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ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.

L-16439 July 20, 1961


ANTONIO GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
2 SCRA 801

FACTS:
Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage,
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to
be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third
abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of,
nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based
on the third and last abortion.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as
attorneys fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may
recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?

RULING:
Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course,
essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed
legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account
of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even
if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil
Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated
from its mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.

Geluz v CA G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961


J. J. B.L. Reyes

Facts:
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Lazos cuase of action
was the third and last abortion of his wife to the said doctor.
The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married. She had herself aborted again by
the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant and was
aborted when the husband was campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent.
The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to pay Php 3,000. The CA sustained. The
doctor appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus
Held: No. Petition granted.

Ratio:
Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of
the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality.
Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born
later with the condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the
present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that
he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee
does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant.
His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity"
claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

Quimiguing vs Icao
TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao
CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City
and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to
have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her
consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages
and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on
the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable
since the original complaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.
So ordered.

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from
the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request
for amendment of complaint.

Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations
with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorneys fees.

The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguings failure to allege the fact
that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to
allege fact of birth in complaint

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and
an independent cause of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child,
which includes its right to support from its progenitors, even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article
742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive donations through persons
that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish
Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.

Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused
per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides moral damages
for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.

Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the
decision; with costs against Icao.

Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs


Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montao

603 SCRA 621 Labor Law Labor Standards Death Benefits for the Death of a Dependent A
Fetus is a Dependent
Civil Law Civil Personality When does civil personality start When does life begin
In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their
unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death
benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied
the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty.
Allan Montao act as the arbitrator. Montao ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of Montao.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death
benefits are awarded if an employees legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no
death has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no
juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which
provides a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born
hence it is not a legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as
contemplated under civil laws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?
HELD:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in
question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate
dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need
to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality that is not the issue here.
But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state
that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillanos fetus
had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the
unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is
entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902 G.R. No. 445


J. Cooper

Facts:
This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against
Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.
The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his
second wife and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the
administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for
litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the
property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.
The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under
which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has
caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in
his own name without the consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating
the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorneygiven to plaintiff,
and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who,
notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of
his administration.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against
him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:
The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying
general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.
Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a
disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family
to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.
Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who
can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner,
but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well
be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property,
and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.
While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her
marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the
defendants property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being
a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability
that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of
the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.
A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself
possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.
Beatriz Wassmer vs Francisco Velez
12 SCRA 648 Civil Law Torts and Damages Article 21 of the Civil Code Moral Damages
Exemplary Damages Breach of Promise to Marry
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it
on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he
will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor
of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested
the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated.
It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case,
it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made
preparations for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of
the Civil Code which provides in part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his
promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this warrants the
imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Tanjanco v. CA
Facts:
Apolonio Trajanco courted Araceli Santos. Since he promised her marriage, she consented to his pleas
for carnal knowledge. As a result, she conceived a child, and due to her condition, she had to resign from
her work. Because she was unable to support herself and
the baby, and the Apolonio refused to marry her, she instituted an action for damages, compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child, pay her monthly support, plus P100,000 in moral and exemplary
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute seduction as contemplated in Art. 21.

Held:
No, it is not. Seduction is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry. It connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded. In this case, for 1 whole year, the woman maintained intimate
sexual relations with the defendant, and such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
here there is voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces for a year.

Leouel Santos vs Court of


Appeals
204 SCRA 20 (310 Phil. 21) Civil Law Family Code Article 36: Psychological Incapacity
Note: This was the first case where the term psychological incapacity was discussed by the Supreme
Court.
Leouel Santos, a member of the Army, met Julia Rosario Bedia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they
got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to their son in 1987. Their
marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parents, as averred by Leouel.
The couple also occasionally quarreled about as to, among other things, when should they start
living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite
Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in
1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military
training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to
at least have his wife come home, filed a petition to nullify their marriage due to Julias alleged
psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least
communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia filed an
opposition; she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is
no collusion between the two. Leouels petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.
HELD: No. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term
psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision in PI, adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC
did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon
Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes
can be of an infinite variety.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68),
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the
alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do
not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC

Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name Rommel Jacinto to Mely and his
sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He
alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law
allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion.
The petitioners basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law
allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the
petition.

Obergefell vs Hodges
The landmark case of Obergefell vs Hodges upheld the rights of same-sex couples to
marry. The US Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State
to license a marriage between two people of the same sex based on the following
principles and premises:

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause
extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices
defining personal identity and beliefs.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

(a) The first premise of this Courts relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.

(b) A second principle in this Courts jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental
because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v.
Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use
contraception.

(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.

(d) Finally, this Courts cases and the Nations traditions make clear that marriage is a
keystone of the Nations social order. States have contributed to the fundamental character
of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is
no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet
same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to
marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find
intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the
Nations society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just,
but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now
manifest.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights
secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive,
yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry.

(5) While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for
change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a
fundamental
right.

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