1
50. Bureau of Printing vs Bureau of Printing Employees Association
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
1 SCRA 340
Facts:
Upon complaint of the respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees Association
against the Bureau of Printing, the complaint alleged that the latter have been engaging
in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing their employees, in the exercise
of their right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities. The
Petitioners of Bureau of Printing denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed
to and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that the
respondents of the Bureau of Printing Employees Association were suspending the
pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil
Service rules and regulations petition; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical
personality to sue and be sued; that said bureau is not an industrial concern engaged for
the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions.
The petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion asking for a preliminary hearing on the
question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of
the case on the merits pending the determination of such juridical question.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bureau of Printing, in the proceeding in the action for unfair labor
practice, lacks jurisdiction thereof.
Held:
The trial judge of the Industrial Court in an order dated January 27, 1959 sustained the
jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are
exclusively proprietary in nature,". The Bureau of Printing is an office of the
Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such
instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all
printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the
National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may,
by law or by order of the Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake...". It has no
corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the General
Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is
primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for
pecuniary profit. Overtime work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the
interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime
compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the
Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for
holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. The
additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and
although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that
the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those
employed in its general governmental functions.As an office of the Government,
without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually
be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that
the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection
51. MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE
SERVICE
18 SCRA 1120
FACTS:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned
to MobilPhilippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the
custody of the CustomsArrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the
broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs
Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered
case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants
cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from
suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of
Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private
individuals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants can invoke state immunity.
HELD:
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function
is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of
Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own
apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of
assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and
customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. Clearly, therefore, although said
 2
arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary
and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engagingin the same does
not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its
governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity,
granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.
52. Case Digest: Banahaw Broadcasting vs. Pacana III
G.R. No.171673: May 30, 2011
BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CAYETANO
PACANA III, NOE U. DACER, JOHNNY B. RACAZA, LEONARDO S. OREVILLO,
ARACELI T. LIBRE, GENOVEVO E. ROMITMAN, PORFERIA M. VALMORES,
MENELEO G. LACTUAN, DIONISIO G. BANGGA, FRANCISCO D. MANGA,
NESTOR A. AMPLAYO, LEILANI B. GASATAYA, LORETA G. LACTUAN,
RICARDO B. PIDO, RESIGOLO M. NACUA and ANACLETO C. REMEDIO,
Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Respondents in the case at bar (the DXWG personnel), are employees of the DXWG-
Iligan City radio station which is owned by petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), a corporation managed by Intercontinental Broadcasting
Corporation (IBC).
On August 29, 1995, the DXWG personnel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, reimbursement of unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
benefits, and attorneys fees against IBC and BBC.
On June 21, 1996, Labor Arbiter (LA) decided in favour of the DXWG personnel.
Both, parties, however, appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
On May 15, 1997, a Motion to Dismiss, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, was jointly
filed by IBC and the DXWG personnel based on the latter's admission that IBC is not
their employer as it does not own DXWG-Iligan City.The NLRC granted the Motion
with respect to IBC.
BBC filed an MR.
On December 12, 1997, the NLRC issued a Resolution vacating the Decision of LA and
remanding the case to the arbitration branch of origin on the ground that while the
complaint was filed against both IBC and BBC, only IBC was served with summons,
ordered to submit a position paper, and furnished a copy of the assailed decision.
On October 15, 1998, the new LA rendered a Decision adjudging BBC to be liable for
the same amount discussed in the vacated original Decision of the previous LA.
Both BBC and respondents appealed to the NLRC.BBC challenged the monetary award
itself. In the same Memorandum of Appeal, BBC incorporated a Motion for the
Recomputation of the Monetary Award (of the Labor Arbiter),in order that the appeal
bond may be reduced.
On September 16, 1999, the NLRC issued an Order Denying the Motion for the
Recomputation of the Monetary Award. The NLRC ordered BBC to post the required
bond within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will
cause the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection.Instead of complying with the
Order to post the required bond, BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,alleging this
time that since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines, it need not post an
appeal bond.
On November 22, 1999, the NLRC rendered its Decision. In said Decision, the NLRC
denied the MR of BBC and accordingly dismissed the appeal of BBC for non-
perfection.
BBC filed an MR which was denied by the NLRC.
BBC filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
On April 15, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying BBCs Petition
forCertiorari.The CA held that BBC, though owned by the government, is a corporation
with a personality distinct from the Republic or any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
and therefore do not partake in the latter's exemption from the posting of appeal bonds.
The Court of Appeals denied the MR.Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: Whether BBC is exempt from posting an appeal bond.
HELD: Petition denied.
 3
GOCCs NOT EXEMPT FROM POSTING BOND
Generally, the government and all the attached agencies with no legal personality
distinct from the former are exempt from posting appeal bonds, whereas government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) are not similarly exempted except if it is
sued in relation to its governmental functions. Here, BBC was organized as a private
corporation, sequestered in the 1980s and the ownership of which was subsequently
transferred to the government. Its primary function is to engage in commercial radio
and television broadcasting. It is therefore clear that BBCs function is commercial or
proprietary and not governmental.As such, BBC is not entitled to an exemption from
the posting of an appeal bond.
FAILURE TO POST BOND CONSTITUTED NON-PERFECTION OF APPEAL
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from. The posting of the appeal bond within the period
provided by law is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional. The failure on the part of
BBC to perfect the appeal thus had the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory.
54. (Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21
1916, 34 Phil. 311)
FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped
by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering
him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt
to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine
the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court
held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit
or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject
to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order
or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which
are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special
agent; thus the Government is not liable.
NOTE:
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)
The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on
the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)
The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government
does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)
60. Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)
 4
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of
Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that
Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had
eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died
a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is
not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear
as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was
approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments
render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of
the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991,
testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which
was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was
signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross
and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept
in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining
among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the
OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates
how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious
freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing
the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable
as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and
punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court
cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must
also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be
given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed
religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest"
to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the
state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the
Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
59. Aglipay v. Ruiz - A case digest
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman
 5
Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic
duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners
attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold
though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held / Ruling:
There has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs. Even if we
were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in
weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step
taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the
official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The court resolved that petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without
pronouncement as to costs.
58. Everson v. Board of Education
Citation. 22 Ill.330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947)
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Everson (Petitioner), in his status as a taxpayer,
filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent, Board of Education (Respondent),
to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their
children to and from school.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that, while no law
respecting an establishment of religion will stand under the United States Constitution
(Constitution), neutral laws, which afford benefits to children will be upheld.
Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the
Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the
transportation of their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging
that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by
allowing the parents of parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement
scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the
Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted
certiorari to consider the issue.
Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit
from the same services afforded to the parents of public school children.
Held. Affirmed.
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the statute
was not unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of
all school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged.
Dissent. The dissents of Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) and Justice Wiley Rutledge
(J. Rutledge) stand for strict adherence to the establishment clause.
Discussion. It is important to understand, in striking down the Establishment Clause
challenge, the Supreme Court highlights the fact that funds cannot be commingled
when they are reimbursed only for transportation costs already expended. Thus, because
there is no possibility of funding parochial activities in themselves, the statute is
allowed to stand.
57. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RICARDO BOSI y
DANAO,
Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 193665 June 25, 2012
DECISION
REYES, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by Ricardo Bosi y Danao (accused-appellant) from the
Decision[1] dated December 23, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 03226.
Antecedent Facts
 6
The victim (AAA) testified that on November 2, 2001, at about 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, AAA went to bed to sleep beside her younger sister. While sleeping, AAAs
father and mother woke her up so that she could transfer to the sala where her parents
and siblings were sleeping. AAA heeded her father's command out of fear. AAA then
slept again but was awakened when she felt her father pulling down her shorts and
panty. AAA tried to push him and kicked him while accused-appellant held her hand;
finally, accused-appellant went on top of her, kissed her and inserted his penis inside
her vagina. AAA succumbed to her father's bestial desire out of fear that the latter might
hurt her mother and her siblings. Subsequently, accused-appellant tried to rape AAA
again at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning but did not succeed. AAA reported the crime
to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) the following morning,
accompanied by her aunt Raquel Bosi, the sister of the accused-appellant.[2]
Accused-appellant was subsequently charged with violation of Article 266-A, No. 1(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9711. The Information
states as follows:
That on or about November 02, 2001, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Iguig, Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused RICARDO BOSI y DANAO, father of the complainant, [AAA], a woman
twenty four (24) years of age thus, have [sic] moral ascendancy over the aforesaid
complainant, with lewd design, and by the use of force[,] threat and intimidation, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kiss, caress the private parts of the
complainant and thereafter have sexual intercourse with the herein complainant,
[AAA], his own daughter a woman twenty four (24) years of age, against her will.
Contrary to law.[3]
During trial, aside from the testimony of AAA, the prosecution also offered as part of
their evidence: (a) the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Vida Lappay-Fuguiao,
Medical Officer III of Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC) in Tuguegarao City,
and (b) the sworn statement AAA gave to the Iguig Police.[4]
Meanwhile, the accused-appellant in his defense simply denied the accusation against
him. He claimed that AAA charged him with rape because he slapped her when she
eloped with her boyfriend and because he asked her to stop her studies for one year. He
alleged that his daughter even warned him that he would have his comeuppance. He
insisted that he could have not raped his daughter because they were then sleeping with
AAAs mother and siblings. The defense also presented the accused-appellant's son,
Santiago Bosi (Santiago), who testified that his father could not have raped his sister
because his mother and siblings were sleeping with her and their father. Aside from the
accused-appellant and Santiago's testimonies, the defense also offered the counter-
affidavit which was submitted during the preliminary investigation.[5]
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Ruling
After weighing the evidence adduced by both sides, the RTC found the accused-
appellant guilty. It gave credence to the testimony of AAA who narrated her ordeal in a
straightforward, convincing, and consistent manner, interrupted only by her convulsive
sobbing. It disbelieved the accused-appellant's alibi that his daughter charged him with
rape because he disciplined her; it also did not give much weight to the accused-
appellant's argument that he could have not raped AAA because he and AAA slept
together with AAAs mother and siblings. The trial court found the accused-appellant's
denial as simply self-serving and inherently weak, especially without a strong evidence
of non-accountability. Finally, the RTC held that defense witness Santiagos testimony
deserves scant consideration because negative evidence cannot prevail over the positive
assertions of private complainant AAA. The RTC ratiocinated that lust is no respecter of
time and precinct and known to happen in most unlikely places. The accused-appellant
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.[6]
The CA Ruling
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, explaining that when the credibility of the
victim is put in issue, as in this case, it will adhere to the well-entrenched rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination, if not
disturbance, of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique
position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and
attitude. It also agreed with the RTC in not giving credence to accused-appellant's
argument that he could have not raped his daughter since there were other members of
the family sleeping in the sala. The CA reechoed the RTC's ruling that lust is no
respecter of time and precinct and known to happen in most unlikely places. It also did
not agree with the accused-appellant's argument that AAA did not show resistance. It
ratiocinated that rape victims show no uniform reaction. Finally, the CA also disagreed
with the accused-appellant's allegation that AAA was motivated by ill-will in filing the
 7
case because it has been found that mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough
reason for daughters in a Filipino family to invent charges that would bring shame and
humiliation to the victim and to her family and loved ones.[7]
Issues
Considering that accused-appellant Ricardo Bosi and plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines adopted their respective briefs before the CA, we now rule on the matter
based on the issues[8] which the accused-appellant raised in his brief before the CA, to
wit:
I even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S VERSION DESPITE ITS IMPROBABILITY AND
HER ILL FEELINGS TOWARDS [THE] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE
HIS GUILT WITH MORAL CERTAINTY.[9]
Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we see no reason to reverse or modify
the findings of the RTC, especially because the CA has affirmed the same.
The accused-appellant claims that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to
AAAs version despite its improbability and her ill-feelings towards him. He alleges that
he could have not raped his daughter because at that time he and AAA were sleeping
with his wife and his other children. He also argues that AAA never testified that he
used a weapon to compel her to submit to his desires. Rather, AAAs only justification
for her silence was her unfounded fear that the accused-appellant might harm her
mother and siblings, considering her father's domineering and tyrannical ways.
In deciding this case, we are guided by the three principles which courts should take
into account when reviewing rape cases, namely: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to
make, difficult to prove, and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[10] Because of these guiding principles, we
are confronted with one core issue: the credibility of the victim.
Time and again, we have held that when at issue is the credibility of the victim, we give
great weight to the trial courts assessment. In fact, the trial court's finding of facts is
or circumstance of weight and influence. Our reason is that the trial court had the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying. It is
in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.
[11]
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA recognized the credibility and believability
of AAAs testimony. They both gave credence to the testimony of AAA who narrated
her ordeal in a straightforward, convincing, and consistent manner, interrupted only by
her convulsive sobbing. We cannot but do the same, considering that both the RTC and
the CA found AAAs testimony credible and believable. Indeed, AAAs brother Santiago
testified that his father could have not raped her because he would have heard it.
Moreover, Santiago did not categorically say that no rape happened. Rather, he only
claimed that since he was at the other room he could have heard whatever happened at
the other room where the rape occurred. Not because Santiago did not hear anything
and the victim did not shout, no rape has ever happened. As correctly pointed out by the
RTC, defense witness Santiago's testimony deserves scant consideration because
negative evidence cannot prevail over the positive assertions of the private complainant.
An evidence is negative when the witness states that he did not see or know the
occurrence.[12] In this case, what Santiago declared in the RTC is that he did not hear
anything, but such testimony does not negate the positive assertion of AAA that she was
raped. Thus, [b]etween the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative
averments of the [appellant], the former indisputably deserve more credence and are
entitled to greater evidentiary weight.[13] Furthermore, we agree with both the RTC
and the CA that lust is no respecter of time and precinct and known to happen in most
unlikely places. Indeed, rape can either happen in populated area or in the privacy of a
room.
 8
Of course, the accused-appellant belabored the issues of AAAs lack of resistance and
the absence in her testimony of an allegation that the accused-appellant used a weapon
to make her submit to his desires. However, the same must fail because not all victims
react in the same manner[14] and that the absence of the use of weapon is immaterial
since, as put forward by the Office of the Solicitor General, (The lack of) resistance is
immaterial when the accused is the father or is closely related to the victim, the moral
ascendancy and influence substitutes physical violence or intimidation.[15]
The accused-appellant also argued that AAA charged her own father of rape because
she begrudged him for his tyrannical ways. However, we agree with the RTC and the
CA when they said that mere disciplinary chastisement does not suffice for a daughter
to accuse her father and invent charges of rape which would bring shame and
humiliation to the victim and to her family and loved ones if the same did not really
happen. In our view, we cannot simply ignore the consistent and unwavering testimony
of AAA pointing to her father as her rapist.
Finally, our moral fiber must have truly deteriorated with fathers raping their own
children. For a Christian nation like ours, such bestial act should never be tolerated.
Some would argue that for the sake of the family the child must forgive her father-
tormentor. But in the eyes of the law, a crime is a crime and justice dictates that fathers
who rape their children deserve no place in our society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 23, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. HC-03226 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
55. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, vs.
GROUP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (GMC) AND LAPU-LAPU
DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING Corporation (LLDHc), Respondents.
G.R. No. 167000 June 8, 2011
In G.R. No. 167000, GSIS is assailing the Orders issued by the Lapu-Lapu RTC on
March 11, 2004 and May 7, 2004 for being legally unenforceable on GSIS because the
titles of the 78 lots in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City were already in LLDHCs name,
due to the final and executory judgment rendered by the Manila RTC in Civil Case No.
R-82-3429. GSIS contends that it is legally and physically impossible for it to comply
with the assailed Orders as the "subject matter to be delivered or performed have
already been taken away from" 75 GSIS. GSIS asserts that the circumstances which
have arisen, from the judgment of the Manila RTC to the cancellation of GSISs titles,
are "supervening events" which should be considered as an exception to the doctrine of
finality of judgments because they render the execution of the final and executory
judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC in Civil Case No. 2203-L unjust and inequitable. GSIS
further claims that it should not be made to pay damages of any kind because its funds
and properties are exempt from execution, garnishment, and other legal processes under
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291.
LLDHC, in its Compliance,76 believes that it was impleaded in this case as a mere
nominal party since it filed its own Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
which was granted in CA-G.R. SP No. 84382. LLDHC essentially agrees with GSIS
that the implementation of the assailed Orders have become legally impossible due to
the fully implemented Writ of Execution issued by the Manila RTC in Civil Case No.
R-82-3429. LLDHC alleges that because of this "supervening event," GSIS cannot be
compelled to execute a final deed of sale in GMCs favor, and "LLDHC cannot be
divested of its titles, ownership and possession" of the subject properties.77
GMC in its comment78 argues that GSIS has no legal standing to institute this petition
because it has no more interest in the subject lots, since it is no longer in possession and
the titles thereto have already been registered in LLDHCs name. GMC claims that the
decision of the Special Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is barred by res
judicata, and that LLDHC is guilty of forum shopping for filing several petitions before
the Court of Appeals and this Court with the same issues and arguments. GMC also
asserts that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 is enforceable only between
GSIS and LLDHC as GMC was not a party to the case, and that the Manila RTC cannot
overrule the Lapu-Lapu RTC, they being co-equal courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Manila RTC in Civil Case No. R-82-3429 constitutes
a supervening event, which should be admitted as an exception to the doctrine of
finality of judgments.
Supervening Event
It is well-settled that once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may not be changed, altered or modified in any way even if the
modification were for the purpose of correcting an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
This is referred to as the "doctrine of finality of judgments," and this doctrine applies
even to the highest court of the land.82 This Court explained its rationale in this wise:
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
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judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of
courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. 83
This Court has, on several occasions, ruled that the doctrine of finality of judgments
admits of certain exceptions, namely: "the correction of clerical errors, the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its
execution unjust and inequitable."84
Both GSIS and LLDHC claim that the execution of the decision and orders in Civil
Case No. 2203-L should be stayed because of the occurrence of "supervening events"
which render the execution of the judgment "impossible, unfair, unjust and
inequitable."85 However, in order for an event to be considered a supervening event to
justify the alteration or modification of a final judgment, the event must have transpired
after the judgment has become final and executory, to wit:
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and
executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired
finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
as they were not yet in existence at that time. 86
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition in G.R. No. 167000 is DENIED
and the Decision dated November 25, 2004 and Resolution dated January 20, 2005 of
the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R.
No. 169971 is GRANTED and the Decision dated September 23, 2005 of the Special
Nineteenth Division of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.