G.R. No.

179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence
their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for
land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanans period of possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that
the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable
by the State.

The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different

classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.15This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18 lands of the
public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. 19 Section 10, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department. 22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of
the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however, public land
will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land
is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession

and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent
be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should
best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law
as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is derived only
from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of
the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in
order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer

intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth. 1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the
trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire
real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel,
both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale
took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who
were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain;
 8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the
Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18,
1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant
was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,
have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and
this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was
accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their
special session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had
gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible
error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court
which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before
this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and
through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more
than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in
Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension
that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership
of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV
already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against
private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000
hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously
does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et
al, where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
1

corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947
two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and,
before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the
Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public
land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to
apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or
natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed,
and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of
the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still
public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration
under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be
dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between
(on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an
occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may
be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the
land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 thru Susi in 1925 down to Herico in 1980, which developed, affirmed and
2 3 4

reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land
and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the
correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. It was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
5

possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in
view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language,
in Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So
that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it
is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director
of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, Miguel vs. Court of
7 8 9

Appeals and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it
10

in jurisprudence.

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court
held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-
interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

 As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the possessor(s) "... shall be
13

conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm
such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the
1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right
to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the
vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only
limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands
in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate
transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales
14

application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to
the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

 The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the
right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established
and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had
the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to
obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due
process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919). <re||an1w>
15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must
be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience
to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule,
as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and
on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at
the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title
under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its
answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect
in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result
of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not
be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications
in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
 The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and
who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title
to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by
a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent
in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner
therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to
public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may,
in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional
question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134308 December 14, 2000

SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA,

RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO
MENGUITO, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such land has been classified as
alienable, title thereto can be registered only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse,
notorious and open possession in the concept of owner for a period of thirty years.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 30,
1997 Decision and the June 23, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
1 2

39638. The decretal portion of said Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
appellees application for registration is hereby DISMISSED." 3

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157), which was reversed by
4

the appellate court, granted petitioners application for registration in this wise:
5

"WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case
is affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants to the
land described in their application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its technical descriptions, situated
in the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and containing an aggregate area of
2,112 square meters; and individual and separate certificates of titles to the lots comprising the said
land are hereby ordered registered in the names of the applicants, as follows:

1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of Susana Menguito, of legal
age, widow, Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pater[o]s,
Metro Manila;

2. For Lot 6045-E -- in the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene Toledo,
Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

3. For Lot 6045-F -- in the name of Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single,
with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

4. For Lot 6045-G -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single,
with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

5. For Lot 6045-H -- in the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
single, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

6. For Lot 6046-I -- in the name of Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Zenaida Carag, with residence and postal address at T.Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

7. For Lot 6045-J -- in the name of Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Luciano Manalili, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
and

8. For Lot 6045-K -- in the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married
to Luciano Manalili; and Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida
Carag, all with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land Registration
Authority for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in
favor of the applicants pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.

SO ORDERED."

The Facts
The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

"On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for
Registration of Title was filed by the following successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo
Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito, namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-
MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO,
FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said court as LRC Case No.
N-10938, the application reads:

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE

The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529
and to have their title thereto registered and confirmed,

AND DECLARE:

1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in
the Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are bounded and described
as shown on plan Swo-13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-
F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-I, 6045-J and 6045-K) and corresponding technical descriptions, x
x x;

2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year at P5,910.00 as
per Tax Declaration No. B-11-01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;

3. That to the best of applicants knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance
of any kind whatsoever affecting the said land nor any other persons having any estate or
interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;

4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;

5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of
owners, of said parcels of land for more than thirty years;

6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the owners of all
adjoining properties are as follows:

a) Pilar Menguito
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

b) Andres Filemon
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

c) Beatriz Dumagat
Pateros-Taguig Road
 Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

d) Maura Cabanatan
Pateros-Taguig Road
Ususan, Taguig
Metro Manila

e) Pateros-Taguig Road
c/o The District Engineer
Pasig, Metro Manila

7. That the applicants full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address, are as
follows:

SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to Luciano Manalili; HELEN

MARTA M. LUNA, married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO, married to Irene
Toledo; BERSAMIN MENGUITO, married to Elvira Salvacion; FROILAN MENGUITO,
married to Zenaida Carag; and GENEROSO MENGUITO, single; all of legal age, Filipinos,
and with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case, the
applicants hereby apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended;

9. That the following documents are attached hereto and made part hereof:

(a) Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227

(b) Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227

(c) Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:

Lot 6045-A

Lot 6045-B

Lot 6045-C

Lot 6045-D

Lot 6045-E

Lot 6045-F

Lot 6045-G

Lot 6045-H

Lot 6045-I
 Lot 6045-J

Lot 6045-K

(d) Three (3) copies of Engineers Certificate

(e) Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351

xxx xxx xxx

(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).

"Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a Notice of Initial Hearing addressed to:
the Solicitor General, the Director of the Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department
of Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of the adjacent properties as mentioned in the
application, informing them that the application is scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The
addressees were then ordered to present such claims as you may have to said lands or any portion
thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such claims and unless you appear at said court at the
time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded and the title to the lands will be adjudicated
and determined in accordance with law and the evidence before the Court, and thereafter, you will
forever be barred from contesting said application or any decree entered thereon (Exhibit A).

"Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid
(Exhs. C, C-1, C-1-A).

"Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed its
Opposition to the application for registration contending:

1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached to or
alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the lands applied for or his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior
thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be genuine and indicate the pretended
possession of applicant to be of recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was
filed on July 31, 1990.

4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).
"The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and for the
declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines.

"At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared
and registered a verbal opposition to the application. On motion of counsel for the applicants, the
court issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors
Republic of the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but
never did. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

"On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their Formal Offer of Evidence, submitting therewith the
following documentary exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. F); (2) technical descriptions of Lot
Nos. 6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive (Exhs. F to F-10, inclusive); (3) Engineers Certificate (Exh. G);
(4) Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the applicants dated December 12, 1985
(Exh. H); (5) description of the land and the apportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs.H-1
and H-2, respectively); (6) Tax Declarations (Exhs. I, J, K, L, M, N and O) (7) Tax Receipts
(Exhs. O, O-1, P. P-1, Q and R); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloobdated May 7, 1969 executed
by Cirilo Menguito in favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh. S); and (9) Deed of Partition dated November
7, 1990 executed by the applicants (Exh. T).

"On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants
formal offer of evidence. The said manifestation reads:

It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits A, B, C, D, relative to jurisdictional

requirements. It has no objection to Exhibits E, F, F-1, to F-10 relating to the plan and the
technical description of the lots being applied for and Exhibit G which is the Engineers certificate.

It objects to Exhibits H, H-1 to H-2 the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12,
1985 for being self serving. It objects to Exhibits I, J, K, L, M and N for being incompetent and
insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest.
In fact the said tax declarations do not date back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits O,
P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12,
1945. It objects to Exhibits O, P, Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove
possession since June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibit S as being self-serving being a mere
photocopy of the alleged Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by Cirilo Menguito
the same cannot be accepted in evidence, applicants not having first laid the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence. It objects to the first page of Exhibit T, being self-serving and a
mere photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of said exhibit, where the supposed acknowledgment of the
instrument appears, refers to different parcels of land other than those being applied for.

WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their title to the lands applied for,
it is respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be
declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no need for it to submit
evidence in support of its opposition. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).

"On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case
is affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants x x x
"On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a
reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the
applicants.

"On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit."
6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to consider the legal
requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is alienable and disposable; and
(2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in
question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this Petition. 7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:

"Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court." 8

In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners application for the
registration of their respective titles.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue: Registration of Petitioners Titles

Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, as amended, provides for the registration of
9

imperfect titles to lands of the public domain in this wise:

"SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter."
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073 clarified paragraph "b" of the said provision by specifically
10

declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. 11

Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal
requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since June 12, 1945.

The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.

Classification of the Land

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public
12

land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
13

incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to
14

be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a
positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable.

Period of Possession

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is alienable, their
Petition for confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be
denied. The reason is that they have failed to establish possession of the lots in question -- openly,
continuously, exclusively and adversely -- in the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June
12, 1945.

Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question, which had
allegedly belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro died in
1978, these lots allegedly passed down to petitioners.
Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would
tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the
Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim.

Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974. Their 15

predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years
before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943. However, they did
16

not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General
statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and
cannot suffice.17

Cirilos six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during the hearing of their
application for registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the six children, only Pilar Menguito was
personally informed of petitioners application. Still, she was not presented as a witness. 1wphi1

There can be no question that Cirilos children were the best witnesses, because they could have
substantiated petitioners claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito.
Moreover, they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support their
supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo
Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilos
children nor the documents that they might have had in their possession were presented. 1wphi1

Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners claim that their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land. Because
they are of recent vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. "I" to "N"), tax receipts (Exhs. "O". "O1", "P",
and "P-1") and the Municipal Treasurers certifications of tax payments (Exhs. "Q" and "R")
presented in evidence are incompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners and their predecessors-
in-interests possession of the lots in question.

Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary to each other, we
waded into the records, but found no reason to modify the assailed CA Decision. Much as we want
18

to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public
lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by
the laws stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA
that petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with the legal requirements for
registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186961

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
 EAST SILVERLANE REALTY PEREZ,
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SERENO, and
Respondent. REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 20, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31, 2008 Decision [1] and
February 20, 2009 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
00143. In its July 31, 2008 Decision, the CA affirmed the August 27, 2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 of Cagayan De Oro City.
The dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated
August 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[3]

In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners August 29, 2008
Motion for Reconsideration.[4]

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration, covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador,
Misamis Oriental and with an area of 9,794 square meters. The respondent
purchased the portion of the subject property consisting of 4,708 square meters
(Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
27, 1990 and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B)
from Rosario U. Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of
Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed
that the respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945.

After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a
Decision, granting the respondents petition for registration of the land in question,
thus:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and

pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, particularly
the provisions of P.D. 1529, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
instant application. The Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered to
issue a decree in the name of the applicant EAST SILVERLANE
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION covering the parcel of
land, Lot 9039, Cad 237, having an area of 9,794 square meters covered
by the two (2) tax declarations subject of this petition. Based on the
decree, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental is
hereby directed to issue an original certificate of title in the name of the
applicant covering the land subject matter of this application. [5]

On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTCs August 27, 2004 Decision.
In its July 31, 2008 Decision,[6] the CA found no merit in the petitioners appeal,
holding that:

It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must

conform to three requisites: (1) the land is alienable public land; (2) the
applicants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is
a bona fide claim of ownership.

In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements.

Anent the first requirement, both the report and certification issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shows
that the subject land was within the alienable and disposable zone
classified under BF Project [N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map [N]o. 585 and was
released and certified as such on December 31, 1925.
Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a positive
government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in
question. It is a settled rule that the classification or re-classification of
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is now a
prerogative of the Executive Department of the government.
Accordingly, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence. As it is, the said certification remains
uncontested and even oppositor-appellant Republic itself did not present
any evidence to refute the contents of the said certification. Thus, the
alienable and disposable character of the subject land certified as such as
early as December 31, 1925 has been clearly established by the evidence
of the petitioner-appellee.

Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant is required

to prove his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

xxxx

In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and occupation

over the subject land to that of its predecessors-in-interest. Copies of the
tax declarations and real property historical ownership pertaining thereto
were presented in court. A perusal of the records shows that in 1948, a
portion of the subject land was declared under the name of Agapito
Claudel. Subsequently, in 1957 until 1991 the same was declared under
the name of Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the same was declared under the
name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial
Assessor of Misamis Oriental that previous tax declarations pertaining to
the said portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no longer be
located as the files were deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.

On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was
previously declared in 1948 under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho.
Subsequently, in 1969 until 1990, the same was declared under the name
of Jacinto Tan. Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of
ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor
that the files of previous tax declarations under the name of Jacinto Tan
Lay Cho were deemed lost or destroyed again before World War II.
 In 1991 or upon ESRDCs acquisition of the subject property, the
latter took possession thereto. Albeit it has presently leased the said land
to Asia Brewery, Inc., where the latter built its brewery plant,
nonetheless, ESRDC has its branch office located at the plant compound
of Asia Brewery, Inc.

Corollarily, oppositor-appellants contentions that the court a

quo erred in considering the tax declarations as evidence of ESRDCs
possession of the subject land as the latters predecessors-in-interest
declared the same sporadically, is untenable.

It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax

payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title
to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all
other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by

petitioner-appellee are incontrovertible. Not one, not even oppositor-
appellant Republic, presented any countervailing evidence to contradict
the claims of the petitioners that they are in possession of the subject
property and their possession of the same is open, continuous and
exclusive in the concept of an owner for over 30 years.

Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for taxation
purposes until ESRDC filed an application for land registration in 1995,
ESRDC have been in possession over the subject land in the concept of
an owner tacking its possession to that its predecessors-in-interest for
forty seven (47) years already. Thus, ESRDC was able to prove
sufficiently that it has been in possession of the subject property for
more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious in the concept of an owner.
[7]
(citations omitted)
 The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the respondent failed to
prove that its predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property in the manner
and for the length of time required under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act (PLA), and Section 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree (P.D. No. 1529). According to the petitioner, the respondent did not present
a credible and competent witness to testify on the specific acts of ownership
performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the subject property. The respondents
sole witness, Vicente Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and competent
witness as he is the respondents liaison officer and he is not related in any way to
the respondents predecessors-in-interest. That coconut trees were planted on the
subject property only shows casual or occasional cultivation and does not qualify
as possession under a claim of ownership.

Issue

This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether the respondent has
proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this petition from the
standpoint of Rule 45, this Court agrees with the respondent that the issue of
whether the respondent had presented sufficient proof of the required possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership raises a question of fact, considering that it
invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record.[8] However, that a petition for
review should be confined to questions of law and that this Court is not a trier of
facts and bound by the factual findings of the CA are not without exceptions.
Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case, are: (a) when the judgment of
the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not
sustained by the evidence on record.
This Courts review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence submitted
by the respondent fell short of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over
the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The respondent cannot
register the subject property in its name on the basis of either Section 14 (1) or
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the required quantum of
evidence that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for the
prescribed statutory period.

The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
Under Section 11 thereof, one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes is by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. [9] On the
other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified possessor of an alienable
and disposable public land. Thus:

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to

the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other
form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings
in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part,
or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or
grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
 conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January 25,
1977, deleted subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c),

Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense
that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945.

Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and occupation for a
period of ten (10) years prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or
on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in the PLA until it was amended by Republic
Act No. 1942 on June 22, 1957, which provided for a period of thirty (30) years. It
was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977 that it was
required that possession and occupation should commence on June 12, 1945.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws
relative to the registration of property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
 (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by

prescription under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or

abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other

manner provided for by law.

Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers
alienable and disposable land while Section 14 (2) covers private property. As this
Court categorically stated in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,
[10]
the distinction between the two provisions lies with the inapplicability of
prescription to alienable and disposable lands. Specifically:

At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire
regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14 (1).[11]

Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned. [12] Under Article
420 of the Civil Code, the following properties are of public dominion:

(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,

rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth.
 All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in
Article 420 is patrimonial property,[13] hence, susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.[14]

In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of

an alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil
Code do not automatically convert said property into private property or release it
from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is
no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without
such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of

public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted
into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After
all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
(emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State

that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
 Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
[15]

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up
acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the
property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession
preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in
determining the completion of the prescriptive period.

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject

property on or prior to June 12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive period of
thirty (30) years, the respondent submitted the following tax declarations:

a) Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita Claudel for the

year 1948;

b) Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca Oco for the

years 1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and 1991;

c) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years

1991, 1992 and 1994;

d) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho for

the years 1948 and 1952;

e) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan for the

years 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990; and

f) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years

1991, 1992 and 1994.

Pursuant to Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration, there were nineteen (19)
coconut and ten (10) banana trees planted on Area A. The coconut trees were
supposedly four years old, hence, the reasonable presumption that she had been in
possession even before June 12, 1945.[16]
 The respondent also offered the following testimony of Vicente Oco:

Q Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your predecessor

has started to possess this land subject matter of this application?

A Per my personal knowledge, it was before the second world war

but the Municipality of El Salvador was created on June 15, 1948 by
virtue of RA 268 and its started to officially function only on August 2,
1948[.]

Q From whom did you acquire this information?

A From the seller and the adjoining lot owners. [17]

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the

subject property, the respondent claimed that per Francisca Ocos Tax Declarations,
the following improvements were introduced in Area A: nineteen (19) coconut and
ten (10) banana trees in Area A in 1957 and 1963; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in
1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree and three (3)
seguidillas vines in 1974; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87)
coconut trees in 1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees in 1989. Per Jacinto Tans Tax
Declarations, there were fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area B in 1973, 1974,
1980, 1989 and 1990.[18]

A reading of the CAs July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it affirmed the grant
of the respondents application given its supposed compliance with Section 14 (2)
of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled that based on the evidence submitted, the respondent is
not qualified to register the subject property in its name under Section 14 (1) as the
possession and occupation of its predecessors-in-interest commenced after June 12,
1945. Nonetheless, as the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the subject
property by prescription as its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject
property for more than thirty (30) years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of the
Philippines,[19] the CA held that even if possession commenced after June 12, 1945,
registration is still possible under Section 14 (2) and possession in the concept of
an owner effectively converts an alienable and disposable public land into private
property.

This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On

the premise that the application for registration, which was filed in 1995, is based
on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the subject property in the manner prescribed by
law and for the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may apply.

While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on
December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),[20] the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted the same from agricultural to
industrial only on October 16, 1990.[21] Also, it was only in 2000 that
the Municipality of El Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject
property in the industrial zone.[22] Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject
property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive
period began to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession of
its predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property
from the public domain, it may not be acquired by prescription.

On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on

Section 14 (1), the same would likewise not prosper. As shown by the tax
declarations of the respondents predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that the
respondent can trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-interest is in 1948.
That there were four-year old coconut trees in Area A as stated in Agapita Claudels
1948 Tax Declaration cannot be considered a well-nigh controvertible evidence
that she was in possession prior to June 12, 1945 without any evidence that she
planted and cultivated them. In the case of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho, the earliest tax
declaration in his name is dated 1948 and there is no evidence that he occupied and
possessed Area B on or prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the
respondents lone witness that the respondents predecessors-in-interest were already
in possession of the subject property as of June 12, 1945 lacks probative value for
being hearsay.
 It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation
required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable public land
must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious in character. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba,[23] this Court explained that the intent
behind the use of possession in conjunction with occupation is to
emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words

are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
[24]
(citations omitted)

On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of

possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of
the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for
purposes of prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. In Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon,[25] this Court
expounded on the nature of possession required for purposes of prescription:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions

laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of
an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is
open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It
is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally
known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession
 must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.[26] (citations omitted)

This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to prove
compliance with the possession required either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14
(2).

First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and the eleven (11)
Tax Declarations covering Area B for a claimed possession of more than forty-six
(46) years (1948-1994) do not qualify as competent evidence of actual possession
and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee v. Republic of the Philippines:[27]

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for
the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession
and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type of
intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not
prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence,
tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or
declarants right to registration of title. [28] (emphasis supplied and citation
omitted)

The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner, by

which the respondent describes its possession and that of its predecessors-in-
interest is a conclusion of law. The burden of proof is on the respondent to prove
by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of its
predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration required by law. [29] It is
therefore inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present evidence that would
controvert the allegations of the respondent. A person who seeks the registration of
title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-
in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., he must
prove his
title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of the
oppositors.[30]
 The respondents claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax
declarations alone. In Cequea v. Bolante,[31] this Court ruled that it is only when
these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property
that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership. [32] In the absence of actual
public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership.[33]

Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly found on Area A
were four years old at the time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in 1948
will not suffice as evidence that her possession commenced prior to June 12, 1945,
in the absence of evidence that she planted and cultivated them. Alternatively,
assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and maintained these trees, such can only
be considered casual cultivation considering the size of Area A. On the other hand,
that Jacinto Tan Lay Cho possessed Area B in the concept of an owner on or prior
to June 12, 1945 cannot be assumed from his 1948 Tax Declaration.

Third, that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it
was the respondents predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that actual
cultivation or harvesting was made does not constitute well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence of actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee:

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence

of an unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who
planted them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting
was made or what other acts of occupation and ownership were
undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate petitioners right to the
registration of title in her favor.[34]

Fourth, Vicente Ocos testimony deserves scant consideration and will not
supplement the inherent inadequacy of the tax declarations. Apart from being self-
serving, it is undoubtedly hearsay. Vicente Oco lacks
personal knowledge as to when the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent
started to occupy the subject property and admitted that his testimony was based on
what he allegedly gathered from the respondents predecessors-in-interest and the
owners of adjoining lot. Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific
acts of dominion or ownership were performed by the respondents predecessors-in-
interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that they came into
possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not factual
proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice.[35] Evidence of
this nature should have been received with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous
and unreliable.

Finally, that the respondents application was filed after only four years from
the time the subject property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the
DARs October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of possession whether for ordinary or
extraordinary prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in Heirs of
Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in Republic of the Philippines v.
Rizalvo:[36]

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application

for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the
subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer
intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. [37]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.

The July 31, 2008 Decision and February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the respondents application for registration of title over Lot 9039
of Cagayan Cadastre is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.