28 I JEROME L. SINGER IMAGINATION, COGNITION AND PERSONALITY, Vol. 1(1), 1981.

82

64. J. L. Singer, The Inner World of Daydreaming, Harper & Row, New York,
1975.
65. 1. Janis and L. Mann, Decision-Making, Free Press, New York, 1977.

MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS:
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EMPIRICAL-
Direct reprint requests to:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH*
Jerome L. Singer, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Yale University
Box IIA, Yale Station RONALD J. PEKALA
New Haven, Connecticut 06520 University Drive V. A. Medical Center, Pittsburgh
RALPHL. LEVINE
Michigan State University

ABSTRACT
..."
A methodology for mapping the structure and organization of subjective experience
via the retrospective completion of a self-report inventory, the Phenomenology of
Consciousness Questionnaire (PCQ), is presented. The development of the
questionnaire is discussed along with its refinement by cluster and factor analyses.
...
The usefulness of this approach for mapping subjective experience associated with
various stimulus conditions is offered as an unobtrusive and reliable means to
quantify states of consciousness phenomenologically.

INTRODUCTION ,..
n
"1
TIle last twenty years have seen a tremendous growth in the theorizing on the ~;
,
nature of consciousness [1-5] and its various altered [6] or alternate [7] states
as induced by meditation [8], drugs [9, 10], hypnosis [11], EEG-biofeedback .<,,
[12] , and many other altered state induction procedures. Since consciousness, "
by definition, is "awareness, especially of something within oneself' [13], it
would seem that introspection or phenomenological observation [14] might be
J very useful means to map subjective experience.

Yet, despite a great deal of theorizing on the enumeration [15, 16] , nature
[I 7, 18] , and organization of states of consciousness [19-21] , with the
exception of studies that have focused upon a particular state of consciousness

This paper is based on the first author's dissertation that was completed in partial
lulllllrnent for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Clinical Psychology at Michigan State
L'lll,ersity.

29
C 1981, Baywood PUblishing Co.; Inc.
'3D I R. J. PEKALA AND R, L. LEVINE
[22-24] , there has been relatively little systematic research into the structure of
consciousness and its various states via the observation of subjective experience.
There has also been little research that compares the phenomenological
parameters of altered states of consciousness against normal, nonaltered states.
Such comparisons may be crucial, especially since evidence suggests that altered
states may not be that different phenomenologically from ordinary, nonaltered
states of consciousness [25]. In short, although much theorizing exists on the
nature of consciousness and its various states, there is less than adequate
phenomenological research to evaluate the validity of that theorizing.
One of the reasons for the lack of phenomenological research is related to the
expectation that neurophysiological methods, especially electroencephalography,
could be used to map the structure and organization of consciousness [26, 27].
But the use of such an approach has not led to great advances in our under-
standing of states of consciousness, besides the association of particular EEG
rhythms to general states of awareness, such as sleeping, dreaming, and waking
[28].
Moreover, recent evidence on the lack of a relationship between the
occurrence of the "alpha experience" [27] and the strength or density of the
EEG alpha activity "calls into question the entire enterprise of 'maping
consciousness' neurophysiologically." [29] This suggests that neurophysiological
methods may not be able to comprehensively map subjective experience.
A second reason for the lack of systematic phenomenological research into
states of consciousness concerns the difficulty involved in trying to devise a
phenomenological methodology to adequately and unobtrusively map the
structure of conscious experience. Ever since the turn-of-the-century
structuralists, such as Wundt [30] and Titchener [31] were attacked for their
obtrusive methods of introspection [32] and the uselessness of mapping the
structure of subjective experience through introspection [33] , psychologists
have been hesitant to assess the nature of phenomenological experience.
When Titchener attempted to investigate the structures of consciousness by
retrospection upon a few seconds of subjective experience, such a method was
ridiculed for "freezing" and hence destroying the most fundamental property of
consciousness, its evanescent and fleeting quality [34]. More recently, due to
behaviorism's hegemony during the twentieth century [35] and the acceptance
by psychologists of behaviorism's philosophical and methodological assumptions,
the mind or consciousness has been seen to be of dubious epistemological status
[36]. As a result, introspection was seen as an inherently flawed tool for the
investigation of consciousness.
However, modern functionalists, like Klinger [37] and Singer [38], are
reliably mapping the stream of consciousness or the nature of the daydreaming
experience without stopping and hence destroying the nature of that experience.
This strongly suggests that similar methodological approaches may be used to
systematically and unobtrusively map the structure of conscious experience.
Since neurophysiological approaches for mapping consciousness are being called
MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS I 31
into question [29] , a phenomenological or introspective approach may be the
unly means to adequately and comprehensively investigate the structure of
conscious experience.
If a phenomenological methodology for assessing and mapping the structure
of consciousness is found to be reliable and valid, then it can be used to deter-
mine the particular phenomenological parameters associated with a specific
stimulus condition. Such parameters could then be used to quantify the
phenomenological state associated with a particular stimulus condition. This
would provide a means by which states of consciousness [3, 7] associated with
stimulus conditions or induction procedures used to produce altered states of
consciousness [6] could be empirically compared to one another.
It appears that a phenomenological methodology for unobtrusively and
reliably mapping the structure of subjective experience need not be that difficult
to develop.
I
METHOD I
I
.;"
Development of a Phenomenological Methodology
Klinger suggests that there are five procedures currently is use for assessing
the phenomenology of experience [37]. These include: self-report ..,
questionnaires, thinking out loud, narrative thought sampling, thought sampling
usingratings, and event tabulation. With self-report questionnaires, subjects
retrospectively evaluate aspects of their subjective experience via an inventory.
,,....
II
TIle experience assessed may be the nature of subjective experiences in general
or the quality of a given experience in particular. In thinking out loud, the
subjects verbally report what they are experiencing while they are experiencing
it.
The third method, narrative thought sampling, consists of the subjects going
about their everyday business and being interrupted intermittently and asked ,
')
about their experience just before the interruption. With the fourth method,
instead of being asked to spontaneously report their experiences, subjects rate
their subjective experience according to particular items. This procedure allows
for the flexibility and unobtrusiveness of narrative thought sampling and yet
allows as many aspects of subjective experience to be assessed as there are items.
In the last method, event tabulation, the subjects report the number of times
subjective events occurred during a particular time period.
Three of these approaches appear to have serious drawbacks for
comprehensively and adequately monitoring subjective experience. A content
analysis of the subjects' verbalizations during either thinking out loud or
narrative thought sampling, may not yield data comprehensive enough to cover
themany dimensions of phenomenological experience. On the other hand,
having subjects report the number of times many different subjective events
c~curred could be tedious and overwhelming.
32 I R. J. PEKALA AND R. L. LEVINE
Retrospective phenomenological observation - The Imaginal Process
Inventory, which assesses the nature of the daydreaming experience [39] , and
other self-report questionnaires, such as those concerning imagery vividness
[40,41] have been found to be reliable and valid. Similarly, a self-report
inventory assessing the various aspects of subjective experience might yield an
appropriate and reliable assessment of the nature of phenomenological
experience. If subjects could use the questionnaire in order to rate their
subjective experience for an immediately-preceding time period, the act of
observation would be retrospective and hence not as obtrusive as reporting on
subjective experience as it was occurring. This approach is thus a combination
of the self-report questionnaire and the thought sampling method using ratings.
Such an inventory would rely on subjects remembering the nature of their
experience during the criterion time interval and accurately rating it on the
items of the questionnaire. The time interval to be assessed would have to be
short enough so that memory loss would not severely affect the material
reported, and yet long enough to allow for any stable properties of conscious-
ness to demonstrate themselves without interference from the stream of thought.
Since a time period of only several seconds may be associated with a disruption
of the stream of consciousness [32] , and it was not known how accurate
subjects would be in retrospecting upon an assessment period of ten minutes or
more, it was decided to use a time interval of only several minutes.
For this purpose, a time period of four minutes was chosen. Such a time
period seemed long enough for any stable and relatively intransient properties of
consciousness to be assessed without disrupting ones stream of consciousness and
yet it seemed short enough so that remembering the general nature of that
experience would not be extremely difficult.
Determining a normal baseline condition - Since the initial mapping of
subjective experience should be representative of a usual, ordinary state of
consciousness, a baseline period was needed that would be similar to ones
ordinary waking state of consciousness, i.e., unstructured ongoing thought [18].
Ones ordinary waking state has been described as that in which a person is alert
and conscious, engaged in the perception of external or internal events, involved
in some verbal thinking, and maintaining a satisfactory self-image [21].
Since structuring the session to engage in some specific type of activity would
bias the state of consciousness assessed in terms of that activity, only a more
open-ended instructional set was needed. For this reason, sitting quietly with
ones eyes open was chosen as the baseline measure. It meets the criteria
proposed by both Singer [18] and Fishkin and Jones [21] and is a procedure
that most people should be able to do without difficulty.
The Phenomenology of Consciousness Questionnaire (PCQ)
Construction of the questionnaire - Based upon Battista's eight elements of
phenomenological experience [14], Tart's eleven subsystems of consciousness
MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS I 33
[3, 19] ,Krippner's [15] and Ludwig's [16] altered states of consciousness, and
Silverman's dimensions of attention [1] , the following dimensions or content
areas of consciousness were identified: self-awareness, body integrity, (altered)
state of awareness, alertness, attention, volition, space/time, perception, affect,
imagery, internal dialogue, memory, rationality, meaning, and a miscellaneous
category.
Items were constructed for each of these content areas. The form of these
items was patterned after the Post-Session Questionnaire (PSQ) items developed
by Osis, Bokert, and Carlson to assess phenomenological experience during
meditation [42]. Each item consisted of extreme statements that anchored a
seven-point Likert scale. The items were randomly ordered, yielding an initial
questionnaire of sixty items. Several pilot studies were completed on this initial
questionnaire, during which time items were added, deleted, and modified.
First and second pilot studies - For the first pilot study twenty subjects
experienced the baseline condition of sitting quietly with their eyes open for
four minutes and then completed the questionnaire. They were also asked to
write down their impressions of how appropriately the questionniare assessed
what they had experienced and any areas of experience they felt the
questionnaire did not assess adequately. Based on their feedback, many of the
items of the questionnaire were modified and ten more items dealing more
specifically with the aforementioned content areas were added to the original
sixty.
For the second pilot study, fifteen subjects completed the expanded
questionnaire after experiencing an identical baseline condition. Since the .
;L
Instructions for the first two pilot studies did not tell the subjects what to expect
while they sat quietly, several of the subjects of the second pilot study indicated
that if they knew what they would be involved in doing and had some practice
.
~.
(j
~,
,
'
'J'
at doingit, it would be easier for them to retrospectively rate their subjective ()
experience. ~.
')
Thirdpilot study - For this purpose an initial practice period was instituted
before the baseline condition for a third pilot study and a means was devised
that monitored the subjects' consistency at completing the questionnaire. Five
Hems of the questionnaire (those dealing with awareness, attention, affect,
internal dialogue, and imagery) were duplicated with synonyms substituted for a
few of the words in each of the items. Thus there were two sets of five items
....ith nearly identical wording. Five items of the previous 70-item questionnaire
that seemed rather ambiguous were eliminated and the set of duplicate items
were included in their place.
At the beginning of the third pilot study, twenty-seven subjects were given a
short explanation of the nature of introspection and what that might involve.
After sitting quietly for one minute with their eyes closed, the subjects
completed a ten-item practice question very similar to the longer inventory.
34 I R. J. PEKALA AND R. L. LEVINE
Since this short questionnaire contained several items similar in content to
several other items, these item-pairs were reviewed with the subjects, letting
them know how consistent they were at introspection.
The subjects then experienced three criterion time periods, each of which
was followed by completion of the inventory. There were two four minute
periods of sitting quietly and a four minute time period during which subjects
were instructed to be aware of their breathing. This last period was preceded by
fifteen minutes of progressive relaxation.
Pearson product-moment correlations were computed between the five pairs
of duplicate items, using the data from all three periods for all the subjects.
Pearson correlations for the five pairs were: .47, .62, .68, .83, and .87. A new
pair of items was substituted for the pair with the lowest correlation since the
content of these items was diffuse and vague and seemed to be the reason for
their low reliability. This substitution was made when the final form of the
questionnaire was constructed.
The subjects' responses to the items of the questionnaire for the third pilot
study were then cluster analyzed, collapsing across all three criterion time
periods. A multiple groups oblique cluster analysis [43] with communalities in
the diagonals of the correlation ma trix was employed using Hunter's PACKAGE
program [44] to determine those items that had their highest loadings in the
content area for which they were written.
Items that loaded higher on a different cluster from which they were
assigned were eliminated as were items that had very low loadings. Reclustering
then occurred until the items making up the final clusters all had their highest
cluster loading in that cluster. Based on this procedure, the final version of the
questionnaire, which was named the Phenomenology of Consciousness
Questionnaire or the PCQ, consisted of sixty items, drawn from fifteen different
content areas.
The particular content areas (and the number of items in each) were:
body integrity (5); self awareness (4); internal dialogue (3
time (3); perception (3); rationality (3);
state of awareness (3); postive affect (4); memory (2);
attention (6); negative affect (3); meaning (3); and
volition (5); imagery (4); alertness (3).
Six items made up a miscellaneous category.
Comment - The results of these pilot studies indicated that this methodology
seemed quite adequate to assess the structure of subjective experience without
being severely affected by memory loss. A comparison between the conditions
of sitting quietly with eyes open and attention to ones breathing (that was
preceded by relaxation) also indicated that the former was an easy task for
subjects to do that seemed quite appropriate for assessing ordinary, waking
consciousness.
MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS I 35
Procedure
Subjects were 249 introductory psychology students who were seen in groups,
ranging in size between thirty to forty students. There were 179 females and
70 males. At the beginning of the session the subjects were told about the
general nature of the study and the fact that they would be involved in intro-
spection. They were then asked to sit quietly with their eyes closed for one
minute. They completed a short ten-item practice questionnaire in reference to
the eyes closed period to give them some initial practice at introspection.
TIle subjects were then instructed to sit quietly with their eyes open without
reading, writing, or talking. They were told that after several minutes of doing
this they would be asked to report upon their experience just like they had done
after the one minute practice session. The experimenter left the room and
returned four minutes later. Each subject completed the PCQ in reference to
the previous time period.
RESULTS
Pearson r product-moment correlations were computed for the subjects'
responses to the five pairs of duplicate items of the PCQ. Correlations ranged
frolll.47 for the item-pair dealing with state of awareness to .83 for the internal
dialogue item-pair, and averaged .67 across all five pairs.
Since the number and composition of clusters was specified in advance, an
obliquemultiple groups cluster analysis was used on the subjects' reponses to
the sixty-item PCQ [43]. With communalities in the diagonals of the correlation
matrix, Hunter's PACKAGE program was used [44]. This initial analysis
resulted in ten of the fifteen clusters having coefficient alphas of .60 or greater.
After this initial analysis, confirmatory cluster analysis was used [45] ,
purifyingthe clusters of items that were heterogenous so as to arrive at clusters
composed of homogenous items. This was done by checking for the extent to
which items of a given cluster had the same meaning, by checking the degree to
which the cluster loadings of the items within each cluster had the same general
pattern, and by noting the extent to which items within each cluster paralleled,
U1 terms of cluster loadings, the items ou tside that particular cluster [43] .
Items failing to meet the above criteria were removed and the remaining items
of the clusters were then reclustered with another multiple groups cluster
analysis, checking to make sure that coefficient alpha increased for each of the
reclustered clusters. Those clusters correlating highly were also combined to
see if the resulting supracluster was internally consistent, i.e., had an equal or
hIgher coefficient alpha. This procedure resulted in several clusters being
subclusters of more general and inclusive clusters.'
I This Was true for all the resulting supraclusters except one. The attention cluster had
:h,oefhclCntalpha (.72) less than one of its subclusters, direction of attention (.76). Since
.1\ seemed due to the much lower alpha for the absorption subcluster (.58) both sub-
clustCfI were still combined, especially since the correlation between subclusters was high
II = .63).
 MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS / 37
36 I R. J. PEKALA AND R. L. LEVINE
the distinctions between clusters arrived at via the multiple groups cluster
Table 1. Dimensions of Consciousness and Corresponding analytic approach, it "will usually find those dimensions which are completely
Coefficient Alphas for the Final Cluster Analysis outside the investigator's frame of reference." [43]
Number of Coefficient The analysis consisted of a principal components factor analysis that was
Dimensions Items Alphas followed by Varimax rotation. Orthogonal factors were extracted for factors
with eigenvalues of greater than one. Nine factors were generated, accounting
1. Internal dialogue (2) .91 for 43 per cent of the variance. As can be seen from Table 2, except for the
collapsingof attention and memory, the clusters arrived at by this blind
2. Awareness (5) .86
empirical analysis were exactly the same as the clusters arrived at by
a. Self awareness (2) .81
confirmatory cluster analysis .
b. State of awareness (3) .79
Another exploratory factor analysis was also performed, but with only the
3. Imagery (4) .84 thirty-nine items of the final confirmatory cluster analysis. Seven factors were
a. Imagery amount (2) .78 generated which accounted for 46 per cent of the variance. As can be seen from
b. Imagery vividness (2) .77 Table 3, almost invariably, the factors were composed of items that were
grouped together according to the clusters or subclusters arrived at by
4. Positive affect (4) .77 confirmatory cluster analysis."
The results of these exploratory factor analyses strongly suggest tha t there
5. Volition (4) .74
were no other dimensions of consciousness tapped by the PCQ besides those
(9) .73 already mentioned. Table 4 lists the thirty-seven items of the final cluster
6. Altered experience
(3) .63 analysis, excluding the alertness items, according to the dimensions to which
a. Meaning
(2) .54 they belonged.?
b. Perception
c. Time (2) .53
d. Body image (2) .49 DISCUSSION

7. Attention (4) .72 The PCQ and its method of administration were developed to unobtrusively
a. Attention direction (2) .76 and reliably assess the structure of subjective experience. A search of the
b. Absorption (2) .58 literature identified the major areas of phenomenological experience and the use
of confirmatory cluster analysis collapsed and refined these areas into nine
8. Negative affect (3) .65
major dimensions of consciousness that were internally consistent, i.e., had a
(2) .61 coefficient alpha of .60 or greater.
9. Memory
An average coefficient alpha of.76 for these nine dimensions of conscious-
10. Alertness (2) .50 ness attests to the relatively good internal consistency for these dimensions.
These results indicate that the PCQ is a reasonably reliable instrument for
assessing nine major dimensions of subjective experience. The other measure of
This process of confirmatory cluster analysis yielded ten major clusters or
reliability used, Pearson r for the five pair of duplicate items, indicated that the
dimensions of consciousness that were composed of only thirty-nine of the
subjects were being fairly consistent in completing the items of the questionnaire.
original sixty items of the PCQ. Of these ten, four clusters were composed of
These reliabilities can be defined as being above the lower limit of adequate
two or more subc1usters. Table 1 shows the clusters and subclusters, the number
reliability and are high enough for introspective data to be adequately evaluated.
of items in each, and their corresponding coefficient alphas. Of the fifteen
They indicate that retrospective introspection by means of a self-report
dimensions found in the third pilot study, only rationality failed to find
empirical support as a cluster or subcluster of phenomenological experience,
, The consistently lower coefficient alphas for the alertness dimension in both the
although a coefficient alpha of only .50 for alertness makes its inclusion as a cluster and factor analyses makes its inclusion as a reliable major dimension of conscious-
major dimension questionable. ness questionable. For this reason, it was not included as a major dimension of conscious-
ness in the discussion section.
As a check upon the above dimensions, an exploratory factor analysis was
, A CQPY of the sixty-item PCQ is available from the author upon request.
done on all sixty items of the PCQ. Although this type of analysis tends to blur
38 I R. J. PEKALA AND R. L. LEVINE
,.
MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS I 39
,
Table 2. Exploratory Factor Analysis for All Sixty Items of the Table 2. (Cont'd.)

Factor
Item
Phenomenology of Consciousness Questionnaire

Number
General Nature of
Item Content
Factor
Loading
Factor
Item
Number
General Nature of
Item Content
Factor
Loading
I

#65 direction of attention .46 ,\
[

1. Altered Experience (Alpha = .80; Variance = 7%) #27 rememberance of experience 1

.44
#30 religious, spiritual experience .55 #19

I
control over attention .36
#55 change in body perspective .52 #41 memory .36
#67 dizzy and disoriented .51 #26 understanding of experience .34
#70 strange and dream-like state .50 I
#68
#56
#66
#39
sacredness or deep meaning
ineffability
change in objects of world
profound and enlightening ideas
.49
.47
.44
.44
5. Negative Affect
#38
#31
#71
(Alpha = .79; Variance = 4%)
feelings of irritation
feelings of anger
.69
.62
, -.
!i

#61 change in perception of time .43 #69

un pleasure/pleasure
feelings of shame and guilt
.58 ,,~.
.54
#48 change in perception of space .39 #59 excitement/peacefulness .44
#15 body expansion into world .39
#21 extraordinary sensory changes .37 6. Alertness (Alpha = .57; Variance = 3%)
#29
#73
separation of self/environment
transcendence of opposites
.35
.35
#32 awareness intensity .55 ...
#33 fantastic thoughts and ideas .29
#37
#18
perceptual sensitivity/i ntensity .53 ,.
direction of attention
#74 questionnaire easy/hard to do .24 #29 alertness/drowsiness
.49
.43 .~ilI' (
10.,
2. Awareness (Alpha = .80; Variance = 7%) 7. Positive Affect (Alpha = .75; Variance = 4%)
#60 self-awareness .73 #22 sexual feelings .82
#49 consciousness of self .72 #72 sexual feelings .81
#52 certainty of unusual state .67 #47 feelings of love .56
#57 unusual state of consciousness .60 #62 feelings of joy and bliss .34 r
#54 awareness of body sensations .54 #35 suggestibility ()
.34
#17 nonordinary state of awareness .47
#40 awareness of ego and personality .36 8. Volition (Alpha = .56; Variance = 3%)
#53 change in passage of time .34 #42
#28
control of experience
actively involved/letting go
.56
.50 'J
.
3. Imagery (Alpha = .80; Variance = 7%) #50 control of thoughts and images .47
#23 amount of imagery .73 #16 sense of time .41
#63 amount of images .72
#46 vividness of imagery .70 9. Internal Dialogue (Alpha = .91; Variance = 4%)
#36 distinctness of imagery .67 #24 silent talking to oneself .89
#45 imagery versus thoughts .55 #64 silent talking to oneself .89
#34 mind's occupation with thoughts .42
#25 field of conscious attention .24

4. Attention/Memory (Alpha = .76; Variance = 5%) questionnaire is a viable means for assessing subjective experience. A subsequent
#44 focus of attention .70 paper [46) will further evaluate the reliability of this approach and will also
#43 logical/illogical thinking .68 aJd'ess itself to its validity since the usefulness of retrospective
#51 distraction/absorption .50 phenome~olOgical observation will ultimately depend on its ability to validly
#58 involvement/detachment .46
help predict future behavior and add to our understanding of that behavior [36J.
 I

40 I R. J. PEKALA AND R. L. LEVINE MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS I 41

Table 3. Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Thirty-Nine Items of the PCO

Cluster Analytic Factor Coefficient

Table 4. The Thirty-Seven Items of the Nine Dimensions of Consciousness

Dimensions
I
I
Factors

1.
Variance

(10%)
Item

#57
(Sub)Dimension

state of awareness
state of awareness
Loading

.72
.72
Alpha

.81 1. Internal Dialogue

Left Dipole Right Dipole
I
#52 "I did not engage in any silent I was silently talking to myself a
#17 state of awareness .64 talking to myself. great deal.
#61 time .51
"I did not engage in any silent I was silently talking to myself a
#21 perception .50
talking to myself. great deal.
#16 time .49
#68 meaning .45
.41 2. Awareness
#30 meaning
a. Self Awareness
#29 body integrity .38
I was continually conscious and I lost consciousness of myself.
#66 perception .37
well aware of myself.
#15 body integrity .36
#39 meaning .35 I maintained a very strong sense I did not maintain a very strong
of self awareness the whole time. sense of self awareness at all.
2. (10%) #46 imagery vividness .72 .82
.72 b. State of Awareness
#36 imagery vividness
#63 imagery amount .65 'My state of awareness was not
unusual or different from what it
I felt in an extraordinarily unusual
and nonordinary state of awareness. 'J
'"
':'1
.
:,

#23 imagery amount .63 J..,

#58 absorption .62 ordinarily is. '...;-

#65 attention direction .49 , am reasonably certain I was in my I am reasonably certain I was in an
#27 memory .42 usual state of consciousness . extremely altered state of
#51 absorption .42 consciousness.
#41 memory .40 "I felt in an extremely different and My state of consciousness was not .~

#62 positive affect .39 unusual state of consciousness. any different or unusual from what -"''/
'./...
j

(J
.71 .79 it ordinarily is. .., f '
3. (7%) #50 volition ',..
,<,
#42 volition .70 I I,.:
#19 volition .56 3. Imagery )
( J

#28 volition .55 a. Imagery Amount

-J
,
#49 self awareness .50 ", experienced very little or no My experience consisted almost
self awareness .48 imagery. completely of imagery .
#60
"I experienced no or very few My experience was made up almost
4. #22 positive affect .85 .80
I
(6%) images. completely of images.
#72 positive affect .84
#47 positive affect .55 b. Imagery Vividness

5. (5%) #24 internal dialogue .90 .91

The imagery I experienced was very
detailed and quite distinct.
The imagery I experienced was not
very detailed, nor was it very I
#64 internal dialogue .90 distinct. I
6. (4%) #38 negative affect .70 .65 My imagery was very vague and My imagery was as clear and vivid
#31 negative affect .69 dim . as objects in the real world.
#69 negative affect .45
7. (4%) #18
#32
#37
attention direction
alertness
alertness
.56
.54
.45
.53
4. Positive Affect
'1 was not aware of any strong
sexual feelings.
I experienced very strong sexual
feelings.
a An asterisk (.) indicates items that were duplicate item-pairs.
I
 MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS I 43
42 I R. J. PEKALA AND R. L. LEVINE

Table 4. (Cont'd.)
Table 4. (Cont'd.)
Dimensions
Dimensions 4
Right Dipole Left Dipole Right Dipole
Left Dipole
I experienced no strong feelings of c. Time
I experienced very strong feelings I felt no sense of timelessness; time Time stood still; there was no
love.
of love. flowed as I usually experience it. movement of time at all.
I experienced no joy or bliss
I felt extreme joy and bliss. My perception of the flow of time I noticed no changes in my per-
beyond my usual feelings.
changed drastically. ception of the flow of time.
I experienced no intense sexual
* I became aware of very intense d. Body Image

~
feelings.
sexual feelings. My body ended at the boundary I felt my body greatly expanded
between my skin and the world. beyond the boundaries of my skin.
5. Volition I had no control over what I was I continually maintained a very I experienced an intense unity with
I had complete control over what Ir
paying attention to. strong sense of separation between the world; the boundaries between
{
1
I was paying attention to.
I was actively involved in deter-
I was able to "let go" and passively myself and the environment. me and the environment dissolved I I
\
experience what was happening to away.

I mining what was happening to me.

me.
I was willfully controlling what I
7. Attention
a. Direction of Attention
I
I
i
I relinquished control and became
receptive and passive to what I was
experiencing.
was experiencing. *My attention was totally directed
toward the environment around
My attention was totally directed
toward my own internal subjective \
Images and thoughts popped into
my mind without my control.
The thoughts and images I had
were under my control: I decided
me.
*My attention was completely
experience.
My attention was completely I ,
what I thought or imaged. directed toward my own internal
subjective experience.
directed toward the world around
me.
I
6. Altered Experience b. Absorption
a. Meaning I was continually distracted by I was not distracted, but was able
I did not have any experience
I had an experience which I would extraneous impressions or events. to become completely absorbed in
which I would label as religious,
label as very religious, spiritual, or what I was experiencing.
spiritual, or transcendental.
transcendental.
I experienced no profound insights I felt very involved and immersed I felt very detached and distant
I experienced very profound and in my experience. from what I was experiencing.
besides my usual cognitive under-
enlightening insights of certain
standing of things.
ideas or issues. B. Negative Affect
Experience became deeply sacred I experienced no strong feelings of I experienced very strong feelings
I experienced no sense of sacred-
ness or deep meaning in existence or meaningful. anger. of anger.
beyond my usual feelings. I experienced very strong feelings I was not aware of any feelings of
b. Perception of irritation or annoyance. irritation or annoyance.
My experience did not involve any
Objects appeared to take on extra- I felt ashamed or guilty. I felt no feelings of shame or guilt.
changes in my sensory experience.
ordinary sensory qualities, such as
unusual brilliance, vibrancy, 9. Memory
clarity, etc. I cannot remember what I I can remember just about every-
I noticed no changes in the size, experienced. thing that I experienced.
Objects in the world around me
shape, or perspective of the objects
1 changed in size, shape, or My memory of what I experienced My memory of what I experienced
in the world around me.
perspective. was greatly impaired. was greatly enhanced.
1 a An asterisk (*1 indicates items that were duplicate item-pairs. a An asterisk {*l indicates items that were duplicate item-pairs.

!
44 I R. J. PEKALA AND R. L. LEVINE

II 41',I
MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS I 45
The nine major dimensions of the PCQ were derived by cluster analysis and
supported by exploratory factor analysis. Since the items that composed them
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