BRENTSCHOOL vs ZAMORA
At that time, i.e., before the advent of the Labor Code, there was
Petitioner: Brent School, Inc., and Rev. Gabriel Dimache
Respondent: Ronaldo Zamora, the Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs, Office of the President, and Doroteo R. Alegre
Citation: GR No. L-48494
Date of Promulgation: February 5, 1990
Ponente: Narvasa
FACTS:
Doroteo Alegre: engaged as athletic director by Brent School at
a yearly compensation of PhP 20, 000.
Contract: fixed specific term for its existence which is 5 years
(July 18, 1971 July 17, 1976). These were further reiterated in
subsidiary agreements on various occasions
Three months after the expiration (April 20, 1976): Alegre was
given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with DOLE
advising of the termination of his service effective on July 16,
1976
- Ground for Termination: completion of contract,
expiration of the definite period of employment
A month after: Alegre accepted the amount of PhP 3, 177.17
and signed a receipt containing the phrase, in full payment of
the services for the period May 16 to July 17, 1976 as full
payment of contract
Investigation conducted by the Labor Conciliator: Alegre
contested the announced termination of his employment.
- He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the
same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services
were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his
employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he
had acquired the status of a regular employee and could
not be removed except for valid cause.
Regional Director: considered Brent Schools report as an an
application for clearance to terminate employment (not a
report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of
the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and
instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent
employee," to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and with full back wages. The Director pronounced "the
ground relied upon by the respondent (Brent) in terminating
the services of the complainant (Alegre) . . . (as) not sanctioned
by P.D. 442," and, quite oddly, as prohibited by Circular No. 8,
series of 1969, of the Bureau of Private Schools.
Brent School: filed an MR which was denied. On appeal, the
Secretary of Labor upheld the decision of the Regional Director
Brent appealed at the Office of the President: rebuffed for lack
of merit
ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have
anathematized fixed period employment or employment for a
term?
HELD:
No.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was
executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the
Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. Indeed, the
Code did not come into effect until November 1, 1974, some three
years after the perfection of the employment contract, and rights
and obligations thereunder had arisen and been mutually observed
and enforced.
no doubt whatever about the validity of term employment. It was
impliedly but nonetheless clearly recognized by the Termination
Pay Law, R.A. 1052, 11 as amended by R.A. 1787. 12 Basically, this
statute provided that
In cases of employment, without a definite period, in a
commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or
enterprise, the employer or the employee may terminate at
any time the employment with just cause; or without just
cause in the case of an employee by serving written notice on
the employer at least one month in advance, or in the case of
an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at least
one month in advance or one-half month for every year of
service of the employee, whichever is longer, a fraction of at
least six months being considered as one whole year.
The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in case
of termination of employment without just cause, may hold
the employee liable for damages.
The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case
of termination of employment without just cause, shall be
entitled to compensation from the date of termination of his
employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages
corresponding to the required period of notice.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed
between Brent School and Alegre on July 18, 1971, it was perfectly
legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof.
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period
employment contracts under the Labor Code (Presidential Decree
No. 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code
contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or
employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless,
obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began
to take place at about this time
Article 320, entitled "Probationary and fixed period employment,"
originally stated that the "termination of employment of
probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD
shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may
prescribe." The asserted objective to was "prevent the
circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in their
employment as provided . . . (in the Code)."
Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could
terminate "an employment without a definite period."
And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed
period" in the following manner: 18
An employment shall be deemed to be without a definite period for
purposes of this Chapter where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season.
The question immediately provoked by a reading of Article 319 is
whether or not a voluntary agreement on a fixed term or period
would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer." The definition seems a non
sequitur. From the premise that the duties of an employee entail
"activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer the" conclusion does not
necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be
forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of
those activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between
a definite period of an employment contract and the nature of the
employee's duties set down in that contract as being "usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer." The concept of the employee's duties as being "usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer" is not synonymous with or identical to employment with
a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term employment
should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to
perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the
commencement and termination of their employment relationship,
a day certain being understood to be "that which must necessarily
come, although it may not be known when." 19 Seasonal
employment, and employment for a particular project are merely
instances employment in which a period, where not expressly set
down, necessarily implied.
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development
of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor
Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent
circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the
clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all
written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular
employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the
substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements
entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should
have no application to instances where a fixed period of
employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the
parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily
appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on
more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being
exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its
purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than
those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and
arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and
unintended consequences.
Respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the
expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976
without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice
given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a
mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a
letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate
which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make
the termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance
should properly have been given, not denied.
GMA NETWORK vs PABRIGA
Petitioner: GMA Network Inc.,
Respondents: Carlos Oabriga, Geoffrey Arias, Kirby campo, Arnold
Lagahit, Armando Catubig
Citation: GR No. 176419
Date of Promulgation: Nov. 27, 2013
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro
FACTS:
July 19, 1999 due to the miserable working conditions, private
respondents (Television Technicians) were forced to file a
complaint before NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII Cebu
City
Private respondents were engaged in the ff activities:
1) Manning of Technical Operations Center:
(a) Responsible for the airing of local commercials; and
(b) Logging/monitoring of national commercials (satellite)
2) Acting as Transmitter/VTR men:
(a) Prepare tapes for local airing;
(b) Actual airing of commercials;
(c) Plugging of station promo;
(d) Logging of transmitter reading; and
(e) In case of power failure, start up generator set to
resume program;
3) Acting as Maintenance staff;
(a) Checking of equipment;
(b) Warming up of generator;
(c) Filling of oil, fuel, and water in radiator; and
4) Acting as Cameramen
August 4, 1999 GMA received a Notice of Hearing of the
Complaint
Next day Engineering manager Roy Villacastin confronted
private respondents about the complaint
Aug. 9, 1999 Private respondents were summoned to the
office of the GMAs Area Manager, Susan Alio and they were
made to explain why they filed the complaint
Next day they were barred from entering and reporting for
work without any notice stating the reasons
Aug. 13, 1999 Private respondent through counsel wrote a
letter to Susan requesting that they be back to work
August 23, 1999 A reply letter from Bienvenido Bustria,
petitioners Head of Personnel and Labor Relations Division,
admitted the non-payment of benefits but did not mention the
request of private respondents to be allowed to return to work
Sept, 15, 1999 private respondents sent another letter to
Bustria reiterating their request to work but the same was
ignored
October 8, 1999 Private respondents filed an Amended
Complaint raising addtl issues if unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, and damages & attorneys fees
Sept. 23, 1999 a mandatory conference was set to settle the
dispute, but of no avail
Both were directed to file their position papers, to which they
complied.
LA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair
labor practice, but held GMA liable for 13th month pay
NLRC reversed the LAs decision
a) All complainants are regular employees with respect to
the particular activity to which they were assigned, until it
ceased to exist. As such, they are entitled to payment of
separation pay computed at one (1) month salary for every
year of service;
b) They are not entitled to overtime pay and holiday pay;
and
 c) They are entitled to 13th month pay, night shif
differential and service incentive leave pay.
For purposes of accurate computation, the entire records
are REMANDED to the Regional Arbitration Branch of
origin which is hereby directed to require from respondent
the production of additional documents where necessary.
Respondent is also assessed the attorneys fees of ten
percent (10%) of all the above awards.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the private respondents are regular employees of
GMA?
2. W/N private respondents are entitled to a separation pay
absent a finding that they were illegally dismissed
3. W/N private respondents are entitled to NSDP considering
the absence of evidence
HELD:
1. YES.
At the outset, we should note that the nature of the employment is
determined by law, regardless of any contract expressing otherwise.
The supremacy of the law over the nomenclature of the contract and
the stipulations contained therein is to bring to life the policy
enshrined in the Constitution to afford full protection to labor. Labor
contracts, being imbued with public interest, are placed on a higher
plane than ordinary contracts and are subject to the police power of
the State.7
Respondents claim that they are regular employees of petitioner
GMA Network, Inc. The latter, on the other hand, interchangeably
characterize respondents employment as project and fixed
period/fixed term employment. There is thus the need to clarify the
foregoing terms.
The terms regular employment and project employment are taken
from Article 280 of the Labor Code, which also speaks of casual and
seasonal employment:
ARTICLE 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and employment is
for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by
the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity actually exist.
Pursuant to the above-quoted Article 280 of the Labor Code,
employees performing activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the employers usual business or trade can either be
regular, project or seasonal employees, while, as a general rule,
those performing activities not usually necessary or desirable in the
employers usual business or trade are casual employees. The reason
for this distinction may not be readily comprehensible to those who
have not carefully studied these provisions: only employers who
constantly need the specified tasks to be performed can be
justifiably charged to uphold the constitutionally protected security
of tenure of the corresponding workers. The consequence of the
distinction is found in Article 279 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
On the other hand, the activities of project employees may or may
not be usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, as we have discussed in ALU-TUCP v. National Labor
Relations Commission,9 and recently reiterated in Leyte Geothermal
Power Progressive Employees Union-ALU-TUCP v. Philippine National
Oil Company-Energy Development Corporation.10 In said cases, we
clarified the term "project" in the test for determining whether an
employee is a regular or project employee:
It is evidently important to become clear about the meaning and
scope of the term "project" in the present context. The "project" for
the carrying out of which "project employees" are hired would
ordinarily have some relationship to the usual business of the
employer. Exceptionally, the "project" undertaking might not have an
ordinary or normal relationship to the usual business of the
employer. In this latter case, the determination of the scope and
parameters of the "project" becomes fairly easy. It is unusual (but
still conceivable) for a company to undertake a project which has
absolutely no relationship to the usual business of the company;
thus, for instance, it would be an unusual steel-making company
which would undertake the breeding and production of fish or the
cultivation of vegetables. From the viewpoint, however, of the legal
characterization problem here presented to the Court, there should
be no difficulty in designating the employees who are retained or
hired for the purpose of undertaking fish culture or the production
of vegetables as "project employees," as distinguished from ordinary
or "regular employees," so long as the duration and scope of the
project were determined or specified at the time of engagement of
the "project employees." For, as is evident from the provisions of
Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted earlier, the principal test for
determining whether particular employees are properly
characterized as "project employees" as distinguished from "regular
employees," is whether or not the "project employees" were
assigned to carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the
duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the
employees were engaged for that project.
In the realm of business and industry, we note that "project" could
refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of
activities. Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or
undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the
employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and
identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company.
Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or
determinable times. The typical example of this first type of project
is a particular construction job or project of a construction company.
A construction company ordinarily carries out two or more [distinct]
identifiable construction projects: e.g., a twenty-five-storey hotel in
Makati; a residential condominium building in Baguio City; and a
domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. Employees who are hired for the
carrying out of one of these separate projects, the scope and
duration of which has been determined and made known to the
employees at the time of employment, are properly treated as
"project employees," and their services may be lawfully terminated
at completion of the project.
The term "project" could also refer to, secondly, a particular job or
undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably
separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business
operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins and
ends at determined or determinable times. x x x.11 (Emphases
supplied, citation omitted.)
Thus, in order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary
use of the word "project" to prevent employees from attaining the
status of regular employees, employers claiming that their workers
are project employees should not only prove that the duration and
scope of the employment was specified at the time they were
engaged, but also that there was indeed a project. As discussed
above, the project could either be (1) a particular job or undertaking
that is within the regular or usual business of the employer
company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such,
from the other undertakings of the company; or (2) a particular job
or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation. As it was with regard to the distinction between a
regular and casual employee, the purpose of this requirement is to
delineate whether or not the employer is in constant need of the
services of the specified employee. If the particular job or
undertaking is within the regular or usual business of the employer
company and it is not identifiably distinct or separate from the other
undertakings of the company, there is clearly a constant necessity for
the performance of the task in question, and therefore said job or
undertaking should not be considered a project.
In the case at bar, as discussed in the statement of facts,
respondents were assigned to the following tasks:
1) Manning of Technical Operations Center:
(a) Responsible for the airing of local
commercials; and
(b) Logging/monitoring of national
commercials (satellite)
2) Acting as Transmitter/VTR men:
(a) Prepare tapes for local airing;
(b) Actual airing of commercials;
(c) Plugging of station promo;
(d) Logging of transmitter reading; and
(e) In case of power failure, start up
generator set to resume program;
3) Acting as Maintenance staff;
(a) Checking of equipment;
(b) Warming up of generator;
(c) Filling of oil, fuel, and water in
radiator; and
4) Acting as Cameramen
These jobs and undertakings are clearly within the regular or usual
business of the employer company and are not identifiably distinct
or separate from the other undertakings of the company. There is
no denying that the manning of the operations center to air
commercials, acting as transmitter/VTR men, maintaining the
equipment, and acting as cameramen are not undertakings
separate or distinct from the business of a broadcasting company.
Petitioners allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or
what they call pinch-hitters (which means that they were employed
to take the place of regular employees of petitioner who were
absent or on leave) does not change the fact that their jobs cannot
be considered projects within the purview of the law. Every industry,
even public offices, has to deal with securing substitutes for
employees who are absent or on leave. Such tasks, whether
performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, cannot be
considered separate and distinct from the other undertakings of the
company. While it is managements prerogative to device a method
to deal with this issue, such prerogative is not absolute and is limited
to systems wherein employees are not ingeniously and methodically
deprived of their constitutionally protected right to security of
tenure. We are not convinced that a big corporation such as
petitioner cannot device a system wherein a sufficient number of
technicians can be hired with a regular status who can take over
when their colleagues are absent or on leave, especially when it
appears from the records that petitioner hires so-called pinch-hitters
regularly every month.
In affirming the Decision of the NLRC, the Court of Appeals
furthermore noted that if respondents were indeed project
employees, petitioner should have reported the completion of its
projects and the dismissal of respondents in its finished projects:
There is another reason why we should rule in favor of private
respondents. Nowhere in the records is there any showing that
petitioner reported the completion of its projects and the dismissal
of private respondents in its finished projects to the nearest Public
Employment Office as per Policy Instruction No. 2015 of the
Department of Labor and Employment [DOLE]. Jurisprudence
abounds with the consistent rule that the failure of an employer to
report to the nearest Public Employment Office the termination of
its workers services everytime a project or a phase thereof is
completed indicates that said workers are not project employees.
In the extant case, petitioner should have filed as many reports of
termination as there were projects actually finished if private
respondents were indeed project employees, considering that the
latter were hired and again rehired from 1996 up to 1999. Its failure
to submit reports of termination cannot but sufficiently convince us
further that private respondents are truly regular employees.
Important to note is the fact that private respondents had rendered
more than one (1) year of service at the time of their dismissal which
overturns petitioners allegations that private respondents were
hired for a specific or fixed undertaking for a limited period of time.1
the Court of Appeals also ruled that even if it is assumed that
respondents are project employees, they would nevertheless have
attained regular employment status because of their continuous
rehiring:
Be that as it may, a project employee may also attain the status of a
regular employee if there is a continuous rehiring of project
employees after the stoppage of a project; and the activities
performed are usual [and] customary to the business or trade of
the employer. The Supreme Court ruled that a project employee or
a member of a work pool may acquire the status of a regular
employee when the following concur:
1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after
cessation of a project; and
2) The tasks performed by the alleged project employee are vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer.
The circumstances set forth by law and the jurisprudence is present
in this case. In fine, even if private respondents are to be
considered as project employees, they attained regular
employment status, just the same.21 (Citation omitted.)
As stated above, petitioner interchangeably characterizes
respondents service as project and fixed term employment. These
types of employment, however, are not the same. While the former
requires a project as restrictively defined above, the duration of a
fixed-term employment agreed upon by the parties may be any day
certain, which is understood to be "that which must necessarily
come although it may not be known when."25 The decisive
determinant in fixed-term employment is not the activity that the
employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon
by the parties for the commencement and termination of the
employment relationship.26
Cognizant of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed-term
employment contracts, we emphasized in Brent that where from the
circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to
preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they
should be struck down as contrary to public policy or morals.27 We
thus laid down indications or criteria under which "term
employment" cannot be said to be in circumvention of the law on
security of tenure, namely:
1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any
other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt
with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance exercised by the former or the latter.28 (Citation
omitted.)
These indications, which must be read together, make the Brent
doctrine applicable only in a few special cases wherein the employer
and employee are on more or less in equal footing in entering into
the contract. The reason for this is evident: when a prospective
employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a
position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such
prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary
worker. Lesser limitations on the parties freedom of contract are
thus required for the protection of the employee.
We reject the petitioners submission that it resorted to hiring
employees for fixed terms to augment or supplement its regular
employment "for the duration of peak loads" during short-term
surges to respond to cyclical demands; hence, it may hire and retire
workers on fixed terms, ad infinitum, depending upon the needs of
its customers, domestic and international. Under the petitioner's
submission, any worker hired by it for fixed terms of months or years
can never attain regular employment status. x x x.
Similarly, in the case at bar, we find it unjustifiable to allow petitioner
to hire and rehire workers on fixed terms, ad infinitum, depending
upon its needs, never attaining regular employment status. To recall,
respondents were repeatedly rehired in several fixed term contracts
from 1996 to 1999. To prove the alleged contracts, petitioner
presented cash disbursement vouchers signed by respondents,
stating that they were merely hired as pinch-hitters. It is apparent
that respondents were in no position to refuse to sign these
vouchers, as such refusal would entail not getting paid for their
services. Plainly, respondents as "pinch-hitters" cannot be
considered to be in equal footing as petitioner corporation in the
negotiation of their employment contract.
In sum, we affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
that respondents are regular employees of petitioner.1wphi1 As
regular employees, they are entitled to security of tenure and
therefore their services may be terminated only for just or
authorized causes. Since petitioner failed to prove any just or
authorized cause for their termination, we are constrained to affirm
the findings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that they were
illegally dismissed.
2) YES
In light, however, of our ruling that respondents were illegally
dismissed, we affirm the findings of the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals that respondents are entitled to separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. We quote with approval the discussion of the Court
of Appeals:
However, since petitioner refused to accept private respondents
back to work, reinstatement is no longer practicable. Allowing
private respondents to return to their work might only subject
them to further embarrassment, humiliation, or even harassment.
Thus, in lieu of reinstatement, the grant of separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service is proper
which public respondent actually did. Where the relationship
between private respondents and petitioner has been severely
strained by reason of their respective imputations of accusations
against each other, to order reinstatement would no longer serve
any purpose. In such situation, payment of separation pay instead
of reinstatement is in order.33 (Citations omitted.)
3) YES
As regards night shift differential, the Labor Code provides that
every employee shall be paid not less than ten percent (10%) of his
regular wage for each hour of work performed between ten oclock
in the evening and six oclock in the morning.34 As employees of
petitioner, respondents are entitled to the payment of this benefit in
accordance with the number of hours they worked from 10:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m., if any. In the Decision of the NLRC affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, the records were remanded to the Regional Arbitration
Branch of origin for the computation of the night shif differential
and the separation pay. The Regional Arbitration Branch of origin
was likewise directed to require herein petitioner to produce
additional documents where necessary. Therefore, while we are
affirming that respondents are entitled to night shif differential in
accordance with the number of hours they worked from 10:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m., it is the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin which
should determine the computation thereof for each of the
respondents, and award no night shif differential to those of them
who never worked from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

It is also worthwhile to note that in the NLRC Decision, it was herein
petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (respondent therein) which was tasked
to produce additional documents necessary for the computation of
the night shif differential.
BANI RURAL V DE GUZMAN
PETITIONERS: Bani Rural Bank
Enoc Theater I and II
Rafael De Guzman
RESPONDENT: Teresa de Guzman
Edgar C. Tan
Teresa G. Tan
DOCKET: G.R. No.170904
DATE: November 13, 2013
PONENTE: Brion, J.
FACTS:
The respondents were employees of Bani Rural Bank, Inc. and
ENOC Theatre I and II who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the petitioners.
This complaint was DISMISSED BY LA, but the NLRC REVERSED.
o NLRC ordered that respondents be reinstated with
payment of backwages from the time of their
dismissal until their actual reinstatement.
Computation of backwages was remanded to Labor Arbiter
Gambito.
o First, Labor Arbiter Gambito deducted the earnings
derived by the respondents either from Bani Rural
Bank, Inc. or ENOC Theatre I and II.
o Second, Labor Arbiter Gambito fixed the period of
backwages from the respondents illegal dismissal
until August 25 1995 or the date when the
respondents allegedly manifested that they no longer
wanted to be reinstated.
Petitioners appealed the computation of the backwages with
the NLRC.
o NLRC modified the terms of the March 17, 1995
resolution insofar as it clarified the phrase less
earnings elsewhere.
The phrase earnings elsewhere shall exclude the
complainants salaries from the Rural Bank of
Mangantarem
o The NLRC additionally awarded the payment of
separation pay equivalent to one month salary for
every year of service computed from the start of their
employment up to the date of the finality of the
decision., in lieu of reinstatement on account of the
strained relations between the parties.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on whether
the award of backwages was still included in the judgment. The
NLRC dismissed the motion for having been filed out of time.
o The recomputation of the monetary awards of the
respondents' backwages and separation pay,
according to the decision dated July 31, 1998 and the
modified terms of the March 17, 1995 resolution of
the NLRC, was referred to Labor Arbiter Gambito. In
the course of the recomputation, the petitioners filed
before Labor Arbiter Gambito a Motion to Quash Writ
of Execution and Suspend Further Execution they
reiterated their position that the respondents
backwages should be computed only up to August 25,
1995, citing the alleged manifestation made by the
respondents, through Samuel de la Cruz, as their
basis.
LA RULING
o In an order dated July 12, 2000, Labor Arbiter
Gambito computed the respondents backwages only
up to August 25, 1995.
NLRC RULING:
o REVERSED THE LA RULING re: computation of
backwages.
o In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered by
ordering respondents to pay complainants backwages
up to January 29, 1999 as above discussed.
COURT OF APPEALS
o AFFIRMED the NLRC.
o As explained in the assailed Decision, what is
controlling for purposes of the backwages is the
NLRCs Resolution dated 17 March 1995 which
decreed that private respondents are entitled to
backwages from the time of their dismissal
(constructive) until their actual reinstatement; and
considering that the award of reinstatement was set
aside by the NLRC in its final and executory Decision
dated 3 July 1998 which ordered the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement to be
computed up to the finality on 29 January 1999 of
said Decision dated 3 July 1998, then the computation
of the backwages should also end on said date, which
is 29 January 1999.
ISSUE: WON NLRC erred in ruling how the backwages are to be
computed
HELD:
o No. The SC enumerated the basis of the computation
of backwages:
o The computation of backwages depends on the final
awards adjudged as a consequence of illegal
dismissal, in that:
First, when reinstatement is ordered, the general
concept under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as
amended, computes the backwages from the time of
dismissal until the employees reinstatement. The
computation of backwages (and similar benefits
considered part of the backwages) can even continue
beyond the decision of the labor arbiter or NLRC and
ends only when the employee is actually reinstated.
Second, when separation pay is ordered in lieu of
reinstatement (in the event that this aspect of the
case is disputed) or reinstatement is waived by the
employee (in the event that the payment of
separation pay, in lieu, is not disputed), backwages is
computed from the time of dismissal until the finality
of the decision ordering separation pay.
Third, when separation pay is ordered after the
finality of the decision ordering the reinstatement by
 reason of a supervening event that makes the award
of reinstatement no longer possible (as in the case),
backwages is computed from the time of dismissal
until the finality of the decision ordering separation
pay.
Under these circumstances, while there was no express
modification on the period for computing backwages stated in
the dispositive portion of the July 31, 1998 decision of the
NLRC, it is nevertheless clear that the award of reinstatement
under the March 17, 1995 resolution (to which the respondents
backwages was initially supposed to have been computed) was
substituted by an award of separation pay. As earlier stated, the
awards of reinstatement and separation pay are exclusive
remedies; the change of awards (from reinstatement to
separation pay) under the NLRCs July 31, 1998 not only
modified the awards granted, but also changed the manner the
respondents backwages is to be computed. The respondents
backwages can no longer be computed up to the point of
reinstatement as there is no longer any award of reinstatement
to speak of.
We also emphasize that the payment of backwages and
separation pay cannot be computed from the time the
respondents allegedly expressed their wish to be paid
separation pay. In the first place, the records show that the
alleged manifestation by the respondents, through Samuel, was
actually a mere expression of interest. More importantly, the
alleged manifestation was disregarded in the NLRCs July 31,
1998 decision where the NLRC declared that the award of
separation pay was due to the supervening event arising from
the strained relations (not a waiver of reinstatement) that
justified the modification of the NLRCs final March 17, 1995
resolution on the award of reinstatement. Simply put, insofar as
the computation of the respondents' backwages, we are guided
by the award, modified to separation pay, under the NLRC's July
31, 1998 decision.
Thus, the computation of the respondents backwages must
be from the time of the illegal dismissal from employment
until the finality of the decision ordering the payment of
separation pay. It is only when the NLRC rendered its July 31,
1998 decision ordering the payment of separation pay (which
both parties no longer questioned and which thereafer became
final) that the issue of the respondents' employment with the
petitioners was decided with finality, effectively terminating it.
The respondents' backwages, therefore, must be computed
from the time of their illegal dismissal until January 29, 1999,
the date of finality of the NLRC's July 31, 1998 Decision. As a
final point, the CAs ruling must be modified to include legal
interest commencing from the finality of the NLRC's July 31,
1998 decision. The CA failed to consider that the NLRC's July 31,
1998 decision, once final, becomes a judgment for money from
which another consequence flows -the payment of interest in
case of delay. Under the circumstances, the payment of legal
interest of six percent (6) upon the finality of the judgment is
proper. It is not barred by the principle of immutability of
judgment as it is compensatory interest arising from the final
judgment.
MZR INDUSTRIES V COLAMBOT
PETITIONERS: MZR Industries
Marilou R. Quiroz
Lea Timbal
RESPONDENTS: Majen Colambot
DOCKET: GR No. 179001
DATE: August 28, 2013
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marilou Quiroz, Owner and Vice-President for
Finance and Marketing of MZR, hired respondent Majen
Colambot (Colambot) as messenger.
However, beginning 2002, Colambots work performance
started to deteriorate.
o Petitioners issued several memoranda to Colambot
for habitual tardiness, negligence, and violations of
office policies.
o He was also given written warnings for
insubordination committed on several occasions.
Despite multiple warnings, Colambot failed to mend his ways.
o Hence, a notice of suspension for insubordination and
negligence was issued against Colambot.
o Colambot was subsequently suspended from Nov. 26-
Dec 6, 2004 for insubordination.
o Petitioners claimed they waited for Colambot to
report back for work on December 7, 2004, but they
never heard from him anymore.
Later, petitioners were surprised to find out that Colambot had
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
underpayment of salaries, holiday pay, service incentive pay,
13th month pay and separation pay.
o Petitioners, however, insisted that while Colambot
was suspended due to insubordination and
negligence, they maintained that they never
terminated Colambots employment.
o They added that Colambots failure to report for work
since December 7, 2004 without any approved
vacation or sick leave constituted abandonment of his
work, but they never terminated his employment.
o Petitioners further emphasized that even with
Colambots filing of the complaint against them, his
employment with MZR has not been terminated.
LA RULING
o IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, illegally dismissed.
o there was no abandonment as there was no
deliberate intent on the part of Colambot to sever the
employer-employee relationship.
o The Labor Arbiter likewise noted that Colambot
should have been notified to return back to work,
which petitioner failed to do.
NLRC RULING
o REVERSED LA RULING
o pointed out that Colambots complaint was
unsupported by any evidence and was not even made
under oath, thus, lacking in credibility and probative
value.
o The NLRC further believed that Colambot abandoned
his work due to his refusal to report for work afer his
suspension.
o The failure of MZR to notify Colambot to return back
to work is not tantamount to actual dismissal.
o in lieu of reinstatement, petitioners were ordered to
pay respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1)
 month pay for every year of service in addition to full
backwages.
CA RULING
o REVERSED NLRC DECISION.
o The appellate court ruled that Colambot was illegally
dismissed based on the grounds that:
MZR failed to prove abandonment on the
part of Colambot, and
MZR failed to serve Colambot with the
required written notices of dismissal.
ISSUE: WON Colambot was illegally dismissed
HELD:
o No.
o In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid
or authorized cause, in the present case, however, the
facts and the evidence do not establish a prima facie
case that the employee was dismissed from
employment. Before the employer must bear the
burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the
employee must first establish by substantial evidence
the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no
dismissal, then there can be no question as to the
legality or illegality thereof.
o In the present case, other than Colambots
unsubstantiated allegation of having been verbally
terminated from his work, there was no evidence
presented to show that he was indeed dismissed from
work or was prevented from returning to his work. In
the absence of any showing of an overt or positive act
proving that petitioners had dismissed respondent,
the latters claim of illegal dismissal cannot be
sustained as the same would be self-serving,
conjectural and of no probative value.
A review of the Notice of Suspension dated November 25, 2004
shows that respondent was merely suspended from work for 6
days, there was, however, no evidence that Colambot was
terminated from work.
o While the same appeared to contain a warning of
termination should Colambot fail to improve his
behavior, it is likewise apparent that there was also a
specific instruction for him to report back to work, on
December 7, 2004, upon serving his suspension. The
subject of the Letter, i.e., Suspension due to
Insubordination, the wordings and content of the
letter is a clear-cut notice of suspension, and not a
notice of termination. The notice of suspension may
have contained warnings of termination, but it must
be noted that such was conditioned on the ground
that Colambot would fail to improve his
attitude/behavior. There were no wordings
whatsoever implying actual or constructive dismissal.
Thus, Colambots general allegation of having been
orally dismissed from the service as against the clear
wordings and intent of the notice of suspension which
he signed, we are then inclined to believe that there
was no dismissal.
However, while the Court concurs with the conclusion of the
NLRC that there was no illegal dismissal, no dismissal having
actually taken place, the Court does not agree with its findings
that Colambot committed abandonment of work.
This Court consistently held that to constitute abandonment of
work, two elements must be present:
o first, the employee must have failed to report for
work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and
o second, there must have been a clear intention on the
part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt act.
In the instant case, other than Colambot's failure to report back
to work afer suspension, petitioners failed to present any
evidence which tend to show his intent to abandon his work. It
is a settled rule that mere absence or failure to report for work
is not enough to amount to abandonment of work. There must
be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt
acts from which an employee may be deduced as having no
more intention to work.
These circumstances, taken together, the lack of evidence of
dismissal and the lack of intent on the part of the respondent to
abandon his work, the remedy is reinstatement but without
backwages. However, considering that reinstatement is no
longer applicable due to the strained relationship between the
parties and that Colambot already found another employment,
each party must bear his or her own loss, thus, placing them on
equal footing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and subject to the above
disquisitions, the Decision dated May 1 7, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution
dated October 31, 2006 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC NCR CASE No. 00-11-12189-04/ CA No.
049533-06 is hereby REINSTATED.
VICENTE ANG, v. CEFERINO SAN JOAQUIN, JR., AND DIOSDADO
FERNANDEZ, Petitioner: Ang
Respondents: San Joaquin and Fernandez
G.R. No. 185549
August 07, 2013
FACTS: The employers act of tearing to pieces the employees time
card may be considered an outright not only symbolic
termination of the parties employment relationship.
Petitioner Vicente Ang is the proprietor of Virose Furniture and Glass
Supply (Virose) in Tayug, Pangasinan, a wholesaler/retailer of glass
supplies, jalousies, aluminum windows, table glass, and assorted
furniture. Respondents Ceferino San Joaquin, Jr. (San Joaquin) and
Diosdado Fernandez (Fernandez) were regular employees of Virose:
San Joaquin was hired in 1974 as helper, while Fernandez was
employed in 1982 as driver. Each received a daily salary of P166.00.
Through the years, San Joaquin who is Angs first cousin, their
mothers being sisters became apahinante or delivery helper, and
later on an all-around worker of Virose.
On August 24, 1999, respondents attended the court hearing relative
to the 41 criminal cases filed by former Virose employee Daniel
Abrera (Abrera) against Ang for the latters non-remittance of Social
Security System (SSS) contributions. 9 During that hearing,
respondents testified against Ang; it was the second time for San
Joaquin to testify, while it was Fernandezs first. Previously,
respondents joined Abrera in questioning Angs procedure in
remitting their SSS contributions. Afer the said hearing Ang began to
treat respondents with hostility and antagonism.
One day, a heated argument between San Joaquin and Ang's wife
Rosa took place, in view of the former's refusal to obey her her
instruction to transfer the monobloc chairs in her restaurant. Upon
reporting for work two days later, he found out that his DTR was torn
into pieces by Ang. He learned that the DTR of Fernandez also
suffered the same fate afer they testified in Court.
Fernandez was suspended for a week for insubordination but the act
of insubordination was not specified by Ang in his memorandum to
the latter.
Respondents filed complaints for illegal constructive dismissal. Labor
Arbiter held that respondents were unable to show how Ang
discriminated against them. San Joaquin was guilty of
insubordination in not carrying out a reasonable order of his
employer. As for Fernandez, the Labor Arbiter held that the loss of
his time card is not sufficient reason to suppose that his employment
had been terminated.
NLRC AFFIRMED LA. Court of Appeals REVERSED the ruling of NLRC.
ISSUE: WON tearing of DTRs of the employees by the employer
constitutes constructive dismissal.
HELD: Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of
work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
and a diminution in pay. It is a dismissal in disguise or an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were
not.Constructive dismissal may likewise exist if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so
unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any
choice by him except to forego his continued employment.
Constructive dismissal exists when the employee involuntarily
resigns due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by
the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employees position would have felt
compelled to give up his position under the circumstances.
"The CA is correct in its pronouncement that respondents were
constructively dismissed from work. Moreover, by destroying
respondents time cards, Ang discontinued and severed his
relationship with respondents. The purpose of a time record is to
show an employees attendance in office for work and to be paid
accordingly, taking into account the policy of no work, no pay. A
daily time record is primarily intended to prevent damage or loss to
the employer, which could result in instances where it pays an
employee for no work done; it is a mandatory requirement for
inclusion in the payroll, and in the absence of
an employment agreement,it constitutes evidence of employment.
Thus, when Ang tore the respondents time cards to pieces, he
virtually removed them from Viroses payroll and erased all vestiges
of respondents employment; respondents were effectively
dismissed from work. The act may be considered an outright not
only symbolic termination of the parties employment relationship;
the last straw that finally broke the camels back, as respondents
put it in their Position Paper."
SAN MIGUEL BREWERY SALES FORCE UNION (PTGWO) vs. HON.
BLAS F. OPLE, as Minister of Labor and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
Petitioner: San Miguel
Respondent: Ople
G.R. No. L-53515
February 8, 1989
FACTS: On April 17, 1978, a collective bargaining agreement
(effective on May 1, 1978 until January 31, 1981) was entered into by
petitioner San Miguel Corporation Sales Force Union (PTGWO), and
the private respondent, San Miguel Corporation, Section 1, of Article
IV of which provided as follows:
Art. IV, Section 1. Employees within the appropriate bargaining unit
shall be entitled to a basic monthly compensation plus commission
based on their respective sales.
In 1979, SMC implemented its Complementary Distribution System
(CDS) whereby wholesalers can directly get beer products from any
SMC offices. The SMB Union assailed this program because it violates
the CBA particularly the established scheme whereby route
salesmen have been given specific territories to sell beer products.
The CDS scheme would then lower the take home pay of the route
salesmen. SMB Union then sued SMC for unfair labor practices.
ISSUE: WON the CDS is a violation of the CBA.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that the CDS is an exercise of management
prerogatives whereby the management can implement schemes to
optimize their profit. Further, the CDS provides for a compensation
clause as well for salesmen. San Miguel Corporations offer to
compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely
affected by the implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-
called back adjustment commission to make up for the
commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS proves the
companys good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.
So long as a company's management prerogatives are exercised in
good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not
for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this
Court will uphold them (LVN Pictures Workers vs. LVN, 35 SCRA 147;
Phil. American Embroideries vs. Embroidery and Garment Workers,
26 SCRA 634; Phil. Refining Co. vs. Garcia, 18 SCRA 110). San Miguel
Corporation's offer to compensate the members of its sales force
who will be adversely affected by the implementation of the CDS by
paying them a so-called "back adjustment commission" to make up
for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS proves
the company's good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.
KING OF KINGS ET AL vs. MAMAC
Petitioner: KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT INC., CLAIRE DELA FUENTE
and MELISSA LIM
Respondent: SANTIAGO O. MAMAC
G.R. No. 166208
June 29, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner KKTI is a corporation engaged in public
transportation and managed by Claire Dela Fuente and Melissa Lim.
Respondent was a conductor for Don Mariano Transit Corporation
(DMTC). He was one of the few people who established Damayan ng
mga Manggagawa, Tsuper at Conductor-Transport Workers Union.
Pending the unions certification election, respondent was
transferred to KKTI. The KKTI employees later organized the Kaisahan
ng mga Kawani sa King of Kings (KKKK) which was registered with
DOLE. Respondent was elected KKKK president.
Upon audit of the October 28, 2001 Conductors Report of
respondent, KKTI noted an irregularity. It discovered that respondent
declared several sold tickets as returned tickets causing KKTI to lose
an income of eight hundred and ninety pesos. While no irregularity
report was prepared on the October 28, 2001 incident, KKTI
nevertheless asked respondent to explain the discrepancy. In his
letter, respondent said that the erroneous declaration in his October
28, 2001 Trip Report was unintentional. He explained that during
that days trip, the windshield of the bus assigned to them was
smashed; and they had to cut short the trip in order to immediately
report the matter to the police. As a result of the incident, he got
confused in making the trip report.
On November 26, 2001, respondent received a letter terminating his
employment effective November 29, 2001. The dismissal letter
alleged that the October 28, 2001 irregularity was an act of fraud
against the company. KKTI also cited as basis for respondents
dismissal the other offenses he allegedly committed since 1999.
Afer that, he filed an action for illegal dismissal, among other
claims. He denied committing any infraction and alleged that his
dismissal was intended to bust union activities. Moreover, he
claimed that his dismissal was effected without due process.
KKTI averred that it had observed due process in dismissing
respondent and maintained that respondent was not entitled to his
money claims such as service incentive leave and 13th-month pay
because he was paid on commission or percentage basis.
LABOR ARBITER: he was validly dismissed
NLRC: Affirmed. CA held that there was just cause for respondents
dismissal. It ruled that respondents act in declaring sold tickets as
returned tickets x x x constituted fraud or acts of dishonesty
justifying his dismissal.
ISSUE: WON respondent was given due process (procedural)
HELD: NO. There was failure to observe the requirements of due
process.
Due process under the Labor Code involves two aspects: first,
substantivethe valid and authorized causes of termination of
employment under the Labor Code; and second, proceduralthe
manner of dismissal.
Section 2(d) of Rule I of Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code provides:
SEC. 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice.In all
cases of termination of employment, the following standards of
due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in
Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground
or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable
opportunity within which to explain his side.
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned,
with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity
to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the
evidence presented against him.
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee,
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination.
The first written notice to be served on the employees should
contain the specific causes or grounds for termination against them,
and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to
submit their written explanation within a reasonable period.
Reasonable opportunity under the Omnibus Rules means every
kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees
to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense.15 This
should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days
from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to
study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer,
gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees
to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice
should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances
that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A
general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice
should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated
and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged
against the employees.
Afer serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and
conduct a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be
given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the
charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their
defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the
assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover,
this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
Afer determining that termination of employment is justified, the
employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination
indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the
employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been
established to justify the severance of their employment.
Respondent was not issued a written notice charging him of
committing an infraction. A verbal appraisal of the charges against an
employee does not comply with the first notice requirement.
The court observed from the irregularity reports against respondent
for his other offenses that such contained merely a general
description of the charges against him. The reports did not even
state a company rule or policy that the employee had allegedly
violated.
No hearing was conducted. Regardless of respondents written
explanation, a hearing was still necessary in order for him to clarify
and present evidence in support of his defense. Moreover,
respondent made the letter merely to explain the circumstances
relating to the irregularity in his October 28, 2001 Conductors Trip
Report. He was unaware that a dismissal proceeding was already
being effected. Thus, he was surprised to receive the November 26,
2001 termination letter indicating as grounds, not only his October
28, 2001 infraction, but also his previous infractions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the September
16, 2004 Decision of the CA is MODIFIED by deleting the award of
backwages and 13th-month pay. Instead, petitioner KKTI is ordered
to indemnify respondent the amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP
30,000) as nominal damages for failure to comply with the due
process requirements in terminating the employment of respondent.
DOMINGO v RAYALA
Petitioner: MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO
Respondent: Rogelio Rayala
Citation: G.R. No. 155831
Date of Promulgation: February 18, 2008
Ponente: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic
Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
 She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched
her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her ears.
Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual
harassment because for it to exist, there must be a
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition
for continued employment or for promotion to a higher
position.
Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.
Ruling:
Yes.The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA
7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in
this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment
Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant
the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges
under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.
It is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be
made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to
a higher positionit is enough that the respondents acts result in
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee. Contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the
demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for
continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is
enough that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment for the employee. That the acts of
Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for
Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the
Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported
the matter to an officemate and, afer the last incident, filed for a
leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
AGABON v NLRC
Petitioner: Jenny Agabon, Vergilio Agabon
Respondent: National Labor Relations Commission (Nlrc), Riviera
Home Improvements, Inc. And Vicente Angeles
Citation: G.R. No. 158693
Date of Promulgation: November 17, 2004
Ponente: Ynares0Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum
board and cornice installers from January 1992 to February
23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of
work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was
decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera
appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the
dismissal because of petitioners abandonment of work.
NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay.
The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal
because they have abandoned their work but ordered the
payment of money claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a
just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the
employee the right to be heard and to defend himself. Abandonment
is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume
his employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are
considered: failure to report for work without a valid reason; and, a
clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the
second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by
overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no
more intention to work.
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but
did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be
upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to
the employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the
Belated Due process Rule.
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of
the justifiable or authorized by law. Where the dismissal is for a
just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal but the employer should indemnify the employee for the
violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to
discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later which
we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees
rights warrants the payment of nominal damages.
JAKA v PACOT
Petitioner: Jaka Food Processing Corporation
Respondent: Darwin Pacot, Robert Parohinog, David Bisnar, Marlon
Domingo, Rhoel Lescano And Jonathan Cagabcab
Citation: G.R. No. 151378
Date of Promulgation: March 28, 2005
Ponente: Garcia, J.
FACTS:
Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on
August 29, 1997 because the Corporation was in dire
financial straits.
It was not disputed that they were terminated without
complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the
Labor Code regarding the service of notice upon the
employees and DOLE at least one month before the
intended date of termination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to
respondents when employers effected termination without
complying with the twin notice rule.
RULING:
The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under
Article 283. A dismissal for authorized cause does not necessarily
imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee.
Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employers exercise
of his management prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to
install labor-saving devices, when he decides to cease business
operations or when he undertakes to implement a retrenchment
program.
Accordingly, it is wise to hold that:
1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to
comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed
upon him should be tempered because the dismissal was initiate by
an act imputable to the employee.
2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer
fails to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be
stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers
exercise of his management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld
but ordered JAKA to pay each of the respondents the amount of PhP
50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with
statutory due process.
ROYALE HOMES MARKETING v ALCANTARA
PETITIONER: Royale Homes Marketing Corporation
RESPONDENT: Fidel P. Alcantara [deceased], substituted by his heirs
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 195190
DATE OF PROMULGATION: July 28, 2014
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.
Control is the most important determinant of employer-employee
relationship. Not every form of control that a hiring party imposes on
the hired party is indicative of employee-employer relationship.
Rules and regulations that merely serve as guidelines towards the
achievement of a mutually desired result without dictating the
means and methods of accomplishing it do not establish employer-
employee relationship.
FACTS:
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Fidel Alcantara worked as a Marketing Director (fixed
period one year) for Royale homes, which is a
corporation engaged in marketing real estates.
He was reappointed for several consecutive years, the last
of which covered the period January 1 to December 31,
2003 where he held the position of Division 5 Vice-
President-Sales.
On December 17, 2003, Alcantara filed a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal9 against Royale Homes and its President
Matilde Robles, Executive Vice-President for
Administration and Finance Ma. Melinda Bernardino, and
Executive Vice- President for Sales Carmina Sotto.
Alcantara alleged that:
o he is a regular employee of Royale Homes since
he is performing tasks that are necessary and
desirable to its business;
o in 2003 the company gave him 1.2 million for
the services he rendered to it;
o in the first week of November 2003, however,
the executive officers of Royale Homes told him
that they were wondering why he still had the
gall to come to office and sit at his table;
o the acts of the executive officers of Royale
Homes amounted to his dismissal from work
without any valid or just cause and in gross
disregard of the proper procedure for dismissing
employees.
Alcantara prayed to be reinstated to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, as well
as to be paid back wages, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorneys fees.
Royale Homes:
o Alcantara is not an employee but an
independent contractor. He didnt receive salary
(commission basis only). Royale had no control
on how Alcantara would accomplish his tasks (he
was free to solicit sales at any time and by any
manner; even free to recruit his own sales
personnel)
o Alcantara decided to leave company to join his
wife who formed her own brokerage company
that directly competed with its business. Even
threw a despedida party in his favor.
LA Alcantara is an employee
NLRC Alcantara is not an employee but an independent
contractor so LA has no jurisdiction
CA reversed NLRC
ISSUE: Whether or not Alcantara was an independent contractor or
an employee of Royale Homes.
HELD:
Alcantara is not an employee but a mere independent
contractor.
While the existence of employer-employee relationship is a
matter of law, the characterization made by the parties in
their contract as to the nature of their juridical relationship
cannot be simply ignored.
The contract, duly signed and not disputed by the parties
conspicuously provides that no employer-employee
relationship exists between Royale Homes and Alcantara.
It is clear that they did not want to be bound by employer-
employee relationship at the time of the signing of the
contract.
o Contract states: It is understood, however that
no employer-employee relationship exists
between us, that of your sales personnel/agents,
and that you shall hold our company, its
officers and directors, free and harmless from
any and all claims of liability and damages arising
from and/or incident to the marketing of our real
estate inventories
Since the terms of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations should control.
 In determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, this Court has generally relied on the four-fold
test, to wit:
(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
(2) the payment of wages;
(3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the employers power to control the employee
with respect to the means and methods by which the
work is to be accomplished.
Among the four, the most determinative factor in
ascertaining the existence of employer-employee
relationship is the "right of control test".
o deemed to be such an important factor that the
other requisites may even be disregarded.
Not every form of control is indicative of employer-
employee relationship.1
The Control Test proved that no ER-EE relationship exists.
The rules, regulations, code of ethics, and periodic
evaluation of Royale do not involve control over the means
and methods by which Alcantara was to perform his job
(e.g. no working hours, no other tasks than soliciting sales,
he had full control of how to accomplish tasks)
Other grounds considered in ruling that no ER-EE
relationship exists:
o Repeated hiring does not prove existence. Only
signifies renewal of contract and highlights
satisfactory services
o Exclusivity clause does not necessarily result in
ER-EE relationship.
o Payment of wages Alcantara had no fixed
monthly salary. On commission basis only.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
June 23, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
109998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 23, 2009 Decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.