WP as an ontology Quotation

The clearest statement of a proposed reduction A note from the Nachlass laying out WP as an
of all ontological kinds to 1 kind i.e. WP ontological category (i.e. category of existence):
And do you know what the world is to me?
2 radical features of the proposal: This world is the will to power and nothing
N claims that even the subatomic and besides! And you yourselves are also this will
atomic levels of existence are nothing but to power and nothing besides! (WP 1067)
instances of will
o Suggesting one of the most
outrageous forms of panpsychism
N thinks that even the conscious and
intentional levels of existence are nothing
but instances of power
o Suggests one of the most
unforgiving reductions
N hypothesizes that the world is ephemeral, The degree of resistance A quantum of power is
energetic, transient and constantly in motion, designated by the effect it produces That is why I
that is composed of events, and that events are call it a quantum of will to power: it expresses the
nothing more than a determination of degrees characteristic that cannot be thought of the
and relations of force (WP 552) mechanistic order without thinking away this order
itself (WP 634).
Crucial components from the 2 passages:
There are nothing but logically atomic no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a
events of power (referred to as quanta of relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their
power and dynamic quanta) essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, the
These power events are identified and most elemental fact from which a becoming and
distinguished from each other by the effecting first emerge. (WP 635)
effects they produce and those they resist
Their essence consists in their being a
relation of effecting and resisting other
such events
They are essentially experience pathos
Related to one another in relations, best
characterized as relations of tension
What does N mean by force and power? 1st question:
N holds that force is an amount/quantum E.g. a passage in the GM e.g. claims that:
of outwardly directed energy
o Where energy is a primitive A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of
drive, will, effect more, it is nothing other than
Why does he think that there is some connection precisely this very driving, willing, effecting (GM I 13)
between power and willing?
Connection between willing and energy:
Thus, from the quotes:
P1: Quanta of force are reduced to outwardly The victorious concept force, by means of which
directed energy effects on other quanta of force our physicists have created God and the world, still
P2: Since a quantum of force is directed needs to be completed: an inner will must be
outwards it would be accurately described as ascribed to it, which I designate as Will to power,,
a quantum of willing. i.e. as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as
C: Force is nothing but will to power the employment and exercise of power, as a creative
drive, etc. (WP 619)
WP seems to be subject to the same objections In the Nachlass:
against mysterious metaphysical categories (as The world is only a word for the totality of these
N deploys against substance, the ego and actions. Reality consists precisely in this particular
identity): action and reaction of every individual part toward
But once the effects of force are the whole (WP 567)
experienced, we have experienced all
there is to force
o A metaphysically neutral view,
consistent with there being many
ways that the effects of force are
experienced
o Reflected in the quote besides:
Why does N think that because energy is
directed outwards it is an instance of willing?
We can grant that outwardly directed
energy is a kind of force, what justifies the
proposed identification of efficient
causality with willing?
Having speculated about the nature of relations
between atomic quanta of power N builds the
world up out of them

N thinks that e.g. the quanta of power cooperate

to form structured bundles/alliances of power
each alliance concerned with extending its
power

Thus, every specific body continually

encounters similar efforts on the part of other
bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement
(union) with those of them that are sufficiently
related to it thus they conspire together for
power (WP 637)

More complex bundles of power are only

contingently cooperative and their membership
regulary changes when quanta terminate the
cooperation of the union
So units do not reach a stable identity
over time, except in a loose and popular
sense
Most bundles of power are simple and inorganic, N claims that all life, even a form as simple as
some more complex and organic living entities protoplasm (WP 551), is a will to the accumulation
of force; life strives after a maximal feeling of power
(WP 689)

On the emergence and functioning of bodily organs:

 Greater complexity, sharp differentiation,
commanding forces continually extend the bounds of
their power and continually simplify within these
bounds. (WP 644)
This construction continues right up to the
human being, an entity that is, Nietzsche willing
to admit, the most complex bundle of forces
This is in opposition to Kauffmans idea
that N first starts with human being and
then extends this idea to other living
beings and then the universe

Human can expand their power against other

inorganic, organic, and human entities and also,
via various schemes of self overcoming, against
themselves as well.

Suggests that the self that is engaged in such The assumption of one single subject is perhaps
activity is compositionally a society of relations To be sure, an aristocracy of equals, used to ruling
between forces, united by a mode of nutrition. jointly and understanding how to command? (WP
490)
Nietzsches view/complex composition of the
self:
The self is composed of bundles of power
directly entails rejecting subject atoms So long as the entities that compose the self are
More, the bundle view of the self also quanta of outwardly directed energy, N claims that
implies: there is no substratum: there is no being behind
o Rejecting the distinction between doing, effecting, becoming: the doer is merely a
doer and deed fiction added to the deed the deed is everything
Rejects self-substances and egos as the (GM I 13)
agents of action and as responsible moral
agents Between ourselves, it is not at all want henceforth
o But rejecting the self-substance is to have citizens rights in science (BGE 12)
not the same as denying the self
altogether N suggests that even
the word soul might be salvaged
for reuse:
Claims that there need be no entailment
from the organization of drives to a
soul/subject of thought
Nietzsches decomposition of the self into
an aristocracy of drives is driven not just
by:
o His hostility towards decadent
metaphysicians (who want
something mysterious that only
they can have control over)
o Conception of the self as a bundle
drives
 But also by his own monism of power
Criticism 1:
P1: Things were set of properties
P2: Properties exists necessarily
P3. Sets exist necessarily if all their
members do
C: Things would be necessary things
But contingent things are not necessary
things and there are many contingent
things
NB: properties are usually treated as
abstract entities
Criticism 2:
Answer:
Ns preferred conception of things is not as
sets of properties but as bundles of power
quanta
Power quanta are primitive units of force that
form their own non-abstract ontological
category
Power quanta are not abstract entities
because:
o Unlike abstracta, they are neither
multiply instantiable by particulars nor
repeatable i.e. power quanta are
instantiated only once
o Thus, power quanta are concrete
entities they do not necessarily exist
hence entities they compose are not
necessary entities either

1. Explain and assess Nietzsches claim that the world is will to power and
nothing besides.
a. Explanation will to power as:
i. WP as a fundamental ontological category:
1. The WP characterizes every mote of existence
ii. WP as a replacement for the traditions concept of cause:
1. The WP is a property of events and collections of
them
iii. WP over a range of psychological phenomena