Persons Compilation 1

Digests by Alex Delos Santos
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

College of Law
Rockwell Center, Makati City
PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS

2011-2012
Judge Bonifacio
Delos Santos, Alexandra Patricia Lim

September 20, 2012
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
NIAL vs. BAYADOG
Facts:
Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 1974, children as petitioners. Pepito killed Teodulfa on 1985.
One year and 8 months, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license but with an
affidavit dated stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. Under the assumption that the validity of the second marriage would affect
successional rights of children, they filed for annulment of the second marriage.
RTC dismissed the petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the second marriage of deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(2) Whether or not the children have legal standing to file the case of annulment,
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their fathers death.
Held:
The applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.
1. Article 76 marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage has no need
for a marriage license
There is no dispute that the marriage was without any marriage license.
five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union
The time of Pepito and respondents marriage, they did not live with each other as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to their wedding day.
second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
2. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
The second marriage is already void, therefore there is no need for a declaration of nullity.
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
Doctrine:
1. Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage
to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
2. Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
3. Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
4. Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. x x x.
5. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage.
SANTOS VS CA
[January 4, 1995]
Facts:
Plaintiff Santos married defendant Bedia on 1986. On 1988, Julia left for the U.S. and did not communicate with
husband and did not return. 1991, Leoul filed a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36. The RTC
dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal.
Issues:
Is Julia psychologically incapacitated?
Held:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not
constitute psychological incapacity. Pyschological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL
ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inablity to give meaning and significance to the marriage and must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Ruling:
Petition is denied.
Doctrine:
1. Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage
to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
2. Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
3. Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment
to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
4. Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. x x x.
5. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity
of a marriage.
REPUBLIC VS CA
[February 13, 1997]
Facts:
1985 plaintiff Molina married Reynaldo Molina and bore a son. After a year, Reynaldo showed signs of childishness and
negligence as a husband through financial dishonesty, spend time with friends rather than family and etc. The RTC
granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage and was avowed by the CA.
Issues:
Is there psychological incapacity in the present case?
Held:
There is no clear showing that the psychological defect expressed of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a
difficulty,irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It
is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they show that they are helpless due to psychological illness.
Guidelines in Article 36
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
4. Incapacity is medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
5. Grave enough to disable party to assume the essential obligations
6. Marital obligations should in law
7. Clarifications by the Catholic Church in the Philippines, should be given great respect by our courts.
8. Arranging attorney and Solicitor General to show as counsel
Ruling:
The petition is dismissed.
Dedel vs. CA
Facts:
1966, David and Sharon got married and had four children. David found out that Sharon is an irresponsible wife and
mother through her actions. E.g. had children with other men, remarried and had affairs with other men.
David petitioned for annulment, together with an examination by Doctor Dayun of Sharon certifying that she has a
personality disorder showed by her actions.
Her acts were an indication of symptoms of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Issues:
Whether or not there is psychological incapacity.
Held:
No, psychological incapacity is intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be
incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute as
psychological incapacity.
These are meager grounds for legal separation.ss
Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
[226 SCRA 572 1993]
DOMINGO V. CA
Facts:
Delia Domingo and Roberto Domingo got married. After a few years, Delia filed for a declaration of nullity against her
marriage to Roberto on the grounds that Roberto was was already married to another when they conducted their
marriage. Petitioner prays that she may acquire all her exclusive properties. However, Roberto moved to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that Declaration of Nullity was only needed for remarriage.
Lower court and CA denied the motion.
Issues:
Whether or not declaration of nullity is only approved for reasons of remarriage
Held:
No. The declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 40 may be resorted to even for a purpose other than
remarriage.
Vital to the correct clarification of Article 40 is the word "solely." xxx. As it is placed, it is meant to qualify "final
judgment." Had the provision been stated as follows: "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
solely for purposes of remarriage...," the word "solely" will qualify "for purposes of remarriage" and the husband
would have been correct. That Art. 40 as finally expressed comprised the important clause signifies that final
judgment affirming the previous marriage void does not need to be obtained for purposes of remarriage only.
Ruling:
Petition was dismissed.
Lam vs. Chua
Facts:
Petition for review of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Lam and Chua were married in 1984 and said marriage conceived a son. Chua claims that Lam is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his obligations. Chua says that he is thoughtless and keeps on asking for money. Lam does not
help his family and he doesnt come home, he is also an adulterer and mishandles their properties.
Petition was granted by the regional trial court. The spouses have been living independently and Chua seeks the
nullification of her marriage. She offered indication presenting that Lam has been married twice before their marriage
which makes it bigamous. The Trial Court declared their marriage void and ordered Lam for support. This was disputed
by Lam declaring that a common fund was agreed upon both would support the child. The CA affirmed the trial courts
decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void for psychological
incapacity
1. whether or not the marriage is bigamous in nature and
2. whether or not the monthly support is necessary.
Held:
Whether or not the marriage is bigamous in nature and whether or not the monthly support is necessary, yes sc said it
was declared null and void by reason of bigamy. There was proof that Lam was previously married and incapacitated
to marry said petitioner. Lam did not contest the issue. 3. No, monthly support was not reasonable because it was
decided outside the opportunity of the questions upraised. Mother was not able to prove the amount was necessary.
Ruling:
Petition was partly approved.
[320 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]
Lucita E. Hernandez vs. CA and Mario Hernandez
Facts:
1981, Lucita married Hernandez and they had 3 children. 1992, Lucita filed a petition for annulment of marriage under
Article 36, alleging Mario who failed to support the family. He was drunk, had affairs with women and had illegitimate
children. The RTC and CA dismissed the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not Marios habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity/perversion and family abandonment constitute
psychological incapacity.
Held:
No. These acts do not constitute psychological incapacity. These acts, to be considered should be manifestations of a
disordered personality and make the person unable to discharge marital obligations.
Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
MALLION vs ALCANTARA
Facts:
This is a petition for review e decision of the Court of Appeals. Mallion was married to Alcantara and in 1995, Mallion
filed a petition seeking the nullification of their marriage because of psychological incapacity. Due to his letdown to
adequately show the incapacity, the court denied the petition. In 1999, he filed a petition for nullification of their
marriage now because of lack of marriage license. Alcantara disputed the petition by appealing res judicata and forum
shopping. The petition and motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
Whether or not party can raise both contentions of lacking marriage license and psychological incapacity.
Held:
No, the concept of res judicata does not allow both contentions to be raised by the party. the court does not favor
those who raise different contentions on one issue. It just goes to say that the petitioner is desperate to have his
annulment or nullification approved.
Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
WIEGEL V. SEMPIO-DIY
Facts:
On 1978, Lilia married Weigel in Makati. Weigel found out that lilia was already married file for a declaration of nullity
of their marriage. Lilia on the other hand, claimed that her first merraige was void ab initio on the grounds that her
first husband was also already married and her consent was obtained by intimidation.
Issues:
Whether or not Lilias first marriage is void.
Held:
No, however the marriage was voidable. If there is force it only makes a marriage voidable, not void (ART. 85). It is
valid until annulled and since there was no annulment, marriage is still valid. Also, even if marriage is void, judicial
declaration of nullity is still required for purposes of remarriage.
Ruling:
CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs SIAYNGCO
Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari the decision of the CA. Juanita Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their
marriage did not produce children but they adopted a boy. After 24 years Manuel filed a petition to the court seeking
the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity displayed through domineering attitude by his
wife producing him humiliation. The lower court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision
with consideration of doctors examination.
Issues:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated.

Held:
No, sexual infidelity is not considered as a ground for psychological incapacity. The doctors examination indicates that
Manuel does not have psychological illness and that his infidelity was caused by his want of children. Juanita on the
other hand, is also not psychologically incapacitated as doctors examination shows.
The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void.
Ruling:
[G.R. No. 53642 April 15, 1988]
Donato vs. Luna
Facts:
Leonilo Donato is accused of bigamy by Paz Abayan filed in lower court in Manila. Abayan, first filed a declaration of
nullity against her marriage with the respondent. The grounds were that Donato was already married and Abayan
agreed to the marriage with the knowledge of his first marriage. Donato claims that the second marriage was already
void, because there was a lack of marriage license. Abayan however countered that they have been living together for
5 years and more and this an affidavit of that makes the requisite of the marriage license not need. Abayan left
Donato and filed petition.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.
Held:
No, bigamy case can only be a prejudicial question if it was proven that the consent of the parties was attained
through force or intimidation. Therefore there is no prejudicial question in this case.
Ruling:
Landicho vs. Relova
Facts:
The husband had 2 wives. The first one filed for bigamy and the second filed for annulment with the grounds of
vitiated consent. Subsequently, the husband filed for annulment of his first marriage. It was brought out by
respondent that there is a prejudicial question.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.
Held:
No, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his
consent the the 2nd marriage is not in issue.
"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean
that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case.
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of
duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The present case is different, petitioner was accused of bigamy, there was actually two marriages contracted.
There was not yet a declaration of nullity of the first marriage. In this case the husband contracted his second
marriage even without the declaration. Sc claimed that he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Ruling:
Petitioner guilty of bigamy.
NAVARROJr.vs CECILIO-NAVARRO
Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and respondent were childhood sweethearts who got married and had 4 children. In the middle of their
marriage the couple encountered difficulties, e.g. the woman always wanted to get what she wanted and always made
it difficult for the man when she doesnt get what she wants. The woman also accuses the man of his affairs. The
couples went to a counselor. The counselors examination resulted of results favorable to the husband. The couple also
submitted themselves for doctors examination. The results show that reconciliation was futile.
Respondent claims that she did not have marital difficulties until petitioner had an affair. Petitioner husband ultimately
did not come home. The trial court held that both were psychologically incapacitated and that the marriage is now null
and void. CA ruled otherwise.
Issues:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated and such should warrant the nullification of their marriage.
Held:
No. The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Psychological Incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability for it to nullify a marriage. There must be a mental incapacity that renders a person
incapable of performing basic marital obligations such as living together, observing mutual love, respect and fidelity
as well as render mutual help and support. It must be limited to the most solemn cases that would truly eliminate the
importance of marriage. In this case, the squabbles and bickering as well as the continuous arguments cannot be
considered as psychological incapacity. Difficulty, refusal or neglect in performing then marital obligations is not
sufficient, it must be some psychological illness. A previous decision of the court gave guidelines for deciding similar
cases. One of the guidelines says that the weight of evidence rests with the plaintiff and any misgivings should be
decided in favor of the subsistence of marriage.
Ruling:
CA ruling affirmed.
[337 SCRA 122]
Mercado vs Tan
Facts:
Vincent Mercado, a doctor, used to be married with Olivia during the seventies during which he decided to leave the
marriage and filed for a declaration of nullity, after which he remarried Consuelo Tan in the nineties. Consuelo Tan
after finding out that Vincent was already married filed a case for declaration of nullity on grounds of bigamy. The
lower courts approved the declaration.
Issues:
Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
Held:
Yes, judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is essential before a following one can be legally
contracted. Anybody who enters into a consequent marriage minus first acquiring such judicial declaration is culpable
of bigamy. This standard applies even if the first marriage is void.
Ruling:
Mercado is guilty of bigamy.
Meynardo Beltran vs People and Judge Tuazon
Facts:
In the seventies, Charmaine and Meynardo Beltran married and had 4 children. However, after twenty four years of
being together Meynardo filed for action of declaration of nullity on grounds of psychological incapacity of Charmaine,
vice versa Charmaine filed action on grounds of concubinage. It was then proven that Meynardo was living with a
certain Milagros. Meynardo, in order to delay the proceedings, said there was a prejudicial issue. Lower court and RTC
denied the motion. Thus this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the case.
Held:
No, the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions arising from an entwined case.
Elements of prejudicial question
1. the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
2. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
For a civil case to be contemplated prejudicial, it should seem that the civil case involves the same facts, which the
criminal prosecution would be originated, similarly that in the willpower of the theme or issues elevated in the civil
action, the fault or virtue of the suspect would essentially be determined.
the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can offer evidence in criminal case.
Ruling:
The decision of RTC was upheld.

Doctrine:
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT
Facts:
Godofredo and Lioda got married, after 3 months Loida gave birth to a child. Godofredo suddenly does not want the
child and wants to annul the marriage between him and Loida. He files petition for annulment, the grounds of which
were concealment of pregnancy by Loida.
Issues:
Whether or not concealed pregnancy applies to this case.
Held:
No, during the marriage it would have been obvious to Godofredo that his soon to be wife is 6 months pregnant and
still he continued the marriage. Godofredom through his acts accepted the child of Loida and the pregnancy. There is
no concealment in this case.
Ruling:
Petition Dismissed.
Sarao vs. Guevara
Facts:
Sarao and Guevara got married however they were not able to consummate the marriage due to some pains Guevara
experienced during the night of the marriage. After which, Guevara went to the hospital and the doctors advised her
to get an operation. The operation as an effect removed Guevaras ovaries and other organs that is needed to bear a
child. Guevara as a consequence cannot get pregnant. Sarao, badly wanting children, decides to annul the marriage
with Guevara.
Issues:
Whether or not impotency is a valid ground to annul the marriage.
Held:
No , im p o te n c y is no t a va l i d gr o u n d to an n u l th e ma r r i a g e . Ho w e v e r th e in a b i li t y to co p u l a t e is .
Gu e va ra is ab l e to co p u l a t e ho w e v e r is no t ab l e to be a r ch i l d r e n . Th is do e s no t ma k e va l i d
gr o u n d fo r an n u l m e n t of ma r r i a g e .
Ruling:
Pe t i t i o n is dis m i s s e d .
Aquino vs Delizo
Facts:
Fernando Aquino and Conchita Delizo fell inlove and got married, however after 4 months Conchita gave birth.
Fernando appalled and shocked filed for annulment against Conchita, on grounds that she concealed her pregnancy.
During the trial Conchita did not appear nor present evidence.
The lower courts dismissed the case and was affirmed by the CA, thus this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy would be a valid ground to annul said marriage.
Held:
Yes, According to the family code the concealment of a womans pregnancy is valid and sufficient ground for
annulment. In this case the woman was only 4 months pregnant. The pregnancy during that time would be easy or
not impossible to hide. However, since the woman in this case was not able to present her evidence there is no
absolute conclusion.
Ruling:
Petition is remanded to lower court for further evidence.
FRANCISCO vs. TAYAO
Facts:
Juanaria Francisco and Lope Tayao contracted marriage and they separated in 1917. There he was later prosecuted
for having committed adultery with a married woman and was sentenced to prison.
the action of Juanaria Francisco against Lope Tayao, was there denied because the plaintiff was not an innocent
spouse.
undeniable fact remains that the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of adultery and not
the crime of concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife can secure a divorce from the husband, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and
not of concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was convicted of adultery may also constitute
concubinage.
Held:
No, what counsel is asking this court to do is to sit as a trial court to convict the defendant of the crime of
concubinage, although no prosecution for the same has been instituted by the aggrieved wife and no hearing has been
had or judgment rendered in a lower court. This the appellate court cannot do.
What counsel also desires this court to do is to add a third cause for divorce to the law and to insert two words in
section 1 of the Divorce Law so that it will read: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the
wife or husband or concubinage on the part of the husband."
This likewise the court cannot do. It would amount to judicial amendment of the law.
Ruling: Judgement appealed from must be affirmed .
Doctrine:
The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for
adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only" and the
conjunctive "or."
Section 3 of the Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . . "
GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, PADILLA, J.

Facts:
Action for certiorari to annul Order of the respondent Judge ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private
respondent (his wife) and their child,
1986, legal wife of the petitioner, filed with RTC a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. The respondent judge, ordered the payment of
support pendente lite.
petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application
for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the
private respondent.
Issue:
1. W/N there is a civil action
2. W/N his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper
Held:
Petitioner's contention is not correct.
The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil action
arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal
separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority
for this position is this Court's decision in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano.
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific
that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1
(c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."
2. No, A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Ruling: Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Doctrine:
1. SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil
action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following
rules shall be observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered. . .
2. Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules
shall he observed:
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and
the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)
[GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004]
Morigo vs People
Facts:
Lucia and Lucio were sweetheart and subsequently got married with out a marriage ceremony in 1990. However,
Lucia went back to Canada, her home town, and filed for divorce against Lucio. The divorce was granted. Lucio, in
1992 got married again to Lumbago. Lumbago was not aware of Lucios previous marriage, and when she found out
she filed bigamy case against Lucio. Lucio pleaded not guilty, saying that he was in good faith.
Issue: W/N Lucios marriage with Lucia was valid.
Held:
No, the first marriage did not comply with the requirements of a valid marriage therefore the marriage is void. Thus
there was no marriage in the very beginning between lucio and lucia. Lucio then contrated a valid marriage with
Lumabago.
Ruling: Lucio is not guilty of Bigamy.
EMILIO TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners
appeal
Facts:
In 1989, respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the RTC a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of
her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. respondent alleged that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was
already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest afterward
and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries
on private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used
prohibited drugs, that petitioner was a womanizer, and left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in
succession, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as
a husband but treated him like a persona non grata
RTC ruled: the marriage null and void oh initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage is void.
Held:
Yes, the facts in the trial court is binding upon the Sc and the petitioner has not shown any diff convincing evidence to
hold different as such.
Ruling:
The petition is denied and the decision of CA is affirmed.
Doctrine:
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA
Petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners
appeal
Facts:
2001, Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mr. Macias and presiding judge.
Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication. Judge granted with the directive that Mrs. Macias should
file her answer within 30 days after notice.
Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias
and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint containing the above-cited facts before the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA).[11] Also in the Complaint is her prayer that an order be issued ex-parte directing
the respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the subject case and imposing an administrative
sanction against him.
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective because it is not supported by the
affidavits of persons who have knowledge of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations
therein. Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass and humiliate him had
motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.
The conclusion by the Court of Appeals Decision which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs.
Macias right to due process.
Issues:
W/N Judge was guilty of railroading.
Held:
Yes, the respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr.
Macias evidence ex-parte.
The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ruling:
Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED.
Doctrine:
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending party in an action for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
ONG vs. ONG
Facts:
Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision of the RTC
granting the petition for legal separation filed by herein respondent.
William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on 1975 and have three children. 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal
Separation alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or
whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. RTC ruled that, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal
separation of plaintiff and defendant, William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied hence the present
petition.
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; where he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of
abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following
Issue:
1. Whether or not this court can dispute a question of fact

2. Whether or not since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted
Held:
No, It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such
instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts.
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional circumstances, the general rule
applies.
2. No, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both
parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment
without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
Ruling: The petition is DENIED.
[470 SCRA 508]

Republic v. Iyoy
Facts:
Crasus and Fely were married in Cebu City. They bore 5 children. Crasus found out that Fely was hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines to work in the U.S.A. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely
was already married to an American
Crasus saying that she had Psychological incapacity that was only shown after the wedding and that such
incapacity should render their marriage null and void filed a Complaint against her on 1997.
RTC ruled that the marriage was void ab initio because of her psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties.
Solicitor General invoked that the ruling was contrary to law and brought it up to the CA.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Fely was psychologically incapacitated.

2. Whether or not Court of Appeals committed an error using Article 26 in their decision.
3. Whether or not the Solicitor General under Article 48 was authorized to intervene the said case.
Held:
1. Fely was not incapacitated
Requisites of Physcological Incapacity

Gravity the party must have grave or serious psychological incapacity that would render the party incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Juridical Antecedence The party must have had the said incapacity before the said marriage even though it
manifests only after the marriage.
Incurability The party must have an incurable incapacity or if curable, the cure is way beyond the means of
the party involved.
At most Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy give Crasus only a ground for Legal Separation
2. Art. 26 does not apply
By its plain and literal interpretation, it means that it is a marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino and the
former divorcing the latter.
At the time Fely filed for a divorce, which was in 1984, she was still a Filipino because as she admitted, she
only got her US citizenship in 1988.
3. The Solicitor General is authorized
Article 48 states:
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Solicitor General is the Legal Counsel of the Govt.
Ruling: Court granted the petition.

Tenebro vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Tenebro and Ancajas got married in 1990. After a year Tenebro told Ancajas that he was previously married to Hilda,
after then Tenebro left the conjugal house and proceeded to live with another Nilda. Tenebro married Nilda. Ancajas
filed bigamy case against Tenebro, Tenebro contents that there is no proof of his marriage with Nilda and his marriage
with Ancajas was void on grounds of Psychological Incapacity.
Issue: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
Held:
Yes, Tenebro is guilty of Bigamy. There was established the proof of the first marriage of Tanebro with a certain Hilda.
Making the second marriage with Ancajas, Void. However according to the RPC to be convicted of bigamy one need
not have a valid marriage. Psychological in capacity is not relevant.
Ruling: Tenebro is convicted of Bigamy.
Doctrine:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
[220 SCRA 20]
Republic vs Nolasco
Facts:
Gregorio Nolasco, seaman, met Janet Parker, bristish in england. They fell in love, after which Janet with Nolasco in
his Ship for half a year. After Nolasco had expired his contract in London, he returned to the Philippines together with
janet and got married. After which Janet became pregnant, however, Nolasco was awarded a new contract elsewhere
and had to leave the country. He did so, while he was away Janet gave birth and subsequently left the conjugal home.
Nolasco, informed by his mother, in panic went home to search for Janet. He went to London and wrote several letters
to the bar where they met, but the letters did not reach his wife. Nolasco filed for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage on grounds of presumptive death.
Issues:
Whether or not Nolasco had established the presumptive death of his wife.
Held:
No, Nolascos efforts were not reflective of supreme need to find his wife. He should have exhausted various ways to
locate his missing wife and this he has not yet done so.
Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
Armas vs Calisterio
Facts:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate leaving numerous parcels of land with value of six hundred thousand. Before he
died he was married to Mariette. Marietta used to be married to William Bounds. However, her husband suddenly
disappeared one day and Marrietta married Teodorico 11 years later. Marrieta did not have a courtsjuducial
declaration of presumptive death of her first wife.
Antonia, Teodoricos sister petition her son to be the administrator of his brothers estate. Claiming that she is the sole
surviving heir of Teodorico and that the marriage between Marietta and Teodorico was void.
Issues:
Whether or not marriage of Teodorico and Marrieta is valid.
Held:
Yes, during the time of marriage of marrietta and teodorico, the law that was governing them was the civil code. And
under the civil code, there was no need for a declaration of presumptive death if a time of 7 years has lapsed since
the disappearance of the other spouse.
Ruling:
Marriage is valid.
Manuel vs People of the Philippines
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari the decision of CA affirming the RTC convicting petition of bigamy.
Petitioner Eduardo Manuel married Ruby in 1975. Ruby, in light of unfortunate events was charged with estafa and
convicted and disappeared. After which, Eduardo married again, this time to Tina who was not aware of Eduardos first
marriage. During their marriage they encountered problems and Tina discovered that Eduardo was already married,
she filed for a bigamy case. Petitioner invoked good faith and ignorance of the law. RTC found him guilty. CA affirmed
the decision with minor adjustments to punishment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner can legally marry again without judicial declaration of presumptive death
Held:
1. Yes, Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. The petitioner cannot claim
good faith when in the instant case good faith is translated into obtaining declaration of presumptive death
from the courts.
current partner can contract a succeeding marriage first after obtaining a judgment declaring the presumptive
death of the absent spouse to evade being charged and convicted of bigamy; the current partner will have to
offer evidence that he had a logical certainty that the nonexistent partner was now deceased.
Ruling: The petition is denied for lack of merit
Lam vs. Chua
Facts:
Petition for review of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Lam and Chua were married in 1984 and said marriage conceived a son. Chua claims that Lam is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his obligations. Chua says that he is thoughtless and keeps on asking for money. Lam does not
help his family and he doesnt come home, he is also an adulterer and mishandles their properties.
Petition was granted by the regional trial court. The spouses have been living independently and Chua seeks the
nullification of her marriage. She offered indication presenting that Lam has been married twice before their marriage
which makes it bigamous. The Trial Court declared their marriage void and ordered Lam for support. This was disputed
by Lam declaring that a common fund was agreed upon both would support the child. The CA affirmed the trial courts
decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the marriage should be declared null and void for psychological
incapacity
1. whether or not the marriage is bigamous in nature and
2. whether or not the monthly support is necessary.
Held:
Whether or not the marriage is bigamous in nature and whether or not the monthly support is necessary, yes sc said it
was declared null and void by reason of bigamy. There was proof that Lam was previously married and incapacitated
to marry said petitioner. Lam did not contest the issue. 3. No, monthly support was not reasonable because it was
decided outside the opportunity of the questions upraised. Mother was not able to prove the amount was necessary.
Ruling:
Petition was partly approved.
[470 SCRA 508]

Republic v. Iyoy
Facts:
Crasus and Fely were married in Cebu City. They bore 5 children. Crasus found out that Fely was hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines to work in the U.S.A. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely
was already married to an American
Crasus saying that she had Psychological incapacity that was only shown after the wedding and that such
incapacity should render their marriage null and void filed a Complaint against her on 1997.
RTC ruled that the marriage was void ab initio because of her psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties.
Solicitor General invoked that the ruling was contrary to law and brought it up to the CA.
Issue:
4. Whether or not Fely was psychologically incapacitated.

5. Whether or not Court of Appeals committed an error using Article 26 in their decision.
6. Whether or not the Solicitor General under Article 48 was authorized to intervene the said case.
Held:
4. Fely was not incapacitated
Requisites of Physcological Incapacity

Gravity the party must have grave or serious psychological incapacity that would render the party incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Juridical Antecedence The party must have had the said incapacity before the said marriage even though it
manifests only after the marriage.
Incurability The party must have an incurable incapacity or if curable, the cure is way beyond the means of
the party involved.
At most Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy give Crasus only a ground for Legal Separation
5. Art. 26 does not apply
By its plain and literal interpretation, it means that it is a marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino and the
former divorcing the latter.
At the time Fely filed for a divorce, which was in 1984, she was still a Filipino because as she admitted, she
only got her US citizenship in 1988.
6. The Solicitor General is authorized
Article 48 states:
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Solicitor General is the Legal Counsel of the Govt.
Ruling: Court granted the petition.

[43 SCRA 177]
Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-sy and Eufemio were married, with no children, however on 1953 Lapuz Sy file for a case of legal
separation because Eufemio left their conjugal home and proceed to live with another woman. However, by some sort
of unfortunate incident, Carmen died before the proceedings ended.
Issues:
W/N the death of the plaintiff in effect abates the proceedings of the case.
Held:
Yes, one of the effects of death is terminating the present case for legal separation.
According to the court These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation
Also the effects of death is the severance of the marriage. Therefore the filing of declaration of nullity of the husband
is now moot.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
CERVANTES vs. FAJARDO
Facts:
Petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister, who took care and custody of
the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old.
The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo.
Sometime 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners
refused to accede to the demand.
While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" She sent word to the
petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, testified that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon said respondent manifested to the social
worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners
Issue:
Whether or not there has been legal adoption
Held:
Yes,
The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where
the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Her future is better with the petitioners than what the natural
mother who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents.
Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED.
ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The innocent victims are two
children horn out of the same union.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in Iligan City. In 1977, Teresita
left for Los Angeles, In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh, Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. Reynaldo
and Teresita got married, their second child was born on.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
the trial court suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into
responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Held:
It is father who should have the authority, We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody
over the children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code
Doctrine:
1. Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.
2. Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a
simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount
criterion must always be the child's interests.
Ruling: the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside,
MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision Court of Appeals granting support pendente lite to Rebecca
Angela (Rica) and Regina Isabel (Rina), both surnamed Delgado.
1994, petitioner Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati.
it was alleged that on 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married petitioner was only 21
years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent, it was annulled
1976 petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina, private respondents had totally abandoned them.
Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of certain reasons.
Petitioner demand support from father of children.
Their father was known to be financially well-off.9 These demands, however, remained unheeded.
trial court resolved and directed respondent to provide a monthly support (pendente lite), CA Affirmed, however
changed it to 5000php to 10000php only.
Issue:
1. W/N the petitioner is able ti support by herself her daughters
2. W/N the respondent is liable

Held:
1. No, The fact that petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough
money to enable her to send her daughters to college by herself.
2. Yes, It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters
education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which
may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or
other documentary evidence appearing in the record.32lavvphi1.net
we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private
respondents and the twins entitlement to support pendente lite.
Doctrine:
1. ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
2. Essence of support pendente lite: Rule 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
Ruling:
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
CERVANTES vs. FAJARDO
Facts:
Petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister, who took care and custody of
the child when she was barely two (2) weeks old.
The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo.
Sometime 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners
refused to accede to the demand.
While petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" She sent word to the
petitioners that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the amount of P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, testified that she had interviewed respondent Gina Carreon said respondent manifested to the social
worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners
Issue:
Whether or not there has been legal adoption
Held:
Yes,
The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where
the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. Her future is better with the petitioners than what the natural
mother who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents.
Ruling:
ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The innocent victims are two
children horn out of the same union.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in Iligan City. In 1977, Teresita
left for Los Angeles, In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh, Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. Reynaldo
and Teresita got married, their second child was born on.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
the trial court suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into
responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Held:
It is father who should have the authority, We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody
over the children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code
Doctrine:
1. Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be
reasons for such measure.
2. Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a
simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount
criterion must always be the child's interests.
Ruling: the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside,
[35 Phil 252]
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Facts:
Luisa and Jose were sweethearts and got married on 1915, they proceeded to live in manila. However, after a month
Luisa wanted to go back to her parents home because as the petitioner is claiming, was that her husband was
maliciously perverted and when she refuse, her husband beats her. Luisa left and she also wanted support from his
husband, so she filed for support.
Issues:
Whether or not the husband can be compelled to support her wife.
Held:
Yes, according to the civil code obligations of the husband is not absolute. The court said that if the reasons for the
leaving the conjugal home of the wife is because of the husband. The husband maltreats the wife when she refuses to
perform perverted acts with his husband, the wife however only wants to perform acts obligated by the law.
Ruling:
Petition is granted.
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ (Matrimonial Home)
Facts:
Mariano and Dolores were married, however after 10 years Dolores left the conjugal home alleging that her husband
was maltreating her.
Mariano filed for judicial proceedings compeling Dolores to come back. Dolores proceeded to also file for a legal
separation with her husband, on grounds of maltreatment. RTC approved the legal separation. Thus this petition for
certiorari.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the desertion by the wife of the conjugal home was with adequate rationalization.
(2) Whether or not cross objection convincingly demonstrates that the plaintiff has surrendered his right.
(3) Whether or not the husband is permitted to force the wife to come back and live with him as his dutiful wife.
Held:
1. No, the maltreatment was bereft of sufficient evidence.
2. No, The husband has the obligation to support the wife under the family code. However in this case, the wife has
not proven to that the husband has already waived his rights to his right.
3. No, the husband cannot compel the court to compel the wife to return home.
Ruling:
Petition is granted.
VALDEZ vs. CA
Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari
Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina de Leon Valdez were the owners of a parcel of land in Sultan Kudarat. When Carlos
Valdez, Sr. died intestate on March 26, 1966, he was survived by Josefina and their children, including Carlos Valdez,
Jr., a practicing lawyer.
Josefina decided to sell a portion thereof to Jose Lagon,
On December 31, 1982, Josefina and her children executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Carlos
Valdez, Sr. in which the heirs waived all their rights over the estate in favor of their mother, Josefina.
Lagon testified that Josefina failed to deliver the title to the property he purchased from her. Lagon demanded that
the title to the property be turned over to him. Carlos, Jr. dilly-dallied, saying that the heirs of Carlos, Sr. needed time
to execute the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, and thus failed to deliver said title to him.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lagon.
Court of Appeals affirmed that of the RTC.

Issues:
I. Whether or not the contract of the parties being subject to the suspensive conditions agreed upon was a
contract to sell or a contract of sale?
II. Whether of (SIC) not the petitioners had the right to rescind their contract with private respondent?
Held:
1. The Subject Property is the Exclusive Property of Josefina de Leon Valdez .

2. Petitioner Josefina Valdez and the Respondent entered into a Contract of Sale over the Subject Property.
Ruling:
The complaint of the respondent is DISMISSED.
[GR No. 116668 July 28, 1997]
Agapay vs Palang
Facts:
Carlina and Miguel got married in Philippines, and had one child. Miguel worked in Hawaii, while in Hawaii, he
attempted to divorce Carlina and married another woman whom he also had another child. Carlina and Miguel still
maintained talking relationship, where they both decided to donate all their property to their daughter. Miguel died,
Carlina filed for recovering property of Miguel. RTC dismissed and the CA reversed.
Issues:
W/N Carlina is entitled the property of Miguel .
Held:
No, only they shall own the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution in proportion to
their respective contributions, because the second marriage was void. Actual contribution is necessary.
The second wife was not able to prove her actual contribution to the property, therefore the property legally belongs
to Carlina.
Ruling:
Petition granted.
RODRIGUEZ vs. RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
This is an appeal by Concepcion Felix Vda. de Rodriguez from the decision of the Court to secure declaration, of nullity
of two contracts executed on January 24, 1934 and for recovery of certain properties.
Concepcion Felix, widow of the late Don Felipe Calderon and with whom she had a child, Concepcion Calderon,
contracted a second marriage on June 20, 1929, with Domingo Rodriguez, widower with four children by a previous
marriage, named Geronimo, Esmeragdo, Jose and Mauricio, all surnamed Rodriguez.
Concepcion Felix appeared to have executed a deed of sale conveying ownership of the aforesaid properties to her
daughter, Concepcion Calderon, which the latter in turn appeared to have transferred to her mother
Domingo Rodriguez died intestate. The properties were distributed. Unfortunately after a few years the relationship
with widow and children turned sour and children wanted the donated property back.
Issues:
W/N the children can nullify the donation.
Held:
No, the evidence is not convincing that the contracts of transfer from Concepcion Felix to her daughter, and from the
latter to her mother and stepfather were executed through violence or intimidation
Plaintiff-appellant had knowledge of the nullity of the contract for the transfer of her properties in 1934, because she
was even a party thereto. And yet, her present action was filed only on May 28, 1962 and after the breaking up of
friendly relations between her and defendants-appellees.
Ruling:
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
[GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001]
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vida De Batocael
Facts:
Francisco and Zosima are married and are owners of a lot.
Zosima died, Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, latter waived her share.
Francisco did not have any children he asked Leticia, his niece, Luzviminda and Cirila. It was alleged that Francisco
and Cirilia were lovers.
Francisco died and donated house to Cirilia.
Issues:
Whether or not the deed of donation was valid.
Held:
No, under Art. 87 of the Family Code if there is common law relationship donation is void. The common law
relationship was proved through the ff: acts.
There was no payment of wages to Cirilia. Both lived together in one house.
Therefore the donation is void.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.
[G.R. No. 79734 December 8, 1988]
MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES vs. GUIANG
Facts:
Petition for Review seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed a Decision
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner company against private respondent spouses.
Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont.. Under the agreement,
Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a water
supply facility to service.
After some time, the water supply of the Marmont Resort Hotel became inadequate to meet the hotel's water
requirements. Marmont filed a Complaint against the Guiang spouses for damages the Guiang spouses (defendants
below) denied having had any previous knowledge of the first Memorandum.
Issues:
Whether defendants are liable for damages under the human relations provision of the Civil Code.
Held:
Yes, The spouse, alleging that the subject matter thereof involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora Guiang
without the marital consent of her husband, Federico Guiang.
Court found that Aurora Guiang had validly alienated her rights over the disputed portion of land to Maris Trading, but
held that the evidence failed to show that Maris Trading, in turn, had transferred such rights to petitioner Marmont.
Finally, even if it be assumed (for purposes of argument merely) that the second Memorandum of Agreement did not
constitute a stipulation pour autrui, still respondent spouses, in the circumstances of this case, must be regarded as
having acted contrary to the principles of honesty, good faith and fair dealing embodied in Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code when they refused petitioner Marmont access to the water facility to inspect and repair the same and to
increase its capacity and thereby to benefit from it. In so doing, respondent spouses forced petitioner Marmont to
locate an alternative source of water for its hotel which of course involved expenditure of money and perhaps loss of
hotel revenues. We believe they should respond in damages.
Ruling:
The petition is dismissed.
[G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG
AND MAXIMO VITUG, respondents.
Facts:
Petition to review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, an action for reconveyance and damages.
Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) several
parcels of land
The above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Titles covering said properties were all in the name of Donata
Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they were mortgaged to PNB
3
and were free from all hens and encumbrances.
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times.
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate.
Issues:
Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160
of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow?
Held:
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on
the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow.
"but from the conduct of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor during the existence of their marital life, the
inference is clear that Clodualdo had the unequivocal intention of transmitting the full ownership of the 30 parcels of
land to his wife Donata Montemayor, thus considering the 1/2 of the funds of the conjugal property so advanced for
the purchase of said parcels of land as reimbursible to the estate of Clodualdo Vitug on his death. That must be the
reason why the property was registered in the name of Donata Montemayor as widow after the death of Clodualdo
Vitug.
The PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions.
Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of Donata Montemayor to the said
properties.
Ruling:
Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the complaint.
[G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004]
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari
1988, Eusebia Napisa Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her husband claiming the subject
properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas they begot five (5) children
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore,
The trial court rendered its Decision on in favor of Eusebia.
Issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE DECLARATION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PROPERTIES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE COMPLAINT ARE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF NICOLAS RETUYA AND
EUSEBIA RETUYA ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION IN EUSEBIAS COMPLAINT.
Held:
Petitioners contention that Eusebias complaint failed to state that the subject properties are conjugal is absolutely
without basis. A cursory reading of the complaint readily shows that the complaint maintains that the subject
properties are conjugal. The first sentence of the second paragraph of the complaint states:
The plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and defendant Nicolas Retuya are husband and wife and conjugal owners of real
properties and all improvements thereon situated in Mandaue City and Consolacion, Cebu more particularly
described as follows: (Emphasis added)
The same claim is restated and repleaded throughout the complaint. Petitioners should know better than to clutter
their appeal with useless arguments such as this.
Ruling:
We DENY the petition.

[GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987]
Villanueva vs IAC
Facts:
Modesto and Victoria are married. Modesto inherited a land from his deceased father. Modestos illegitimate offspring,
borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, pawning as warranty their dad's land.
The children failed to pay the loan and the land was mortgaged.
petitioner Villanueva and Aranas filed a complaint against Bernas spouses, they be declared co-owners of the land.
Issues:
WON by rendering the property as conjugal property the right of petitioner is affected.
Held:
No, there was insufficient proof presented by petitioner.
Ruling:
Petition Dismissed.
[GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987]
JOCSON vs. HON. COURT OF
Facts:
This is a petition for review on
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete
predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate
on April 1, 1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently
covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife.
Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the properties
subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
Issues:
I. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF
CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS INEXISTENCE
AND NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW,
MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER
IN THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION?
Held:
1. and 2.
herein petitioner's causes of action were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract tainted
by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and the action for annulment must
be brought within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code),
otherwise the contract may no longer be contested.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing the questioned documents, We would have
sustained the above pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he further assailed the deeds of
conveyance on the ground that they were without consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paid
were in fact merely simulated.
The certificates of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show
that the properties covered therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and, therefore, under Article
160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first present
proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The
certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
Ruling:
Petition Dismissed.
[G.R. No. 73733, December 16, 1986]
MAGALLON, VS. HON. ROSALINA L. MONTEJO
Facts:
The petition before this Court seeks the annulment of a writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge
The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, who died in 1953,
asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin.
While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia Pichan -- although he admitted living with her
without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him
Said Court, on the basis of the evidence presented to it, found that Martin had in fact been married to Eustaquia, and
that the plaintiffs were his children with her.
Issues:
W/N the lower court erred in the decision.

Held:
The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of the latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court
and can no longer be controverted, as well as the pertinent allegations of the petition, leave no doubt that the land in
question, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan, the plaintiffs'
mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses, was, through fraud or mistake, registered in the
names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner herein, Epifania Magallon. In such a situation, the property should be
regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto.
The Civil Code provides that:
"If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the persons obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."
Ruling:
The writ of execution complained of is set aside and annulled.
[G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991]
WONG vs IAC
Facts:
Instant petition for review on certiorari
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6, 1964. They have three children but even
during the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately.
in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter
consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry, When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period
agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value.
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for P55,000 which, however, was dishonored
for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa.
Issues:
Whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the
ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a
husband who did not participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed.
Held:
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While
there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear
where he obtained the money to repay the loan.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them her
obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows
money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the
proper sum;
Applying jurisprudence, execution purchasers Santos and Joson possess no rights, which may rise above judgment
debtor Katrina's inchoate proprietary rights over the properties sold at public auction. After all, a person can sell only
what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no more that what the seller can
legally transfer.
Ruling:
Decisions of the appellate court and the lower court are hereby AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 160347 November 29, 2006]
CARANDANG vs. HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN
Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa
Carandang [hereinafter referred to as spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan to Quirino A. de
Guzman.
[Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System
1992, [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the payment of said total amount.
[The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was executed
between [Arcadio Carandang] and [de Guzman.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PURPORTED
LIABILITY OF PETITIONERS ARE JOINT AND SOLIDARY, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1207 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
Held:
RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the
express waiver of the heirs to the jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before the
promulgation of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de Guzmans counsel.
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did
not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern their property relations.
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the spouses Carandang are liable, such credits
are presumed to be conjugal property.
Ruling:
The Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment rendered against the spouses Carandang, is hereby
[G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998]
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC).
PBM failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case
the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC
Sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their
conjugal properties.
private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners, lower court issued a temporary restraining order
Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to prove that actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the
partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that the transaction was entered into for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Issues:
W/N Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered
"for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership?
Held:
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to the benefit of" or
"benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article
161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the
benefit of." On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as
they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
Ruling:
DENIED for lack of merit.
CHING, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the task of resolving the
1992, petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati with four counts of estafa
Ching filed a petition for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question in a civil
action.
RTC-Makati issued an order which denied the petition for suspension and scheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of
the criminal cases.
Court of Appeals affirmed RTC decision.
Issues:
Whether the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of nullity of documents, specifically trust receipts,
warrants the suspension of criminal proceedings instituted for violation of Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
We agree with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that no prejudicial question exists in
the present case. Scmis
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.[
It is no less true that the Supreme Court may, on certain exceptional instances, resolve the merits of a case on the
basis of the records and other evidence before it, most especially when the resolution of these issues would best serve
the ends of justice and promote the speedy disposition of cases.
Clearly, a trust receipt partakes the nature of a security transaction. It could never be a mere additional or side
document as alleged by petitioner.
Ruling:
Decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED .
[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005]
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
Facts:

Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a
house and lot. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as
vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a SPA, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the
knowledge and consent of respondent.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
on the mortgaged property.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died,
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in
nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVINGREDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
Held:
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED.
Doctrine:
1. Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
2. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
[G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002]
MANALO vs. CAMAISA
Facts:
The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an
advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the
Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door
apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal.
She was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker,
petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses.
This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal
nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wifes conformity and consent to the sale
The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions
of the contracts.[
When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilbertos office for the formal
affixing of Normas signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of
the agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration
Issues:
Whether the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of fact
necessitating a trial on the merits.
Held:
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is no genuine controversy as to the facts
involved therein.
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land between petitioner and respondent
spouses;
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Ruling:
The petition is hereby DENIED.
[G.R. No. 121810. December 7, 2001]
SPOUSES INOCENCIO AND ADORACION SAN ANTONIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO AND
GREGORIA GERONIMO
Facts:
This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision affirming the orders granting the motion for execution
of compromise judgment.
Private respondents spouses Mario and Gregoria Geronimo obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Inocencio
and Adoracion San Antonio. To secure the loan, private respondents mortgaged two parcels of land. Private
respondents failed to pay the loan and the interest on the due date, hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed.
Before the one-year redemption period expired, private respondents filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial
foreclosure with preliminary mandatory injunction
In accordance with the Compromise Agreement, respondents, however, failed to transfer the ownership and deliver
the titles of the three parcels of land.
Issues:
Is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code applicable in this case?
Held:
In their view, the trial court should have enforced the compromise agreement instead of rescinding it. Thus, it was
error for the Court of Appeals to apply Article 1191 of the New Civil Code which concerns rescission of
contract. Applicable here is Article 1159 which enjoins compliance in good faith by the parties who entered into a
valid contract. Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal obligations to avoid
litigation, or put an end to one already commenced.
Ruling: The petition is GRANTED.
VALDEZ vs. CA
Facts:

Carlos Valdez, Sr. and Josefina de Leon Valdez were the owners of a parcel of land in Sultan Kudarat. When Carlos
Valdez, Sr. died intestate on March 26, 1966, he was survived by Josefina and their children, including Carlos Valdez,
Jr., a practicing lawyer.
Josefina decided to sell a portion thereof to Jose Lagon,
On December 31, 1982, Josefina and her children executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Carlos
Valdez, Sr. in which the heirs waived all their rights over the estate in favor of their mother, Josefina.
Lagon testified that Josefina failed to deliver the title to the property he purchased from her. Lagon demanded that
the title to the property be turned over to him. Carlos, Jr. dilly-dallied, saying that the heirs of Carlos, Sr. needed time
to execute the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, and thus failed to deliver said title to him.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Lagon.
Court of Appeals affirmed that of the RTC.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the contract of the parties being subject to the suspensive conditions agreed upon was a
contract to sell or a contract of sale?
II. Whether of (SIC) not the petitioners had the right to rescind their contract with private respondent?
Held:
1. The Subject Property is the Exclusive Property of Josefina de Leon Valdez .

2. Petitioner Josefina Valdez and the Respondent entered into a Contract of Sale over the Subject Property.
Ruling:
The complaint of the respondent is DISMISSED.
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages,
Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying,
inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half death benefits
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of
the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.
Issues:
Validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt
Held:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. However, for purposes other
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement.
The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
Ruling: The petition is GRANTED.
[G.R. No. L-34583 October 22, 1931]
BPI vs. POSADAS
Facts:
The Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the estate of the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, has
appealed to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant Juan
Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him by said plaintiff bank, and dismissing
the complaint with costs.
Issues:
Whether an insurance policy on said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's life was, by reason of its ownership, subject to the
inheritance tax, it would be well to decide first whether the amount thereof is paraphernal or community property.
Held:
The record shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on
January 16, 1914.
All the money used for paying the premiums, is conjugal property inasmuch as it does not appear to have exclusively
belonged to him or to his wife (art. 1407, Civil Code). As the sum of P20,150 here in controversy is a product of such
premium it must also be deemed community property, because it was acquired for a valuable consideration, during
said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's marriage with Rosario Gelano at the expense of the common fund (art. 1401, No. 1,
Civil Code), except for the small part corresponding to the first premium paid with the deceased's own money.
The Supreme Court of Texas, United States, in the case of Martin vs. Moran (11 Tex. Civ. A., 509) laid down the
following doctrine:
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LIFE INSURANCE POLICY.
A husband took out an endowment life insurance policy on his life, payable "as directed by will." He paid the
premiums thereon out of community funds, and by his will made the proceeds of the policy payable to his own estate.
Held, that the proceeds were community estate, one-half of which belonged to the wife.
Thus both according to our Civil Code and to the ruling of those North American States where the Spanish Civil Code
once governed, the proceeds of a life-insurance policy whereon the premiums were paid with conjugal money, belong
to the conjugal partnership.
The estate of a deceased person cannot be placed on the same footing as an individual heir.
Ruling:
The judgment appealed from is reversed.
[G.R. No. L-48137 October 4, 1943]
In re testate estate of NARCISO A. PADILLA
Facts:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of the late Narciso A. Padilla. In order that his property
may be divided according to his last will and testament, it is necessary first to liquidate the conjugal partnership.
We find no error in the findings of fact made by the trial court. From the evidence it appears that Narciso A. Padilla
and Concepcion Paterno were married on December 12, 1912. The husband, who was a medical student, contributed
a small capital to the conjugal partnership at the time of the marriage. The wife, on the other hand, brought to the
marriage considerable property in real estate, jewelry and cash. Practically all of the conjugal partnership property
came from.
(1) That the husband borrowed P7,000 from the wife to meet his personal obligations; and (2) that the amount of
P21,046.52 (the remainder of P66,046.52) received by the wife during the marriage was commingled with the
conjugal partnership funds.
Issues:
1. How far is a Torrens title conclusive and incontestable?
2. Whether the value of the paraphernal land to be reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Held:
1. The true and real owner may be shown whether it be the husband, or the wife, or both. Thus, in Flores vs. Flores,
48 Phil. 288, this Court held that property acquired during the marriage but registered in the husband's name still
belonged to the conjugal partnership. A similar ruling was announced when the real estate was registered in the wife's
name. Romero vs. Sheriff, 53 Phil., 51. But the appellant maintains that the converse is not true; and that even if
evidence is admissible to alter the conjugal character of the property, such evidence must be clear, strong and
convincing (citing Art 1407, Civil Code, and Ahern vs. Julian, 39 Phil., 607).
We are of the opinion that an exception should in no wise be made when the property is registered in the names of
both spouses.
2. Appellant's theory is untenable. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the
lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of a building from common funds
does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a mode of using the
land, namely, by erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct pertaining to the conjugal
partnership over the wife's land.
Ruling:
Judgement Affirmed.
Gonzales vs Gonzales
Facts:
1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started living as husband and wife. After
two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this union, four children were born.
1992, respondent filed a complaint for annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite, alleges that
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no justifiable
reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. She managed their pizza
business and worked hard for its development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Issues:
Whether the court of Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally between the parties.
Held:
Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the Appellate Courts Decision declaring his marriage
with respondent void. Consequently, their property relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the
Family Code quoted as follows:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in
the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household."
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Ruling: Instant petition is hereby DENIED.
[GR No. 116668 July 28, 1997]
Agapay vs Palang
Facts:
Carlina and Miguel got married in Philippines, and had one child. Miguel worked in Hawaii, while in Hawaii, he
attempted to divorce Carlina and married another woman whom he also had another child. Carlina and Miguel still
maintained talking relationship, where they both decided to donate all their property to their daughter. Miguel died,
Carlina filed for recovering property of Miguel. RTC dismissed and the CA reversed.
Issues:
W/N Carlina is entitled the property of Miguel .
Held:
No, only they shall own the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution in proportion to
their respective contributions, because the second marriage was void. Actual contribution is necessary.
The second wife was not able to prove her actual contribution to the property, therefore the property legally belongs
to Carlina.
Ruling:
Petition granted.
[G.R. No. L-20530 June 29, 1967]
MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY COMPANY, INC vs. TRINIDAD TEODORO and THE COURT OF
Facts:
The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for review by certiorari. The case relates to the
execution of a joint and several judgment for money obtained by the said company against the Philippine Ready-Mix
Concrete Co.,
When said decision became final, respondent Manila Sure secured on from the Court of First Instance of Manila a
second alias writ of execution addressed to respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal whose deputy, together with counsel
for respondent Manila Surety, repaired to the residence of herein petitioner. Thus, respondents caused the posting at
several places notices of sale, preparatory to disposing petitioner's properties at public auction.
Trinidad Teodoro interposed an appeal and filed an original petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals to stop the
scheduled sale.
The said properties, claimed by respondent Teodoro to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established
between her and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and consequently may be levied upon
on execution for the satisfaction of the latter's judgment debt. The facts relied upon in support of this theory of co-
ownership are stated in the decision of the court a quo and quoted by the Court of Appeals, as follows:
Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo.
Issues:
Applicability of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the situation thus created.
Held:
This Article provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through then work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law,
which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares
have not been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's
subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void.
In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular properties involved here which
were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as
found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits
of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were
not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive
properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
Ruling: Petition dismissed.
[G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005]
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision.
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married. Eduardo was then employed
as the vice president in a private corporation. A little more than a year and seven months thereafter, Imus Bank
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco.
This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina,
the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he
was waiving whatever claims he had over the property.
Before she could commence presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the
RTC
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal property of Eduardo and Josefina, and that the latter
failed to rebut such presumption.
The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her marriage to Eduardo is void ab initio, there is no occasion that would give
rise to a regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Issues:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco.
Held:
We note that the only questions raised in this case are questions of facts. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in and resolved by the Court.
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with
Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a
deed of absolute sale over the property to the petitioner on August 31, 1984 and titles over the property were,
thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee on September 4, 1984 after her marriage to Eduardo on January 15, 1983.
Article 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, on which the petitioner anchors her claims, provides as follows:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148
the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under
normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Atienza vs De Castro
Facts:
1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian
Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married
man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two
children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they parted ways.
1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition, Lupo alleged that the
subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is
co-owned by them.
Issues:
Held:
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo Atienza
was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime,
therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ...Proof of actual contribution is required.
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil cases, the burden of proof
rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Ruling:
The instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA are AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979]
VICTOR JUANIZA vs. EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC
Facts:
This case was certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court on the ground that the questions raised in the appeal of
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna are purely questions of law.
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with
a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death to
seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally
married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in
a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
RTC: defendants Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza
Motion for reconsideration was filed by Rosalia Arroyo praying that the decision be reconsidered insofar as it
condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her co-defendant, but was denied. The lower court based her
liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads:
When a man and woman driving together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Rosalia Arroyo then filed her appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the parties in a common-law
relationship is incapacitated to marry
(2) whether or not Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for
damages with the registered owner of the same.
Held:
1. It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code
requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia Arroyo.
2. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs
to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for
damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in
the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its
operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for
damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers
therein.
Ruling:
Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared free from any liability for damages and the appealed decision is hereby modified
accordingly. No costs.
[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005]

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992,
on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent.
Issues:
1. W/N There is psychological incapacity
2. What to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage.
Held:
1. Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . .
2. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for
the liquidation of property
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
proceedings.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
[G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004]
MILAGROS JOAQUINO vs. LOURDES REYES, MERCEDES
Facts:
Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981; that [respondents] Mercedes,
Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased
Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B.
Joaquino;
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in [petitioners] possession and that the real and
personal properties in [petitioners] possession are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes
and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the
estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the [other respondents] as his forced heirs.
During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and while living together,
they decided to buy the house.
Issues:
W/N properties are conjugal in nature.
Held:
Though registered in the paramours name, property acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband
belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse. The filiation of the paramours children must be settled in a
probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.
Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes on January 3, 1947.
Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal
union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by
law owned in common by the husband and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of
the Code, which we quote:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse.
Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively,
are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be
proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Ruling:
The Petition is hereby DENIED.
[G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993]
JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
The property had been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950
but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during the
latter Code's regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03
August 1988.
The husband, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three children, namely, Flora,
Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera
with whom he later begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Balcobero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment, he indicated his civil status as, "married to
Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife.
On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on
11 march 1967.
Issues:
W/N ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having deserted his
lawful wife and children, is the wifes.
Held:
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 or in 1959 when a deed of sale was finally executed
by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the legal results would be the same. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code
(Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request,
she should thereby be deemed to be its owner.
As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law
established through judicial precedents under the old code. In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than
once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry.
Ruling:
The decision appealed from in the instant petition for review on certiorari is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970
PEDRO GAYON vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON
Facts:
1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging
substantially that, on said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a
parcel of unregistered land
He had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code
require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and,
accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the
aforementioned property.
Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, that the complaint is malicious and
had embarrassed her and her children;
She filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing substantially the averments made in her answer and stressing that, in view
of the death of Silvestre Gayon, there is a "necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record."
Issue:
W/N Gayon is included in the Family Relations
Held:
it is not true that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint." As the widow of
Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs and has, accordingly, an interest in the property in question.
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil
Code provides:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them
is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in
the case at bar
Ruling:
Order appealed from is hereby set aside
G.R. No. 58010. March 31, 1993.
EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA vs. VALENTIN CO CHO CHIT, O LAY KIA and COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
It involves half-sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. While petitioner Emilia O'Laco asserts that she
merely left the certificate of title covering the property with private respondent O Lay Kia for safekeeping, the latter
who is the former's older sister insists that the title was in her possession because she and her husband bought the
property from their conjugal funds.
The trial court declared that there was no trust relation of any sort between the sisters.
Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation. They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually bought the
property with her own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the corresponding title with respondent-
spouses merely for safekeeping;
Issue:
Whether a resulting trust was intended by them in the acquisition of the property.
Held:
We find that there is. By definition, trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. Express trusts
are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by
words evincing an intention to create a trust.
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the
equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.
"ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the
price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee,
while the latter is the beneficiary . . ." (emphasis supplied).
Ruling:
Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
G.R. No. 104875 November 13, 1992
FLORANTE F. MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS and F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC
Facts:
Following the dismissal of his petition for certiorari
petitioner airs his concern over the propriety thereof by claiming in the petition at hand that the disposition, in
practical effect, allows a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the court of origin against his corporation to be
implemented on his family home which is ordinarily exempt from the process.
the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him and his family since
1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.
Issue:
W/N Family home is exempt
Held:
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code (Mondequillo
vs. Breva, supra).
Since petitioner's debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His
property is therefore not exempt from attachment
Ruling:
Petition is hereby DISMISSED
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS
Facts:
1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals, that Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants.
the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag. A motion to quash and/or to set aside
levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag is where the family home is built.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of
execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
Held:
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the
dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If
the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable."
It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Gomez vs Inez
Facts:
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo filed a complaint for damages before the RTC
against alleging that they are the children of the deceased Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez who, during her lifetime,
entrusted her rice land.
1993, a complaint for annulment of said sale was filed before the RTC Sta. Ines together with Noel, Roel, and Jannette,
all named Sta. Ines, husband and children of Marietta, respectively, against Mary Josephine and Sheriff Flaviano
Balgos, Jr. on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus
exempt from execution
Issue:
W/N the family home is exempt
Held:
Such contentions are erroneous. Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt
from execution, forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home. In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not constituted as a family home, whether
judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed
constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were incurred
before the constitution of the family home.
Neither is it correct to say that the obligation sought to be satisfied by the levy of the property was incurred
only upon the issuance of the judgment in the original case in January of 1989. As stated by herein petitioners, the
complaint against Marietta was instituted on 17 June 1986 to seek redress for damages suffered by them due to acts
and omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she assumed management and supervision of their
deceased mothers rice land. This means to say that Mariettas liability, which was the basis of the judgment, arose
long before the levied property was constituted as a family home by operation of law in August 1988.
Ruling:
The petition is hereby GRANTED.
G.R. No. 164740 July 31, 2006

VERSOLA vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
This case has its genesis from a loan transaction entered into by private respondent Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh and a
certain Dolores Ledesma, As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for the same
amount and promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house.
Thereafter, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to petitioners
After trial, the RTC, rendered a verdict in favor of private respondent and against petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution.
Held:
Article 153 of the Family Code provides:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. From
the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.7
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges
that such property is a family home.
Petitioner did not present evidence that the property was a family home.
The Court finds that petitioners' assertion for exemption is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive private
respondent of the fruits of the verdict of her case.
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS,
represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS
Facts:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablos
surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna
indicated in her claim that his minor child, Jeylnn, likewise survived Pablo.
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting
Rosannas claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than
six years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support.
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension in September 1997. It also
conducted an investigation to verify Leticias allegations. Social Security Officer, learned that the deceased had no
legal children with Rosanna; Jenelyn and Jefren were Rosannas children with one Romeo, Mariquita also confirmed
that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was under treatment.
SSS denied Rosannas request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within
30 days the amount of P10,350.00 representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn
Claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablos
signature as Jeylnns father.
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted
marriage with Romeo dela Pea during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo.
Issue:
Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
Held:
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the Court in petitions
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court may review findings of facts in some instances,
such as, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are contrary to those
of the trial court or quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
At the time of Pablos death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161
Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. The
Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a
monthly pension.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this
case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns status as
a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablos signature, which
was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent
evidence of paternity
Ruling:
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ
AGUILAR
Facts:
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna.
Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez
Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in
favor of private respondent Aguilar.
They alleged no other heirs survive the decedent or relatives are they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or legally adopted.
Petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
Issue:
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the
provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in adopting and
upholding private respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child;
Held:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or
both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified
such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument
shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) The physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) The fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
or
c) Serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband
except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the
birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city
or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or
where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, which ever
is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
Article only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife.
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters
that cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not
have, therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were
her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born), we can be sure that she is not the true mother of that baby.
Ruling:
The petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit.
G.R. No. L-49542 September 12, 1980
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS
Facts:
This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Davao, dismissing the action for recognition and support filed by respondent Elizabeth Mejias
against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang, and which found minor Rolando to be the illegitimate son of petitioner who
was ordered to give a monthly support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of majority
The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw. She
allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March 1967. She also alleges that due to
the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit
encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang
Issue:
1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and
Crispin Anahaw;
2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband, the
legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
Held:
The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened out from the very beginning is the fact that
respondent's initial illicit affair with petitioner occurred sometime in March, 1967 and that by reason thereof, she and
her husband separated.
The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in mind:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred, which preceded the birth
of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no
physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the child is prima facie
presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband.
For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case.
Xxx
Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy
(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred
days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred, which preceded the birth of the
child.
[1] By the impotence of the husband
[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible;
[3] By the serious illness of the husband;
(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical
impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the child is presumed legitimate, unless it
appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purpose of the rule, the
wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the status of the
child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three
hundred, which preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to
establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse.
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates.
It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence
only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified but not the veracity of the states
or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse.
Ruling:
The decision is set aside
TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL
Facts:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera
she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26,
1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of
birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena,
then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature x; that petitioner,
then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their
house, assisted by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a
simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of
Hermogena Babiera.
Issue:
1. W/N respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code states that the child's
filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs.
Held:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which
shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by
the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate
child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner
stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case concerned the properties
inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows
that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present
action does not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood
relation to impugn in the first place.
Ruling:
Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997]
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO
Facts:
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein
private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment
thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin
Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the
deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioners father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to
inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute.
Issue:
whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code
to establish legitimacy and filiation.
Held:
There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioners legitimacy, and second is the
question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently
of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that
the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place,
the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that
herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on
both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally
recognized presumption on legitimacy.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy;
that would amount to an insult to his memory.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be
properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration
that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption
consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Ruling:
Judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN
MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI
Facts:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3)
marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely:
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named
Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children.
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried.
Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all
surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina,
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa
Estate.
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the
lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned
by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they
(children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
Issue:
W/N Private respondents are legitimate children
Held:
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on
the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he
was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these
facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate;
and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor.
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban,
supra).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
Ruling:
Petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.
[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998]
FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON
Facts:
In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a
certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated
Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result,
MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that
FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a
certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to
expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO
support and treat her as such.
In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during
the period specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her
whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child.
Issue:
W/N Monina is his legitimate child
Held:
While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity
for such indulgence, this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only
witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of
whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or mothers word, as against the
accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify as to the
fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution of the complaint for
recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her
parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is
whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances
and events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the
testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the employ of
the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct.
It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local Civil
Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation.
Ruling:
petition is hereby DENIED
G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967
CECILIO MENDOZA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA
Facts:
We glean from the record that Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza instituted Case No. 3436 against petitioner herein. In the
complaint, she averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953; that they lived together as
husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and
practice his profession; that since then, defendant Mendoza "without justifiable cause or reason deliberately
abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and
still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegel to be pregnant, sickly and
without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States,
earning an average of $200.00 a month, besides being a part-owner of lands in Muoz, Nueva Ecija, assessed at
P32,330.00 in 1955.
In due course, defendant Cecilio Mendoza moved for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue.
Petitioner argues that Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (jam. quot.) requires that before a suit between
members of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is
by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint.
Issue:
W/N There is proof or need of reconciliation
Held:
While we agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are
nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in
refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035
of the Civil Code of the Philippines can not be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of
application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article
222, already quoted. Even the answer below, in attacking the validity of the marriage of plaintiff-respondent Luisa de
la Rosa to defendant-petitioner Cecilio Mendoza, poses a non-compromisable issue.
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) x x x;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) x x x;
(4) Future support.
Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be
superfluous.
It may be that the complaint asks for both future support and support in arrears, as petitioner contends. But, the
possibility of compromise on the latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future support, to
which Article 222 can not apply.
Ruling:
the decision of the Court of Appeals, is affirmed.

[G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001]
MARCELO LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different
mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok
Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter
referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee,
and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners).
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of
petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting
the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly the petitioners true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children of
spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it
appear that petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Chengs demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all
his children, including those of petitioners, be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Chengs death that was to
be published in the newspapers.
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared
a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in petitioners records of birth with the lower courts.
Issue:
W/N The decision of CA is contenable
Held:
We agree.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of a
special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties, notices
and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.(Underscoring supplied.)
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we
declared null and void the portion of the lower courts order directing the change of Labayo-Rowes civil status and the
filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latters record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to
effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowes petition before the lower court failed to implead all indispensable
parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:
x x x. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the case
as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary
in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the
declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary
rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified
or represented
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the
procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
Ruling:
the petition is hereby DENIED
[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]
LIYAO vs. LIYAO
Facts:
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case which is
an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein
respondents.
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years
at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the
time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2)
children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This
was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from
his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively.
1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to
show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature.
Issue:
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William
Liyao?
Held:
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based
on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a
policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the child.
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner
was conceived and born is of no moment.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then
minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of
the late William Liyao cannot prosper.
Ruling:
the instant petition is DENIED
G.R. No. 157037 : May 20, 2004
ROSALINA P. ECETA v. MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA
Facts:
Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926.During the subsistence of their
marriage, they begot a son, Vicente.The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property
located at Stanford, Cubao, Quezon .
In 1977, Vicente died.During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter.Thus at the time
of his death, his compulsory heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa.
In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, for Partition and
Accounting with Damages against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her fathers death, she became Rosalinas co-heir
and co-owner of the Cubao property.
In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively.
Issue:
W/N Maria Theresa successfully established filiation
Held:
We note Rosalinas attempt to mislead the Court by representing that this case is one for compulsory recognition,
partition and accounting with damages. Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the Court of
Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente
Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted
in the trial courts pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalinas granddaughter.
Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated
birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria Theresas birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his
daughter.By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa, thus:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Ruling:
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
G.R. No. L-24284 February 28, 1968
JAIME LIM, Minor, represented by his mother, TARCIANA RODRIGUEZ vs. LOCAL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
and LIM SUI KIAN
Facts:
This is a petition for correction of an alleged error, in the records of the Local Civil Registrar for the City of
Manila, concerning petitioner Jaime Lim, represented by his alleged mother, Tarciana Rodriguez.
It is alleged in the petition, filed on September 2, 1963, that petitioner was born on September 7, 1953; that his
parents are Lim Sui Kian, Chinese, and Tarciana Rodriguez, Filipino; that petitioner's aforesaid parents "were not
married to each other" at the time of his (petitioner's) birth; that they remain "unmarried up to the present;"
It is prayed that said entries in the Local Civil Register be corrected, so as to state that petitioner's true name is
"Jaime Rodriguez," instead of "Jaime Lim," and his status "illegitimate," instead of "legitimate." On July 14, 1964, the
petition was amended, by eliminating therefrom any reference to petitioner's father.
Issue:
W/N the petitioner is legitimate or illegitimate
Held:
The manifest purpose of the petition is to make it appear that petitioner is an illegitimate child of a Filipina, Tarciana
Rodriguez not the legitimate son of Lim Sui Kian and Tarciana Rodriguez, as now set forth in the records of the
local civil registrar with a view to bolstering up his claim to Filipino nationality, following that of his Filipino mother,
instead of that of his Chinese father, Lim Sui Kian.
It is well settled, however, that Article 412 of our Civil Code, upon which petitioner herein relies, contemplates a
summary proceeding, involving the correction of clerical errors, of a harmless and innocuous nature, not changes
involving civil status, nationality or citizenship, which are substantial and/or controversial, or a change of name.
Ruling:
the order appealed from is hereby affirmed
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES vs. MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor
VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA,
Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986
met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the
end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office starting on September 1,
1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas,
she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
When they reached the place her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making
amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until
someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to
herself.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay
projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked
to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted
the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he
was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. They had a child.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as
mayor of Pandan.
Issue:
(1) whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente lite
(2) whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven;
Held:
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states "Damages coupled with Support
Pendente Lite," Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances,
her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all
clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters
between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna
Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented by respondents,
the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed,
petitioners illegitimate child.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own.
Ruling:
The assailed Decision are AFFIRMED

Angeles vs Maglaya
Facts:
The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan
City, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Francisco M. Angeles. Respondent allege,
That Francisco, died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of
land and a building, among other valuable properties; That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second
marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent; and
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of
Franciscos estate. In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on August 7,
1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified two (2) months later in
religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco represented in their marriage
contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of
Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was
not signed by him.
Issue:
W/N respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco
Held:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element
of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of
Appeals, stated that since petitioner opted not to present any contrary evidence, the presumption on respondents
legitimacy stands unrebutted.
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child
is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot
be attacked collaterally.
Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of
legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To
reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really
nothing for petitioner to rebut.
Ruling:
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L.
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence
on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long
before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their
relationship started in 1993 but he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret
lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
(1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition
(2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
Held:
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private respondents
complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action
are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act
or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
1. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely
allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the
documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an
action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag
v. Court of Appeals,[20] we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones
inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or
presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter.
2. Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for determining
paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or
mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee where the appellant was convicted of murder on the testimony of
three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as
accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test
result (emphasis supplied).
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results
thereof as evidence.
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility
that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted
entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an
error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in law
and jurisprudence, was correct.
Ruling:
The petition is hereby DENIED.
[G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005]
ROSENDO HERRERA vs. ROSENDO ALBA
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the
trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998,
petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Issue:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
Held:
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is
examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is
taken.
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180 degree
turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case, where we stated that DNA, being
a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. In Vallejo, the DNA profile
from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed the accuseds
conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death.
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If
the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence.
Ruling:
Petition Dismissed
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN
Facts:
In a civil case private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cayuga, filed on
April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner
Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose
Cayuga, for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous
relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cayuga.
His putative father showered Chad with exceptional affection, fervent love and care.
Issue:
1. Whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir
2. Whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.
Held:
Affirmative provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in
the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which
that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to
compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases
2. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child bas been
vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

Facts:
2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to
Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
RTC rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption
Issue:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name?
Held:
It is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189
of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Also there is no law expressly prohibiting
Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of
an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a
married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and
surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose
to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article
370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional
name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be
used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code
merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided
by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above.
Ruling:
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam,
USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos and et al. The minors are the natural children of
Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with
her in-laws; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as
Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their
written consent to the adoption;
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia
Ramos;
Held:
1. It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to
give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the
latters souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.
Ruling:
Petition is denied
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO
Facts:
Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty. Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross
Immoral Conduct.
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be
single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. Complainant first
learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her
relationship with respondent. Respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship
with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his
Issue:
W/N there is gross immoral conduct
Held:
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during
good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after giving him the opportunity to be heard.[26]
Ruling:
Respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct
G.R. No. L-29959 December 3, 1929
AURELIA DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA vs. RAFAEL VILLANUEVA,
Facts:
The plaintiff, Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, was married to the defendant, Rafael Villanueva, on July 16, 1905, in the
City of Manila, where the pair has since resided. To them have been born three children, namely, Antonio, Guillermo,
and Sergio, who were, at the time of the trial of this case in the lower court, aged respectively 18, 10 and 9 years.
The grounds on which separate maintenance is sought infidelity and cruelty.
The incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations with other women, coupled with a lack of consideration and
even brutality towards the plaintiff, caused her to withdraw from the domestic hearth and to establish a separate
abode for her and two younger children.
Issue:
W/N The wife is required to live with the husband
Held:
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable
propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. Deeply rooted instincts of human
nature sanction the separation in such case, and the law is not so unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the
part of the injured party, which is beyond the capacity of nature. In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate
home and to require separate maintenance from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a
concubine into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are
enough. As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 262), a husband cannot, by his
own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by
wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of
her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.
Ruling:
The judgment is therefore reversed

February 5, 1913
G.R. No. L-7426 MARIA QUINTANA vs. GELASIO LERMA,
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a sum of money due upon a contract between the
plaintiff and defendant husband and wife, for support.
The action is by a wife against her husband for support. It is based upon a written contract. The evidence shows that
the parties were lawfully married in 1901 and that in February, 1905, they entered into a written agreement of
separation whereby each renounced certain rights as against the other and divided the conjugal property between
them, the defendant undertaking in consideration of the premises to pay the plaintiff within the first three days of
each month the sum of P20 for her support and maintenance.
The defendant set up as a special defense that the wife had forfeited her right to support by committing adultery.
Issue:
W/N the wife forfeits her right to support by commiting adultery
Held:
This allegation was stricken out by the court on motion, upon the ground that under the provisions of article 152 of
the Civil Code the commission of adultery is not recognized as a ground upon which the obligation to support ceases.
Notwithstanding that such special defense was stricken out by order of the court, the defendant, after plaintiff had
filed an amended complaint, inserted the same defense in his answer to the amended complaint. The court upon the
trial, however, refused to recognize such defense or to permit any evidence to be introduced in support thereof, to
which the defendant duly accepted.
Article 1432 of the Civil Code provides: In default of express declarations in the marriage contract, the separation of
the property of the consorts, during marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in the case
provided by article 50.
We are of the opinion that the special defense of adultery set up by the defendant in his answer both to the original
and the amended complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action.
Ruling:
The judgment of the court below is reversed
G.R. No. L-26231 August 7, 1926
LORENZO MENDOZA vs. GORGONIA PARUNGAO
Facts:
Original petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Lorenzo Mendoza against Gorgonia Parugao, praying that a
preliminary injunction be issued against the respondent sheriff prohibiting him from carrying out the sale of the
property of the petitioner.
1925, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered judgment in civil case of said court in which the herein
respondent Gorgonia Parugao was plaintiff and the herein petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza defendant, declaring the
marriage between the two null on account of the return of the first husband of the petitioner, who had been though
dead after an absence of more than seven years.
1925, Antonio Buenaventura, the first husband of the respondent Gorgonia Parugao, died in the barrio of Cebu in the
municipality of Cabanatuan Nueva Ecija.
Said judgment annulling the marriage being on appeal, on September 14, 1925, the said respondent Gorgonia
Parugao brought an action, in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, against the petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza in
which she alleged the existence of certain conjugal property acquired during her marriage with the said petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Gorgonia Parugao, on September 14, 1925, when she filed her complaint for the
liquidation of the conjugal property and alimony, was entitled to support during the pendency of the action.
Held:
The right to support between spouses arises from law (art. 143 of the Civil Code) and is based upon their obligation to
mutually help each other created by the matrimonial bond. After the complaint for annulment of marriage has been
filed by the wife and admitted she is entitled to support during the pendency of the suit (arts. 67 and 68, par. 4, Civil
Code), but once the nullity is decreed, the right ceases, because the mutual obligation created by the marriage is
extinguished. The marriage of the respondent with the petitioner having been annulled on August 7, 1925, by virtue
of the rule enunciated, she was no longer entitled to support on September 14, 1925, when she filed her complaint for
support.
Ruling:
Declaring void the writ of execution of March 23, 1926, and all the proceedings had therein and making the
preliminary injunction issued by this court absolute
August 9, 1935
G.R. No. L-43794 LUIS FRANCISCO vs. FRANCISCO ZANDUETA,
Facts:
Original petition for the writ of certiorari whereby the petitioner, Luis Francisco, seeks to procure the abrogation of an
order of the respondent judge, dated May 2, 1935, granting the respondent, Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, a monthly
pension of P30 pendente lite.
It appears that the respondent, Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, aged two years, through his natural mother and guardian
ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against the herein petitioner. In that case it is alleged that
the therein plaintiff is the acknowledged son of Luis Francisco and as such is entitled to support. The petitioner, as
defendant in that case, answered by a general denial of each and every material allegation contained in the complaint
and as a special defense alleged that he never acknowledged and could not have acknowledged that he never
acknowledged and could not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his son; that he was not present at the baptism of the
plaintiff and that he was married at the time it is alleged that the plaintiff was born.
Notwithstanding this denial of paternity the respondent judge issued the order, hence the institution of this special
proceeding.
Issue:
W/N respondent need support
Held:
In the present case the action for the support or alimony is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife;
therefore it is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse that is, a marriage, without which
one has no right to the title of husband or wife.
This evidence being lacking, and the civil status of marriage being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken
for granted upon the point in issue.
It is evident that there is of necessity a substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the rendition of a
final judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of the status of marriage and his capacity prior to
such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such status of marriage . . ..
Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1) Husband and wife, (2)
legitimate ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate
descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of natural children and (5)
brothers and sisters. In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for
support, the civil status of marriage or that of relationship.
The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the respondent
judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner, as defendant in case No. 47238, to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P30, or any other amount as monthly support, pendente lite.
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter, which is
excluded by the laws of the land.
Ruling:
The writ prayed for is granted
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN
Facts:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to
allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl;
Issue:
W/N the child shoud be given support
Held:
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by
law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said
child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
Doctrine:
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and those persons who would legally represent them if they were already
born may accept unborn children.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Ruling:
The orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
G.R. No. L-19065 January 31, 1964
MANUELA ADVINCULA vs. MANUEL ADVINCULA
Facts:
1956, Manuela Advincula filed Civil Case, against Manuel Advincula, for acknowledge merit and support. On motion of
both parties, said case was dismissed. On January 16, 1961, Manuela Advincula filed the complaint under
consideration against the same Manuela Advincula, also acknowledgment and support, same court. Instead of filing
his answer, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the dismissal of Civil Case barred the filing of the
second complaint. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the former was with prejudice.
Held:
There is no statement in the order of dismissal of the first case (Civil No. 3553) that the dismissal was without
prejudice. In accordance, therefore, with Section 2, Rule 30, such dismissal is without prejudice. Said rule provides:
Except as provided in the preceding section, as action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as court deems proper. If a prior counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class action shall not
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, in both Civil Cases Nos. 3553 and 5659, the action of the plaintiff was for acknowledgment and support.
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded
as subject to final determination.
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or
decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297);
Ruling:
Said order is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin, for further proceedings
G.R. No. L-10792 April 30, 1958
ENRIQUE T. JOCSON vs. THE EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Facts:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, certified to us by the Court of Appeals on the ground that
the questions involved are purely legal.
It appears that in Special Proceedings No. 734 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Agustin A. Jocson was, on
October 3, 1950, appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his then minor children, Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla,
Enrique and Jesus, and as such guardian, he had a bond filed with the Empire Insurance Co. as surety.
In the course of the guardianship. Jocson submitted periodic accounts to the court, among them those for expenses
incurred for the education and clothing.
Jocson died on February 12, 1954, and to succeed him, Perla, who together with her brothers Carlos and Rodolfo, had
already attained majority, was appointed guardian of the remaining minors. Perla filed a petition in the guardianship
proceedings to have the accounts of the deceased guardian, Jocson, reopened, claiming that the disbursements made
from the guardianship funds for the education and clothing of the minors Enrique and Jesus were illegal.
The motion was opposed by the Empire Insurance Co., the surety on the bond, as well as by the administratrix of the
intestate estate of Jocson, and the court, after considering the written arguments submitted by the parties, rendered
an order denying it and declaring the bond cancelled and the guardianship terminated. The movants appealed, and it
is that appeal that has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
What constitutes support
Held:
The contention is clearly without merit. Support does include what is necessary for the education and clothing of the
person entitled thereto (Art. 290, New Civil Code). But support must be demanded and the right to it established
before it becomes payable (Art. 298, New Civil Code; Marcelo vs. Estacio, 70 Phil., 215). For the right to support does
not arise from the mere fact of relationship, even from the relationship of parents and children, but "from imperative
necessity without which it cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless
support is demanded" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol. 1, p. 181, citing 8 Manresa 685).
In the present case, it does not appear that support for the minors, be it only for their education and clothing, was
ever demanded from their father and the need for it duly established. The need for support, as already stated, cannot
be presumed, and especially must this be true in the present case where it appears that the minors had means of
their own.
Ruling:
The order appealed from is affirmed,

G.R. No. L-26062 December 31, 1926
JOSE V. RAMIREZ vs. J. R. REDFERN
Facts:
The plaintiffs are Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida. The defendant is J. R. Redfern. Jose V. Ramirez
and J. R. Redfern are brothers-in-law.
The action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant the sums of $600 and more for alleged advances
to the defendants wife for her support and maintenance.
In 1908, J. R. Redfern took his wife and three minor children to England and left them there. He returned to the
Philippines the following year. .
The result reached by the trial judge was this: "Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the court is of the
opinion that defendant was amply providing for his wife and children in London, and that defendant is not liable to
plaintiffs for the sums of money here sought to be recovered, which were delivered to defendant's wife without his
knowledge or consent and when there was no necessity therefore."
Issue:
W/N the trial court erred in his deciosion
Held:
The case falls squarely within the provisions of the first paragraph of article 1894 of the Civil Code. This article
provides: "When without the knowledge of the person who is bound to give support to a dependent, a stranger
supplies it, the latter shall be entitled to recover the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of
charity, and without the expectation of recovering it." For one to recover under the provisions of article 1894 of the
Civil Code, it must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished a dependent of one bound to give
support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged
with the duty. The negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it.
With special reference to the combined facts and law, it may be conceded that Mr. and Mrs. Redfern with money out
of charity. The third requisite of the law is also taken out of consideration since Mr. Redfern is the first to acknowledge
that the money was handed to his wife by Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez without his knowledge. We think, however, that there
is a failure of proof as to the first essential, and possibly the second essential, of the law.1awphil.net
The husband and wife are mutually bound to support each other. By support is understood all that is necessary for
food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social standing of the family. Parents are also
required to bring up and educate their children. But in this connection, the point of interest is that the wife accepted
assistance from another, when it is not shown that she had ever made any complaint to her husband or any of his
agents with regard to her allowance.
It is clear that there is evidence in the record which corroborates the finding of the trial judge that the defendant was
amply providing for his wife and children in London.
Ruling:
judgment appealed from be affirmed
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in
1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody
of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent
spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy
because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work.
Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts, Private respondents contend petitioner abducted the boy.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.,"
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
Held:
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep
them in their custody and company.
Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant
right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable
and unfit parent.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for the past three years is understandable.
Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when
the parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a
fact which has not been proven here.
Ruling:
The petition is GRANTED
[G.R. No. 116773. January 16, 1997]
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE
Facts:
1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married; after their marriage, the couple stayed
with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, two children were begotten. Leslie was entrusted to the care
and custody of petitioners mother, while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house; on August 6, 1990,
petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died; petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the
respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just
died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her
late son.
Petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye and their acquaintance blossomed into a
meaningful relationship.
Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education;
however, respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days
old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
Issue:
W/N the mother has the right of custody of her child.
Held:
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their
heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law
When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter
was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the
right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases
of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case
at bar.
Ruling:
Decision appealed is hereby AFFIRMED
[G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001]
BONIFACIA P. VANCILvs. HELEN G. BELMES,
Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who
died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children.
1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the
persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent,Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old
child. It
Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent
Vancil Jr.
Natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship.
Let it be stressed that in her Manifestation/Motion, dated September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes
stated that her daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth Certificate
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian
Held:
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family
Code which provides:
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
xxx.
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to
his custody
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case
of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of
the parents death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of respondent.
Ruling:
Appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
G.R. No. L-26953 March 28, 1969
ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO vs. DRA. VENANCIA L. MAKABALI
Facts:
Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, Joseph Casero, was sought to be enforced by habeas corpus
proceedings in the Court of First Instance. After hearing, the Court denied the writ, and the case was appealed directly
to this Supreme Court exclusively on points of law.
1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San
Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the delivery.
The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her own
son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he recovered his health;
and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her child, and never paid for his
expenses.
Petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children apparently with the tolerance.
The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed that the boy is fairly intelligent as a witness.
He never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was calling the respondent his "Mammy". The Court informed him that his
real mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with his real mother or the respondent. The boy pointed to
the respondent and said "Mammy!"
The Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother and denied the writ
prayed for.
Issue:
W/N the child can choose the foster parent
Held:
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may
be ordered separated from the mother (Do.) This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions,
the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under
which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of
Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pea, now "there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor." 1
Ruling:
Decision is affirmed
[G.R. No. 126556. July 28, 1997]
NELSON C. DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PETRON CORPORATION
Facts:
The petition for review before us questions the, 1996 decision and 1996 resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals which declared void a special order of the Regional Trial Court stationed at Balanga, Bataan, ordering partial
execution pending appeal to the extent of P50 million out of an award of P1,291,456,320.00 to be paid by Petron
Corporation. The award is for the use of water over a 3-year period beginning 1992 up to 1994. The Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Limay, Bataan, passed Municipal Ordinance No. 90 charging private respondent Petron
Corporation the amount of approximately P430 million per year for the use of the municipalitys water. Private
respondent questioned the legality of the said ordinance before the above-named regional trial court, claiming among
other things, that it does not consume more than P7 million worth of water per year.
The then prevailing rule invoked by petitioner and accordingly applied by the regional trial court was Section 2,
Rule 39 of the former Rules of Court that provides:
Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party which notice to the adverse party, the court
may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to
be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter the motion and the special order shall be included
therein.
Issue:
W/N The execution of a judgment before becoming final by reason of appeal is recognized.
Held:
This Court upholds respondent Court of Appeals ruling that the basis relied upon by the regional trial court does not
constitute good reason or reasons for the execution of the judgment pending appeal even though such execution was
only a partial of the judgment; the amount awarded being in the substantial amount of P50 million pesos. The
posting of a corresponding bond to answer for damages does not cure the insufficiency or lack of good reason.
Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good
reason. The fact that the losing party had also appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari proceedings,
as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution. (Jaca vs. Davao Lumber Co)
In this resolution, therefore, this Court purposely limits itself to resolving only to the wisdom of the trial courts
exercise of discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment pending appeal.
Ruling:
The instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 72424 February 13, 1989
INTESTATE ESTATE OF CARMEN DE LUNA (deceased), CATALINA MORALES

GONZALES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Facts:
1964, Jose de Luna Gonzales and former Judge Ramon Icasiano were appointed co-administrators of the estate of
Carmen de Luna in
1968, Judge Icasiano died so Gonzales performed his duties as sole administrator of the estate.
1980, Gonzales through counsel filed a motion for allowances and payment of administrator's commission in
accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court leaving the matter to the discretion of the court.
1980, the trial court issued an order requiring the administrator to define the fees he was demanding, furnishing
copies to all parties and their respective counsel who were then required to file their opposition if any, within ten (10)
days from receipt.
1980 Jose de Luna Gonzales died. His heirs filed in his behalf on March 10, 1980 an Urgent Supplemental Motion for
allowances and payment of administrator's commission. Heir Trinidad Villajuan Vda. De Martinez filed an opposition to
which Catalina M. Gonzales, widow of the late administrator filed a reply.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose de Luna Gonzales is entitled to the amount of P500,000.00 by way of compensation as
administrator of the estate of Carmen de Luna.
Held:
Section 7, Rule 85 states:
SEC. 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. -
Compensation provided by wills controls unless renounced. An executor or administrator shall be allowed the
necessary expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate, and for his services, four pesos per day
for the time actually and necessarily employed, or a commission upon the value of so much of the estate as comes
into his possession and is finally disposed of by him in the payment of debts, expenses, legacies, or distributive shares,
or by delivery to heirs or devisees, of two per centum of the first five thousand pesos of such value, one per centum
of so much of such value as exceed five thousand pesos and does not exceed thirty thousand pesos, one-half per
centum of so much of such value as exceeds thirty thousand pesos and does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos.
But in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has
required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed. If
objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be re-examined on appeal.
If there are two or more executors or administrators, the compensation shall be apportioned among them by the court
according to the services actually rendered by them respectively.
The applicable provision is the proviso which states: "in any special case, where the estate is large and the settlement
has been attended with great difficulty and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or
administrator, a greater sum may be allowed." A wide latitude, leeway or discretion is therefore given to the trial
court to grant a greater sum. And the determination of whether the administration and liquidation of an estate have
been attended with greater difficulty and have required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or
administrator rests on the sound discretion of the court which took cognizance of the estate. (Rodriguez v. Silva) The
trial court, in applying this proviso awarded the sum of P500,000.00 as administrator's compensation.
The records of the case is replete with evidence to prove that the late administrator Jose de Luna Gonzales had taken
good care of the estate and performed his duties without any complaint from any of the heirs. In fact, the appellate
court agrees with the trial court as it held:
Ruling:
Decision of IAC is reinstated
[G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005]
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTOvs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V
Facts:
2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite
of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her
from the conjugal home and his school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in Paraaque City) when she decided to
abandon Crisanto sometime in early February 2002. On April 2, 2002, RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort heard the ancillary
prayer of Crisanto for custody pendente lite. Because Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear despite notice, Crisanto a
certain Col. Renato Santos, and Ms. Cherry Batistel, testified before the Judge; documentary evidence. 2002, Judge
awarded custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto.
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He stated that Joycelyn took their minor child with her to Caminawit, San
Jose, and Occidental Mindoro. At that time, the minor was enrolled at B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. Despite efforts
exerted by him, he has failed to see his child. Joycelyn and the child are at present staying with the formers
stepfather at the latters residence at Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
The findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that
the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn
slapping the child.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the custody of the child to the father,
violated Art. 213 of the Family Code, which mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Held:
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often
over the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody
pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years old.[30] On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on
Article 213 of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the father argues
that she is unfit to take care of their son; hence, for compelling reasons, he must be awarded custody of the child.
Article 213 of the Family Code[31] provides:
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs
the custody of their child.[32] Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be
reasons for such measure.(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison
detre in the basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care.In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of
the Civil Code,
In like manner, the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
has been held to connote a mandatory character. Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which
the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation
or a de facto separation.[44] In the present case, the parents are living separately as a matter of fact.
The principle of best interest of the child pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support,
personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody.
Ruling:
The Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED
[G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004]
JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL
Facts:
2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and
Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as
one of the respondents.
This Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, the petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate
son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel.
He also alleges that he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and
send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels
L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.
Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines
and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of
the mother who is away
Held:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is
entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause
showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the father
or the mother recognizing them.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the records
showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge
that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his
mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over
the minor, is entitled to have custody of him.
Ruling:
Petition is DENIED
[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]
ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS
Facts:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
1997, RTC rendered its decision that, Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following sums of money.
Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident
Issue:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
Held:
1. Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the
pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Ruling:
The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals

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Digests by Alex Delos Santos

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS

Delos Santos, Alexandra Patricia Lim

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

NIAL vs. BAYADOG

RTC dismissed the petition.

The petition is granted.

Is Julia psychologically incapacitated?

[February 13, 1997]

Is there psychological incapacity in the present case?

The petition is dismissed.

Whether or not there is psychological incapacity.

These are meager grounds for legal separation.ss

[226 SCRA 572 1993]

Lower court and CA denied the motion.

Whether or not declaration of nullity is only approved for reasons of remarriage

Petition was dismissed.

Lam vs. Chua

Petition was partly approved.

[320 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]

Lucita E. Hernandez vs. CA and Mario Hernandez

Whether or not Lilias first marriage is void.

Petition was dismissed.

Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated.

The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void.

Petition was dismissed.

[G.R. No. 53642 April 15, 1988]

Donato vs. Luna

Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.

Petition was dismissed.

Landicho vs. Relova

Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.

Petitioner guilty of bigamy.

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

[337 SCRA 122]

Mercado is guilty of bigamy.

Meynardo Beltran vs People and Judge Tuazon

Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the case.

Elements of prejudicial question

The decision of RTC was upheld.

BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT

Whether or not concealed pregnancy applies to this case.

Sarao vs. Guevara

Whether or not impotency is a valid ground to annul the marriage.

Petition is remanded to lower court for further evidence.

FRANCISCO vs. TAYAO

Ruling: Judgement appealed from must be affirmed .

GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, PADILLA, J.

1. W/N there is a civil action

Petitioner's contention is not correct.

Ruling: Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)

[GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004]

Issue: W/N Lucios marriage with Lucia was valid.

Ruling: Lucio is not guilty of Bigamy.

EMILIO TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Whether or not the marriage is void.

The petition is denied and the decision of CA is affirmed.

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA

W/N Judge was guilty of railroading.

ONG vs. ONG