Timbol v.

COMELEC
751 SCRA 456
February 24, 2015

FACTS:
Joseph Timbol filed his Certificate of Candidacy for member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod on October 5, 2012. On January 17, 2013, he received a
notice from the election officer Dinah Valencia for him to appear before her office for
a clarificatory hearing on his certificate of candidacy. During the hearing, Joseph,
assisted by counsel, argued that he was not a nuisance candidate, alleging that in the
2010 elections, he ranked 8th among all the candidates for the Sangguniang
Panglunsod, and he had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign. While his
name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates in the Comelec website, the
panel assured him that his certificate of candidacy would be given due course and
his name deleted in the list of nuisance candidates. Indeed, the election officer thru
a Memorandum dated January 17, 2013 recommended that Josephs COC be given
due course. Despite the recommendation, his name was not deleted from the list,
and since the printing of ballots for the automated election will be held on February
4, 2013, he filed before the COMELEC on February 2, 2013 a petition praying that his
name be included in the certified list of candidates. By a Minute Resolution issued
on February 5, 2013, the COMELEC denied his petition, averring that it became moot
and academic with the beginning of the printing of ballots. Aggrieved, Joseph field a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared him a nuisance candidate,
even before the hearing officer conducted the clarificatory hearing on his certificate
of candidacy. In its comment, the Comelec argued that the petition had become
moot and academic with the conduct of the 2013 elections. Even assuming it is not
yet moot and academic, the Comelec did not deprive him of due process as he was
given the opportunity to be heard during the clarificatory hearing. The Supreme
Court ordered Joseph to file his Reply, and subsequently his counsel but both failed,
hence the court submitted the case for decision even without the Reply.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Joseph.
RULING:

YES. COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Joseph. Respondents power to motu proprio deny due
course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the candidates opportunity to be
heard. Under Art. II, Sec. 26 of the Constitution, the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service. This, however, does not guarantee a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office. To run for public office is a mere
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law, such as prohibition on nuisance
candidates. Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy
to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among
the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. To
minimize logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their CoCs may be
denied due course or cancelled by COMELEC, through motu proprio or upon verified
petition of an interested party, subject to an opportunity to be heard. In election
cases, due process requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. COMELEC
declared Timbol a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his
bona fide intention to run for office. It issued Resolution No. 9610 when Timbol
appeared before Valencia in a clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective
opportunity to be heard. Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates
did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not
have to file the Petition had he been given an opportunity to be heard in the first
place. Second, in the Minute Resolution, COMELEC denied Timbols petition on the
sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.
Although reprinting of ballots would indeed be costly, COMELEC should balance its
duty to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly and peaceful with
the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public
office before he/she is declared a nuisance candidate.

Secretary of DPWH v. Heracleo

756 SCRA 389
 April 21, 2015

FACTS:
Spouses Heracleo are the co-owners of a land which is among the private
properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a government project
undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite
expropriation proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded
the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70
centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan.
Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages.
Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500
per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment.
The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based
at the time the property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of
the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental
importance of the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
Issues:
1: Whether or not the taking of private property without due process should
be nullified
2: Whether or not compensation is based on the market value of the property
at the time of taking
3: Whether or not the principle of equity should be applied in this case
Rulings:
1. No. The taking of private property without due process should not be
nullified. The governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation
proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the States
exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of
expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due
process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the States inherent
powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good. Thus,
the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the
return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the
right of compensation.
 2. Yes. Compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time
of taking. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive
an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of
a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time
of taking. This is because the purpose of just compensation is not to
reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the
loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he actually
loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the time it is
taken.

3. No. The principle of equity should not be applied in this case. The Court
must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the
application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being
called for only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain
other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those
established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of
economic policies a matter which this Court has no competence to take
cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only come into full play
when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.

Jacomille v. Secretary of DOTC

G.R. No. 212381
April 22, 2015

FACTS:
The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program
(MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle registrants.
The DOTC, in its invitation for bidders on Feb 20, 2013, announced that it intends to
apply the sum of 3.8 billion for the contract. The award was granted to JKG Power
Plates on July 22, 2013. The contract signing, however, was halted. It was made only
on February 2014 when sufficient funds from the GAA 2014 were already made
available for the project.
Jacomille instituted a taxpayer suit questioning the procurement process on
the ground that it did not comply with the requirements of RA 9184 and its
implementing laws, and that when DOTC commenced the MVPSP, there was no
sufficient funding as reflected in the GAA 2013. Jacomille saw this as a clear
misrepresentation or even a deception by the said DOTC against the government
and the general public as a whole.
JKG Power Plates averred that the case was not a proper subject of taxpayer
suit because no taxes would be spent for this project. The money to be paid for the
plates would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would
pay P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every
motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor vehicle plate
would only be P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from
every pair of plate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacomille has legal standing to maintain the suit.

RULING:
Yes. Jacomille has legal standing to maintain the suit. A taxpaying citizen is a
proper party because the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program
(MVPSP) involves the expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle
registrants will pay for the license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP
indicate that the government shall bear the burden of paying for the project. As a
rule, a person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Jacomille
satisfies this requirement when he alleges that public funds in the amount of P3 .851
billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper procurement
process.

Province of Aurora v. Marco

G.R. No. 202331
April 22, 2015

FACTS:

Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by

Gov. Ong 5 days before the end of her term in June 30, 2004. His appointment, along
with 25 other appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that funds
were available for the position. When the new Governor took over, the appointments
made by Gov. Ong were revoked based on the recall made by Budget Officer
regarding the availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration
from the CSC Regional Office but was denied. On appeal, the CSC through a
resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the appointment on the ground that it
complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the certification did not affect its
validity because evidence was not presented.
Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by
the CSC because it was not allowed by the rules. Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to
implement the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an MR of
the Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15-
day reglementary period. Finally, the Province filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari via Rule 43 against the CSCs second order implementing the Apr 14
resolution, invoking the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
The CA denied the petition and upheld the CSC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to
appointments made by local executives.

RULING:

No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential
appointments, and not to those made by local executives. A midnight appointment
"refers to those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the
next presidential election." Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is "duty
bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and
he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the
policies of his successor." An outgoing President should not "deprive the new
administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments."
However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to
presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief
executives
 1 UTAK v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206020
April 14, 2015

FACTS:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that
would implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. One of the provisions
of the Resolution provide that the posting of any election propaganda or materials
during the campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and
within the premises of public transport terminals. 1 UTAK, a party-list organization,
questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right to free speech of the private
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs and public
transport terminals during the election pursuant to its regulatory powers
delegated under Art IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free speech

RULINGS:
1. No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and
not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals. The posting of
election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of
ownership it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
PUV or transport terminal. A franchise or permit to operate transportation
utilities pertains to considerations affecting the operation of the PUV as such,
 e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the
vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or, in certain cases,
nationality. Thus, a government issuance, which purports to regulate a
franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations
affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or
supervision not on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very
ownership of the vehicle used for public transport. The expression of ideas or
opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election campaign
materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the
operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain
candidate in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV
as such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the
posting of an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the
franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the
vehicle.

2. Yes. The regulation constitutes prior restraints on free speech. It unduly

infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central
to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree
with them.

Villanueva v. JBC
G.R. 211833
April 7, 2015
FACTS:
After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva
applied for the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC
however informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such
position because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge
of first-level courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the
SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary
injunction the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued
with grave abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due
process for lack of publication and non-submission to the UPLaw Center Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been
published because it will affect all applying judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari
and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal
function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because
the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional.

2. Whether or not JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down

such policy

3. Whether or not it the violates the equal protection clause of the

Constitution

RULINGS:
1. Yes. The policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional. As an
offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list
officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as
justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great
responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men
and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution
 has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

2. No. The JBC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in laying down such
policy. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary
and incidental to the JBCs principal function of choosing and
recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by
the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms
the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to
set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the
judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the
Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held
qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine
who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not
unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

3. No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification
created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. Substantial
distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience
and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to
its legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for
promotion to a second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of
a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the
JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards
requiring that a member of the judiciary be of proven competence. In
determining competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications,
experience and performance.

Republic v. Heirs of Saturnino Borbon

745 SCRA 40
January 12, 2015
FACTS:

NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in

order to construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino
Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the
Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of an easement
of right of way over a portion of the property. The respondents staunchly maintained
that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and that
the entry was done without their consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection
to NAPOCORs entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the
portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was
greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project. During the pendency of an
appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that
the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose
because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the
respondents property; that because the public purpose for which such property
would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no
longer continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return the property to its
owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings
was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or
dismissed pending appeal.

RULING:
The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR
is proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the
court deems just and equitable. Before anything more, we remind the parties about
the nature of the power of eminent domain. The right of eminent domain is the
ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the
private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.
But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements
should underlie the Governments exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely:
(1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid
to the property owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions
that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated. Public use, in common acceptation, means use by the public.
However, the concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for
the benefit of the public. Public use has now been held to be synonymous with
public interest, public benefit, and public convenience. It is essential that the
element of public use of the property be maintained throughout the proceedings for
expropriation. With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,
the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and the
judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness and equity.

It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in
question for public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the
expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being
true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be
dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the
expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of
the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in
the lower court, it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the
expropriation is not for some public use, it would be the duty and the obligation of
the trial court to dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it
should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the
expropriation is not for public use, then it would become the duty and the obligation
of the appellate court to dismiss it.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the
expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with the
expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the
project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the
expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings
subject to the conditions to be shortly mentioned hereunder, and requires the return
of the property to the respondents. Having said that, we must point out that
NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners consent and without paying
just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as required
by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and
its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any person of his or her
property for public use. Considering that in the process of installing transmission
lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the
installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to
divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property
inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to
the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry
until the time of restoration of the possession of the property.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay just compensation to them
because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value
of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the time of
restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory
damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually
lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use,
including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCORs
construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court
now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of
converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The court of origin shall treat
the case as if originally filed as an action for damages.

Ferrer v. Bautista
G.R. No. 210551
June 30, 2015

FACTS:
Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the Socialized
Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides: SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A
special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed value of
land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected
by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the
Quezon City Government. Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax
(SHT) shall be utilized by the Quezon City Government for the following projects: (a)
land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of current/existing socialized
housing facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core houses, sanitary
cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of
public-private partnership agreement of the Quezon City Government and National
Housing Authority (NHA) with the private sector. On the other hand, Ordinance No.
SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took effect ten days after
when it was approved by respondent City Mayor. The proceeds collected from the
garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an
earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage
collections.7 Section 1 of the Ordinance set forth the schedule and manner for the
collection of garbage fees: The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first
day of January and shall be paid simultaneously with the payment of the real
property tax, but not later than the first quarter installment.8 In case a household
owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due, plus an interest of 2%
per month or a fraction thereof, shall be charged. Petitioner, a Quezon City property
owner, questions the validity of the said ordinances. He claims that the annual
property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the assessed value of the property,
which is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in
the market value of the property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases
in the property tax which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its
reassessment every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the
Local Government Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
2. Whether or not the ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double
taxation.

RULING:
1. Yes. The Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is valid. The tax is within the power
of Quezon City Government to impose. LGUs may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject and a lawful method.
Herein, the tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is
levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police
power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public
interest. On the question of inequality, the disparities between a real property owner
and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be
discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice
and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution.
Notably, the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which
impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over another. Further, the
reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory
or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually
allows. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit.
2. No. the ordinance on Garbage Fee does not violate the rule on double
taxation. Pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its
corporate powers under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Quezon City, like other local legislative bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances,
approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants. In this regard, the LGUs shall share with the national government the
responsibility in the management and maintenance of ecological balance within
their territorial jurisdiction. The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000, affirms this authority as it expresses that the LGUs shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions. Necessarily,
LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and
charges for services rendered. The fee imposed for garbage collections under
Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity as provided
by the same. As opposed to petitioners opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. Hence,
not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235
violates the rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.
The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 205728
January 21, 2015

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either
(Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a checkmark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising Team
Patay, while those who voted against it form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid
for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of
candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of
the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is
a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts
power of review.

2. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression.

3. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.

4. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.

RULINGS:

1. No. The size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is not a
political question. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for
the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this
court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. The concept of a
political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective
right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to
choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so
by abridging the fundamental right to expression. Also, the Court said that
in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly
political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
 whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits. A political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the
body to the scrutiny and review of this court. In this case, the Bill of
Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance
that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall
squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

2. Yes. The assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated
petitioners fundamental right to freedom of expression. The Court held that
every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection. Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is
election propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no
water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for
or posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions
are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the
tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech refers to speech both
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issue, fostering informed and civic minded deliberation. On the other
hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction. The expression resulting from the
content of the tarpaulin is, however, a political speech.

3. Yes. There was violation of petitioners right to property. The Court held
that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property
is likewise protected by the Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which
operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
 arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it
is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws. The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that
regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property. Consequently, it violates
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall
be deprived of his property without due process of law.

4. No. The tarpaulin and its message are not considered religious speech. The
Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regard the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not
religious speech. As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take
religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state
involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may
flourish.
 Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015

FACTS:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada

for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however,
former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil
and political rights. In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of President. None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only
placed second in the results. In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post,
that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC),
in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). The Comelec
dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas right to
seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by
former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013
elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and
sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada may run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

RULING:

Yes. Former President Joseph Estrada may run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification to hold public office. Estrada was granted an absolute
pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes
the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation
of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code. It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the
pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo
did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estradas rights of suffrage
and to hold public office, or to otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardons text. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited
by legislative action. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the
power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit: Section
19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission. It is apparent from the foregoing
constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws,
rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute
cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. The proper
interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties
that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC
in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section
40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the
latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia,
to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position. The third
preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as the pardon itself
does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use
of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that
a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory
clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word
"whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas
clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the
scope of the pardon. Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of
rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its
text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on
Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.

Cudia v. PMA
G.R. No. 211362
February 24, 2015

FACTS:
 Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudias class had a lesson
examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was
from 1:30pm to 3pm. However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a
query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia
complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English
teacher reported Cudia for being late. In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was
late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to
look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was
dismissed late because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late.
Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of said
infraction. Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not
content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty
he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his
appeal. In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because
his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To
that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers
concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the
English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a
student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be
excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm;
that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on
that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their
examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the
teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher,
rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there
were at least two students with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of
them cannot be considered a class; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of
saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the
decision of the TO. Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs Honor Committee (HC)
for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal
when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next
class. The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the minimum standard of behavior required
of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC.
Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an
investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with
their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast their vote. The
initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules
(Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also
have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are
made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the tyranny of the minority. After the
chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial not guilty vote was
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia
was immediately placed inside PMAs holding center. Cudia appealed to the HC
chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA
ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA. Cudia and several members of his
family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-investigation.
It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC.
As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMAs sham investigation violated Cudias
rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication. Eventually, the
CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on
the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia. PMA averred that CHRs findings are
at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it
argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should
avoid interfering with military matters.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cudias petition is proper.

 2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.

RULINGS:

1. No. Cudias petition is not proper. Mandamus will not prosper in this case.
Cudias prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give
him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the
Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of restoring
Cudias rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a
discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or
government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to
perform is within PMAs academic freedom as an educational institution and
such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts. The petition for
certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its
responsible officers acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual
controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or
instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not
proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in
military affairs is not an absolute rule. One of the arguments raised by PMA is
that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their
civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by
the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less, question it in the
courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by
enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the
proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with
a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet
facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life, liberty,
property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due
process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the
PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus,
 when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed
from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.

2. Yes. The PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings. It is within PMAs
right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be
part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case,
the investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor
Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the
report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process
that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation.

Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report

together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter
reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the
hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the
charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to
explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in
his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was
found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level from the OIC of the HC,
to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the
PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG
(Headquarters Tactics Group).

Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to

reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the
PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of
the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly, for
him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to
disturb the findings of facts by these bodies. Cudia would argue that there is no
law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to
dismiss or recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code
violation is not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA
conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty
cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service. Such argument is
not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory
authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such
power by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who
may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets. Further, as stated
earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic
freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as
follows; a. the right to determine who may teach; b. the right to determine
what may be taught; c. the right to determine how it shall be taught; d. the
right to determine who may be admitted to study. The Honor Code is just but
one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that a
cadet violates it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based
on its findings, Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code. But Cudias
lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted? The PMA
Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes
any form of lying. It does not have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the
discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia
enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System.
Thus, while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and
not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering
that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
 Jacomille v. Abaya
G.R. No. 212831
April 22, 2015

FACTS:
Recently, the LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization
Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old and new vehicle
registrants. The DOTC published in newspapers of general circulation the Invitation
To Bid for the supply and delivery of motor vehicle license plates for the MVPSP and
stated that the source of funding in the amount of P3,851,600,100.00 would be the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). However, a perusal of R.A. No. 10352 or the
General Appropriations Act of 2013 (GAA 2013), would show that Congress
appropriated only the amount of P187,293,000.00 under the specific heading of
Motor Vehicle Plate-Making Project. The DOTC proceeded with the bidding process,
but delayed in the implementation of the project. The Senate Committee on Public
Services conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported delays in the
release of motor vehicle license plates, stickers and tags by the LTO. Petitioner, by
counsel and assisted by Retired Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, instituted this
taxpayer suit, averring that he was a diligent citizen paying his correct taxes to the
Philippine Government regularly; that he was a registered vehicle owner, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Registration of his motor vehicle and a registered
licensed driver; that he would be affected by the government issuance of vehicle
plates thru its MVPSP upon his renewal of the registration of his vehicle; that not
being a participant to the bidding process, he could not avail of the administrative
remedies and procedure provided under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 or the
Government Procurement Reform Act, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR); that as far as he was concerned, there was no appeal or any plain or speedy
remedy available to him. For the respondents, the OSG stated that the issues
presented had been rendered moot and academic as the gap in the budget of MVPSP
was already bridged and covered by the full and specific funding by GAA 2014 in the
amount of P4,843,753,000.00 for the item Motor Vehicle Registration and Drivers
Licensing Regulatory Services. With the signing of MVPSP on February 21, 2014,
after the enactment of GAA 2014, the OSG claimed that all objections that petitioner
might have, whether right or wrong, had been rendered naught. On the other hand,
JKG-Power Plates averred that petitioner had no locus standi. It pointed out that
petitioner had admitted that he was not one of the bidders in MVPSP and so he
would not suffer any direct injury. Likewise, the present case was not a proper
subject of taxpayer suit because no taxes would be spent for this project. The money
to be paid for the plates would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle
owners, who would pay P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and
P120.00 for every motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor
vehicle plate would only be P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn
P70.00 from every pair of plate.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic,
considering the assailed deficiencies in appropriation have been substantially
complied with.
2. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to bring his case in court.
3. Whether the petitioner established a taxpayers suit.
RULINGS:
1. NO. The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The
case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon
would be of no practical u se or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
xxx Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon
issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and
academic. After all, the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. In the case at bench, the
issues presented must still be passed upon because paramount public interest is
involved and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. MVPSP is a
nationwide project which affects new and old registrants of motor vehicles and it
involves P3,851,600,100.00 of the taxpayers money. Also, the act complained of is
capable of repetition because the procurement process under R.A. No. 9184 is
regularly made by various government agencies. Hence, it is but prudent for the
Court to rule on the substantial merits of the case.
2. YES. Locus standi is defined as the right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question. The fundamental question is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In the present case, petitioner
justifies his locus standi by claiming that the petition raises issues of transcendental
importance and that he institutes the same as a taxpayers suit. It must be noted that
the Court has provided the following instructive guides to determine whether a
matter is of transcendental importance, namely: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. Petitioner sufficiently
showed that his case presents a matter of transcendental importance based on the
above-cited determinants. He elucidated that, first, around P3.851 billion in public
funds stood to be illegally disbursed; second, the IRR of R.A. No. 9184 and R.A. No.
7718 were violated and the contract for MVPSP was awarded to respondent JKG
Power Plates despite the utter disregard of the said laws; third, there was no other
party with a more direct and specific interest who had raised the issues therein; and
fourth, MVPSP had a wide range of impact because all registered motor vehicles
owners would be affected.
3. YES. A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to
the assertion of JKG-Power 638 Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the expenditure of
public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license plates, the
bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the government shall bear the
burden of paying for the project. Every portion of the national treasury, when
appropriated by Congress, must be properly allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an
allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851 billion shall be used in a project
that has undergone an improper procurement process cannot be easily brushed off
by the Court.

Cawad v. Abad
764 SCRA 1
July 28, 2015

FACTS:
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7305, otherwise known as the Magna
Carta of Public Heath Workers was signed into law in order to promote the social
and economic well-being of health workers, their living conditions and terms of
employment, to develop their skills and capabilities, and to encourage those with
proper qualifications to remain in government service. Accordingly, public heath
workers were granted allowances and benefits, which includes additional
compensation. Pursuant to Section 35 of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health
promulgated its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) on July 1992. Thereafter,
in November 1999, the Department of Health (DOH), in collaboration with various
government agencies and health workers organizations, promulgated a revised IRR,
consolidating all additional and clarificatory rules issued by the former Secretaries
of Health, dating back from the date of effectivity of the Magna Carta.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular No.1, series of
2012 is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power.

RULING:
Yes. The issuance of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular No.1, series of 2012 is null
and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power. Before a tribunal, board, or
officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific rights under which adverse claims are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed
with authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties. In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial capacity in their issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In
issuing and implementing the subject circulars, respondents were not called upon to
adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a
judicial nature. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretaries of the DBM, CSC
and DOH of the questioned joint circulars were done in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate
legislation, promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power. Quasi-
legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation
of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government.
The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates below the
minimum prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5(a) of its
Revised IRR is invalid. For being an undue exercise of legislative power.
 Araullo v. Aquino
G.R. No. 209287
February 3, 2015

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a
stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as
a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive
to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next years appropriation. So, what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these
funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be re-
allotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP. Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds
from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expose
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed
upon the request of the Senators. This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns
out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that
some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA
(Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc. This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of
the DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates
the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the
GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

2. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is

constitutional.

3. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

RULINGS:
1. No. The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is
true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated
by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
 Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they
are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
Moreover, these DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was
being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the
funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a
slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP,
funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the
year and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.

2. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money

source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

3. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects
of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It
has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP
effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the
validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is
so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith
 Garafil v. Office of the President
G.R. No. 203372
June 16, 2015

FACTS:
Prior to the May 2010 elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
more than 800 appointments including the petitioners in several government
offices. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for a ban on
midnight appointments. For purposes of the 2010 elections, March 10, 2010 was the
cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of
the ban. An exception is provided under such provision which allows temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. None of the petitioners claim that
their appointments fall under this exception. President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo
which violated the constitutional ban. The officers and employees who were affected
by EO 2 were informed that they were terminated from service effective the next
day. Several petitions were filed seeking to declare the executive order as
unconstitutional and for the declaration of their appointment as legal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Garafils appointment is valid.

RULING:
 No. Garafils appointment is not valid. The following elements should always
concur in the making of a valid appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence
of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4)
receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The
concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the
appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a
single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. In
this case, petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid
appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners
admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. The
President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the
Constitution and laws. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. There should be evidence that
the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the
President's intent of its issuance. For purposes of verification of the appointment
paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security
marks and must be 651 accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO. Also, an
appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to
an occupied office. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment
validly terminated, before one could be validly installed to succeed him. Lastly,
acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking
the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. The appointments made by
President Arroyo are void.