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BELARMINO, Anna Katrina A.

2013400069
Land Titles and Deeds Atty. Palabrica

CASE DIGEST:

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

FACTS:
On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. To prove such, Malabanan presented during trial a
certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR. The RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for registration.
The OSG appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto, the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to
the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that
the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Malabanan established that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
RULING: No. the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, to wit:
BELARMINO, Anna Katrina A.
2013400069
Land Titles and Deeds Atty. Palabrica

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
In sum, these are the rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong
to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) Exceptions:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of
the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of
the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has
become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for
public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and
are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua
non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
BELARMINO, Anna Katrina A.
2013400069
Land Titles and Deeds Atty. Palabrica

CASE DIGEST:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SOGOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION


G.R. No. 175760 February 17, 2016

FACTS:
On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration and confirmation of land title
over Lot No. 2533, Cad. 827-D with an area of 23,896 square meters and situated in Brgy. Tabunok,
Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu. Sogod claimed that it purchased the land from Catalina Rivera
per deed of absolute sale dated October 28, 1996 and averred that by itself and through its predecessors-
in-interest, it had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
land since June 12, 1945. On February 11, 2000, the OSG moved to dismiss the petition on the ground
that Sogod was disqualified from applying for original registration of title to alienable lands pursuant to
Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. On September 19, 2000, the Regional Executive Director
of the DENR Region VII filed an Opposition on the ground that the land was previously forest land and
"was certified and released as alienable and disposable only on January 17, 1986." Thus, it could not be
registered without violating Section 48, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Sogod also presented witnesses Celedonio
Campos, Jr., Bonifacia Sugarol, and Ranito Quadra to prove its ownership and possession of the land.
According to their testimonies, the land "was originally in the possession of Ignacia Rivera, the mother of
Catalina." "Catalina inherited this land from her mother." On October 28, 1996, Catalina sold the land to
Sogod. "A tax clearance dated July 30, 1999 was issued by the Office of the Municipal Treasurer,
certifying that all taxes over the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 043 6156 had been paid."
"Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 11096 A was issued in the name of Sogod." The Office of the Solicitor
General did not present any controverting evidence.

ISSUES:
Whether the occupation of forest land prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land
may be considered for purposes of complying with the requirements for judicial confirmation of title
Whether respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property in the manner
and length of time required by law

RULING:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title ,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
BELARMINO, Anna Katrina A.
2013400069
Land Titles and Deeds Atty. Palabrica

This court in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, has clarified that the fixed date of June 12, 1945
qualifies possession and occupation, not land classification, as alienable and disposable. The agricultural
land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

We proceed to the second issue relating to the sufficiency of evidence showing the nature and length of
respondent's possession over the land. As a rule, factual findings of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are binding on this court. Petitioner did not show the existence of any exceptions for us to depart
from this rule.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondent applicant had sufficiently proved its and its
predecessors-in-interest's continuous possession of the land tracing back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Possession since 1945 was established through testimonies of respondents' witnesses, the unbroken chain
of tax declarations in the name of Catalina Rivera, the person from whom respondent bought the property
in 1996, and a certification from the municipal treasurer that all previous taxes had been paid. Tax
declarations or realty tax payments constitute at least proof that the holder has a sincere and honest claim
of title over the property. Moreover, witness Bonifacia Sugarol, the owner of the adjoining land, stated
that the land was owned by Ignacia Rivera and inherited by Catalina; and the land was planted with corn
and had many tenants.

Thus, respondent had established (by itself and through its predecessor-in-interest) its possession in the
concept of owner of the property since 1945. It is further undisputed that the property was declared
alienable and disposable in 1986 prior to respondent's filing of its application in 1999. 91 The Court of
Appeals, therefore, did not err in affirming the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Decision granting
respondent's application for original registration of title.

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