ALVAREZ v.

INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT

G.R. No. L-68053, 7 May 1990

FACTS:

The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B
which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot
773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes.
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children and grandchildren, herein private respondents.

It is on record that on May 19, 1938 and September 6, 1938 Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B,
respectively, were registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago. Fortunato D. Santiago eventually
sold the two lots to Monico Fuentebella which was eventually sold to Rosendo Alverez.

The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the return of the ownership and possession of the lots,
and prayed for an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint,
and that the share or money equivalent due the heirs be delivered to them, and damages. During the
pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.

ISSUE:

Are the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez liable to the respondents, Yaneses, for damages for the
properties sold by their late father (in bad faith while there was a case pending) to Dr. Siason even
though the heirs of Alvarez have not inherited the property involved herein?

RULING:

YES. Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction
on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children
and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. Art. 776. The
inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.

Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property received from the decedent.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That
petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the
monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have
ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the
estate.

GEVERO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 77029 30 August 1990

FACTS:

Respondent corporation purchased a parcel of land from one Luis Lancero, and the latter
purchased the same on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was
duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the
mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2 share and her
children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2
undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters. Teodorica Babangha died long
before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned.

The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17, 1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement
and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476.
By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica
Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly
approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to
Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966.
Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to
quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.

ISSUE:

Is the right to succession deemed to have transmitted only from the date of the execution of
an extrajudicial partition thereby rendering the sale of the land to respondent invalid?

RULING:

NO. The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577
[1972]). Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were
transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966,
the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his
mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited
from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
 LOCSIN v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 89783 19 February 1992

FACTS:

During the lifetime of Dona Catalina Locsin, she executed a will affirming and ratifying the
transfer she made during her lifetime in favour of her husband and her own own relatives. After the
will was read all relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to probate. Six years after the
death of testatrix some of her nephews and nieces (surnamed Jaucian) who had already received
their legacies and hereditary shares from the estate filed an action to recover the properties which
the testatrix conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, averring that the same were inofficious,
without consideration and intended to circumvent the laws on succession. Both the RTC and CA
decided the case in favour of Locsins. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Are private respondents, nephew and nieces of testatrix entitled to inherit the properties
which she had already disposed of ten years before her death?

RULING:

NO. The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she
had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not form
part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at
the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession." The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and
do not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed
to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to
which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate
at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all,
treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the
reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since
neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. All that the respondents had was an
expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to
the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may
not invoke:

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of
himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be
reduced on petition of any person affected.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment
and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had
been consummated, and six (6) years after Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after
the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, whether considered an action
based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents
may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive
notice thereof to them and the whole world.

OPULENCIA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. 125835 30 July 1998

FACTS:

In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo Aladin Simundac and
Miguel Oliven (private respondents) alleged that Natalia Opulencia (petitioner) executed in their
favor a CONTRACT TO SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters
located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of
P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the
contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her
contractual obligations and to further pay damages, attorneys fee and litigation expenses.
Opulencia put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract
formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioners father), in respect of which a petition for
probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed,
the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not
approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to
return the downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it; that
[private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in
payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract. With
these defenses, Opulencia denies the validity and efficacy of the contract to sell.

ISSUE:

Is the Contract to Sell dated February 3, 1989 executed by the petitioner and private
respondents without the requisite probate court approval valid

RULING:

The contract is VALID. Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of
the decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her
father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the
petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late
father. Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of hereditary property is deemed
to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance be accepted. upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate
while it remains undivided. Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others,
sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano
Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may
be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
 EMILIO EMANCE v. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO,
VICENTE WILLAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA,
ROSELA TABANAO AND VINCENT TABANAO
G.R. No. 126334 23 November 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Emilio Emance, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a
business known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January 1986, they decided to dissolve
their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership
properties among them, consequent to Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership. Throughout
the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimely demise, petitioner failed
to submit to Tabanaos heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render
accounting of the partnership finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to
Tabanaos heirs the deceaseds 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. Consequently,
Tabanaos heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of
shares division of assets and damages. Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente
Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix
of his estate.

ISSUE:

In the absence of an appointment as administratrix or executrix of an estate, does a surviving

spouse (and other heirs) have legal capacity to sue on behalf of the estate of the deceased spouse?

RULING:

YES. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of the surviving spouse as
executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As
successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any
action originally pertaining to the decedent. She and her children are complainants in their own
right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of the death of the decedent, his
rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (CIVIL CODE, Art. 777).
Whatever claims and rights the deceased had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted
to his heirs by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted. Respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the
moment Vicente Tabanao died. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand
fulfillment of petitioners obligations were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the
capacity to sue and seek the courts intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
 RABADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725 29 June 2000

FACTS:

Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of a parcel of land in Bacolod. Devisee herein is the predecessor-in-
interest of the petitioner. The codicil was duly probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros
Occidental. The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and
rights shall be inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver
75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza,
and should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his
heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the
obligation to deliver the piculs. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and children
(pet).In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the
codicil and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES:

1. Did the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla inherited his obligations under the Codicil
2. Was there a substitution?

RULING:

1. YES. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

2. NONE. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of
the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide
for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should
die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon
contemplates neither of the two. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. In a fideicommissary
substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later
to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister
of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission
to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the
testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing. Under Article 863, the
second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one
degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the
first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near
descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

TANEDO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104482 22 January 1996

FACTS:

On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of
his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latters wife, Teresita Barera, whereby he conveyed to the
latter in consideration of P1,500.00, one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of
the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac, the said property being his future inheritance
from his parents. Upon the death of his father, Lazaro executed an Affidavit of Conformity dated
February 28, 1980 to re-affirm, respect, acknowledge and validate the sale he made in 1962. On
January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
covering his undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191. He acknowledged
therein his receipt of P 10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that
Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated
December 29, 1980. On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor
in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
166451.

ISSUE:

Is a sale of future inheritance valid?

RULING: NO. Pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a
future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. Consequently, said contracts made
in 1962 conveying one (1) hectare of his future inheritance is not valid and cannot be the source of
any right nor the creator of any obligation between parties. Hence, the affidavit of conformity dated
February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale is also useless and in the
words of the respondent Court, suffers the same infirmity.
 SANTOS vs. LUMBAO
G.R. No. 169129 28 March 2007

FACTS:

Herein petitioners, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita
Catoc Santos. Herein respondents Spouses Lumbao are the alleged owners of a lot (subject property),
which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime. The facts of the present case are as
follows: On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao
the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc.
Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate through a document
denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa. After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses
Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been
occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property,
respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and
thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the
issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents insofar as the subject property is concerned.
Respondents alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could
not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-
heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. After the death of Rita, petitioners executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the
estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents.

ISSUE:

Are petitioner heirs legally bound to comply with the Bilihan ng Lupa that was supposedly
executed by the late Rita Catoc?

RULING:

YES. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-
in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear
from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property
were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs
cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest
because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed
to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding
as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves
a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of
the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other
party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.
 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. ALMEIDA
G.R. No. 162784 22 June 2007

FACTS:

The Land Tenure Administration (now the National Housing Authority), awarded to Margarita
Herrera several portions of land evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. Margarita Herrera had
two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (mother of the private respondent) and Francisca Herrera.
Beatriz predeceased her mother and left heirs. After Margaritas death, Francisca executed a Deed of
Self-Adjudication, claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter
of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of Margarita. The Deed of Self
Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay allegedly executed by Margarita, wherein she
stated that it was Francisca who continued paying for the subject portions of land and that she
conveys said portions of land to Francisca. It was also stated that the Sinumpaang Salaysay shall
take effect upon the death of Margarita. The surviving heirs of Beatriz filed a case for annulment of
the Deed of Self Adjudication. The CFI declared the deed as null and void. However, during the trial
of the case for annulment of the Deed, Francisca filed an application with the NHA to purchase the
same portions of land submitting therewith a copy of the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by her
mother. Private respondent Almeida protested the application. The NHA granted the application.
When Francisca died, her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca.
Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of Franciscas heirs. The RTC and the
CA both ruled that the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not an assignment of rights to Francisca but a
disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. They also held that said document must
first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.

ISSUE:

Is the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Margarita Herrera her last will?

RULING:

YES. The NHA should have noted that the Sinumpaang Salaysays effectivity commences at
the time of death of the author of the instrument; in Margaritas words sakaling akoy bawian na
ng Dios ng aking buhay Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be
hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of a
will or by operation of law, as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code. By considering the document,
petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant (Margarita) has already passed away.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on February 5,
1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering
that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate
including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of
the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita
Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so
as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation
of law.
 The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita
Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise,
this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on
both parties Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's
obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.

If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the
NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already
initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the
law on sales and obligations.

When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as
the next "person likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price.

CONDE V. ABAYA
G.R. No. 4275 23 March 1909

FACTS:

Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died. Paula
Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by
Casiano Abaya, moved the settlement of' the said intestate succession. Roman Abaya, brother of
Casiano, was appointed as administrator claiming himself as the nearest relative of the deceased.
Roman Abaya moved that the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion
of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all
the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him.

Paula Conde, in reply, claims that her right was superior and moved for a hearing of the matter, and,
in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her
together with the corresponding products thereof. The trial held that the administrator of the estate
of Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano
Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with
respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby
declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the
administrator, Roman Abaya.

ISSUE:

Is an action for acknowledgment by a natural child transmissible as a portion of his

inheritance to his ascendants or descendants?
RULING:

NO. As a general rule, the right of action of a child to enforce recognition of its legitimacy
lasts during the lifetime of such child, but the right of a natural child to compel acknowledgment of
its status continues only during the life of the alleged parents. The right of action for a declaration
of legitimacy is transmitted to the heirs of the child only when - the latter dies during minority or
while insane, or in case the action has already been instituted. On the other hand an action by a
natural child can only be brought against the heirs of the parents in the event of the death of the
parents during the minority of the child, or upon the discovery of a document, after the death of the
parents, expressly acknowledging such child. This right of action which the law concedes to this
natural child is not transmitted to his ascendants or descendants. Therefore, the respective corollary
of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of action which devolves upon the child
to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated
in the said article; (2) That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which
article 137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in
any case, not even as an exception. It is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not
one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no
part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity to
establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of
the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's inheritance, it is necessary
that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present, since without them, the
right that the child held during his lifetime, being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore,
as a general rule not susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his
death. Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for
the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his
death, and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.

PAMPLONA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-33187 31 March 1980

FACTS:

Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they
acquired adjacent lots 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba,
Laguna. The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6)
children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto. Ursulo
Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo,
Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto. Marta Moreto died also intestate on
April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza. La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17,
1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all
surnamed Mendoza. Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff
Josefina Moreto. Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his
brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein. On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega
died intestate in Calamba, Laguna. On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his
wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife
Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be
effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed
of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale contained a description of lot
No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No.
14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was
acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and
a new transfer certificate of title no. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married
to Apolonia Onte.

After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona
and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at
the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter,
Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house
within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano
Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square
meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495
appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale although the fact is that the said portion sold
thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496. From 1956 to 1960, the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house and they even constructed a piggery
corral at the back of their said house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of
lot 1496. On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on
the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that
Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same
belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already
dead when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica.
The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by
them and hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration
of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 as regards one-half of the property subject matter
of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the
plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. After a relocation of lots
1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out that there was mutual error
between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the
said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a
portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale
transaction.

ISSUE:

Does Moreto have the right to sell the property without the consent of the wifes heirs,
considering that the subject property is part of the conjugal partnership and that the sale was made
when the wife was already dead?

RULING:

YES. The Court held that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already
dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano
Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of
the New Civil Code is applicable. The Court held that there was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781
sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and also that
whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
The Court rejected CAs pronouncement that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as to the
other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more
than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the
vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as
vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be
erectd without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, the Court ruled that a factual
partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against
the vendees petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor
Flaviano Moreto. Lastly, equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the
deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed
by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00 and which he, including
his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano
Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and
1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transferring
the ownership of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein
private respondents. Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property
rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311,
paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took
effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein.
Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver in full ownership the
whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation of their
predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with
said obligation. The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners
for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by
private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance
of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO
G.R. No. 84450 4 February 1991

FACTS:

Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of
robbery. As Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his parents.
Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police headquarters and was informed about
the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police investigators if something could be done to
determine the source of the marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other minors
in the community. The police then sought the help of Francisco Manalo. Previous to the case of
Pierre Pangan was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives and
for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him. Aside from said case,
accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon
and other crimes against property. Manalo agreed to help in the identification of the source of the
marijuana. Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which he allegedly bought from the
accused Gloria Umali. Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article
1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The lower court rendered a decision finding accused Gloria
Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant denied the findings of the lower court and
insisted that said court committed reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness
Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be
taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and
because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood. The
plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing
several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its
material respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers.

ISSUE:

Is a person facing several criminal charges disqualified from being a witness?

RULING:

NO. The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account
Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons convicted of falsification of a document,
perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." Since the witness
Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the abovementioned crimes to disqualify him as a
witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, the Court ruled that the fact that said
witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a
witness. The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence
that he was actuated by improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness
Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

TEOPISTA DOLAR v. FIDEL DIANCIN

G.R. No. L-33365 20 December 1930

FACTS:

The will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was denied probate in the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo on the sole ground that the thumbmarks appearing thereon were not the thumbmarks of the
testator. Disregarding the other errors assigned by the proponent of the will, we would direct
attention to the third error which challenges squarely the correctness of this finding. The will in
question is alleged to have been executed by Paulino Diancin at Dumangas, Iloilo, on November 13,
1927. A thumbmark appears at the end of the will and on the left hand margin of each of its pages
in the following manner: "Paulino Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro Diamante." The witnesses to the will
were the same Pedro Diamante, Inocentes Deocampo, and Juan Dominado. The will is detailed in
nature, and disposes of an estate amounting approximately to P50,000.
ISSUE:

Is the disputed will valid despite the fact that there was a thumbmark instead of a signature
in the will?

RULING:

YES. The requirement of the statute that the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only the
customary written signature but also by the testator's or testatrix' thumbmark. Expert Testimonyas
to the identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course admissible. The method of identification
of fingerprints is a science requiring close study .Where thumb impressions are blurred and many
of the characteristic marks far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated
by experts as showing the identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the court is justified in
refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in substituting its own opinion that a distinct
similarity in some respects between the admittedly genuine thumbmark and the questioned
thumbmarks, is evident .This we do here.

There is another means of approach to the question and an obvious one. The three
instrumental witnesses united in testifying concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the will. It was stated that in addition to the testator and themselves, on other person, Diosdado
Dominado, was present. This latter individual was called as a witness by the oppositors to the will to
identify Exhibit 8. He was later placed on the witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal, and
thereupon declared positively that he was the one who prepared the will for the signature of Paulino
Diancin; that the thumbmarks appearing on the will were those of Paulino Diancin, and that he saw
Paulino Diancin make these impressions. The testimony of a witness called by both parties is worthy
of credit. We reach the very definite conclusion that the document presented for probate as the last
will of the deceased Paulino Diancin was, in truth, his will, and that the thumbmarks appearing
thereon were the thumbmarks of the testator .Accordingly, error is found, which means that the
judgment appealed from must be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the will ordered admitted to probate,
without special finding as to costs in this instance.

YAP TUA v. YAP KA KUAN

G.R. No. 6845 1 September 1914

FACTS:

In 1909, Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be
admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears
that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo
Paez. The judge ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be allowed and
admitted to probate. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will,
upon the giving of a bond, the amount of which was to be fixed later. In 1910, Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said
will and desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in
the cause. The court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. In his motion, he
alleged the following: First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate
by order of the court on the 29th day of September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons: (a)
Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes. (b)
Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then
mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness. (c) Because her signature to the will
had been obtained through fraud and illegal influence upon the part of persons who were to receive
a benefit from the same, and because the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of
executing the same. Second. That before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null,
the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed another will, with all the formalities required by
law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909. Third. That the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu were minors
and that, even though they had been negligent in presenting their opposition to the legalization of
the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age. Upon the foregoing facts the court
was requested to annul and set aside the order allowing and admitting the will to probate.

ISSUE:

Did Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use
of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909?

RULING:

YES. While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one
Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the other
hand, there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the
execution of the will, to influence her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity
to see, to hear, and to note the witnesses during their examination reached the conclusion that a
preponderance of the evidence showed that no undue influence had been used. While the testimony
of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet,
nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the
will in question. Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her
signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her
possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a
preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound
mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. Also, the
mere fact that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not execute a later will. She had a
perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the
very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of
her former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke
all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will.

In another assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, in her first will was not identical with that which appears in her second
will. Several witnesses testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses
testified that she had written her full name. The Court is of the opinion that if Tomasa Elizaga Yap
Caong signed any portion of her name to the will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will
amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the
same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will
is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then certainly the
writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her intention to
execute the will. With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said that during the trial
of the cause, the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not
sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their
presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is considerable conflict of
proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the witnesses in one room and by
Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof
and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below
the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the
lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was
possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute
that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses
must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet,
nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the
signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may
see the signatures placed upon the will. Upon a full consideration of the record, the Court finds that
a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and
voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.

EUTIQUIA AVERA v. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 15566 14 September 1921

FACTS:

In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one
Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez. Upon the date appointed
for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified
that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time
in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the
person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not
introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.

When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose
testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the
testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. Judge found that the
testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the
will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate. From this judgment an
appeal was taken in behalf of the persons contesting the will.

ISSUES:

1. Whether a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single
attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two; and
2. Whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the
testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will
instead of the left margin.

RULING:

1. NO. (But in this case, it was admitted to probate, read below). All three witnesses must be produced.
While it is undoubtedly true that an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only one of
the three attesting witnesses, nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291, this court
declared after an elaborate examination of the American and English authorities that when a contest
is instituted, all of the attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process
of the court. In the present case no explanation was made at the trial as to why all three of the
attesting witnesses were not produced, but the probable reason is found in the fact that, although
the petition for the probate of this will had been pending from December 21, 1917, until the date set
for the hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal contest was entered until the very day set for the
hearing; and it is probable that the attorney for the proponent, believing in good faith the probate
would not be contested, repaired to the court with only one of the three attesting witnesses at hand,
and upon finding that the will was contested, incautiously permitted the case to go to proof without
asking for a postponement of the trial in order that he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance may explain why the three witnesses were not produced, it does not in
itself supply any basis for changing the rule expounded in the case above referred to; and were it
not for a fact now to be mentioned, this court would probably be compelled to reverse this case on
the ground that the execution of the will had not been proved by a sufficient number of attesting
witnesses. It appears, however, that this point was not raised by the appellant in the lower court either
upon the submission of the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing
of the motion for a new trial. Accordingly it is insisted for the appellee that this question cannot now
be raised for the first time in this court. We believe this point is well taken, and the first assignment
of error must be declared not be well taken. This exact question has been decided by the Supreme
Court of California adversely to the contention of the appellant, and we see no reason why the same
rule of practice should not be observed by us. Estate of McCarty, 58 Cal., 335, 337.

2. NO. The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated In Re will of
Abangan 40 Phil., 476, 479, where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avancea, in a case
where the signatures were placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said: The object of
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud,
to avoid substitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. In the
case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as attendant
upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to
invalidate the instrument.
 NAYVE v. MOJAL AND AGUILAR
G.R. No. 21755 29 December 1924

FACTS:

The Court of First Instance of Albay ordered the probate of the will, holding that the
document in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance
with law. The defects attributed to the will are: (a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator
and the witnesses on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the
document not being paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear
to have signed all the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested
and signed all the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Attestation Clause: "In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig,
Albay, Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed of
four sheets, including the next: "ANTONIO MOJAL " (Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio
Mojal to be his last will and testament in the presence of each of us, and at the request of said testator
Don Antonio Mojal, we signed this will in the presence of each other and of the testator.) "PEDRO
CARO "SlLVERIO MORCO "ZOILO MASINAS"

ISSUE:

Is the will valid?

RULING:

YES. Where each and every page upon which the will is written was signed by the testator
and the witnesses, the fact that the signatures on each page do not all appear on the left margin
thereof does not detract from the validity of the will. Paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters
is within the spirit of the law, and is just as valid as paging with letters. The number of sheets or
pages of which the will is composed must be stated in the attestation clause (Uy Coque vs. Navas L.
Sioca, 43 Phil., 405); but where such a fact appears at the end of the will so that no proof aliunde is
necessary of the number of its sheets, then the failure to state in the attestation clause the number
of the pages of the instrument does not invalidate it. The attestation clause must state the fact that
the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be
proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. But the fact that the testator and
the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere examination of
the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does
not invalidate the will.
 PROBATE OF THE LATE REV. P. ELEUTERIO PILAPIL v. PILAPIL CALIXTO AND OTHERS
G.R. No. L-47931 27 June 1941

FACTS:

P. Eleuterio Pilapil, the parish priest of Mualboal of Cebu Province, died on December 6,
1935. No will has been presented after his death, at least until early February 1939. A part of the will
states that:

ART. SECOND: I hereby certify that this Last Will and Testament, which confirms, affirms and
assures the legitimacy of documents for my buyers granted consists of two items; contains
sixteen provisions and is written on three pages; x x x x x x x x x

Also at the bottom of the pages (1) and (2) are respectively the notes: "Go to 2. Pages", "go to 3. Pages".

ISSUE:

Is the will NOT valid because the attestation clause does not state the number of pages upon
which the will was written?

RULING:

NO. The will is valid. First translation: The court held that this deficiency was cured by the
will itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three pages. Second
translation: The court held that the law has been substantially complied with inasmuch as in the body
of the will and on the same page wherein the attestation clause appears written it is expressly stated
that will contains three pages each of which was numbered in letters and in figures.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA v. ALIPIO ABAJA

G.R. No. 147145, 31 January 2005

FACTS:

Alipio Abada (Abada) died sometime in May 1940, while his widow died sometime in 1943.
Both died without legitimate children. Respondent Alipio Abaja (respondent) filed before the RTC a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja and Rosario Cordova. Respondent is the son
of Eulogio Abaja. Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed to the petition on the ground that Abada
left no will when he died. He further alleged that assuming a will was really executed, the same should
be disallowed on the ground, among others, that it was not executed and attested as required by law.
The nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada also opposed based on the same grounds that
Caponong alleged. The RTC allowed the probate of the will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of
the RTC. Hence, this petition. Petitioner Caponong primarily based the arguments on Article 804 and
806 of the New Civil Code. Article 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will,
or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

ISSUE:

Was the will executed and attested in accordance with the law?

RULING:

YES. Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Old Civil
Code (Civil Code of 1889) and the Code of Civil Procedure, which governed the execution of the
wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code. Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are
new provisions. Relevant provision: Article 795. The validity of the will as to its form depends upon
the observance of the law in force at the time it is made. Caponong pointed out that nowhere in the
will can one discern that Abada knew the Spanish language. This contention must fail, as there is no
statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in
the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Respondent testified that Abada
used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his
companions would talk in Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish
language. The Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code
of Civil procedure, the intervention of a notary public is not necessary in the execution of any will.
Therefore, Abadas will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public. Moreover, a
scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. Caponong argued that the attestation
clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On this point, the Court applies the rule on
substantial compliance. While the attestation clause does not state the number of witnesses, a close
inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it. If the surrounding circumstances point
to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion
of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may
suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. The Court explained the
extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus: They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill
a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself.
They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or
to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation
eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.

CANEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103554 28 May 1993

FACTS:

Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life,
executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses.
The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public.
 Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The testator passed away before his petition could
finally be heard by the probate court. Petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator,
instituted a second petition for the intestate proceeding of Mateos estate, had their said petition
consolidated with the first petition aforementioned and opposed the probate of the testator's will
and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate, claiming that the will in question is
null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically
state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their
presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another. The contested attestation clause are reproduced below: We, the undersigned
attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our
respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO
CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the
Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as
his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for
his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of
each and all of us. The attestation clause is subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of
each page by the three attesting witnesses.

ISSUE:

Is the absence of the statement \that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another in the attestation clause fatally defective?

RULING:

YES. Under the third paragraph of Article 805, an attestation clause, the complete lack of
which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the number of the pages used upon
which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. The
Court stresses that under Article 809, i.e., the substantial compliance rule, the defects and
imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed
therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the
will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the
manner of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an
examination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written. The
foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but
the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will. The rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal
and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

CODOY v. CALUGAY
G.R. No. 123486 12 August 1999

FACTS:

Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seno Vda. Ramonal, filed with the RTC for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. Respondents claimed that deceased
was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, there was no fraud,
undue influence and duress and the will was written voluntarily. Egneia Codoy and Manuel Ramonal
filed an opposition to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and
that same is even illegible. It gives the impression that a third hard of an interested party executed
the holographic will. Codoy and Ramonal argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing
on the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed
the will, the dates and signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done.

The lower court denied the petition for probate of the document. On Appeal, the decision of
the lower court was reversed. The CA held, citing J.B.L. Reyes, xxx even if the genuineness of the
holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can
not be interpreted as to require compulsory presentation of 3 witnesses to identify the handwriting
of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may been present at the
execution of the holographic will, none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence
of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.
xxx but it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of
ordinary testaments, precisely because of the presence of at least 3 witnesses at the execution of
ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity. Where the will is holographic, no witness
need be present and the rule requiring production of witnesses must be deemed merely permissive
if absurd results are to be avoided.

ISSUE:

Is Article 811 of the Civil Code mandatory?

RULING:

YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that
the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory. Laws are enacted to
achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief it aims to prevent. In the case at bar,
the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the
possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the
wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration is to determine the true intent of the deceased.
We cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator,
which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the
will as in the handwriting of the deceased. It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the
respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. The Court
of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of a
contested holographic will. Moreover, the will was found not in the personal belongings of the
deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at
comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked
Ms. Binanay to compare the documents, which contained the signature of the deceased with that of
the holographic will, and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the formal lawyer of the deceased
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. A visual examination
of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other
documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not
readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. Comparing the signature in
the holographic will and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for
pasture permit, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes
evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of a holographic will. We, therefore,
cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720 14 September 1994

FACTS:

The decedent names as devisees Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente
Sand, Meriam Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero and
their children. The petitioners filed a petition for the allowance of decedent's holo will. Private
Respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly
signed by the decedent; and the will was procured by pets through improper pressure and undue
influence. Dr. Jose Ajero also opposed the petition. He contested the disposition in the will of a house
and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted the holo
will to probate. On appeal, the said decision was reversed and the pet for probate was dismissed. The
CA found that the holo will failed to meet the requirements for its validity. I held that the decedent
did not comply with Arts 813 and 814. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either
unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE:
 Is the respondent court correct in disallowing the probate of the will?

RULING:

NO. Refer to Art. 839. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1)
whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said
will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had
the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution
of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. A reading of Article 813 of the
New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions,
the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the
whole testament void.

AZAOLA v. SINGSON
G.R. No. L-14003 5 August 1960

FACTS:

When Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died, petitioner Francisco Azaola filed a petition for the
probate of the formers holographic will, whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as
against the nephew of the deceased Cesario Singson. Witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw
the holographic will one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as the same was
handed to him and his wife. Witness Francisco testified also that he recognized all the signatures
appearing in the holographic will as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement,
witness presented the mortgage, the special power of attorney, and the general power of attorney,
besides the deeds of sale and including an affidavit and two residence certificates to show the
signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes. The opposition to the probate was on the
grounds that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend
the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day
of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will. The probate was denied on
the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who
could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being
contested. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Does Article 811 mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the
adverse party?
RULING:

NO. We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he
was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present
at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it
becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any
three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator"
and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness acquainted with
the testators hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive
opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that - "in the
absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to." As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that
no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness
may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to
supply the deficiency.

NATIVIDAD NAZARENO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 138842 18 October 2000

FACTS:

Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15,
1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad,
Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case,
while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. After the
death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch
XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28. Upon the reorganization of the courts in
1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed
administrator of his fathers estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered
that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor
of his sister, Natividad. Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3- B which is
registered under TCT No. 140946. This lot had been occupied by Romeo, his wife Eliza, and by
Maximino, Jr. since 1969. Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31, 1982 to Maximino,
Jr., for which reason the latter was issued TCT No. 293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale made on January 29, 1970 to Natividad
and that made on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of
consideration. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Romeo
and Eliza.They alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of January 29,
1970 to Natividad, had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new
title (TCT No. 277968) in his name. They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo
and Eliza to third persons. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the
cancellation of his title, the eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from
Lot 3, and the payment of damages. Romeo presented evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea
Nazareno never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said
lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28, 1962
executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was
then abroad and was represented by their mother, Aurea. Petitioners make capital of the fact that in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12932, which was declared final by this Court in G.R. No. 107684, the Court of
Appeals upheld the right of Maximino, Jr. to recover possession of Lot 3-B. In that case, the Court of
Appeals held: As shown in the preceding disquisition, Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property
in dispute by purchase in 1970. She was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162738 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When her parents died, her mother Aurea Poblete-Nazareno in
1970 and her father Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. in 1980, Natividad P. Nazareno had long been the
exclusive owner of the property in question. There was no way therefore that the aforesaid property
could belong to the estate of the spouses Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete. The mere fact
that Romeo P. Nazareno included the same property in an inventory of the properties of the deceased
Maximino A. Nazareno, Sr. will not adversely affect the ownership of the said realty. Appellant Romeo
P. Nazarenos suspicion that his parents had entrusted all their assets under the care and in the name
of Natividad P. Nazareno, their eldest living sister who was still single, to be divided upon their
demise to all the compulsory heirs, has not progressed beyond mere speculation. His barefaced
allegation on the point not only is without any corroboration but is even belied by documentary
evidence. x x x x

ISSUES:

1. Should the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the ownership of Maximo, Jr. over the lot
under consideration be binding to the estate of Maximo Sr.?

2. Should the lots in question be a proper subject of collation?

RULING:

1. NO. To be sure, the abovecited case decided by the Court of Appeals was for recovery of
possession based on ownership of Lot 3-B. The parties in that case were Maximino, Jr., as plaintiff,
and the spouses Romeo and Eliza, as defendants. On the other hand, the parties in the present case
for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino, Sr., as plaintiff, and Natividad and Maximino, Jr.,
as defendants. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-party complaint
was filed by Natividad and Maximino, Jr. As already stated, however, this third-party complaint
concerned Lot 3, and not Lot 3-B.

The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though
Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct
personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership
of Maximino, Jr. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and not the estate of Maximino, Sr., which
also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.
2. YES. As Romeo admitted, no consideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of Sale.
Therefore, the sale was void for having been simulated. Natividad never acquired ownership over
the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being without consideration and
title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her name. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr.
intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the
Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only female and the only unmarried
member of the family. She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As
she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned
from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code
states: There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although
the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or
only a part thereof. There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation
in accordance with Art. 1061 which states: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.

RIVERA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. Nos. 75005-06 15 February 1990

FACTS:

A prominent and wealthy resident of that town named Venancio Rivera died. Jose Rivera,
claiming to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Venancio's estate which was opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera, who denied
that Jose was the son of the decedent. Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die
intestate but in fact left two holographic wills which was eventually admitted to probate. Zenaida and
Venancio Rivera, Jr., siblings of Adelaido, authenticated the wills as having been written and signed
by their father. The existence and also the authenticity of the holographic wills were questioned by
Jose Rivera. In his own petition, he declared that Venancio Rivera died intestate; he also denied the
existence of the holographic wills presented by Adelaido Rivera for probate. In both proceedings,
Jose Rivera opposed the holographic wills submitted by Adelaido Rivera and claimed that they were
spurious.

After joint trial, it was found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different
Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria VITAL. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question
was married to Maria JOCSON, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido.

ISSUE:

Can Jose Rivera contest the validity of the supposed holographic wills of Venancio Rivera?
RULING:

NO. Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question.
Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the wills and his opposition thereto
did not have the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio
Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by their father, was
sufficient. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature
are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be
required. The respondent court considered the holographic wills valid because it found them to have
been written, dated and signed by the testator himself in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code. It also held there was no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required under Article
811 because the authenticity of the wills had not been questioned.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO
LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and
CRISTOBAL LABRADOR v. COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR
G.R. No. 83843-44 5 April 1990

FACTS:

On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving behind a parcel of land and the following
heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all
surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.

Sagrado Labrador (deceased but substituted by his heirs) filed a petition for the probate of
the alleged will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently, Jesus Labrador and Gaudencio Labrador
filed an opposition on the ground that the will has been revoked by implication of law, alleging that
before the death of Melecio, he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of oppositors Jesus and
Gaudencio. Sagrado filed for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which
Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by device from their father under a holographic will
executed on March 17, 1968 being premised on the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.
The Trial Court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null and void the Deed of
Sale. The CA modified the decision by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being
undated. It is principally alleged that the holographic will is dated, although the date is not in its
usual place.

ISSUE:

Is a holographic will still considered as dated when the date is not located in its usual place?
RULING:

YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Art.
810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will: And
this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968
The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor
of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement
by a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that he was executing was a will. The act
of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testators instruction or decision to
be followed reveal that Melecio was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed
of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.

SEANGIO v. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 27 November 2006

FACTS:

Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio. This petition was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that Segundo left a
holographic will, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause, among
others. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent
is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced
by the proceedings for the probate of the will. The petitioners instead filed a petition for the probate
of the holographic will.

Then private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under
Article 783 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Can the document executed by Segundo be considered as a holographic will?

RULING:

YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document, although it
may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while
it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme
law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention.
It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot
be given effect. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as
Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was
executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,
the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

CAPITLE v. ELBAMBUENA
G.R. No. 169193 30 November 2006

FACTS:

A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar (Olar) covering
a parcel of agricultural land in Nueva Ecija. Respondents alleged that on petitioners request,
petitioners were allowed to occupy the lot to pursue a means of livelihood. Since 1990, however,
petitioners did not pay rentals despite demand therefor, and neither did they heed the demand to
return the possession of the lot, drawing respondents to file a Petition for Recovery of Possession
and Payment of Back Rentals before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB). Petitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they have been in possession of the lot since
1960, presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar wherein he renounced in their favor his rights
and participation over the lot; a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" wherein Olar acknowledged that he co-
possessed the lot with petitioner Capitle since 1960; and a Pinagsamang Patunay from the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman and barangay chairman of Valle certifying that they
(petitioners) are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot. Petitioners further claim that since 1959,
Fortunata was already separated from Olar and she even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit
from Olar. DARAB ruled against petitioners. The CA ruled that Olars death substantially passed all
his rights and interest in and over the subject property to his legal heirs by operation of law. In the
case at bench, to herein respondents-appellees: to Fortunata Elbambuena, being his surviving wife,
and to Rosalinda Olar, his sons surviving spouse. This is as it should, considering that rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. And since Fortunata and
Rosalindas relationship with Olar was in this case never put in issue, their being legal heirs of the
deceased gave them unqualified right to participate in all proceedings affecting the subject property.

ISSUE:

Does the waiver of rights made by the deceased deprive the legal heirs of their participation
in the proceedings over the subject property?

RULING:
 NO. Petitioners concede that although Olars death passed all his rights and interest over the
lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to his estranged wife but to a relative, who
helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him, should be accorded respect over the intent of
the law on hereditary succession. The Court does not agree. Petitioners argument that it would be
absurd for Olar to bequeath his property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed
helped him in tilling the property and took good care of his needs, is a virtual admission that their
possession was not in the concept of owners, they having merely helped in tilling the lot, thereby
acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and tiller. Even assuming that petitioners were
indeed the actual tillers of the lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of
Olar would not bind respondents as they were not impleaded. Although estranged from Olar,
respondent Fortunata remained his wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground
for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. Rosalinda, on the
other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand
to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olars name.

GUERRERO v. BIHIS
G.R. No. 174144 17 April 2007

FACTS:

On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A. Guerrero
and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo, Manila. On May
24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent in
Branch 95 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
Q-94-20661. Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was
not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgment did not
comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and
petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence.
On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed a demurrer thereto
alleging that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that the decedent's will complied with Articles
804 and 805 of the Civil Code. In a resolution dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate
of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was
"acknowledged" by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon
Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned notary public for and
in Caloocan City.

ISSUE:

Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a notary
public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the
Civil Code?

RULING:
 NO. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial will
is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial
will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses
is void and cannot be accepted for probate.

The acknowledgment of a notarial will coerce the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the will
as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving
the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills,
or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of
assurance that the testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to the
persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will A notary public's
commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. It is issued "within and
for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary public's authority is co-extensive with it. In
other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he
is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the
limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary
public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix
and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have
validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and
testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.

PAZ SAMANIEGO- CELADA v. LUCIA D. ABENA

G.R. No. 145545 30 June 2008

FACTS:

The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S. Mayores probated and
designated Lucia Abena, her life-long companion, as the executor of her will. It also ordered the
issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia. Paz Samaniego-Celada, the first cousin of
Margarita, questioned the order of the court. Paz alleged that the will was not signed in the presence
of instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also argued that there was an
indication that the pages of the will were not signed by the testator on the same day and there was a
discrepancy in the numbering of pages. She alleged that the will was procured through undue
influence and pressure because at the time of the execution of the will, the testator was weak, sickly,
jobless and entirely dependent upon Lucia for support, thereby affecting her freedom and willpower
to decide on her own. Finally, she claimed that the letters of administration should be issued in favor
of her and her cousins as the only living collateral relatives of the decedent.

ISSUES:

1. Is the will invalid for failure to conform to the formalities required by law?
 2. Is the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and pressure? 3. Did
the court err in not granting the letters of administration to the petitioner?

RULING:

1. NO. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after
examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of
the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted
that the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient
safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been
brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages
inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in
consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code.

2. NO. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and
contradict the presumption that the testator was of sound mind. Not one of the oppositors witnesses
has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be
construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically
weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. 3. NO. The petitioner and
her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the
decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no
legal right to claim any part of the decedents estate. Note: The Supreme Court ruled that the issues
raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
SC only affirmed CAs decision.

RODELAS v. ARANZA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-58509 7 December 1982

FACTS:

This case is about the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla which was
opposed by the Bonillas. They allege among others that the alleged holographic will itself, and not
an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect. The will was not
probated.

ISSUE:

Can a holographic will be proved based on photocopies of the same?

RULING:

YES. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will.
It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and
the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

AJERO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 106720 15 September 1994

FACTS:

On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted probate proceedings for allowance of decedent
Annie Sand's holographic will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither
the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations
and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court
admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the
petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will
which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. Hence, the
appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Should the will be admitted to probate?

RULING:

YES. For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, the formal solemnities include the
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New
Civil Code. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly
observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows
that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not
its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-

compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes. Only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not
those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic
will.
 SOFIA NEPOMUCENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-62952 9 October 1985

FACTS:

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly
signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof
in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed
their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in
the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged
before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses. In the said
Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and
wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in
Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his
legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion
thereof to herein petitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary. The
llegal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging that the
execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner;
that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner
having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus,
letters testamentary should not be issued to her. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on
the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner, the Will's
admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its
intrinsic provisions is evident.

ISSUE:

Can the court validly pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will?

RULING:

YES. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. Thus: It is elementary that a
probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and
the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The Court citing Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449, mentioned that the testator instituted the
petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature,
no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter
proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous.
 The Court held that there is no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified
provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate
of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions, considering
Art. 739 and 1028 of the Civil Code. In Article III of the disputed Will, executed or almost six years
before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was
his legal wife from whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also declared that
respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate children. In Article IV, he stated that
he had been living as man and wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the
petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her
own husband but "in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in
the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage. There is no question
from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will.
There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital
relationship for 22 years until his death. Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code
is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is
the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may
receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was
disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

POLLY CAYETANO v. HON. TOMAS LEONIDAS

G.R. No. L-54919 30 May 1984

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her
sisters, Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As
Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased.

Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased alleging that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a
permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A and that during her
lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania. Court allowed the questioned will to be admitted and be probated here in the
Philippines. In the course of the proceedings, Hermogenes died and was substituted by his executrix,
Polly Cayetano. Cayetano assailed the decision contending that the respondent judge erred in
allowing the will to be probated and that assuming that pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked the provisions of the will is still invalid as it divested Hermogenes of his
legitime. (Note: Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given
away by the testatrix to a complete stranger.)

ISSUE:
 Whether the respondent judge correctly ruled in allowing the will to be admitted and be
probated here in the Philippines?

RULING:

YES. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally come only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478). In the
case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law
for him. This contention is without merit. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited
the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16
par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: Art. 16 par. (2).

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent. The law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which
is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger,
the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a
settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358, wherein we ruled:

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones. xxx xxx xxx

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO
v. LUZ, GLICERIA AND CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538 21 September 1951

FACTS:

Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of
Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived,
however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew,
the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate
children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left
two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939.

On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no
opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order
of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at
which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said
will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with
law.

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24,
1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918,
in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three
grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that
said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been
subsequently revoked.

ISSUES:

1. Was Molo's will of 1918 subsequently revoked by his will of 1939?

2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the
testator's belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter
would be given effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?

RULING:

1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine that a subsequent will,
containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the
making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void. Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting
opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State
in the subject of revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a review and the study of
the pertinent authorities that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law.
2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative
revocation". The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation
depends, is equivalent to the nonfulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the
revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that
destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent
upon the valid execution of a new will.

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN v. HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS et.al
G.R. No. 53546 25 June 1992

FACTS:

Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, with neither descendants nor ascendants, executed a last will
and testament wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces) all her properties. Jesus Fran filed a petition for the probate of Remedios last will and
testament. No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested. On November
17, 1972, The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the testatrix. On
October 1 1979, private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate
judgment wherein they ask the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition
to the allowance of the will. They allege among others that they were not furnished with a copy of
the will, and the will is a forgery. The respondent judge granted the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate judgment and declared the subject will of the
testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions.

ISSUES:

1. Is it necessary to attach original will to petition for probate?

2. Can the judge nullify the probate judgment, which is long final?

RULING:

1. NO. In Santos vs. Castillo and Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, decided six (6) months
apart in 1937, the Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached
to the petition. In the first, it ruled: The original of said document, the will, must be presented or
sufficient reasons given to justify the non-presentation of said original and the acceptance of the
copy or duplicate thereof. Moreover, Failure to attach original of will to petition not critical where
will itself was adduced in evidence.

2. NO. The probate judgment of November 13, 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to
unsettle it, had inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside,
by mere motion, on the ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate
is conclusive with respect to the due execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on any of the
grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceeding.
 CANEDA, et.al. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103554 28 May 1993

FACTS:

Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life,
executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses, and duly assisted by his lawyer,
and a notary public. In his will, the testator left his real and personal properties, by way of legacies
and devises, to six persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator. Thereafter,
Caballero himself filed a petition seeking the probate of his last will and testament, but he passed
away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the
legatees named in the will, was appointed as the administrator of Caballeros estate. Thereafter,
herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition,
entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" opposing the probate of the
Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate on the ground that that
the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective as it
fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the
will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another. During the pendency of the action, Benoni Cabrera died, hence the
appointment of William Cabrera, the private respondent herein. Private respondent presented,
among others, one of the attesting witnesses, Labuca, who testified that he and the other witnesses
attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting
witnesses were not presented in the probate hearing as they had died by then The probate court
sustained the validity of the will. Petitioners appealed. CA affirmed that of the trial court and ruled
that the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805
of the Civil Code. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Can the substantial compliance rule under Article 809 of the Civil Code be invoked to sustain
the validity of a will with an attestation clause that totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other?

RULING:

NO. The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot relied on by respondents since
it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the
will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed
in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts
not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied within the execution of the
will. In other words, defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. In the
case at bar, what private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that they
saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that
he is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by
the indirection what in law he cannot do directly. It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands,
is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of
resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately,
of the will itself. ***The attestation clause in question is reproduced below: We, the undersigned
attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our
respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO
CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the
Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as
his Last Will and Testament and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in
the presence of each and all of us.

AGAPAY v. PALANG
G.R. No. 116668 28 July 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private
respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church. A
few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only
child, Herminia Palang was born on May 12, 1950. On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three year old
Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner.
Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, herein subject
property. Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December
6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two
years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died. On July 11, 1981, Carlina and her daughter, Herminia,
instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the subject property with damages
against petitioner. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision, among others,
adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from Miguel, one-half of the aforementioned
agricultural land.

ISSUE:

Can the issue concerning Kristopher Palangs status and claim as illegitimate son and heir
to Miguels estate be adjudicated in the instant civil action which is for recovery of ownership and
possession?

RULING:

NO. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in
the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be
adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession.
 REYES v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124099 30 October 1997

FACTS:

Torcuato J. Reyes declared in his will that he bequeaths to certain properties to his wife
Asuncion Reyes.

The children of Torcuato Reyes, herein petitioners, filed an opposition to the petition for
probate filed by the designated executor, herein private respondent. The opposition averred that
Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his
wife in the will, because the Asuncion was already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive
and their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open
cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals. The trial court ruled that Asuncion Reyes,
based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and, therefore,
their relationship was an adulterous one.

ISSUE:

May the probate court during the petition for probate pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will?

RULING:

NO. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due
execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary
capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficacy of the wills provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration
thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when: 1. The defect of the will is
apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically
invalid; 2. Because practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or
the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality; and 3. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic
validity be first determined. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and which need not be
inquired upon by the probate court. This case is different from the Nepomuceno case. Testator
Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and real
properties to his wife, Asuncion Reyes. There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship.
In the case of Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already previously married and that he
had an adulterous relationship with the devisee.
 SANCHEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108947, 29 September 1997

FACTS:

Private respondent, Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria
Villafranca while private respondents, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are
the legitimate children of herein private respondent Rosalia. Petitioners, Rolando, Florida Mierly,
Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Juan C.
Sanchez, Rosalias father, died on October 21, 1968. On October 30, 1969, Rosalia and herein
petitioners assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement wherein they
agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez. On October 25, 1979,
herein petitioners filed, thru counsel, a motion to require Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to
render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement. They likewise filed
a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement, in which they prayed for the annulment
of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.

ISSUE:

In a probate proceeding, is judicial approval necessary for a compromise agreement to take

effect?

RULING:

NO. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract whereby
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the
parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. Although denominated a compromise
agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of
the Civil Code which provides that [e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale,
an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no
will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and
liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian
or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit
duly filed with the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case.
We therefore affirm the validity of the parties compromise agreement/partition in this case.

GANUELAS v. CAWED
G.R. No. 123968 24 April 2003

FACTS:

On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation
of Real Property covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina),
one of herein petitioners. The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and
of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by
these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above,
described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and
effect. On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of Donation
purporting to set aside the deed of donation.

ISSUE:

Is the revocation null and void for not having embodied any of the grounds prescribed by
law for donations inter vivos?

RULING:

NO. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must
be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code,
except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the
donation must be in the form of a will, with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is
void and cannot transfer ownership. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa
are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any
right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death
of Celestina. The phrase to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on
her death, not during her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the
donee should die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force
and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition. As stated in a long line of cases, one
of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered
void if the donor should survive the donee. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly
confirming the donation as mortis causa. (In this case however, the court ruled that being a donation
mortis causa, the deed of donation must have complied with the formal validities of a will, failing
which the donation is without any effect.)
SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD v. COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY
CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMA and JESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA
G.R. No. 125888 13 August 1998

FACTS:

In 1979, Aurora Montinola executed a deed entitled Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor
of her three grandchildren Catalino Valderrama, Judy Valderrama, and Jesus Valderrama. The deed
however provided that that the donation shall take effect ten year after the death of donor. In 1980,
the original title of the parcel of land subject of the donation was cancelled and a new title was given
to the Valderramas. Montinola however retained the original title and she continued to perform acts
of ownership over the parcel of land. In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of
ingratitude committed against her by the Valderramas; that they defamed her; that she overheard
them plotting against her life. In 1990, she petitioned to have her title be reinstated and her
grandchildrens title be cancelled. She said that the donation is actually a donation mortis causa and
that the same is void because the formalities of a will were not complied with. In the same year, she
sold her property to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. The Valderramas opposed the petition,
contending that that it is donation inter vivos which the lower court ruled it to be so. In 1993, while
the case was still pending on appeal, Montinola died. The petition was continued by the spouses
Sicad.

ISSUE:

Is the donation inter vivos in case it states that it shall take effect ten years after the death of
the donor?

RULING:

NO. The donation is mortis causa. Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect
only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the
property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the
donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of
the donor." The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of
the instrument: the intercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a
different machine, and is crammed into the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed
and that immediately preceding it. As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained
by both its language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant
upon its execution. In this respect, case law has laid down significant parameters. In the instant case,
nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to Montinola's
grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did
not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More
importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them
only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate
of title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these
circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation reserving the
exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property
until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question
was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the
donor's demise.

CANIZA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110427 24 February 1997

FACTS:

On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caiza, a spinster,
a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the
University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 107, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which
included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal
guardian of her person and estate.

Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17,
1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.The complaint
was later amended to identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian,
Amparo Evangelista. In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been
living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been
considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on
September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question. They
conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them
from the disputed premises.

ISSUE:

Does Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian, have authority to bring said action for recovery
of possession of property?

RULING:

YES, she has authority. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's
death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court." An owner's
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession
is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age. Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court
the general guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of
Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and
properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full authority to take possession of the
property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to
perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties **." By that appointment, it
became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs,
to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends.
It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property,
both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or
control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with
it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and
defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.

JOSEPH CUA v. GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS,
EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS
G.R. No. 156536 31 October 2006

FACTS:

A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 sq. meters was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas. A notarized Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina
Vargas heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida Matienzo, Rosario
Forteza, Andres Cargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and
adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed the extra judicial partition. The said Extra Judicial Settlement was published in the
Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks. Subsequently, an ExtraJudicial Settlement among
Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also
with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed
document and their respective shares totalling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner
herein. According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vergas and one of respondents herein,
she came to know of the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale only when the original
house build on the lot was being demolished. She likewise claimed that she was unaware of the
earlier Extrajudicial Settlement involving the same property. After knowing of the sale to Cua, Gloria
Vargas tried to redeem the property. When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed
to reach an amicable settlement, Gloria filed a case for annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Legal Redemption of the lot. Respondents claims that as co-owners of the property, they may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise
allege that the 30-day period following written notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to
exercise the right of redemption had not yet set in as no written notice was sent to them. In effect,
they claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extrajudicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.

ISSUES:

1. Are heirs deemed constructively notified and bound by an extrajudicial partition of an

estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extrajudicial settlement and
partition has been duly published?
 2. Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition does not bind persons who
did not participate therein, may a written notice of sale of hereditary rights to a stranger before
partition (under Art 1088) to a co-heir be dispensed with when such co-heirs have actual knowledge
of the sale, such that the 30-day period within which a co-heir can exercise the right to be subrogated
to the rights of a purchaser shall commence from the date of actual knowledge of the sale?

RULING:

1. NO. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had
no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their
lawful participation in the decedents estate. In this connection, the records of the case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only
shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extra judicial settlements
do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned.

2. NO. This is not to say, though, that respondents co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights
to third persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the
execution of the extrajudicial settlements including the sale of their pro indiviso shares are bound
by the same. Nevertheless, the co-heirs are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Art.
1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified
in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. There is a need for written notice to start the period of
redemption. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price
of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor. Due to failure to comply with the said requirement, there is no legal
impediment in allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the formers
obvious willingness and capacity to do so.

RODRIGUEZ v. RODRIGUEZ
GR. NO. 175720 11 September 2007

FACTS:

Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San Jose Street, Guadalupe Nuevo,
Makati City, and covered by TCT No. 144865. On October 27, 1983, Juanito executed a Huling
Habilin at Testamento giving petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez, his live-in partner,
apartments D and E, and his children Benjamin Rodriguez (the deceased husband of respondent
Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and
respondent Belen Rodriguez, apartment C.

However, on June 14, 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in
favor of petitioner. Thus, a new TCT No. 150431 was issued in the name of the petitioner. The case
arose when petitioner filed on September 20, 2001 a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
respondents, alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the property; and that in 1984,
she allowed respondents Evangeline, Buenaventura and Belen, out of kindness and tolerance, to
personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively. However, without her knowledge and consent,
respondents separately leased the units to Montano Magpantay, Mel Navarro and Socorro Escota,
who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to vacate the premises and to pay the rentals
thereof.

ISSUES:

Is the last will and testament valid even though not probated?

RULING:

NO. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as the Huling Habilin at
Testamento and the Partition Agreement have no legal effect since the will has not been probated.
Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot be dispensed with and is
a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. As the
will was not probated, the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto cannot be given
effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to aforementioned agreement becomes immaterial
in the determination of the issue of possession. Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed
in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof since ownership would only
pass to his heirs at the time of his death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or not the disposition was valid is an issue that can
be resolved only in Civil Case No. 01-1641, an action instituted by the respondents for that purpose.

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y

BELLEZA VILLACARLOS
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

Purisima, J.:

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which set aside the
decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-
appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No.
1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) made by Aleja Belleza,
was instituted devisee of Lot No.1392 with an area of 511,855 square meters with the obligation
until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza dies. The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but
also to his successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall seize
the property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants."
 Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children,one of whom is herein
petitioner. Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to comply with their obligation, filed a
complaint with the RTC prayingfor the reconveyance of the subject property to the surviving heirs
of the testatrix.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, While there
may be the non-performance of the command as mandated, exaction from them (the petitioners),
simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question,
does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.

The CA reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature
of a modal institution and acause of action in favor of private respondent arose when petitioner
failed to comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to
the estate of testatrix. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent has a legally demandable right against the petitioner, as
one of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.

HELD:
YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation
of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow
or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs
of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of
further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death
of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted
to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also
form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on
the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death. In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No.1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject
to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every
year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the
lot involvedto herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint.

BORDALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002

Doctrine:
 A judicial declaration of heirship is not a condition precedent in order that an heir may
validly file his/her claim in the estate of the decedent or the testator. Issue: Whether or not an heir
should show judicial declaration of heirship before she/he can file a claim to the estate of the
decedent

Issue:

Whether or not an heir should show judicial declaration of heirship before she/he can file a
claim to the estate of the decedent

Ruling:

No. Untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of
Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order
that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of
heirship is necessary. Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C), the subject land in the case at bar, is
part of the parcel of land over which private respondents predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3
pro-indiviso share, which was disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private respondents predecessors-in-interest,
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private
respondents as co-owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.

HEIRS OF CONTI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998

Bellosillo, J:

Doctrine:

Art. 862. The Substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon
the instituted heir, unless the testator has expressly provided the contrary, or the charges or
conditions are personally applicable only to the heir instituted.

Specific Issue:

Whether or not private respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were
entitled to the partition of the lot and the improvements thereon

Ruling:

In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and establish by
preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and
defendants [now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot owned
in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the
court xxxx Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err in declaring herein
plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit
her property, the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now private
respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit (insertions in [ ] supplied).

Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua and Marabilles v. Quito, that a prior
and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary and that private respondents became
the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo
upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other
incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law including the right
to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code, and Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa holding that
the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the probative
value of the documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners
for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she was a vital witness in the case. Hence,
petitioners pursued this case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the
deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance
with all legal requirements, especially publication, and private respondents were not able to prove
by competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the
heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v.
Salud.

Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of
kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because
there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate
of Claro Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is
nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the
property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is,
under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from
the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without
some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate
of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil
Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right
to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful
heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally
pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the
action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with
extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small
value.But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share
which they inherited from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary
partition between co-owners
 GALA vs. ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
GR No. 156819 December 11, 2003

Ynares-Santiago, J:

DOCTRINE:
Article 906. Any compulsory heir to whom a testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

SPECIFIC ISSUE:
Whether or not the organization or creation of respondent corporations are illegal for
depriving petitioner Rita G. Benzon of her legitime.

SC RULING:
The reliefs sought by petitioners should have been raised in a proceeding for settlement of
estate, rather than in the present intra-corporate controversy. If they are genuinely interested in
securing that part of their late fathers property which has been reserved for them in their capacity
as compulsory heirs, then they should simply exercise their actio ad supplendamlegitimam, or their
right of completion of legitime. Such relief must be sought during the distribution and partition
stage of a case for the settlement of the estate of Manuel Gala, filed before a court which has taken
jurisdiction over the settlement of said estate.

SEANGIO vs. REYES

G.R. Nos. 140371-72; 508 SCRA 177; Nov 27, 2006

2nd Division; AZCUNA, J.:

(HOLOGRAPHIC WILL; PRETERITION)

Private respondents, Alfredo Seangio et. al., filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners opposed said petition, contending that 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full
command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor
of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business
in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of
the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo
Seangio, for cause. The reason for the disinheritance was due to Alfredos maltreatment to his father
Segundo. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent
is found to have a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings of the will. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
contending that the alleged will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir Devisee or
legatee hence there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Petitioners countered that the rule
on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to
the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his
compulsory heirs, petitioners and PRs alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his
estate. The RTC dismissed the said petition. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by
the RTC

ISSUE

(1) WHETHER THE DOCUMENT EXECUTED BY SEGUNDO CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A

HOLOGRAPHIC WILL

HELD

(1) YES. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made
in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document, although it may initially
come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to
dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless,
is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed
in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is
only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatanng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was
executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.

ISSUE:

(2) WON THE COMPULSORY HEIRS IN THE DIRECT LINE WERE PRETERITED IN THE WILL.

HELD:

(2) No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. According to the SC,
it was Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not
operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included only as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
 Michael Guy vs. Court of Appeals and minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes
(G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006)

Ynares, Santiago, J.:

DOCTRINE:

As stated under Article 1044 of the New Civil Code, any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians
may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

FACTS:

Herein private respondent-minors Karen and Kamille claimed that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of deceased Sima Wei (aka Rufino Guy Susim), who died intestate
leaving an estate valued at Php 10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. Sima Wei
was survived by his spouse Shirley Guy and five children, one of whom is herein petitioner Michael
Guy.

Private respondents Karen and Kamille, represented by their mother Remedios, then filed a
petition for letters of administration before the Makati RTC and prayed that in the meantime,
petitioner Michael be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Petitioner in turn moved to
dismiss the petition asserting that Sima Weis estate can be settled without securing letters of
administration, and that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate
children during Sima Weis lifetime. Petitioner and his co-heirs further contended that private
respondents claim had been paid, waived and abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by reason
of Remedios release and waiver of claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

The RTC denied the joint and supplemental motions to dismiss. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Respondent Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari affirmed
the orders of the RTC. Petitioners motion for reconsideration before the CA was also denied. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the release and waiver of claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights
2. Whether or not private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.

RULING:

1. NO. The release and waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from claiming
successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly
and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.

In this case, the Court found no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and
in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim." Since the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary
share in the estate, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. Even assuming that
Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar
the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their
parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization.

The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by
the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to
those mentioned in Article 1030.

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards
without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which
must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially
authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in this case is void and will not bar private
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
It must be further emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given
under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
In this case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. It
would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims
that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private
respondents must fail.

2. NO. The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the issue on
private respondents filiation would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to
present evidence. That illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was
not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based
upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means
allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of
evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be
impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This
Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a
full-blown trial.

Hence, the petition is DENIED.

NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF

MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO
G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000
Mendoza, J.;

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR
CV No. 39441 dated May 29, 1998 affirming with modifications the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in an action for annulment of sale and damages.

Maximinio Nazareno Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. They had five children,
namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico and Maximino Jr. In the course of their marriage, the
spouses acquired properties in Quezon City and Cavite. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while
Maximinio died on Dec. 18, 1980. After Maximino Sr. died, Romeo filed an intestate case and was
appointed by the RTC of Naic as administrator of his fathers estate. In the course of the proceedings,
Romeo discovered that his parents executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of properties
in favor of his sister Natividad in 1970. Among the lots covered by the Deed of sale is Lot 3-B that
had been occupied by Romeo and his wife Eliza and Maximinio Jr. since 1969. Unknown to Romeo,
Natividad sold Lot 3-B to Maximinio Jr. in 1982. When Romeo found learned of the sale, he and his
wife Eliza locked Maximino Jr. out of the house. So, Maximino Jr. brought an action for recovery of
possession and damages with the RTC of QC which ruled in his favor. Romeo in turn filed, on behalf
of the estate of Maximino Sr. a case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and
Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration. He testified that there
was no full payment. He also claimed that their parents only intended that Natividad hold the said
lots in trust for the other siblings. As evidence, he presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution
executed by their parents. In a third party complaint against Romeo and Eliza, Natividad and Maximo
alleged that Romeo surreptitiously appropriated Lot 3-B by securing himself a new title. They sought
the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his title. The RTC ruled in favor of
Romeo and declared the nullity of the Deed of sale. The third party complaint was also dismissed. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to
Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno, Jr.), as well
as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr.

ISSUE:

W/N the estate of Maximino Sr. can recover the lots in dispute?
Held:

Yes. The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own.
Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximo SR., the latter has a separate and distinct
personality from the former. Hence, the judgment in the case regarding the ownership of Maximo
over lot 3-B binds Romeo only, and not the estate of Maximo Sr., which has also a right to recover
properties which were wrongfully disposed. It cannot be denied that Maximo intended to give the six
lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in her favor because
she was the only female and the only unmarried member of the family. She was thus entrusted with
the real properties in behalf of her siblings. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor.
Art 1449 of the CC states: there is also an implied trust when a donation nis made to a person but it
appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have
no beneficial interest or only a part thereof. There being an implied trust, the lots in question are
therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061which states: Every compulsory heir who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SANCHEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 108947
Panganiban, J.:

Doctrines:

1) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. An act done by a probate court in
excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari.

2) A compromise agreement being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the
minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.

3) For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of
the following conditions: (a) the decedent left no will; (b) the decedent left no debts, or if there
were debts left, all had been paid; (c) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors,
the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (d) the partition
was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the decision and resolutions on the validity of the will may be challenged through
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2) Whether or not a compromise agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the
approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner.
SC Ruling:

1) As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed
resolution. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this
case with the caveat that, due to its limited jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only
provisionally. In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and
fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in
favor of their daughter and grandchildren. The trial court ruled further that the properties
covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code,
the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership of the
properties subject thereof. In doing so, it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court.
A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so.Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its
decision in disregard of the parties compromise agreement. Such disregard, on the ground that
the compromise agreement was not approved by the court, is tantamount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and
within the bounds of law.The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the
trial courts decision but also the latters jurisdiction. Since the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy.

2) Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract whereby the
parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the
parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection.In the case before us, it is ineludible
that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement. Adequately
assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four
months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft.

In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the
minority of Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend
that the courts approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in
behalf of their wards or children. However, we observe that although denominated a compromise
agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of
the Civil Code. For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the
concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts,
or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are
minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the
partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of
Deeds.We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore affirm the
validity of the parties compromise agreement/partition in this case.In any event, petitioners neither
raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial court.It is also significant that all the parties, including
the then minors, had already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their
compromise. By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their
compromise agreement.

HEIRS OF CONTI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118464 December 21, 1998

Bellosillo, J.:
Doctrine:

Art. 862. The Substitute shall be subject to the same charges and conditions imposed upon
the instituted heir, unless the testator has expressly provided the contrary, or the charges or
conditions are personally applicable only to the heir instituted.

Specific Issue:

Whether or not private respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were
entitled to the partition of the lot and the improvements thereon

Ruling:

In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and establish by
preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and
defendants [now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot owned
in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the
court xxxx Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err in declaring herein
plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit
her property, the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now private
respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit (insertions in [ ] supplied).

Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua and Marabilles v. Quito, that a prior
and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary and that private respondents became
the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo
upon her death and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other
incidents/rights of ownership as provided for by law including the right
to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code, and Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa holding that
the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the probative
value of the documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners
for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she was a vital witness in the case. Hence,
petitioners pursued this case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the
deceased co-owner cannot prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance
with all legal requirements, especially publication, and private respondents were not able to prove
by competent evidence their relationship with the deceased.
 There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the
heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v.
Salud.

Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of
kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because
there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate
of Claro Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is
nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the
property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is,
under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from
the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without
some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate
of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 of the Civil
Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right
to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful
heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally
pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the action
been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small value.But
what private respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which
they inherited from her through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition
between co-owners

ALEJANDRINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114151. September 17, 1998

Romero, J.:

FACTS:

The late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six children named
Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a parcel of land. Upon the demise
of the Alejandrino spouses, the property should have been divided among their children with each
child having a share of 36.50 square meters. However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not
settled in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.

Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 square meters of
Gregorios share, 36.50 square meters of Ciriacos share and 12.17 square meters of Abundios
share thereby giving her a total area of 97.43 square meters, including her own share of 36.50
square meters. It turned out, however, that a third party named Licerio Nique, the private
respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50 square meters
from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from Gregorio through Laurencia, 12.17 square
meters from Abundio also through Laurencia and 36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a
total area of 121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino property.

However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square meters of the property)
later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and damages against private respondent
Nique. She lost in the case and was ordered to deliver the lot to its rightful owner, Nique.

Mauricia, the petitioner, then filed a complaint for redemption and recovery of properties
against Nique. She manifested her intention to buy back back the area she allegedly co-owned. She
also questioned the decision of the lower court as stated above.

ISSUE:

Whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific
portions thereof to a third party?

HELD:
YES, she can. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing
or right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises
his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that
he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together
with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate
has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership
over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:

ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro

indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that provides:
ART. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share
in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the
Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the
object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a
co-owned property shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership, the Court said:
x x x (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in
the co-owned property even without the consent of the other co-owners. Nevertheless, as
a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition
is premised on the elementary rule that `no one can give what he does not have (Nemo dat
quod non habet).

`x x x since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

`The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property of the co-owners
who possessed and administered it.

The legality of Laurencias alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was
settled in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. The decision in that case had become final and executory with
Laurencias withdrawal of her appeal. When private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of
the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, private respondent was in effect calling
for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent may
only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for
partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the
third person designated by the testator.
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of title.
As there is no pending administration proceedings, the property of the Alejandrino spouses can only
be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on
the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for
the order for segregation of the property sold to private respondent. Petitioner Mauricia does not
deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions
its validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the non-publication
thereof.

ELEUTERIO, ANATALIA, JOSELITO, ROGELIO, EVANGELINE, NOEL, GUILLERMO, LORENZO,

DOMINGO, AMADO, and VICTORIA, all surnamed LOPEZ vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 127827 March 5, 2003

FACTS:

In 1920, Fermin Lopez occupied, possessed, and declared for taxation purposes a parcel of
public land containing an area of 19 hectares, 48 ares, 88 centares, more or less, situated in
Makatubong, Barrio De la Paz, Antipolo, Rizal. He filed a homestead application over the land, but
his application was not acted upon until his death in 1934. When he died, he was survived by the
following: (1) Hermogenes Lopez, now deceased, leaving his children, respondents Marcelino,
Felisa, Zoilo, and Leonardo, all surnamed Lopez, as his heirs; (2) petitioner Eleuterio Lopez; (3)
Juan Lopez, now deceased, leaving his children, Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado, and
Victoria, all surnamed Lopez, as his heirs; and (4) Nazario, now deceased, leaving his wife, petitioner
Anatalia, and children, petitioners Joselito, Rogelio, Evangeline and Noel, all surnamed Lopez, as
his heirs.

Following Fermin's death, Hermogenes, being the eldest child, worked and introduced
additional improvements on the land. In 1936, he inquired from the Bureau of Lands the status of
his late father's application for a homestead grant. An official of the bureau informed him that the
application remained unacted upon and suggested that he file a new application. Following the
suggestion, Hermogenes filed a homestead application in his own name.

After ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any private person, the Bureau
approved his application. The land was surveyed and a resulting plan was approved by the Director
of Lands, who thereafter ordered the issuance of the homestead patent. The patent was transmitted
to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of
title in his name.

Unaware that he has been awarded a homestead patent, Hermogenes executed an Extra-
judicial Partition of the disputed land with his brothers petitioner Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario.
The three executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of their share in the land in favor of Hermogenes. The
succeeding year, Hermogenes applied with the Land Registration Commission for the registration of
the property in his name. To his surprise, he found that the land has been registered in the names of
Fernando Gorospe, Salvador de Tagle, Rosario de Tagle, Beatriz de Suzuarrequi and Eduardo Santos,
who collectively opposed his application. Hermogenes filed a complaint for the annulment of the
free patent and title against these persons. Some of the defendants moved for its dismissal alleging
that Hermogenes was not a real party in interest since he previously sold his right to the land to one
Ambrocio Aguilar on July 31, 1959. The case was dismissed.

Aguilar instituted a new civil action. The court declared Aguilar as the absolute owner of the
land and all subsequent certificates of title emanating therefrom as void ab initio. CA affirmed this
in toto. SC affirmed CA.

The heirs of Hermogenes filed a complaint against Aguilar for the cancellation of the deed
of sale executed by Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar and/or reconveyance. The lower court declared
the deed of absolute sale null and void ab initio and the respondents as the true and absolute owner
of the disputed land. CA affirmed in toto RTC decision.

Respondent Lopezes sold a large portion of the disputed property to respondent spouses
Amurao.

Herein petitioners instituted the present action against the respondents praying, among
others, that they be declared co-owners of the property subject matter hereof and that private
respondents be ordered to reconvey to them 3/5 thereof as its co-owners, or in the alternative, to
pay its value. RTC decided in favor of petitioners.

While the case was on trial, complainants therein Guillermo, Lorenzo, Domingo, Amado and
Victoria, all children of Juan Lopez, entered into a compromise agreement with the respondent
Lopezes, heirs of Hermogenes, recognizing the latter's ownership and possession of the property
subject of the case. They confirmed the sale made by their father Juan to Hermogenes. The court a
quo rendered a partial decision approving the compromise agreement: 1. Ordering the dismissal of
the case; 2. Declaring Hermogenes Lopez as the exclusive owner of the property in question; 3.
Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and 4.
Ordering plaintiffs to pay the costs. Hence, the present action. Petitioners claim that Fermin filed a
homestead application over the land, cultivated at least one-fifth of it, and resided on it for at least
one year. Upon his death, they argue that they became its co-owners through succession.

ISSUE:

1. WON upon Fermins death, petitioners became its co-owners through succession?

2. WON Respondents are precluded from denying the contents of these documents (an Extra-
judicial Partition of the real property executed by Hermogenes and his brothers petitioner
Eleuterio, Nazario, and Juan, a Special Power of Attorney to sell the lot in question executed by
petitioner Eleuterio, Nazario and Juan in favor of Hermogenes, and a letter which contains the
statement that petitioners are co-heirs of the property, and which respondent Marcelino Lopez
signed) based on the principle of estoppel by deed?

3. WON Petitioners are entitled to have the land partitioned?

HELD:

1. NO. Homestead settlement is one of the modes by which public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes are disposed of. Its object is to provide a home for each citizen of the state, where his
family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals
those feelings of independence which are essential to the maintenance of free institutions.

A person who is legally qualified has to file his application for a homestead patent with the Bureau
of Lands. If in order, the application shall be approved by the Director. It bears emphasis that Act
No. 2874 requires that for an application to be valid, it must be approved by the Director of Lands.
This provision gives the Director of Lands discretion to approve or deny an application. He is not a
mere automaton who must perfunctorily approve an application upon its filing.

The application of Fermin unfortunately remained unacted upon up to the time of his death. It was
neither approved nor denied by the Director, as the Bureau failed to process it. Hence, he could not
have acquired any vested rights as a homestead applicant over the property because his
application was never acted upon.

A valid application is sadly lacking in the case of Fermin. This circumstance prevented him from
acquiring any vested right over the land and fully owning it at the time of his death. Conformably,
his heirs did not inherit any property right from him.

Had the application of Fermin been duly approved, his heirs would have succeeded him in his rights
and obligations with respect to the land he has applied for. Sec. 103 of Act No. 2874 covers such a
contingency.

The failure of the Bureau of Lands to act on the application of Fermin up to the time of his death,
however, prevented his heirs to be subrogated in all his rights and obligations with respect to the
land applied for.

Perforce, at the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the disputed property, it was
still part of alienable public land. As he applied for it in his own name, his application inures to his
sole benefit. After complying with the cultivation and residency requirements, he became a grantee
of a homestead patent over it, thereby making him its absolute and exclusive owner.

2. NO. Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other party
and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material
facts asserted in it. The principle is that when a man has entered into a solemn engagement by deed,
he shall not be permitted to deny any matter which he has asserted therein, for a deed is a solemn
act to any part of which the law gives effect as the deliberate admission of the maker. It promotes
the judicious policy of making certain formal documents final and conclusive of their contents.

A void deed, however, will not work, and may not be the basis of, an estoppel. Covenants do not
work an estoppel unless the deed in which they are contained is itself a valid instrument. In the case
at bar, the deed and instruments at issue were void. The extra-judicial partition and the special
power of attorney to sell did not have an object certain, which is the subject matter of the deed. The
disputed land cannot be their object because petitioners do not have any right or interest over it.
They are not its co-owners as it is owned absolutely by Hermogenes. Well to note, the two instruments
were executed on the mistaken assumption that Hermogenes and his brothers inherited the property
from Fermin. Moreover, at the time the documents were made, Hermogenes was unaware that he was
granted a homestead patent. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, estoppel does not operate to
confer property rights where there are none.

Apropos the letter, suffice it to state that the Court agree with the trial court's pronouncement that
respondent Marcelino Lopez signed it merely "to gain the favors of his uncle Eleuterio Lopez and in
no way does it constitute an admission that the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are co-owners of the
property." Under these circumstances, respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel by deed.

3. NO. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving
to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. Not being
co-owners of the disputed lot, petitioners cannot demand its partition. They do not have any
interest or share in the property upon which they can base their demand to have it divided.

BRAVO V BRAVO
G.R. No. 152658 July 29, 2005

FACTS:
Spouses Mauricio Bravo (Mauricio) and Simona Andaya Bravo (Simona) owned two
parcels of land (Properties) located along Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. The
Properties contain a large residential dwelling, a smaller house and other improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar
died without issue. Lily Bravo married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. (David
Jr.). Roland had six children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero (Elizabeth), Edward Bravo
(Edward), Roland Bravo, Jr. (Roland Jr.), Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and their half-
sister, Ofelia Bravo (Ofelia).
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) on 17 June 1966 appointing Mauricio
as her attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to mortgage or otherwise
hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of any
kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx. Mauricio subsequently
mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate
Mortgage (Deed of Sale) conveying the Properties to Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and
Elizabeth Bravo (vendees). The sale was conditioned on the payment of P1,000 and on the
assumption by the vendees of the PNB and DBP mortgages over the Properties.
As certified by the Clerk of Court, the Deed of Sale was notarized and entered in the Notarial
Register. However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. Neither was
it presented to PNB and DBP. The mortage loans and the receipts for loan payments issued by PNB
and DBP continued to be in Mauricios name even after his death in 1973. Simona died in 1977.
On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an action for the judicial
partition of the Properties. Edward claimed that he and the other grandchildren of Mauricio and
Simona are co-owners of the Properties by succession. Despite this, petitioners refused to share
with him the possession and rental income of the Properties. Edward later amended his complaint
to include a prayer to annul the Deed of Sale, which he claimed was merely simulated to prejudice
the other heirs.
In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 filed a complaint-in-intervention impugning
the validity of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition of the Properties among the surviving
heirs of Mauricio and Simona.
The trial court upheld Mauricios sale of the Properties to the vendees. The trial court ruled
that the sale did not prejudice the compulsory heirs, as the Properties were conveyed for valuable
consideration. The trial court also noted that the Deed of Sale was duly notarized and was in
existence for many years without question about its validity.
Citing Article 166 of the Civil Code (Article 166), the Court of Appeals declared the Deed of
Sale void for lack of Simonas consent. The GPA executed by Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to
authorize Mauricio to sell the Properties because Article 1878 of the Civil Code requires a special
power of attorney for such transactions. The Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void and
ordered the partition of the Properties.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale with assumption of Mortgage is valid.

2. Whether the order of partition of the properties was valid.
RULING:

The petition is partly meritorious.

On the Requirement of the Wifes Consent

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the Deed of Sale void based on Article
166, which states:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.

This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal partnerships before the effective
date of this Code.

Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the conjugal partnership after the
effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Although there is no dispute that the Properties were
conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the records do not show, and the parties did not
stipulate, when the Properties were acquired. Under Article 1413 of the old Spanish Civil Code, the
husband could alienate conjugal partnership property for valuable consideration without the wifes
consent.
Even under the present Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is not void. It is well-settled that
contracts alienating conjugal real property without the wifes consent are merely voidable under the
Civil Code that is, binding on the parties unless annulled by a competent court and not void ab
initio.
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the Civil Code (Article 173). The
latter prescribes certain conditions before a sale of conjugal property can be annulled for lack of
the wifes consent, as follows:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage,
may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract that disposes of conjugal real
property without her consent. Respondents action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article 166
must fail for having been filed out of time. Further, respondents, who are Simonas heirs, are not the
parties who can invoke Article 166. Article 173 reserves that remedy to the wife alone. Only Simona
had the right to have the sale of the Properties annulled on the ground that Mauricio sold the
Properties without her consent.
Simona, however, did not assail the Deed of Sale during her marriage or even after Mauricios
death. We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of the
Properties when she executed the GPA.
*Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross inadequacy of price
does not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the consent or
that the parties actually intended a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause will not
invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. In this case,
respondents have not proved any of the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale.
Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof

The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, entered
in the notarial books submitted to that court. As a document acknowledged before a notary public,
the Deed of Sale enjoys the presumption of regularity and due execution. Absent evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, the presumption must be upheld.

On the Partition of the Property

This Court finds it proper to grant the partition of the Properties, subject to modification.

Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of the vendees who bought the
Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and Ofelia both testified that the Roland A. Bravo in the Deed of Sale
is their father, although their brother, Roland Bravo, Jr., made some of the mortgage payments.

As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward Bravo, Edward is thus a
compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and entitled to a share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his
fathers portion of the Properties. In short, Edward and petitioners are co-owners of the Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the Properties. Any co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-
ownership. This action for partition does not prescribe and is not subject to laches.

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA vs. CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,* ELENA FIGURACION-

ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and
MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ

G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006

Corona, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children:
petitioner and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), HilariaFiguracion,
FelipaFiguracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.
 On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor
of his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 and (2) Lot
705, which he had inherited from his deceased parents.

Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT was issued
to "Lazaro Adviento, married to RosendaSagueped" as owner of the 162 sq. m. and "Leandro
Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento" as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the
name of Leandro in Tax Declarationfor the year 1985.

What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and
her sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta.

Lot 707 belonged to EulalioAdviento. When Adviento died, his two daughters,
AgripinaAdviento (his daughter by his first wife) and respondent Carolina (his daughter by his
second wife), succeeded him to it. On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of
petitioner over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and
without any issue. Before her half-sisters death, however, respondent Carolina adjudicated unto
herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to
respondents Felipa and Hilaria. A new titlewas then issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot
707.

In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for
ten years. Returning in 1981, she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion
of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the realty taxes thereon.

It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition
of all properties held in common by her and respondents. Petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of
Urdaneta City for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages
against respondents, praying, among others, for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2) the
nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration
that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707 and (4) damages.

On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should first undergo
settlement proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an
accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.

The trial court rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and
deed of absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of
Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of his estate. It, however, dismissed the complaint for
partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by
petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties
should first be effected.

On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being
premature. The CA reversed the decision, however, with respect to the nullification of the self-
adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication and
deed of sale as to Carolinas one-half pro-indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an
accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus
compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or
distributed.

RULING: YES. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides, that a person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint
the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.

The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment
of death of the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner
has a legal interest in Lot 2299.There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69:
by agreement under Section 211 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be
reached, under Sections 3 to 6.

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate.
While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income
(rentals and profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting
of expenses for which property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as
funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court.

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate,
partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt
and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding
of the CA that "certain expenses" including those related to her fathers final illness and burial have
not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers
estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for
partition.

In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all
expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs of
the properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they
first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.

Petition is DENIED.

CUA vs. VARGAS

FACTS:

A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac,
Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized
Extrajudicial Settlement among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas heirs partitioning
and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question. Each one of them is getting a share of 11 square
meters.

Their heirs. Florentino, Andres, Antonina, and Gloria, however, did not sign the document.
Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida, and Rosario signed it. An Extrajudicial Settlement among Heirs
with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the
same sharing. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida, and Rosario signed the document
and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua.

Gloria Vargas came to know of the Extrajudicial Settlement among Heirs with sale only when
the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995. She claimed that
she was unaware that an earlier Exrajudicial Settlement among Heirs dated February 4, 1994
involving the same property had been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.

After knowing the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner Cua, Gloria Vargas tried to
redeem the property from Joseph Cua but the offer was refused. Gloria Vargas filed a case for
annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot against Cua.

ISSUE:

Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of the estate duly published

RULING:

NO. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not
be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before
any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties
to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after
such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. This is not
to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons
even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of the
extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso
shares in the subject property, are bound by the same.

TEOFILO BAUTISTA, represented by FRANCISCO MUOZ, Attorney-in-Fact vs. ALEGRIA

BAUTISTA et. al.

G.R. No. 160556 August 3, 2007

FACTS:

During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80-square meter parcel of land
(the property) in Poblacion, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. She died intestate leaving behind her
spouse Isidro Bautista (Isidro) and five children, namely: Teofilo, Alegria, Angelica, Pacita, and Gil.
 Isidro and four of his five children Pacita, Gil, Alegria, and Angelica executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition of the property in which Isidro waived his share in favor of his said four
children. Teofilo was excluded from the partition.

Alegria and Angelica, who, under the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, acquired of the
property, sold the same, by Deed of Absolute Sale to their sibling Pacita and her common-law
husband Pedro Tandoc. Pacita and Pedro soon obtained tax declarations in their names over 209.85
square meters of the property including the shares they purchased from Angelica and Alegria. Pacita,
with Pedros conformity, later conveyed via Deed of Absolute Sale of the property in favor of
Cesar Tamondong, Pedros nephew.

Petitioner Teofilo, represented by his attorney-in-fact Francisco Muoz, filed a Complaint[6]

against his siblings Alegria and Angelica, along with Pedro (the common-law husband of his already
deceased sister Pacita), Priscilla Bautista (wife of his already deceased brother Gil), Pricillas children
Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, and Gelacio and Cesar Tamondong for annulment of documents, partition,
recovery of ownership, possession and damages. Petitioner claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him
of his rightful share of the property and that the deed of sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar
Tamondong was fictitious as it was impossible for her to have executed the same in Manila, she
being already seriously ill at the time. RTC rendered decision in favot of Teofilo. CA reversed and set
aside RTC decision on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:

WON prescription had set in?

HELD:

NO. The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it
annulled does not prescribe.

As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the Court of Appeals applied the
prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property under
a constructive trust.

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilos co-
heirs. Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of of the property to Pacita
and her husband Pedro, as well as the transfer of of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid,
hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.

DACLAG vs. MACAHILIG

G.R. NO. 159578 : July 28, 2008

Austria-Martinez, J.:

FACTS:
 During their lifetime, the spouses Candido and Gregoria Macahilig were the owners of seven
parcels of land, all located in Numancia, Aklan. They had seven children, namely: Dionesio, Emeliano,
Mario, Ignacio, Eusebio, Tarcela and Maxima.

On March 18, 1982, Maxima, a daughter of Candido and Gregoria entered into a Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition3 with the heirs of her deceased brothers, Mario and Eusebio Macahilig, over
the seven parcels of land. The same deed stated that Dionesio was already deceased but was survived
by his daughter, Susana Briones; Emeliano was out of the country; Ignacio and Tarcela were also
both deceased but were survived by three children each.

One of the properties partitioned in the Deed was a parcel of irrigated riceland located at
Poblacion, Numancia, Aklan, with an area of 1,896 square meters declared in the name of Maxima
under Tax Declaration No. 644 which was denominated as "Parcel One." This Parcel One was divided
between Vicenta Macahilig Galvez for the heirs of Mario Macahilig, who was given the one half
southern portion of the land; and Adela Macahilig for the heirs of Eusebio Macahilig, who got the
one half northern portion. The Deed was notarized by Municipal Judge Francisco M. Ureta in his
capacity as ex-officio notary public. The heirs of Eusebio Macahilig are the herein respondents.

On March 19, 1982, Maxima executed a Statement of Conformity4 in which she confirmed
the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and conformed to the manner of partition and
adjudication made therein. She also attested that five parcels of land in the deed were declared in
her name for taxation purposes, although said lands were actually the property of her deceased
parents Candido and Gregoria Macahilig; that she waived, renounced and relinquished all her rights
to the land adjudicated to all her co-heirs in the deed; and that she had already sold one parcel before
the deed was executed, which was considered as her advance share. Pedro Divison, Maxima's
husband, also affixed his signature to the Statement of Conformity.

On May 23, 1984, Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag
(petitioners) lino Macahilig, Adela Macahilig, Conrado Macahilig, Lorenza Haber and Benita del
Rosario (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint for
recovery of possession and ownership, cancellation of documents and damages against Maxima and
petitioners. Respondents alleged that they were the lawful owners and previous possessors of the
one half northern portion of Parcel One by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.

The RTC found that respondents were able to establish that Parcel One was divided between
the heirs of Mario and the heirs of Eusebio, with the former getting the one half southern portion
and the latter the one half northern portion embodied in a Deed of Extra-judicial partition, which
bore Maxima's thumbmarks.

In disposing the issue of whether petitioners could be considered innocent purchasers for
value, the RTC ruled that petitioners could not even be considered purchasers, as they never acquired
ownership of the land since the sale to them by Maxima was void; and that petitioners' act of
reflecting only the price of P5,000.00 in the Deed of Sale to avoid paying taxes to the BIR.

ISSUE:
 WON Maxima may validly sell the said lot to herein petitioners and WON the latter are
purchasers in good faith.

HELD:

NO. In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is
selling.12 Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to transfer the
ownership of the property sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the thing must be
licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.
Maxima's execution of the Deed of Sale selling Parcel One, part of which is respondents' one half
northern portion, was not valid and did not transfer ownership of the land to petitioners, as Maxima
had no title or interest to transfer. It is an established principle that no one can give what one does
not have - - nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized
to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally.

Maxima's possession of the subject land was by reason of her request to her daughter
Penicula, who was installed by respondents as tenant after the execution of the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition, as Maxima wanted to farm the land so that she could have a share in the produce, to which
Penicula acceded out of pity. It was also established that after the execution of the Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition, Penicula as tenant was able to farm the subject land for one cropping year before
she allowed her mother Maxima to farm the land thereafter; and, at that time, Penicula gave the
corresponding share of the produce of that one crop year to Adela, one of herein respondents, thus
establishing respondents' ownership of the subject land. Evidently, Maxima's possession of the land
was not in the concept of an owner.

While petitioners were able to secure a certificate of title covering Parcel One in petitioner
Rogelia's name, their possession of a certificate of title alone does not necessarily make them the
true owners of the property described therein. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any
better title than what he actually has.

Petitioners claim that they were innocent buyers in good faith and for value; that there was
no evidence showing that they were in bad faith when they purchased the subject land; that Article
526 of the Civil Code provides that he is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; and that good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of
proof.

Notably, petitioners bought the property when it was still an unregistered land. The defense
of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is
involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.

THE PROPER REMEDY OF THE HEIRS WHO HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEIR PROPERTY IS AN
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE.

OFELIA BAGUNU vs. PASTORA PIEDAD

G.R. No. 140975 December 8, 2000
Facts:
Augusto Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the
maternal aunt of the decedent, a third degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter
of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. On August 28, 1995,
herein petitioner moved to intervene in Special Proceeding entitled In the Matter of Intestate
Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto Piedad, pending before the RTC of Pasay City assailing the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent and asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate. RTC denied the motion. Petitioner went to CA but CA dismissed
the appeal because the issues raised involved pure questions of law. Petitioner contested the
resolution of the CA in the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a
collateral relative of the third civil degree?

Held:

No. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. Xxx

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

DELGADO VDA. DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA

FACTS:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may
be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-
blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was
not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a
son, Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgadobut whether a marriage infact took place is
disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home
the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by
the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa,
however, Guillermo Rustia did managet o father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent
Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

ISSUES:

1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of
representation?

Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?

RULING:

1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the Children
born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and
his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado,
her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her
brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: Should
brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to
present authentic proof of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal
strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of
his sisters, nieces and nephews. Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half
of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-
siblings of Josefa

Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who
may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews
and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the
identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate. Guillermo Rustias
estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia
vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the
children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares
shall be per stirpes). Considering thatMarciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are
now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-

BAUTISTA ET AL.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

Paras, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children
of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

a. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

b. Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-BautistaManuel C. PascualJose C. PascualSusana C.
 Pascual-BautistaErlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
c. Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino PascualIsoceles PascualLoida Pascual-MartinezVirginia Pascual-
NerNona Pascual-FernandoOctavio PascualGeranaia Pascual-Dubert;
d. Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased,
to wit:
Olivia S. PascualHermes S. Pascual
e. Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented
by the following:
Dominga M. PascualMamerta P. FugosoAbraham S. Sarmiento, IIIRegina
Sarmiento-MacaibayEleuterio P. SarmientoDomiga P. San DiegoNelia P.
MarquezSilvestre M. PascualEleuterio M. Pascual(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
She filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she
expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual.

Again, she executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is
the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made
by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual.

All the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement
objections of the herein petitioners Olivia and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such
compromise agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-
entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another
compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal
heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of
the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision denying this motion reiterating the hereditary
rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration and such motion was denied.

On appeal, the petition is DISMISSED.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
HELD:

The petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 because
being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior
marriage when such children were under conception. Otherwise stated they say the term
"illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious
children.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the
prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable
to them.

Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this
Court ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely
a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood,
but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of
sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate
children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate.
In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance
of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant
of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides
that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. The
rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation
prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed
under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural
children should be treated differently, in the negative.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA

MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
NUMERIANA MANUEL vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

FACTS:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an
illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners, the
legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit.

During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio,
married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, Laurenciana Manuel executed a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters in favor of Juan
Manuel. Two other parcels of land were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple
were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take
private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
"daughter".

Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro
(with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No.
41134
 Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992,
Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land (all still in the name of
Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the
Register of Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles were
issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.

Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation

and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by
Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did
not sit well with petitioners.

In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.

RTC dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their
illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit and ordered
them to solidarily pay moral, exemplary damages, attys fees and litigation expenses.

ISSUE:

WON Petitioners are legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half
would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994
of the Civil Code?

HELD:

NO. Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code.

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by
his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate. If the widow or
widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall
inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between
legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will
of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus,
it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had
no right to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot
succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to
the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part
should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to
produce a harmonious whole.

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate
heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption,
is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. The Court held, nevertheless, that the complaint of
petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three
(3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-
in-interest" in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
Award of damages, attorneyss fees and litigations expenses are deleted.

Ofelia Bagunu vs. Pastora Piedad

G.R. No. 140975
December 8, 2000

Facts: Augusto Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the
maternal aunt of the decedent, a third degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter
of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. On August 28, 1995,
herein petitioner moved to intervene in Special Proceeding entitled In the Matter of Intestate
Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto Piedad, pending before the RTC of Pasay City assailing the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent and asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate. RTC denied the motion. Petitioner went to CA but CA dismissed
the appeal because the issues raised involved pure questions of law. Petitioner contested the
resolution of the CA in the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a
collateral relative of the third civil degree?
Held: No. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. Xxx
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa vs. Heirs of Marciana Rustia

FACTS:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may
be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-
blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from
Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was
not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a
son, Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgadobut whether a marriage infact took place is
disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home
the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by
the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa,
however, Guillermo Rustia did managet o father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent
Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

ISSUES:

3. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

 4. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of
representation?

Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?

RULING:

1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the Children
born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and
his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado,
her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her
brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: Should
brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.

2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to
present authentic proof of recognition. Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal
strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of
his sisters, nieces and nephews. Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half
of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-
siblings of Josefa

Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who
may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews
and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the
identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate. Guillermo Rustias
estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia
vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the
children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares
shall be per stirpes). Considering thatMarciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are
now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-

BAUTISTA ET AL.
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

PARAS, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children
of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

f. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

g. Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-BautistaManuel C. PascualJose C. PascualSusana C.
Pascual-BautistaErlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
h. Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino PascualIsoceles PascualLoida Pascual-MartinezVirginia Pascual-
NerNona Pascual-FernandoOctavio PascualGeranaia Pascual-Dubert;
i. Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased,
to wit:
Olivia S. PascualHermes S. Pascual
j. Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented
by the following:
Dominga M. PascualMamerta P. FugosoAbraham S. Sarmiento, IIIRegina
Sarmiento-MacaibayEleuterio P. SarmientoDomiga P. San DiegoNelia P.
MarquezSilvestre M. PascualEleuterio M. Pascual(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
She filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she
expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual.

Again, she executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is
the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made
by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual.

All the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement
objections of the herein petitioners Olivia and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such
compromise agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-
entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another
compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal
heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual.

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of
the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision denying this motion reiterating the hereditary
rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration and such motion was denied.

On appeal, the petition is DISMISSED.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:

The petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 because
being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior
marriage when such children were under conception. Otherwise stated they say the term
"illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious
children.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the
prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable
to them.

Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
 The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this
Court ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely
a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood,
but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of
sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate
children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate.
In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are
themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance
of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant
of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides
that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception. The
rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation
prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed
under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural
children should be treated differently, in the negative.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA

MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
NUMERIANA MANUEL vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995

FACTS:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an
illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners, the
legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit.

During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio,
married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, Laurenciana Manuel executed a
donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters in favor of Juan
Manuel. Two other parcels of land were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple
were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take
private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
"daughter".

Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro
(with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No.
41134

Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992,
Esperanza Gamba also passed away. A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land (all still in the name of
Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the
Register of Deeds, the three titles in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles were
issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.

Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation

and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land that was sold to the latter by
Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did
not sit well with petitioners.

In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.

RTC dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their
illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit and ordered
them to solidarily pay moral, exemplary damages, attys fees and litigation expenses.
ISSUE:

WON Petitioners are legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half
would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994
of the Civil Code?

HELD:

NO. Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code.

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by
his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate. If the widow or
widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall
inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between
legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will
of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus,
it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had
no right to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot
succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to
the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part
should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to
produce a harmonious whole.
 In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate
heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption,
is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. The Court held, nevertheless, that the complaint of
petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three
(3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-
in-interest" in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
Award of damages, attorneyss fees and litigations expenses are deleted.

Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller vs. Court of Appeals and Teodora Domingo
G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997

Regalado, J.:

FACTS:

Herein petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of deceased
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioners father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora
died without any descendant or ascendant and was survived only by her husband Martin Guerrero
and herein petitioners. When Hermogenes died, petitioners seek to inherit from Teodora by right of
representation.

Upon Teodoras death, her husband adjudicated unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land
in dispute with a house and apartment thereon in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which
Martin sold to private respondent Teodora Domingo. When Martin later on died, petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question
by right of representation. However, private respondent Domingo filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs
Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased
Teodora in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the demurrer to
evidence and dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented by petitioners such as
baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to
prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners are legitimate children of Hermogenes.
2. Whether or not petitioners filiation with deceased Teodora was proved.
3. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to inherit by right of representation.

RULING:

1. YES. The Court noted that both the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals overlooked
the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. Also, well settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. One rationale for this rule is that the
contest of legitimacy, as in the case of a child, by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court. Hence, the issue on whether petitioners are
 the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the
present action for reconveyance. This is in addition to the fact that private respondent
Domingo is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of petitioners. The presumption
of legitimacy continues to operate in petitioners favor unless and until it is rebutted. The
burden of proof is on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should
have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting,
as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the
party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish
that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear
the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption.

2. YES. The Court held that the declaration made by deceased Teodora that petitioner Corazon
is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason
being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving
such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an
absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent. Where the
subject of the declaration is the declarants own relationship to another person, it seems
absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact
which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main
evidence unnecessary.

3. YES. The Court applied the following provisions of the Civil Code on the manner by which
the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles
or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate
children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving
spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.

Thus, upon the death of Teodora, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved
to her surviving spouse, Martin, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The remaining half
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin could only validly alienate his total undivided
three-fourths share in the entire property to private respondent Domingo. Resultantly,
petitioners and Domingo are deemed co-owners of the property involved in the proportion
of an undivided one-fourth and three-fourths share thereof, respectively.

The questioned judgment of respondent CA is reversed and set aside.

 Heirs of Pascasio Uriarte vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998

Mendoza, J.:

Doctrine:
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or
spouse survive the descendant.

FACTS:

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were
Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by
whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. Private respondent Benedicto is thus the
nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica.

Petitioners as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio, who
was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva was the
daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo and Justas Father, Juan, were
brothers. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, relatives within the 5th degree of consanguinity, of Justa
by her cousin Primitiva. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother
Gregorio.

Private Respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the RTC for the partition of the
land left by Justa. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, has been acquired by Justa wherein 0.5 hectare
by inheritance from her parents, and 2.2 hectares by purchase. Private respondent claimed to be the
sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that
Pascasio Uriarte who he claimed worked the land as Justas tenant, refused to give him (private
respondent) his share of the harvest. He further contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire
land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from
her parents.

Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. In their
answer, the heirs denied they were tenants of Justa but the latters heirs entitled to her entire land,
claiming that the entire land was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great granduncle. It
was bequeathed to Domingo (2/3 of the land) and Juan Arnaldo (1/3). The heirs claimed that the land
had always been in their possession and that Justa, in her lifetime, never asserted exclusive right
over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it. They alleged that private
respondent (Bendicto Estrada) did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of
Ambrocio Arnaldo, the original owner of the property. The trial court sustained petitioners
contention. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision finding that 0.5 hectares had been acquired
by Justas parents during their marriage. Hence, as the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica,
private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her
nearest relatives within the meaning of Article 962 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

Private respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and therefore, the only one entitled to her
estate. Given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership
of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her fathers share
in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition, Justa
inherited her mothers share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to
her own right. Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7 hectare land. This 2.58-hectare
land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justas nearest surviving relative.

According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

As Justas nephew, Benedicto Estrada is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if
no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survives the decedent. That private respondent is only a half-
blood relative is IMMATERIAL. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. The
determination of whether the relationship is full or half blood is important only to determine the
extent of the share of the survivors. Petition is DENIED.

GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 117740 October 30, 1998

Romero, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners are the siblings of the deceased Ricardo. Respondents are the alleged illegitimate children
of the deceased and common-law wife.

On April 18, 1972, petitioners sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their deceased brother,
Ricardo. They claimed that he died a bachelor without any issues in the direct descending line and
that they are the only and surviving heirs. This was opposed by the respondents, who alleged that
they Ricardo had a common law wife named Honoria and they produced two children. They also
claimed that he has another child with one named Dolores. Hence, since there are no legitimate
children and there are illegitimate children, the latter shall be entitled to the entirety of the state to
the exclusion of those Ricardos relatives.

The lower court ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioners appealed to the CA but it was denied.
Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

WON the respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo?

WON the petitioners may inherit from their deceased brother Ricardo?
HELD:
1. Yes, they are. Petitioners claimed that Honoria was legally married at that time the two
illegitimate children were born to one Jose and that he died in 1971. There is thus the
presumption that despite even though the mother has declared against the legitimacy of
her children or even though she is declared as an adulteress, her children and presumed
legitimate.

The court however observed that the best proof of ascertaining the time of death of
Jose was to present the death certificate. But this they did not do.

The petitioners likewise presented the physician of Ricardo. He testified that Ricardo
is sterile as he had gonorrhoea. The court however considered this inadmissible as evidence
because of its nature as a privileged communication.

Respondents on the contrary, presented among others, that in Ricardos tax

declarations, he presented Honoria as his wife. He even opened a trust fund account in favor
of the two illegitimate children

The burden of proof in assailing the illegitimacy of the two children was not satisfied
by petitioners.

2. NO, they cannot.

With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad,
petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable
provisions are:

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate

children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003. If there are noillegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.

ARNELITO ADLAWAN vs. EMETERIO ADLAWAN and NARCISA ADLAWAN

G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006

A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of including all
the co-owners as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the action of the
plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.

FACTS:

A house and lot located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu was registered in
the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner) Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged
illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole heir. He then adjudicated to
himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the siblings of his father to
occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he demanded that they
vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them. His aunt and uncle on the other
hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that the said lot was registered
in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since birth. The only reason
why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominadors name was when their parents were in
need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan and since
Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale in
favor of Dominador. The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelitos filiation and the
settlement of the estate are conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador
was survived by his wife, Graciana, her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC
ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the
motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew and nieces of Graciana who claim that they
have a share in the lot. The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs
of Graciana are co-heirs thus he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:

NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of
Dominador. Since Dominador was survived by his wife, upon his death Arnelito and Graciana
became co-owners of the lot. Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity
thus making them co-owners as well. Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant
petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-
owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the co-owners as plaintiffs
because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all but if the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.

Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation
of the ownership of the other heirs, the instant petition should be not be allowed to prosper.
Consequently, justice dictates that respondents who are now in the twilight years of their life be
granted possession of their ancestral property where their parents and siblings lived during their
lifetime, and where they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life. Wherefore, the petition
is denied.