D.

Venue

1. Venue versus jurisdiction

UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION VS. CA G.R. NO. 119657FEB 7 1997

2. Venue of real actions

3. Venue of personal actions

4. Venue of actions against non-residents

5. When the rules on venue do not apply

6. Effects of stipulations on venue

E. Pleadings

1. Kinds of pleadings

a) Complaint

United Paragon vs. CA, G.R. No. 150959, August 4, 2006

Vicar International vs. FEB Leasing, G.R. 157195, April 22, 2005

Buan vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 75349, October 13, 1985

b) Answer

(i) Negative defenses

(ii) Negative pregnant

(iii) Affirmative defenses

c) Counterclaims

(i) Compulsory counterclaim

(ii) Permissive counterclaim

(iii) Effect on the counterclaim when the complaint is dismissed

d) Cross-claims

e) Third (fourth, etc.) party complaints

f) Complaint-in-intervention

g) Reply

2. Pleadings allowed in small claim cases and cases covered by the Rules on

Summary Procedure

3. Parts of a pleading

a) Caption

b) Signature and address

c) Verification and certification against forum shopping

 (i) Requirements of a corporation executing the

verification/certification of non-forum shopping

d) Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading

4. Allegations in a pleading

a) Manner of making allegations

(i) Condition precedent

(ii) Fraud, mistake, malice, intent, knowledge and other condition

of the mind, judgments, official documents or acts

b) Pleading an actionable document

c) Specific denials

(i) Effect of failure to make specific denials

(ii) When a specific denial requires an oath

5. Effect of failure to plead

a) Failure to plead defenses and objections

b) Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim

6. Default

a) When a declaration of default is proper

b) Effect of an order of default

c) Relief from an order of default

d) Effect of a partial default

e) Extent of relief

f) Actions where default are not allowed

HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 146262
January 21, 2005

JOHANNE J. PEA & ERLANA G. VDA. DE INOCENCIO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. No. 126275. November 11, 2004.
1) UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KUBOTA AGRI
MACHINERY PHILIPPINES, INC.

FACTS: On October 8, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters

Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of the
formers product in Samar and Leyte Provinces. The contract stipulated that all suits arising out
of the said Agreement shall be filed within the proper courts of Quezon City and that
UNIMASTERS was to obtain a credit line with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch
in the amount of P2, 000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA. Five years later,
UNIMASTERS filed an action on the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban against KUBOTA, Reynaldo
Go, and Metrobank for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order. On the same day the Trial Court issued a restraining order and set the
application for preliminary injunction for hearing. KUBOTA then filed-two motions, one prayed for
dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue, and the other for the transfer of the date
of the injunction hearing due to the unavailability of respondents counsel on the date first agreed
upon. Notwithstanding KUBOTAs claim that its motion to transfer hearing has been granted, the
Trial Court went ahead with the hearing on the injunction incident. On January 13, 1994, the Trial
Court handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for,
upon a bond of P2, 000,000.00. 3 And on February 3, 1994, the same Court promulgated an Order
denying KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. Both orders were challenged by KUBOTA by a petition of
certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. The Appellate Court agreed with KUBOTA. After its
motion for reconsideration was turned down by the CA, UNIMASTERS appealed to this Court.

The question is whether this stipulation had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an
optional venue and limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively
to Quezon City.

ISSUE: WON THE STIPULATION REGARDING THE VENUE HAD THE EFFECT OF
EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATING THE LATTER AS AN OPTIONAL VENUE AND LIMITING
LITIGATION BETWEEN UNIMASTERS AND KUBOTA ONLY AND EXCLUSIVELY TO
QUEZON CITY.

HELD: No. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the
parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place
selected by them, Quezon City or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire
and intention the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties
only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City,
at the option of the plaintiff. The invariable construction placed on venue stipulations is that they
do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably
limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively
at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to
be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule.
The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the venues mentioned in Rule 4,
or fix a place for their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not, without more,
suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one.

2) UNITED PARAGON MINING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Prior to the instant controversy, private respondent Cesario F. Ermita (Cesario, for brevity)
was a regular employee working as a foreman of petitioner United Paragon Mining Corporation
(UPMC, hereafter).

On January 18, 1996, Cesario received a termination letter bearing date January 16,
1996 and signed by UPMCs Personnel Superintendent, Feliciano M. Daniel,
informing Cesario that his employment as foreman is terminated effective thirty days after his
receipt of the letter. As stated in the letter, the termination was on account of Cesarios violation
of company rules against infliction of bodily injuries on a co-employee, it being alleged therein
that Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on a co-employee, a certain Jerry Romero, as well as for
unlawfully possessing a deadly weapon, a bolo, again in violation of company rules.

As a result of the termination, the matter was brought to the grievance machinery as mandated
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement existing at that time between UPMC and the United
Paragon Supervisors Union. Having failed to reach a settlement thereat, the parties agreed to
submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. Accordingly, the complaint for illegal dismissal was
referred to Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Murly P. Mendez of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board, Regional Branch No. V, LegaspiCity, whereat the same was docketed as VA Case No.
RB5-657-04-002-96.

On February 28, 1997, Voluntary Arbitrator Mendez rendered a decision[4] in Cesarios favor,
stating that although the procedural requirements in the termination of an employee had been
complied with, the termination of Cesario was unjustified because it was arrived at through gross
misapprehension of facts.

ISSUE: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION AFTER FINDING THAT THE PROPER REMEDY SHOULD HAVE BEEN A PETITION
FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE PETITION AFTER FINDING THAT THE VERIFICATION PORTION OF THE
PETITION WAS INEFFECTIVE AND INSUFFICIENT IN THE ABSENCE OF ALLEGATION OR
SHOWING THAT FELICIANO DANIEL, AS PERSONNEL SUPERINTENDENT WAS DULY
AUTHORIZED TO FILE THE PETITION;

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE PETITION AFTER FINDING THAT THE PETITION LACKS MERIT BECAUSE
IT DWELLED ON THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS WHICH IS NOT PROPER IN PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.

HELD: The recourse must have to be DENIED, no reversible error having been committed by the
CA in its challenged decision. We start with the basic concept that a corporation, like petitioner
UPMC, has no power except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those
that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through
its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. It has thus been observed
that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with its board of directors
that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by the
corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors. Given the reality that the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 44450 was filed by Daniel in behalf of and in representation of petitioner UPMC
without an enabling resolution of the latters board of directors, that petition was fatally defective,
inclusive of the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping executed by Daniel himself.
True, ample jurisprudence exists to the effect that subsequent and substantial compliance of a
petitioner may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice. But to merit
the Court's liberal consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying non-
compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of justice. Here, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure
to have the certification against forum shopping signed by its duly authorized officer. Instead, it
merely persisted in its thesis that it was not necessary to show proof that its Personnel
Superintendent was duly authorized to file that petition and to sign the verification thereof and the
certification against forum shopping despite the absence of the necessary board authorization,
thereby repeating in the process its basic submission that CA-G.R. SP No. 44450 is merely a
continuation of the proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator and that its Personnel
Superintendent was impleaded as one of the respondents in Cesarios complaint for illegal
dismissal.

3) Vicar International vs. FEB Leasing

FACTS: This controversy originated from a Complaint for unjust enrichment and damages, filed
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati by herein petitioner, Vicar International Construction, Inc.
(Vicar), against Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation)
and the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation filed
a Complaint against Vicar, Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John Doe, for a sum of money,
damages and replevin.

These Complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB by Vicar, a corporation engaged in
the construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. In obtaining the loans,
Deeds of Absolute Sale with a lease-back provision were executed by the parties. In those
Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the loan proceeds and,
at the same time, leased them back. For the total loan of P30,315,494, Vicar claims to have paid
FEB an aggregate amount of P19,042,908 in monthly amortizations.

Nevertheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of about P22,000,000,
despite the extrajudicial foreclosure of sixty-three (63) subdivision lots. These lots, comprising an
aggregate area of 20,300 square meters in Calamba, Laguna, were used by the corporation as
additional collateral. As a consequence, the auction sale produced P17,000,000 which, Vicar
claims, should have been applied to its loans.

In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders pertaining to the
possession/custody of eight (8) units of the subject equipment. In an Order dated August 2, 2002,
the regional trial court (RTC) quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and denied the
latters Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum shopping. In an Order
dated September 30, 2002, the RTC denied the corporations Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge. On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued
against the subject equipment.

CA dismissed petition.

ISSUES: Whether compelling reasons exist which warrant the liberal construction of the Petition
for Certiorari. Whether petitioners subsequent submission of the secretarys certificate is a
sufficient compliance with the requirement of the law.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED, and the appealed Resolutions are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lims authority from Vicar
to execute the said Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in
submitting its corporate secretarys Certificate attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicars
board of directors had unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its
president and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and to execute and sign x
x x the verification and certification against forum shopping.

The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition. Such
swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition
and execute the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner
Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion
of petitioners that it was only due to inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the
Secretarys Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari.

In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to
promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective,
the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal. Rules of procedure are but tools
designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.

4) BUAN vs. LOPEZ

FACTS: Petitioners claim to be five of about 130 "licensed and duly authorized vendors of x x x
religious articles, medicine herbs and plants around the quiapo church, x x x manila," bringing suit
"for themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves."[3] they allege that their licenses
"were revoked or cancelled (by respondent mayor) for reasons unknown to them which is
tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws," written notice of such
cancellation having been served on them on or about may 30 (actually may 3), 1986; that the
revocation of their licenses was beyond respondent mayor's competence, since section 171 (n)
of the local government code (b.p. Blg. 337) Authorizes the same only "for violation of the law or
ordinances or conditions upon which they have been granted," and no such violation had been
committed by them;[4] but this notwithstanding, respondent mayor "had given (them) an ultimatum
of 7:00 up to 12:00 o'clock in the afternoon" (of august 5, 1986) to vacate the premises where
their respective stalls are situated or suffer physical demolition thereof." [5]

In the light of the facts disclosed by the pleadings[6] and at the hearing of the case on august 13,
1986, the petition must be given short shrift.

The action must in the first place be abated on the ground of lis pendens, or more correctly, auter
action pendant; pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause.[7]

It appears that on july 7, 1986 there was filed in the regional trial court of manila, docketed as civil
case no. 86-36563, A special civil action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against acting
manila city mayor gemiliano lopez, jr.[8] it was filed by samahang kapatiran sa hanapbuhay ng
bagong lipunan, inc." (hereafter, simply "samahan") composed, according to the petition, of "some
300 individual owners and operators of separate business stalls x x x mostly at the periphery
immediately beyond the fence of the quiapo church." the president of the samahan is rosalina
buan and its press relations officer, liza ocampo.[9] rosalina buan and liza ocampo are two of the
five petitioners in the case at bar,[10] described in the petition before this court as suing "for
themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves": I.e., vendors "around the quiapo
church."[11] the three other petitioners also appear to be samahan members. [12]

The petition in case no. 86-36563 Is grounded on the sane facts as those in the case at bar: the
members of the samahan had been legitimately engaged "in their respective business of selling
sundry merchandise, more particularly religious articles, flowers and ornamental plants, and
medicinal herbs"; they had been religiously paying "the corresponding license and permit fees
imposed by prevailing ordinances of the city of manila," but this notwithstanding they had been
given written notice dated may 3, 1986 emanating from the mayor's office, advising of the
cancellation of their permits and their possible relocation to another site; and these acts "are
unjust, illegal, arbitrary, oppressive and constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent."

There thus exists between the action before this court and rtc case no. 86-36563 Identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the
two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.

ISSUE: W/NOT THERE IS FORUM SHOPPING

HELD: Petition dismissed as there was a clear case of forum shopping. It would seem that after
the filing by rosanna buan and liza ocampo (president and press relations officer, respectively, of
the quiapo church vendors' association known as the samahan) of the petition in this case, "for
themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves" (I.e., the members of the samahan,
who are vendors in the area of quiapo church) they came to the belated realization that in view of
the pendency of the identical action filed by them in the regional trial court (case no. 86-36563),
They were vulnerable to the accusation of "forum shopping," and thus amenable to its dire
consequences. This explains the filing in this court by their lawyers of a "manifestation with
affidavit of withdrawal" on august 11, 1986,[17] another "manifestation and motion" on august 29,
1986, and an "urgent manifestation and motion to strike-out the name rosalina buan and liza
ocampo" on september 13, 1986. In these manifestations the claim is made that the five (5)
petitioners in the action before this court who are members of the samahan.

Yet another reason exists for the denial of the petition. Not one of the petitioners or the "others
similarly situated as themselves" had a valid and subsisting license or permit as of the date of the
filing of their petition in this court, august 5, 1986, all licenses and permits having expired prior
thereto.[20] this is confirmed by the few receipts submitted by petitioners[21] which all set out expiry
dates before august 5, 1986. The petitioners thus have no basis whatever to postulate a right to
ply their trade in the quiapo area or elsewhere. The argument that the non-renewal by the
municipal authorities of their licenses was in effect a cancellation or revocation thereof without
cause is puerile

Finally, the action for prohibition has become moot and academic by the occurrence of the acts
sought to be inhibited. The petitioners' permits and licenses have all expired; hence, there can
be no occasion whatsoever to speak of the inhibition of any revocation or cancellation
thereof. And the "physical demolition of their respective business stalls" has already been
consummated.