Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471,
474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT 544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604,
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, 857.
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50,
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of 436-439.
Printing, respondents.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
ESCOLIN, J.: submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 are without the requisite legal personality to institute this
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of we quote:
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation,
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
sought: there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, of the defendant.
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847. Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of
the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, interest for their petition to be given due course.
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251,
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278. protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at
large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen,
79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561- of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831- in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853- ed., sec. 431].
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244. private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for
the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said: applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case published. ...
without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
lead to error' their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which surround this case are different from those in the United which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
represent the people in cases of this character. this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-
herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the
the government officer generally empowered to represent the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads:
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
otherwise provided, ... included or excluded from such publication.
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax
date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication- issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
effect. on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. 6
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as
it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of
all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though
know where to obtain their official and specific contents. some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in binding force and effect.
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the SO ORDERED.
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their Relova, J., concurs.
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth Aquino, J., took no part.
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
Separate Opinions
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however,
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. issuances" to have binding force and effect.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest I shall explain why.
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due
process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette.
declared unconstitutional by this Court. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained.
It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow,
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question.
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that
cannot be justified." such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out.
appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to
to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any
so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or
PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But effectivity.
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate
the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions
this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in
the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
Gazette. 2 concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law
connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court
it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can
What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on
be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially
is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their
existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by
provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3
Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of
be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository
into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is no one from compliance therewith.
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post
facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the
as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity
be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity"
presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly
then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due
goes. process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same
Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their
a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in
subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force its proper dissemination.
of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion
of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree
thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would
any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official
pronouncement. Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect
to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of
Senates internet web page.49 legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the SO ORDERED.
rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.
On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for
brevity), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective
approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and
SECOND DIVISION By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission,
(SEC, for brevity). The amendments applied for include, among
others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE G.R. No. 164026
Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. to GMA Network, Inc. as well as
the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from
COMMISSION,
and after June 16, 2000.
Petitioner, Present:
Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SECs
Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the
QUISUMBING, J., application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1%
of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount
Chairperson, of P1,212,200.00.
TINGA, On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its
intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said
*
CHICO-NAZARIO, and assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve
the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without
VELASCO, JR., JJ., being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of
corporate term.
GMA NETWORK, INC.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the
December 23, 2008 assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for
extension of corporate term.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
On February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to
the petitioners Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof
referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2
thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner
was formed.
DECISION
On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official
opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the
assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.
TINGA, J.:
An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the respondent SEC was It should be mentioned at the outset that the authority of the SEC to
subsequently taken by the petitioner on the ground that the collect and receive fees as authorized by law is not in question. [7] Its
assessment of filing fees for the petitioners application for extension power to collect fees for examining and filing articles of
of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital incorporation and by-laws and amendments thereto, certificates of
stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law. increase or decrease of the capital stock, among others, is
recognized. Likewise established is its power under Sec. 7 of P.D. No.
On September 26, 2001, following three (3) motions for early 902-A to recommend to the President the revision, alteration,
resolution filed by the petitioner, the respondent SEC En Banc issued amendment or adjustment of the charges which it is authorized to
the assailed order dismissing the petitioners appeal, collect.
the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
The subject of the present inquiry is not the authority of the SEC to
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant Appeal is hereby collect and receive fees and charges, but rather the validity of its
dismissed. imposition on the basis of a memorandum circular which, the Court
of Appeals held, is ineffective.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the
[3]
In its petition for review with the Court of Appeals, GMA argued amendment consists in extending the term of corporate existence,
that its application for the extension of its corporate term is akin to the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the
an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of incorporation. It amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under
further averred that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of existing law as the filing of articles of incorporation. [8] As is clearly
1994, which the SEC used as basis for assessing P1,212,200.00 as the import of this law, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive
filing fee for the extension of GMAs corporate term, is not valid. the same fees it assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of
incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of incorporation
The appellate court agreed with the SECs submission that an for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence.
extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a
corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the aforequoted law and
expressly bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary other pertinent laws,[9] issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1,
amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of Series of 1986, imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of the
incorporation. authorized capital stock but not less than P300.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 for stock corporations, and 1/10 of 1% of the
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. authorized capital stock but not less than P200.00 nor more
2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been than P100,000.00 for stock corporations without par value, for the
published in accordance with law. The challenged memorandum filing of amended articles of incorporation where the amendment
circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an internal or consists of extending the term of corporate existence.
interpretative rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its
publication is required for its effectivity. Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994, imposing new fees and charges and deleting the
The appellate court denied reconsideration in a Resolution [4] dated maximum filing fee set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of 1986,
June 9, 2004. such that the fee for the filing of articles of incorporation became
1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof but not
less than P500.00.
In its Memorandum[5] dated September 6, 2005, the SEC argues that
it issued the questioned memorandum circular in the exercise of its
delegated legislative power to fix fees and charges. The filing fees A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed
required by it are allegedly uniformly imposed on the transacting pertain to different matters, as GMA points out. SEC Memorandum
public and are essential to its supervisory and regulatory functions. Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fee for the
The fees are not a form of penalty or sanction and, therefore, amendment of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life,
require no publication. while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 pertains to the
filing fee for articles of incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the
former circular, being squarely applicable and, more importantly,
For its part, GMA points out in its Memorandum, [6] dated September
being more favorable to it, should be followed.
23, 2005, that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers
to the filing fees for amended articles of incorporation where the
amendment consists of extending the term of corporate existence. What this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear
The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only to filing fees directive of R.A. No. 3531 to impose the same fees for the filing of
articles of incorporation and the filing of amended articles of unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal
incorporation to reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No. definition, is that charged by a public official to accept a document
3531 provides an unmistakable standard which should guide the SEC for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the
in fixing and imposing its rates and fees. If such mandate were the
service for which the fee is being collected, in this case, the
only consideration, the Court would have been inclined to rule that
the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees as outlined in the examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to
questioned memorandum circular, GMAs argument notwithstanding. warrant an extension of its corporate term.
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been
memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The
records that it has been published in the Official Gazette or in a due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine
newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within
repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that laws shall take effect
the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to property.
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
In Taada v. Tuvera,[10] the Court, expounding on the publication Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68163, dated February 20, 2004, and its
requirement, held: Resolution, dated June 9, 2004, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
SO ORDERED.
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find Unfortunately for the petitioners, the observation made by this
the instant Petition devoid of merit. Court in De Las Alas does not apply to their case.
At the time this litigation was instituted in the trial court, Section 3, In De Las Alas, the view expressed by this Court to the effect that "a
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was the provision governing the period one-day delay does not justify the dismissal of the appeal" is
within which an Appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals, to wit qualified by the phrase "under the circumstances obtaining in this
case". Unlike the situation faced by the herein petitioners, there is
no showing that the petitioners in the De Las Alas case failed to file
SEC. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal may be taken by serving upon their Motion for Reconsideration as well as their Record on Appeal
the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) within the reglementary period. On the contrary, this Court noted
days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal therein the lack of delay on the part of the petitioners in that
bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set case, viz
aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall
be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Furthermore, WE note from the records the absence or lack of the
Rule 37. element of intent to delay the administration of justice on the part of
petitioners in this case. On the contrary, petitioners' counsel have
But where such a motion has been filed during office hours of the demonstrated cautiousness, concern and punctuality in the
last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected prosecution of the appeal. They filed their motion for
within the day following that in which the party appealing received reconsideration October 7, 1972, even if the respondent lower court
notice of the denial of said motion. judge had given them an extension up to October 24, 1972, within
which to file the said motion. Petitioners had up to December 25,
Under this cited provision, the Appeal may be taken within 30 days 1972, within which to submit their record on appeal, yet they filed
from notice of the judgment or order of the trial court. 16 In the their record on appeal on December 8, 1972, or 17 days before the
event that the party aggrieved by the judgment or order of the trial deadline. 23
court files a Motion to set aside the judgment or order, i. e a Motion
for Reconsideration, the time during which such Motion is pending Moreover, a doubtful and controversial question of law confronted
resolution shall, as a rule, be deducted from the 30-day period. 17 In the parties in the De Las Alas case, i.e., the matter of computing the
relation thereto, the New Civil Code states that in computing a reglementary period for filing an Appeal. The respondent court
period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. 18 found petitioner had only two (2) days left to perfect the appeal after
the denial of the motion for reconsideration while this Court held
The petitioners admit that they received their copy of the Order of petitioners had three (3) days left deducting the period within which
dismissal of their Complaint on July 17, 1979. Under Section 3, Rule the motion for reconsideration has been pending, excluding the first
41, they had 30 days within which to appeal their case or to file a day in the computation of the period, but since the last day falls on a
Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment or order of the trial Sunday the period of appeal is ipso jure extended to the first working
court. In computing the 30-day period, July 17, 1979 (the first day) is day immediately following. 24 In the case at bar, however, there is no
excluded, pursuant to Article 13 of the New Civil Code. Counting 30 such doubtful or controversial question of law submitted for Our
days thereafter, beginning on July 18, 1979, the petitioners had up to resolution.
August 16, 1979 to file their Motion for Reconsideration. Their
Motion for Reconsideration, although dated August 16, 1979, was For the petitioners to seek exception for their failure to comply
filed with the trial court on August 17, 1979 or one day beyond the strictly with the requirements for perfecting their Appeal, strong
30-day reglementary period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 41. compelling reasons, like the prevention of a grave miscarriage of
justice, must be shown to exist in order to warrant this Court to
Under these circumstances, the order of the trial court dismissing suspend the Rules. 25 No such reasons have been shown to exist in
the Complaint has become final and executory. As such, it is beyond this case. In fact, the petitioners did not even offer any reasonable
the reach of a Motion for consideration. 19 The Notice of Appeal, explanation for their delay.
therefore, was properly denied. Perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only On the basis of the foregoing discussion, We find no jurisdictional
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal as infirmity, sufficient to call for the issuance of the corrective writ of
certiorari in the action taken by the trial court. As stated earlier, the
instant Petition is devoid of merit.
SO ORDERED.