1.

Agustin vs Edu

G.R. No. L-49112

February 2, 1979

FACTS:

Petitioner Leovillo C. Agustin was an owner of a Volkswagen beetle car, already properly
equipped with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device to other motorists. He is
assailing the validity or constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, requiring all motor vehicles to be equipped with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning
devices because of the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways
without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence which
causes fatal and serious accidents in land transportation. In compliance with such letter of instruction,
the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office Romeo F. Edu issued Administrative Order No. 1
directing the compliance thereof.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

1. Agustin is arguing that the said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power. For him they are oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society.
*Police Power - State's constitution-granted power to govern, and to make, adopt, and enforce
laws for the protection and preservation of public health, justice, morals, order, safety and security, and
welfare.

2. The order is unlawful and unconstitutional because it is compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the
motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to
the specified set of EWD's (Early Warning Devices)

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

The Solicitor General mentioned the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road
traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. The
said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.

*The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is a treaty concerning the international
law on treaties between states. It was adopted on 23 May 1969 and opened for signature on 23 May
1969. The VCLT has been ratified by 114 states as of April 2014. Some countries that have not ratified
the Convention, such as the United States, recognize parts of it as a restatement of customary law and
binding upon them as such.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued
is valid and constitutional?
HELD:

Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible
even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or
from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic.
The conclusion reached by the Court that the petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:
Whereas, the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization (U.N.); Whereas, the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle
found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which
it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which
is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

*Pacta sunt servanda (agreements must kept) the principle refers to private contracts,
stressing that contained clauses are law between the parties, and implies that nonfulfillment of
respective obligations is a breach of the pact.

2. REYES VS BAGATSING,
125 SCRA 553
G.R. NO. L-65366/ NOVEMBER 9, 1983
FERNANDO, C.J.:

TOPIC: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

CONFLICT BETWEEN A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF A CITIZEN AND A GENERALLY
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

SECTION 2. ARTICLE II---1987 CONSTITUTION

THE PHILIPPINES RENOUNCES WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, ADOPTS THE
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE LAW OF THE
LAND AND ADHERES TO THE POLICY OF PEACE, EQUALITY, JUSTICE, FREEDOM,
COOPERATION, AND AMITY WITH ALL NATIONS

SECTION 4. ARTICLE III---1987 CONSTITUTION (FREEDOM OF SPEECH)

NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF EXPRESSION OR OF
THE PRESS, OR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.

FACTS:
Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti- Based Coalition sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 25, 1983, from 2:00- 5:00 in the afternoon, starting
from Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, requesting for the removal of the
foreign Military bases in Manila. The respondent Mayor denied the petition as it was recommended by
the police authorities a permit may only be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other
enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be issued.
Petitioner contends that such holding of a rally in front of the US Embassy would be violative of
Ordinance No. 7295 of the city of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of issuance of permit by the respondent mayor valid.
Whether or not the petioners holding of a rally in front of the US embassy violative of Ordinance
No. 7295 of the city of Manila.

HELD:
The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land, To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted
principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were
a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or
impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal
point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500)
feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. There was no showing, however, that
the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied. It does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the
way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued
that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable
assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the
need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of
Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded
the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less. Unless the ordinance is
nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of
the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.
The Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit.
The mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.

3. People vs. Lagman

66 Phil. 13

FACTS:

Tranquilino Lagman is a Filipino citizen who turned 20 years old in 1936. He was duly notified by
corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service
as compelled by Commonwealth Act No. 1 (The National Defense Act). He refused to register in the
military service between the 1st and 7th of April that year, saying that he has a father to support, has no
military learnings, and does not wish to be kill or be killed. He was sentenced to 1 month and 1 day
imprisonment with costs as per Sec. 60 of the above mentioned.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

The National Defense Law is constitutional. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

The National Defense Law is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

WON the National Defense Law is constitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the National Defense Law is constitutional. It is in faithful compliance of Sec. 2, Art. II of the
Philippines Constitution that states The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfilment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service. The
circumstance that the appellant has dependent a dependent father to support does not excuse them
from his duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists,
they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper
pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (Secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1). SC affirms the appealed judgment rendered with the case, with the costs to the appellant.

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO MANAYAO

July 28, 1947

FACTS/SUMMARY:

Pedro Manayao, the appellant, was a member of the Makapili. He collaborated with the Japanese army
to impose violence in Bannaban, Bulacan. On January 27, 1945, the guerrillas attacked the Japanese in
Sitio Pulong Tindahan, Angat, Bulacan. As revenge, the Japanese army, with the help of Makapili, killed
almost around sixty to seventy people/residents for being allegedly wives, relatives and supporters of
guerillas fighting against the Japanese army on January 29, 1945.

The appellant was charged with the following aggravating circumstances:

1) The aid of armed men; and

2) The presence of a band in the commission of the crime

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

The state contended that it is the constitutional duty of the citizens to defend the State especially in
times of war. His duty and obligation towards the land cannot be disregarded when the country is at war.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELANT:

Manayaos counsel contended that the appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan (was
subject to military law), thus cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Peoples court. Further, he
argued that Manayao had already lost his Filipino citizenship upon his allegiance to support and aid the
Japanese army, thus he cannot be charged with the high crime of treason. Further, it was argued that
the appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior, thus he shall be exempt from criminal
liability. He allegedly acted only to fulfill his duty related to his service for Japan since he is a member of
the Makapili. He further contended that certain provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 63 state that a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
 1. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
2. By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; and
3. By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps in the time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason

HELD/RULING:

Yes. The appellant was found guilty of the high crime of treason with multiple murder.

1. He was indeed a member of Makapili, a group of Filipinos who rendered service and aided the
Japanese army against the Philippines during the war; however, the said organization was not
part of the said army. It was merely a group of Filipino traitors, pure and simple.
2. There was no evidence that Manayao subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution of laws of Japan. Further, members of the Makapili could have aid and support Japan
without having to swear to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution/laws of Japan. Also,
there was no evidence that the appellant has ever been declared as a deserter in the Philippine
Army, Navy or Air corps-nor even that he was a member of the said Army, Navy or Air Corps.
Therefore, there was no evidence that the appellant has already lost his Filipino citizenship,
especially in relation to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
3. The appellants contention is against the provision of Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
The said provision covers both time of peace and time of war.

The appellant was initially charged with death, and to pay a fine of Php 20, 000, an indemnity of Php 2,
000 to the heirs of each of the victims (named in the third paragraph of the lower courts decision), and
the costs. However, due to the opposition of Justice Perfecto, in accordance with the applicable legal
provisions, the appellant was charged with reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Php 20, 000, an
indemnity of Php 2, 000 to the heirs of each of the victims (named in the third paragraph of the lower
courts decision), and the costs.

5. Pamil vs Teleron (With Dissenting Opinion)

86 SCRA 413
Fact:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, was elected Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol in 1971. He was
later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate, then filed a quo warranto against
Gonzaga, arguing that Gonzaga be disqualified that as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code:
in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality.

Respondent Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code
of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to run. Thus, a certiorari was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. If the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be
maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for elective office.
However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority
vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional
7 members of the Court are of the view that judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is
no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed; 6 Justices,
including Teehankee, are of the same mind, stating that the overriding principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution, or at the very least, the repeal of such provision bars a reversal; the remaining 5 members
if the Court, on the contrary, held the position that such prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for
elective office is not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. This vote is indecisive that while 5 members
constitute a minority, 7 votes does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. The
Supreme Courted granted a certiorari.
For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set
aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) in question, how one who swore to serve the
Churchs interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church
tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code
still stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective
office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 every person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces shall ipso facto cease in their office or
position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer
disqualified from running for an elective office. The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining
categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, ecclesiastics and contractors for
public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim,
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible
under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications,
except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.

6. GERMAN vs. BARANGAN

Facts of the case:

The petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees, converged at J.P.
Laurel Street, Manila for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which is connected to the
Malacaang grounds located in the same street. They wore inscribed yellow shirts and marched down
the said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government insults. Along the way, they
were barred by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders from Gen. Santiago Barangan on the
ground that the chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. They decided to leave when
their protests and pleas to get inside the chapel were denied, but not without allegedly receiving a
warning from respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to allow them to enter the
chapel in the future would likewise be prevented.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER

Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and
pray inside St. Jude Chapel, and a writ of injunction to prevent respondents from prohibiting them from
getting into and praying in said church. This is pursuant to their right to religious worship and locomotion
as stated in sec 6, Art II of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P.
Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church.

Freedom of religious worship is guaranteed under Section 8, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, thus:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

DEFENSE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict,
any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that
petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the
Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as
sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow T-shirts worn by some of
the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to
substantiate the respondents allegations of their true motive. The restriction was also intended to secure
the several executive offices within the Malacaang grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of
the executive branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action would certainly disrupt.

RULING

The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street is allowed under the fundamental law, having
been established in the interest of national security. Hence, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, no
costs.

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This
curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear
to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of
 society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

Elucidating on the meaning and scope of freedom of religion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut said:

The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the
one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two
concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Teehankee voted to grant the petition on the ground that the right of free worship and movement is a
preferred right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restraint except where
there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evil sought to be prevented. There was and is
manifestly no such danger in this case.

The majority's dismissal of the petition on the ground that the restriction imposed by respondents was
"necessary to maintain the smooth functions of the executive branch of the government which
petitioners' mass action would certainly disrupt" and that such prior restraint was not violative of
petitioners' constitutional rights of freedom of religious worship and movement "having been established
in the interest of national Security," is not in accordance with the applicable established standards and
principles.

MAKASIAR

The petitioners gave the assurance that they are marching towards St. Jude's Church only for the
purpose of praying or attending mass therein; that they were and are going to march in an orderly
manner without blocking the traffic and with the marshals policing and Identifying the marchers; that they
are not armed and are not going to be armed with any kind of weapon; and that they are willing to be
frisked. These are practically the same assurances made by the petitioners in the case of Reyes vs.
Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553, November 9, 1983) and by the petitioners who marched from Espaa
Rotonda to Liwasang Bonifacio sometime in September, 1984.

Their wearing yellow T-shirts and clothing and bearing yellow emblems or banners, are forms of
expression which are also protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression in
general, and religious freedom in particular. The fact that most, if not all, of them are not residents of
Sampaloc or the neighborhood around St. Jude's Church, should not impair their credibility as to their
true intentions because St. Jude's Church, to the believers or devotees, is the only church in Metro
Manila especially dedicated to supplications for the realization of impossible hopes and dreams.

With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and
present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of
Malacaang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents have adopted measures and are prepared to
insure against any public disturbance or violence.

Hence, the petition should be granted.

ABAD SANTOS voted to grant the petition.

We are asked to give meaning to the constitutional guarantee that, "The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed." (Art. IV,
Sec. 8.)

True it is that the free exercise of religion can be restrained under the clear and present danger principle.
But I fail to perceive the presence of any clear danger to the security of Malacaang due to the action of
the petitioners. The danger existed only in the fertile minds of the overzealous guardians of the complex
which is protected by a stout steel fence.

MELENCIO-HERRERA

I vote to accord to petitioners their right to freedom of worship.

One of the basic and fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution is the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship (Section 8, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). "For freedom of
religious expression, the Constitution assures generous immunity, unless it can be shown that there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent" (E. M. Fernando
on The Bill of Rights, Second Edition, p. 198).

The act of petitioners in converging at J.P. Laurel Street, majority of whom were wearing yellow T-shirts,
marching towards St. Jude Chapel, there to hear Mass, shouting anti-Government invectives with
clenched fists as they marched, did not in my opinion pose any clear and present danger. Petitioners
were unarmed, marching peacefully, albeit noisily.

The location of the St. Jude Chapel within the perimeter of the Malacaang security area is not, to my
mind, sufficient reason for a prior restraint on petitioners' right to freedom of religious worship. Proper
security measures can always be taken. It is only when petitioners, in the exercise of their religious
beliefs, exceed those bounds and translate their freedoms into acts detrimental or inimical to the
superior rights of public peace and order, that the test of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
is met and the acts having a religious significance may be infringed upon in the exercise of the police
power of the State. "Freedom of worship is susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect" (West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette (319 U.S. 624 [1943]).

RELOVA (Separate vote and statement)

The majority opinion doubts the sincerity and good faith of the fifty (50) petitioners in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of religious worship and of locomotion because they were wearing yellow T-
shirts as they marched down J. P. Laurel Street with raised clenched fists on October 2, 1984, at about
5:00 in the afternoon, for the purpose of praying and/or hearing mass at the St. Jude Chapel which
adjoins the Malacaang grounds.

Petitioners claim that they were on their way to hear mass and/or pray. For respondents to say, even
before petitioners have reached the place, that they would be delivering speeches is pure speculation.
Respondents should have allowed petitioners to hear mass and/or pray and, thereafter, see what they
would do. Only then would We know what were really in their minds. What respondents did by acting
before petitioners could display themselves was tantamount to prohibiting free exercise and enjoyment
of religious worship. Demonstrations about or near the premises of St. Jude Chapel because of its
proximity to the residence of the President may be restricted, but certainly, for petitioners or any group of
men for that matter, to hear mass and/or pray at the chapel should be tolerated.

The petition should be granted.

7. Rene A. V. Saguisag vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
Case Digest: GR 212426
January 12, 2016

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality
of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive
department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US
forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities
within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the
parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated
the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops
and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The
Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional
ratification.

Contention of the State:

The State is questioning the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement due to
the said violation of the agreement with regards to Art XVIII, Section 25 of the constitution which states:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Contention of the Accused:

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an executive agreement that gives U.S troops, pans
and ships increase rotational presence in Philippine military bases and allows the U.S to build facilities to
store fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the backdrop of the Philippines maritime dispute
with China over West Philippine Sea.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA.
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers.
Whether or not the petitions qualify as legislators suit.
Whether or not the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case.

Held:
 No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may
dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the
act affects a public right. But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve the
protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the
petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated
by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be
considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned
requirements

No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure,
nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which
the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they
must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A
reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an
authorization of disbursement.

No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative

granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the
Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional
function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former senators,
have the legal standing to maintain the suit.

Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental
importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised
here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides
for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be
allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.

8. Espina vs. Zamora, JR

G.R. No. 143855
September 21, 2010

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG,

ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI
AND FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY), HON. MAR ROXAS (SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY), HON. FELIPE
MEDALLA (SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY), GOV.
RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND HON. LILIA BAUTISTA
(CHAIRMAN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION), Respondents.

ABAD, J.:
FACTS:

On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as
the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited
foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under
four categories.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the
Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present
petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:

The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to
place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities,
promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition
and trade policies.

The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with
alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the
economy.

Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors,
destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.

The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the
government as a condition for the release of certain loans.

There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint
of trade.

Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas,
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista
countered that:

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers
since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds.

The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.

Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and
20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.

The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs
Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the
NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the
Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of
R.A. 8762

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional

POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court
of justice and make such a challenge.

HELD:

Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a
challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has
suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law.

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices
petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve
the question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the
public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.

POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the Constitution are not self-
executing.

As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such
policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit
foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it
depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to
open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them
exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it
blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has
contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A.
8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered
any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on
foreign participation in that business. Thus -

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated;
Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry
of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign
retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling,
restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

29. Ichong vs. Hernandez

101 PHIL. 1155
May 31, 1957
Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted
the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business, prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in our country. Petitioner, for
and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional.

Contention of the Petitioner: He attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;
(4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article
XIV of the Constitution.

Contention of the State: The Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that:
(1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival;
(2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title;
(3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed;
(4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not
impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Held: The petition was denied. The disputed law is a valid exercise of police power and is not the
product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and
determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic
situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. It was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it
protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien
and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of
the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Furthermore, an alien retailer in this country is never really makes a genuine contribution to national
income and wealth. Aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the
customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not
invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The removal
and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest
motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to
bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. Thus in the preamble, a principle
objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to
citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State
insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens. The law is reasonable and is
made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to
continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses.

Notes and Definitions:

Section 9, Article II, 1987 Constitution
- The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life for all.
The main provisions of the R.A. No. 1180 are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the
above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who
are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten
years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a
provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws
on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with
the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal
offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the
retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
Police Power
- It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
- Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do
is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause
and the equal protection clause. Theses constitutional guarantees which embody the essence
of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are
admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or
of nationality.
Equal Protection Clause
- The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
 legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
Due Process Clause
- The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance
of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the
Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection
with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can
the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process
test is applied.
Griffith vs. Court of Appeals
379 SCRA 94
March 12, 2009
Facts:

Lincoln Gerard, Inc. leased the lot and factory building of Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. for a
term of two years at monthly rental of P75,000. Geoffrey F. Griffith, petitioner and president of
Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued a two checks amounting to P215,442.65 to private respondent.The
checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard,
Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner. It was a condition written on the voucher for each
check that the check was not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard,
to be given at a specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing
to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the companys inability to fund its
checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto that
if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30, 1986, the checks would
be presented for payment. This is final and irrevocable, according to the note that was written
actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps
Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took place only
after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to
spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerards properties impounded by
Phelps Dodge.
The MeTC found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P. 22 and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for six months on each count, to be served consecutively. The RTC affirmed in toto
the lower courts decision. He appealed his conviction in the CA and is now seeking reversal on
the CA decision and resolution on the criminal case.

Contention of the Petitioner:

Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher
attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their
issuance. Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any intent to put worthless
checks in circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second
check that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22 with
said check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner could not
have known at the time of its issuance that the postdated check would be dishonored when
presented for payment later on. Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be
violative of the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since
petitioner would be punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an
obligation when it fell due.
Contention of the State:
The Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge, through the note on
the voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered with sufficient funds by
May 30, 1996, which assurance was final and irrevocable. The OSG also argues that B.P. 22
does not distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that is not, for as long as the
drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient funds and the check is dishonored
upon presentment. The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps
Dodges notarial foreclosure of Lincoln Gerards properties could not bar prosecution under B.P.
22, since damage or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made
only after the violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day
period, from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22

Held:
The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage those who
seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school
that imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be aimed at actual and potential
wrongdoers. Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the
checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid
reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a
notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards
property for cash amounting to P1,120,540 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said
property was already in Phelps Dodges custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was
moving into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said
rentals was only P301,953.12. Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale,
Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totaling P215,442.65. In fact,
it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This
was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two
counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps
Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the
payment thereof as involuntary. That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was
already collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two
criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge
was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. The
court cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioners conviction and sentence could be
upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in
our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its
chosen remedy.

The court agrees with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is
the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, they
should not apply penal laws mechanically. The court must find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When
the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law
also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization would not
serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find
that holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after
said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
 Adjudication:

The petition was granted.

30. Ginsberg v. New York,

390 U.S. 629
(1968)

FACTS:

Appellant and his wife operate Sams Stationery and Luncheonette in Bellmore, Long Island. They
have lunch counter and also sell magazine which includes some so-called girlie magazines. The
appellant was prosecuted under two informations, each in two counts, charged that he personally sold a
16-year-old boy two girlie magazines on each of two dates in October, 1965, in violation of 484-h of the
New York Penal Law. He was tried before a judge without a jury and was found guilty on both counts.
The judge found out that the magazines contained pictures which depicted female nudity and that the
pictures were harmful to minors using the definition used in 484-h.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSSED/APPELANT:

The broad proposition that the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to
read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend upon whether the citizen is an adult
or a minor. He accordingly insists that the denial to minors under 17 of the materials condemned by 484-
h, insofar as that material is not obscene for 17 years of age or older, constitutes an unconstitutional
deprivation of protected liberty.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. While the parents
have the primary responsibility for the childrens wellbeing the legislature or the state also has the power
to provide laws that will aid in performing those responsibilities.

Issues:

Whether or not the prohibition of sale of the girlie magazine to minors violates the right of parents in
rearing their children for civic efficiency.

Ruling:

New York Penal Law 484-h Exposing minors to harmful materials does not violate the primacy of the
right of parents in rearing their child rather it is an expression of the States interest to protect the
welfare of the children and that exposure to the material condemned by the 484-h is harmful to minors.

31. ROBERT T. MEYER vs. STATE OF NEBRASKA

Facts:
 On April 9, 1919, Nebraska enacted a statute called an act relating to the teaching of foreign
languages in the state of Nebraska, also known as the Siman Act. It imposed restrictions on both the
use of a foreign language as a medium of instruction and on foreign languages as a subject of study.
The Act specifically prohibited teaching foreign languages to any pupil who had not yet attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade.

On May 25, 1920, Robert T. Meyer while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, taught the subject of
reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, a fourth grader who had not
attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The Hamilton County Attorney entered the
classroom and discovered Parpart reading from the Bible in German. He charged Meyer with violating
the Siman Act.

Contention of the Petitioner:

The vocation of the plaintiff is teaching-a legitimate vocation-and in teaching, as he did, a certain
subject in a language other than English, he encroached upon the rights of no other person. Imparting
knowledge in a foreign language is not inherently immoral or inimical to the public welfare, and not a
legitimate subject for prohibitory legislation.

The relation to the common good of a law fixing a minimum of education is readily perceived, but
how one fixing a maximum limiting the field of human knowledge can serve the public welfare or
add substantially to the security of life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness is inconceivable.

Contention of the Respondent:

The statute forbids the teaching of foreign languages to children of tender years before such
children are grounded in the English tongue. It does not forbid the use of foreign languages by persons
of maturity or prevent the study of foreign languages by persons who have passed the eighth grade.

The object of the legislation was to create an enlightened Page 394 American citizenship in
sympathy with the principles and ideals of this country, and to prevent children reared in America from
being trained and educated in foreign languages and foreign ideals before they have had an opportunity
to learn the English language and observe American ideals. It is a well known fact that the language first
learned by a child remains his mother tongue and the language of his heart. The purpose of the statute
is to insure that the English language shall be the mother tongue and the language of the heart of the
children reared in this country who will eventually become the citizens of this country.

Issue:

Whether or not the government can prohibit children from being taught foreign languages in
private schools.

Ruling:

No. The State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well
as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
31. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters
268 US 510
(1925)

Facts:
The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or gardians to send children between
the ages of eight and sixteen to public.
Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools
and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants
from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send
children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.

Issue:
Whether or not Compulsory Education Act of 1922 violates the liberty of parents to direct the
education of their children.

Held:
The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with the protected liberty interest and
has no reasonabe relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the
appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the
right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is unconstitutional since it
interferes with the right of parents in rearing their children. They have the right to choose which school is
best suited for the development of their children without interference from the State.
33. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (PACU), etc. vs. SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS
97 Phil 806
October 31, 1955

Facts:

Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." The petitioning colleges and
universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be
declared unconstitutional because they deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and
parents of liberty and property without due process of law; and they deprive parents of their natural
rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency.

Issue:

Is Act No. 2706, as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 unconstitutional?

Held:

No. Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of
law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which
provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the
Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners
has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating
by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has
threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand, naturally
need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education
might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive
relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein,
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues "reach
constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of
constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.

Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of
Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by
Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936 because in March 1924 the Philippine Legislature
approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education
in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. It was said that there
was no law or regulation in the Philippines to prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance,
greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teach the young. In view of these findings
and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government in the exercise of its police power to
correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous permit" system objected to by petitioners? This
is what differentiates our law from the other statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any
doubt still exists, recourse may now be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The
power to regulate establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or
license.

ADJUDICATION: Petition for prohibition was denied.

34. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO

109 SCRA 1
November 5, 1981

FACTS:
Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the
City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service
Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such
appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular
No. 18 series of 1964.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

Villegas pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence
the same is no longer in effect.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

Subido pointed out that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and
placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of
the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service
Commissioner.

RULING:
Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on
his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal
predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside
their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to
point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.

Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government
itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers
therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there
is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either
express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high
dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the
rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid