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The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International

Society
Author(s): Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 327-348
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Review of International Studies (1991). 17, 327-348 Printed in Great Britain

The Other in European self-definition:


an addendum to the literature on
international society*
IVER B. NEUMANN and JENNIFER M. WELSH

It is strange that the problem of Others has never truly disturbed the realists. To
the extent that the realist takes everything as given, doubtless it seems to him that
the Other is given. In the midst of the real, what is more real than the Other?
Jean-Paul Sartre1

The logic of raison d'?tat and the logic of culture

The dominant role of the realist paradigm in international relations theory has left
little room for the study of the role of cultural variables in world politics. The two
central tenets of the realist theoretical game-plan?the primacy of the sovereign state
system, and the autonomy of that system from domestic political, social and moral
considerations?focus our attention on the vertical division of the world into
sovereign states, rather than on the horizontal forces and ties that cut across state
frontiers.2 The result is the metaphor for the interaction of states as the mechanical
one of the billiard table, with power politics as the primary dynamic.
It is not our intention to deny the role of power politics or raison d'?tat in
international relations. As Andrew Linklater has recently written, the systemic
approach of the realists 'helps to explain important dimensions in world politics
which no serious account of international relations can realistically ignore'.3 Indeed,
the anarchical character of the states system ensures that the insights of classical
realists such as Hobbes and Rousseau, and their modern disciples, such as
Morgenthau or Kennan, will have relevance wherever states systems exist.
Instead, we submit that there are different logics at work in the international system.
The first is the one characterized by the realist school?the reason of states.4 For the
realists, the systemic anarchy of international politics necessitates certain 'rational' forms

* We would like to thank Jon Bingen, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Michael Harbsmeier, Andrew Hurrell,
Celia Kerslake, Kumru Toktamis, and especially our teacher and mentor the late John Vincent for
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (London, 1957), p.
223.
2 Cf. e.g. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, 1979), chs. 1-4.
3 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations
(London, 1990), p. 14.
4 For a summary of this position, cf. R. J. Vincent, 'Realpolitik', in James Mayall (ed.), The Community
of States (London, 1982), p. 74.

327

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328 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
of behaviour for all kinds of states, regardless of their internal peculiarities: the search for
security, power accumulation, alliance formation, etc. In short, the logic of the system
dictates the logic of raison d'?tat.5 Order in this precarious state of nature, they continue,
is necessarily of a limited and self-help kind. To avoid the perils of constant insecurity and
conflict, it is in the interest of each sovereign state?or more specifically, the most
powerful states in the system?to establish rules for peaceful coexistence, such as the
balance of power or Great Power cooperation.
As an explanatory and predictive device, however, this realist picture falls short of
the mark. Despite almost scientific aspirations, the realist focus on the demands of
power politics and national interest fails to explain adequately a great deal of state
activity. Choices are still available; action is not automatically dictated by a state's
place in the system. Consequently, it is not enough to say that all states simply seek
to preserve or increase their power, that hostility towards another state is motivated
solely by considerations of security, or that all states are regarded as equally valuable
partners in potential alliances.
Nor, more importantly, is it accurate to place international order squarely on the
shoulders of the sovereign state?i.e., on consent and self-help. As contended by
'rationalist' thinkers such as Hedley Bull, international order is also created and
perpetuated through the existence of common interests, values and norms, and the
sense of belonging to a society. Hence his distinction between an international system,
which exists when two or more states have sufficient contact between them to behave
as parts of a whole, and an international society, which arises when states consciously
conceive of themselves as bound by common rules and share in the working of
common institutions.
In fact, we would argue, it is possible to go beyond Bull's position. While his
rationalist conception of order is not confined to the procedural dictates of raison
d'?tat, the interests and values of which he speaks are for the most part confined to
the realm of the international. In characterizing international order as a pattern or
disposition of international activity that sustains the goals of the society of states, he
defines these goals to include: the preservation of the system of sovereign states,
maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, pacta sunt
servando, the laws of warfare etc. In short, Bull's agreed values are values about the
international system, and the orderly functioning of that system.6
It is our hypothesis that European international society historically depended on a
deeper consensus. Order among European states was generated by agreement on not
only international values, but also domestic values of a social and cultural nature.
This alternative source of order operates at the societal level rather than the level of
the independent sovereign state. And, in contrast to raison d'?tat, which is unique to
the interactions between sovereign states, this logic is common to all forms of human
interaction. It is the cultural logic of 'us and them', of collective identity, of group
consciousness. It therefore requires for its analysis a recognition of the relevance of
other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology.
Questions of a cultural nature have not been wholly absent from the international
relations literature. They receive much unacknowledged attention in the work of early

5 The classic statement is provided by Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, fifth edn,
1978), pp. 4^15.
6 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977), pp. 13-16
and passim.

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The Other in European self-definition 329
writers such as Grotius, and in contemporary cosmopolitan analysis.7 Moreover,
cultural issues have been a key ingredient in the work of the 'English school' of
international theory. For example, Martin Wight highlights the role of cultural
solidarity in the preservation of stability among members of a states system,8 and Bull
himself suggests that international order is more likely to develop if states share an
'international political culture'.9 In his later writings, Bull hints at the universalizing
force of modernity in creating a twentieth century international society.10 None the
less, while both Bull and Wight discuss issues of international political culture in their
works, they do not treat them as a 'logic' operating among and between the units of
international society. Such a treatment, we believe, would be a useful extension of
their ideas concerning culture and international relations.
More importantly, for the most part the treatment of cultural variables by
international society theorists has centred on cultural diffusion or 'socialization'?the
way in which European international society has spread to encompass ever new
human collectives. It is indeed timely and relevant to show how the expansion of
international society has intermingled with the spread of European power and
culture. However, such an expansion thesis is in many respects vulnerable to the
general critique hurled on diffusionist theories of social change, especially from the
standpoint of cultural relativism. Furthermore, the project can be seen as an attempt
to construct what Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard calls a 'grand narrative'.11 What is the
literature on 'international society' as it stands if not an all-embracing yarn of how
relations between Europe on the one hand, and the barbarians and the savages on the
other, are transformed from a Hobbesian state of nature to a Grotian pastorale,
ushering in the spirit of enlightenment and modernism? At the very least, the
unspoken presuppositions which go with any grand narrative must be pointed out
and assessed.
One such presupposition?the focus of our addendum?is the assumption that the
spread of international society has been a one-way process whereby the core, i.e. the areas
where international society is most strongly embedded (Europe and the West), has
influenced the periphery, i.e. the areas where international society is being introduced. It
can be argued that this traditional assumption neglects an important aspect of the story
of the expansion of European society: how that diffusion affected the core itself. It was
not the case that the values of a constant European core simply expanded to ever new
areas. Rather, the very idea of what Europe was was from the beginning defined partly in
terms of what it was not. In other words, the Other, i.e., the non-European barbarian or
savage, played a decisive role in the evolution of the European identity and in the
maintenance of order among European states. It is this functional role of the Other in
promoting cohesiveness that is the focus of our concern.
By delineating which areas and values fell beyond the pale of European society (a

7 Cf. e.g. Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens and the Theory of International Relations (London, 1982).
8 Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester, 1977), p. 33.
9 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 316-317.
10 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984), p. 435.
Adam Watson, 'Hedley Bull, states systems and international societies', Review of International
Studies, 13 (1987), pp. 147-53, which is an account of his cooperation with Bull, on p. 149 stresses
how 'We also recognized that what really and decisively made the settler states of the Americas
consider themselves, and be considered, members of the European family was that they were
European or European-dominated?in other words the cultural factor, as in the Ottoman case'.
11 Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge (Manchester, 1984).

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330 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
process which Wight has referred to as 'external differentiation'12), European states
refashioned their own identity as a cultural whole and were better able to create the
rules and institutions distinctive to their own interstate game. Although in no way
sealed off from the outside world by a Great Wall, 'a kind of diplomatic fence divided
the European state system from the rest of the world.'13 Thus, while the realists claim
that it was the careful and persistent management of the balance of power which kept
the peace in the European society of states, we would contend that an a priori
definition of a collective, partially through the process of external differentiation, was
requisite.
It is this reinforcing effect of the Other on the collective of Europe which has thus
far been neglected by the international society literature. What took place was not a
straight story of diffusion, but rather a process in which both the logic of raison d'?tat
and the logic of culture were at work.14 By providing an outline of that process, we
intend not to question the legitimacy of the rationalist 'expansion of international
society' project, but to offer an addendum to the account of how international society
expanded. That task is part of a more general movement within the social sciences. In
the words of Simon Dalby, '[The] postmodern sensibility questions how the social
construction of reality is formulated; and how "Others" are created as the external
antagonist against which internal identity is mobilized.'15
A variety of Others have been instrumental in this process of forging the European
identity. From the confrontations with Islam and the Spanish conquest of the 'New
World', to the scramble for colonial possessions at the end of the nineteenth century
and beyond, European historians and philosophers have grappled with the clash
between 'infidels' or 'barbarians', and 'civilized' peoples.16 Moreover, ethnically and
culturally peripheral minorities have also served as Others. The Other need not
necessarily be spatially outside, but may also be an 'internal Other'. Outstanding
historical examples include Jews and Freemasons. The most important contemporary
candidate is, arguably, the post-colonial migration from Africa, the Middle East and
the subcontinent.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of our analysis, the dominant Other in the history of
the European states system is 'the Turk'. In contrast to the communities of the 'New
World', the military might and physical proximity of the Ottoman Empire, combined
with the strength of its religious tradition, made it a particularly relevant Other in the
evolution of European identity. It can be shown that up until the mid nineteenth
century, contemporaries saw the frontier of Europe as stopping where the Ottoman

12 Wight, Systems, p. 18.


13 Edward V. Gulick: Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of
One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York, 1967), p. 10.
14 Bull identifies the process we are referring to, but does not address it directly: 'The standard view [i.e.,
what we have called the diffusion view of international society], moreover, neglects the influence of
Asian international practices on the evolution of European ones: the international society to which
non-European powers came to adhere was not one made in a Europe isolated from the rest of the
world, but grew up concurrently with the expansion of Europe into other continents over four
centuries, and was marked by this experience.' Hedley Bull, 'The Emergence of a Universal
International Society' in Bull and Watson, Expansion, pp. 117-26, on p. 123.
15 Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War. The Discourse of Politics (London, 1990), p. 4.
16 Michael Harbsmeier, 'Early Travels to Europe: some remarks on the magic of writing', in Francis
Barker et al. (eds.), Europe and Its Others (Colchester, 1985), pp. 72-88, on p. 72, is among those who
stress how 'the European' was defined by means of an Other: 'early modern European civilisation
came to make its own ability properly to describe and understand the other, its own proper literacy,
into the very definition of its own identity as against the rest of the world'.

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The Other in European self-definition 331

Empire began, and the Christians living within the Ottoman Empire as Europeans in
exile. During the nineteenth century perceptions began to change, especially after
1856, commonly cited as the date at which the Sublime Porte was formally admitted
into the European club of states. Thus, although we will touch on the existence of
other internal and external Others, as well as some twentieth-century issues regarding
Turkey and its relationship with Europe, it is 'the Turk' as Other in the era before
1856 which is the centerpiece of our analysis.
The purpose of our addendum concerning Europe and its Other is two-fold. First,
in charting the relations between European society and the Ottoman Empire we will
attempt to show the cultural logic of international relations at work, and thus
challenge the excessive concern with the logic of raison d'?tat in international relations
literature. More importantly, such an outline will enable us to highlight the role of
agreed cultural and social values in the maintenance of international order, and how
they often underlie agreement on the more procedural rules and institutions em
phasized by rationalist writers concerned with the notion of an international society.
Consequently, while the object of our critique is the realist school and its pre
occupation with raison d'?tat, we also hope to add a new dimension to the growing
literature on the foundations of international society.
Secondly, by underlining the importance of the Other for the very formulation of
international society, we hope to suggest some basic problems in Europe's present
day relations with non-European states. Inasmuch as European identity is tied to the
existence of an Other, it is probable that the European perception of that Other is
blurred by this very fact. In this case, exposing the existence of an Other may remove
an unnecessary obstacle to working relations between European and non- European
societies. Since the Other is a human invention, and although the cultural differences
between self and Other may be real enough, it is in the final analysis historically
arbitrary who at any given time fills the role of Other. Moreover, one should not rule
out the possibility of turning a traditionally apposite Other into & positive Other, with
which one could have mutually fruitful interaction.17

The notion of the Other

Before examining European-Ottoman relations, and the theoretical issues mentioned


above, a word should be said about the notion of the Other. Gestalt psychology is
preoccupied with how perceptions of a specific phenomenon tend to be subsumed to
fit a preconceived pattern of opposites.18 The basic value of the notion of the Other is
to remind us that this is not only a positive, but also a negative process; a thing is
perceived as much in terms of what it is not as in terms of what it is. Other social
disciplines have also capitalized on this insight, each in terms of their own Other. In
philosophy, Sartre and others have underlined how the perception of another person

17 There are precedents for the existence of a positive Other, most notably in eighteenth-century
Enlightenment thinking. Hence, for example, Rousseau pointed to the merits of the 'noble savage'.
Where relations with 'the Turk' are concerned, an alternative European tradition stretching back to
Cusanus has held that if the two parties could only engage in dialogue, positive results would surely
follow.
18 Ernest R. Hilgard et al., Introduction to Psychology (New York, 1985), pp. 181-97.

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332 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
contributes to the constitution of the self, while Foucault has demonstrated how the
sane can only constitute themselves as a social category in terms of who the Others,
the mad, actually are. In the realm of sociology, feminists have staked woman's claim
to be the Other in world history. Historian Edward Said has taken European
Orientalists to task for creating an Oriental Other, and tried to show how 'European
culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort
of surrogate and even underground self.'19
In his analysis of that subgroup of Others, strangers, Georg Simmel points out that
'The state of being a stranger is of course a completely positive relation [...] The stranger
is an element of the group itself, not unlike the poor and sundry "inner enemies"?an
element whose membership within the group involves both being outside it and
confronting it.'20 What Simmel sees at the personal level also seems to hold true on the
level of human collectives such as states. Anthropologists, for example, have illustrated
how ethnic identity is created in opposition to some Other.21 Relations between such
ethnic groups bear many structural similarities to relations between states. Indeed, ethnic
groups in the guise of nations often aspire for statehood.
But perhaps the most explicit attempt to define states in terms of the Other has been
made by Carl Schmitt. While noting the same similarity between the notions of
enemies, strangers and Others as did Simmel, and expanding Weber's argument about
the monopoly of violence as the defining trait of the state, Schmitt maintains that the
state defines itself as the unit which distinguishes public enemies {Feind) from friends
{Freund). If a given state fails to do so, its authority will immediately be challenged by
some other unit which will take on this burden. According to Schmitt, the public
enemy 'does not have to be morally evil, he does not have to be esthetically ugly, he
does not have to appear as an economic competitor, and it can [. . .] even be
advantageous to have business dealings with him. He is nevertheless the Other
[Andere], the stranger.'22
In our view, Schmitt goes too far, by focusing exclusively on Otherness to the
detriment of defining integrating traits internal to states. Therefore, on our level, the
system of states, we will not replicate Schmitt's position. We do not intend to go as far
as Vilho Harle, for example, who asserts that the fundamental basis of Europeanism
is found in its juxtaposition with the enemy?its need to differentiate between 'friend
and foe'.23 While we recognize the importance of the external dynamics of identity,
and illustrate them through Europe's relations with 'the Turk', we also want to

19 Edward Said, Orientalism (1978; Harmondsworth, 1985), p. 3. Apart from two passing remarks about
Kissinger's view of the Orient on pp. 47-8 and Cardinal Newman's use of Orientalism to justify
British intervention in the Crimean War on p. 153, Said does not discuss the implications of his
findings for international relations.
20 Georg Simmel, 'The Stranger', in Georg Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forces. Selected Writings,
ed. Donald N. Levine (Chicago, 1970), pp. 143-9.
21 E.g. Arnold L. Epstein, Ethnos and Identity. Three Studies in Ethnicity (London, 1978).
22 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (1932; Munich, 1936), p. 14. Michael J. Shapiro actually
echoes Schmitt when he suggests that foreign policy generally is about making an Other. See Michael
J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation (Madison, 1988).
23 'Indeed, if the idea of Europeanism is to be realised, it will inevitably be based on dualism.
Europeanism will not be an alternative to dualism, Europeanism is from beginning to end just a new
application of dualistic patterns. And in this application, there are candidates for the role of common
unifying enemy: Islam in religion, Japan and the other Pacific-Asian countries in economic
competition, and the United States in economics, politics and security.' Vilho Harle, 'European Roots
of Dualism and Its Alternatives in International Relations', in Vilho Harle (ed.), European Values in
International Relations (London, 1990), pp. 1-14, on p. 11.

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The Other in European self-definition 333
acknowledge the crucial role of cultural traits internal to Europe in promoting group
identity, and the consolidation of those cultural traits over time.

Culture and raison d'?tat in Europe's relations with 'the Turk'

For the fledging international society which evolved from the ashes of Western
Christendom, the most important relevant Other was 'the Turk'. From the fourteenth
century to the nineteenth, the Ottoman Empire occupied and controlled a quarter of
the European continent, comprising some of Europe's most coveted territory. Yet, as
Thomas Naff contends, its relationship with the emerging European states system was
an ambiguous one: 'The logical conclusion ought to be that the Ottoman Empire was,
empirically, a European state. The paradox is that it was not. Even though a
significant portion of the Empire was based in Europe, it could not be said to have
been of Europe.'24 In Bull's phraseology, 'the Turks' and the Europeans formed a
system, but not a society. While there was interaction between the Ottoman Empire
and the European powers in war and commerce, 'it was specifically denied on both
sides that the European powers and Turkey possessed any common interests or
values [. . .] and there were no common institutions, such as united the European
powers, in whose working they cooperated.'25
It was only in 1856, with the Treaty of Paris, that the Ottoman Empire was
officially recognized as a permanent part of the European balance of power system?
the first non-European power to gain that status. The Preamble to that treaty
declared that the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire was vital to 'the
Peace of Europe', and Article II gave the Sublime Porte the right 'a participer aux
avantages du droit public et du concert europ?en'.26 This status was codified at the
Hague Conference (1899), in which Turkey was included as one of the participants,
and confirmed again by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
The realist paradigm, with its empirical treatment of power relationships, is only
partially helpful in understanding this ambiguous relationship between Europe and 'the
Turk'. Of equal salience is an examination of Europe's strong sense of group identity, and
its perceived cultural differences with the Ottoman Empire. In the following overview of
European-Ottoman relations, we seek to augment the raison d'?tat explanation of
European diplomacy with a discussion of what we have called the cultural logic of
international relations. We hope to demonstrate both how Europe differentiated itself
from the Other, and how that Other in turn consolidated the European identity.

Christendom and the Ottoman Empire before the Peace of Westphalia

Christendom, as it stood in the eleventh century, combined a Stoic, universalist belief


in the essential unity of humankind with a missionary dynamic to convert the infidel.

24 Thomas Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', in Bull and Watson,
Expansion, pp. 143-70, on p. 143.
25 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 14. However, see also Watson, Hedley Bull.
26 Cited in Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society (Oxford, 1984), p. 113.
See also Wight, Systems, p. 116.

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334 Tver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
According to the mediaeval canonists, the pope had rightful jurisdiction over all
human beings, faithful and unbeliever alike. As a corollary, he was given the right of
direct interference in non-Christian countries to protect Christians living there, to
correct perceived misgovernment, or in some cases to depose rulers. The tricky
question, however, and one that would plague Europeans for the next five centuries,
was whether the infidel had rightful domain over his land at all, or whether Christians
had an explicit duty to conquer him. In essence, it was a tension between universalism
and exclusivity.
The early Augustinian solution to this dilemma leaned in the latter direction, by
giving papal sanction for Holy wars of conquest against the non-believers. Hence, the
mediaeval crusades. Later, under Pope Innocent IV (1243-1254), a canonist com
promise was reached which claimed that force could be used against the infidel only
to redress an injury, and that Christian conversion was to be brought about by
peaceful missionary methods only. This compromise became crucial in the Spanish
Conquista of the New World, and was most notable in the writing of the theologian
jurist, Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546).27 In positing the existence of a jus inter
gentes?a natural law applicable to all men, Christian or non-Christian?Vitoria
sought to legitimate peaceful conquest while respecting the rights of the Indian in the
New World.
The tension between universalism and exclusivity was most immediate, however, in
the peculiar relationship between Christendom and 'the Turk'. The Ottoman Empire
was the principal political formation with which mediaeval Christendom had to deal.
Moreover, as suggested above, it was regarded with greater antipathy than the
non-Christian territories of the New World, given its geographical relationship to
Europe and its military prowess. Ironically, a further reason for this hostility was a
profound similarity between the two religions of Christianity and Islam. Both
believed they were the unique possessors of the whole of God's truth, and both
combined a universalist faith with proselytizing zeal.28
The presence of an Other which could be characterized as the embodiment of evil
served to unify and strengthen the disparate Christendom of the fourteenth and early
fifteenth centuries. But according to Maxime Rodinson, the 'image of Islam was not
drawn simply from the Crusades, as some have maintained, but rather from the Latin
Christian world's gradually developing ideological unity. This produced a sharper
image of the enemy's features and focused the energies of the West on the Crusades.'29
These two processes fed off one another. The increasing solidarity of Christendom
gave greater power to the crusade against the Other; the crusade against the Other
helped to promote solidarity among the members of Christendom.
As Rodinson demonstrates, however, the logic of raison d'?tat occasionally crept
into relations within Christendom to confuse this cultural solidarity against 'the
Turk'. The fall of Acre in 1291 saw the hopes for the great Crusades diminish, as the

27 'The barbarians in question [. . .] cannot be barred from being true owners, alike in public or in
private law, by reason of the sin of unbelief or any other mortal sin, nor does such sin entitle
Christians to seize their goods and lands.' Vitoria's De Indis et de Ivre Belli cited in Gong, Standard, p.
36; also F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations (Beverly Hills, 1977), pp. 18-24;
Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations
(Oxford, 1990), pp. 43-4.
28 Bernard Lewis, Tanner Lectures, Oxford University, 26 February, 1990.
29 Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam (London, 1987), p. 7.

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The Other in European self-definition 335
emerging European states began to pursue their individual interests.30 Thus, for
example, while attempts were made to create a common Christian front at the council
of churches at Ferrara-Florence, it collapsed due to a lack of unity among the
European states. The Orthodox delegates accepted unity with Rome in order to
obtain help against 'the Turks', which were presently at the gates of Constantinople.
However, when the Russian delegates came back to Moscow, Grand Duke Vasiliy II
refused to acquiesce in the church union, and declared their actions null and void.
When Constantinople fell in 1453, Metropolitan Jonas declared from Moscow that it
was God's punishment of the Greeks for having united with Rome.31 It is apparent,
then, that in this case the dualism between Christendom and 'the Turk', so formidable
on a rhetorical level, was not strong enough to marginalize the differences within
Christendom itself.
Nevertheless, early Renaissance images of 'the Turk' serve to underline the degree
of mediaeval Christian hostility which survived even among those Europeans inspired
by the new ethic of humanism. Therefore, during the Renaissance period of
European-Ottoman relations, one finds not only a struggle between competing
military powers?the logic of raison d'?tat?but also a conflict of ideologies and of
competing social, economic and political systems?the logic of culture.32 The Turkish
peril was viewed as the latest phase in the centuries-old assault of Islam on
Christianity. Consequently, for their understanding of this challenge, Europeans
drew heavily upon the crusading literature of the Middle Ages.
In addition, Renaissance writers harked back to the precedent of dualism found in
the ancient Hellenic system of city states. To Hesiod, Xenofon, Herodotus and other
ancient Greeks, their system of city states was the realm of dynamic change, while the
barbarians in the East lived in a world which was condemned to be forever static.33
Already at this stage, long before the coming of Christianity and Islam and the
controversy between them, the proto-European Greeks defined themselves culturally
in direct opposition to the Asian Other. This tradition combined with mediaeval
stereotypes to influence Renaissance perceptions of the Ottoman menace. Therefore,
while Rodinson is correct to point to the growing influence of raison d'?tat in this
period, it was not at the expense of the logic of culture. This latter logic was operative
from as far back as European written history takes us, whereas the logic of raison
d'?tat and the system of states had to be reborn after the mediaeval hiatus of over a
thousand years.34
When news of the fall of Constantinople (1453) spread through Italy to northern
and central Europe, few chroniclers engaged in the cool, power political assessment of
the defeat which is typical of the logic of raison d'?tat. Instead, they concentrated on

30 'It had been some time since the war against the Eastern infidels had been able to unite the West in a
common struggle. The plan for the expansion of a united Christian Europe gave way, once and for all,
to nationalistic political projects.' Ibid. p. 29. The use of the adjective 'nationalistic' is anachronistic.
31 Dimitri Stremooukhoff, 'Moscow and the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine', Speculum, 28 (1953),
pp. 84-101.
32 Robert Schwoebel, The Shadow of the Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (Nieuwkoop,
1967), p. ix.
33 Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of An Idea (New York, 1966), pp. 2-6.
34 Moreover, the ancient Greeks entertained the idea of an internal Other in relation to which the Greek
city state defined itself, the pharmakos (magician; poisoner; the one sacrificed in expiation for the sins
of the city), which illustrates that both types of 'Otherness' were operative at least from the time of the
beginnings of written history; Jacques Derrida, 'Plato's Pharmacy' in Dissemination (London, 1981),
pp. 61-171, on p. 132.

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336 Tver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
the agonies and atrocities suffered at the hands of the infidels. Hence, when informed
of the event, Christian I, King of Denmark and Norway, declared that 'the grand
Turk was the beast rising out of the sea described in the Apocalypse'.35 Rather than
attributing Turkish victory to the well organized, highly disciplined army of Mehmed
II, European observers railed against the divisions and dissensions among Christians,
who preferred spoiling one another to defending the faith. In Robert Schwoebel's
words: 'If the Turks were barbarians, it followed that they must be inferior to civilised
Europe on all accounts; and, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
even the military abilities of the Turks were disparaged.'36 Here, then, the logic of
culture appeared to hold sway.
More significantly, the image of the Other was used to reinforce and strengthen the
existing collective. The Turk was seen as a pernicious force sent by God to scourge
Christendom for its sins. To fend off this evil, all that was required was for Christians
to repent, unite and take up the defence of the faith. Consequently, in the period after
the fall of Constantinople, one finds new proponents of the chivalric tradition of
courage, honour and piety, as well as conservative calls for the restoration of the
papacy: 'The Turkish threat worked toward reviving a waning loyalty to the
Respublica Christiana and gave new life to the old cry for peace and unity in a
Christendom subject to the pope.'37
As a result, following 1453, the Papacy (first under Nicholas, and later under Pius
II) took bold steps to reinvigorate the mediaeval crusade. First, it offered material
and financial assistance to military campaigns, primarily through the use of in
dulgences. And second, it intervened to pacify and unify Europe through an appeal
to Christian conscience. Despite the increasing dedication of Renaissance princes to
national aggrandisement, support could still be summoned for the mediaeval ideals of
a united Christendom. As Pius II proclaimed in his Commentaries: 'An unavoidable
war with the Turks threatens us. Unless we take arms and go to war to meet the
enemy, we think all is over with religion.'38 In short, the non-cultural justification of
political behaviour which would characterize European statecraft?raison d'?tat?
was yet to take root.
There was, to be sure, some recognition of the growing force of temporal
considerations. In his appeal to the princes of Europe to keep up the fight, Pius
acknowledged the need to combine religious with practical arguments. He therefore
sought to demonstrate that an unopposed Ottoman advance was an imminent threat
to the temporal interest of the rulers?i.e., the raison d'?tat fear of one power striving
for mastery over Europe. In fact, Rodinson alleges that by the end of the fifteenth
century, 'the Turk' was seen more as a secular or cultural menace than an ideological
threat:

At this stage (around 1500) European rulers did not consider Christian expansionism worth
the sacrifice of their own political (and eventually national) interests; nor did the general
public see this as justification for a call to arms throughout Europe, as earlier had been the
case with the Crusaders. [. . .] From then on, to the realists, the Ottoman Empire became a
power like any other and even a European power.39

35 Schwoebel, Shadow, p. 4.
36 Schwoebel, Shadow, p. 19.
37 Schwoebel, Shadow, p. 23.
38 Cited in Schwoebel, Shadow, p. 71.
39 Rodinson, Europe, pp. 32-3.

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The Other in European self-definition 337
We would argue, however, that Rodinson's characterization underestimates the force
of the logic of culture. Even in the early sixteenth century, after the bulwark of
Christendom had begun to crumble, mediaeval conceptions of Islam and 'the Turk'
continued to reign supreme. Humanism, and the accompanying rise of the doctrine of
raison d'?tat, had still failed to breach the barriers of orthodoxy in reorienting the
attitudes of contemporaries towards non-Christians.
Evidence for the resonance of mediaeval images can be found in the anti-Turk
tirades that remained fashionable in Renaissance political oratory. At diplomatic
congresses, the marriage of princes or the inaugurations of popes, an orator could be
expected to deliver an Exhortatio ad helium contra barbaros, which was part of his
standard repertory.40 Whether such orations were motivated by serious religious
concerns or political expedience, the result was the same. Through them, the image of
'the Turk' as the enemy of faith and culture was perpetuated.
One such Renaissance orator was Giovanni Botero. While in many respects a
classic proponent of raison d'?tat,41 Botero believed additional factors needed to be
considered when waging a campaign against the 'Other'. In the following excerpt, one
sees the uneasy tension between the logic of raison d'?tat and the logic of culture in his
attitude towards 'the Turk':

There are only two ways of uniting against the Turk with any hope of success. Either the
rulers of all the countries which border upon his dominions should attack him at the same
moment on all sides, not with limited strengths but using all available resources?and in this
way all the parties would have an equal interest in ultimate victory. Or another and more
noble way would be for many princes to unite together with no other interest than the
honour of God and the exaltation of the church, and to attack the Turk at one or several
points. [. . .] I do not know by what justice the reason of state (if something so irrational, not
to say bestial, merits the name of reason) has shown itself more hostile to Christians than to
Turks and other infidels. Machiavelli cries out impetuously against the Church, and yet
utters not a word against the infidels; and the Christian rulers are intent upon each other's
downfall as though they had no other enemy in the world. [. . .] And what came of this? The
barbarians first drove us out of Asia and then subjugated the Greeks. This is the fruit of
modern policy.42

To Botero, then, the logic of culture must and does take precedence over the logic of
raison d'?tat.
The demands of raison d'?tat nevertheless brought the two hostile rivals of
Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire into increased contact. Until the death of
Mehmed II, alliances and pacts aimed at the Ottoman Empire had been the most
prominent feature of European international relations. At this time, however,
significant Ottoman involvement in European conflicts began to appear as the
warring city-states of Italy sought Ottoman aid against their enemies. Thus, between
1495 and 1502, Sultan Bayezit II sided with Milan and Naples against a Franco
Venetian alliance. Moreover, European powers quickly learned to 'do business' with
'the Turk', including him in their diplomatic machinations. The first alliance between
Ottomans and Europeans occurred during the struggle for the Holy Roman Empire

40 Schwoebel, Shadow, p. 150.


41 E.g. presentation in Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism; The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in
Modern History (1924; London, 1957), ch. 3.
42 Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State (1589; London, 1956), pp. 164?5, Book VIII, 13; pp. 222-3,
Book X, 9. The parenthesis was added to the 1590 and 1596 editions.

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338 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
between Charles V and Francis I, when the latter signed a treaty with the Ottomans
for an attack against the Italian states (1536). While the military articles became
superfluous once Francis made peace with Charles, friendship and co-operation
continued to characterize Ottoman-French relations. In fact, some have argued that
with this alliance, 'Christendom' disappeared as a relevant political term.43 Rodinson
supports this view of the predominance of raison d'?tat:

[By] the late sixteenth century, religious arguments completely gave way to political realities.
In 1588, Elizabeth I even went so far as to inform Sultan Murad II that, as far as she was
concerned, Spain was nothing but a nation of idolators with Philip II as their leader. An
alliance based solely on ideology was now proposed: strict monotheists against
untrustworthy Catholics.44

This interpretation has been challenged by Franklin Baumer, who demonstrates how
Elizabeth I took great pains to dispel the impression that she was conspiring with 'the
Turk' against other Christian powers. Furthermore, he contends that in spite of
diplomatic overtures towards 'the Turk' in the sixteenth century, this new diplomacy
was not considered respectable by either contemporary political or legal standards.
'In short, despite the growing secularization of European politics and the religious
schism, the idea of 'the common corps of Christendom' continued to hold its ground
to an astonishing degree in official as in other circles'.45 Once again, the logic of
culture was in operation.
Indeed, even the Ottoman-French treaty of 1536 illustrates some of the lingering
cultural gaps between the Ottomans and the Europeans. While France regarded the
agreement as a formal treaty, to the Ottomans it was no more than an ahdname?a
contract granted unilaterally by the Sultan. The unilateral character of this agreement
therefore 'reflected the Muslim-Ottoman view of the inferiority of Christian
Europe'.46 And, on the other side, while today we might interpret these diplomatic
relations as constituting defacto European recognition of the Ottoman Empire, such
was not the case in the eyes of contemporaries. Negotiations and alliances were not
accompanied by any official redefinition of the status of 'the Turk', or its acceptance
as a legitimate member of the community of states.47

European-Ottoman relations in the modern states system

The logic of raison d'?tat seemed destined to dominate international relations at the
signing of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). At Westphalia, European princes broke
away from the overarching control of the Holy Roman Empire, and from the claims
of the papacy to pronounce on the validity of treaties concluded among Christian

43 Cf. Franklin L. Baumer, 'England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom', The American
Historical Review, 50 (1944), pp. 26-48.
44 Rodinson, Europe, pp. 34-5.
45 Baumer, 'England', pp. 27-8.
46 Naff, in Bull and Watson, Expansion, p. 148. In fact, the Turkish attitude towards diplomatic relations
with the Europeans parallels the Chinese emperor's view of commercial relations with the Japanese;
where the latter saw trade, the former saw tribute, see Hidemi Suganami, 'Japan's Entry into
International Society', ibid. pp. 185-99.
47 Schwoebel, Shadow, p. 204.

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The Other in European s elf-definition 339
powers. In addition, the sovereignty of states was advanced through a reaffirmation
of the principle of cuius regio, eius religi?, which had been introduced at Augsburg in
1555.48 Through the dictates of sovereign absolutism, a legal system of autonomous
states was established, formally superseding the mediaeval notion of Christendom as
one political unity. The process of state-building, which intensified after Westphalia,
often served to sharpen cultural differences among the newly sovereign European
states. As princes turned inwards to summon the military, economic and bureaucratic
strength required by the logic of raison d'?tat, bonds which they had shared as
members of the Holy Roman Empire were to some extent severed.49 Later thinkers on
international relations such as Immanuel Kant believed that these cultural differ
ences, and the lively competition which such differences would produce, would work
in the interest of progress.50
Although weakened, certain cultural ties nevertheless continued to cut horizontally
across Europe. Despite the doctrinal secularism on a systemic level, 1648 was still
perceived as a religious affair. Europe as a whole was decidedly Christian in character,
and frequently was contrasted with the Islam of the Ottoman and Mogul Empires,
the Hinduism of India, and the Confucian tradition of imperial China.51 Further
more, while Hugo Grotius, the prominent Dutch jurist of the period, recognized the
legality of treaty relations with infidels, he did admit the existence of a particular
bond uniting Christian states and acknowledged the special rules regulating relations
among their sovereigns.52 Thus, even Grotius had a dual conception of international
society: an outer circle of all humankind, bound by natural law; and an inner circle of
Christians, bound by the laws of Christ.53 Drawing on the logic of culture, he went as
far as to call for a general league of Christian states and a crusade against 'the Turk'.54
In European eyes, the Ottoman Empire seemed profoundly unsuited to the new
Westphalian system. The post-mediaeval European idea of the states?a territorially
defined entity apart from dynasty, and organized in accordance with man-made
rules?was alien to Muslim political theory. Muslim theories of the state derived from
the concept that God is the source of all authority and law, and that government
exists to enable the community of true believers {ummah) to fulfil its obligations to
God. Consequently, it was the community rather than the state which constituted the
basic Muslim polity. And further, as Naff writes, orthodox viewers held this Muslim
community to be morally superior to all other societies:

48 Hedley Bull, 'The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations', in Bull, Kingsbury
and Roberts, Grotius, pp. 65-93, on pp. 76-7.
49 Alexander George and Gordon Craig, Force and Statecraft. Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New
York, 2nd edn, 1990), pp. 3-16.
50 Treatments of Kant as a statist include F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace. Theory and
Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 62-80 and W. B. Gallie,
Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 8-36.
51 Robert Purnell, The Society of States (London, 1973), p. 14.
52 Wight, Systems, p. 128. See also Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, Grotius, pp. 47-8; 'Grotius may thus be
understood as embracing a minimum content of universally applicable rules of the jus gentium [. . .]
with a pluralist overlay of additional norms based on custom or consent or the values of the peoples
concerned.'
53 ' "We are bidden to exclude no class of men from our deeds of kindness", says Grotius, but the
Christian law "ought to be received with due regard to difference in degree, so that we should be doers
of good to all, but particularly to those who share the same religion".' Bull, Kingsbury, and Roberts,
Grotius, p. 14.
54 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace: Including the Law of Nature and Nations (Westport,
1979), p. 146.

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340 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
Until God's intention of a universal true-believing community under a single law and ruler
was achieved, the world would be divided into two spheres: Dar ul-Islam?the abode of
Islam where Islamic law obtained; and Dar ul-Harb?the abode of war where infidels lived
outside the law of God and against whom holy war, jihad, must be waged until the universal
idea became reality.55

Such religious ideas did not mesh with notions of equality, sovereignty or non
intervention?the key planks of the new, raison d'?tat European diplomacy. Thus, in
1693, when William Penn put forth his scheme for an organized European society of
states, dedicated to the maintenance of peace and stability, he recommended that the
Ottoman Empire be included only if it renounced Islam.56 As we shall see later, this
notion of an 'entry requirement' for European society has persisted, even to the
present day.
In 1683, a league of Christian forces halted the Ottoman thrust into Europe outside
the gates of Vienna, bringing about a decisive change in the historic competition
between the two adversaries. The Treaty of Carlowitz (1699)57 marked the turning
point for Europe and 'the Turk', confirming Europe's military superiority and
signalling the Ottoman Empire's retreat from central Europe. Indeed, 1699 initiated
what Bernard Lewis has referred to as Europe's period of 'reconquest and empire'
with regard to the Sublime Porte.58 But despite the decline in military threat, the
cultural threat of 'the Turk' remained. Hence, as Lewis argues, the European
expansion into the Ottoman Empire was of a very different nature from the
colonialism which characterized North America, China or India. While these latter
three entities had been relatively unknown to Europeans, the European image of the
Ottoman Turk was set, determined and hostile. In Lewis' words, Europe and 'the
Turk' were 'old aquaintances; intimate enemies'. As a result, Europe pursued its
former conqueror with a particular intensity.
In addition, the time of reconquest and empire was seen by many as a reincarnation
of the old religious war?a continuation of the crusades. What is interesting to note,
however, is the increased use of the Greek term 'barbarian' to describe 'the Turk', as
opposed to the strictly religious notion of 'infidel' or 'non-believer'.59 This change in
terms would seem to fit with the growing secularization of the states system which had
begun at Westphalia, and is yet another reminder that the phenomenon of the
Easterner as Europe's Other predates the coming of Christendom and Islam. In other
words, civilization, defined by criteria such as 'humanity', 'law' and 'social mores',
seemed to supplant religion in Europe's external differentiation from non-European
communities. What took hold was a set of 'intercultural relations' between Europe
and 'the Turk', which drew a sharp distinction between civilization and barbarism.60
The exclusivity of the logic of culture had not disappeared; it had simply resurfaced
under another name.

55 Naff, in Bull and Watson, Expansion, p. 144.


56 Lewis, Tanner Lectures, 12 March 1990.
57 The Treaty of Carlowitz was also the first instance in which the Turk was invited to participate in a
European congress. In addition, by signing the treaty, the Ottoman Empire acknowledged the formal
existence of non-Muslim states for the first time. Cf. Derek McKay and H. M. Scott, The Rise of the
Great Powers: 1648-1815 (London, 1983), p. 76.
58 Lewis, Tanner Lectures, 5 March 1990.
59 Lewis, Tanner Lectures, 5 March 1990.
60 Parkinson, Philosophy, p. 24; also Gong, Standard, p. vii.

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The Other in European self-definition 341
The European sense of identity and superiority deepened in the following century,
and helped to reinforce the unity of European society. Moreover, in describing
those components which were uniquely European, eighteenth- and early-nineteenth
century publicists subordinated the logic of raison d'?tat to the 'common ground of
culture' which existed among European states.61 The international lawyer G. F.
Martens, writing in 1795, spoke of Europe as 'a society of nations and states, each of
which has its laws, its customs, and its maxims, but which it cannot put in execution
without observing a great deal of delicacy towards the rest of the society.' Both
Emmerich de Vattel and the Abb? de Pradt went a step further to describe Europe as
a kind of 'republic'.62
But perhaps the most eloquent exponent of the collective idea of Europe as
opposed to the Turkish Other was Edmund Burke, who elaborated the notion of a
'Commonwealth of Europe'. Burke accentuated the cultural 'similitude' throughout
Europe of the monarchical principle of government, the Christian religion, the
Roman law heritage, and old Germanic customs and feudal institutions. In fact, he
went as far as to portray Europe as 'virtually one great state', claiming that 'no citizen
of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it.'63
An integral part of this definition of the Commonwealth of Europe was the attempt
to distinguish it from the Ottoman Empire. During the Ochakov Affair of 1791,
Burke was a vocal opponent of Pitt's Realpolitik scheme to aid 'the Turk' in his fight
against Russian advances:

He had never before heard it held forth, that the Turkish empire was ever considered as any
part of the balance of power in Europe. They had noting to do with European power; they
considered themselves wholly Asiatic [. . .] They despised and condemned all Christian
princes, as infidels, and only wished to subdue and exterminate them and their people. What
had these worse than savages to do with the powers of Europe, but to spread war,
destruction, and pestilence among them?64

In Burke's conception of the kind of cultural homogeneity needed to sustain order in


European international society, there was no room for 'the Turk'.
Despite these impassioned pleas from the European patriots, however, 'the Turk'
already 'had one leg over the European fence'.65 Throughout the eighteenth century,
Britain and France maintained diplomats in Constantinople as part of their campaign
of military and commercial expansion. Furthermore, after the defeats in the wars of
1768-74 and 1787-92, the Ottomans themselves began to recognize that their empire
could no longer be defended without contracting European allies. As a result, the
Sultans adopted certain aspects of European diplomacy, most notably Selim Ill's
establishment of permanent embassies in Europe in 1793.66 In the economic realm, the

61 Gulick, Balance, p. 10.


62 All cited in Gulick, Balance, p. 11.
63 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (London, 1907), VI, pp. 155-7.
See also Jennifer M. Welsh: 'Edmund Burke and the Commonwealth of Europe: The Conservative
Crusade against the French Revolution', MPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1989).
64 The Parliamentary History of England (London, 1816), XXVIII, cols. 76-77.
65 Gulick, Balance, p. 15.
66 McKay and Scott, Rise, p. 205. Previous to 1793, the Sultan had sent individual missions for specific
purposes, after which they returned to Constantinople; 'The absence of permanent resident Ottoman
embassies reflected a basic assumption of superiority: diplomacy was unnecessary during the centuries
of Ottoman power.' Ibid. p. 204.

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342 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
Ottoman decline in power resulted in the infamous capitulation treaties in which
European powers obtained huge concessions and rights of immunity in exchange for
their alliances. One instance of such capitulation was the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca
(1774), which codified Russia's decisive territorial gains on the Crimea and gave it
extensive commercial rights on the Black Sea. It also gave Russia the right to establish
its own consuls, an independent church in Constantinople, and a special relationship
with the Porte's Christian minorities.67 The granting of such rights of extra
territoriality to Europeans became a 'badge of inferiority' for the Sublime Porte.68
The culmination of the Ottoman Empire's increasing reliance on Europe came in
1799, with its Tri-partite Alliance with Britain and Russia against Napoleonic France.
For the European powers, the pact was motivated by military and power political
concerns, i.e. the need to check French hegemonic aims, and the need to postpone the
crumbling of the Ottoman Empire, lest it should reveal a dangerous power vacuum in
Europe. Beyond such considerations of raison d'?tat, the alliance had little substance,
and was therefore destined to crumble once the French threat subsided.69 What
followed was a century of shifting diplomatic arrangements between European states
and the Ottoman Empire, directed at ensuring its survival and at preserving the
European balance of power.
Thus, in the early stages of the Greek War of Independence, European statesmen
such as Metternich and Castlereagh allowed the interests of raison d'?tat to override
their religious sympathies with the struggle of Christian rebels against Muslim rule.
Revolution would destroy the fragile conservative order which had been established
at the Congress of Vienna, and would only open the way for hegemonic aims towards
the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, especially where Russia was concerned. This
status quo policy was echoed by Russia itself in a memo of 1829, which stated
that 'the advantages of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire outweigh its
disadvantages'.70 Similarly, during the second Mohammed Ali Crisis of 1838,
Palmerston organized a collective effort on the part of the European Great Powers to
prevent Ottoman collapse. Subsequent Palmerstonian diplomacy would be directed
at propping up the Empire in order to avoid strengthening Russian power on the
continent. In a conversation with the British naval commander Sir Hamilton
Seymour in 1853, Tsar Nicholas I could afford to allude to the Porte as a 'sick man'
that Europe had 'on its hands'.71 In this era of Great Power management, the logic of
raison d'?tat seemed to outweigh the logic of culture.
Despite this apparent triumph of raison d'?tat, however, the tension between the
two logics remained, as did the immediate implications for European identity. A clear
example is the Christian legitimist campaign that was waged by Alexander I at the
Congress of Vienna. Alexander's scheme for the post-Napoleonic peace called for a
fraternal association of sovereigns, guided by the precepts of Christianity. His 'Holy
Alliance' was to be dedicated to 'the Holy and Indivisible Trinity', and underwritten
by all the European nations 'united in Christ'. Although the Tsar's proposal was
largely treated as an anachronism by the other powers, an altered form of the text

67 M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (London, 1966),
p. xi.
68 Gong, Standard, p. 8.
69 Gong, Standard, p. 33.
70 Cited in Gong, Standard, p. 71. The quotation is from a memorandum delivered by a special task
force set up within the Foreign Ministry to review Russia's policy towards the Porte in its entirety.
71 Cf. Rodinson, Europe, p. 59.

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The Other in European self-definition 343

was nevertheless signed by all parties save Great Britain, the Vatican and, not
surprisingly, the Ottomans themselves.72
Furthermore, in 1836, the British politician Richard Cobden was still doubting the
'acceptability' of 'the Turk' as a member of the European concert framework. In
particular, Cobden protested against the inclusion of Turkey in Europe's calculation
of the balance of power, to the exclusion of the United States. The latter, he
contended, enjoyed the economic standing and tradition which made it fit for
partnership with Britain. But with regard to the former, he asked: 'Upon what
principle is Turkey a member of this European system? The Turks, at least, will be
admitted to everybody to form no party to this "union".'73
And finally, while most historians cite the 1856 Treaty of Paris as the date by which
the Sublime Porte was officially accepted as a member of the European states system,
this acceptance was not accompanied by an admission of equality with 'the Turk'.74
In fact, as Hedley Bull argues, during the nineteenth century 'the idea that inter
national society was world-wide and all-inclusive lost ground, both in theory and in
practice, to the idea that it was a privileged association of Christian, European, or
civilized states'.75 In other words, the logic of culture continued to hold sway.
International lawyers of the nineteenth century perpetuated this cultural dualism
with their positivist assertion that advanced international law did not apply to the
territories outside of Europe. As W. E. Hall writes,

It is scarcely necessary to point out that as international law is a product of the special
civilisation of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of which the principle
could not be supposed to be understood or recognised by countries differently civilised, such
states only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that civilisation.

Legal theorists also seem to suggest that a symbolic act of admittance had to occur
before such territories could be considered part of the European 'club'; states 'outside
European civilisation', Hall continues, 'must formally enter into the circle of
law-governed countries. They must do something with the acquiescence of the latter,
or of some of them, which amounts to an acceptance of the law in its entirety beyond
all possibility of misconstruction.'76
According to Gerrit Gong, nineteenth-century lawyers gradually developed a
formal European 'standard of civilization' to demarcate those states 'which were full
members of the "civilized" international society from those which were merely part of
the European international system'. In keeping with our thesis about the role of Other
in European self-definition, Gong suggests that the very codification of such a
standard?necessitated by increased contacts with the non-European world?helped

72 Alan Palmer: Alexander I, Tsar of War and Peace, (London, 1974), ch. 18. In fact, the whole affair
demonstrates to what extent Alexander's notions about the logic of culture differed from the Western
powers, and bears witness to Russia's perceived need to underline its European identity by means of
an even more obvious 'Other'.
73 Cited in Gulick, Balance, p. 16. Cobden, of course, was also a vocal opponent of the idea of the
balance of power.
74 Gong, Standard, p. 107 makes a similar assessment. On p. 32 he bolsters his case by citing a passage
from Oppenheim's early-twentieth-century standard work on international law which maintains that
Turkey's 'position as a member of the family of nations was anomalous because her civilization fell
short ofthat of the Western states.' Gong even maintains that this was an expression of the 'general
consensus' of international lawyers at the time.
75 Bull, 'The Importance of Grotius', p. 82. Also Gong, Standard, pp. 31-3.
76 W. E. Hall, cited in Wight, Systems, p. 115. See also Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, Grotius, pp. 47-8.

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344 Tver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
to define more clearly the customs of European international society which had
heretofore been implicit and assumed by its members: 'What the "civilized" world
had in common became apparent only when juxtaposed with the "barbarous" and
"savage" worlds.' Thus, the standard included requirements based on long-standing
European practices such as the protection of basic individual rights (life, dignity,
freedom of travel, commerce and religion); an organized and efficient state bureau
cracy; a fairly non-discriminatory domestic system of courts, codes and public laws;
adherence to international law and the maintenance of avenues for diplomatic
interchange; and conformity with accepted norms and practices of civilized inter
national society, with the outlawing of practices such as slavery and polygamy.77
This spirit of exclusivity is perhaps best exemplified by natural law theorist
James Lorimer. Drawing on Gobineau's racialist ideas, he made a clear distinction
between civilized and barbarous humanity, and accorded each a different stage of
legal recognition. Plenary political recognition was to extend to all existing states
of Europe, colonial dependencies with European settlers, and former European
colonies. But only partial political recognition?and therefore only limited member
ship in the 'family of nations'?was to be granted to Turkey (as well as to Persia,
China, Siam and Japan). 'In the case of the Turks', states Lorimer, 'we have had
bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of civilization to
barbarians who have proved to be incapable of performing its duties, and who
possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind.'78 For Lorimer,
then, even the partial acceptance of the Ottoman Empire in 1856 had been premature.
In his mind, 'the Turk' had not yet attained the 'standard of civilization' which would
allow him to sustain orderly international relations.
Further proof for the continuing operation of the logic of culture can be found in
the fact that the evolution of Ottoman diplomacy was accompanied by internal
changes within the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of'the Turk' at the hands of superior
European military and economic might had necessitated a grudging self-examination
on the part of Muslim leaders and intellectuals. The humiliation of military defeat
was aggravated by accompanying perceptions of arrested cultural development.
Europe was no longer considered an inferior entity to be converted, but a military,
economic and political giant to be emulated. With European assistance, reforms were
initiated in the realms of education, technology, communication, transportation, and
political and judicial institutions, to give the Porte some semblance of a secular,
European-style state.
More importantly, the European powers themselves continuously demanded a
widening and deepening of these domestic changes to conform to European stand
ards. In other words, in order to play in the Concert of Europe, 'the Turk' was
expected to learn new tunes. Thus, Ottoman reforms were introduced at critical
junctures in European Concert diplomacy. For example, in 1839, at the height of the
Mohammed Ali Crisis over Egypt and Syria, the Ottomans introduced new measures
guaranteeing the security of life and property, and drew up a new penal code for the
empire. In addition, the reform edict of 1856, which not only reaffirmed privileges and
immunities for non-Muslim communities but also enshrined a new principle of

77 Gong, Standard, p. 10; p. 36; pp. 14-15; on p. 42, he suggests that 'In part, the standard reflected
Europe's need to explain and justify its overlordship of non-European countries in other than merely
military terms.'
78 Cited in Wight, Systems, p. 122.

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The Other in European self-definition 345

religious equality throughout the empire, appeared a month before the Treaty of
Paris.79 And finally, the first Ottoman constitution was promulgated in December
1876, at the time of another Balkan crisis which threatened to involve the Ottomans
in a war with Russia. It is evident, then, that the moulding of alliances depended as
much on the logic of culture as on the dictates of power political realities. If the Porte
was to be granted European support, it had to tailor its domestic realities to the
standards of European civilization.80 As we shall see, the attitude of furious surprise
by which Constantinople met European cultural demands is still very much with us,
bearing witness to the continued force of the logic of culture in European-Turkish
relations.
By the time the Ottoman Empire had completed its entry into Europe's state
system, most Islamic societies outside the empire had already been made subject to
European colonial expansion. But it would be wrong to suggest that the synthesis of
European and Muslim societies was total: 'What occurred was an integration of
systems and the material and technological accoutrements of modern societies.
Values, outlooks on life, behaviour patterns, and beliefs remained culturally dis
parate.'81 Thus, for example, at the Second Hague Conference of 1907, the continuing
presence of capitulations was used to accord the Ottoman Empire second-class status
and to prohibit it from nominating a permanent member to the Court of Arbitration.
While 'the Turk' was a part of the system of inter-state relations, the logic of culture
denied it equal status within the community of Europe.
Indeed, where Russia was concerned, the theme of Christian unity vs. Ottoman
domination of Christian peoples remained a staple in the Russian historiographical
and political treatment of the Eastern Question. In 1877 the leading historian Sergey
Mikhaylovich Solov'ev wrote that 'the Eastern Question surfaced in history from the
moment when European man saw the difference between Europe and Asia, between
the European and Asian spirit'.82 As late as 1916, the leading Russian liberal Pavel
Milyukov used the idea of the Other as proof that Russia was better equipped than
the Porte to take care of the Straits and Constantinople. Quoting a contemporary
British writer, he argued that 'The presence of the Turk in Europe is incidental. They
remain at the end of five hundred years as much strangers as they were at
the beginning. European ideals and words, like "nation", "government", "law",
"sovereign", "subject", do not apply to them.'83 In the case of Russia, we have an
outstanding example of how the idea of 'the Turk' as the Other is used to bolster the
case for Russia's own Europeanness, which was in doubt in quarters at home as well
as in Western Europe.84

79 Turkish hesitations about Russian demands for an agreement guaranteeing the position of Orthodox
Christians within the Ottoman Empire were a vital part of Russo-Turkish relations from the time of
the Treaty of Kucuk-Kaynarca onwards.
80 It must be acknowledged that the reform demands of the European states were also oriented towards
their own economic interests, or the interests of non-Muslim communities. These interests often
conflicted with the goals of the Ottoman elite. For a further discussion of this point, see Niyazi
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal, 1964), pp. 147-54.
81 Naff, in Bull and Watson, Expansion, p. 169.
82 Cited in Nina Stepanovna Kinyapina, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii pervoy poloviny XIX v. (Moscow,
1963), p. 17.
83 Cited in Thomas Riha, A Russian European. Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics (Notre Dame, 1969), p.
257.
84 Cf. e.g. Peter R. Weisensel, 'Russian Self-Identification and Travelers' Descriptions of the Ottoman
Empire in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century'. Paper presented to the Fourth World Congress
for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 21-6 July, 1990.

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346 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
Conclusions

As the above discussion demonstrates, any treatment of European-Turkish relations


which is carried out simply according to the logic of raison d'?tat or the one
dimensional approach of the existing international society literature will present an
incomplete picture. Beyond the realist account of how the Ottoman Empire was
contained by the Great Powers of Europe and eventually brought into their
diplomatic machinations, and beyond the expansionist thesis of how 'the Turk'
became a law-abiding member of international society, is the more complex story of
the development of Europe's collective identity and its relationship with the non
European world. And within this story, the logic of culture, which continued to
regard 'the Turk' as Other, is an important dynamic.
The continuing force of this logic can be seen in contemporaneity with regard to
Turkey's unsuccessful application for membership to the EC in 1987.85 When the
Commission published an Opinion (no. 1589) on the matter, it carefully steered clear
of explicit references to the logic of culture. Yet, it can be argued, the question of what
is required to maintain a European community (e.g. a democratic political system,
respect for human rights, etc.) also figured in the Community's decision.86 Moreover,
Europeans unshackled by the formal rules of diplomacy tend to draw on the logic of
culture rather than on the logic o? raison d'?tat when assessing Turkey's relations with
Europe.
Turkish observers, unsurprisingly, keenly resent the apparent discrepancy of the
logic of raison d'?tat, by dint of which Turkey obtained membership in NATO, and
the logic of culture, which contributes to keeping Turkey outside the European
Community. This discrepancy has been exacerbated by the fading of the Soviet
Union's role as a superpower, which marginalizes NATO but is certain to play into
the hands of the European Community. In April 1990, when Edward Mortimer
reviewed contemporary European perceptions of Islam and Turkey, he found them to
be echoing the views of Penn, Lorimer and other Europeans discussed above, thereby
bearing witness to the continued operation of the logic of culture. His findings are
worth citing at some length:
Educated Turks especially, heirs to the militant secularism of Kemal Ataturk, are shocked to
find their European identity judged by religious criteria. Yet the success of Ataturk's
revolution looks far less certain today than it did a generation ago: almost every day brings
new evidence of the strength of Islam in Turkey, not as a set of private religious beliefs but as
a public phenomenon, moulding people's behaviour in the political and social arena. Nor in
fact has it ever ceased to be the state religion in Turkey, in the sense that its institutions,
unlike those of other religions, are financed and directly controlled by the state. Few
Christians nowadays would wish to see Christianity reinstated as the established religion of
Europe in that sense. But for good or ill the Christian legacy remains a key component of
European identity. That is bound to affect the argument over where Europe's border should
be drawn, and its relations with Moslem communities both inside that border and beyond.87

85 Elisabeth ?zdalga, Turkiets v?g in i Europa (Stockholm, 1989) discusses how the Europeans' stressing
of the logic of culture looms large in Ankara's perceptions of the EC.
86 We are not denying that questions of an economic nature also played a role here. The Treaty of Rome
explicitly states that a state must be democratic to join.
87 Edward Mortimer, 'Is This Our Frontier?', Financial Times, 3 April 1990. Of course, variants of the
Christian faith remain the state religions of a number of European states.

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The Other in European self-definition 347
Mortimer's analysis must have hit a raw nerve. Turkey's ambassador to the United
Kingdom quickly published a response, maintaining that 'Turkey has been an
integral part of Europe for six centuries and surely has a role to play and is a voice to
be heard. The logic of an argument that Europe could renege on its commitment to
Turkey's eventual full membership of the European Community now that the iron
curtain is up is insupportable.'88 In the Ersatz world of the realists, he is quite right.
Nevertheless, the logic of culture, which the ambassador tries to deny, seems to be at
least as important as the logic of raison d'?tat.
In addition, present-day European-Turkish relations as well as conceptions of
European identity are affected by the over one million Turkish residents in Europe,
and by other groups of resident Others. Issues of religious and cultural freedom are
constantly debated on the front pages of European newspapers, and nationalist
political parties such as the French Front National or the German Republicans raise
the spectre of the resident Other when assessing the causes of economic hardship and
violent crimes within their societies.89 In short, the problems which dominate
Europe's relationship with the Other are not confined to the realm of external
relations, but are, as always before, intricately linked up with the question of what it
is to be European, and which cultural requirements are necessary to attain that status.
The above treatment of European attitudes towards 'the Turk' as Other also raises
serious questions for international relations theory, both in terms of the realist
paradigm and the existing literature on international society. The realist picture of a
system of sovereign states autonomous from domestic political and social consider
ations overlooks the strong horizontal ties that bound, and bind, the states of Europe
together. Rather than a heterogeneous, anarchical system of sovereign units, we have
seen that the Commonwealth of Europe was a cultural community which demanded
a high degree of domestic homogeneity among its members. This would seem to
answer affirmatively Wight's question as to whether a society of states presupposes a
common culture. It also suggests that for the Europeans, this cultural unity had to be
of a substantive kind?i.e., that it had to transcend the procedural rules of coexistence
on an international level (the balance of power, non-intervention, etc.) to common
assumptions about religion, ideology, social and political structure, etc.90
These substantive assumptions, which are elements of what we have called the logic
of culture, have received only cursory treatment from the realist literature. It is not
merely the case, as Edward Gulick seems to suggest, that cultural similarity helps to
facilitate the working of international institutions, such as the balance of power.91

88 Nurver Nures, 'Turkey's Place in Europe', Financial Times, 20 April 1990. The Gulf War sparked a
new set of Turkish comments on the same theme.
89 Immigration statistics help to convey the magnitude of Europe's 'resident Other' population. For
example, of the French foreign population in 1982 (the most recent census), 1.76m were European;
1.12m were North African; 138k were French W. African; 294k Asian; 124k Turks; and 51k were
from the Americas. In a recent documentary anthology, Alec Hargreaves expands upon the North
African portion of these statistics to reveal some of the social, political and educational problems
associated with the clash of European and Islamic cultures: 'As the geographical sources of emigration
to France widened, so too did the cultural differences between the sending and receiving countries.
Despite language and other differences, France shared a long heritage of Christian belief with her
European neighbours, which, even in the more secular world of the twentieth century, was reflected in
many aspects of ordinary life.' Cf. Hargreaves, Immigration in Postwar France (London, 1987), p. 4.
For a more personalised account of the tensions between France and its North African population,
see Jane Kramer, Unsettling Europe (New York, 1980), Chapter 4.
90 Wight, Systems, p. 34.

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348 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh
Rather, cultural homogeneity, which is instrumental to the formulation and perpetu
ation of an international society, is the more fundamental condition that makes these
institutions possible at all. In the words of Ronald Dore: 'The rules of order in a
society of states?that agreements should be obeyed, that envoys should be immune,
etc.?rest on some sort of perception that the society of states requires moral
commitment to certain basic rules because it is a community.'92 As many of the
European thinkers touched on above have argued, this perception can only be
secured if states are culturally homogeneous. In a word, agreement on values about
the international system requires a priori agreement about values of a domestic and
cultural nature.
In European eyes, 'the Turk', with his pagan and barbarian political culture, could
not be incorporated into such a cultural consensus. Thus, while the logic of raison
d'?tat, through diplomatic and economic contact, extended the boundaries of the
European international system to encompass 'the Turk', the prevalence of the logic of
culture made his status ambiguous from a societal point of view. 'The Turk' remained
the relevant Other for the cultural community of Europe.
While the literature on international society has recognized the existence of the
barbarian as Other, it has not fully considered the role of the Other in the formation
of the European identity. Using the case of the Ottoman Empire, we have tried to
illustrate that?far from a linear history whereby Europe absorbs this relevant
Other?the definition of Europe and what it was to be European was continually
linked to the external differentiation of 'Europeanness' from 'barbarity'. Such
dualism in turn helped to reinforce what Europe was and to consolidate European
cultural values. This logic of culture, far from being eschewed by the logic of raison
d'?tat when 'the Turk' entered the system of states, continued, and continues, to affect
both the European self-image and European-Turkish relations.
With the waning of the Cold War, it is highly likely that the logic of culture will
come to the fore in international relations. Iraq's recent challenge to international
society may well prove to be paradigmatic for the kind of crises which will threaten
international order in the period ahead. If so, the dynamics of European-Turkish
relations may be of some relevance for the understanding of international relations in
general. One of the main lessons to be learned is that the demonization of challengers
to international society may strengthen the ties between its most established con
stituent members. Indeed, those members may use the existence of a challenge for that
exact purpose. However, since such behaviour makes it so much harder to further
integrate the tenous members of international society, it may quickly prove counter
productive to the overall maintenance of order in international relations.

92 Ronald Dore, 'Unity and Diversity in Contemporary World Culture' in Bull and Watson, Expansion,
pp. 407-24, on p. 407

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