Urban Ecology, 3 (1978) 241-261 241

o Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

CULTURE AND THE SUBJECTIVE EFFECTS OF STRESS

AMOS RAPOPORT

The University of Wisconsin, Department of Architecture and Department of Anthropology,

P.O. Box 413, Milwaukee, Wise. 53201 (U.S.A.)
(Received 13 June 1977)

ABSTRACT

Rapoport, A., 1978. Culture and the subjective effects of stress. Urban Ecol., 3: 241-261.

The quality of life is a multidimensional, subjective and variable concept. It can be

approached by considering either its positive or negative aspects. In this paper, one of the
latter - stress- is discussed. It is argued that stress is a general problem and that environ-
ments can be conceptualized as stress-modulating devices, so that preferences for particular
environments can be partly interpreted in terms of stress reduction. It is further argued
that although stress has received much attention, the importance of its subjective effects
and the role of culture and perception in it have been neglected. Rather than dealing with
two sets of variables - environmental stimuli and organismic factors - a third set should
be considered - cultural variables; a three-element model of stress is, therefore, proposed.
The implications of this model are discussed, the principal being that the effects of
particular stressors depend on their meaning, although the role of species-specific con-
stancies cannot be ignored. The variable effects of apparently minor and major stressors
can then be understood and related to the notion in perturbations in homeostasis. Various
ways of coping with stress are then discussed and illustrated, as is their relation to environ-
mental variables. Given the argument about the importance of subjective, cognitive factors
and the central role of culture in the subjective effects of stress, the implications for plan-
ning and design are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The quality of life is a complex and multidimensional concept. It is also

subjective and highly variable am.ong different individuals, groups, subcultures
and cultures who select different components and, even if they select the
same components, may rank them very differently.
Quality of life is related to life-styles, perceptions, culture and the like.
The interrelationships among these and with migration (i.e., habitat selection)
are complex, but one can argue that all of them and their interaction involve
some element of choice. Like lifestyle, quality of life represents a choice
among alternatives defining a particular profile and expressing some ideals
(often embodied in images) (Rapoport, 1972, 1977), although the fit is rarely
perfect - there are distortions in the translation of ideal to reality - due to
242

ecological, resource and social constraints and limitations.

Quality of life is too global a term and, in terms of environments, environ-
mental quality is equally global and complex - many physical and socio-
cultural variables are involved, and meaning and symbolism play a role about
which little is as yet known and which require much work, particularly cross-
cultural analysis.
Given the complexity and multidimensional nature of environmental quality
(Rapoport, 1977) it can clearly not be discussed fully. At the very least, how-
ever, it consists of positive and negative characteristics (the pull and push
factors, respectively, of habitat selection). In dealing with environmental
quality one can, therefore, take two major approaches. One can try to describe
those positive characteristics, and their ranking, which best describe environ-
mental preference. Alternatively, one can try and deal with the negative
aspects - those variables which make environments unsatisfactory. While
both are complex issues, the former is a lengthy procedure and I have recent-
ly tried to summarize much of the evidence elsewhere (Rapoport, 1977).
Among negative characteristics stress seems clearly to be one important
variable, which plays a role among both animals and humans. One aspect of
environmental quality is often its congruence with such levels of environ-
mental press which do not lead to stress so that environmental quality,
whether in terms of space organization, density, various sensory stimuli, the
presence of like people in residential areas and so on can all be interpreted as
a search for stress-reducing characteristics.
Particular environments - dwellings, clusters of dwellings, neighborhoods,
etc. - can be seen, at least partly, as stress-reducing devices (or, more general-
ly, as stress-modulating devices) which allow both low and high arousal, inter-
action and withdrawal. (Note that privacy can be described as a system for
controlling unwanted interaction and hence potential stress (Rapoport,
1973b, 1976a).) Among others, current urban and residential forms, prefer-
ences for them and habitat selection (e.g., migration to suburbs) can be inter-
preted and evaluated in these terms. One might, then, predict public prefer-
ences in terms of reaching some particular subjectively-preferred levels of
stimulation, with both too little and too much being potentially stressful, but
seen in terms of an activity system, so that settings of both high and low
stimulation are necessary. Thus, from a model of density proposed (Rapoport,
1975b), it could be predicted that in urban residential areas high perceived
density generally, noise, unlike people, poor maintenance and untidyness
(which increase feelings of crowding and act as people-surrogates), lights,
advertisements, non-residential uses and other annoyances would be evaluated
as undesirable because potentially highly stressful, although they might be
sought in, say, a theater district. It could also be predicted that residential
areas, seen as areas of withdrawal, would have very different profiles from
business and, even more so, entertainment areas in cities. Without being
reductionist one could say that in most large, modern urban areas those
qualities of dwellings, neighborhoods, transportation and services which are
 243

disliked are those which are felt to be stressful, while those liked are stress
reducing so as to allow people to achieve subjectively optimal levels of
stimulation which tend to be at the pacer frequency (Rapoport and Kantor,
1967; Nahemow and Lawton, 1973). This becomes even more significant in
developing countries and other situations of rapid culture change and other
forms of long-term environmental stress.
One could discuss the specific environments chosen, how and why they
reduce stress (Rapoport, 1977), but stress itself, as a concept, needs to be
discussed from this perspective. Although it has received much attention
recently, the importance of its subjective effects has been neglected, as has
the role of culture in this process. The models of stress commonly used tend
to consider two sets of variables - environmental stimuli and organismic
factors; in this paper the central role of cultural variables in the subjective
effects of stress will be emphasized, and the suggestion made that models of
stress should include three elements - environmental stimuli, organismic
factors and cultural variables.

STRESS

Stress is a concept which has been used extensively in a number of fields.

It follows that there are a number of different definitions of this concept and
also that its meaning has become increasingly vague. Since its initial introduc-
tion into the English language (as distress), it has meant to impose a strain
on, to coerce, to compel (Dubos, 1965, p. 27). It has tended to be associated
with a common pathological manifestation, involving a series of associated
physiological effects which have come to be known as the General Adapta-
tion Syndrome (Selye, 1950, 1956). Many of the definitions refer to Selye
and his notion that a stressor is a stimulus which elicits stress; stress is the
resulting state of the organism while stress response (or strain) is response
characteristic of a state of stress (Selye, 1950,1956; Horvath, 1959; Turan,
1974).
It also seems generally agreed that stress impairs psychological functioning
or causes a deterioration in goal-oriented tasks, and that it occurs when the
organisms homeostatic mechanisms are unable to maintain a state of dynamic
equilibrium. The consequences of this upset of homeostasis are disruption and
disorganization (Horvath, 1959) or disease (Carlestam and Levi, 1971).

STRESSORS

There have been several attempts to classify stressors. One attempt, typical
of many others, classifies them as belonging either to the biochemical,
physical, psychological or sociocultural environments (Howard and Scott,
1965). The emphasis is frequently on relative deprivation or excess, whether
of social stimuli, economic resources, of freedom of choice, etc. However,
from the point of view of environmental design, potential stressors can include
244

physical variables such as heat, cold, noise or pollution; inadequate or excessive

information - sensory, symbolic, social or cognitive; threats or hazards of
various sorts, and change - particularly sudden and rapid change, as well as
forced change, which upsets homeostasis.
Even apparently minor changes in the socio-cultural environment may lead
to stress if they demand major adaptation -type of food eaten, ideas about
what is funny or sad, ideas about friendship and so on (Spradley and Phillips,
1972, pp. 522-524). Similarly, temporal cycles, space organization, environ-
mental cues for behavior and the like may, when impossible or difficult to
decode, become stressors.
Two aspects have received inadequate attention. First, the question (which
I will not discuss) of how stressors act together - are they additive, multi-
plicative or subtractive (Carson and Driver, 1967). The second, which is my
major topic, concerns the relative impact of various stressors and, more
importantly, their variable effects. Thus, while it has generally been assumed
that stressors are due to negative factors, e.g., fear or anxiety, they may, in
fact, also be due to appetitive behavior (S. Levine, 1971) or even apparently
positive factors.

MODELS OF STRESS

Generally, there is considerable disagreement about stress and no one

accepted model. However, implicit in much of the literature (as in many other
fields of man-environment research such as environmental cognition (Rapoport,
1976b)) is a two-element model which includes environmental and organismic
factors, as illustrated in Fig. 1. This model is too simple because people, in
effect, operate in the perceived environment and react to potential stressors
subjectively. This implies an evaluative element, so that apparently attractive
stimuli may be stressful, either if they cannot be obtained or attained, or if
there is a surfeit of such stimuli (Lipowski, 1971). More generally, the same
stimuli may be evaluated as attractive or noxious, and their strength and
effects may vary with particular values and orientations (Lipowski, 1975).
It has been argued that environmental press is the threat to desired level of
maintenance of the system; environmental stress is the resulting state, while
environmental strain (or stress response) is the disturbance if coping is un-

L- I

,ENIRCJNMENTAL ,RGANlSMlC
r ACTORSi FACTCIRS,

Fig. 1. The two-element model of stress.

 245

successful (Turan, 1974). This clearly implies a major evaluative dimension,

which applies whether one concentrates on the potential stressors in the
environment or the responses. For example, threat involves anticipation and
evaluation which are dependent on cognitions, associations etc. - i.e., it is
variable and subjective as seems quite clear from the geographical literature
on the perception of natural hazards, threats (and opportunities (Kates,
1962; Saarinen, 1966; Kates et al., unpublished); urban threats such as crime
are also subjectively evaluated with variability in perceived stress; stress
response is even more variable since coping ability and response strategies
may also vary.
The crucial point, that evaluation and matching of situations against certain
desired levels, norms and the like occur (although frequently beyond awareness),
and that environmental attributes become stressors on this basis is often
implicit, but rarely made explicit, and even more rarely given central impor-
tance. Thus, if stress may follow from stimulus overload, behavior constraint
or resource scarcity (Stokols, 1976), then whether it does will depend on the
meaning attached to these variables in particular situations and the evaluative
standards used. Similarly, the cognitive element, while mentioned in several
discussions of stress (Carson and Driver, 1967), has not received adequate
attention (Spradley and Phillips, 1972). Thus, the view that density and
crowding effects are related to the exposure to strangers whose presence leads
to disruption of homeostasis (Dubos, 1965; Goss, 1973), depends on who are
strangers, which is clearly a matter of definition, as well as of the defenses
used (see later). In this case, then, as in many others, the stressor is subjec-
tively defined, hence variable, and depends partly on some norms or schemata.
This gives a more active role to the individual who, in the two-element model,
appears as rather passive. This process can usefully be represented as in Fig. 2.
We have already seen that threats and hazards are perceived and evaluated
subjectively and their stress effects thus variable - similarly with information
overloads. An example of the latter is unwanted social interaction and, when
one defines privacy as the control of unwanted interaction, then the definition
of unwanted, interaction, desired levels, the sensory modalities emphasized
and the mechanisms of control used are all variable (Rapoport, 1973b, 1976a).
The response to given situations will be correspondingly varied. Similarly the
different evaluations of severe climates and their effects on housing are quite
clear (Rapoport, 1969). Widely different also are evaluations and responses
to cold, heat, noise, pain - and the resulting behaviors and standards (Rapoport
and Watson, 1972). Furthermore, stress can occur even in high quality of
life situations as has been shown for Australian Aborigines (Hamilton, 1975)
and nomads generally (Rapoport, 1974).

In a recent paper (House Form and Climate) in one of my classes Mrs. Donna Wade
demonstrated this variability for a large sample of extremely cold climates. The variability
of both evaluation and response is quite clear.
246

CULTURAL TEMPORAI

PERSONAL

FILTERS MA,BE ONE OF

ITHESE MAY PLAY A SOCIAL. SENSORY
REDUCED ROLE IN OR COGNITIVE
SITUATIONS OF OVERLOAD OR
EXTREME STRESS DEPRIVATION: THREAT
SEE ALSO FIG. 3) ETC.

MATCHED OR EVALUATED
AGAINST NORMS. VALUES,
EXPECTATIONS. CURRENT MAXIMUM
STATE, ADAPTATION LEVEL STRESS COPING RESPONSES
ETC OF PARTICVLAR
INDIVIDUALS& EG
GROUPS ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN
,THlS MATCHING PROCESS MIGRATION
IS UNIVERSAL IN THE NO CHANGING BEHAVIOR
JUDGEMENT OF STRESS ACCEPTING SlTUAilON
ENVIRONMENTAL OUALITY CHANGING NORMS OR
GENERALLYi OTHER WAYS OF
THE MATCHING OR I REDVCING
EVALUATION IS IN TERMS COGNlTlVE
OF CONGRUENCE WiTH DISSONANCE
THE NORMS ETC

Fig. 2. Amended model of stress.

THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE IN THE MODEL OF STRESS

Many environmental attributes become subjective stressors via cognitive

factors which are important regarding motivation (Glass and Singer, 1972)
and in the appraisal which reveals a disparity between perceived environ-
mental demands and perceived ability to cope (Lazarus, 1966). Given a
homeostatic model of stress, any change implies a norm of non-change (which
is subjective), so that what researchers find stressful may not be stressful to
others. Thus being moved from where one lives, widely regarded as stressful,
may be less stressful for less place-related people; or not be stressful at all for
others. For nomads, it may be settling down which is stressful since their
norm of non-change is mobility (Rapoport, 1974).
In effect we are discussing aspects of culture, and cultural variables may
play a central role in the subjective effects of stress. This seems clear from
the differential adaptation of different groups to apparently similar changes,
for example a move to urban housing, where one group adapts quickly and
easily, since the new housing is reasonably congruent with their cognitive
schemata and lifestyle, whereas another, less congruent group remains in a
maladaptive state for a considerable period (Ashton, 1972). Clearly if a group
or individual easily adapts to a new situation there is less stress on them than
if they do not, due both to the shorter period of maladaptation and because
the change is less traumatic - for the same apparent set of conditions. The
suggestion is that this differential adaptation is a matter of evaluation of the
 247

fit or congruence of the new situation with a number of core variables im-
portant to the particular culture. This may be evaluated in terms of the
conceptual distance between a given state and a new state, the desired state,
the rate of change or the degree of perceived control and choice (Rapoport,
1974).
This differential response may also be related to the extent to which a
new state is the result of compulsion or choice and, in the latter case, having
to choose without sufficient information. This can be generalized to a state
of uncertainty about a whole set of important variables, such as knowing ones
place in a system, family, kinship, environments, etc. (Madge, 1968). While
this will be discussed later (in a slightly different formulation), it seems likely
that certainty and uncertainty of new or existing situations is variable and
depends on the culturally defined baseline.
Not only may apparently similar situations have different effects and vice-
versa: apparently minor events may be stressful while apparently traumatic
ones may not - i.e., their salience is not immediately obvious. It follows that
apparently negative events may be less stressful than positive ones. A classic
example is that of the Y ir-Yiront (an Aboriginal group in Northern Australia)
who quickly forgot, and recovered from, an apparently traumatic near-ex-
termination at the hands of some white hunters, only to be destroyed by the
introduction of steel axes by missionaries -because the production and
distribution of stone axes was central to the cultural system, maintaining it
in a state of homeostasis in terms of social relations, roles, status and the
like (Sharp, 1952) - all of which suddenly became highly uncertain.
It follows that mobility, bad housing, slums, a hard life, high density
and so on may not necessarily be stressful just because researchers feel that
they are. These examples suggest the importance of considering elements such
as stressors emically as well as etically. In other words, they must be con-
sidered from the point of view, and as perceived by, the group in question as
well as externally from the perspective of an outside observer, although this
perception - and the matching process - are frequently beyond awareness.
In this connection the notion of subliminal perception may be useful (Dixon,
1971; Smith, 1972) so that, for example, noise, particular work patterns or
social situations may be stressful without people being aware of it. Such
stressors cannot, therefore, be identified without considering cognitive media-
tion, subjective definition, matching against some set of (cultural) norms
(Spradley and Phillips, 1972; Rapoport, 1974, 197513). It should also be
remembered that stressors are not unitary, and vary in magnitude and the
ways in which they act together, and that adaptation level, competence and
criticality influence the effects of potential stressors. We are dealing with
subjective effects of potential stressors and both their nature and intensity
is a matter of meaning, cognitive mediation and definition: these, as well as
defenses available, are related to culture.
Consider an example. It has recently been suggested that social stress is
controlled by buffering but that the amount of buffering required is a result
248

of stimulus intensity, so that high intensity stimuli (such as bright colors,

strong smells, etc.) lead to more potential stress and hence require more
buffering (Nesbitt and Steven, 1974). It seems likely, however, that the impact
of clothing, colors, smells and other attributes is variable and a matter of
definition and interpretation, i.e., of matching against some standard or
schema whereby one judges the type of person via the cues provided (Warr
and Knapper, 1968) and in a specific context. Meaning is attached to smells,
hair style or clothing (Roach, 1973; Roach and Either, 1965), as well as to
the setting whereby the context is judged, leading to the evaluation of the
intensity of stimuli - and their positive or negative nature. Thus odors (like
clothing) are used to confer a moral identity and hence affect interaction -
and the interpretation of odors assigns olfactory identity (Largey and Watson,
1972) and hence, like other cues, separates us from them.
Meaning, as in the example above, or the case of Yir-Yiront, involves aspects
of culture. Clearly much of our discussion has been about the importance of
a cultural component in the subjective perception of stressors, in effects of
stress, and also in ways of coping with stress. In effect, the model in Fig. 2
is one in which the two elements of environmental and organismic factors of
Fig. 1 are supplemented by a third, giving a three-element model with:
(i) environmental factors,
(ii) organismic factors, and
(iii) cultural factors.
This three-element model follows from much of the literature where it is only
implicit. Thus it has been suggested that environment as a source of stimula-
tion is directly related to the individuals affective response and adaptation
leading to optimal levels of stimulation. Stress is then seen as excessive devia-
tion from such optimal levels in terms of intensity, diversity and patterning
(Wohlwill, 1974). It also follows that adaptation levels are very important
and depend on past exposure (Wohlwill and Kohn, 1973): they influence
evaluative criteria and are, at least partly, an aspect of culture and part of
enculturation. Thus the introduction of this third element - culture - will
be useful in the discussion of stress and will make explicit what is frequently
left implicit. Stimuli become stressors in terms of how environments are
structured and evaluated by the individual (through norms, standards and
cognitive styles) so that it is essential to consider the nature of the cognitive
styles of cultures and subcultures.
This is, of course, a specific aspect of the more general stream of thought
regarding the perceived environment, the important role of subjective exper-
ience in mediating all sorts of variables ranging from pain and comfort to
feeling states, with the general conclusion that the emotions resulting from
given situations seem more related to social factors, and their linguistic codes,
than to the nature of the experience itself (Bourque and Back, 1971) and
also to the culturally defined context and situation. For example, if we return
to the model of privacy briefly discussed above, we not only find cultural
variability of definition and control (defenses), but also a cultural definition
 249

of context. Thus stress, seen as excessive social stimulation, is affected both

by shielding and context (Desor, 1972) and excessive, the nature of shielding
and the context are culturally variable. Among the !Kung Bushmen, for
instance, intense interpersonal press and multisensory contact seems desired
and is supportive rather than stressful (Draper, 1973). This seems partly a
matter of definition - i.e., cultural preference - and partly a matter of the
mechanisms used, such as the ability to move away (through band fission ) -
the wide separation of camps with a consequently low level of contact with
strangers and the existence of two contexts - a public and a private phase
(Rapoport, 1974).
Thus, while culture plays a major role in the filtering, perception and
evaluation shown in Fig. 2 and hence in cultural variability, there are probably
species-specific constancies (such as genotype, channel capacity, evolutionary
background, etc.) which limit the variability. Adding these factors to the
objective nature of the environment and its press, and to some organismic
factors, a much richer model results. Little work has been done on this
question, but conceptually this can be summarized as in Fig. 3.
Also involved in the presence or absence of stress response is the individuals
coping ability. Clearly the ability to cope with stress situations (whether per-
ceived consciously or subliminally) is also variable - as are the outcomes. Thus,
not only are the definitions of stress and its perception variable, but so is the
ability to cope and the effectiveness of coping responses. These latter operate
in the real world rather than the perceived world which makes this model
not purely solipsistic. The ability to cope, beyond certain general species-
specific limits, would seem to be related both to the magnitude of the press
and the level of competence of the organism or group, i.e., competence applies
also in the cultural realm.
Also involved is the ability to cope with the costs of adaptation (White,
1959; Lawton, 1970; Rapoport, 1973c) and culture plays a role in this. Con-
sidering migration as one very important stress-reducing mechanism, in
which symbolic and image push and pull aspects are important, the role of
culture is central, so that groups respond differently to pushes and pulls,
develop differing migration patterns, environmental choices and design
activities. Some potential stressors may be such in all societies (i.e., be species

ENVlRONMENTALPRESS
MATERIALENVIRONMENT
PHYSICAL
CHEMICAL 5 ORGANISMIC
BIOTIC CULTURAL FACTORS.
- - OUTCOME, OR
FACTORS
BIOTIC STATE,
PSYCHO-SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT / B GENOTYPE
- ONE OF WHICH
PHYLOGENIC MAY BE STRESS
CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT I- INDlVlDUAL -

INCREASE IN REDUCTION IN
POSSIBLE POSSIBLE
RESPONSES RESPONSES

Fig. 3. Combined model of stress (based, in part, on Boyden (1974)).

250

specific), while others may be culturally variable (i.e., there may be both pan-
human and variable stressors) (Spradley and Phillips, 1972). It is the variable
aspects of the magnitude of events, their evaluation and matching coping
styles and so on, which have been neglected and which help explain stress.
The amount of stress is also related to the degree of incongruence between
the perceived situation and the evaluative standards and norms, the sudden-
ness of the change, the degree of perceived control, and so on. The degree of
stress may then be a result of perceived threat to individual integrity and
identity, of sensory or cognitive overload due to the need to relearn and
restructure culturally defined cognitive schemata, rules, skills or defenses, to
the secondary effects of changes in the social system, etc. (Rapoport, 1974).
All of these involve a matching and evaluation process. Since personal filters
and the elements and norms used in the matching and evaluation process are
also affected by culture, its influence may be even more pervasive than might
appear at first glance.
It might be pointed out that while most of the discussion so far has been
in terms of certain groups (although stress is always experienced by individuals)
there is some evidence (although certainly not universally accepted) that the
personality and needs of the individual may be at least partly related to
culture (Aronoff, 1967; Aronoff, 1970; R. Levine, 1973) and previous exper-
ience and adaptation levels certainly are - as are the evaluative standards
used to judge situations.
The consequence of this approach is that all stages of the process need to
be studied cross-culturally, partly at least in order to determine constancies
and regularities as well as variability (Rapoport, 1975a). It is also necessary
to consider the central, core or salient elements in any cultural system in
order to be able to predict whether certain events or situations are likely to
be stressful. This, in effect, becomes a question of the degree of incongruence
between a perceived situation and some baseline state or set of norms. This
is an approach which relates the discussion in this paper with some recent
discussions on the sedentarization of nomads (Rapoport, 1974) and the sub-
jective definition of density (Rapoport, 1975b) which can be seen as specific
examples of the more general model being developed here.
Given the homeostatic nature of most stress models (Horvath, 1959; Dubos,
1965, p. 164) it follows that the system tries to maintain dynamic homeostasis
- whether physiological, psychological or cultural; it is the subjectively exper-
ienced degree of perturbation which leads to stress. This is why even positive
change may be stressful; it is also why it becomes important to elaborate on
conceptual distance, voluntary vs involuntary change, degree of control, rate
of change, the salience of the elements affected, etc. It is these which deter-
mine whether changes which are not stressful in themselves become stressful
in the cultural realm, whether they are significant enough to be called culture
shock.
Such changes tend to be stressful because they greatly depart from
homeostasis and are perceived as threats, and also because they often lead to
 251

overload due to the need radically to reorganize cognitive schemata, ways of

coping, methods of communication (specially non-verbal), learn new rules for
interaction and avoidance, new temporal rhythms, new cognitive maps, new
rules for behavior appropriate to given settings - and hence relearning the
meaning of environmental cues. Regarding this last point consider a traditional
culture where there is usually very close congruence between the physical en-
vironment and culture. In that case environmental cues are easily noticed,
easily read and understood, and readily obeyed. When the environment
becomes incongruent the cues may not be noticed, if noticed - misunder-
stood and, as the cultural system is disrupted, if understood - rejected. In
effect the cues cannot be decoded and the environment tends to become
meaningless and hence stressful: social behavior which often depends on
congruent and shared definitions of the situation also becomes less predictable
and hence more stressful.
In addition to the threat posed by all of ones behavior, skills and cog-
nitive schemata becoming inappropriate and even maladaptive, and the
problems of meaning, the relearning process involved requires a great deal of
energy and additional information processing, since it is no longer possible
to routinize behavior, in either the physical or the socio-cultural environ-
ments: everything has to be thought about, information processing is
increased and overload tends to follow. In other words, familiarity (physical,
cultural etc.) is important for feelings of low stress, security and maximum
use of the environment among both animals and humans.
More generally, as choices are opened up, stress results (Spradley and
Phillips, 1972, p. 526). Of course some press is required for development and
life (S. Levine, 1971) and the optimum level of press is that which is moderate-
ly challenging (Nahemow and Lawton, 1973) rather than stressful. This
corresponds to the notion of the pacer proposed for the required level of
environmental complexity (Rapoport and Kantor, 1967; Rapoport and
Hawkes, 1970; Rapoport, 1971) and for stimuli generally (Carlestam and
Levi, 1971); it can also be applied to play, where both too much and too
little challenge is stressful (via either anxiety or boredom) (Csikszentmihalyi
and Bennett, 1971).
At the same time, from an emit perspective, these preferred levels, within
species-specific limits, vary with experience, set and so on, are subjective and
partly cultural, so that which is stressful for one may be interesting and
stimulating for another; i.e., one could argue that optimal levels of press are
equivalent to stimulation. The definition of standards also depends on similar
factors and this approach seems clearly important in the study of moderniza-
tion, industrialization, urbanization and culture change generally. At the etic
level this type of evaluation also depends on the values of the observer, so
that while I may prescribe a course of action to reduce stress and hence
maintain homeostasis others may aim at a diametrically opposed outcome
(Sennett, 1970).
252

COPING WITH STRESS

While already mentioned, the role of coping needs to be elaborated. Stress

response depends partly on the coping repertoire and ability of various
individuals and groups, i.e., both cognitive overload and cognitive deprivation
are related to cognitive capacity (Saegert, 1973) while the magnitude of press
partly evaluated in terms of the defenses available. The role of lowered
competence in increasing criticality (Rapoport, 1969) has already been
discussed. Under these conditions apparently minor effects in the physical
environment may have major effects on given populations by subjecting
them to stress levels with which they (unlike other populations) cannot
cope. Thus apparently minor stressors may become destructive (because the
additional costs become too high due to the inability to cope) leading both
to the notion of prosthetic environments and the need for them (Lawton,
1970; Rapoport, 1973c).
Without going deeply into the general question of the effect of environ-
ment on behavior, the validity of a determinist vs a supportive/inhibiting
model and many other complex issues, it can be suggested that such effects
can be direct or indirect. Direct effects are those generally discussed where
physical environments affect behavior, mood, wellbeing and the like in terms
of their congruence with particular evaluative standards. Indirect effects, on
the other hand, are those where physical environments provide cues whereby
social situations are interpreted. The effects are social but the cues are en-
vironmental (Rapoport, 1976a). Action and behavior are in accordance with
the perceived social context and a room or area judged as belonging to high
status individuals will generally constrain behavior more than one judged as
belonging to ones peers. The role of cultural variables in these indirect effects
is obvious, although they also play a role in direct effects, since physical en-
vironments (the amount of space, cleanliness, noise and light levels, services,
etc.) are all evaluated against cultural norms.
The coping process also involves evaluation: there is self-evaluation of the
ability to cope, i.e., perceived ability to cope. At the same time there is also
the objective ability to cope - either as judged by an outside observer or
when a given individual or group, believing that they are able to cope are, in
fact, unable to do so. As mentioned before, this prevents the model being
solipsistic. It should be emphasized that both the perceived and objective
ability to cope are variable in terms of the mechanisms available to individuals
and groups and their appropriateness, and these have a major cultural compo-
nent. Also variable are the resources available to groups.

WAYS OF COPING WITH STRESS

The effects of information overload and perceived threat as stressors can

be reduced by various available defenses. Here I propose to discuss some
specific defenses in more detail without being exhaustive. My purpose is to
 253

indicate the range available, their diversity and also to imply the variable
utility of some of these mechanisms under different conditions.2

A sense of control

At the most general level, it appears that a sense of control over the en-
vironment reduces stress effects. Conversely, the effects of stressors are
heightened by the unpredictability due to lack of perceived control (Glass
and Singer, 1972).
The means of control can be of very different types. At the largest scale
it is a matter of choice, of events being voluntary and in a direction desired.
Thus environments such as suburbs, central cities or slums will have differ-
ent effects depending on whether they are selected or imposed. At a small
scale, once again using the example of privacy, it can be shown that at the
very least there are five major control mechanisms - space and space organiza-
tion, physical devices (walls, boundaries, doors - barriers generally), organiza-
tion of time (scheduling), rules of behavior (etiquette, manners, avoidance),
psychological withdrawal (trance and the like) (Rapoport, 197313, 1976a).
These control mechanisms can be substituted one for the other, but only up
to a point, because they are often closely integrated with the cultural system.
Beyond that point substitution becomes stressful; for example, when attempts
are made in Western culture to substitute the organization of time for that of
space (Harrington, 1965). Much more work is needed on cultural variability
in the sense of control (or even the extent of this need), but generally the
absence of any sense of control, however defined, heightens stress. The level
of analysis selected may be significant in any comparisons. Thus, avoidance
can be discussed at a large scale in terms of rules of avoidance of specific
groups or individuals under specified conditions or population homogeneity;
at a micro-scale, considerable numbers of very specific mechanisms including
behavior, physical devices, seating patterns and so on used to avoid eye
contact (Coss, 1973).

Predictability

The rules for avoidance of specific groups and individuals under specified
conditions, and other mechanisms discussed above, have the effect of increasing
predictability (or reducing unpredictability). More generally the presence or
absence of control seems also to be related to predictability. Both in physical
and social environments predictability - knowing the cues, and hence knowing
what to expect -tends to reduce stress. A major way of achieving such
predictability is through homogeneity in important settings. The nature of
this homogeneity varies since it is, in effect, perceived homogeneity and,

*In a different context (the geographic literature on hazard perception) there is also
discussion of various styles of coping and their effects.
254

while homogeneity seems very prevalent historically, the criteria whereby it

is defined vary greatly. The presence of other like people (as opposed to
strangers who tend to lead to stress (Dubos, 1965; Goss, 1973; Rapoport,
1974, 1977)) is a matter of definition, but once agreed upon there can be an
accepted set of rules - social, regarding interaction, behavior, non-verbal
communication, the significance of environmental cues, etc. - with conse-
quent reduction in stress (Rapoport, 1975b, 1977). Clear territories and
boundaries also help in this process.
Thus social stress can be reduced greatly by the establishment of an accepted
hierarchy in a stable group, i.e., a kind of social homeostasis, although there
are limits to the protective efficacy of social organization alone (Dubos,
1965, p. 107). That this can work is shown by studies of high density housing
in Hong Kong, where negative effects are related to the number of households,
rather than people, per dwelling (Mitchell, 1971), i.e., the presence of strangers
(defined as non-kin) plays a major role. Similarly, the use of clear and accepted
hierarchies and rules, as well as the setting of norms emphasizing the desirabil-
ity of what we would regard as crowding, also reduces stress (Anderson, 1972).
Clearly cultural variables are central in these kinds of processes.

Physical environment

It has been pointed out that in the absence of certain physical devices (such
as spacing) relative hierarchies are replaced by absolute ones (Leyhausen,
1971). This suggests the importance of the physical environment as a coping
mechanism - which is also one of the few elements over which designers have
some control.

It is known that architectural elements which reduce the impact of one

individual on another moderate the reaction to invasion of personal space
(Baum et al., 1974) and also the perception of crowding (Desor, 1972) thus
affecting stress levels. In the case of the study of high-density housing in
Hong Kong one of the major effects was due to the form of the housing,
particularly high-rise buildings, which influenced the control of children and
teenagers (Mitchell, 1971). The impact of the form of the environment has
also been demonstrated in the U.S. (Hall, 1971; Yancey, 1971) and in Japan
(Smith, 1971; Canter and Canter, 1971).
In the latter case there are also cultural defenses which interact with the
physical ones (Rapoport, 1969, 1977) and it must be borne in mind that the
efficacy of any physical device (as of rules and so on) varies with culture, and
that physical design needs to be culture specific (Rapoport, 1973c, 1974,
1976a).

Restoring homeostasis

There are a number of possible ways of restoring homeostasis: in a sense

 255

all the mechanisms being discussed have this objective. Some specific ones
will receive separate attention (e.g., defensive structuring) but generally
equilibrium can be restored in different ways. For example one can change
behavior, one can change the macro-environment - i.e., move, one can
modify the meso- or micro-environment (King, 1976). One can also change
norms and expectations, distort information and so on. All of these impose
some stress - some greater, some less - and the stress of migration (or
sedentarization) is well known (Brody, 1970; Rapoport, 1974). The most
difficult way of restoring homeostasis may be to change norms or expectations
particularly if they are of high salience in the system and thus highly resistant
to change. The purpose of changing these, or distorting information, is to
reduce the incongruity or inconsistency, whether in terms of a cognitive
dissonance model (Festinger, 1957) or some other model (Rosenberg, 1970).
Such incongruity may occur at the level of culture change, sedentarization,
urbanization (Watson, 1973) or at smaller scales. More generally, it is likely
to occur whenever reality and ideals fail to match. Since, as I have argued
elsewhere, all design (in the sense of creating environments) can be seen in
terms of a choice from among alternatives attempting to match some ideal
(Rapoport, 1973a, 1977) this may be a very common mechanism. One may
also hypothesize that different cultures will tend to use different methods of
reducing cognitive incongruity or inconsistence in terms of their particular
cognitive styles.

Defensive structuring

This is a specific response of groups under conditions of long term envir-

onmental stress. The devices used include authoritarian control over members
exercised by a small, specially knowledgeable elite, a high rate of endogamy,
early socialization for impulse control and the cultivation of cultural identity
symbols. The central characteristic is the presence of a few key values which
give a strong sense of cultural identity to the group and create a tightly
integrated system (Siegel, 1970). This process can be interpreted as one con-
trolling communication between members and non-members (us vs them)
by generating group solidarity. This is helped by dense settlement, homogeneity,
strong control by a small elite, rituals and symbols of identity (badges) (Siegel,
1970).
Using my proposed conceptualization of the environment and its design
as the organization of space, time, communication and meaning (Rapoport,
1975a, 1976a, 1977) one can see defensive structuring as an attempt to control
the organization of all four - but primarily of meaning - since the under-
standing of defensive structuring depends on the importance of symbols and
their use in culture - understood as a process of symbolic communication.
It may be suggested that by the appropriate use of symbols some of the
other, possibly less desirable, forms of defensive structuring may be avoided
or reduced. These symbols may be clothing, language, religion, food or what-
256

ever - or physical environment, which may also relate to some of the others.
This may suggest the importance of meaning aspects of the physical environ-
ment in coping with stress, particularly when such stress results from un-
familiarity (a possible interpretation of Royses (1969) paper) or its function
as an indicator of group identity (Duncan, 1973; Rapoport, 1975a, 1977)
and even more when this function is central in the cultural system (Rapoport,
1974).
There are, in fact, examples of the use of ritual and architectural settings
appropriate to it (both symbolic elements) used by particular groups as a form
of defensive structuring. (It is interesting that among animals also one can
find examples of the use of rituals in situations of stress which seem to cor-
respond, at least superficially, to defensive structuring (Huxley, 1966).) One
is the case of the Fang in Africa where new religious buildings, dances, etc.
are used to recreate traditional cultural patterns in miniature (Fernandez,
1977); the other - the Mayo Indians of Mexico - where the house cross is
the major symbol of ethnic identity (Crumrine, 1964). One can interpret
particular settlement patterns, forms of clustering and environmental choices
in such terms (Rapoport, 1977).

Giving meaning to the environment

Many of the specific mechanisms and defenses discussed, and some not
discussed, can be seen, in the broadest sense, as being attempts to impose
meaning on the world by structuring it into schemata, i.e., by classifying and
coding it in some way. This is a fundamental property of cognition and the
cultural variability of such schemata is an important aspect of its study in
cognitive anthropology (Rapoport, 1976b). This is related to stress because
an environment the organization or meaning of which cannot be read is stress-
ful. Also, when there are many elements in the environment which do not fit
into schemata, because they are totally alien, the environment is seen as
meaningless, hence disorienting and potentially stressful.
The notion of coding can occur at several levels.
(a) Reducing the amount of information by chunking, using symbols, and
other devices. (For a summary, see Rapoport (1977).)
(b) Reducing the amount of information by ignoring those elements which
do not fit into schemata, thus reducing the impact of large numbers (e.g.,
in cities), for example, by defining people as us or them and acting
accordingly.
(c) Reducing the amount of information due to large numbers of people and
the consequently large potential numbers of relationships not only by the
method described in (b) but also by schematizing a city into smaller areas
and limiting ones knowledge of it as well as by other means. Among these
are: changing the time allocated to each stimulus or interaction, dis-
regarding low priority inputs (a matter of definition), blocking reception
of stimuli, filtering stimuli, developing specialized institutions, limiting
 257

ones responsibility, depersonalization and disengagement (Milgram, 1970).

Many of these, and others, it seems likely from our discussion so far, have
important cultural components.

AN EXAMPLE

In one study of the methods employed in traditional Chinese culture to

deal with the potential stressor of crowding, a number of devices are listed
which show several of the defenses and mechanisms acting together and
clearly demonstrate the central role of cultural factors.
While crowding (and it has to be subjectively evaluated as such) is a
potential stressor, in traditional China one finds (Anderson, 1972):
(a) That crowding is voluntary - when more space is available more people
are brought in, since many people are seen as a desirable condition (cf.
Draper (1973) on the !Kung Bushmen).
(b) Noise is desired so that any desirable activity, good time and excitement
are called hot noise. (These are clearly examples of setting norms against
which one matches the potential stressors as well as being methods of
dealing with cognitive dissonance.)
(c) There are clear rules which separate people, and different parts of the en-
vironment have very different rules attached to them. (This implies sharing
the rules and an ability to read the cues and be prepared to obey them.)
(d) Time management is loose and flexible allowing people to avoid each
other. (This is learned at an early age and becomes normal.)
(e) Status and respect management are consistent, strong and accepted.
(Points (c), (d) and (e) clearly relate to a number of the coping strategies
discussed above.)
(f) All members of the group can discipline children. (cf. Hall (1970); this
clearly has implications for design and planning - cf. Mitchell (1971).)
(g) Interaction is very different for relatives and kin than for non-kin. (The
definition of kin is culturally extremely variable; this clearly relates to our
discussion above on homogeneity and the like.)
The study concludes that the Chinese have not eliminated tension, stress
and conflict but they have developed ways of managing space, time and
people such that even the most extreme crowding does not lead to any
particular increase in social stress. (Anderson 1972, p. 148.)
This example can be compared with Japan (Rapoport, 1975b,l977) or
with the Yagua Indians who use very different rules based on eye contact so
that stress is reduced by the relation of individuals eyes to the center and
periphery of the communal dwelling. Through an absolute set of rules, which
even apply to small children, anyone facing away from the center of the
communal dwelling and facing the periphery is deemed not to be present,
will be ignored and interaction is thus reduced (Rapoport, 1967). In this
latter case another interesting parallel with an animal example can be cited
where male turkeys crowded in a single enclosure used an analogous mech-
anism facing outwards and ignoring each other (McBride, 1970).
258

CONCLUSION

I have argued that a large number of elements in both the social and physical
environments are potential stressors. They only become stressors when filtered
and in this process culture plays a major role. I have further argued that such
perceived stressors are then matched against certain criteria and evaluated,
which may then lead to stress or its absence for apparently identical situa-
tions. After discussing some of the situations which may lead to stress given
this homeostatic/congruence approach some mechanisms available for coping
with stress were discussed, which are in themselves variable.
At each stage of the argument two major points were made. Firstly the
importance of subjective cognitive factors and secondly, and intimately
linked with the first, the central role of culture in the subjective effects of
stress. In fact the major suggestion made was the need to replace the com-
monly used model of stress, with its two elements of environment and
organism, with a rather more complex model.
It seems, on the face of it, that this latter model is more sophisticated,
truer to the evidence, suggests new kinds of questions and is hence potentially
more useful. Initially, however, as is often the case, the result may be reduced
utility. So many questions are raised, so much work needs to be done (as just
three examples: cross-cultural studies of stress; the nature of the groups which
are significant in such comparisons; the relative significance of various ele-
ments in creating stress) that one may feel rather helpless.
However, in the long run, asking questions about existing models, and the
suggestion for more complete conceptualizations, can only have positive
results. For one thing the discussion generated may possibly make the
suggested approach unnecessary. If it should, however, prove valid then the
sooner such an approach is taken the better. For one thing, the implications
for design and planning in the developing countries as well as in relation to
changing lifestyles demanded in developed countries by energy shortages are
extraordinarily important - as are the implications of particular governmental
policies based on other considerations.
Also, if stress is a major and fairly widespread problem, as seems likely,
then an important function of habitats and settings is to reduce stress to
desired and acceptable levels, to provide places to recover - backstage
regions, secure and predictable. An important aspect of environmental quality,
particularly in large urban areas and rapidly changing situations (which may
be becoming maladaptive for human evolution-based characteristics) is their
success as stress reducers. This is not the place to deal with this, but many
characteristics of preferred environments - suburbs, low density areas,
natural environments, population homogeneity - can easily be interpreted
in this way. Similarly, cultural preferences for apparently different environ-
ments can be seen all fulfilling this need (Rapoport, 1977), for example,
environments as diverse as courtyard cities (inside-out cities), low density,
green residential areas and urban villages (homogeneous neighborhoods)
become structurally equivalent in terms of this model - which is most useful.
 259

REFERENCES

Anderson, E.N. Jr, 1972. Some Chinese methods of dealing with crowding. Urban
Anthropol., l(2): 141-150.
Aronoff, J., 1967. Psychological Needs and Cultural Systems. Van Nostrand, Princeton,
N.J.
Aronoff, J., 1970. Psychological needs as a determinant in the formation of economic
structures: a confirmation. Human Relat., 23(2): 123-138.
Ashton, G.T., 1972. The differential adaptation of two slumsubcultures to a Columbian
[sic] housing project. Urban Anthropol., l(2): 176-194.
Baum, A., Riess, M. and OHara, J., 1974. Architectural variants of reaction of spatial
invasion. Environ. Behav., 6(l): 91-100.
Bourque, L.B. and Back, K.W., 1971. Language, society and subjective experience. Socio-
metry, 34( 1): 1-21.
Boyden, S.V., 1974. Conceptual basis of proposed ecological studies on large metropolitan
areas. Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T. (mimeo).
Brody, E.B. (Editor), 1970. Behavior in New Environments. Sage, Beverly Hills, Calif.
Canter, D. and Canter, S., 1971. Close together in Tokyo. Des. Environ., 2(2): 60-63.
Carlestam, G. and Levi, L., 1971. Urban Conglomerates as Psycho-Socia 1 Human Stressors.
(General aspects, Swedish trends and psychological and medical implications.) Ministry
of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of Agriculture, Stockholm.
Carson, D.H. and Driver, B.L., 1967. An environmental approach to stress and wellbeing:
with implications for planning. Ann Arbor, Mental Health Research Institute, University
of Michigan (mimeo).
Coss, R.G., 1973. The cut-off hypothesis: its relevance to the design of public places. Man-
Environ. Syst. (November), pp. 417-440.
Crumrine, N.R., 1964. The House-Cross of the Mayo Indians of Sonora, Mexico (A Symbol
of Ethnic Identity). Tucson, Arizona, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz., Anthropol.
Pap., 8.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. and Bennett, S., 1971. An exploratory model of play. Am. Anthropol.,
73(l): 42-58.
Desor, J.A., 1972. Toward a psychological theory of crowding. J. Pers. Sot. Psychol., 21(l):
79-83.
Dixon, N.F., 1971. Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy. McGraw-Hill,
New York, N.Y.
Draper, P., 1973. Crowding among hunter-gatherers: the !Kung Bushmen. Science, 182
(4109) (Oct. 19): 301-303.
Dubos, R., 1965. Man Adapting. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 00 pp.
Duncan, S. Jr., 1973. Landscape taste as a symbol of group identity. Geogr. Rev., 63(4):
334-355.
Fernandez, J.W., 1977. Fang Architectonics. Institute for the Study of Human Issues,
Philadelphia, Pa., Working Paper No. 1.
Festinger, L., 1957. The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Harper and Row, New York,
N.Y.
Glass, D.C. and Singer, J., 1972. Urban Stress. Academic Press, New York, N.Y.
Hall, E.T., 1971. Environmental communication. In: A.H. Esser (Editor), Behavior and
Environment. Plenum Press, New York, N.Y., pp. 247-256.
Hamilton, P., 1975. The environment and social stress in traditionally orientated aboriginal
society. In: I. Pilowski (Editor), Cultures in Collision. Australian National Assn for
Mental Health, Adelaide, pp. 212-214.
Harrington, M., 1965. Resettlement and self-image. Hum. Relat., 18(2) (May): 115-137.
Horvath, F.E., 1959. Psychological Stress: a review of definitions and experimental research.
Gen. Syst., 4: 203-230.
260

Howard, A. and Scott, R.A., 1965. A proposed framework for the analysis of stress in the
human organism. Behav. Sci., lO(2).
Huxley, J. (Editor), 1966. Ritualization of behavior in animals and man. Philos. Trans.
R. Sot. London, Ser. B, 251 (see especially Sect. C: abnormal rituals in stress situations).
Kates, R.W., 1962. Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood Plain Management. Dept of
Geography, University of Chicago, Ill., Research Paper No. 78.
Kates, R.W., Burton, I., White, G. et al. Ongoing research on natural hazard perception.
King, A.D., 1976. Values, science and settlement: a case study in environmental control.
In: A. Rapoport (Editor), The Mutual Interaction of People and their Built Environ-
ments: a Cross-Cultural Perspective. Mouton, The Hague, pp. 365-390.
Largey, G.P. and Watson, D.R., 1972. The sociology of odors. Am. J. Social., 77(6): 1021-
1034.
Lawton, M.P., 1970. Ecology and aging. In: L.A. Pastalan and D.H. Carson (Editors),
Spatial Behavior of Older People. Ann Arbor, Mich., pp. 40-67.
Lazarus, R., 1966. Psychological Stress and the Coping Process. McGraw-Hill, New York,
N.Y.
Levine, R.A., 1973. Culture, Behavior and Personality. Aldine, Chicago, Ill.
Levine S., 1971. Stress and behavior. Sci. Am., 224(l) (Jan): 26-31.
Leyhausen, P., 1971. Dominance and territoriality as complemented in mammalian social
structure. In: A.H. Esser (Editor), Behavior and Environment. Plenum Press, New York,
N.Y., pp. 22. -33.
Lipowski, Z.J., 1971. Surfeit of attractive information inputs: a hallmark of our environ-
ment. Behav. Sci., 16(5).
Lipowski, Z.J., 1975. Psychiatry of soma tic diseases: epidemiology, patbogenesis,
classification. Compr. Psychiatry, 16(2) (March/April): 105-124.
Madge, J., 1968. The Social Sources of Anxiety. Angst/6 (Roche Products Ltd.), pp. l-4.
McBride, G., 1970. Social adaptation to crowding in animals and man. In: S.V. Boyden
(Editor), The Impact of Civilization on the Biology of Man. Australian National
University, Canberra, pp. 142-166.
Milgram, S., 1970. The experience of living in cities. Science, 167: 1461-1468.
Mitchell, R.E., 1971. Some social implications of high density housing. Am. Social. Rev.,
36(l): 18-29.
Nahemow, L. and Lawton, M.P., 1973. Towards an ecological theory of adaptation and
aging. In: W.F.E. Priser (Editor), 4th Annual Environmental Design Research Associa-
tion Conference, Vol. 1, pp. 24-32.
Nesbitt, P.D. and Steven, G., 1974. Personal space and stimulus intensity in a Southern
California amusement park. Sociometry, 37 (1): 105-115.
Rapoport, A., 1967. Yagua, or the Amazon dwelling. Landscape, 16(3): 27-30.
Rapoport, A., 1969. House, Form and Culture. Prentice-Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.
Rapoport, A., 1971. Designing for complexity. Archit. Assoc. Quarterly, 3(l): 29-33.
Rapoport, A. (Editor), 1972. Australia as Human Setting. Angus and Robertson, Sydney,
N.S.W.
Rapoport, A., 1973a. Images, symbols and popular design. Int. J. Symbol., 4(3): l-12.
Rapoport, A., 197313. Some aspects of the human use and organization of space. Archit.
hoc. Quarterly, 5( 3): 27-37 (bibliography missing).
Rapoport, A., 1973c. The ecology of housing. Ekistics, 36(213): 145-151.
Rapoport, A., 1974. Nomadism as a man-environment system. Paper at the Conference on
Psycho-Social Consequences of the Sedentarization of Nomads. UCLA (mimeo).
(Published in shortened form in: Environ. Behav., lO(2): 215-246.)
Rapoport, A., 1975a. An anthropological approach to environmental design research.
In: B. Honikman (Editor), Responding to Social Change. Dowden, Hutchinson and
Ross, Stroudsburg, Pa., pp. 141-151.
Rapoport, A., 1975b. Towards a redefinition of density. Environ. Behav., 7(2): 133-158.
Rapoport, A., 1976a. Socio-cultural aspects of man-environment studies. In: A. Rapopc&
(Editor), The Mutual Interaction of People and their Built Environment: a Cross-Cultural
Perspective. Mouton, The Hague, pp. 7-35.
 261

Rapoport, A., 1976b. Environmental cognition in cross-cultural perspective. In: G. Moore

and R.G. Golledge (Editors), Environmental Knowing. Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross,
Stroudsburg, Pa., pp. 220-234.
Rapoport, A., 1977. Human Aspects of Urban Form. Pergamon Press, Oxford.
Rapoport, A. and Hawkes, R., 1970. The perception of urban complexity. AIP Journal,
36(2): 106-111.
Rapoport, A. and Kantor, R.E., 1967. Complexity and ambiguity in environmental design.
AIP (Am. Inst. Plan.) Journal, 33(4): 210-222.
Rapoport, A. and Watson, N., 1972. Cultural variability in physical standards. In:
R. Gutman (Editor), People and Buildings. New York, Basic Books, New York, N.Y.,
pp. 33-53.
Roach, M., 1973. The Visible Self: Perspective on Dress. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.
Roach, M.E. and Either, J.B. (Editors), 1965. Dress, Adornment and the Social Order.
Wiley, New York, N.Y.
Rosenberg, M.J., 1970. The experimental parable of inauthenticity: consequences of
counterattitudinal performance. In: J.S. Antrobus (Editor), Cognition and Affect.
Little, Brown and Co., Boston, Mass.
Royse, D.C., 1969. Social Inferences via Environmental Cues. Unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion in planning, MIT.
Saarinen, T.F., 1966. Perception of Drought Hazard in the Great Plains. Dept. of Geo-
graphy, University of Chicago, Ill., Research Paper 106.
Saegert, S., 1973. Crowding: cognitive overload and behavioral constraints. In: W.F.E.
Preiser (Editor), 4th Annual Environmental Design Research Association Conference,
Vol. 2, pp. 254-260.
Selye, H., 1950. The Physiology and Pathology of Exposure to Stress. Acta, Montreal.
Selye, H., 1956. The Stress of Life. McGraw-Hill, New York, N.Y.
Sennett, R., 1970. The Uses of Disorder. Knopf, New York, N.Y.
Sharp, L., 1952. Steel axes for stone age Australians. In: E.H. Spicer (Editor), Human
Problems in Technological Change. Russell Sage, New York, N.Y.
Siegel, B.J., 1970. Defensive structuring and environmental stress. Am. J. Social., 76:
1146.
Smith, R.A., 1971. Crowding in the city: the Japanese solution. Landscape, 19(l): 3-10.
Smith, P.F., 1972. The pros and cons of subliminal perception. Ekistics, 34(24): 367-369.
Spradley, J.P. and Phillips, M., 1972. Culture and stress: a quantitative analysis. Am.
Anthropol., 74(3): 518-529.
Stokols, D., 1972. A social-psychological model of human crowding phenomena. AIP
Journal, 38: 72-84.
Stokols, D., 1976. The experience of crowding in primary and secondary environments.
Environ. Behav., B(1) (March): 49-86.
Turan, M.H., 1974. Environmental Stress: an Ecological Approach with Special Reference
to Housing. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.
Warr, P.B. and Knapper, C., 1968. The Perception of People and Events. Wiley, New York,
N.Y.
Watson, L.C., 1973. Urbanization and identity dissonance: a Guajiro case. Ekistics,
36(213): 94-102.
White, R.W., 1959. Motivation reconsidered: the concept of competence. Psychol. Rev.,
66: 297-333.
Wohlwill, J.F., 1974. Human adaptation to levels of environmental stimulation. Hum.
Ecol., 2(2): 127-147.
Wohlwill, J.F. and Kohn, I., 1973. The environment as experienced by the migrant: an
adaptation level view. Represent. Res. Sot. Psychol., 4 (1): 135-164.
Yancey, W.L., 1971. Architecture, interaction and social control. Environ. Behav., 3(l):
3-21.