KRIVENKO VS.
REGISTER OF DEEDS ACTION OF THE COURT
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS or THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
(Section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution)
(1) Agricultural
(2) timber and
(3) mineral.
PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LANDS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
EFFECT UPON THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF NOT CONSIDERING RESIDENTIAL LANDS
AS AGRICULTURAL LANDS.If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not
including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that aliens
may freely acquire and possess
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
G.R. No. L-360
November 15, 1947
NATURE OF CASE
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
BRIEF:
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. De la Rosa, J.
FACTS
Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to
accomplish said registration but was denied by, the register of deeds of Manila on the
ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then
brought the case to CFI Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
Register of Deeds: Refused registration for petitioner being an alien is prohibited to
acquire land.
CFI: Affirmed the Register of Deeds.
SC: Judgment is affirmed.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
No. The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language,
embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a
permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural
resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the
public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that
all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the
public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands"
under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the
members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal
profession.
In determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is
actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But
whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into
agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was
construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including
residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the
Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-
known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with
a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. After the
Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of
residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such
citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as
agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable
public lands" which are the same "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are
classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This
simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular
meaning. "Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtf ful.
lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to aliens
alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have
cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or been.
lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their SUPREME COURT RULING
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed,
Prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could without costs.
acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential purposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public
Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes
could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the
lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The
exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or
lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of
any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural.

This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of
the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring
again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public
Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private
lands only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the phrase "no land" used in
these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or
otherwise.

It is said that the lot in question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by
one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, deciding the instant
case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to lands that had