Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property.
Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any
such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians
alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both
the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.
These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well
the manner by which employers treat their employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization.
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of
the constitution mandates to afford labor full protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that
labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups
were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-
hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain
benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former
from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise
of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.
FACTS:
Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro bought tickets for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu
Since many passengers were bound for Surigao, M/S "Sweet Hope would not be proceeding to Bohol
They went to the proper brancg office and was relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" where they were forced to agree "to
hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." and they were exposed to
the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits and their tickets were not
honored so they had to purchase a new one
They sued Sweet Lines for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental who dismissed the compalitn for improper venue
A motion was premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets -dismissed
instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction
ISSUE: W/N a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed at the back of passage
tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the contract of carriage should be filed only in a particular
province or city
HELD: NO.petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Restraining order LIFTED and SET ASIDE
contract of adhesion
not that kind of a contract where the parties sit down to deliberate, discuss and agree specifically on all its terms,
but rather, one which respondents took no part at all in preparing
just imposed upon them when they paid for the fare for the freight they wanted to ship
We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and
unenforceable for the following reasons
circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship
will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who, under Condition No.
14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu
subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions
philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as well as his
witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice
PHILSEC VS. CA
PHILSEC INVESTMENT et al vs.CA et al
G.R. No. 103493
June 19, 1997
FACTS: Private respondent Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA)
and Philsec Investment Corp (PHILSEC), secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its president, private respondent
Daic, assumed Ducats obligation under an Agreement, whereby 1488, Inc. executed a Warranty Deed with Vendors
Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings, N.V. (ATHONA) a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A., while PHILSEC and
AYALA extended a loan to ATHONA as initial payment of the purchase price. The balance was to be paid by means of a
promissory note executed by ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon their receipt of the money from 1488,
Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their
possession belonging to Ducat.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance, the entire amount covered by the note became due and
demandable. Accordingly, private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United
States for payment of the balance and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by
petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint For Sum of Money with Damages
and Writ of Preliminary Attachment against private respondents in the RTC Makati. The complaint reiterated the
allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in the Civil Action in the United States District Court of
Southern Texas that private respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more than its
true value.
Ducat moved to dismiss the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-vis the Civil Action in
the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducats MTD, stating that the evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably
tried before the forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum non
conveniens, even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum
non conveniens.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case against Ducat, 1488, Inc., and Daic on the ground of litis pendentia.
ISSUE: is the Civil Case in the RTC-Makati barred by the judgment of the U.S. court?
HELD: CA reversed. Case remanded to RTC-Makati
NO
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. This is
because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof
to the contrary. Rule 39, 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S.
court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial
court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the
U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of whether the issues then
being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered
would constitute res judicata.
Second. Nor is the trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case justifiable under the principle of forum non
conveniens:
First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec.1, which does not include forum non conveniens. The propriety
of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a
matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.
Facts:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant
stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered
two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was
bound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.
Issue:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port.
Held:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by
the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality. However,
the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can
of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal law in force
at the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either
from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the
property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it
is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in
person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-
Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the
Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was
necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this
requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment
by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the
bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after
the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate
all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of
the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the
authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to
the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thus fixes
its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made
effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken
into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and
held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found
in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without
taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to
exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which
is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain
proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon
which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to
the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of
the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus
designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to
the principles governing actions in rem.
Far East International Import and Export Corporation vs Nankai Kogyo Co. Ltd. etal
GR NO. L-13525 November 30, 1962
Facts: On December 26, 1956, the Far East International Import & Export Corporation, Far East for short, organized
under Philippine Laws, entered into a Contract of Sale of Steel Scrap with the Nankai Kogyo Co., Ltd., Nankai for short, a
foreign corporation organized under Japanese Laws with address at Osaka, Japan. The buyer sign in Japan and the seller
in Manila, Philippines. Upon perfection of the contract and after having been informed of the readiness to ship and that
the Export License was to expire on March 18, 1957, Nankai opened a letter for credit (No. 38/80049) with the China
Banking Corporation, issued by the Nippon Kangyo, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, in the amount of $312,500.00 on January 30,
1957. On March 15, 1957, only four (4) days before the expiration of the Far East licence, three (3) boats sent by Nankai
arrived in the Philippines, one to load in Manila, the other two at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union, and Tacloban,
Leyte, respectively. On March 19, 1957, the expiration of the export license, only 1,058.6 metric tons of scrap steel was
loaded on the SS Mina (loading in Manila). The loading was accordingly stopped. The boat at Poro Point was also
unloaded of the 200 metric tons, for the same reason. An agreement was reached whereby the Far East would seek an
extension of the license. However, the untimely death of President Magsaysay and the taking over by President Garcia
changed the picture, for the latter and/or his agents refused to extend the license. The two boats sailed to Japan
without any cargo, the third (SS Mina) only 1,058.6 metric tons. As repeated requests, both against the shipping agent
and the buyers (Nankai), for the issuance of the of Bill Lading were ignored, Far East filed on May 16, 1957, the present
complaint for Specific Performance, damages, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directed against Nankai and
the shipping company, to issue and deliver to the plaintiff, a complete set of negotiable of Lading for the 1,058.6 metric
tons of scrap and a writ of preliminary injunction against the China Banking Corporation and the Nankai to maintain the
Letter Credit. The lower court issued on May 17, 1957 an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction, after Far East had
posted a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant-
appellant.
Held: Yes. It is true that the defendant entered a Special Appearance, wherein it contested the jurisdiction of the
Philippines Courts to take cognizance of the case on grounds contained in the various pleadings presented by it. The
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction had been overruled because it did not appear indubitable.
Subsequently, however, the defendant filed its Answer and invoked defenses and grounds for dismissal of complaint
other than lack of jurisdiction, which circumstance vested upon the Court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
Even though the defendant objects to the jurisdiction of the court, if at the same time he alleges any non-jurisdictional
ground for dismissing the action, the Court acquires jurisdiction over him. Even though he does not intend to confer
jurisdiction upon the court, his appearance for some other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction subjects him to
jurisdiction of the court.Even though he does not wish to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot ask the court
to act upon any question except the question of jurisdiction, without conferring jurisdiction upon the court.
Thus though a Special appearance to object to the jurisdiction is not a submission, if it is followed by a motion to dismiss
or to quash the motion invokes the jurisdiction of Court to decide the issue raised by the motion; and a decision of that
issue binds the defendant. Therefore if the decision of the motion is based upon a finding of facts necessary to
jurisdiction, this finding binds the defendant and the court acquires jurisdiction to determine the merits of the case.
Undoubtedly if after his objection to the jurisdiction is wrongly overruled, a defendant files a cross complaint demanding
affirmative relief, he cannot thereafter claim that the court had no jurisdiction over him.
Not only did appellant allege non-jurisdictional grounds in its pleadings to have the complaint dismissed, but it also went
into trial on the merits and presented evidence destined to resist appellees claim. Verily, there could not be a better
situation of acquired jurisdiction based on consent. Consequently, the provision of the contract wherein it was agreed
that disputes should be submitted to a Board of Arbitration which may be formed in Japan (in the supposition that it can
apply to the matter in dispute payment of the scrap), seems to have been waived with appellants voluntary
submission. Apart from the fact that the clause employs the word may.
The appellant alleges that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction, because it was not doing business in the
Philippines and the requirement of summons had not been fulfilled. It is difficult to lay down any rule of universal
application to determine when a foreign corporation is doing business. Each case must turn upon its own peculiar facts
and upon the language of the statute applicable. But from the proven facts obtaining in this particular case, the
appellants defense of lack of jurisdiction appears unavailing.
In the instant case, the testimony of Atty. Pablo Ocampo that appellant was doing business in the Philippines
corroborated by no less than Nabuo Yoshida, one of appellants officers, that he was sent to the Philippines by his
company to look into the operation of mines, thereby revealing the defendants desire to continue engaging in business
here, after receiving the shipment of the iron under consideration, making the Philippines a base thereof.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and
co-defendant, Helen Schenker, said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with her as party defendant,
because he is beyond the reach of the magistracy of the Philippine courts."
The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker hereinafter referred to as Schenker acting through his wife and
attorney-in-fact, Helen Schenker hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the
enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippine-Swiss Trading Co., Inc.
and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the
increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs.
Schenker had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant
and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit
of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his "honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into
public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman", Gemperle commenced the present
action against the Schenkers for the recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney's fees, and costs, in addition
to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions". In due course,
thereafter, the lower court rendered the decision above referred to. A reconsideration thereof having been denied,
Gemperle interposed the present appeal.
The first question for determination therein is whether or not the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Schenker. Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons
in the Philippines, although the summons addressed to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in
the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary
appearance on his part, he not having made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an
answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint,
respectfully aver", which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but, this counterclaim
was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative
defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this
defense. Nevertheless, we hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of
the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and
attorney-in-fact of her husband in the aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest,
in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually
sued, on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly
in a case, like the one at bar, which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.
Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn therefrom is,
likewise, untenable.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings, with the costs of this instance against defendants-appellees. It is so ordered.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
Held:
1. Because Arelma and PNB also seek review of the Ninth Circuits decision, this Court need not rule on the question
whether the Republic and the Commission, having been dismissed from the suit, had the right to seek review of the
decision that the suit could proceed in their absence. As a general matter any party may move to dismiss an action
under Rule 19(b). Arelma and PNB have not lost standing to have the judgment vacated in its entirety on procedural
grounds simply because they did not appeal, or petition for certiorari on, the underlying merits ruling denying them the
interpleaded assets. Pp. 79.
(a) Under Rule 19(a), nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in dismissal. When joinder is not
feasible, the question whether an action should proceed turns on nonexclusive considerations in Rule 19(b), which asks
whether in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.
The joinder issue can be complex, and the case-specific determinations involve multiple factors, some substantive,
some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests, Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102 . Pp. 910.
(b) Here, Rule 19(a)s application is not contested: The Republic and the Commission are required entities. And this
Court need not decide the proper standard of review for Rule 19(b) decisions, because the Ninth Circuits errors of law
require reversal. Pp. 1019.
(1) The first factor directs the court to consider, in determining whether the action may proceed, the prejudice to
absent entities and present parties in the event judgment is rendered without joinder. Rule 19(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit
gave insufficient weight to the sovereign status of the Republic and the Commission in considering whether they would
be prejudiced if the case proceeded. Giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the comity and dignity interests
that contributed to the development of the immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U. S. 480 . These interests are concrete here. The entities claims arise from historically and politically significant events
for the Republic and its people, and the entities have a unique interest in resolving matters related to Arelmas assets. A
foreign state has a comity interest in using its courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. Its dignity is not enhanced if
other nations bypass its courts without right or good cause. A more specific affront could result if property the Republic
and the Commission claim is seized by a foreign court decree. This Court has not considered the precise question
presented, but authorities involving the intersection of joinder and the United States governmental immunity, see, e.g.,
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U. S. 371 , instruct that where sovereign immunity is asserted, and the
sovereigns claims are not frivolous, dismissal must be ordered where there is a potential for injury to the absent
sovereigns interests. The claims of the Republic and the Commission were not frivolous, and the Ninth Circuit thus erred
in ruling on their merits. The privilege of sovereign immunity from suit is much diminished if an important and
consequential ruling affecting the sovereigns substantial interest is determined, or at least assumed, by a federal court
in its absence and over its objection. The Pimentel class interest in recovering its damages is not discounted, but
important comity concerns are implicated by assertion of foreign sovereign immunity. The error is not that the courts
below gave too much weight to the Pimentel class interests, but that they did not accord proper weight to the
compelling sovereign immunity claim. Pp. 1116.
(2) The second factor is the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by relief or measures
alternative to dismissal, Rule 19(b)(2), but no alternative remedies or forms of relief have been proposed or appear to be
available. As to the third factorwhether a judgment rendered without the absent party would be adequate, Rule
19(b)(3)adequacy refers not to satisfaction of the Pimentel class claims, but to the public stake in settling disputes
by wholes, whenever possible, Provident Bank, supra, at 111. Going forward with the action in the absence of the
Republic and the Commission would not further this public interest because they could not be bound by a judgment to
which they were not parties. As to the fourth factorwhether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action
were dismissed for nonjoinder, Rule 19(b)(4)the Ninth Circuit made much of the tort victims lack of an alternative
forum. But Merrill Lynch, not the Pimentel class, is the plaintiff as the stakeholder in the interpleader action. See 28 U. S.
C. 1335(a). The Pimentel class interests are not irrelevant to Rule 19(b)s equitable balance, but the Rules other
provisions are the relevant ones to consult. A dismissal on the ground of nonjoinder will not provide Merrill Lynch with a
judgment determining entitlement to the assets so it could be done with the matter, but it likely would give Merrill
Lynch an effective defense against piecemeal litigation by various claimants and inconsistent, conflicting judgments. Any
prejudice to Merrill Lynch is outweighed by prejudice to the absent entities invoking sovereign immunity. In the usual
course, the Ninth Circuits failure to give sufficient weight to the likely prejudice to the Republic and the Commission
would warrant reversal and remand for further determinations, but here, that error plus this Courts analysis under Rule
19(b)s additional provisions require the actions dismissal. Pp. 1720.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito,
JJ., joined, in which Souter, J., joined as to all but Parts IVB and V,and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Part II. Stevens,
J., and Souter, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.