Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ABSTRACT
In 1983 the francophone Lebanese author Amin Maalouf
published The Crusades Through Arab Eyes (original French title:
Les croisades vues par les Arabes), a critically acclaimed and
best-selling retelling of the Crusades from the Muslim point.
Using a variety of contemporary Arab sources, Maalouf aimed to
offer a corrective to traditional Western views of the Crusades
and concluded that the traumatic events of the Crusades
profoundly influenced the Arab perception of the West and its
conception of modernity. Yet, while The Crusades Through
Arab Eyes was generally praised for its effort to represent the
Muslim point of view on the medieval clash of civilizations, the
present study will argue that Maalouf availed himself generously
of a whole range of French and more generally Western literary
and cultural constructs to make his material accessible and
interesting to francophone and other European readers. In doing
so, some aspects of his work may have unexpectedly reinforced
some entrenched consumptions of Islamic civilization among the
Western reading public.
The title refers to the statement by the Muslim hero Saladin which Maalouf uses at the
beginning of his book: Behold the Franks: see with what fury they fight for their religion,
while we, the Muslims, show no ardor for waging holy war.
1983
Les
croisades vues par les Arabes
Saladin
E-mail: hvynck@thu.edu.tw
Behold the Franks 3
Amalric of Anjou, second son of Fulk of Anjou, rashly intrudes into Egypt in
1163 and lays siege to the town of Bilbeys, the towns defenders were
dumbfounded and amused (161; stupfaits et amuss, 187) because
Bilbeys was located on the Nile and, as this was the beginning of September
and the river was beginning to swell, all they had to do was breach a few
dikes and watch the crusaders hurriedly abandon their siege and flee to safer
shores. Another amusing vignette is offered when Arab eyewitnesses in
Jerusalem are quoted as providing the following description of the German
Emperor Frederick Hohenstaufen: he was covered with red hair, bald, and
myopic. Had he been a slave, he would not have fetched 200 dirhams. (230)
[tait de poil roux, chauve et myope; sil avait t un esclave, il naurait pas
valu deux cents dirhams. (264)] The French King Louis IX similarly
suffered such slight regard. When he was captured and then ransomed, the
Egyptian officials who oversaw his release presented him with the following
parting lecture: How could a sensible, wise, and intelligent man like you
embark on a sea voyage to a land peopled by countless Muslims? According
to our law, a man who crosses the sea in this way cannot testify in court. And
why not? asked the king. Because, came the reply, it is assumed that he is
not in possession of all his faculties. (241) [Comment un homme de bon
sens, sage et intelligent comme toi, peut-il sembarquer ainsi sur un navire
pour venir dans une contre peuple dinnombrables musulmans? Selon
notre loi, un homme qui traverse ainsi la mer ne peut tmoigner en justice.
Et pourquoi donc? Interroge le roi. Parce quon estime quil nest pas en
possession de toutes ses facults. (274)] These hilarious anecdotes and
incisive observations from Arab sources which Maalouf quotes time and again
seem to take one to the heart of the intercultural dynamic and redirect the
Europeans gaze upon himself. The result is chastening and the European
views himself as an uncouth, ignorant, violent, laughable barbarian.
Yet, while Maalouf is culling these choice passages from his sources, he
is also adroitly recasting them in terms that appeal specifically to a French
readership. When King Luis was admonished by his Egyptian captors, e.g.,
they appealed to him ironically in very French terms as a man of good sense
("bon sens), wisdom (sagesse) and intelligence, thus making it easy for the
readers to align themselves on the side of the Egyptians. Elsewhere, the
historian Usamah, already referred to above, is not impressed when presented
with a crude Crusader entertainment which consisted of having two infirm old
Behold the Franks 7
women race one another as the knights stood by and jeered them on.
Maalouf summarizes Usamahs response to this distasteful spectacle as
follows: An emir as well-educated and refined as Usamah was unable to
appreciate this burlesque Gallic humour. (130) The original French text
nails down the concept more succinctly: Un mir aussi lettr et raffin
quOussama ne peut apprcier ses gauloiseries. (155) While the concept
gauloiseries is relevant to the extent that some of the so-called Franks
may have been of Gallic rather than Germanic descent, it also has a
well-defined place in French culture in that it stands for a kind of broad and
racy humor associated with the Gallic tribes which inhabited France in
antiquity and later applied to Franois Rabelais and his bawdy tales.
These examples indicate that a process of acculturation is at work in
Maaloufs treatment of his subject and this process occasionally results in the
intrusion of typically French cultural constructs into what aims to be the
discourse of the other. In those cases, questions arise as to the authenticity of
the civilizational discourse. A striking example of this occurs in Maaloufs
discussion of the conflict between two Christian knights, viz. Count Baldwin
of Edessa and Tancred of Antioch, which took place in 1107. While referring
to the Arab historian Ibn-al-Athir as his source regarding this episode, he
narrates the beginning of the conflict in his own words and explains that,
while Baldwin had been captured by Jawali, the governor of Mosul, Tancred
had taken advantage of this opportunity to seize Baldwins fiefdom of Edessa
in Turkey. After some time, Baldwin agreed to an alliance with his captor
and was released. At that point in the story, Maalouf turns to his source and
quotes at length from the Arab historian to explain what happened when
Baldwin speedily traveled to Antioch to reclaim his fiefdom from Tancred.
[Tancrde lui offrit trente mille dinars, des chevaux, des armes,
des vtements et bien dautres choses, mais il refusa de lui
rendre la ville. Et lorsque Baudouin, furieux, quitta Antioche,
Tancrde essaya de le suivre pour lempcher de faire sa
8 Wenshan Review of Literature and CultureVol 5.1December 2011
the afterlife. No one else ever joins them and, when offered a chance to leave,
they choose to remain. Thus, in using Sartres phrase, Maalouf clarifies his
analysis with a textual tag familiar even to French school kids. Yet, to
juxtapose a Muslim historical trauma with mid-twentieth century European
existential anxieties is also a reductionist gesture which does not do justice to
the complex, heterogeneous forces that shaped the historical events discussed
here. Maaloufs aim, it is to be remembered, is to create the true-life novel
of the crusades and this, then, may be an example of the shortcuts one takes
when historical discourse has to entertain as if it were historical fiction.
Maalouf, moreover, was fully conscious of the kind of reader he was seeking
and comments in the section on notes and bibliographic references at the end
of the book that it is meant for a public which is not necessarily a specialist
public. [destin un public non ncessairement spcialis (310)] This
latter phrase, incidentally, was omitted from the English translation.
As for the current critical standing of The Crusades Through Arab Eyes,
Carole Hillenbrands assessment in her The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, a
major academic study on the subject published in 1999, is representative.
While deploring the lack of substantial publications about the Muslim view of
the crusades throughout the twentieth century, she noted that The Crusades
Through Arab Eyes came as a breath of fresh air into this field; it is lively
and always popular with students. Moreover, the book lives up to its title.
The drawbacks are that it is unashamedly general in its approach, is not
comprehensive or academic, and furnishes little new information. (12)
Maalouf, it is to be noted, never claimed to be an academic. Nor does
Hillebrands mixed assessment take away from the fact that almost thirty
years since its publication The Crusades Through Arab Eyes remains in print
and was for decades the only easily accessible resource for many readers
unfamiliar with the Muslim point of view regarding medieval Europes
encounter with the Middle East. In any event, her comments indicate the
predicament. Numerous readers interested in the Islamic view of the
crusades know the book and appreciate it for having offered something fresh
and lively. Indeed, for many this may have been the first book on the subject
they read. Yet, not being a scholarly work, it is not taken serious by
historians, whereas literary critics consider it popular history and not suitable
for literary analysis. My reading, however, is that the book does deserve and,
indeed, calls for literary analysis as Maalouf himself invites such attention
10 Wenshan Review of Literature and CultureVol 5.1December 2011
1
Cheveddens New History of the Crusades (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003) and The Islamic
Interpretation of the Crusade: A New (Old) Paradigm for Understanding the Crusades, Der Islam 83
(2006): 90-136 further clarify the Islamic perspective on the crusades.
Behold the Franks 13
Works Cited
Chevedden, Paul E. The Islamic View and the Christian View of the
Crusades: A New Synthesis. The Journal of the Historical Association
93 (2008): 181-200.
Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome, ed. The Postcolonial Middle Ages. London: St.
Martins Press, 2000.
Gabrieli, Francesco. Arab Historians of the Crusades. Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1969.
Hartley, L. P. The Go-Between. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953.
Hillenbrand, Carole. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
Kopf, David. A Macrohistoriographical Essay on the Idea of East and
West from Herodotus to Edward Said. Comparative Civilizations
Review 15 (1986): 22-42.
Lewis, Bernard, Edmund Leites, and Margaret Case, eds. As Others See Us:
Mutual Perceptions, East and West. Special issue of Comparative
Civilizations Review (Fall 1985 and Spring 1986).
Maalouf, Amin. Les croisades vues par les Arabes. Paris: Editions jai lu,
1983.
. The Crusades Through Arab Eyes. Trans. Jon Rotschild. NY:
Schocken Books, 1984.
. In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong. Trans.
Barbara Bray. 2000. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003.
Saber and Scroll
Volume 4
Article 3
Issue 2 Spring/Summer 2015
August 2015
Recommended Citation
Hutto, Noah (2015) "The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades," Saber and Scroll: Vol. 4: Iss. 2, Article 3.
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Hutto: The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades
Noah Hutto
Europes Crusaders first began rallying to Pope Urban IIs call for a Holy
War following the Council of Clermont in 1095. He charged Christians to set aside
their coreligionist struggles in order to set out and reclaim the holy lands of the Near
East, specifically Jerusalem, from the infidel Muslims. 1 The first, ill-prepared, non-
combatant-driven expedition, the Peoples Crusade, led by Peter the Hermit, was
massacred almost to a man in August 1096.2 Following that slaughter, Byzantine
Emperor Alexius I consolidated the European generals in Constantinople and
immediately launched the first armed pilgrimage.3 This pilgrimage was not only
successful, but provided the undertone of romanticism for further exploits. The rise
in popularity and nod to Christian duty in the Western world still echoes with the
exploits of the Crusader knights on their quest from God. Muslim historiography
contradicts this line of thought and treats the Crusades almost as a footnote within
the greater struggles of warring factions in the regionthat they were in fact, tiny
and futile attempts to halt the inevitable expansion of Islam.4 In the beginning of
the conflict, the Muslims did not even consider themselves involved in a religious
struggle against Christianity.5
Aside from a handful of primary sources from some contemporary
historians, such as the personal memoirs of Usmah Ibn-Munqidh,6 or in the
collective works of Izz ad-Din Ibn Al-Athr, Abu Yala Hamza ibn Asad at-Tamimi
(also known as Ibn Al-Qalans), and Nasir ad-Din Ibn al-Furt,7 most surviving
historical Islamic sources reference early works that have been lost. Other surviving
documents include significant revisions reflecting the views and motives of the
author. Although the term jihad was a familiar lexicon in the Muslim world, the term
crusader was not a term used by contemporary participants on either side of the
struggle. It was not the Crusades, nor the Islamic reaction to them during the two
hundred-year struggle, that shapes the modern-day world debate concerning the
eternal struggle between Christianity and Islam.
Western views dominate the historiography of the Crusades, presenting a
one sided view of a topic that is far from black and white. M.R.B. Shaws translation
of European noblemen Joinville and Villehardouin does just that. It captures
contemporary views of Western Christendoms involvement in the Crusades. 8 A true
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Hutto: The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades
wildfire spread, it was far from a uniting force that produced anything like a United
Islamic Empire.13 When Mohammed died in 632 CE, divided on succession, Islam
splintered into two main factions.
Two distinct sects resulted from this splinter. The Shiites believe the
caliphates, the political and religious leaders within a Muslim community, can derive
only from a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. The Sunni belief is
contrary to this, believing that caliphates can, and should, rise to power from public
demand. At the close of the eleventh century, the Shia powerbase was absorbed into
the Fatimid Empire in Egypt and extended across Africa and into Palestinian
territory. The Sunni powerbase, from a religious leadership point, stemmed from
Baghdad with an elected caliphate, but its military power rested with the Seljuk
Turks. Although based far to the east in present day Iran, the Sunni/Turk influence
14
included portions of present day Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.
When the milites Christi (knights of Christ), or the crusaders, first set out to
liberate the city of Jerusalem in 1095, they did so at the height of the struggle
between the two Islamic sects. This struggle took precedence above all other affairs
and the power of both Baghdad and Cairo stagnated.15 In The First Crusade: A New
History, Thomas Asbridge outlined that there was a pathological hatred that divided
the two main arms of the Islamic faith so much so, that Muslims had absolutely no
intention of opposing the crusaders siege of cities belonging to different sects or
kingdoms. He further suggested that because of the constant power struggles
between the Muslim sects, the original Franj invasions may have been confused with
just another Byzantine campaign. Because of this confusion, there was not a
distinction initially, but once the defending Muslims realized that their attackers were
from Frankish lands, they identified their opponents as Franj. The Arabs described
all European settlers and armies as Franj, never distinguishing between their actual
nationalities. 16
In addition to the internal fighting between rival tribes and rulers throughout
the Near and Middle East, same-sect power struggles divided Muslims further.
Mohammed's death created a faith-based schism. In the same way, the death of local
sultans, Turkish nobility (or atabegs), and caliphates increased the warring between
coreligionists. Many lesser lords and rulers were eager to exploit any weakness in
their neighbors hoping for an increase of their own powerbase.
Two examples outline the extent of the fratricidal struggles between the
Seljuks (a Sunni Muslim tribe that established a Turko-Persian empire in Iran) and
the Fatimids (a Shia Muslim tribe that established a dynasty that extended from
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Atlantic North Africa across Egypt and into Syria and the Arabian Peninsula).
Between these two opposing powerhouses fell the openly hostile city-states that
dotted Syria and Palestine.17 First, between the years 1096 and 1099, control of
Baghdad passed from usurper to usurper eight times. This translated to a new ruler
every hundred days.18 Second, the underappreciated contemporary historian Ibn al-
Athir authored an accurate reflection that the invading Christian armies, properly
referred to by Muslim leaders as the Franj armies, easily seized and controlled large
portions of territory. This success stemmed from the Islamic sultans inability and
unwillingness to work together against a common enemy. 19 The modern Muslim
historian Amin Maalouf summed up the deep-seated, individualistic approach of the
warring Muslim empires perfectly, In the eleventh century, jihad was not more than
a slogan brandished by princes in distress. No emir would rush to anothers aid
unless he had some personal interest in doing so. Only then would he contemplate
the invocation of great principles.20
On the eve of the Europeans arrival in Asia Minor in 1096, the level of
infighting and dissension among Muslims peaked, for virtually the entire upper
echelon of the regions Islamic authorities [passed away] between 1092-1094.21 The
Seljuk vizier, or high-ranking political advisor, and Sultan died in 1092. In Egypt,
the Fatimid caliph and vizier died in 1094. The vacuum of power in the Muslim
world hindered their resistance to European aims. 22 Salahuddin Ayubi, or Saladin,
would eventually found the Ayyubid dynasty that spread from his rise to power in
Egypt and eventually included Egypt, Syria, and regions across Mesopotamia. In the
midst of consolidating power, Saladin found himself in conflict with both Muslim
and Christian adversaries. During the Third Crusade, Saladin commented to King
Richard the Lionheart: the land, it is also ours originally. Your conquest of it was an
unexpected accident due to the weakness of Muslims there at the time. 23 Later, to
his own confidant and historian, he commented on the fragility of the united Muslim
jihad efforts against the Christians, If death should happen to strike me down, these
forces are hardly likely to assemble again and the Franks will grow strong. Our best
course is keeping on the Jihad until we expel them from the coast or die ourselves. 24
So who were these invaders from Europe that arrived in the midst of the
regions greatest internal strife? Muslim historians did not use the word crusaders
when referencing the European forces. The terms crusades and crusaders were
not contemporary terms of historians on either side of the conflict. Muslims grouped
all Europeans into only two categories. Upon first arriving, all Europeans were
deemed Franj, or the Franks (Pope Urban was from France). Later, contemporary
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Hutto: The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades
sources differentiated between the Franj and the Rm (the Arabic term for the
Byzantine Empire).25 This distinction between the two did not occur immediately.
The historiography reflects that Muslims were not aware that they were dealing with
different foes than the Byzantine forces they had defeated without difficulty at
Manzikert in 1071. The first indication of Muslim awareness that they were dealing
with a different enemy did not occur until their first major defeat at the hands of
Christian armies.
Even so, after the Muslims realized who the crusaders were they did not
understand their intent. That is, they were unaware that the Franj arrived as
Muhjadeen, or soldiers of a (in this case, Christian) Holy War. The only source that
survived as the exception to this ignorance are the writings of As-Sulami, a Muslim
cleric from Damascus. As early as 1105, As-Sulami recognized the European threat
as a Christian jihad and began promoting Muslim unity as a necessary step for
launching their own holy war to repel the European invaders. As-Sulami further
prophesized that the arrival of the Franj in the Holy Lands was divine intervention.
He believed that Muslims had strayed from the teachings of the Quran. This
combined with the infighting made the European invasion an act of punishment on
the Muslim world. He preached that spiritual purification for both the individual and
for Islam as a whole rested on a united Turk-Kurd-Arab jihad. His insight received
little attention, until some fifty years later with the ascension of Nur al-Din. Nur al-
Din demanded a unified counter-jihad to expel the Franj.26 Prior to Nur al-Din, jihad
appears intermittently among Arabic historiography. When it does appear, it refers
more often as propaganda or as an attempt to smooth over wrinkles stemming from
same-sect armies warring with each other.
From the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, until the completion of the First
Crusade and the European capture of Jerusalem, Muslims did identify the Franj
separately from the Rm. However, this separation only went as far as the Muslim
consensus which indicated the Rm were mercenary European armies but formed
under the banner of the Byzantine Empire, and paid to re-conquer territories lost in
1084.27 In this capacity, contemporaries, such as Yaghi-Siyan, the Muslim ruler of
Antioch in 1097,28 even legitimized the arrival of the Christian armies as honorable.
It was honorable because they were waging a war to reestablish their original
boundaries in Asia Minor.29
By the middle of 1098, after the fall of Edessa and Antioch to a combined
European crusader force, the Muslims did distinguish between the Rm and the
Franj. Furthermore, they highlighted the greater military prowess and fanaticism of
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the Franj.30 Despite actual friendships and even cordial visits among Christian
settlements, contemporary historians are quick to riddle their histories with
propaganda-based anecdotes. They pay tribute to Franj military skill but often lace
the compliment with descriptions and stories that highlighted the barbaric and
backward mannerisms of the Franj.31 Well known contemporary poet and
adventurer, Usmah Ibn-Munqidh wrote autobiographical accounts both during and
after the early Crusades. He captured the life, struggles, and conflicts of the Muslim
warriors and the Christian invaders. In his memoirs, he described the Franj in the
following way, when one comes to recount cases regarding the Franks . . . he sees
them as animals possessing the virtues of courage and fighting, but nothing else. 32
Not all observations and opinions were negative. One interesting story from
Ibn-Munqidh records a surprising event. The Knights Templar (usually categorized
with extreme disdain) extended an apologetic concern when they interrupted Usmah
during his Islamic prayers:
This fickle relationship between Christian and Muslim armies sheds light on an
aspect overshadowed by the simple us vs. them mentality that accompanies
discussions of the Crusades.
When the Franj first arrived, the internal power struggles so engulfed the
Muslim world of the Near East that Muslims viewed the European armies as just
additional players on the field of battle. Almost from the beginning, separate Muslim
sultans and Franj leaders sought to suppress or defend against internal rivals, often
signing treaties and alliances with rival religious armies. In later years, when a rift
occurred between the Europeans, there were even Muslim/Franj alliances against
rival Muslim/Franj alliances, and Muslim/Franj alliances fighting Muslim/Rm
alliances.34
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Hutto: The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades
Again, it was not until Nur al-Din finished consolidating his own powerbase
by uniting the Sunni areas of Baghdad, Damascus, Mosul, and Syria that a united
Muslim front appeared.35 In 1149, after vanquishing a combined Christian and
Muslim force with his victory at Inab, Nur al-Din bathed in the Mediterranean, a
gesture that symbolized his dominance over Syria. This consolidation of power
served as the first phase of Nur al-Dins quest for eliminating the Franj, but as a
jihad, against Muslims, it was a contradiction to the term. Ironically, his second
phase also did not focus on Christian armies, and was another declaration of Holy
War against Muslims. Through his upstart, Shirkuh (and later his son, Saladin), Nur
al-Din then conquered the Shia Fatimids in Egypt, creating an extended unified
Sunni caliphate that included Egypt. With the Shia subjugated, he turned his
attention to the Franj, and the first jihad to eliminate the Christian invaders.36
Since the Muslims did not originally understand that the Crusaders arrived
with every intention of bringing a Holy War to the region, it is important to
understand the Muslim concept and contemporary view of jihad. The sectarian
struggle was so great at this point, that little interest existed in pursuing action that
would expand the borders of Islam.37 Only an imam, or the Islamic religious and
worship leader, can grant permission for an offensive jihad. This forced a multi-
tiered leadership structure akin to Stalins Red Army, wherein he had both military
and commissar leaders in tandem roles. According to the Quran, the call for an
offensive jihad of such magnitude equated to the Last Days, or the Islamic Day of
Reckoning. That is, the Last Jihad is the final struggle between Muslims and non-
Muslims.38
Therefore, the actual concept of pursuing a Holy War against the Christians
was foreign to the Shia and an afterthought for the Sunni. It was after Nur al-Din
prevented the European Second Crusade from gaining momentum beyond
strongholds in Syria, and Muslims united under one leader from the Euphrates to the
Mediterranean to the Nile, that a true jihad occurred.39 Just over eighty years after As
-Sulamis warning, and three decades after Nur al-Din set out to remove the
Christians, his successor, Saladin, set out for Jerusalem. Muslim armies marched into
Jerusalem as victors over the Franj in 1187. Muslim defenders finally became
involved, in every sense of the word, in jihad, and battle for the Levant commenced
through a lens of the survival of Islam equated with the destruction of Christianity in
the Middle East.40
As the focus shifted from infighting to jihad, so too did Arabic
historiography. Rather than the casual mentioning of a conflict with the Franj,
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for immediate subjugation of any opposition to his designs, and ensured the
consolidation of the Egyptian kingdom within the vast empire left by Nur al-Din.48
Saladins first order of business in this consolidation phase was waging
war against coreligionists, even among the same sect. The different opinions of
Saladin in his own time are relevant today. Those that praise Saladin remark on his
pious approach and dedication to the jihad.49 According to Saladins own historian,
Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad, Saladin was very diligent in and zealous for the Jihad.
He further praised his hero by recording that Saladin once remarked,
His desire for serving the best interest of Islam often skewed Saladins treaties and
alliances. Ibn Shaddad comments at length on a peace treaty signed by Saladin after
a fierce battle outside Acre:
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Franj inhabitants were fully absorbed into the overall situation and struggles of the
Near East. From the outset, the nature of war and power struggles throughout the
Levant and the Near East suffered from any clarity of who was at war with whom.
Muslims, Sunni, Shiite, Fatimids, and Christians, Franj, Rm, all hoped for a
foothold in the region as an extension of power. It was not a Crusade, nor was it a
jihad as defined by Islamic leaders. It was a grasp for power.
It is evident from Muslim historiography that the Crusades' initial success
caused a unifying effort through Zengi, Nur al-Din, and finally Saladin. Further, it
was the realization that the Europeans were waging their own Holy War that served
as the impetus behind their own jihad. However, evidence also exists that the Franj
were not specifically anti-Islamic, and the two religions co-existed before, during,
and after the Crusades.54 Three contemporary sources remark that the Franj were
tolerant of Islamic practices within the lands they controlled. First, Imad ad-Din
commented that the Franj changed not a single law or cult practice of the [Muslim
inhabitants].55 Second, Yaqut remarked, the Franks changed nothing when they
took the country.56 Third, Ign Jubayr echoed Yaquts observation, when he wrote,
in the hands of the Christians [the shrine at Ain el Baqar and its] venerable nature
is maintained and God has preserved it as a place of prayer for the Muslims. 57
Muslims themselves did not have a term for the Crusades. Until the
nineteenth century, they referred only to the invasion by the Franj.58 In the 1890s,
the Ottoman Empire suffered humiliating defeats in the Balkans. This brought the
end to the last great Muslim Empire. Afterwards, non-Muslim religions surrounded
the Muslim Middle East. This caused a rekindled interest in the champions of
Islamnamely Nur al-Din and Saladin. Furthermore, the Ottoman Sultan called for
the unification of Muslims under one authority.59 It was not until this resurgence,
nested within a romantic notion of the great jihad against Christianity, that the term
Hurab al-Salibiyya, or Wars of the Crusades, came into use.60
The European Holy War and presence in the Near East lasted less than
200 years.61 This period is minute considering the great and vast history of the
cradle of civilization. Ultimately, the Crusades were a failure. Only the initial shock
and initial Muslim dissension allowed the First Crusade any real measure of success
in the Muslim Near East. Anachronistic manipulation in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries transformed the Crusades into a modern day rally cry of Islamic
extremists. Thus, terrorists enacted their own warped version of jihad. Jonathan
Riley-Smith noted that until this modern misrepresentation, Muslims . . . looked
back [on the crusaders] with indifference and complacency. They believed, after all,
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Hutto: The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades
that they had beaten the crusaders comprehensively . . . [and] had driven them from
the lands they settled in the Levant.62
In the 1930s, Muslims claimed, [The] West is still waging crusading wars
against Islam under the guise of political and economic imperialism. 63 In the 1970s,
Islamic Nationalists, under the leading ideologist Sayyid Qutb, defined "crusading"
as any offensive, including a drive for economic or political hegemony, against
Islam anywhere by those who called themselves Christian . . . and to any aggressive
action by their surrogates, like Zionists or Marxists. 64 The argument today that the
Franj Invasion that began in the late eleventh century is the impetus of todays
claims of a religious war between Christianity and Islam is unfounded. Eastern
historiography on the Crusades, suggests the Muslims of yesterday gave the Franj
invasion little attention. Muslims did not inherit bitter, hate-filled accounts of the
Crusades from their contemporaries65rather their main interest lay in recording the
everyday Muslim views and portraying comic book-esque plights of their heroes and
champions of Islam.66
Afterword
The concept of this essay arose from the peculiarities of the authors
specific situation when his research was at its infancy. Extensive reading and
scribbling of notes occurred in the backseats of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected
(MRAP) vehicles while on breaks from traveling, almost daily, from the mission at
hand. The author served as a Captain on a United States Army Military Transition
Team (MiTT) in the position of Combat Advisor for Iraqi Army Officers. He
assisted in the training and rebuilding of the Iraqi Army in 2009. Thus, working hand
-in-hand with the Iraqis, daily interaction occurred with both the Iraqi Army
counterparts and/or the five interpreters assigned to the teamall of them Muslim.
Both the Shia and Sunni sects were represented. Having received weeks of cultural
awareness and even elementary Arabic language training, the author saw a great
opportunity and environment for discovering the Islamic/Arab view of the European
Crusades.
Not long after research began, one of the interpreters commented on one of
the sources. Do not trust everything you read, especially in Arabic historymost of
it is twisted or is lies, time after time in order for politics and dictators to influence
the minds of the Arabic people. It was an interesting point of view.
17
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Saber and Scroll, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
A few days later, another interpreter, who was also attending Baghdad
University for a degree in History, remarked that in his University, and in Iraq in
general, historical lessons only concentrate on Classical History, such as the Greeks
and Romans. This made sense to him, because Arabs know that most history after
that is just made-up, to give the messages of the people in power. Because he held
this viewpoint with such passion, there was no point in explaining that not only
were Greek and Roman historians guilty of manipulation, but also, unless
approached from a purely scholarly lens, all history contains biases or propaganda.
Within three weeks of the initial research, all five interpreters and three
accompanying Iraqi officers echoed the same sentiment. The Franj invasion was
hardly a footnote in Arab or Muslim history. All agreed that Saladin is overrated as
a hero, having warred against fellow Muslims more than Christians, and that any
history regarding Saladin is circumspect at best. One even remarked, through a
thousand-yard stare, that during Saddams reign over Iraq, there was endless
comparison of Saddam to Saladinboth from Tikrit and both power-hungry at the
expense of their own people and Muslims in general.67 With that in mind, the author
researched the topic and the above article is a product of that work.
Notes
1. Thomas F. Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
2006), 7-8.
2. Ibid., 16-18.
5. Thomas Asbridge, The First Crusade: A New History (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), 114.
6. Usmah ibn-Munqidh, An Arab-Syrian Gentleman & Warrior in the Period of the Crusades:
Memoirs of Usmahh Ibn-Munqidh (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
7. Francesco Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984).
8. Shaw, Margaret R.B., trans. Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades (London:
Penguin Books), 1963.
9. Francesco Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades; Amin Maalouf, The Crusades Through
Arab Eyes (New York: Shocken Books, 1984)
18
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Hutto: The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades
10. Riley-Smith, The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades; Jonathan Riley-Smith, The
Crusades: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
11. Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2006), xiv.
12. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. D.S. Richards, trans., The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, or al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya
wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya by Baha' al-Din Ibn Shaddad (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), 186.
26. Thomas Madden, ed., The Crusades (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 221.
28. Ibid.
34. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History; Christopher Tyerman, Gods War: A New History of the
Crusades (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 344.
19
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Saber and Scroll, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
38. Quran. Surat At-Tawbah, 9:5,29. There are numerous references throughout the Quran in
regards to jihad between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the Last Days. In 9:5 a particular course of
action is outlined and in 9:29, specific reference to the Last Days occurs.
40. Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades, 51, 63-64.
42. Ibid.
49. Richards, trans., The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 27.
52. Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 184; Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History,
146.
53. Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 184.
56. Ibid.
61. Margaret R.B. Shaw, trans., Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades (London:
Penguin Books, 1963), 7.
20
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Hutto: The Franj Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades
67. A fact that was actually referred to in the Epilogue of Carole Hillenbrands The Crusades:
Islamic Perspectives, page 595. See Bibliography.
21
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Saber and Scroll, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
Bibliography
Asbridge, Thomas. The First Crusade: A New History. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Maalouf, Amin. The Crusades Through Arab Eyes. Translated by Jon Rothschild.
New York: Shocken Books,1984.
Madden, Thomas F., ed. The Crusades. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002.
Richards, D.S., trans. The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, or al-Nawadir al-
Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya by Baha' al-Din Ibn Shaddad.
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002.
Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Crusades: A History. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2005.
22
http://digitalcommons.apus.edu/saberandscroll/vol4/iss2/3 16
Oshkosh Scholar Page 29
Senior Jared Stroik is a history major at UW Oshkosh. His research was conducted
for a course on the history of the Crusades in fall 2009. During spring 2010 he was a
research assistant for Dr. Kimberly Rivers for her work on the Devotio moderna. Jared
is a member of the University Honors Program, and he will graduate in spring 2011.
Abstract
The Crusades began in 1095 as an effort to resist the spread of Muslim forces
into Asia Minor, present-day Turkey, and to prevent Muslims from moving into
Christian Europe. The Third Crusade, during the end of the twelfth century, was also
known as the Kings Crusade because the Christian forces were led by some of the
most important and powerful kings of the time. One of these was Richard I, King
of England. In 1191, Christian forces successfully took the city of Acre, in present-
day northern Israel, after a long siege. Following the siege, however, many unarmed
Muslim prisoners were killed. Some modern scholars contend that the massacre of
these prisoners was ordered by Richard I as a blood-thirsty and ruthless act. This study
draws on primary sources and the analysis of modern scholars to determine the validity
of these claims against Richard I. Through a synthesis of primary sources, I argue that
the massacre, although unfortunate, was not the act of a blood-thirsty killer, but rather a
strategic last resort.
The Christian forces in the Holy Land during the mid- to late-1100s had, for many
years, requested assistance to maintain their dwindling and increasingly challenged
control in the Holy Land, but no help came.1 The tenuous rule of Guy of Lusignan,
King of Jerusalem, in the mid-1180s, led to further internal conflict. The lack of
military support, however, would soon change. The Third Crusade was called in 1187
by Pope Gregory VIII after the disaster of Hattin earlier that year. At Hattin, Saladin,
the now-famous Muslim leader and military commander, lured the Christian forces
led by King Guy out through the desert and to battle in the area known as the Horns of
Hattin. There Saladin surrounded and attacked the Christians and essentially destroyed
the Christians military forces. According to Thomas Madden, the Horns of Hattin
marked the greatest defeat in crusading history.2 Subsequent victories by Saladin led
to an almost total reclamation of the Holy Land by the Muslims, including the city
of Jerusalem. The news of the defeat was so powerful that Pope Urban II, the leader
of the Roman Catholic Church, died of grief on October 20, 1187.3 His successor,
Gregory VIII, issued Audita tremendi, a papal bull that created a seven-year-long truce
throughout Europe so that the Christians of Europe could focus on contributing to
Page 30 Oshkosh Scholar
the crusades.4 The Third Crusade, which was intended to re-conquer the Holy Land
from Saladin, was the height of the Crusading Movement. Many important figures
took the cross, the donning of a cloth cross on ones clothing or some other method of
signifying that one intended to make the pilgrimage to the Holy Land. A few notable
individuals included King William II of Sicily, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa, King Henry II of England, and King Philip II of France. William II,
Frederick, and Henry II died, however, before making the pilgrimage to the Holy Land.
After Henry IIs death, his son Richard I became king of England.5
Richard I of England is one of the most recognizable characters in medieval
history. Even today, his life is marked by legend and prestige. Richard Is reputation as
a gallant knight and effective military commander often precedes him, and his exploits
in the Holy Land against the great Saladin have essentially solidified his legendary
status. During his time in the Holy Land, Richard Is campaigns against Saladin made
the Third Crusade one of the more successful forays by Christians in the Levant,
the region around the Holy Land. There is, however, a great cloud that hangs over
this legacy. While on crusade, Richard I was accused of a blood-thirsty and heinous
act, namely, the massacre of Muslim prisoners after the siege of Acre in 1191. This
massacre has been viewed as a malicious act by the generally praiseworthy king.
For modern historians, however, the massacre at Acre does not seem to have had
a definitive impact on Richard Is reputation. Little consideration of the Third Crusade
has been made to this point, and no single work exists that is written in study of the
Third Crusade. Subsequently, little, if any, consideration of Richard Is actions at Acre
outside a few passing paragraphs or pages has been made. Steven Runciman, in his
three-volume A History of the Crusades, asserts that it was a cold-blooded act against
the roughly 2,700 prisoners that took place after an attempted ransom payment in
exchange for the prisoners on August 11, 1191. The number of prisoners is confirmed
in the Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, an anonymous account of
Richard Is deeds on crusade.6 Runciman further explains that the attempted exchange
on August 11 did not meet the standards expected by Richard I, and the negotiations
soon fell apart. On August 20, Richard I determined that Saladin had not met the terms
of the bargain and subsequently ordered the prisoners to be executed.7
In contrast, Jonathan Riley-Smith believes that the negotiations with Saladin
broke down when the first installment of the ransom became due,8 implying that
Saladin had made no payment. Christopher Tyerman contends that this was indeed an
atrocious act but that it was not uncommon in war.9 He does allow that this action
could have been in response to Saladins massacre of the Templars and Hospitallers
after Hattin in 1187, but he eventually concludes that Richard Is actions were a
deliberate act of policy,10 i.e. that Richard Is goal was never to take prisoners.
Finally, John Gillingham, arguably the leading scholar on Richard I, states that
the massacre at Acre has been called both barbarous and stupid and has been cited
to show that there were no depths to which he could not sink in order to relieve
his frustrations.11 Gillingham places the events at Acre in context with those four
years prior at Hattin and ultimately wonders what other recourse Richard I could
have taken.12 There are two questions that surround Richard Is actions at Acre: Did
Richard I have justification as a military commander to kill these prisoners? And,
depending on the answer to that question, how should the events after the siege of Acre
Oshkosh Scholar Page 31
be incorporated and integrated into Richard Is history and legacy? To answer these
questions, a comparison of the sources is necessary.
This examination of the massacre at Acre will draw on five important accounts
of the events in the summer of 1191 beginning with the chronicle by Richard of
Devizes. Little is known about Richard of Devizes outside the information provided
in his chronicle of Richard I. Early in life he was a monk at St. Swithins Priory in
Winchester and later became a Carthusian of Witham.13 Next I will examine the
chronicle by Geoffrey de Vinsauf, who is believed to be an Englishman of Norman
descent living during the time of Richard I and the Third Crusade. He wrote an
important eyewitness chronicle of those furious assaults which the army of Saladin
made upon the Christians, and of the firmness with which the lion-hearted Richard I
withstood and repulsed them.14 The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre,
118497 is my third source. As Peter Edbury explains in his introduction to The
Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in Translation, William of
Tyres account ended in 1184, and in the early thirteenth century Tyres work was
translated into French, and many of the manuscripts of the French translation have
continuations tacked on to the end,15 of which The Continuation is one. The fourth
source is a letter from Richard I to Garnier of Rochefort, who was then Abbot of
Clairvaux. Lastly is the account of Baha ad-Din, a Muslim eyewitness to the Third
Crusade. He entered the service of Saladin in 1188 and is best known for his biography
of the great Muslim leader.
Before determining why the Muslims were killed or if the killings were justified,
a timeline of events must be established. From all the accounts it is clear that the
siege of Acre ended through a negotiated surrender. The terms of this surrender
were that the Muslim defenders of Acre would be set free if a ransom was paid and
the True Cross relic, a piece of what was believed to be the cross upon which Jesus
was crucified, returned to the Christians. The sources are unclear as to the extent of
Saladins involvement in the negotiations. Geoffrey de Vinsaufs account claims that
the negotiations began on the advisement of Saladin,16 whereas The Continuation
of William of Tyre, Baha ad-Din, Richard Is letter, and Richard of Devizes say that
the negotiations were made in Saladins name but that he was unaware of the terms
until afterward. The Continuation, Richard of Devizes, and Richard I agree that
Saladin eventually approved the terms. Conversely, Baha ad-Din tells of Saladins
unwillingness to agree to the conditions and of his attempt to write to the leaders of
the city to disapprove of them, but by that time the Christians had already taken the
citys walls.17 After the peace terms were made, the sources reveal that a date was set
for Saladin to pay the ransom and turn over the True Cross. The sources also show
that, once the date came, the ransom was not paid. It is that twist of events which best
explains why the prisoners were executed.
Although it is clear that the exchange of prisoners for the ransom was not made,
the immediate circumstances are unknown. Richard Is account merely says that the
time-limit expired, and . . . the pact which he had agreed was entirely made void.18
The Continuation says that on the day that he [Saladin] had promised he did not
come. He sent word requesting another day, saying that he had a good reason why he
had been unable to come on the date he had promised. The kings had a great desire
to recover the Holy Cross. They took counsel and agreed another day.19 After the
Page 32 Oshkosh Scholar
additional day, the Christians came out in great anticipation of regaining the True
Cross but were once again disappointed when [Saladin] withdrew and reneged on the
agreement and the promise that he had made.20 According to Geoffrey de Vinsauf,
Saladin not only failed to provide the True Cross, he sent constant presents and
messengers to King Richard I to gain delay by artful and deceptive words.21 Richard
of Devizes states that the heathen could by no entreaty be moved to restore the Holy
Cross.22 The most important account, however, with regard to the payment of the
ransom and fulfillment of the terms of surrender, is that of Baha ad-Din.
In his account, Baha ad-Din explains how, after the Christians moved into the
city, Saladin ordered maneuvers to draw the Christians out to attack him with the
hope of gaining a more favorable position.23 It is crucial to note that these movements
came after the terms of the treaty had been negotiated, and, according to Baha ad-
Din, it was these delays that caused Richard I to [break] his word to the Muslim
prisoners.24 From the sources, several details are clear. First, there was a treaty made
for the exchange of Muslim prisoners for ransom to be paid to the Christians. Second,
the deadline established for payment was not met due to Saladins delays. The sources
agree that the missed deadline was the justification used for the execution of prisoners.
The next factor in the sequence of events sheds light on the overall character
of Richard Ihow soon after the deadline was missed were the prisoners executed?
Unfortunately, the sources present great ambiguity. Richard of Devizes, Geoffrey
de Vinsauf, The Continuation, and the letter of Richard I are all unclear in their
presentation of when it was determined that Saladin was not going to pay and when the
execution occurred. According to Baha ad-Din, the date of the execution was August
20. The only date given prior to this is July 14, after Saladins delaying maneuvers.25 If
it is correct that these delays were the ones that caused the execution of the Muslims,
the gap of time is roughly a month. The Itinerarium Peregrinorum reconfirms the
month-long gap of time and states that as the time limit had expired long before, King
Richard was certain that Saladin had hardened his heart and had no concern about
ransoming the hostages.26 Overall, it is not clear how quickly the decision to execute
the prisoners was made after it was determined that the terms of the ransom would not
be met. Frankly, once it became evident to the Christians that the terms would not be
met, the time between became irrelevant.
This irrelevancy came from a general standpoint of military strategy. Once it
was clear that the payment was not to be received, the Christian leaders, including
Richard I, needed to determine how to proceed in order to continue on their campaign.
According to J. O. Prestwich, Richard I, although often reckless, was highly adept at
medieval military strategy. Because he was such a military expert, Richard I would,
without a doubt, have known that staying indefinitely at Acre to wait for the True
Cross and ransom would be wasteful. This sentiment is even offered by Baha ad-Din,
who says that, many reasons were given to explain the slaughter. One was that they
[the Christians] had killed them [the prisoners] as a reprisal for their own prisoners
killed before then by the Muslims. Another was that the King of England had decided
to march on Ascalon and take it, and he did not want to leave behind him in the city
a large number (of enemy soldiers). God knows best.27 Although it may have been a
terrible experience to see comrades killed, Baha ad-Din understands that sound military
strategy would not have left thousands of enemies at Acre. Overall, Richard I would
Oshkosh Scholar Page 33
have had, at best, four other options: (1) leave the prisoners at Acre and men to guard
them; (2) wait for Saladin to pay the ransom; (3) take the prisoners with him on the
march south; or (4) sell the prisoners into slavery. The first scenario could be ruled out
because leaving men behind to guard prisoners would put the army at a disadvantage
on an offensive campaign. The second, it soon became clear, would not happen. The
third would also put the army at a disadvantage having to feed several thousand more
people. The fourth option would have been possible, and probably acceptable, but
in all likelihood would have taken more time than the Christian forces were willing
to spare. Ultimately, when it became clear that the True Cross and ransoms were not
forthcoming, Richard I was forced to make a military decision.
One important, final point must be made. Two of the sources raise the question of
whether or not Richard I was in fact the one who ordered the execution. In his letter to
the Abbot of Clairvaux, Richard I states that as the pact which he [Saladin] had agreed
was entirely made void, we quite properly had the Saracens that we had in custody
. . . put to death.28 Arguably, this we could merely be the proverbial royal we.
Interestingly enough the account of Geoffrey de Vinsauf, which is, as previously noted,
an eyewitness account of the actions of Richard I, states that Richard I called together
a council of the chiefs of the people, by whom it was resolved that the hostages should
all be hanged, except a few nobles of the higher classes.29 Although the other accounts
do not mention this council, it must be taken into consideration that none of the other
accounts were written by eyewitnesses. The only exception is the account of Baha
ad-Din, and he would clearly not have been present at a council on the execution of
Muslim prisoners.
Overall, the two accounts that stand out as the most accurate portrayals of Richard
Is actions after Acre are those of Geoffrey de Vinsauf and Baha ad-Din. Geoffrey de
Vinsaufs appeal comes not only from being an eyewitness account, but most of the
events portrayed match those written by Baha ad-Din, the other eye-witness. Baha ad-
Dins appeal lies in his ability to understand the enemys view, no matter how much
he disliked it. Additionally, be it intentional or not, Baha ad-Dins account of Saladins
delay places blame onto Saladin for the execution of prisoners, which an acutely
biased author would have avoided. Conversely, The Continuation cannot be seen as
an entirely reliable source because it was not written during the time the events were
occurring but many years later. Additionally, Richard Is mention of the massacre at
Acre cannot be trusted outright either because, although it may be the most intimate
window into the thoughts of the king, it is also the easiest way for Richard I to have
included any biases he may have had, or to present himself in a better light. Ultimately,
the fact that the two eyewitness accounts have various similarities and that one of the
accounts is from an enemys chronicle suggest that Baha ad-Dins and Geoffrey de
Vinsaufs accounts are most trustworthy and accurate.
In regard to Richard Is reputation, it cannot be said that this was a blood-thirsty
act or that this was a deliberate act of policy. It is very likely that, had Saladin paid
the ransom and returned the True Cross, the prisoners would have been exchanged.
The sources make clear that the Christian forces eagerly anticipated the ransomand
especially the return of the True Crossand allowed Saladin to delay several times
before taking action. Although there was likely an emotional motivation behind the
massacre, it cannot be said that the decision to execute the prisoners was any more than
a last resort and strategic decision.
Page 34 Oshkosh Scholar
Notes
1. Thomas Madden, The New Concise History of the Crusades (New York: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 79.
2. Ibid., 76.
3. Ibid., 79.
4. Ibid., 79.
5. Ibid., 7985.
6. Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, in The Chronicle of the Third
Crusade: Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, ed. Helen J. Nicholson
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), 231.
7. Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. 3, The Kingdom of Acre and the
Later Crusades (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 53.
8. Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2005), 144.
9. Christopher Tyerman, Gods War: A New History of the Crusades (Cambridge, MA:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 456.
10. Ibid., 45657.
11. John Gillingham, Richard the Lionheart (New York: Times Books, 1978), 182.
12. Ibid., 184.
13. Henry G. Bohn, Chronicles of the Crusades (New York: AMS Press, 1969), iii.
14. Ibid., iiiiv.
15. Peter W. Edbury, The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in
Translation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 3.
16. Geoffrey de Vinsauf, Chronicle of Richard the Firsts Crusade, in Chronicles of
the Crusades, ed. Henry G. Bohn (New York: AMS Press, 1969), 214.
17. Baha ad-Din, The Enemy Takes Possession of Acre, in Arab Historians of the
Crusades, ed. Francesco Gabrieli (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993), 222.
18. Richard I, Correspondence to the Abbot of Clairvaux, in The Conquest of
Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in Translation, ed. Peter W. Edbury
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 180.
19. The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre, 118497, in The Conquest of
Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in Translation, ed. Peter W. Edbury
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 107.
20. Ibid., 107.
21. Geoffrey de Vinsauf, Chronicle, 221.
22. Richard of Devizes, Concerning the Deeds of King Richard the First, King of
England, in Chronicles of the Crusades, ed. Henry G. Bohn (New York: AMS
Press, 1969), 42.
23. Baha ad-Din, Enemy Takes Possession of Acre, 223.
24. Baha ad-Din, Massacre of the Muslim Prisoners, in Arab Historians of the
Crusades, ed. Francesco Gabrieli (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993), 223.
25. Ibid., 22324.
26. Itinerarium Peregrinorum, 21831.
27. Baha ad-Din, Massacre of the Muslim Prisoners, 224.
28. Richard I, Correspondence to the Abbot of Clairvaux, 180.
29. Geoffrey de Vinsauf, Chronicle, 222.
Oshkosh Scholar Page 35
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