LEGAYADA V SULLANO
and open possession of subject property.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY V MUOZ
FACTS: Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a company
engaged in logging. It was given a Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so that it can
operate in a 72,000 hectare land. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in 1894
under the Spanish regime.
In 1964, the NAWASA (National Water and Sewerage Authority) director ordered the
cancellation of Piadecos certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the
certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was
prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with
Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of
Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never
been used to apply for a Certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.
HELD: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There
should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of
law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code,
empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue
regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the
public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other
forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest
reserves, to the same end. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the
Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is
no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of
the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the
promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, [a]ll
that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the
law prescribes.
ANTONIO V BARROGA
REPUBLIC V INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT
NGA V INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT
FACTS: On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, owners of a
parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, sold for P30,000.00 said property
in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit (private
respondents)
It is evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli" with right to repurchase, recorded in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act No. 3344.
A balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued.
From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful, adverse
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in
question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the
knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage the property
with the petitioner, National Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea Ramirez.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the property
in question, scheduling the public auction sale and petitioner was the highest and successful
bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor
The private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been issued
covering the property in question and that the same property had been mortgaged in favor of
the petitioner.
Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of
P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of the
absolute deed of sale.
Petitioner refused to accept the payment.
On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents made a formal demand on the spouses Vivas
and Lizardo the offer to pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute deed of sale.
However, petitioner in its reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is now
the owner of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject property were
asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused.
Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of
Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First Instance
of Laguna but the declared petitioner the lawful owner of the property by virtue of its
indefeasible title to the same.
The private respondents interposed an appeal.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the lower courts decision.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied.
ISSUE: whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by
petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.
HELD: Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the
Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although unregistered under
the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership and the possession of the
property in question.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may
be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said provision, claims and liens of whatever
character, except those mentioned by law as existing, against the land prior to the issuance of
certificate of title, are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so
issued binds the whole world, including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns &
Co., 30 Phil. 209 [1915]; Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said
ruling, if the purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles
in the property registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed by law to be the owner
of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to that
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Umbay vs.
Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions provided
for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner herein.
The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question
as to its legality.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging
to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is then considered as
guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the defrauded owner so long
as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
ANG LAM V ROSILLOSA
CACHO V CA
FACTS: Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lanao,
Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of the Military Reservation No. 43 known
as Camp Overton.
The application was tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge and he granted the petitioner
(Cacho) the entitlement to the two (2) parcels of land. On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, the
sole heir of the deceased Demetria Cacho filed for a petition for the reconstitution of the two
(2) original certificates of title under RA 26.
The petition was opposed to by the Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation and
the City of Iligan on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine that states that all lands of whatever
classification belong to the State. The matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA), the
CA denied the petition for reconstitution of title and ordered that the decree of registration
be reopened. Thus, the instant petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in its decision to reopen the
decrees issued by the Judge Jesse Jorge.
HELD: A land registration proceeding is in rem. The decree of registration is binding upon
and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches, irrespective of
whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application, because all
persons are considered as notified by the publication required by law. A decree of registration
that has become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested
and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceedings. It is no doubt that the decrees of registration had been issued and
such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. The decision of
the CA to reopen the decrees previously issued runs counter to the very purpose of the Torrens
System.
It also constitutes a derogation of the Doctrine of Res Judicata. The decrees are res judicata
and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of
proceedings in rem. Such a requirement is impermissible assault upon the integrity and
stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.
REPUBLIC V UMALI
FACTS: Mauricia Castillo was the administratrix in charge over a parcel of land left be Felipe
Castillo. Said land was mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines and was about
to be foreclosed but then Mauricias nephew, Santiago Rivera, proposed that they convert the
land into 4 subdivisions so that they can raise the necessary money to avoid foreclosure.
Mauricia agreed. Rivera sought to develop said land through his company, Slobec Realty
Corporation (SRC), of which he was also the president. SRC then contracted with Bormaheco,
Inc. for the purchase of one tractor. Bormaheco agreed to sell the tractor on an installment
basis. At the same time, SRC mortgaged said tractor to Bormaheco as security just in case SRC
will default. As additional security, Mauricia and other family members executed a surety
agreement whereby in case of default in paying said tractor, the Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines (ICP) shall pay the balance. The surety bond agreement between Mauricia and ICP
was secured by Mauricias parcel of land (same land to be developed).
SRC defaulted in paying said tractor. Bormaheco foreclosed the tractor but it wasnt enough
hence ICP paid the deficiency. ICP then foreclosed the property of Mauricia. ICP later sold said
property to Philippine Machinery Parts Manufacturing Corporation (PMPMC). PMPMC then
demanded Mauricia et al to vacate the premises of said property.
While all this was going on, Mauricia died. Her successor-administratrix, Buenaflor Umali,
questioned the foreclosure made by ICP. Umali alleged that all the transactions are void and
simulated hence they were defrauded; that through Bormahecos machinations, Mauricia was
fooled into entering into a surety agreement with ICP; that Bormaheco even made the
premium payments to ICP for said surety bond; that the president of Bormaheco is a director
of PMPMC; that the counsel who assisted in all the transactions, Atty. Martin De Guzman, was
the legal counsel of ICP, Bormaheco, and PMPMC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced.
HELD: No. There is no clear showing of fraud in this case. The mere fact that Bormaheco paid
said premium payments to ICP does not constitute fraud per se. As it turned out, Bormaheco
is an agent of ICP. SRC, through Rivera, agreed that part of the payment of the mortgage shall
be paid for the insurance. Naturally, when Rivera was paying some portions of the mortgage
to Bormaheco, Bormaheco is applying some parts thereof for the payment of the premium
and this was agreed upon beforehand.
Further, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is not the proper remedy in order that the
foreclosure conducted by ICP be declared a nullity. The nullity may be attacked directly without
disregarding the separate identity of the corporations involved. Further still, Umali et al are
not enforcing a claim against the individual members of the corporations. They are not
claiming said members to be liable. Umali et al are merely questioning the validity of the
foreclosure.
The veil of corporate fiction cant be pierced also by the simple reason that the businesses of
two or more corporations are interrelated, absent sufficient showing that the corporate entity
was purposely used as a shield to defraud creditors and third persons of their rights. In this
case, there is no justification for disregarding their separate personalities.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V CA 102 SCRA 370

BENIN V TUASON
Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the three parcels of
agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint, located in the barrio of La Loma
(now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, that they
inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same
from his father, Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed
these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the same and
exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom; that Eugenio Benin, plaintiff's grandfather,
had said parcels of land surveyed on March 4 and 6, 1894, that during the cadastral survey by
the Bureau of Lands of the lands in Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs
claim the ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for taxation
purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after the outbreak of the last World
War, or sometime in 1942 and subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other
places, after having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon
and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. was actually
served with summons. The other defendants were ordered summoned by publication in
accordance with Sections 16 and 17 of the Rules of Court. Only defendant J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. appeared. The other defendants were all declared in default.
HELD: It will be noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of
the three parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in
interest of Sixto Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim
of ownership over the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs
and successors in interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the
plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint
on their being the heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931. It will be
noted that in Civil Case No. 3621 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership of the three
parcels of land described in the complaint on their being heirs or successors in interest of Sixto
Benin who died in 1936. In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs base their claim of ownership over
the two parcels of land described in their complaint on their being the heirs and successors in
interest of Bonoso Alcantara who died in 1934. In Civil Case No. 3623 the plaintiffs base their
claim of ownership of the one parcel of land described in their complaint on their being the
heirs and successors in interest of Candido Pili who died in 1931.
Therefore, that the decision of this Court, which affirmed the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing the complaint of Jose Alcantara, Elias Benin and Pascual Pili (along
with four other plaintiffs) should apply not only against the heirs, of Elias Benin, against Jose
Alcantara, and against Pascual Pili, as plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623,
respectively, but also against all the other plaintiffs in those cases. We find that the plaintiffs
do not claim a right which is different from that claimed by Elias Benin. Likewise, the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3622 do not claim a right different from that claimed by Jose Alcantara in Civil
Case No Q-156. And, also, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3623 do not claim a right different
from that claimed by Pascual Pili.
The court sited the Santiago case which states that, (T)he mere fact that appellants herein
were not personally notified of the registration proceedings that resulted in a decree of
registration of title in favor of the Tuasons in 1914 does not constitute in itself a case of fraud
that would invalidate the decree. The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem, operate
as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the
ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such
proceedings but also against parties who were summoned by publication but did not appear.
The registration by the appellee's predecessors-in-interest freed the lands from claims and
liens of whatever character that existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the
certificates of title, except those noted in the certificate and legal encumbrances saved by law
(Yumol vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17 and cases cited therein). In addition, there being
no allegation that the registered owners procured the non-appearance of appellants at the
registration proceedings, and very much more than one year having elapsed from the issuance
of the decree of registration in 1914, neither revocation of such decree nor a decree of
reconveyance are obtainable any more.
The joint decision of the Court of First Instance, appealed from, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
ASSOCIATION OF BAPTIST FOR WORLD EVANGELISM, INC. V FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH
FACTS: On 30 September 1963, the parties entered into a agreement, denominated "Contract
of Purchase and Sale" wherein the petitioner agreed to sell to the respondent a parcel of land,
together with the building and improvement thereon, with an area of 735 Sq. meters, located
at the corner of Leon Guinto and Padre Faura Streets, Manila, and covered by TCT No. 62203
of the Register of Deeds of Manila, for the amount of P293,506.25, payable in three (3)
installments, as follows:
"1. The First Installment shall be paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR on or before
Sep-tember 30, 1963 amounting to P29,350.62,
"2. The Second Installment which shall be the sum of P66,038.90, shall be paid by
the VENDEE to the VENDOR on or before September 30, 1964.
"3. The last and final installment which shall be the sum of P198,116.72, less the
P25,-000.00 deduction allowed by the VENDOR, shall be paid by the VENDEE to the
VENDOR on or before September 30, 1965."
The parties further agreed that:
"All the foregoing payments shall be made by the VENDEE to the VENDOR'S duly authorized
Resident Agent and attorney-in-fact in Manila, Philippines.
"It is hereby expressly understood and agreed that immediately upon the
execution of this document and thereafter for a period of five (5) consecutive years
so long as this agreement is in force and effect, the VENDEE shall have the right to
occupy and use the property for church purposes but for no other purpose
whatsoever.
"Should the VENDEE fail to pay any or all the installments when due, this
agreement shall automatically be considered as rescinded and without force and
effect and the VENDEE shall, without further demand from the VENDOR peacefully
return possession of the property to the VENDOR; provided, however, that any
installment which the VENDEE may have already paid to the VENDOR shall be
returned by the VENDOR to the VENDEE.
"Upon final and complete payment of the stipulated purchase price the VENDOR
shall immediately execute and deliver to the VENDEE a final and absolute Deed of
Sale of the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances."
The first instalment of the purchase price was duly paid and the respondent took of the
property. However, when the second instalment became due on September 30, 1964, ABWE,
upon the request of FBC, extended the period of its payment to 30 October 1964. For this
purpose, the parties executed a document entitled Supplement to the Contract of Purchase
and Sale of 30 September 1963 with the stipulation that all the provisions of the original
contract of purchase and sale of 30 September 1963 shall remain in full force and effect, except
as modified and supplemented.
 The respondent failed to pay the second instalment when it became due, neither did it
return the possession of the property to the petitioner. On 8 March 1965, the respondent
caused to be recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila a Notice of Adverse
Claim on the said property. Upon learning of the burden the petitioner, on 6 June 1965, filed
a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila for the cancellation of the said notice of
adverse claim, on the ground that when said notice of adverse claim was filed, the respondent
had already lost its right to or interest in the property, in view of the automatic rescission of
the contract caused by the respondent's failure to pay the second installment of the purchase
price on 30 October 1964, as agreed upon, so that the notice of adverse claim is invalid and
should be cancelled.
The lower court issued an order on 15 September 1965 directing the cancellation of the
notice of adverse claim on TCT No. 62203 on the grounds that the basis of said notice of
adverse claim was no longer in force and effect inasmuch as the same was automatically
rescinded upon the failure of the respondent to pay the second installment when it became
due, and for failure of the respondent to file the civil action, as required by the court
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order claiming, for the first time,
that the trial court had no jurisdiction in that, as a land registration court, it cannot pass upon
the issue of whether or not the contract of purchase and sale has been rescinded or rendered
without force and effect but the trial court denied said motion.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 25 May 1970, the appellate court
rendered judgment affirming the order of the lower court. This decision, however, was set
aside by the appellate court in its Resolution dated 17 August 1970 on the ground that the
lower court, sitting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction to resolve the issues
presented which should be litigated in a regular court. Accordingly, the respondent appellate
court ordered the dismissal of the petition to cancel notice of adverse claim, hence, the present
recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has
jurisdiction to cancel an adverse claim based on a contract to sell or promise to sell which can
no longer be enforced because of non-payment of the agreed purchase price.
HELD: The issue had been raised in view of the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals
that the court a quo, sitting as a land registration court, has limited jurisdiction and has no
authority to resolve controversial issues which should be litigated before a court of general
jurisdiction. However, this concept no longer holds. Under existing laws Sec. 2 of PD 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides, as follows:
"SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceed-ings: jurisdiction of courts. - Judicial
proceed-ings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem
and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens
system.
Regional Trial Courts now have exclusive jurisdiction, not only over applications for original
registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, but also over
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions.
Even under Act 496, the Land Registration Act, the court of first instance, sitting as a land
registration court, has the authority to conduct a hearing, receive evidence, and decide
controversial matters with a view to determine whether or not the filed notice of adverse claim
is valid. Section 110 of Act 496 provides:
"SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or inte-rest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the ori-ginal registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom
acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
"The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement
shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party
in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim
and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged
to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and
hearing shall find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse
claimant double or treble costs in its discretion."
At any rate, it appears that the disputed "Contract of Purchase and Sale" entered into by
and between the parties on 0 September 1963 had already been rescinded so that there is no
more basis for the continued annotation of the notice of adverse claim on the petitioner's TCT
No. 62203. Records show that the herein petitioner had filed an action against the respondent
for the rescission of said contract of purchase and sale on 1 August 1967 before the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case no. 70298, and after trial, the said
contract was ordered rescinded for reasons therein stated. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 42467-R, the judgment was affirmed. The respondent then
appealed to this Court, docketed as G.R. no. L-35008; again, its petition was denied on 15 May
1972, "for being factual (insufficient showing that the findings of fact are unsupported by
substantial evidence) and for lack of merit." The judgment became final and executory on 14
August 1972.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the respondent Court, dated 17 August 1970, is hereby set
aside. The notice of adverse claim annotated on petitioner's TCT No. 62203 by virtue of the
"Contract of Purchase and Sale" entered into by and between the parties on 30 September
1963 is hereby ordered cancelled. Without costs.
VDA DE ARCEO V CA
Facts: The spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of
unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan,
identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942
while Abdon passed away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941.
Esteban had five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia
Franco, with whom he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and
Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's
widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners.
It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of
donation inter vivos, in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since
1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof,
worked thereon, and claimed them as owner thereof 5It furthermore appears that on August
2, 1950, the spouses executed another deed of donation inter vivos, marked as exhibit "T"
disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose. 6On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos
supposedly signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked as exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J"
and giving away the properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose. It
seems however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had died.
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral court 7 an
application for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Pedro,
Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application.Pedro and Lorenzo specifically
contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them were entitled
to one-third thereof. 8The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the
properties according to the law on intestate succession. 9Virginia and her children shortly went
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the
appeal.
Issue: The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine
conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an existing title,
and that anyway, all the lots should have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the
parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive prescription.
The important question, so we find, is, based on existing facts, legal in character: Who has the
right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131?
Ruling: (In favor of petitioners)
As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.
The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held that under
Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496,
the former land registration law. 11 We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment
was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings
by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.'" 12 At
any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land registration
courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or
have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have
been given full opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered
the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a
decision upon such controversial issues. 13 It is not amiss to state likewise that where the
issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the
cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case,
where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the
parcels sought to be registered, in which case, registration would not be possible or would be
unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it.
With regard to the prescription alleged by herein petitioners,we also regret that one can not
agree with this proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels ' had come under the
category of a co-ownership, following the death of their grandparents, but in that case, it has
been held that in order for prescription to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has made known
to the rest of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the property; (3)
there is clear and convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious. 15
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the
lots by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does
not amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and
his use thereof can not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he
paid taxes thereon is not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not
necessarily confer title upon a claimant. 16 The fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to
extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they,
Virginia, et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we can not
validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of prescription.
We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been conferred to
Jose by a valid donation inter vivos.
Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that documents issued by respondents appear to have
been executed in compliance with legal requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. 17 It is
true that the cadastral court was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of Jose in
making Abdon sign the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature thereon
upon "the belief that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one Marciano Santos"
19) but as found by the Court of Appeals, It is a theory that "must be received with a 'grain of
salt', 20 because, for one thing, Jose is dead, and for another, the petitioners have adduced
evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine. We are bound by the factual finding of the Appellate
Court and as we averred, we are disposing of this question on pure questions of law.
As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just as controlling
on this Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the death of his wife on
September 16, 1942 and does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo." 21
We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that
a valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23 failure by the donee to comply with
charges imposed in the donation, 24 or by reason of ingratitude. 25 There is simply no proof
that Abdon when he executed exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.
We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the
force and effect" 26 of exhibit "J".
It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition in favor of Jose (whose rights were
transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to
distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or September)
27, 1941, exhibit "J", according to the terms and conditions set forth therein, and in the
proportions indicated thereby. No costs.
DOLFO V REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE
FRANCO V MONTE DE PIEDAD
On October 30, 1953, the spouses Jesus R. Franco and Natividad C. Torres, oppositors in this
case, obtained from the petitioner Monte de Piedad & Savings Bank, a loan in the amount of
P15,000.00 secured by four (4) parcels of land, three of which are located in San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 11918 and 19919 of the Land
records of Quezon City, and another parcel of land located at Cavite City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-3330 of the land records of Cavite City. From the date of the granting
of the mortgage loan, the oppositors-borrower did not pay one single amortization. In view of
this and after several demands, notice of foreclosure was given the mortgagors and published
in the newspapers. However, upon request of mortgagor Jesus R. Franco, it was agreed to
suspend the foreclosure proceedings and in view thereof, he offered to cede his mortgaged
properties in payment of the mortgage obligation, which at the time reached the amount of
P20,242.07.In the deed of assignment, the mortgagors were granted the right to redeem the
properties within one (1) year, from July 13, 1956. The period of redemption would have
expired on June 13, 1957, but before that time specifically on June 5, 1957, the mortgagor
Jesus R. Franco, redeemed the property situated at Cavite City upon payment of P10,000.00
for which a deed of partial redemption was executed. It was agreed, however, that the period
of redemption as regards the other property would in no way be affected. Upon request
of mortgagor Jesus Franco in writing on July 8, 1957 the mortgagors were granted an extension
of six (6) months from and after July 8, 1957 within which to exercise their right of redemption
with respect to the remaining parcels of land in Quezon City, said extension to expire on
January 13, 1958. On January 13, 1958 the mortgagor Jesus Franco again requested for a
further extension of one (1) month to redeem his properties, which was granted by the
petitioner on condition that such extension would be the last, the same to expire on February
13, 1958. Fifteen days thereafter or on February 28, 1959, mortgagor Franco again asked for
another extension of one month. Because from the very beginning his account has been
handled very unsatisfactorily, the petitioner denied his request for further extension.
In view of the repeated failures of the assignors (spouses Franco) to redeem the properties,
the Monte de Piedad finally petitioned the Court of Quezon City, in the G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3563
case, to declare the ownership of the assigned properties consolidated in it; to order the
cancellation of the titles in the name of the spouses; and the issuance of new certificates in
the name of Monte.
The spouses Franco opposed the petition on the ground that their deed of cession or
assignment was valid as a pactum commissorium; but the court overruled their objection, and
ordered their certificates cancelled and the issuance of new ones in the name of Monte de
Piedad.
Before the finality of decision, spouses Franco instituted the present case by a complaint
alleging substantially the loan, the mortgage, and the cession(assignment), with right to
repurchase; that it was the intention of the parties, at least the plaintiffs were made to
understand, that the said deed of assignment was only an extension or continuation of the
mortgage of the above-mentioned properties; that on 5 July 1957, the property at Caridad,
Cavite City, was redeemed by plaintiffs for P10,000, so the property was released by defendant
in their favor, thus reducing the indebtedness by P10,000.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs made attempt to pay the balance of the mortgage indebtedness,
and secure the release of the remaining mortgaged properties at San Francisco del Monte, but
defendant considered itself the owner of said properties, and would only consider selling the
properties not less than P20,000, although their indebtedness was reduced by payment of
P10,000; and that the properties in San Francisco del Monte are valued at approximately
P25,000, and its improvements, consisting of a two-story house of
strong materials, one kiosk, and one shed, is valued at approximately P35,000, or a total of
P60,000.
Plaintiffs prayed for judgment declaring the deed of assignment in fact not a deed of
assignment of properties with the right to repurchase, but an equitable mortgage, and that
the same be foreclosed in the manner provided by law, with costs, and further rrelief, just and
equitable.
On March 6, 1960, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the inconsistent
theories that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, the same cause of action having
been finally decided between the same parties in Land Registration Ten days later, plaintiffs
opposed this action on the ground that the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration
court, because of its limited jurisdiction, could not have passed upon the issues of the
present action for reformation; and that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action, the
facts alleged must be deemed admitted true, in view of the motion to dismiss.
The lower court dismissed the complaint in an order finding the presentaction to be one of the
declaratory relief and barred by res judicata.
Issue: WON the action is barred by the previous adjudication had in G.L.R.O
Held: The Supreme Court held that a prior decision is conclusive in a second suit between the
same parties, on the same subject-matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to
what was expressly adjudged in the first suit but also as to all matter and defenses that could
have been properly set up in the prior action. The identity of parties and subject tmatter in the
present litigation and in the G.L.R.O. case is not disputed; and there is also identity of causes
of action, since in both suits the issue is wheather the deed of assignment was in reality an
equitable mortgage merely, the Monte de Piedad would not have been entitled to have
certificates of title transferred to its name. Therefore could have been properly interposed in
the former case of consolidation of ownership; and not having been set up there, it is now
barred. Appellant Franco argue that they could not have raised the issue in the G.L.R.O. case,
because a Land Registration Court has no power to decide cases involving issues properly
litigable in ordinary civil actions. Such is the general rule; but because in this jurisdiction it is
the courts of first instance that also function as courts of land registration, our jurisprudence
recognizes exceptions to the rule, where the parties have acquiesced in submitting the issues
for determination in the registration proceedings, and they are given full opportunity to
present their respective sides and submit their evidence.
MANALO V MARIANO
HEIRS OF JACOB V CA
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the
deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In
support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge
Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo
in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-
46 (entitled Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro
sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted
son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between
appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction
with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
Issue/s: Whether the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid.
Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
Held: The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents adoption has
not been sufficiently established.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties
had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr.
Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
The second issue regarding adoption states that the burden of proof in establishing adoption
is upon the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover,
the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption
of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT.
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE V INTERMEDIATE APPEALATE COURT
FACTS: Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila are
covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles, one of which is TCT No. 20408 issued in the
name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657,
758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively. In 1977, Morris
Carpo filed a complaint for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408."
The complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609 from which it was derived,
is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, was not sitting as a land registration court, but as a
court of ordinary jurisdiction. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a
manifestation alleging that the case at bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-46953, Jose N.
Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc., et.
al. and moved for consolidation of the two cases involving as they do the same property. By
Resolution of August 29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for consolidation.
ISSUE: WON the case at hand and G.R. No. L-46953 should be consolidated?
RULING: NO, they should not be consolidated. The Supreme Court emphasized that
the action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title
to real property. By asserting its own title to the property in question and asking that Carpo's
title be declared null and void instead, and by filing the third-party complaint against QCDFC,
Realty was similarly asking the court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature
are governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title of the Civil Code and Rule 64, Declaratory
Relief and Similar Remedies of the Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suitsin rem, nor are they, strictly speaking,
in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's final determination of
G.R. No. L-46953 a case involving the validity of the compromise agreement between the
parties in this case
JM TUASON & CO., INC. V VIBAT
Facts: On January 7, 1959, a plenary action (publiciana) for ejectment and collection of rentals
was filed by plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against appellant t on the basis of
plaintiffs registered title to a parcel of land known as the Santa Mesa Heights Subdivision
situated at Quezon City. The complaint avers that on June 1950 the defendant, without
plaintiffs consent, through force unlawfully entered into the possession of a portion of 500
square meters within said parcel of land of the plaintiff situated at Bo. North Tatalon, Quezon
City, and constructed his house thereon.
As a consequence of the acts of usurpation committed by the defendant, the plaintiff suffered
damages at the rate of P150 monthly representing the fair rental value of its premises, and
prayed that defendant be adjudged to be without any valid right of possession and title in
plaintiffs premises and that defendant and all person claiming under him be ordered to vacate
the same and remove his house and other construction thereon, and to pay P150 a month
from the date of usurpation until restoration of possession, with costs.
Summons appears served on April 13, 1959 upon the defendant, through one Candido Calon.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, on May 16, 1959, declared defendant in default for failure
to file any responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and as a consequence, plaintiff
was allowed to present his evidence in support of the complaint. Thereafter, upon
presentation of plaintiffs evidence, finding the allegations of the complaint sufficiently
established, the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff.
On June 23,1959, defendant (now appellant) filed a petition for relief from his judgment of the
trial court, alleging that his failure to file a responsive pleading was due to no fault, or
negligence of his; that Candido Calon, the person who, according to the Sheriffs return,
received the copy of the summons and a copy of the complaint, was not, and never has been,
residing at 39 B.M.A. Avenue, Tatalon, Quezon City, herein defendants residence. At that time
Calon was only a visitor who happened to be in the yard of his residence when the Deputy
Sheriff persuaded him to receive said summons. Defendant contends that he and his family
were in Calamba, Laguna
On May 10, 1959, Calon delivered to him the copy of the summons with a copy of the
complaint. It was only on June 5, 1959 that he learned that he was declared in default; and
that he has good and valid defenses to the plaintiffs complaint it given a chance to be heard.
Plaintiff, opposing this pleading, alleged that defendants petition is not sufficient in form to
justify the issuance of an order requiring to answer because he relied only upon an alleged
purchase of the property in question from one E. Alquiros as his defense, whereas plaintiff is
indubitably the registered owner of the property in question of virtue of a Torrens title issued
in its name; that even assuming the truth of defendants allegation that he purchased the
property in question from E. Alquiros, such fact could not offset plaintiffs right to recover
possession of the property as it is the registered and indefeasible owner thereof, and that the
affidavits executed by defendant and Calon are purely self-serving, and should not be
countenanced by this Court; and prayed for the summary dismissal of the petition.
Held: We find no error in the denial on the petition for relief, because the record shows that
appellant did not act with due diligence, and that he has no meritorious defense. The court
deny the petition, for the same has failed to comply with mandatory requirements laid down
by the provision of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this
court on the ground that only question of law are involved.
Even granting that Candido Calon was not qualified to accept service of summons, the fact is
admitted by him and by the appellant that Calon did turn over the summons to this appellant
only "several days" after May 10, 1959. Had appellant Vibat acted with due diligence, and
made prompt inquiries, he would have discovered that he had been declared in default on
May 16, 1959, and could have asked for its lifting well before the rendition of the judgment of
the merits on June 3, 1959.
As to the alleged defense that appellant Vibat had bought the land occupied by him from
Eustaquio Alquiros, who, in turn, purchased it from Julian de la Cruz, the same plainly cannot
hold against the Torrens title admittedly issued in favor of plaintiff J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc.,
since the Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by the
final decree of registration, nor can title by adverse possession be acquired against the
registered owner (Act 496, section 46). Appellants remedy, if any, would only lie against his
immediate vendor, on the latters warranty against eviction.
WHEREFORE, the denial of the petition for relief is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant Danny Vibat
AGNE V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
FACTS: The land subject matter of this case was originally covered by Free Patent No. 23263
issued on April 17, 1937 in the name of Herminigildo Agpoon. On May 21, 1937, pursuant to
the said patent, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued to said Herminigildo Agpoon
Original Certificate of Title No. 2370. Presentacion Agpoon Gascon inherited the said parcel of
land upon the death of her father, Herminigildo, and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 32209 on April 6,1960. Respondent Presentacion declared the said land for taxation
purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No. 11506 and taxes were paid thereon in her
name.
On April 13, 1971, private respondent spouses (Presentacion and Joaquin Gascon) filed Civil
Case No. U-2286 in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for recovery of possession
and damages against petitioners. Their complaint states that they are the registered owners
under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title No. 32209 of the parcel of land situated in
Barrio Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan which is now in the possession of petitioners; that during
the Japanese occupation, petitioners, taking advantage of the abnormal conditions then
obtaining, took possession of said land by means of fraud, stealth, strategy and intimidation;
that private respondents repeatedly demanded the surrender of the physical possession of
said property but the latter refused.
Petitioners (Agne et. al) alleged that the land in question was formerly a part of the river bed
of the Agno-Chico River; that in the year 1920, a big flood occurred which caused the said river
to change its course and abandon its original bed; that by virtue of the provisions of Article 370
of the Spanish Civil Code which was then the law in force, petitioners, by operation of law,
became the owners by accession or accretion of the respective aliquot parts of said river bed
bordering their properties; that since 1920, they and their predecessors in interest occupied
and exercised dominion openly and adversely over said portion of the abandoned river bed in
question abutting their respective riparian lands continuously up to the present to the
exclusion of all other persons, particularly Herminigildo Agpoon; that they have introduced
improvements thereon by constructing irrigation canals and planting trees and agricultural
crops thereon and converted the land into a productive area.
On March 6, 1974, petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents Director of Lands and
spouses Agpoon with the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for annulment of title,
reconveyance of and/or action to clear title to a parcel of land. According to them, the said
patent and subsequent titles issued are null and void since the said land, an abandoned river
bed, is of private ownership and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a public land grant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the land in dispute is a private land before the issuance of title under
Free Patent.
2. Whether or not, private lands can be subject of free patent
3. Whether or not, the titles issued pursuant thereto are valid.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of respondent court in its AC-G.R. CV No. 60388-
R and the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 2649 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondents to
reconvey the aforesaid parcel of land to petitioners.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
1. Whether or not the land in dispute is a private land.
Yes.
The claim of ownership of petitioners is based on the old Civil Code, the law then in force,
which provides:
The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally
changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the
abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall run
at equal distance therefrom.
It is thus clear under this provision that once the river bed has been abandoned, the riparian
owners become the owners of the abandoned bed to the extent provided by this article. The
acquisition of ownership is automatic. There need be no act on the part of the riparian owners
to subject the accession to their ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment
the mode of acquisition becomes evident, without the need of any formal act of acquisition.
Such abandoned river bed had fallen to the private ownership of the owner of the riparian land
even without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof will be
considered as a trespasser. The right in re to the principal is likewise a right in re to the
accessory, as it is a mode of acquisition provided by law, as the result of the right of accretion.
Since the accessory follows the nature of the principal, there need not be any tendency to the
thing or manifestation of the purpose to subject it to our ownership, as it is subject thereto
ipso jure from the moment the mode of acquisition becomes evident.
2. Whether or not Private lands can be subject of free patent. No
3. Whether or not titles issued in pursuant thereto are valid. No
The land in question was and is of private ownership and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction
of the Director of Lands. The free patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null
and void. The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent
may be invoked only when the land involved originally formed part of the public domain. If it
was a private land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity.
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time a certificate of title was issued
pursuant to a public grant, said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void if
the property covered thereby is originally of private ownership, and an action to annul the
same does not prescribe. Moreover, since herein petitioners are in possession of the land in
dispute, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible. Their action for reconveyance which, in
effect, seeks to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Their undisturbed
possession for a number of years gave them a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to determine the nature of the adverse claims of a third party and the effect on her title.
Under the provisions of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents'
predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public
land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. 30 The nullity
arises, not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Lands. 31 The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public
lands and does not cover lands privately owned. 32 The purpose of the Legislature in adopting
the former Public Land Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the
public domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not
affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or of private
ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the
purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not
embraced in any manner in the title of the Act 33 and the same are excluded from the
provisions or text thereof.
MILLENA V CA
Facts: The involves a 3,934-square meter parcel of land in far-flung Bgy. Balinad, Daraga, Albay.
It was originally a part of Lot 1874, a 14,284-square meter land that was subject of a cadastral
proceeding. Among the claimants in the cadastral case were Gregoria Listana and her sister-
in-law Potenciana Maramba.
Geogoria Listana was at that time seriously ill of tuberculosis. She executed a power of
attorney in favor of her cousin Antonio Lipato which authorized the attorney-in-fact to sell the
portion of Lot 1874 belonging to his principal. On 23 October 1926 Antonio Lipato in his
capacity as attorney-in-fact sold the portion of Gregoria Listana to Gaudencio Jacob.
When Potenciana Maramba learned about Gaudencio's entering the land and harvesting the
coconuts she confronted him and filed an ejectment case against Gaudencio Jacob before the
Justice of the Peace in Legazpi, Albay. The court ruled that Gaudencio entered the land in
question without force and intimidation since he had with him a document of sale over the
land which authorized him to take possession thereof. The case was dismissed.
Gaudencio Jacob continued with his actual and peaceful possession of the land for almost forty
(40) years until 4 April 1966, when he and his children executed an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of his deceased wife Brigida Jacob. The settlement adjudicated to respondent Felisa
Jacob, daughter of Gaudencio Jacob. The respondent, Felisa Jacob, had the land annually
declared as her property and paid the corresponding real property taxes.
However, sometime in November 1981 respondent Felisa Jacob discovered that Florencio
Listana, son of Potenciana Maramba, acquired from the Bureau of Lands in Legazpi City Free
Patent Certificate of Title No. VH-23536 dated 28 August 1980 covering the entire 14,284-
square meter area of Lot 1874 which included the portion adjudicated to Felisa Jacob in 1966.
On March 17, 1992, respondent, Felisa Jacob through her attorney-in-fact Jaime Llaguno filed
a complaint against petitioner Alejandro Millena for annulment of title with preliminary
injunction and damages before the RTC of Legazpi City which she subsequently amended on
March 19, 1992 by including a claim for reconveyance with preliminary injunction and
damages. She prayed for judgment (a) declaring her the lawful and absolute owner of the one-
fourth (1/4) northern portion of Lot 1874; (b) ordering Alejandro Millena to reconvey the
aforesaid portion of Lot 1874 to her; (c) enjoining the construction of a house on said lot by
Alejandro Millena and, after trial, making the injunction permanent; and, (d) ordering
Alejandro Millena to pay damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
On October 3, 1994 Judge Wenceslao R. Villanueva Jr. of the RTC of Legazpi City, Br. 3, rendered
a decision ordering petitioner Alejandro Millena to reconvey by proper document the portion
of 3,934 square meters in question from Lot 1874 to respondent Felisa Jacob and awarded to
her P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.
Petitioner Alejandro Millena appealed to the Court of Appeals which on August 12, 1996
affirmed the trial court but deleted the award of P10,000.00 for attorneys fees.[6] After the
appellate court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, he filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether prescription has now barred the action for reconveyance
An action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. When an action for
reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the
fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original
certificate of title.[7] On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original
certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. For the rule is that the registration of an
instrument in the Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to the whole
world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of
registration.[8]
But, nonetheless, it must be stressed that prescription cannot be invoked in an action for
reconveyance when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.[9] In view of
this, can it be said that Felisa Jacob was in possession of the contested portion of Lot 1874?
Article 523 of the Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment
of a right. In order to possess, one must first have control of the thing and, second, a deliberate
intention to possess it. These are the elements of possession.
The records of the case show that respondent Felisa Jacob had exercised dominion over the
contested parcel of land. Felisa met the requisite elements of possession. She exercised control
over the parcel of land in litigation through her caretaker, her nephew, Jaime Llaguno.
Moreover, her declaration that the land was her property and the payment of real property
taxes manifested clearly that she was in possession of the land. Consequently, petitioner may
not validly invoke prescription as defense against respondent Feliza Jacob.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12
August 1996 as well as its Resolution of 6 December 1996 denying petitioner Alejandro
Millena's motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Consequently, petitioner is ORDERED to
reconvey within thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision that northern portion in
question of Lot 1874 consisting of 3,934 square meters as shown in the location map (Exhs. "L"
and "L-1") in favor of private respondent Felisa Jacob, represented herein by her attorney-in-
fact Jaime Llaguno, with costs against petitioner.
MIRANDA V CA
In 1965, Luneta Motor Company filed an action for recovery of a jeep and for recovery of sum
of money against Lucila Java. Java did not appear in court nor did she file responsive pleadings
despite notice hence she was declared in default. As a result, LMC won the case and eventually
a writ of execution was issued in their favor. Pursuant to said writ certain properties of Java
were sold in a public auction including a parcel of land which LMC was able to buy in said
action. LMC then sold said parcel of land to spouses Miranda.
In 1977, Java filed an action to annul the previous judgment, the auction proceedings, and the
subsequent transfers of the auctioned property. Java alleged that the reason why she did not
appear in court and why she never filed an ANSWER was because she never received any
summons from the trial court.
The Court Sheriff however testified that he handed a copies of the summons and the complaint
to a certain Ernesto Elizondo (son in law of Java) in the compound where Java resides; that said
service was by way of substituted service.
The trial court ruled that there is a proper service of summons. The Court of Appeals however
reversed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid service of summons.
HELD: No, there is none. The Sheriffs report did not fully explain why he did a substituted
service. Particularly, sheriff did not explain why personal service was not done. Substituted
service can only be effected if personal service, under certain circumstances, cannot be
effected. Service of summons upon the defendant is essential for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over his person. The modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the person. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be
served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made.
Another glaring defect in the service of summons is that assuming that substituted service can
be effected, still the service of summons in this case is invalid because said service was upon
Elizondo who testified in court that though he lives in the same compound as Java, he does
not reside in the same dwelling as Java (they live in different houses) hence, this is a violation
to the strict requirements of the Rules of Court.
As a result, the judgment of the trial court, as well as the public auction and the subsequent
transfers of the properties involved are all void. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
Java.
PALOMO V CA
FACTS: Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On
1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio
and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First Instance
of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953. Sometime in July 1954 President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting the area embraced by Executive
Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the control, management,
protection and administration of the defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division
of the Bureau of Forest Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act. The
Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes thereon and
introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8, 1971,
petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual
mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands.
ISSUE: Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.
HELD: The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public domain. It is in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registerable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is
no question that the lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that
the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no justification for
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
ALBA VDA. DE RAZ V CA
Facts: Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the
claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from one Eulalio
Raz. The documents attached to the application are: technical description, surveyor's
certificate, certification by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.
The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of
4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast by the property of the Municipality of Banga
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued but
those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana
Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the Municipality
of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to file their written
opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on October 31, 1958. They
opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the land
applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion and
all the improvements thereon for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-
interest deriving their title by purchase from the original owners.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact
of Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of attorney was attached. He alleged that his
principal is the owner by right of succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its
improvements for more than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously,
peacefully and openly under claim of ownership.
Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz,
alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land applied for with an area of 2,262
square meters bounded on the north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia
and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the public market of
Banga. They claimed to have inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late father,
Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have
been in possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-
mentioned portion for not less 70 years.
The trial court finds that Dr. Jose Lachica is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land
described in his application for its original registration in his name. The land contains an area
of 4,845 square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, Aklan, and Bounded on the NE., along
line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National road; on the
SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the
NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market).
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp.
of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46' E., 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence, S. 56 deg. 42' W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence, N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"
thence, N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point of
 beginning, . . . All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of the survey, January 25, 1957,
and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.
The private respondent/applicant requested the Municipal Assessor of Banga to issue a
revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square meters on the bare claim that "the area has been
decreased" to only 620 square meters.
Issue: whether or not the private respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his
ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land he applied for.
Held: The trial court and the Court of Appeals confirmed private respondent/applicant's title
to the land on the basis of the findings that: 1.] the private respondent/applicant purchased
the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181;
3.] the private respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on the land from 1945 up to the
filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the private respondent/applicant has been in actual, open
and continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.] the
private respondent/applicant has acquired the land by prescription.
private respondent that the acquired land in question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A
Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840
square meters; b] 300 square meters allegedly purchased from private respondent's father-in-
law Eulalio Raz, and c.] 3,725 square meters private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from
Eugrocino Alba.
In Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which
states that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claim and issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied
for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the
laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause,
not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications. 49
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. 50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in the affirming the ruling of
the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52 in
relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the assumption that the subject land
is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court's postulate. The application for
registration of private respondent is for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering
that the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or
non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private
appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands. 53 For purposes of
administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as "disposable" or
"alienable" are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial,
industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar
purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes. 54
Rule:
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in
Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N. Lachica's house is
situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated from the
parcel of land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square meters, to be registered and
confirmed in the name of private respondent;
2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned in the application be
segregated for future road widening programs upon the payment of just compensation to be
annotated at the back of the title.
3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is concerned, the case is
hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the
petitioners to establish the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in
their names of the areas they respectively claim.
GORDULA V CA
FACTS: Petitioner Gordula filed an application for a free patent over a land, which he had been
in possession since 1949, in January, 1973. The Free patent was issued on January 01, 1974.
The subject land in 1973 was still part of the Caliraya- Lumot River Forest reserve and was no
longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public
good. Thereafter, on November 18, 1987, the REPUBLIC, thru the NAPOCOR, filed an action for
annulment of petitioners Free Patent, cancellation of titles and The CA also held that the
petitioners could not claim ownership by acquisitive prescription since as of 1969; Gordula had
been in possession of the property for only 25 years. The period of Gordulas occupancy after
1969 should not be tacked to the period from 1944 since by then the property was not
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation.
HELD: Forest lands/reserves are incapable of private appropriation and possession thereof
however long can not convert them into private properties. (Director of Lands vs. CA). This
ruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined in the 35,73 and 87Constitutions.
Further, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the
State. Gordula did not acquire title to the said land prior to its reservation under Proc. # 573.
He filed his application 3 years after said Proclamation was issued in 1969. At that time, the
land, as part of the Caliraya- Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private
ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for public good.

REPUBLIC V CA 315 SCRA 600
FACTS: The parcel of land that is presently the subject of the dispute in the instant case Lot 3
Portion forms part of the above-mentioned parcel of land declared by this Honorable Court
as belonging to the public domain, classified/zonified land available for fishpond development.
This lot has been leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Secretary of Agriculture, for a period of 25 years, or up to December 31, 2013, under
Fishpond Lease Agreement. On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of
Isidro Bustria] filed acomplaint against Porfirio Morado in theRegional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan for ownership and possession over the lot in question. Herein petitioner, the
Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit. In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria
claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of several lots under PSU-
155696surveyed in the name of her father, Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said
Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources over Lot 3 thereof (the subject lot),well-knowing that said lot had always
been occupied, possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.
Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in question is
part of the public domain which he developed and converted into a fishpond. Due, however,
to Porfirio Morados and his
counsels failure to appear at the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court
subsequently declared Porfirio Morado as in default. Respondent Judge rendered a decision
declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and absolute owner of the land in question. Petitioner
(REPUBLIC), filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the trial courts decision.
Petitioner alleged that the land in question is within the classified/ zonified alienable and
disposable land for fishpond development and that since the land formed part of the public
domain, the BFAR has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No. 704, 4. CA
rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this petition for review. The judgment
rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following grounds: (a) the judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained through extrinsic
fraud. The question in this case is whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void on
any of these grounds. The preliminary question, however, is whether the government can
bring such action even though was not a party to the action in which the decision sought to be
annulled was rendered. We shall deal with these questions in inverse order.
RULING: First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action below. To
begin with, an action to recover a parcel of land is in personam. As such, it is binding only
between the parties thereto, as this Court explained in Ching v. Court of Appeals , viz: An
action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not anaction in rem
or an action against thewhole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a
will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to beheard. Actions in
personam and actionsin rem differ in that the former aredirected against specific persons and
seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status
of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to
recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. The appellate court, holding
that the proceedings before the trial court were in personam, ruled that since petitioner was
nota party to Civil Case No. A-1759, it is not areal party-in-interest and, therefore, has no
personality to bring the action for annulmentof the judgment rendered in that case. The
appellate court is in error. In Islamic Dawah Council of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that a party claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the subject of
foreclosure proceedings has a sufficient interest to bring an action for annulment of the
judgment rendered in theforeclosure proceedings even though it was not a party in such
proceedings. It was held: [A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled. What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained
by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.
Private respondents do not deny that IsidroBustria, to whom they trace their
ownership,previously filed a fishpond application with the BFAR over the disputed land.
Neither do they deny that the disputed land formed part of the public domain.We agree with
petitioner. The State clearlystands to be adversely affected by the trial courts disposition of
inalienable public land. The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for
fishpond development. In controversies involving the disposition of public land, the burden of
overcoming the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the
private claimant. Private respondents have not discharged this burden. The fact that the land
in dispute was transformed into a fully developed fishpond does not mean that it has lost its
character as one declared suitable for fishpond purposes under the decree. By applying for
a fishpond permit with BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as one suitable
for fishpond development since the disposition of such lands is vested in the BFAR.
Consequently, private respondents, as his successors-in-interests, are stopped from claiming
otherwise. It is settled under the Public Land Law thatalienable public land held by a
possessor,personally or through his predecessor-in-interest,openly, continuously, and
exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time.
However, only public lands classified as agricultural are alienable. Lands declared for fishery
purposes are not alienable and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen
into ownership. Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall
within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704, 4, the trial courts decision
is null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable public
land.
NHA V ALLARDE
FACTS: Two parcels of land were acquired by the Republic in 1938 from Philtrust Co. Said lots
were part of the Tala Estate which was later reserved for housing programs by NHA by virtue
of Proclamation No. 483. Rufino Mateo lived in the property since his birth in 1928. He started
farming and working on the 6-hectare lot included in the contested property since 1950. In
1983, NHA informed Mateo that said property was already under the housing program.
Despite this, Mateo applied such lands for CARP (took effect in 1987) in 1989. To reinforce
Proc. No. 483, NHA proceeded in bulldozing the lots which caused several damages to dikes
and irrigations. On March 18, 1992, the Mateo Spouses, relying on their claim that subject lots
are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP filed before RTC a complaint for damages
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin NHA from bulldozing further and
making constructions on the lots under controversy. NHA contended that the said lots which
were previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for housing and resettlement purposes, are
not covered by the CARP as they are not agricultural lands within the definition and
contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R. A. No. 6657.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Compressive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers government lands
reserved for specific public purposes prior to the effectivity of said law

HELD: NO.
RATIO: In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court succinctly held that
lands reserved for, or converted to, non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than
the Department of Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), are not considered and treated as
agricultural lands and therefore, outside the ambit of said law, on the basis of the following
disquisition:
"x x x Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall 'cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.' As
to what constitutes 'agricultural land,' it is referred to as 'lands devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. 'Agricultural lands' are only those lands which
are 'arable and suitable agricultural lands' and 'do not include commercial, industrial
and residential lands' Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
'agricultural lands.' These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation. x x x"
Thus, since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was reserved,
inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National
Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural
activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage
of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the respondent Court declaring the lots under
controversy as "agricultural land" and restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its
housing project thereon, are evidently bereft of any sustainable basis.
REPUBLIC V CA 83 SCRA 453
NAVERA V QUICHO
[consolidated]
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. HON. EMMANUEL M. MUOZ
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968
FACTS: These are two interrelated cases involving some 72,000 hectares of land located in the
municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, Rizal claimed to be owned by Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development
Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) as evidenced by Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894.
PIADECO asserts that the original owner of the subject land appearing on the title acquired his
rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25,
1880.
Petitioners in the first case are government officials seeking to annul the order and writ of
execution issued by the CFI Bulacan allowing Piadeco to haul its logs in land in question. In the
second, it was Piadeco's turn question the authority and jurisdiction of therein government
officials to order the stoppage of logging operations, construction of the roads, among other
things, from Piadecos private woodland area.
Series of motions were made by both parties in the two cases from 1964 to 1966 until it finally
reached the high court for this 1968 disposition.
ISSUE: Is Piadecos Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894 an incontrovertible
evidence of its valid ownership to the subject land?
RULING: No. It is a well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be proved not
only through the genuineness of title but also with a
clear identity of the land claimed.
The standing presumption is that land pertains to the State, and any person seeking to
establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner.
There was inconsistency in Piadecos claim to the coverage of the land in question as it was
claimed to be 72,000 hectares on some instance and 74, 000 hectares on some when this issue
on the Spanish title should have been settled years ago.
Royal Decree of June 25, 1880 authorizes adjustments of land by filing application with the
Direccion General de Administracin Civil within one year from the effectivity of the decree.
The original owner should have settled the exact coverage of the land at this point. Moreover,
Maura Law was published in the on April 1894. That decree required a second petition for
adjustment within six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles
at the time of the publication of the law.
There being cloud to Piadecos claim, the Court did not give prima facie value to Piadeco's title.
It was not proclaimed that Piadeco is a private woodland owner for purpose of these
proceedings.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in the first case was granted; the petition of Piadeco
for injunction and prohibition was denied. Costs in both cases against Piadeco.
GODOFREDO NAVERA v. HON. PERFECTO QUICHO
G.R. No. L-18339, June 29, 1962
FACTS: Municipality of Ligao filed for a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496 with the CFI
of Albay for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 issued in the name of
Godofredo Navera, covering Lot No. 2793-A, on the ground that a portion of 123 sq. m. of
Natera Street was erroneously included in said title, as testified by a duly licensed surveyor,
during the cadastral survey of Ligao.
A motion to dismiss was filed by herein petitioner Navera on the ground that the relief sought
by the Municipality of Ligao cannot be granted under Section 112 of Act 496 because the same
would involve the opening of the original decree of registration and that this cannot be done
at this stage after the lapse of 23 years from the issuance of the certificate of title. Alleging
further that the petition does not seek merely the correction of a mistake or error but the
return or reconveyance of a portion of a registered property to respondent.
The lower court ruled in favor of the Municipality of Ligao, thus this case.
ISSUE: Is the Municipality of Ligao correct in invoking Section 112 of Act No. 496 to correct the
error in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304?
RULING: No. It is true that the erroneous inclusion of the 123 sq. m. of Natera street in the title
issued to petitioner may be corrected under Section 112 of Act 496 because under the law,
a person who obtains a title which includes by mistake a land which cannot legally be
registered does not by virtue of such inclusion become the owner of the land erroneously
included therein.

But this theory only holds true if there is no dispute that the portion to be excluded is really
part of a public highway. This principle only applies if there is unanimity as to the issue of fact
involved.
Lacking the unanimity required under said law since the claim of the municipality that an error
has been committed in the survey of the lot is not agreed to by petitioner, the petition cannot
be granted under Section 112 of Act No. 496.
The petition is granted and the previous orders of respondent court were set aside. No costs.
MATEO V MORENO
REPUBLIC V AYALA
TONGSON V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
FACTS: This case started in the application for registration of title of a lot (Lot 855). Testimonial
evidence shows that a parcel of land, to which the subject lot belong, was under the exclusive
possession of one Francisco Borja. Borja cut trees for firewood in the land. It was alleged that
the land at that time was a mangrove swamp. After subsequent transfers, a portion of the land
was transferred to Santiago Bermejo. After Santiagos death, Macario Bermejo, his heir and
administrator, converted the land into a fishpond.
ISSUE: Whether or not a parcel of land, possessed as far back as 1905, which has been alleged
to be a mangrove swamp and converted into a fishpond, is considered as part of the timber
domain, and thus is not disposable and cannot be registered.
HELD: The possession of Borja and the subsequent owners was peaceful, continuous, open,
and adverse under claim of ownership for a period of not less than 50 years. The application
for registration must be granted.
Besides, the definition of forestry; as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of
1917 cannot affect rights which are vested prior to its enactment. The applicable law is the Act
of Congress of July 1st 1902. The Act classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as
timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands
are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare,
fisheries, or ordinary farmlands. Therefore, mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense
in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
So even if the subject land was indeed a mangrove land, it still does not make it into an
inalienable forest land.
REPUBLIC V CA 135 SCRA 156
Facts: In 1961, the CFI of Quezon rendered a decision, ordering the registration of 885 hectares
of public forestland in favor of the Maxinos. The decision became final and executory so a
decree of registration and an OCT were issued. Eight (8) years after the decision was rendered,
the Republic of the Philippines filed with the same CFI an amended petition to annul the
decision, decree, and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was
still a part of the unclassified public forest. The Maxinos opposed the petition.
The CFI judge denied the petition and when appealed, the same was dismissed on the ground
that the order had allegedly long become final and unappealable so the Government was
estopped thru the registration made by its agents.
Issue/s: Whether or not the Government was estopped in appealing the registration order.
Ruling: No. The Government sufficiently proved that the parcel of land involved in the present
case is a part of a forestland, thus non-registerable. As to the ruling of CA that the government
was estopped to appeal because the land was erroneously registered by its own agency, the
Court ruled otherwise basing on its decision in Gov't. of the U. S. vs. Judge of 1st Inst. of
Pampanga, (50 Phil. 975, 980), where it held that the Government should not be estopped by
the mistakes or errors of its agents.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER CO. V UP
Facts: IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of
plywood. It renewed its timber license, which was granted by the government and shall be
valid for 25 years, in early 1960. Said license authorizes the company to cut, collect and remove
timber from the portion of timber land located in certain municipalities of Laguna, including
Paete.
In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an experiment station for UP. The
said experiment station covers a portion of the timberland in Paete, occupied by IHVCP so UP,
who claims ownership of said portion of timberland, demanded the latter to pay the forest
charges to it, instead of the BIR. IHVCP rejected the demand and it filed a suit against UP,
claiming that R.A. 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by it
within the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding forest charges
prescribed by the BIR.
Issue/s: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in Paete.
Ruling: Yes.
The Court ruled that R.A. 3990 ceded and transferred in full ownership to UP the area, which
means that the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain. In
respect to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP, the said Act removed and
segregated it from being a public forest.
The Court further cited Sec. 3 of R.A. 3990, which provides that, "any incidental receipts or
income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines. The
provision of the Act is clear that UP, being the owner of the land, has the right to collect forest
charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as the property of the UP within it is
concerned.
DE OCAMPO V ARLOS
Doctrine:
Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as
such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.
REPUBLIC V CA 299 SCRA 199

CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
FACTS: From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A
law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA,
several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several portions of
submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING: YES.
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA
may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void
from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V CLT REALTY DEV. CORP
FACTS: The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land
stretches over three (3) cities within Metropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the
sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.
CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLTs
claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolitos
title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that
Dimsons title, the proximate source of CLTs title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same
and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their
ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees
of the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT
No. 994.
The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the title issued in the name of CLT valid.
HELD: It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat the properties they it was immediately cancelled in favor of Ang and Gagoomal. Subsequently, Ang and Gagoomal
purport to cover were " originally registered on 19 April 1917 in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven
that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT were given the
opportunity to submit such proof but it did not.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party
seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and
convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on
the weakness of the defendant's claim.
Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in
the action for annulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for
ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court.
As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for transcription by
the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 based from the issuance of the decree of registration on
17 April 1917.
Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree
into the Original Certificate of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the date of the
title or the date when the title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree was
done on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917.
There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate
of title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry
of the certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in
pursuance of the decree of registration. It was stressed that what stands as the certificate of
the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the
registry.
Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the
certificate of title is to take effect.
Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such
mother title is inexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994
dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent
OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the CLT claims over the subject property
if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on
remand.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is
directed to make further determinations based on the evidence already on record and such
other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
PHILIPPINE COTTON CORP V GAGOOMAL
The Pacific Mills Corporation owned 5 parcels of land in Quezon City covered by four
certificates of title. Pacific Mills sold the land to Naraindas Gagoomal and Engracio Ang in 1979.
In 1983, Philippine Cotton Corporation won a case in the lower court against Pacific Mills which
led to the attachment of the 5 parcels of land previously owned by Pacific Mills. Pacific Mills
appealed until it reached the Supreme Court.
While the case was pending in the SC, the QC Registry of Deeds was razed by fire thereby
destroying all records. In 1992, Pacific Mills filed for a reconstitution of land. It was granted but
received clean TCTs.
Meanwhile, Philippine Cotton received a favorable judgment from the SC and they requested
the Register of Deeds to annotate the same on the titles issued to And and Gagoomal. The
Register of Deeds then annotated the said titles and then sent a letter to Ang and Gagoomal
to surrender their duplicates.
Ang and Gagoomal petitioned for the removal of the annotation. Philippine Cotton argued that
the RD can validly annotate a Supreme Court decision on the said titles and that the same is
its ministerial duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Cottons contention is correct.
HELD: No. Under the circumstances, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City should and could
have properly refused such request instead of immediately annotating it. In the same light,
The Register of Deeds may likewise properly refuse registration of an order attachment when
it appears that the title involved is not in the name of the defendant and there is no evidence
submitted to indicate that the said defendant has any present or future interest in the property
covered by the titles.
Note that in the case won by Philippine Cotton before the SC, the defendant therein was Pacific
Mills. Ang and Gagoomal acquired the property before the resolution of the case, hence, the
annotation is not valid because Ang and Gagoomal were not parties to the said case.
SECRETARY OF DENR V YAP
FACTS: This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey
of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as
a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of
the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant
to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural
land, therefore making these lands alienable.
HELD: No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports
of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
MANOTOK IV V HEIRS OF HOMER BARQUE
FACTS:
Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd.,
La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto
Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar Land.)
o The subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in QC.
On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine Government
pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of the government was OCT
No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration of the Director of Lands.
Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire gutted portions
of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records stored in the Office of the
Register of Deeds.
In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of TCT
No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945 square meters GRANTED TCT No.
RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.
In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also covering Lot 823. In
support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate of the
TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.
o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.
Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging to Lot No.
823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area of 342,945 square
meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1 parcel of land, with a similar area
of 342,945 square meters.
1997 Barques petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already registered in the name of
the Manotoks. --> Barques MR was denied They appealed to the LRA LRA Reversed.
o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it ordered
the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a court of
competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.
The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for immediate reconstitution.
Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal of the
cases claiming ownership of the subject property.
2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to cancel the
Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques valid, genuine and existing TCT
No. 210177.
o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered consolidated
on August 2, 2004.
December 12, 2005, SC First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA. Manotoks
filed MR Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with their MR
attached. Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment was made in the
Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the Barques filed multiple
motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment, while the Manotoks filed an
Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC En Banc (with prayer to set motion for
oral arguments). Case was referred to the En Banc in July 2006.
On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a motion to
intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. They alleged that their
predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale Certificate No. 511 covering Lot
No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that the documents of the Manotoks were not as
old as they were purported to be. Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB
recommended to the Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted
to the state.
o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.
2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of judgment
recalled and the CAs Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and 66700 were reversed
and set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the Manotoks
can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot No. 823 of the
Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON the title of the Maotoks
should be annulled.
CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of Lot 823 from
the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120 otherwise known as the
Friar Lands Act. Notably lacking in the deed of conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon
close scrutiny, the factual allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the
purchase of Lot 823 by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud
and irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They have since
occupied the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land is now known as
Manotok Compound.
Barques Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta who had a
TCT in his name.
Manahans The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought by his
wife. They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men in 1950s so they
just declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the National
Government.
RATIO:
From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records of the DENR-LMB
indicate the original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain Valentin Manahan, only the
Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate in the name of their predecessors-in-interest,
certified by the LMB Records Management Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted
photocopies of original documents entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920
and 1923.
Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale contained only the signature
of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly secured from the National Archives a
certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the
Director of Lands.
Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under
the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of friar lands
shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce).
In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the original
Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives, shows on the second
page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and above it an even more poorly imprinted
impression of what may be a stamp of the Secretarys approval.
The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of the RDs
task in issuing the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend that we can assume that
the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by the Department Secretary because
the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in the name of the buyer Severino Manotok.
FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in
the performance of official duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on
October 27, 2005 by then DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over
friar lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.
Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State and Liao
Cases the absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce in the sale
certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null and void ab initio. Necessarily,
there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY
requirement. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred
from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. Petitioners have not offered any
cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule.
DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the Manahans,
states that some Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the LMB do not bear
the Secretarys signature despite full payment for the Friar Land. They are deemed signed or
otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the applicant really paid the purchase price and
complied with all the requirements under the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department issuance
because it makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with the records of the
DENR field offices. The Manotoks copy of the alleged Deed of Conveyance No. 29204 issued
in 1932, was sourced from the National Archives.
Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the Government ceases
reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price. (They were claiming that they
fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2] of the Friar Lands Act.
Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however, the new
rule Pugeda v. Trias, the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-
called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in
full.
Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate of sale that
vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of sale must, of course,
be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as evident from Sections
11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd paragraph of Section 15[5], in relation to Section 18.
CONCLUSIONS
Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject lot as they had no valid
certificate of sale issued to them by the Government because their Certificate lacks the
signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of real property
taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted that the Manotoks
miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued in the name of Severino
Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price. The Manotoks did not offer any
explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No. 22813 was torn in half and no record of
documents leading to its issuance can be found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification
issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented as
DILAPIDATED without stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their
records, nor any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner.
o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.
RE: MANAHANS No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be found in the
records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although the OSG submitted a
certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 allegedly executed by Valentin
Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no competent evidence to show that the
claimant Valentin Manahan or his successors-in-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared
the land for tax purposes, or paid the taxes due thereon.
Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511
and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by the Manahans, the CA correctly
observed that the claim had become stale after the lapse of 86 years from the date of its
alleged issuance. Citing Liao v. CA the certificates of sale x x x became stale after 10 years
from its issuance and hence cannot be the source documents for issuance of title more than
70 years later.
Dispositive:
Manotok Appeal denied
Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are NULL and VOID. The Register
of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby ordered to CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o prejudice to
Reversion proceedings
Republic vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 591 SCRA 438;
Facts:
On February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which built a chapel
on the lot. Saturnino Sacayanan, who was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948,
testified to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC in 1952.
Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where
the INC chapel was built.
Badanguio in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax
purposes and was issued TD 006114.[8] In 1959, Badanguio also sold a small portion of the
bigger lot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale[9] was executed on January 8, 1959. Jaime
Alcantara, the property custodian of INC, testified to the purchases constituting the subject lot
and the issuance of TDs covering it as declared by INC for tax purposes. Thus, these two
purchases by INC of a small portion of the bigger lot originally owned by Sabuco, who inherited
it from his parents and later sold it to Badanguio, constituted the subject lot.
On September 7, 1970, a Deed of Sale was executed by Badanguio in favor of INC formally
ceding and conveying to INC the subject lot which still formed part of the TD of the bigger lot
under his name. This was testified to by Teofilo Tulali who became a tenant of the bigger lot in
1965 and continued to be its tenant under Badanguio. Tulali testified further that the
ownership and possession of Sabuco and Badanguio of the bigger lot were never disturbed.
Subsequently, TD 6485[10] was issued in 1970 in the name of INC pursuant to the September
7, 1970 Deed of Sale.
For the processing of its application for judicial confirmation of title, subject Lot No. 3946 of
the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed. Report given by the City Environment and Natural
Resources Office special investigator showing that the subject lot is within alienable and
disposable public zone. The public land certifies as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain last May 16, 1993.
MCTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of the subject lot for over 40
years after its acquisition of the lot.Besides, it noted that Badanguio and Sabuco, the
predecessors-in-interest of INC, were never disturbed in their possession of the portions they
sold to INC constituting the subject lot.
After the required jurisdictional publication, notification, and posting, hearing ensued where
the INC presented three testimonial witnesses,[7] the MCTC, acting as cadastral court, grants
title in favor of INC
Aggrieved, the Republic seasonably interposed its appeal before the CA. The appellate court
rendered the assailed Decision affirming MCTC Decision.
CA found that the documentary and testimonial evidence on record sufficiently established
the continuous, open, and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject lot in the concept
of an owner by INC of more than 40 years and by its predecessors-in-interest prior to the
conveyance of the lot to INC.
The issue elevated to SC on the grounds that the Land was declared only alienable and
disposable land of the Public Domain only on May 16, 1993 or 5 years before the filling of the
application of the application of Registration on November 19, 1998.
Issue: May a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property has
been declared as alienable only after June 12, 1945?
Rulling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title
to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the subject lot has
already been declared alienable and disposable by the government on May 16, 1993 or a little
over five years before the application for registration was filed by INC.
Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and Naguit
It must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings in Naguit and Herbieto, relied on by the
parties contradictory positions.
Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable
and disposable, and possession before such date is inconsequential and must be excluded in
the computation of the period of possession. This ruling is very stringent and restrictive, for
there can be no perfection of title when the declaration of public agricultural land as alienable
and disposable is made after June 12, 1945, since the reckoning of the period of possession
cannot comply with the mandatory period under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
In Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application of Sec. 14(1) of PD
1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is the actual possession of the property
and it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and
disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed.
Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic (Malabanan),[22] the Court upheld Naguit and
abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto.
Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The Court in Malabanan traced the rights of a citizen to own alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain as granted under CA 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended by PD 1073, and PD 1529. The Court observed that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec.
14(1) of PD 1529 are virtually the same, with the latter law specifically operationalizing the
registration of lands of the public domain and codifying the various laws relative to the
registration of property.
Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945
cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed
in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its
antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and
not those distantly or remotely located.
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
possession even if in good faith.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are
obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place
due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. It suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is
indeed obiter.
To sum:
In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon
as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of
the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Fortuna vs. Republic of the Philippines, 718 SCRA 35
FACTS:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square
meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The
application was filed with the RTC.
Spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon
whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an
affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No.
4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23,
1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated
May 4, 1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457
for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, technical description,
and certificate of assessment.
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of
the spouses Fortuna.
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not
present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortunas evidence
Tax Declaration No. 8366 showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948,
thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
The spouses Fortuna contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942
amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession to acquire imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-
year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession
should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in
Section 14(1) of the PRD.
HELD:
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their compliance
with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public domain.
1. The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
-The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State. Of the
four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and
national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public land that has not been
classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it
is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to
establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the
grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find
application only from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural and
declared as alienable and disposable.
-Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the
prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation
or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and
disposable.
-Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired
through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
-Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties
alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and
disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The
applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President.
-The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO(Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office) certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and
released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President
or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.
2. In judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, the period of possession should
commence, at the latest, as of May 9, 1947
-Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation," the Court has declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that the
publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature." Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the
decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-
off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years,
or at least since May 8, 1947.
3. The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8,
1947
-Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain, the spouses Fortunas application for registration of title would still not
prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
-The spouses Fortunas allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration No.
8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366
cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the land
prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366
contains a sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While
these circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that it
commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates
possession since 1947, it does not show the nature of Pastoras possession. Notably, Section
48(b) of the PLA speaks of possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction."35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that
Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the
land. Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal."
Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479
Pons Realty vs. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 287
Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22
Facts: This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA
reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance
of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco
instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with
an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she is in continuous, adverse, open,
peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial; respondents have
never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of
Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioners father occupied
the land in dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some
improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango trees and
palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner
included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and when he died in 1941 the
petitioner continued to possess the land in question not embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of
Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.
The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that there is
already a survey plan of the said land in the name of the respondents and that a title was
already issued to them. Petitioner now contends that being an adjacent owner of the land in
question they were not notified of the survey. The Surveyors Certificate reveals that notice
was given to the following: Jose Cruz, Diego Francisco (petitioners father), and Santol Creek.
It is noted that both Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco were already dead from the date of the
notice and Santol Creek is not a person or entity. It was established that the petitioner and her
brother and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent land of the land in question
were not notified of the survey. Petitioner did not read the publication in the Official Gazette
and the former mayor of Teresa who is the owner of the property across the Santol Creek
testified that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land throughout his lifetime and after
his death his heirs and not the respondents. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open
possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has become
the absolute owner of this parcel of land.
Respondent contends that the petitioners claim for ownership of the land in question is
insufficient in form and substance failing to explain under what color of title she acquires
ownership of the land in question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid petition for
reopening and review of a decree should be made by a person who is deprived of the land or
interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 of Act 496 the applicant (1) must have
an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of the decree of
registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained
under the Land Registration Act. The mere claim of ownership of petitioner lacks this requisite
to merit in granting of their petition. They claim that Toribio Santos, the respondents father
owns the land and Alejandro Santos inherited it from him and occupied the land in 1920 and
has been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.
Issue: Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332
Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.
Ruling: It appears that Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco are both dead when the alleged notice
was served and that Santol Creek could not appear for the hearing because it is not a person.
The court finds it absurd that the respondent claims that they complied with the requisite of
serving notice to interested parties on the land in question. It is clear that the petitioner and
her brothers and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent lots were not notified of
the registration proceeding applied for by the petitioner. It is clear that no notice was sent to
the actual owner and possessor of the land in question allowing the respondents to
successfully register the land in their name. It was also established that respondents did not
state the true adjoining owners of the North, East and West of the land in question. On the
North side it is no longer Diego Francisco who is the owner of the lot but it is the petitioner by
virtue of transfer of the homestead patent of their father to them as his heirs. On the East, it
is no longer Jose Cruz who owns the land but it was already by a different person after his
death. On the West, it is no longer Eugenio Francisco who is the owner but it is Paula Francisco,
petitioners sister who is in actual possession of the land.
The court find that the respondents have the motive of concealing their application for
registration from the real owners of these said lands by not sending them the actual notice of
their application for registration to prevent them from filing their opposition. The court cited
the failure of the surveyors of the respondent to comply with the requirement of finding out
the actual occupants and boundary owners of the said land. The court held that the registration
of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith. Thus it reverses the
decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of the lower court without prejudice to petitioner
and the trial court complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the
corresponding title in favor of petitioner.
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509
Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic, 703 SCRA 561
Divina vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 527
Ceremonia vs. CA, 314 SCRA 731
Facts:
On April 17, 1980, petitioner Luis Ceremonia filed a verified complaint for Forcible Entry against
respondent Maximo Celestra before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Binangonan, Rizal.
According to petitioner, he is a co-owner of a parcel of land located at Bombong, Binangonan,
Rizal, with an area of 10,930 square meters more or less, which has been in his possession
and/or that of his predecessors-in-interest since 1910. In June 1979, herein respondent
allegedly constructed a house on the subject property, thru stealth and strategy and without
petitioner's consent thereby effectively depriving him of possession and reasonable
compensation on the said property. Despite several demands, petitioner claimed respondent
failed and refused to vacate and remove the house. As proof of his ownership and prior
possession, petitioner presented several tax declarations on the property.
Respondent as defendant below averred that the land on which he erected his house is owned
by him in common with the other heirs of the late Ceremonia Celestra, their predecessor-in-
interest. Ceremonia allegedly possessed the disputed property as the owner since time
immemorial. 3 Respondent also claimed that the house was constructed with the consent of
his co-heirs.
Pending trial of the case, the original parties died. They were properly substituted by their
respective heirs.
On September 25, 1982, the MTC conducted an ocular inspection of the property in question
thru its appointed commissioner. In his report the commissioner advised the court that the
identity of the lot in question tallies more nearly to the description of the land declared in the
name of Geronimo Celestra, the father of the defendant.
On February 20, 1984, the MTC of Binangonan, based on the evidence presented and the
Commissioner's Report, dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68 reversed the
dismissal and remanded the case to the MTC,
On February 24, 1989, the MTC after conducting further proceedings rendered judgment this
time in favor of the petitioner and ordered the respondent and all persons claiming under him
to vacate the disputed property.
On March 19, 1991, the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68, reversed the decision of the MTC
for plaintiffs failure to prove his prior possession over the subject property where defendant
erected his house.
Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in a decision
dated November 25, 1991, denied the petition for review.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Ceremonia is entitled to possession of the disputed property.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi:
Petitioner failed to clearly identify the parcel of land sought to be recovered, and subsequently
failed to prove prior possession of the land where, he claimed, respondent had built a house.
In civil cases, SC need not stress that the party having the burden of proof must establish his
cause by a preponderance of evidence. The bare allegation that petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest possessed the land in dispute is far from sufficient proof for the Court to rule favorably
on petitioner's claim of prior possession.
These observations together with the fact that these lots do not have common boundaries
provide sufficient bases to sustain the Court of Appeals' findings that there are in fact two (2)
parcels of land. Clearly the self-serving allegations of the petitioner cannot now defeat findings
of the appellate court based on his very own documentary evidence. The weight of the
evidence that said documents carry does not favor petitioner's cause.
SC agreed to The Court of Appeals opinion that the land in dispute is actually two parcels of
lot, the same being traversed by a road. The upper portion of the property bounded in the
west by a road tallies more with the land described in the deed of sale (Exhibit "E") and in the
sketch plans (Exhibit "J"). Undoubtedly, the land described in Exhibit "E" and as admitted by
the plaintiff to be containing an area of 2,000 square meters, more or less, belonged to and is
owned by the plaintiff [herein petitioner] and his predecessor-in-interest, they, having
adduced sufficient evidence of ownership to establish possession thereof.
However, with respect to the lower portion of the land with an area of 8,000 square meters,
more or less, the plaintiff failed to adduce convincing and sufficient evidence of prior
possession and ownership over the same.
Upon re-examination of the findings herein presented, SC find no reason to overturn the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals, particularly with regard to the lower portion or parcel,
where respondent built his house. The calibration of evidence and the relative weight thereof,
before reaching our level of review, belongs to the appellate court. Its findings and conclusions
cannot be set aside by this Court, unless sufficiently shown that there is no evidence on record
to support them. The findings of facts contained in the appealed decision before us are amply
supported by the evidence, and the conclusions therein are not clearly against law and
jurisprudence. Thus, SC find no reason to depart from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner failed to prove by preponderant evidence his prior possession of that parcel of land
in dispute, hence his suit against respondent for forcible entry has been correctly dismissed.
Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210
Del Mundo vs. CA, 252 SCRA 432
FACTS: This petition for review seeks a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
entitled Gerardo A. Del Mundo vs. Spouses Carlos and Alejandra Nava and a declaration that
the Writ of Execution by respondent Regional Trial Court Judge in Civil Case is null and void.
Private respondent Alejandra Nava was a former client of petitioner Gerardo A. del
Mundo. The spouses Carlos and Alejandra Nava owned a house and lot located in Project
6, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 256140 which was mortgaged to the Philippine Veterans
Bank. In 1981, before the spouses Nava migrated to the United States, this residential property
was leased by petitioner. The del Mundo family moved into the house upon execution of the
lease contract. Petitioner was given until October 16, 1982 to exercise his option to buy the
property. While respondent spouses were in the United States, petitioner sent them a Deed
of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage. He asked the spouses Nava to sign the said Deed
ostensibly to enable him to borrow part of the purchase price from the bank. Petitioner also
sent them an Addendum to the Deed of Sale which states that he will also assume her
obligations to Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and to Pablo Nava. Petitioner succeeded in persuading the
spouses Nava to trust him and to sign the Deed of Sale with Assignment of Mortgage and the
Addendum even without receiving consideration for the property. Alejandra Nava lost faith in
petitioner because he did not comply with his promise to pay the obligation to the Philippine
Veterans Bank, the indebtedness to Mrs. Ligaya Gonzales and obligation to Pablo
Nava. On March 16, 1983, private respondent spouses Nava executed a Revocation of Deed of
Sale with Assignment of Mortgage. Private respondent spouses through their attorney-in-fact
Bayani Sy, filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioner before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City and was ordered to vacate the premises, pay rent and attorneys fees
in a decision. Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court thus, rendered its decision on the
ejectment case on appeal. The judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court was merely modified
by increasing the attorneys fees and costs to be paid by petitioner. On November 5, 1985, a
Petition for Declaratory Relief to Quiet Title was filed by herein petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents.
Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court in
toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in not upholding the validity of the Deed of Sale with
Assignment of Mortgage.
RULING: The Ejectment case was for deprivation of possession while an action to quiet title is
based on ownership. Petitioner in the main contends that the Deed of Sale with Assignment
of Mortgage executed by the parties is valid, thus making him the owner of the
property. However, the Regional Trial Court and respondent Court of Appeals ruled against
him and held that the Deed was simulated and was made without consideration. The errors
raised by petitioner are clearly factual in nature. There is no justification to depart from the
well-settled principle laid down in a long line of cases that the findings of fact of the lower
courts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are, as a general rule, binding and conclusive
upon this Court. There is likewise no basis to review the factual conclusions of the Regional
Trial Court, particularly since respondent Court of Appeals adopted them as its own and found
them to be in order. Moreover, we agree with respondent appellate court in sustaining the
trial courts findings. The issue of possession can be resolved in an ejectment proceeding
without deciding the issue of ownership. When the issue of ownership is indispensable to the
resolution of the issue of possession, the Metropolitan Trial Court is empowered to decide it
as well. In any case, its decision does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building.
De Ocampo vs. Arlos, 343 SCRA 716
FACTS: Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared
as such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.
On 14 April 1977, Federico S. Arlos and Teofilo D. Ojerio filed an application for registration,
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-340, wherein they seek judicial confirmation of their
titles to three parcels of land, namely:
(1) A parcel of land covered by SGS 4140;
(2) A parcel of land identified as Lot 1, SGS 4124;
(3) A parcel of land identified as Lot 2, SGS 4141, all located at Cabcaben, Mariveles,
Bataan, and having a total area of 401,159 square meters or 40.1159 hectares.
Spouses De Ocampo and spouses Santos opposed the application for registration, alleging that
they are the co-owners of Lots 1 and 2 of Plan SGS 3062, situated at Cabcaben, Mariveles,
Bataan, and their ownership is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-43298 and T-
44205, and that they became owners of said lots by purchase from the government through
sales patents.
The Republic of the Philippines also opposed the application, contending that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interests have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and that the parcels of land applied for are portions of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.
Spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez and spouses Armando Manalo and Jovita Baron
also opposed the application for registration.
Almost four years after the filing of the land registration case or, to be exact, on 20 February
1981, applicant Arlos and his spouse, and applicant Ojerio and his spouse, filed Civil Case No.
4739, seeking to cancel the following:
(1) The free patent title of defendants-spouses Placido Manalo and Rufina Enriquez,
that is, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 296-Bataan
(2) The free patent title of defendants Armando Manalo and Jovito Baron, that is, OCT
No. 297-Bataan;
(3) The sales patent title of defendants-spouses Geminiano de Ocampo and Amparo de
Ocampo and defendants-spouses Pedro Santos and Crisanta Santos, that is,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-44205-Bataan and T-43298-Bataan with an area
of 111,333 square meters or 11.1333 hectares.
Affirming the factual findings of the trial court, the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to
comply with the Public Land Act, which required sales patent applicants to be the actual
occupants and cultivators of the land. It held that the testimonies of petition- ers, which were
incongruous with reality, bolstered the finding that they had never occupied, cultivated or
made improvements on the property.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the registration of the respondent's land is governed by the Public Land
Act.
RULING: Yes. The respondents bought the land in 1967 from the Obdins. The latter claimed
that they were occupying the said land since 1947. The land, which is a former US Military
reservation, was declared alienable and disposable only in 1971. Therefore, the claim of the
respondents that the parcel of land was under an open and continuous occupation when they
bought is impossible. Any entry, settlement, or occupation in the parcel of land prior to 1971
cannot produce an open and continuous occupation that can be used as a basis for the thirty-
year requirement in registering a land under the Public Land Act. The length of time between
1947 until 1971 before the reclassification of the parcel of land cannot in any way help in
ripening the occupation into ownership.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606
Facts:
Iglesia ni Kristo filed an application for the registration and confirmation of title over a parcel
of land, with an area of 280 sq. meters, situated at Barrio Consuelo Sur, Municipality of San
Marcelino, Zambales.
Petitioner (Republic) opposed the application on the ground that the ** Iglesia ni Kristo is a
private corporation, and that under Art. XIV, sec. 11, of the Constitution, private corporations
cannot acquire lands of the public domain but can only hold them by lease in an area not
exceeding 1,000 hectares. ... It appears that the applicant acquired the property in question
from Gregorio Rolls and Romualdo Rolls on May 23, 1946 (Deed of Sale). After acquiring the
land, applicant had it declared for taxation purposes. The latest tax declaration of this same
parcel of land starts with the year 1974. The land is exempt from payment of Realty Tax, being
devoted primarily for religious purposes.
Without passing upon the Government's contention that respondent Iglesia was disqualified
from acquiring the land in question, the trial court rendered judgment on June 2, 1980
decreeing the registration of the land in the name of the respondent (Iglesia).
(N.B. The decision also makes the finding that since acquiring the land, the Iglesia "has
been in open, public, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in the concept of an
owner thereof to the present time," having in fact " put up a chapel made of concrete
materials and galvanized iron for its roofing;" and that the land is not also within any
military or naval reservation.)
Issue: WON Iglesia ni Kristo is disqualified from acquiring the land in question. NO
RULING:
In accordance with the judgment of this Court en banc in Director of Lands v. IAC handed down
on December 29, 1986, involving substantially similar facts.
In that case, Director of Lands v. IAC, a private corporation, Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.
purchased a tract of land in 1962 from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, two members of the
Dumagat tribe, but applied with the Court for registration of its title over the land under the
Torrens Act only in July, 1981, long after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution-which inter
alia prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except
by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution, in
force in 1962 when Acme purchased the land in question). There being no question that Acme
and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the land for more than the
required 30-year period prescribed in Section 48 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended), the question presented to the Court en banc was whether or not the
title that Acme had acquired in 1962 could be confirmed in its favor in proceedings instituted
by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition
therein against private corporations holdings lands of the public domain. That question the
Court en banc answered in this wise:
... (The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
 upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
auction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court
held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-
interest, title over the lands has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent.
As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The land, therefore, ceased to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of
public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of
an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 (b) of C.A. No.
141) that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title." No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth, be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion
already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete.
The substantial identity of the facts and issues between the case at bar and Director of Lands
v. I.A.C. being undeniable, and being cited to no persuasive reason to decline to apply the
doctrine in the latter to the former, the Court, as aforesaid, has no alternative except to rule
adversely to the petitioner.
Republic vs. CA, 235 SCRA 567
Matthews vs. Taylor, 590 SCRA 394
FACTS
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn
C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought
from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-
Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was
allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed
improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort
known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the
resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8,
1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the
latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third
parties with respect to their Boracay property.
Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of
Lease(Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual
rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary
Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music
Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his
(Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were
used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact
that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease entered into by Joselyn and Matthews is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds
used in acquiring the same?
RULING
The Agreementof lease is valid. The Court confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law
issues, but more importantly, with a constitutional question.
When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the nullification of the
contract on two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he provided
the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid
contract involving the subject property without his consent.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is
reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which
is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify
the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering
that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she
acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was
illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the
alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him
to have.
Turquesa vs. Valera, 322 SCRA 573
FACTS:
Respondent Rosario Valera applied applied for the registration of two parcels
of land in Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square meters.
Lot 1 has an area of 210,767 square meters while Lot 2 has an area of 22,141
square meters.
Valera alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name, when she was
still single, for taxation purposes.
Lot 2 was allegedly bought by Valera and her husband.
Notices for the application for registration were published in the Official
Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper
places.
Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein petitioners as
regards Lot 2.
There was no contest as to the ownership of Lot 2.
The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to substantiate its
claim that the land is part of the public domain.
Other petitioners claim, on the other hand, that their lands were included
in Lot 1.
The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied petitioners
motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute.
Oppositors appealed to CA regarding Lot 1.
CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular inspection.
3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their findings
were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered.
The trial court reiterated its former judgment to register the whole area of Lot 1
to Valera with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already paid
and thus no longer annotated on the title.
The oppositors appealed with the argument that their properties were
erroneously included in the respondents land registration.
CA modified the land registration on Lot 1 excluding the landholdings of the
oppositors.
Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago
Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the court decision and granted the motion for
writ of possession on the landholdings of Partolan, Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal
the decision of the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen
who proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific portion of
land.
Thus, this motion for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to register the entire area of Lot 1 including those
owned by the oppositors?
RULING:
No. Valera is not entitled to the registration of the entire area of Lot 1.
The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon the applicant
who must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for.
Because the land registration proceeding is an in rem proceeding, a default order issued by the
court binds the whole world except those appearing in court to file their opposition or
pleadings in the registration case.
Thus, the oppositors are exempted from the general default order by the court. On the
respondents motion for writ of possession on the lots occupied by Baltar and Partolan, the
court finds no merit in granting their motion. Respondent did not provide evidence on her
rightful claim over these land areas. Although Partolan was excluded in the general default
issued by the court and Baltar did not appeal on the trial courts decision, respondent is still
required to prove and establish her registrable rights over the land even in the absence of
opposition. The payment of tax by her predecessor-in-interest is not sufficient evidence to
prove ownership.
Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to identify the
land in dispute with the boundaries comprising it. What defines a piece of land is not the
size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits. The writ of possession sought by the private respondent against persons
who are in actual possession under claim of ownership and their possession of the land raises
a disputable presumption of ownership.
Therefore, the land areas to be registered to the respondent are limited only to certain areas
in the sketch that is annexed to the Commissioners report as the respondent failed to establish
proprietary right over the excluded areas.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial
court are REINSTATED.
Alba vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 36
Facts: Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the
claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from one Eulalio
Raz. The documents attached to the application are: technical description, surveyor's
certificate, certification by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277.
The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of
4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast by the property of the Municipality of Banga.
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued but
those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana
Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the Municipality
of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to file their written
opposition. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on October 31, 1958.
They opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the
land applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion
and all the improvements thereon for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-
in-interest deriving their title by purchase from the original owners. Jose Rago filed his
opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco
although no special power of attorney was attached. He alleged that his principal is the owner
by right of succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its improvements for
more than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously, peacefully and
openly under claim of ownership.
Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz,
alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land applied for with an area of 2,262
square meters bounded on the north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia
and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the public market of
Banga. They claimed to have inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late father,
Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have
been in possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-
mentioned portion for not less 70 years. The trial court finds that Dr. Jose Lachica is the
absolute owner in fee simple of the land described in his application for its original registration
in his name. The land contains an area of 4,845 square meters, more or less, situated in Banga,
Aklan, and Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE.,
along line 2-3, by National road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl.
Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the
Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan, being
N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46' E., 87.66 m. to point "2"
thence, S. 56 deg. 42' W., 63.81 m. to point "3"
thence, N. 37 deg. 22' W., 59.26 m. to point "4"
thence, N. 33 deg. 42' E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, . . . All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of the survey, January 25, 1957,
and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.
The private respondent/applicant requested the Municipal Assessor of Banga to issue a revised
tax declaration covering 4,845 square meters on the bare claim that "the area has been
decreased" to only 620 square meters.
Issue: WON the private respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership
in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land he applied for.
Held: The trial court and the Court of Appeals confirmed private respondent/applicant's title
to the land on the basis of the findings that: 1.] the private respondent/applicant purchased
the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181;
3.] the private respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on the land from 1945 up to the
filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the private respondent/applicant has been in actual, open
and continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.] the
private respondent/applicant has acquired the land by prescription.
private respondent that the acquired land in question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A
Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed by Faustino Martirez covering 840
square meters; b] 300 square meters allegedly purchased from private respondent's father-in-
law Eulalio Raz, and c.] 3,725 square meters private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from
Eugrocino Alba.
In Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which
states that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the
public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted
and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without
default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their applications. 49
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in the affirming the ruling of
the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52 in
relation to the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the assumption that the subject land
is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court's postulate. The application for
registration of private respondent is for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title considering
that the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or
non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private
appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands. 53 For purposes of
administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain classified as "disposable" or
"alienable" are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial,
industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar
purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes. 54
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in
Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N. Lachica's house is
situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated from the
parcel of land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga,
Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square meters, to be registered and
confirmed in the name of private respondent;
2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned in the application be
segregated for future road widening programs upon the payment of just compensation to be
annotated at the back of the title.
3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is concerned, the case is
hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the
petitioners to establish the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in
their names of the areas they respectively claim.
The Director, LMB vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 757
FACTS: On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, a petition for registration of
Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of 43,614 sq.m more or less, forming part of a bigger tract
of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.
The Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands also disclosed that: 1) the subject land is identical
to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is agricultural in nature and
the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and
one house of the tenant made of light materials; 2) that the land subject for registration is
outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that
same land is free from claim and conflict; 3) that said land is neither inside the relocation site
earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing
public land application and no patent or title has been issued therefor; and, 4) that the
petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the land who acquired the
same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco as mentioned on the
Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 and that said land is also declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner
Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911, and later administered by him in behalf of his five
brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6
by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the
heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial
settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.
The trial court granted private respondent's petition. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
appealed from.
ISSUES: WON the CA erred in not finding that private respondent has not submitted proof of
his fee simple title or proof of possession and for the length of time required by the law to
justify confirmation of an imperfect title.
WON the CA erred in not declaring that private respondent has not overthrown the
presumption that the land is a portion of the public domain.
RULING: The Petition is impressed with merit.
On the first issue, pursuant to Land Registration Act, he who alleges in his petition or
application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times.
In the case, the private respondents has not produced a single muniment of title to
substantiate his claim of ownership. The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss
private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496. The evidence
adduced by the private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in
concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the
confirmation of imperfect title.
On the second issue, possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the
possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim
of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.
In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper, the burden is upon him (petitioner)
to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30)
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.
In the case, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to
the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement
and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he
filed his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his
possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However,
private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that
his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.
Also, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration
No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his brother, Severino
Cario. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969 declaring an
assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax
Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an
assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos. It does not
appear to have any sustainable basis and belied the findings of the lower courts.
Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined
the original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was
never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of
ownership. As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his
mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and
inadmissible in evidence.
To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.
Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his
petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing
and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en
concepto de dueo for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition, the
Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms
part of the public domain not registrable in the name of private respondent. The Petition is
GRANTED
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 276
FACTS: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its
decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, in compliance
with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals
which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the
name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that
the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice
of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD: YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO: The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication
of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding
in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly
be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law
is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the
law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application
for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
Leyva vs. Jandoc, 4 SCRA 595
Laragan vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 172
Facts: Laragan et. al. filed an application with the CFI Isabela for the registration of their title
over a parcel of land. The applicants alleged that they acquired said parcel of land by way of
an absolute deed of sale from the spouses Sibbaluca and that they have been in possession
thereof for more than 34 years.
Solicitor General also opposed on behalf of the Director of Lands alleging that the applicants
and their predecessor-in-interest do not have sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be
registered, the same not having been acquired by composition title from the Spanish
Government nor by acquisitive prescription. He prayed that the land be declared public land.
Teodoro Leano et. al. filed their opposition to the application for registration claiming that they
are co-owners of the southern part of the land covered by a homestead application of their
deceased paretns and that they possessed it for more than 30 years.
The trial court rendered judgment confirming the title of the applicants over the parcel of land
applied for and ordering its registration in the names of the applicants.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court but excluded the southern
portion of the land, which the court declared as a public land.
The petitioners now seek the reversal of the respondent appellate court's decision. They claim
that the respondent appellate court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring the
parcel of land in question as public land, because the decision of the CFI ordering the
registration of said parcel of land in their favor, had already become final and executory for
failure of the Director of Lands to appeal therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the C.A. erred in its decision?
HELD: No. While it may be true that the Director of Lands did not appeal from the decision of
the trial court, his failure to so appeal did not make the decision of the trial court final and
executory, in view of the appeal interposed by the other oppositors who also seek the
confirmation of their imperfect title over the land in question.
Neither did such failure of the Director of Lands to appeal foreclose the appellate court from
declaring the land in question to be public land, since the oppositors and the herein petitioners
are both seeking the registration of their title pursuant to the Public Land Law where the
presumption always is that the land pertains to the state, and the occupants and possessors
claim an interest in the same, by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership for the
required number of years.
Besides, it is an established rule that an applicant for registration is not necessarily entitled to
have the land registered in his name simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to
oppose the registration of the land. He must show, even in the absence of opposition, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple.
Nicolas vs. Pre, 97 Phil. 766
Lee vs. Punzalan, 99 SCRA 567
Dolfo vs. Register of Deeds for the Prov. of Cavite, 341 SCRA 58
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Amelita
Dolfo v. Hon. Novato T. Cajigal, et al." in which the court had denied petitioner's motion for
leave to intervene and/or admit complaint in intervention as well as her motion for
reconsideration. On March 5, 1996, petitioner Dolfo and Yangtze Properties, Inc. filed a motion
for leave to file and/or admit complaint-in-intervention in LRC Cases pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered
owner of the real property subject of the said LRC Cases as shown by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-320601 issued in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. The trial
court denied the aforementioned motion on the grounds that: 1) it is a procedural error to file
a complaint for intervention in cases involving original application for land registration, the
proceedings therein being in rem; and 2) there had already been an order of general default
entered by the court against those who failed to oppose the applications. The trial court noted
petitioner's failure to exercise any act of dominion over the subject property consistent with
her allegation of ownership. The trial court opined that petitioner's title over the subject
property was of doubtful nature and that allowing her to intervene in the LRC cases would
unduly delay the proceedings. And so the Regional Trial Court rendered a joint decision
recognizing and confirming the rights of private respondents over the litigated property and
ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration in their favor. Later, petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul and set aside the orders
of the Regional Trial Court. However, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision denying the
petition. The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court. The petitioner now contends that the
respondent court of appeals gravely erred in holding that the proper remedy in the land
registration cases is an opposition to the application of the applicants, and not a motion to
intervene in the proceedings before the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper remedy in the land registration cases is a motion to intervene in
the proceedings before the trial court.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court states that, the provisions of Sec. 14 and 25 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) show that the applicant and the oppositor are the only parties in cases of
original applications for land registration, unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may
include the plaintiff, the defendant, third party complainants, cross-claimants, and
intervenors. (VIP!) It is now settled that a motion to intervene in a land registration case
cannot be allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general
default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to the application for registration. This is so
because proceedings in land registration are in rem and not in personam, the sole object being
the registration applied for, not the determination of any right connected with the registration.
The Supreme Court further provides, with regards to the issue of the petitioners certificate of
title's authenticity. "It is premature for petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases because her
certificate of title, supposedly her best proof of ownership over the property described therein,
is questionable. Besides, inasmuch as the authenticity of her certificate of title is also being
questioned in the LRC cases, the evidence that she will present to the prove the contrary would
be the same evidence she will present in the case for annulment of title. At this point, where
there is already a decree of registration issued in favor of private respondents, it is moot and
academic to allow petitioner to participate in the LRC cases for the purpose of preventing
possible double titling of property. As the trial court correctly stated, petitioner is not left
without remedy even if she was not allowed to intervene. If it is shown that her certificate of
title is genuine and that she is the true owner of the litigated property, the proceedings in the
land registration cases would then be null and void because the trial court has no jurisdiction
on the matter. The Petition is denied and the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court
and of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. (This is a case under the INTERVENTION IN LAND
REGISTRATION CASES.)
Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 37
Facts: Gutierrez Hermanos filed 7 applications with the CFI of Masbate for the registration
under LRA, Act No. 496, of its alleged titles over 7 parcels of land with an area of around 9,490
hectares in Burias Masbate. They prayed that if Act No. 496 was not applicable in full to each
of the seven petitions for land registration, the benefits of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, known as the Public Land Law, be extended to the applicant.
The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and hundreds of private individuals opposed the 7
petitions for registration. These 7 cases were consolidated after the agreement of the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner may register certain parcels of land or whether it consists of
inalienable timberlands and consequently, non-registerable?
Held:
Dismissed.
As early as 1913, the Supreme Court stated in Malolos v. Director of Lands (25 Phil. 548):
One of the primary and fundamental purposes of the registration of land under the
Torrens system is to secure to the owner an absolute, indefeasible title, free from all
encumbrances and claims whatsoever, except those mentioned in the certificate of
title, and, so far as it is possible, to make the certificate issued to the owner by the
court, absolute proof of such title. In order, however, that the petitioner for
registration of his land under the Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same
registered and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued,
the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple
of the lands which he is attempting to have registered...
xxx xxx xxx
The denial of a petition for registration simply indicates that he has not furnished
that kind of proof showing an absolute title in fee simple which is required under the
Torrens system. It is the duty of the courts, even in the absence of any opposition,
to require the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of evidence and by positive
and absolute proof, so far as it is possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the
lands which he is attempting to have registered.
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court, through then Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stated in
Santiago v. Delos Santos (61 SCRA, 151-152):
The appealed order of dismissal is thus impressed with merit. It has likewise in its
favor the soundest policy considerations, based no less on one of the prime
objectives of the fundamental law. Both under the 1935 and the present
Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources
is ordained. There would be failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not
scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted,
they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case,
no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim
with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification
belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over
the same as dominus. Its disposition is justified only when shown that its utilization
promotes the public welfare. Especially so in case of doubt, considering that our
forest resources have been unduly depleted, courts should not lightly accept claims
that a parcel of land no longer can be classified as forestal. That is certainly one mode
of assuring the realization of the national patrimony being held in trust for future
generations. There is thus fealty to the ideal of conservation.
xxx xxx xxx
The social justice provision, Section 6, Article Two of the Constitution, provides that the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property.
When the claims to private property collide with a strong showing that the land sought to be
titled may be part of the patrimony of the nation, such claims require the closest examination
and scrutiny. The properties sought to be titled are almost 10,000 hectares in area and would
create a landed estate. In the words of the Supreme Court, the registrable rights must be
grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof.
Not only is there a vigorous assertion that the lands sought to be registered belong to the
public domain and that the claims of title are insufficient and nugatory, but the lands subject
of these appeals have been taken over by other private individuals hundreds of oppositors
according to the lower Court who have lived on extensive portions of the disputed lots since
the Japanese occupation.
The Land Registration Act, Act 496 requires the presentation of muniments of title for
registration under the regular provisions of said law. The applicant, which alleged ownership
in fee simple since Spanish times, could have presented old Spanish grants such as a titulo real
or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or
adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. The applicant could have
presented a titulo posesorio or possessory information title, which is not a title in fee simple
but is nonetheless prima facie evidence of possession under concept of ownership from the
date of the title and for the required period under the law.
Serna vs. CA, 308 SCRA 527
FACTS: Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of 12,508 sq.m. parcel of land
located in Alaminos, pangasinan who had 4 children, namely Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenza.
Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and had a daughter; petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to
Enriquito Serna) Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla. Hence, the parties are first
cousins. In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation purposes. In the same
year, Turner Land Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the
agreement that the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of
Lands. On March 1923, the Bureau of Lands approved the survey plan.
In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla sold
the land to his daughter, Rosa which began paying the real estate property tax from 1939
thereon.
On 21 August 1955, for a consideration of P1, 700.00, Rosa sold the land to her nephew,
respondent Santiago Fontanilla, evidenced by a notarized deed of absolute sale, signed by
Rosa. The instrument was not registered. In 1955, respondents constructed their house of
strong materials on the lot in question, which was completed in 1957. On December 16, 1957,
Rosas heirs executed another deed of absolute sale over the same land in favor of respondent
Santiago. In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their daughter. They stayed
there until 1981.
On 20 December 1978, taking advantage of respondents absence from the country,
petitioners Enriquito and Amparo Serna applied to the land registration court of Pangasinan
for registration of the said parcel of land in their name. In 1979, the land registration court
approved the application, and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued OCT. 139 to
petitioners. Said title was transcribed in the registration book of the Register of Deed of
Pangasinan on January 10, 1980.
On May 27, 1981, respondents spouses Santiago Fontanilla filed with the CFI an action for
reconveyance with damages, and sought the annulment of O.C.T. No. 139.
In the trial court, petitioners spouses Serna admitted that their grandfather Dionisio originally
owned the land in dispute. However, they claimed that in 1978 they bought the property for
(P3,000.00) from their aunt Lorenza which in turn, traced her title from her husband, Alberto
Rasca. Petitioner Amparo Serna said that when her grandfather failed to pay the survey costs
in 1921, Turner Land Surveying Company took the property in question as payment for
services. Her father, Alberto Rasca, redeemed the property from Turner evidenced by a deed
of sale, which, however, Amparo could not produce in court. When her father died, Santiago
borrowed from her mother, Lorenza the deed covering the transfer of the property, which he
did not return. Amparo said that the property was first declared in Albertos name for taxation
purposes in 1951. Later, the property was ceded to her.
After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before the trial court and in the
land registration case, on 5 June 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs (herein respondents) spouses Santiago Fontanilla (a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the
absolute and legal owners of the land in question; (b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and
Recover [sic] OCT No. 139 to the plaintiffs; (c) Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount
of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; (d) ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs P5,000,00 as
exemplary damages; and (e) To pay the costs without pronouncement as to moral damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Respondents questioned the court a quos failure to grant
their claim for moral damages. On the other hand, petitioners claimed that the trial court
committed serious error in the appreciation of facts and application of law and jurisprudence.
On August 1995, the CA rendered decision affirming that of the trial court.
In a resolution dated February 1996, the CA denied petitioners MR. Hence, this petition for
review.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the appealed CA decision is supported by evidence;
2) Whether or not the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
HELD:
1.) The first issue is factual, which the Supreme Court cannot review on appeal. As a general
rule, findings of fact of the CA are binding and conclusive upon the court, and will not normally
disturb such factual findings. This is because in an appeal by certiorari to this Court, only
questions of law may be raised. And for a question to be one of law it must involve no
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
To reiterate the distinction between the two types of questions: there is a question of law in a
given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain
state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity
of alleged facts.
Petitioners spouses Serna claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale executed by
Turner Land Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto Rasca, which, however, they failed to present in
court. The truth or falsity of this claim is a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not
reviewable in this appeal.
On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse
possession of the property for more than (60) years tacking in the possession of their
predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As early as 1921, Dionisio
Fontanilla was in adverse possession and paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes
for the first time in 1939, while respondents began paying taxes in 1967. They had their
residential house built in 1955, which was completed in 1957. In 1980, Santiago executed a
tenancy agreement with a certain Sixto Fontanilla until 1984; paid the taxes together with his
tenant Sixto. Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the property of the
declarant, tax declarations and receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when
accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.
2.) The Supreme Court finds the petitioners appeal to be vague and without merit. registration
of untitled land was pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later, PD 1529, the Property
Registration Decree, amended and codified laws relative to registration of property.
Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree. After
the lapse of said period, the decree becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to
reopening or review. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized
by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration.
The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional
omission of a fact required by law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic
or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in
the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were
fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are
entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the land
sometime after its registration, however, an innocent purchaser for value had not acquired
the property. Extrinsic fraud attended the application for the land registration. It was filed
when respondents were out of the country and they had no way of finding out that petitioners
applied for a title under their name.
An action based on implied on constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that
petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or
upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. Discovery of the fraud must be
deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate of title because registration of
real property is considered a 'constructive notice to all persons' and it shall be counted 'from
the time of such registering, filing or entering. Fortunately, respondents' action for
reconveyance was timely, as it was filed within ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 150
Heirs of Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 316
Facts: The Court of First Instance of Masbate(respondent court) confirmed the titles of La
Urbana, Inc. over lots in questions (lot 5 and lot 1, Psu-56145) with reservations, and ordered
the registration of these lots in favor of the Benuvar. A petition for reconstitution was made. At
the pendency of the reconstitution proceedings, the respondent De Banuvar acquired lot 1 from
Santiago de Erquiaga, who was thus substituted as a party for the latter. The petitioners
opposed, on a claim that they have been in actual, adverse, open and uninterrupted possession
and occupation of the said parcel in the concept of owners since time immemorial, long before
the Second World War. For "lack of proper notices," the respondent court denied the petition.
However, in its later order the court reconsidered and granted the petition. The petitioners
interposed an appeal from this last order. Respondent court dismissed the appeal "for failure
to post the required bond," but withheld action on the motion for immediate execution as to
lot 1 "until after this order dismissing the appeal shall have become final." The herein petitioners
then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals, to compel the trial court to give
due course to their appeal. This petition was finally dismissed. De Banuvar filed a motion for the
issuance of a decree over lot 1. The petitioners opposed and contended that the decision is not
final and executory because La Urbana, Inc. appears to have appealed from the said decision by
virtue of a notation the counsel received the same "Con mi excepcion making the execution of
the said decision impossible. De Banuvar asserted that the issuance of the decree is but a
ministerial duty of the respondent court. Respondent court ordered the issuance of a decree in
favor of De Banuvar with respect to lot 1 only, after finding that the decision in the land
registration case had already become final and executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision is not yet final and executory because the La Urbana, Inc. appealed
therefrom, as may be seen from the notation of the reconstituted decision stating, "Recibi copia.
Con mi excepcion.
Ruling:
This contention is without merit. Supreme Court held that the decision of March 24, 1938 had
long become final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom. The certification of the
acting provincial land officer of Masbate, dated March 8, 1960, recites that no "appeal has been
taken by the Director of Lands or any private oppositors from the decision rendered." The
notation found at the foot of the last page of the reconstituted decision, showing that the La
Urbana, Inc. excepted from that decision, did not have the effect of perfecting an appeal. An
appeal was not perfected by the mere notation, "Con mi exception." The judgment rendered in
a land registration case becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days to be counted from the
date on which the party appealing receives notice of the decision. The requirement contained
in the decision of March 24, 1938 regarding the segregation of a portion of lot 1, subject of an
agreement between the Director of Lands and the applicant, while it does leave something yet
to be done, does not detract from the finality of the decision, because the segregation adverted
to refers to a defined and delimited portion of the said parcel and may be accomplished anytime
after the decision became final and executory.
Republic vs. Association Benevola de Cebu, 178 SCRA 692
On October 8, 1965, a petition was filed by the Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Inc. before the RTC
of Cebu praying that a parcel of land situated in Cebu City, specifically Lot 108 of the Banilad Estate,
be registered in its name.
On June 21, 1966, the court, entered an order of general default as against the whole world, except
for the several groups of oppositors who filed their opposition to the petition.
On July 22, 1966, or more than one month after the order of general default was entered, the court
received a letter from the Solicitor General, accompanied by a mimeographed opposition of the
Director of Lands. There also appears in the records of the case, a copy of the letter of the Solicitor
General to the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu requesting the latter to represent the Office of the Solicitor
General at the hearing of the registration case.
On October 29, 1973, the court rendered a partial decision awarding to the applicant Associacion
Benevola de Cebu Lots 108-C and 108-D, and to oppositor Engracia Urot the ownership of Lots-108-
F, 108-I, 108-G, 108-H-I and 108-B-I.
On July 10, 1975, the court rendered a follow-up decision adjudicating to Bolabola and company
certain other specific portions of Lot 108, and to the heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, the remaining
portion of the land subject matter of the case.
The court further declared the other oppositors-claimants Victorino Vda. de Ramos, Sebastian Yap,
Ana Dondoyano, Osmundo Novela, Melchor Novela, Pablo Enolpe, Alfonso Londres and Juanita
Herico owners of their family houses erected on the respective lots.
The claims of the rest of the oppositors were ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
Not satisfied with the decision of the land registration court, the oppositors-appellants Pablo Enolpe,
et. al., appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals whereby affirmed the decision of RTC due to
absence of any gross and patent error committed by the court and Government disinterest to
pursue the case.
The aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated on appeal to SC and the same denied
the petition for lack of merit. The decision became final and executory as per entry of judgment
dated September 14, 1984.
On July 31, 1985, the court a quo granted the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
Guivelondo heirs, and ordered the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu on October 23, 1985 to proceed with
the writ of possessions.
On July 1, 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General was furnished by the Branch Clerk of Court, Branch
VI, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, copies of the decisions in the registration case N-633 dated
October 29,1973 and July 10, 1975.
On July 16, 1986, the Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. This was opposed
by private respondents and the Guivelondo heirs, who were among the adjudicatees in the
registration case.
On September 16, 1986, the respondent judge issued an Order denying the government's appeal,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding that the decisions of the court sought to be appealed from have long become
final and executory, and in fact, have already been executed.
The government thru the Solicitor General alleges that its appeal on July 16, 1986 was filed on time,
which is within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the copies of the
decisions; and that insofar as the government is concerned, the decisions have not yet become final
and executory.
Issue: Whether or not the appeal is allowed which within the prescribed period of 15 days
notwithstanding that the judgment is final and executory?
Issue
The foregoing contentions of the petitioner are impressed with merit.
Section 39 of BP Blg. 129 provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed from; ... .(Italics ours)
There is no question that it was only on July 1, 1986 or more than ten (10) years from the date of
judgments that the Solicitor General became cognizant of the decisions of the lower court when it
was furnished by the Branch Clerk of Court copies of the two decisions dated October 29, 1973 and
July 10, 1975. This fact was not denied nor refuted by respondents herein. Thus, when the Solicitor
General filed its notice of appeal on July 16, 1986, the appeal was perfected well within the fifteen
(15)-day mandatory period to file an appeal.
Moreover, Sec. 23 of the Interim Rules of Court provides that in "case where appeal is taken, the
perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party." As long
as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the
case.
It has been held that a judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial
declaration. Thus, finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of
appeal if no appeal is perfected
If ever there was an entry of judgment in this case dated September 14,1984, this had the effect of
finally disposing and putting an end to the controversy with regard to the private respondents
herein as among themselves and not insofar as the government's interest on the land is concerned.
As to it, the judgments have not yet attained finality because its appeal was perfected on time,
before the lapse of the period within which to appeal.
It is also worthy to note at this point that the adjudication of the land in a registration or cadastral
case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of
the final decree. As long as the final decree is not issued, and the one year within which it may be
revised has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree or adjudicate
the land to another party.
The argument of respondents that the appeal should not be allowed because the judgments
granting the registration have already been executed thru the writ of possession and the order for
the issuance of the title, has no legal basis.
the request of the Solicitor General for the fiscal to represent the former and to appeal did not make
the fiscal counsel of the Republic. We have held in many cases that the reglementary thirty-day
period for appeal (now 15 days) should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor General's Office was
apprised of the decision or order and not from the time the special counsel or fiscal was served with
the decision.
Lucero vs. Loot, 25 SCRA 687
FACTS: The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero. This was opposed to
by oppositors Loot but the court didnt see any merit in the same. Consequently, a writ
of possession was issued.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the order of September 21, 1959, granting the writ of possession in favor
of movant-appellee, and the orders of October 23, 1959, December 10, 1959 and February 20,
1960, denying the reconsideration thereof, are affirmed.
A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated
in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any
portion thereof during the land registration
proceedings. the issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration
proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently, any
person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the
final decree, may be subject to a judicial ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is
the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked by the successful
claimant.
If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the possession of
the land to the successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise issue,
especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without
said writ of execution would be ineffective.
Rodil vs. Benedicto, 95 SCRA 137
Abella vs. Rodriguez, 6 SCRA 987
City of Baguio vs. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342
Facts: On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted
the reopening of cadastral proceedings (a land registration/ titling proceeding) Civil Case No.1.
A decision on November 13, 1922 was rendered; the land involved (Baguio Townsite) was
among those declared public lands.
On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral court to reopen said civil case. He claims
that the land (Baguio Townsite) be registered in his name upon the grounds that 1.) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times 2.) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus were not able to file their claim to the
land in question. On the other hand, Francisco G. Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and
Teresita J. Buchholz, as tree farm lessees of the land in question, opposed the reopening. Their
contentions are as follows: 1.) The reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period
provided by R.A. 931 2.) Petition to reopen the case was not published 3.) as lessees of the
land, they have a standing to appear in the reopening proceedings. ISSUE/S: Statcon issue here
is whether the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by R.A. 931
(enacted June 20, 1953). Joaquins group contests that the title of the said act is in conflict with
section 1 of the same act, thus invalidating the petition of Lutes to reopen the civil case. Title
of the act reads:
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN
DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE
FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 of the act provides:
SECTION 1. in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such
claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of
judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act, are hereby granted
HELD: The court allowed the reopening of the case since the case was filed within the 40-year
period imposed by the act. Joaquins group believes that the difference between the title (BY
VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED and in section 1 (by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted), is material. If the title is to be followed, the date November 13, 1922 should be the
date used in reckoning the period (which is still within the 40-year period; counted from the
date of the enactment of R.A. 931 which is June 20, 1953). But if the wordings of the title are
to be followed, the date April 12, 1912, which is the date the Director of lands instituted the
reopening of the case, would render the petition invalid since it is already outside the 40-year
period. The rule on statutory construction provides that laws should be construed liberally.
The spirit or the intent of the law should be looked upon and should prevail over its letter. In
this case, R.A. 931 clearly gives an opportunity to any person who has any interest in any parcel
of land which has been declared as public land to present his claim within the time prescribed.
This act is a piece of remedial legislation; its intent provides a mode of relief to landowners
who, before the act had no legal means of perfecting titles. Therefore, the court cannot see an
inconsistency between the title and its section. The title of the act is indisputably clear, as it
expresses the very substance of the law itself. The constitutional jurisdiction that the subject
of the statute must be expressed in the title, breathes the spirit of command because the
constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill. Therefore, by the statute, the petition of Lutes to reopen the case,
decision on which was rendered on Nov. 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
Director vs. CA, 106 SCRA 426
Cayanan vs. de los Santos, 21 SCRA 1348
Calse vs. Pinkisan Yadno, 12 SCRA 745
Dela Cruz vs. Reano, 34 SCRA 585
Delos Angeles vs. Santos, 12 SCRA 622
Bayoca vs. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154
FACTS: Before us is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals. In essence, the petition poses a challenge against
the appellate courts conclusion that the first sale of a parcel of land to respondent Gaudioso
Nogales prevails over the second sale of the said property to petitioners Francisco Bayoca,
Nonito Dichoso and spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso. As such, there is no dispute as to the
following facts found by the Court of Appeals: When the Spouses Juan Canino and Brigida
Domasig died intestate, before 1947, they were survived by their legitimate children, namely,
Preciosa Canino, married to Emilio Deocareza, Consolacion Canino, Dolores Canino, Isidra
Canino and Tomas Canino who inherited, from their father, a parcel of land. Each of the heirs,
therefore, had a pro indiviso share of the property. Preciosa Canino executed an unnotarized
Deed of Sale of Real Property with Right of Repurchase over a portion of the above property,
with an area of 5,000 square meters, in favor of her sister-in-law, Julia Deocareza, the sister of
her husband, Emilio Deocareza, for the price of P200.00. On August 29, 1948, Preciosa Canino
executed another unnotarized Deed of Sale of Real Property with Right to Repurchase over the
entirety of the property, in favor of Julia Deocareza, for the price of P270.00, with a right to
repurchase the said lot for the same price. However, Preciosa Canino failed to repurchase the
property. In the meantime, Gaudioso Nogales, the Appellee in the present recourse, acquired
the property abutting the property of Preciosa Canino and her siblings, on the east, and
installed a tenant thereon. Julia Deocareza executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Realty
Property in favor of the Appellee over the aforesaid parcel of land for the price of P3,000.00.
However, the Appelleediscovered that Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso and the Spouses Pio
Dichoso and Dolores Dichoso, the Appellants in the present recourse, claimed ownership of
portion of the said property. The Appellant Nonito Dichoso had constructed a nipa hut on a
portion of the property. The Appellant Francisco Bayoca likewise constructed his house
thereon. Appellee filed a complaint against the Appellants Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso
and the Spouses Pio Dichoso and Dolores Dichoso for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages,
with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. The Appellee alleged, in his complaint, that he
purchased the said property, with an area of 21,000 square meters, from Julia Deocareza,
under the deed and thus acquired ownership thereof and that the Appellants respectively
purchased portions of said property, in bad faith and through fraud. The Appellants, in their
Answer to the complaint, alleged, inter alia that Preciosa Canino and her siblings acquired just
title over the property when they executed their Deed of Partitition of Real Property and
conveyed titles to the vendees, the Appellants in the present recourse, as buyers in good faith.
The trial court found and declared, under its Decision dated March 12, 1996, that Gaudioso
Nogales had acquired ownership over the property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners claim of ownership by virtue of their title issued and/or
registration will prevail over that of respondent.
RULING: Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of
multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Following the above-quoted law, in the double sales of immovables, ownership is
transferred in the order hereunder stated to (a) the first registrant in good faith; (b) the first in
possession in good faith; and (c) the buyer who presents the oldest title in good faith. Verily,
there is absence of prior registration in good faith by petitioners of the second sale in their
favor. As stated in the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344 can
have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such
buyer, On account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by respondent
Nogales as the first buyer, necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale
by the petitioners Erwin Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso for which they had
been issued certificates of title in their names. It follows that their title to the land cannot be
upheld. As for petitioners Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed to register the
portions of the property sold to them, and merely rely on the fact that they declared the same
in their name for taxation purposes. Suffice it to state that such fact does not, by itself,
constitute evidence of ownership, and cannot likewise prevail over the title of respondent
Nogales. It is worth mentioning that while the certificates of title in the names of Erwin Bayoca
and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against
the whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper
from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do
they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. The Torrens System is intended to
guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but it cannot be
used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land. Indeed,
registration with the Register of Deeds of a parcel of land divests the government of title to
the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed DECISION of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Panimdim vs. Director of Lands, 11 SCRA 628
FACTS: Here the free patent covering Parcel A was issued to Estanislao Panimdim on July 8,
1957 for which Original Certificate of Title No. 9040 was issued in his name by the register of
deeds of Camarines Sur, but on August 24, 1959 the Director of Lands, acting on a protest
interposed by Mariano De la Rosa, rendered a decision declaring the issuance of the patent
erroneous and ordering that an administrative action be taken in order to amend the same
and issue another reducing the patent to merely four hectares, This the Director of Lands can
no longer do, considering that more than two years had elapsed since the registration of the
patent As such, the same had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
ISSUE: Whether or not a registered free patent covering a parcel of land along with its
certificate of title is still under the control and jurisdiction of the Director of Lands.
RULING: No. Although the Director of Lands is the official who exercises the power to dispose
public lands, his view is correct only as long as the land remains a part of the public domain
and still continues to be under his exclusive and executive control. But once the patent is
registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the
public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
control nor jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, petition is granted. The decision of respondent Director of Lands of August 24,
1959 is hereby set aside. No costs.
Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124 SCRA 358
FACTS: The Director of Lands in his complaint alleged that Abanilla had, through fraudulent
means, secured a free patent and an OCT over a public land situated in Roxas, Isabela; that the
said free patent and OCT included portions of land occupied by Esquivel and Nuesa; and that
the portion occupied by Nuesa was sold to him by Cullanan who also earlier bought the same
from Abanilla herself (by virtue of a public document)
Abanilla in her answer alleged that her application for a free patent over the parcel of public
land was lawful since the occupancy of Esquivel of the portion claimed by him was merely
tolerated by her and was never adverse, and Nuesas occupancy never her right over the
portion he claims, because the sale made by her to Cullanan was void ab initio because the lot
she sold to him is public land.
Maria Abanilla filed an action with the trial court against Esquivel and Nuesa and three other
for the recovery of possession of the portions of land involved in the administrative case
between them in the land department. The trial court entered a judgment, declaring the Free
Patent null and void, ordering the Director of Lands to cancel said patent and issue another
patent in favor of Abanilla excluding the respective portions of land by Esquivel and Nuesa and
ordering Abanilla to surrender to the RD of Isabela the OCT who was thereby ordered to cancel
the same.
ISSUE: WON the patent and original certificate of title issued by virtue of the said patent can
still be cancelled despite the lapse of six (6) years and six (6) months from their is issuance.
HELD:
1. YES. Defendant-appellant clings to the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title. She
claimed that the lower court erred in not dismissing the action considering that a period of six
years and six months had already elapsed when the present action was instituted, in view of
the line of decisions of this Court sustaining the indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued in
pursuance of a public land patent.
The doctrine regarding the indefeasibility of title issued pursuant to a free patent one year
after its issuance does not apply to a grant tainted with fraud and secured through
misrepresentation, such as the free patent invoked in this case, since said grant is null and void
and of no effect whatsoever. Abanilla cannot use her title as a shield to perpetuate fraud. No
amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of
fraud. Fraus et jus numquam co-habitant
Furthermore, appellant Maria Abanilla cannot pretend that her title has become indefeasible
because no petition for review thereof was filed within one year from its issuance, since
proceedings for the review of her patent was actually pending before and after the issuance
of appellants torrens title.
It should be noted that, pursuant to explicit and repeated averments in the complaint Abanilla
had acted in bad faith, with full knowledge of the factual background of the case, particularly
of the public, continuous and adverse possession of Esquivel at the time she applied for patent
over the land in question, and up to the time she secured the issuance of an OCT over the said
land. The fact that Abanilla acted fraudulently in securing the patent and OCT was clearly and
definitely established in the decision of the Director of Lands. While an administrative case was
pending investigation by the Fact Finding Commitee composed of representatives of the
Bureau of Lands and the Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO)
Abanillasecured the issuance of Free Patent in her name covering the entire Lot; that by virtue
of the said patent, an OCT was issued in her name] This Court held in the case of Eusebio vs.
Sociedad Agricola de Balarin that the factual findings of the Director of Lands, approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, are conclusive in the absence of proof of fraud,
imposition, error or abuse of discretion.
We do not believe that appellant has any lawful claim against appellee Nuesa. The Portion of
land here involved was sold by appellant herself as her own private property. She cannot now
turn back and say that said portion is public land. Here, the matter is exclusively between her
and Wilson Nuesa, her vendees successor-in interest. The government is not involved. As
against appellee Wilson Nuesa, therefore, appellant is in estoppel.
Also, this Court held that prescription of action to review a title after the lapse of one year
from its issuance under Section 38 of Act 496, cannot be invoked against the State, since under
paragraph 4 of Article 1108 of the Civil Code, prescription does not run against the State.
Furthermore, Abanilla is now estopped from claiming that this action had already prescribed
for the simple reason that she can be considered an instrumental party in the delay in the flung
of the instant action.
Bernales vs. IAC, 162 SCRA 764
Facts: Henry Siagan is the father of both Elpidio whose mother is Cagaoay and Augusto whose
mother is Dagaoan. Augusto has a son named Constante, one of the petitioners in this case.
Both sons of Henry Siagan and their successors-in-interest are the contending parties in this
case, claiming ownership of the land in question.
Petitioners claim that Dagaoan acquired ownership over subject land by means of continuous,
adverse and peaceful possession thereof since time immemorial or since 1908; that she
brought said property to the marriage. Dagaoan declared Lot 1494 under T.D. 4187 (Petition,
Rollo, p. 19).
Dagaoan died and Augusto inherited Lot 1494 but his son Constante alleging in a Deed of
Absolute Sale that he inherited the same from his late grandmother, sold the lot in question
to the Pasimio spouses and registered said instrument under Act 3344. The Pasimio spouses in
turn sold the same lot to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. who bought the same for
the sole purpose of disposing the same at cost to the actual occupants-tenants thereon in the
furtherance of the Land Reform Program of the government.
Petitioners allege that they have been in possession and have tilled Lot 1494 as tenants of
Dagaoan Sawadan.The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued confirmed such in his complaint and
that said petitioners tilled the aforesaid parcel of land from 1968 to the present, openly,
publicly, adversely and continuously in the concept of owners.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that Lot 1494 was originally owned by Henry
Siagan who died intestate. That previously, Augusto and Elpidio executed a Memorandum of
Agreement in which they mutually recognize that only the legal heirs of Henry are entitled to
his properties and that Augusto quitclaimed any interest and right he had over three lots
among which is Lot No. 1494 in favor of Elpidio Siagan, while the latter in turn quitclaimed,
waived, ceded and conveyed any interest and right he had over 14 other parcels of land of the
decedent in favor of Augusto Siagan in exchange for said Lot 1494.
Elpidio Siagan applied for Free Patent of the Lot 1494 and subesexquently, and OCT was issued
in his favour. After 5 years, he sold the same to spouses Cadiam. Following their purchase, said
spouses took possession of the land, fenced it and planted it with rice but herein petitioners
forcibly dispossessed them therefrom, uprooting the plants of said couple.
In turn, Constante and his co-petitioners instituted a case for the annulment and cancellation
of certificate of title claiming that the OCT was fraudulently secured.
RTC = ruled in favor of petitioners
C.A. = reversed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Cadiam are entitled to the land?
HELD: Yes.
In the case at bar, the Free Patent was granted to Elpidio Siagan, the very person who as
successor-in-interest of Augusto Siagan with a claim of continuous and adverse possession in
the concept of owner since time immemorial or since 1908 through the latters predecessors-
in-interest, is entitled to subject land. An Original Certificate of Title was issued in favor of
Elpidio Siagan. As held by this Court, once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the
Public Land Act is registered under the Torrens System, the certificate of title issued in virtue
of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land Registration Act.
Corollary thereto, the Director of Patents, being a public officer, has in his favor the
presumption of regularity in issuing the questioned homestead patent.
As aforestated, the Cadiam spouses to whom a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued after
the purchase of the lot from Elpidio Siagan for a valuable consideration as stated in the Deed
and who had no knowledge of any flaw or defect of the title at the time of the purchase, are
evidently as ruled by the Court of Appeals, innocent purchasers for value and above all
considerations, are entitled to the protection of the law.
Cadiam spouses who were found by the Court of Appeals as innocent purchasers for value with
a Transfer Certificate of Title under the Torrens System in their names, have evidently a better
right than herein petitioners.
Lopez vs. CA, 169 SCRA 271
FACTS: The deceased spouses Tiburcio Pinohermoso and Casiana Flores had three children,
namely Hermogenes, Felicidad and Pedro, all surnamed Pinohermoso. The plaintiffs in this
case are the heirs of the children of spouses Tiburcio Pinohermoso and Casiana Flores.It
appears that on July 19, 1913, Tiburcio Pinohermoso filed Homestead Application No. 19478
(E-12596) and it was approved on October 26, 1914.
The applicant had paid the required homestead fees amounting to P20.00 and submitted his
final proof on June 29, 1922. On April 5, 1924, Casiana Flores died. Under date of March 20,
1925, an order for the issuance of patent to 'Tiburcio Pinohermoso was issued by Bureau of
Lands. Original Certificate of Title No. 1406 was issued on April 22, 1926 over the parcel of land
in controversy unto the said Tiburcio Pinohermoso "to have and to hold the said tract of land,
with the appurtenances thereto of right belonging unto the said Tiburcio Pinohermoso and to
his heirs and assigns forever subject to the provisions of sections 116, 119, 120 and 122 of Act.
No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, as amended, which provides that the land hereby
acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to incumbrance for a period of five (5)
years from the date of this patent". . . . . In consideration of the sum of P550.00. Tiburcio
Pinohermoso sold this land to defendants Bonifacio B. Lopez and Roberta Llaneras on May 20,
1939 who took possession of the property and its improvements upon their purchase thereof.
By virtue of the said sale, OCT No. 1406 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15186 was issued on February 3, 1940 in the name of Bonifacio B. Lopez married to Roberta
Llaneras. Tax Declaration No. 1279 was thereafter issued to Bonifacio Lopez and said
defendant has been paying the realty taxes on the land since 1948 up to the filing of this case
in 1958.
In this complaint dated March 19, 1958, plaintiffs pray among others that judgment be
rendered declaring that the property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Tiburcio Pinohermoso and Casiana Flores and that as heirs of Casiana Flores, they
became the owners of one-half (1/2) thereof from the time of her death.
ISSUES: Whether or not buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of may safely rely on the
correctness of its certificate of title ? will theoblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property?
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The land in question is a homestead titled
under the Land Registration Act. In the case of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, this Court citing
the case of Pajomayo, et al. v. Manipon, held that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the
certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens' title
issued under the Land Registration Act.
Under the established principles of land registration law, the presumption is that the
transferee of registered land is not aware of any defect in the title of the property he
purchased. Moreover, the person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.
No strong considerations of public policy have been presented which would lead us to reverse
the established and sound doctrine that the buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of land
does not have to look beyond the Torrens Title and search for any hidden defect or inchoate
right which may later invalidate or diminish his right to what he purchased.
There is nothing in the questioned decision which indicates why Bonifacio Lopez should have
looked beyond the title and why he should have taken notice of the fact that the sole registered
owner had a legitimate wife who died in 1924 or 16 years before the land was offered to him
by the sole registered owner in 1940.
If the court were to accept the respondents' contentions, a buyer of registered land would
have to look beyond the title for any unregistered owner, any earlier buyer who failed to
register his purchase, all possible actual owners who used the registered buyer as a dummy,
and so many other defects or vices of the title, ad infinitum. The ruling of the respondent court
is contrary to the reasons behind the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
Whether the action is one for the annulment of a deed of sale executed by means of fraud, or
for reconveyance based on implied trust is, however, of no moment. Both causes of action had
prescribed, applying the law of the old Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure which
governed the contract of sale executed in 1939.
The reasons alleged by the respondents for the long delay in filing the action-that they were
poor and had to save for the expenses of litigation and that the Japanese occupation prevented
them from filing the case immediately are not meritorious.
Whatever right the respondents had over one half of the registered property had already
prescribed through lapse of time by reason of their negligence and abandonment.
Municipality of Hagonoy vs. Sec. of Natural Resources, 73 SCRA 507
FACTS: Municipality of Hagonoy alleges that it is the lawful and absolute owner of a fishpond
situated at, Barrio San Roque and that from time immemorial, plaintiff has been in actual,
open, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession thereof, and has exercised acts
of ownership thereon. It further alleges that defendant Jose B. Santos, notwithstanding
common knowledge that said fishpond is owned by the municipality, applied for a sales patent
covering the same with the Bureau of Lands; to which the Director of Lands sold said fishpond
to Jose B. Santos despite the fact that the same is patrimonial property of the municipality and,
therefore, not disposable by sales patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The Director of Lands, however, denies the allegation of ownership over the parcel of land
(fishpond) in question, claiming that the same was owned by the Republic of the Philippines
and had been administered by the Bureau of Fisheries which had leased said fishpond to
defendant Santos under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 872 (renewal), and Santos, by virtue
thereof, was in continuous possession of said fishpond as lessee from 1923 to 1962; (2) that
the land was awarded to Santos on February 18, 1963, pursuant to Sales Application No.
V40308, said land being a part of the public domain, belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
and disposable under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
The Director further alleges: (1) that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause; (2) that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment or by the statute
of limitations; and (3) that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
the land in question being a part of the public domain and subject only to the authority and
discretion of the defendant Secretary insofar as its administration, management and
disposition are concerned, in accordance with law.
Jose B. Santos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the plaintiff failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when he did not appeal the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to the President; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute
of limitations under Section 38 of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which provides that
when a decree of registration has been fraudulently issued, the aggrieved party has one (1)
year within which to attack the validity thereof, and in the instant case, the complaint was filed
more than three (3) years from the time title to the property was issued; that plaintiffs cause
of action is barred by prior judgment because plaintiff had already filed a case for annulment
of the same title, which case was dismissed by the court and ruled in favor of Santos.
Lower court dismissed the case, CA also dismissed. Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the lower court dismissing the petition constitute res
judicata or bar to herein appeal?
RULING: The court ruled that the Order of the Bulacan Court of First Instance dismissing the
"Petition for Cancellation of Title, the Original Certificate of Title No. P-746" against Santos
does not constitute a bar to the present action.
The principle of bar by prior judgment or res judicata is based upon the fundamental principle
that a matter once adjudicated shall not again be drawn in issue while the former adjudication
remains in force. If the judgment is not on the merits, it cannot be considered as a conclusive
adjudication of the controversy. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that "the
proper remedy for petitioner under the circumstances seems to be that contemplated in
section 38 of the Land Registration Act and not the present petition for cancellation of the
aforesaid title."
This Order did not settle the question of title over the property but left the question whether
or not the title was unlawfully procured for future determination. SC noted that the
appropriate remedy of the Municipality of Hagonoy under the attendant facts is not one for
the reopening of the decree under section 38 of the Land Registration Act, as suggested by the
trial court, but an action for reconveyance.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases
to be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands
has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when registered in the corresponding
Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible as Torrens title upon
the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. Said title is, like one issued
pursuant to a judicial decree, subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the
issuance of the patent. Beyond said period, the action for the annulment of the certificate of
title issued upon the land grant can no longer be entertained.
However, where it is claimed that the land awarded by virtue of patent was not part of the
public domain but was private property, the owner who has been wrongfully deprived of such
land may, notwithstanding the lapse of the one-year period, bring an action for the recovery
thereof, and "the court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the
cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the
registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the
true owner thereof."
Since the main issue raised by appellant therein is the ownership of said property there can be
no question that a final decision on the merits in Civil Case No. 2186 would, regardless of who
is successful, amount to a res adjudicata in the case at bar, because all questions on the validity
of Original Certificate of Title No. P-746 could be definitely settled therein, thus precluding the
relitigation of the same issues.
The appeal was DISMISSED, without prejudice to appellants pursuing its remedy in Civil Case
No. 2186.
Omandam vs. CA, 301 SCRA 450
Facts: On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of Camilo
Lasola for a certain land in Sagrada, Tambuling, Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deeds also
issued an Original Title Certificate in his name. On April 28, 1983, Blas Trabasas bought the
land from a certain Dolores Sayson who claimed to be the owner. In 1984, Trabasas discovered
that petitioners Carquelo Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on
July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasola's homestead patent before the Bureau of Lands and
prayed for the cancellation of the OCT. Upon Sayson's advice, Trabasas repurchased the land
from Lasola, who executed a Deed of Sale dated September 24, 1987. On August 9, 1989,
Trabasa acquired a new Transfer Certificate of Title. On April 16, 1990, Blas Trabasas and
Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land
with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they are the true owners
of the land and that the petitioners should vacate it.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela
who have been in possession for almost twenty years. After the parties were duly heared, the
RTC issued a decision on November 15, 1993, declaring that neither Trabasas and Bonilla, nor
their predecessor-in-interest were ever in possession of the land. The court ordered the
Trabasas and Bonilla to reconvey the title of the land in the name of the petitioners. The
decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, the DENR dismissed
Omandam's protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandan failed to
prove that Lasola committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the patent, hence there
is no ground for the revocation and cancellation of its title. On October 29, 1996, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the petitioners to vacate
the subject land and surrender it to Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla. The Court of Appeals
declared that the collateral attack on the homestead title to defeat private respondents' accion
publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent had already become indefeasible since
April 28, 1977; and that petitioners' action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with
the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the complaint for recovery of
possession, already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
subsequently denied.
Issue: WON the trial courts decision will affect the order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a
homestead application and decision of the DENR on the protest over homestead patent?
Held: Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in
its Section 3 and 4 to the Director of Lands primarily and to the Secretary of the DENR
ultimately the authority to dispose public lands. In this regard, the courts have no jurisdiction
to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration issued by the Director of Lands. Only
the Secretary of the DENR can review, on appeal, such decree. Thus, reversal of the RTC of the
award given by the Director of Land to Lasola was in error.
DENR's jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the authority of the courts of justice to
resolve questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has
not settled the respective rights of public land claimants. But once DENR has decided,
particularly with the grant of homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its
decision prevails.
Petition was denied and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
Baguio vs. Republic, 301 SCRA 450
FACTS: The patent and certificate of title cover a parcel of land (Lot 1426, Case 2, Pls. 823)
consisting of 5,870 sq.m., in Catarman, Liloan, Cebu was declared by the government public
land in 1963.
On August 2, 1963, private respondent Ricardo Michael, predecessor-in-interest of William
Michael, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of land. The
application was recommended for approval by the land for one year from October 4, 1963 to
October 3, 1964.
On October 8, 1963, William Michael made some reclamation on the land, built a fence around
the premises, and constructed a bridge over a portion which was under water. Upon expiration
of the permit, the Highway District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands that the
land be leased to Michael. The land investigator recommended granting Michael the authority
to survey the foreshore land in view of the completion of the reclamation made by him on the
premises.
On November 9, 1976, petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent
covering the same land. In his application, petitioner stated that the land was agricultural land
and not claimed or occupied by any other person and that he had been in actual and
continuous possession and cultivation of the same. A free patent was issued to him and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-15457 was issued in his name by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu.
Petitioner demanded payment of rentals from William Michael for the use of the land occupied
by Michael Slipways, Inc. William, in turn, protested the issuance of a free patent and claimed
that he had been in actual possession of the land since 1963 and that he had introduced
substantial improvements.
On February 16, 1989, the government, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a petition
for cancellation of title and/or reversion of land against petitioner Baguio and the Register of
Deeds. This granted private respondent Ricardo Michael leave to intervene as heir and
successor-in-interest of William and as president of Michael Slipways, Inc.
The RTC rendered a decision cancelling the free patent and the certificate of title of petitioner
Baguio, ordering the reversion of the land to the public domain, and declaring private
respondent Michael the true and lawful occupant of the land. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. WON the RTC erred in finding that petitioner acted in bad faith and procured the issuance
of the Free Patent (VII-I)-7757 and the OCT No. 0-15457 through fraud and misrepresentation.
2. WON the RTC erred in declaring intervenor (private respondent) as the true and lawful
possessor and occupant of the land subject of the intervention.
RULING: The Court held that the contentions are without merit.
On the first issue, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued,
the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
property, and the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of issuance of such patent. Indeed, the indefeasibility of
a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the tile by means of fraud.
Petitioner declared under oath that the land in question was an agricultural land not claimed
or occupied by any other person; that it had introduced improvements thereon. These
declarations constitute fraud and misrepresentation. The government proved that as early as
September 2, 1963, 13 years before the alleged entry of petitioner on the land, William
Michael; had already filed a foreshore lease application over the same; filed a miscellaneous
sales application over the land; that he has been continuously in possession of the land on
which he has been operating a drydocking service and that he had made improvements
thereon. It was also established that the land is foreshore land, not agricultural.
Petitioner is guilty of making false statements in his application for a free patent justifying the
annulment of his title under Section 91 of C.A. No. 141 (Public Land Act).
On the second issue, it was clearly proven that William Michael had already been in possession
of the land under a provisional permit to occupy the same in 1963. Also, William had filed a
sales application covering the land in 1968, 8 years before the petitioner filed his free patent
application. The RTC held correctly that William and private respondent Ricardo to be the true
and rightful possessors of the land in question. The fact that private respondent Michael is
merely the successor of the original foreshore lease and sales applicant, William Michael, does
not make him any less entitled to the possession of the land. Section 105 of the Public Land
Act provides that, in case of his death, the original applicant shall be succeeded I his rights and
obligations by his legal heirs with respect to the land applied for or leased.
The decision of the CA is affirmed.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, 333 SCRA 628
Francisco vs. CA, 299 SCRA 188
Jocson vs. CA, 170 SCRA 333
Siasoco vs. Narvaja-Bolog, 315 SCRA 144
Benin vs. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531
Balbin vs. Register of Ilocos Sur, 28 SCRA 12
Uraca vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 702
Facts: The Velezes were the owners of the lot and commercial building in Cebu while the
petitioners were lessees of the said building. The Velezes through Ting wrote a letter offering
to sell the subject property for P1,050,000.00 and at the same time requesting the petitioners
to reply in three days. Such sale was accepted.
Uraca went to see Ting about the offer to sell but she was told by the latter that the price was
P1,400,000.00 in cash or managers check and not P1,050,000.00 as erroneously stated in their
letter-offer after some haggling. Emilia Uraca agreed to the price of P1,400,000.00 but counter-
proposed that payment be paid in installments with a down payment of P1,000,000.00 and
the balance of P400,000 to be paid in 30 days. Carmen Velez Ting did not accept the said
counter offer of Emilia Uraca although this fact is disputed by Uraca. However, no payment
was made.
The Velezes sold the lot and commercial building to the Avenue Group for P1,050,000.00 net
of taxes, registration fees, and expenses of the sale. At the time the Avenue Group purchased
the subject property on July 13, 1985 from the Velezes, the certificate of title of the said
property was clean and free of any annotation of adverse claims or lis pendens.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the contract of sale was perfected; and
II. Whether or not the CA erred in not ruling that petitioners have better rights to buy
and own the Velezes property for registering their notice of lis pendens ahead of the
Avenue Groups registration of their deeds of sale.
Held: Novation is never presumed; it must be sufficiently established that a valid new
agreement or obligation has extinguished or changed an existing one. The registration of a
later sale must be done in good faith to entitle the registrant to priority in ownership over the
vendee in an earlier sale.
On the first issue: no extinctive novation.
The lynchpin of the assailed Decision is the public respondents conclusion that the sale of the
real property in controversy. The Court noted that the petitioners accepted in writing and
without qualification the Velezes written offer to sell at P1,050,000.00 within the three-day
period stipulated therein. Hence, from the moment of acceptance on July 10, 1985, a contract
of sale was perfected since undisputedly the contractual elements of consent, object certain
and cause concurred.
Article 1600 of the Civil Code provides that (s)ales are extinguished by the same causes as all
other obligations, x x x. Article 1231 of the same Code states that novation is one of the ways
to wipe out an obligation. Extinctive novation requires: (1) the existence of a previous valid
obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the extinguishment of
the old obligation or contract; and (4) the validity of the new one.
On the second issue: double sale of an immovable.
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does
not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property.Article 1544 requires that
such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he
governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge
gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights except where
the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the
Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under
the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in
converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he
is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad
faith This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able
to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he
must show that he acted in good faith throughout.
Millena vs. CA, 324 SCRA 126
Gatioan vs. Gaffud (PNB), 27 SCRA 706
 Cruz vs. Cabana, 129 SCRA 656
Bayoca vs. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154
Facts: Gaudioso Nogales acquired ownership over the subject property on the basis of the
Compromise Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Julia Deocareza who had Dagupan Trading Co. vs. Macam, 14 SCRA 179
acquired of said property from the Canino brothers and sisters. However, Preciosa Canino
subsequently sold at different times portions of the subject property to herein petiitoners,
Francisco Bayoca, Nonito Dichoso, Erwin Bayoca, and spouses Pio and Dolores Dichoso. The Tomada vs. Tomada, 28 SCRA 1028
Appellee, filed complaint against the Appellants for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages.
He alleged in his complaint, that he purchased the said property from Julia Decareza and thus
acquired ownership thereof and that the Appellants respectively purchased portions of said Heirs of Claro Laureta vs. IAC, 184 SCRA 157
property in bad faith and through fraud. The Appellants, in their Answer to the complaint,
alleged that Preciosa Canino and her siblings acquired just title over the property when they
executed their Deed of Partition of Real Property and conveyed titles to the vendees, the
Appellants in the present recourse, as buyers in goof faith. The Regional Trial Court ruled in
favor of Nogales and declared that the sales of portions of said property by Preciosa Canino
were null and void. The trial court further declared further that petitioners were purchasers in
bad faith. On appeal, the court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling. Hence this petition.

Issue: Who has the superior right to the parcel of land sold to different buyers at different
times by its former owners?

Ruling: Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. There is no question from the records that respondent Nogales was the first to buy
the subject property from Julia, who in turn bought the same from the Canino brothers and
sisters. Petitioners, however, rely on the fact that they were the first to register the sales of
the different portions of the property resulting in the issuance of new titles in their names.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple
sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should
there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
Based on the foregoing, to merit the protection under Article 1544, second paragraph, the
second buyer must act in good faith in registering the deed. Thus, It has been held that in cases
of double sale of immovables, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the
second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such
second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property.
On account of the undisputed fact of registration by respondent Nogales as the first buyer,
necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the sale by the petitioners Erwin
Bayoca and the spouses Pio and Lourdes Dichoso for which they had been issued certificates
of title in their names. As for the petitioners Francisco Bayoca and Nonito Dichoso, they failed
to register the portions of the property sold to them, and merely rely on the fact that they
declared the same in their name for taxation purposes. Suffice it to state, that such fact, does
not, by itself, constitute evidence of ownership and cannot likewise prevail over the title of
respondent