Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Soshichi Uchii
Abstract
Among Leibnizs papers he completed in his last years, the one that should be
regarded as containing the core of his system of knowledge is Monadology (1714). It
is a theory of metaphysics, but I take it that Leibniz thought that it is the foundation
of dynamics, and he envisaged that dynamics should be combined with his new
geometry, called Analysis Situs.
There are two firm grounds for the preceding assertion. The first is that Leibniz
sketched the relationship between his metaphysics and dynamics, in the two papers
New System and Specimen Dynamicum (both published in 1695; English tr. in Ariew
and Garber 1989). If we wish to figure out a reasonable interpretation of
Monadology, this ground must be taken very seriously.
I have come across Leibnizs philosophy in the process of examining the theories of
space and time based on modern physics. Since then, I have spent a little more than
ten years for my study of Leibniz. And only recently I have published a book on
Leibniz, describing my own reading, called Informational Interpretation of
Monadology (first appeared as Uchii 2009, and the updated version is Uchii 2016).
The crucial idea of this interpretation is that we have to extract Leibnizs theory of
information from Monadology and other texts. Indeed, I have found out that
Monadology contained such a theory, since Leibniz had to connect his ontology with
a theory of the state-transition of each monad, and also with mental and physical
phenomena. Needless to say, he did not know the modern theory of information (in
the 20th and 21st century); however, I will claim that his Monadology can be
understood only in terns of the viewpoint and concepts of the theory of
information. The present paper is going to show how we can obtain a better view,
not only of Monadology, but of the overall structure of Leibnizs philosophy,
especially as a philosophy of physics.
Already in New System, Leibniz said that each monad (simple substance) can be
likened to a spiritual automaton, and it is governed by an internal force (primitive
force) . This force is easily understood in terms of the state-transition function of a
monad; alternatively, we may say each monad is programmed (by God) to work
harmoniously with other monads, and changes its state (perception) accordingly.
Further, in Specimen Dynamicum, he said that this primitive force (in a monad) is
transformed into the derivative force in the phenomenal world. This statement can
be simply translated as: the derivative force is a coded appearance of the primitive
force. Coded because the primitive force belongs to reality (the sphere of
monads), but the derivative force belongs to the phenomena, how the reality is
represented to intelligent creatures like humans. In order to connect two entirely
different spheres, we need coding. Further, notice that any monads states
(perceptions) themselves represent the whole reality, the sphere of the monads. Thus
we have to assume at least two different systems of coding, one for states
(perceptions, which occur in reality), another for phenomena. These must be
different, because Leibniz consistently says that there is no space and no time in
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reality whereas phenomena (including motion) occur in space and time (see Uchii
2015b, and for a concise presentation see 2015a). This is a crucial point for
understanding Leibnizs metaphysics.
In any case, it is clear that in order to make sense of Leibnizs assertions about
monads and phenomena, we have to conclude that he presupposed the notion of
coding, despite the fact that he never used this word. And we have to further notice
that programming is inseparable from coding. Take an obvious example of a Turing-
machine. Any Turing machine (its state-transition vis--vis its tape) can be
programmed but any such programs must be linked with coding, how a natural
number is represented on the tape. Likewise, God, the ultimate programmer of
reality cannot make any program without using some coding, and this is logically
necessary.
Many readers may wonder why we have to dig into Leibnizs philosophy which is
quite old, at least 300 years old! For these skeptical readers, I will argue that
Leibnizs program has a surprisingly wide range, from classical physics to the
theories of relativity (special and general), and extending even to quantum physics.
Thus his program should be quite instructive for many philosophers of science.
The reason why his philosophy can have such a wide range is easy to understand:
the separation of reality from the phenomenal world, and connecting these two
spheres by means of code, or we should say, by means of various systems of
coding. The single monadic world (reality) is governed by the law of state-
transition of each monad (programmed by God). And Leibniz consistently says this
reality has neither space nor time, nor any quantities. But this reality can be
represented (via coding) quantitatively in the phenomena, and thereby the law of
the state-transition of reality can be transformed into quantitative laws; I say laws
because any such representation in the phenomena is always incomplete and
therefore a mere homomorphism, not any isomorphism. Thus for creatures with finite
abilities such as humans, knowledge of the laws governing the phenomenal world
should be partial, and not unified. Classical mechanics, special relativity, or
quantum mechanics can at best represent partially the structure of reality. Although
Leibniz had no knowledge of relativity theories or quantum physics, I am sure he
would say as follows: these are different attempts at decoding Gods coding and the
law of reality; and because of incompleteness of any such attempts of decoding,
unification of all of them is quite hard. Aside from incomplete data from the
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phenomenal world, the difference and incompleteness of decoding become
stumbling blocks for unification.
The preceding remark is crucial when we wish to consider space, time, and motion.
How are they related with reality, the sphere of monads? We have to distinguish
space and time in which any phenomena occur from the bases of them in reality. Leibniz
talks about both spheres very often in one breath; and this misleads most readers.
However, if we keep the preceding remark in our mind, we can easily come to the
right answer. In reality (no space, no time), there are monads and relations among
them. And within each monad, its state-transition is all given at once; there is the
order of succession of states, which is not time but the basis of time. Likewise,
monads are not in space, but there are various relations among them; or rather,
since Leibniz says that organized groups of monads, where each group is governed
by a single dominant monad (often called anima) , correspond to natural machines
(divine machines) in the phenomenal world, the relations of these groups are the
bases of spacial relations, and the totality of the latter is space. As De Risis excellent
work has clarified, Leibnizs Analysis Situs aimed at revealing the relationship
between Monadology and the foundations of geometry, the mathematics of space.
Then what can we say about motion and dynamics? It is well known that Leibniz
subscribed to the mechanical philosophy, so that the science of motion, dynamics is
most closely connected with the attempts of knowing reality. For that is directly
concerned with motions of bodies, which should be representing, in the
phenomenal world, groups of monads and the state-transitions of any such groups.
The laws of motion must be regarded as representing the laws of state-transition of
monads, via coding, in some way. This is clear from Leibnizs texts on dynamics,
where he stated the correspondence of the primitive force (in monads) to the
derivative force (in bodies). According to my interpretation, derivative force
means coded representation of primitive force, and I would claim this is the only
sensible interpretation!
The crucial point of Leibnizs metaphysics is that it can provide (1) the basis of
space and time, together with (2) the basis of the law of state-transition of the
phenomenal world. We know neither, of course. But if we assume that there is the
ultimate reality together with the ultimate program for the phenomenal world
(multiverse), then we are coming closer to Leibnizs scenario.
References
Ariew, R. and Garber, D., ed. (1989) G. W, Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Hackett, 1989.
Barbour, Julian (2011) Shape Dynamics. An Introduction, arXiv: 1105.0183v1 [gr-
qc], 1 May 2011.
De Risi, Vincenzo (2007) Geometry and Monadology, Birkhuser, 2007.
Loemker, L. E., ed. (1969) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters,
2nd ed., Reidel, 1969.
Tegmark, Max (2014) Our Mathematical Universe, Penguin Books, 2014.
Uchii, Soshichi (2016) Leibnizs Informatics and Physics (in Japanese), Tokyo: Chuo-
koron-shinsha, Feb. 2016. [This is an integrated version of the following papers
written in English.]
- (2009) An Informational Interpretation of Monadology, in Logic,
Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 13th International
Congress (ed. by C. Glymour, Wang Wei, and Dag Westersthl), College
Publications, 2009, 344-353. (Pdf version, PhilSci-Archive 4635)
- (2014) Monadology, Information, and Physics Part 3 (revised): Inertia and
Gravity, PhilSci-Archive 11125
- (2015a) Leibnizs Theory of Time, PhilSci-Archive 11448
- (2015b) Monadology, Information, and Physics Part 1: Metaphysics
and Dynamics (revised), PhilSci-Archive 11523
- (2015c) Monadology, Information, and Physics Part 2: Space and Time
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(revised), PhilSci-Archive 11647
Wallace, David (2012) The Emergent Multiverse, Oxford University Press, 2012.
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