June 12, 1945.

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable

land of the public domain.[128] Private claimants insist that they have a vested right

in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the

and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession

of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained and investments give them a vested right which cannot be

an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

The continued possession and considerable

Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of investment of private claimants do not automatically give them

imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to

926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This

absence of the second element of alienable and disposable Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the

land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and

present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for

and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in

clear from the wording of the law itself. [129] Where the land is Boracay even with their continued possession and

not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter considerable investment in the island.

how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[130]

One Last Note

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial

confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been

with respect to those lands which were classified as invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-

Page 63 of 64
word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important

also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people as economic progress.

have called the island their home. While the Court

commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our

apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it nations survival. Their promotion and protection are not just

should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral. fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that

become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice

they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:[134]

imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended,

The view this Court takes of the
this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, cases at bar is but in adherence to public
policy that should be followed with respect to
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as
forest lands. Many have written much, and
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial many more have spoken, and quite often,
about the pressing need for forest
investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without
does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. justification. For, forests constitute a vital
segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim now that absence of the necessary green
cover on our lands produces a number of
good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds
preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply
look into other modes of applying for original registration of are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust
title, such as by homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile
conditions imposed by law. topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
results. With erosion come the dreaded
floods that wreak havoc and destruction to
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle property crops, livestock, houses, and
highways not to mention precious human
private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations
should be written down in a lumbermans
exempt them from certain requirements under the present land decalogue.[135]
laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of

Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
law is for Congress to decide.

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R.
has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some

sectors which view the classification of the island partially into 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775
a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its

remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between

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