PD 705 - "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
" manner destroys such forest land or part thereof, or causes any
CHAPTER IV
CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND PENALTIES
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
products without license. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private
lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease,
license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code;
Provided, That in the case of partnership, association or corporation,
the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be
liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the
penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or forest products to cut, gathered,
collected or removed, and the machinery, equipment, implements
and tools used therein, and the forfeiture of his improvements in the
area.
The same penalty plus cancellation of his license agreement, lease,
license or permit and perpetual disqualification from acquiring any
such privilege shall be imposed upon any licensee, lessee, or
permittee who cuts timber from the licensed or leased area of
another, without prejudice to whatever civil action the latter may
bring against the offender.
Section 69. Unlawful occupation or destruction of forest lands. Any
person who enters and occupies or possesses, or makes kaingin for
his own private use or for others any forest land without authority
under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, or in any
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damage to the timber stand and other products and forest growths
found therein, or who assists, aids or abets any other person to do
so, or sets a fire, or negligently permits a fire to be set in any forest
land shall, upon conviction, be fined in an amount of not less than
five hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and imprisoned for not less than six (6) months nor
more than two (2) years for each such offense, and be liable to the
payment of ten (10) times the rental fees and other charges which
would have been accrued had the occupation and use of the land
been authorized under a license agreement, lease, license or permit:
Provided, That in the case of an offender found guilty of making
kaingin, the penalty shall be imprisoned for not less than two (2) nor
more than (4) years and a fine equal to eight (8) times the regular
forest charges due on the forest products destroyed, without
prejudice to the payment of the full cost of restoration of the
occupied area as determined by the Bureau.
The Court shall further order the eviction of the offender from the
land and the forfeiture to the Government of all improvements made
and all vehicles, domestic animals and equipment of any kind used
in the commission of the offense. If not suitable for use by the
Bureau, said vehicles shall be sold at public auction, the proceeds of
which shall accrue to the Development Fund of the Bureau.
In case the offender is a government official or employee, he shall, in
addition to the above penalties, be deemed automatically dismissed
from office and permanently disqualified from holding any elective or
appointive position.
Section 70. Pasturing Livestock. Imprisonment for not less than six
(6) months nor more than two (2) years and a fine equal to ten (10)
times the regular rentals due, in addition to the confiscation of such
livestock and all improvement introduced in the area in favor of the
government, shall be imposed upon any person, who shall, without
authority under a lease or permit, graze or cause to graze livestock
in forest lands, grazing lands and alienable and disposable lands
which have not as yet been disposed of in accordance with the
Public Land Act; Provided, That in case the offender is a corporation,
partnership or association, the officers and directors thereof shall be
liable.
Section 71. Illegal occupation of national parks system and
recreation areas and vandalism therein. Any person who shall,
without permit, occupy for any length of time any portion of the
national parks system or shall, in any manner, cut, destroy, damage
or remove timber or any species of vegetation or forest cover and
other natural resources found therein, or shall mutilate, deface or
destroy objects of natural beauty or of scenic value within areas in
the national parks system, shall be fined not less than two hundred
(P200.00) pesos or more than five hundred (P500.00) pesos
exclusive of the value of the thing damaged; Provided, That if the
area requires rehabilitation or restoration as determined by the
Director, the offender shall also be required to restore or
compensate for the restoration of the damage; Provided, Further,
That any person who, without proper permit shall hunt, capture or kill
any kind of bird, fish or wild animal life within any area in the national
parks system shall be subject to the same penalty; Provided, Finally,
That the Court shall order eviction of the offender from the land and
the forfeiture in favor of the Government of all timber or any species
of vegetation and other natural resources collected or removed, and
any construction or improvement made thereon by the offender. If
the offender is an association or corporation, the president or
manager shall be directly responsible and liable for the act of his
employees or laborers.
In the event that an official of a city or municipal government is
primarily responsible for detecting and convicting the violator of the
provisions of this Section, fifty per centum (50%) of the fine collected
shall accrue to such municipality or city for the development of local
parks.
Section 72. Destruction of wildlife resources. Any person violating
the provisions of Section 55 of this Code, or the regulations
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promulgated thereunder, shall be fined not less than one hundred
(P100.00) pesos for each such violation and in addition shall be
denied a permit for a period of three (3) years from the date of the
violation.
Section 73. Survey by unauthorized person. Imprisonment for not
less than two (2) nor more than four (4) years, in addition to the
confiscation of the implements used in the violation of this section
including the cancellation of the license, if any, shall be imposed
upon any person who shall, without permit to survey from the
Director, enter any forest lands, whether covered by a license
agreement, lease, license, or permit, or not, and conduct or
undertake a survey for whatever purpose.
Section 74. Misclassification and survey by government official or
employee. Any public officer or employee who knowingly surveys,
classifies, or recommends the release of forest lands as alienable
and disposable lands contrary to the criteria and standards
established in this Code, or the rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder, shall, after an appropriate administrative proceeding, be
dismissed from the service with prejudice to re-employment, and
upon conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction, suffer an
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year and a fine of not less than
one thousand, (P1,000.00) pesos. The survey, classification or
release of forest lands shall be null and void.
Section 75. Tax declaration on real property. Imprisonment for a
period of not less than two (2) nor more than four (4) years and
perpetual disqualification from holding an elective or appointive
office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall issue a tax declaration on real property without a certification
from the Director of Forest Development and the Director of Lands
or their duly designated representatives that the area declared for
taxation is alienable and disposable lands, unless the property is
titled or has been occupied and possessed by members of the
national cultural minorities prior to July 4, 1955.
Section 76. Coercion and influence. Any person who coerces,
influences, abets or persuades the public officer or employee
referred to in the two preceding sections to commit any of the acts
mentioned therein shall suffer imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year and pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos for every
hectare or a fraction thereof so improperly surveyed, classified or
released.
Section 77. Unlawful possession of implements and devices used by
forest officers. Imprisonment for a period of not less than (2) nor
more than four (4) years and a fine of not less than one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00), nor more than ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos
in addition to the confiscation of such implements and devices, and
the automatic cancellation of the license agreement, lease, license
or permit, if the offender is a holder thereof, shall be imposed upon
any person who shall, without authority from the Director or his
authorized representative, make, manufacture, or has in his
possession any government marking, hatchet or other marking
implement, or any marker, poster, or other devices officially used by
officers of the Bureau for the marking or identification of timber or
other products, or any duplicate, counterfeit, or imitation thereof, or
make or apply a government mark on timber or any other forest
products by means of any authentic or counterfeit device, or alter,
deface, or remove government marks or signs, from trees, logs,
stumps, firewoods or other forest products, or destroy, deface,
remove or disfigure any such mark, sign, poster or warning notices
set by the Bureau to designate the boundaries of cutting areas,
municipal or city forest or pasture, classified timber land, forest
reserve, and areas under the national park system or to make any
false mark or imitation of any mark or sign herein indicated;
Provided, That if the offender is a corporation, partnership or
association, the officers and directors thereof shall be liable.
Section 78. Payment, collection and remittance of forest charges.
Any person who fails to pay the amount due and payable under the
provisions of this Code, the National Internal Revenue Code, or the
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, shall be liable to the
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payment of a surcharge of twenty-five per centum (25%) of the
amount due and payable.
Any person who fails or refuses to remit to the proper authorities
said forest charges collectible pursuant to the provisions of this Code
or the National Internal Revenue Code, or who delays, obstructs or
prevents the same, or who orders, causes or effects the transfer or
diversion of the funds for purposes other than those specified in this
Code, for each such offense shall, upon conviction, be punished by
a fine of not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
and/or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding six (6) years in
the discretion of the Court. If the offender is a government official or
employee, he shall, in addition, be dismissed from the service with
prejudice to reinstatement and with disqualification from holding any
elective or appointive office.
If the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the
officers and directors thereof shall be liable.
Section 79. Sale of wood products. No person shall sell or offer for
sale any log, lumber, plywood or other manufactured wood products
in the international or domestic market unless he complies with
grading rules and established or to be established by the
Government.
Failure to adhere to the established grading rules and standards, or
any act of falsification of the volume of logs, lumber, or other forest
products shall be a sufficient cause for the suspension of the export,
sawmill, or other license or permit authorizing the manufacture or
sale of such products for a period of not less than two (2) years.
A duly accredited representative of the Bureau shall certify to the
compliance by the licensees with grading rules.
Every dealer in lumber and other building material covered by this
Code shall issue an invoice for each sale of such material and such
invoice shall state that the kind, standard and size of material sold to
each purchaser in exactly the same as described in the invoice. Any
violation of this Section shall be sufficient ground for the suspension
of the dealer's license for a period of not less than two (2) years and,
in addition thereto, the dealer shall be punished for each such
offense by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or
the total value of the invoice, whichever is greater.
Section 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. A forest officer or
employee of the Bureau shall arrest even without warrant any
person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of
the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment
used in committing the offense, and the forest products cut, gathered
or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.
The arresting forest officer or employee shall thereafter deliver within
six (6) hours from the time of arrest and seizure, the offender and
the confiscated forest products, tools and equipment to, and file the
proper complaint with, the appropriate official designated by law to
conduct preliminary investigations and file informations in court.
If the arrest and seizure are made in the forests, far from the
authorities designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations,
the delivery to, and filing of the complaint with, the latter shall be
done within a reasonable time sufficient for ordinary travel from the
place of arrest to the place of delivery. The seized products,
materials and equipment shall be immediately disposed of in
accordance with forestry administrative orders promulgated by the
Department Head.
The Department Head may deputize any member or unit of the
Philippine Constabulary, police agency, barangay or barrio official, or
any qualified person to protect the forest and exercise the power or
authority provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of
any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer
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assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed,
who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or
complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report,
the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with
the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal cases and file an information in Court.
RA 9147 - "Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection
Act."
CHAPTER IV
ILLEGAL ACTS
Section 27. Illegal Acts. - Unless otherwise allowed in accordance
with this Act, it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully and
knowingly exploit wildlife resources and their habitats, or undertake
the following acts;
(a) killing and destroying wildlife species, except in the following
instances;
(i) when it is done as part of the religious rituals of established tribal
groups or indigenous cultural communities;
(ii) when the wildlife is afflicted with an incurable communicable
disease;
(iii) when it is deemed necessary to put an end to the misery suffered
by the wildlife;
(iv) when it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb
of a human being; and
(v) when the wildlife is killed or destroyed after it has been used in Section 28. Penalties for Violations of this Act. For any person who
authorized research or experiments. undertakes illegal acts under paragraph (a) of the immediately
preceding section to any species as may be categorized pursuant to
(b) inflicting injury which cripples and/or impairs the reproductive this Act, the following penalties and/or fines shall be imposed;
system of wildlife species;
(a) imprisonment of a minimum of six (6) years and one (1) day to
(c) effecting any of the following acts in critical habitat(s) twelve (12) years and/or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to One million pesos (P1,000,000.00), if inflicted or
(i) dumping of waste products detrimental to wildlife;
undertaken against species listed as critical;
(ii) squatting or otherwise occupying any portion of the critical
(b) imprisonment of four (4) and one (1) day to six (6) years and/or a
habitat;
fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
(iii) mineral exploration and/or extraction; pesos (P500,000.00) if inflicted or undertaken against endangered
species;
(iv) burning;
(c) imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4) years
(v) logging; and and/or a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken
(vi) quarrying
against vulnerable species;
(d) introduction, reintroduction or restocking of wildlife resources;
(d) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
(e) trading of wildlife; and/or a fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) if inflicted or undertaken
(f) collecting, hunting or possessing wildlife, their by-products and against other threatened species; and
derivatives;
(e) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
(g) gathering or destroying of active nests, nest trees, host plants and/or a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to One hundred
and the like; thousand pesos (P100,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
other wildlife species.
(h) maltreating and/or inflicting other injuries not covered by the
preceding paragraph; and For illegal acts under paragraph (b) of the immediately preceding
section, the following penalties and/or fines shall be imposed;
(i) transporting of wildlife.
(a) imprisonment of minimum of four (4) years and one (1) day to six
CHAPTER V
(6) years and/or a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Five
FINES AND PENALTIES hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken
against species listed as critical;

5
(b) imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4) years
and/or a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
endangered species;
(c) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
and/or a fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken
against vulnerable species;
(d) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
and/or fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against other
threatened species; and
(e) imprisonment of one (1) month to six (6) months and/or a fine of
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife species.
For illegal acts under paragraphs (c) and (d) of the immediately
preceding section, an imprisonment of one (1) month to eight (8)
years and/or a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00) shall be imposed.
For illegal acts under paragraph (e), the following penalties and/or
fines shall be imposed:
(a) imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4) years
and/or a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
species listed as critical;
(b) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
and/or a fine of Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
endangered species;
(c) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
and/or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to One hundred
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thousand pesos (P100,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
vulnerable species;
(d) imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
and/or a fine of Five hundred pesos (P500.00) to Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species listed
as threatened species; and
(e) imprisonment of ten (10) days to one (1) month and/or a fine of
Two hundred pesos (P200.00) to Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife species.
For illegal acts under paragraphs (f) and (g) of the immediately
preceding section, the following penalties and/or fines shall be
imposed:
(a) imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4) years
and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
species listed as critical;
(b) imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years
and a fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
endangered species;
(c) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
and a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
vulnerable species;
(d) imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
and a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against species as
other threatened species; and
(e) imprisonment of ten (10) days to one (1) month and a fine of One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), if
inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife species: Provided, That
in case of paragraph (f), where the acts were perpetuated through
the means of inappropriate techniques and devices, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
For illegal acts under paragraph (h) and (i) of the immediately
preceding section, the following penalties and/or fines shall be
imposed:
(a) imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year
and a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) if inflicted or undertaken against
species listed as critical species;
(b) imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months and a fine of Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
endangered species;
(c) imprisonment of one (1) month and one (1) day to three (3)
months and a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), if inflicted or undertaken against
vulnerable species;
(d) imprisonment of ten (10) days to one (1) month and a fine of One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), if
inflicted or undertaken against species listed as other threatened
species;
(e) imprisonment of five (5) days to ten (10) days and a fine of Two
hundred pesos (P200.00) to One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), if
inflicted or undertaken against other wildlife species.
All wildlife, its derivatives or by-products, and all paraphernalia, tools
and conveyances used in connection with violations of this Act, shall
be ipso facto forfeited in favor of the government; Provided, That
where the ownership of the aforesaid conveyances belong to third
persons who has no participation in or knowledge of the illegal acts,
the same may be released to said owner. The apprehending agency
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shall immediately cause the transfer of all wildlife that have been
seized or recovered to the nearest Wildlife Rescue Center of the
Department in the area.
If the offender is an alien, he shall be deported after service and
payment of fines, without any further proceedings.
The fines herein prescribed shall be increased by at least ten
percent (10%) every three (3) years to compensate for inflation and
to maintain the deterrent function of such fines.
RA 9175 -"Chain Saw Act of 2002".
Section 7. Penal Provisions. -
(a) Selling, Purchasing, Re-selling, Transferring, Distributing or
Possessing a Chain Saw Without a Proper Permit. - Any person who
sells, purchases, transfer the ownership, distributes or otherwise
disposes or possesses a chain saw without first securing the
necessary permit from the Department shall be punished with
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years or a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) but not more Thirty thousand pesos (30,000.00) or
both at the discretion of the court, and the chain saw/s confiscated in
favor of the government.
(2) Unlawful Importation or Manufacturing of Chain Saw. - Any
person who imports or manufactures a chain saw without obtaining
prior authorization from the Department shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6)
months and a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
for more than Four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
(3) Tampering of Engine Serial Number. - Any person who is found to
have defaced or tampered with the original registered engine serial
number of any chain saw unit shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months and a fine
of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than
Four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
(4) Actual Unlawful Use of Chain Saw. - Any person who is found to
be in possession of a chain saw and uses the same to cut trees and
timber in forest land or elsewhere except as authorized by the
Department shall be penalized with imprisonment of six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years or a fine of not less that Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) or both at the discretion of the court without
prejudice to being prosecuted for a separate offense that may have
been simultaneously committed. The chain saw unlawfully used shall
be likewise confiscated in favor of the government.
If the violation under this Section is committed by or through the
command or order of another person, partnership or corporation, the
penalties herein provided shall likewise be imposed on such other
person, or the responsible officer(s) in such partnership or
corporation.
If the offender is a public official or employee, in addition to the
above penalties, he shall be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any public office.
The chain saws confiscated under this Section shall be sold at public
auction to qualified buyers and the proceeds thereof shall go to the
Department.
Section 8. Reward. - Any person who voluntarily gives information
leading to the recovery or confiscation of an unregistered chain saw
and the conviction of persons charged thereof shall be entitled to a
reward equivalent to twenty person (20%) of the value of the chain
saw unit(s). The Department is authorized to include in its budget the
amount necessary to carry out the purpose of this Section.
Section 9. Authority of the Secretary. - To effectively implement the
provisions of this Act, the Secretary shall issue the implementing
rules and regulations within ninety (90) days upon approval of this
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Act. He shall likewise organize an office within the Department to
ensure that requirements imposed by this Act may be complied with
by qualified persons, within the shortest possible time, at the least
possible expense.
In the Province of Palawan, the provisions of this Act shall be
implemented by the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7611 or the Strategic Environmental
Plan for Palawan.
Section 10. Revocation of Registration and Permit. - The Secretary
may revoke any Certificate of Registration or permit previously
issued to a person found violating the provisions of this Act, or the
rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
RA 7586 - "National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992.
Section 20. Prohibited Acts. Except as may be allowed by the
nature of their categories and pursuant to rules and regulations
governing the same, the following acts are prohibited within
protected areas:
a. Hunting, destroying, disturbing, or mere possession of any plants
or animals or products derived therefrom without a permit from the
Management Board;
b. Dumping of any waste products detrimental to the protected area,
or to the plants and animals or inhabitants therein;
c. Use of any motorized equipment without a permit from the
Management Board;
d. Mutilating, defacing or destroying objects of natural beauty, or
objects of interest to cultural communities (of scenic value);
e. Damaging and leaving roads and trails in a damaged condition;
f. Squatting, mineral locating, or otherwise occupying any land;
g. Constructing or maintaining any kind of structure, fence or
enclosures, conducting any business enterprise without a permit;
h. Leaving in exposed or unsanitary conditions refuse or debris, or
depositing in ground or in bodies of water; and
i. Altering, removing destroying or defacing boundary marks or signs.
Section 21. Penalties. Whoever violates this Act or any rules and
regulations issued by the Department pursuant to this Act or
whoever is found guilty by a competent court of justice of any of the
offenses in the preceding section shall be fined in the amount of not
less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing
damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not
more than six (6) years, or both, as determined by the court:
Provided, that, if the area requires rehabilitation or restoration as
determined by the court, the offender shall be required to restore or
compensate for the restoration to the damages: Provided, further,
that court shall order the eviction of the offender from the land and
the forfeiture in favor of the Government of all minerals, timber or
any species collected or removed including all equipment, devices
and firearms used in connection therewith, and any construction or
improvement made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an
association or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly
responsible for the act of his employees and laborers: Provided,
finally, that the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties
consistent with this Act.
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RA 9072 - "National Caves and Cave Resources Management
and Protection Act."
Section 7. Prohibited Acts - The following shall be considered
Prohibited Acts.
(a) Knowingly destroying, disturbing, defacing, marring, altering,
removing, or harming the speleogem or speleothem of any cave or
altering the free movement of any animal or plant life into or out of
any cave:
(b) Gathering, collecting, possessing, consuming, selling, bartering
or exchanging or offering for sale without authority any, cave
resource; and
(c) Counselling, procuring, soliciting or employing any other person
to violate any provisions of this Section.
Section 8. Penalties - Any person found guilty of any of the offenses
enumerated under Section 7 hereof shall be punished by
imprisonment from two (2) years to six (6) years or a fine ranging
from Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) to five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) or both at the discretion of the Court: Provided
That the person furnishing the capital to accomplish the acts
punishable herein shall be punished by imprisonment from six (6) yrs
and one (1) day to eight (8) years or by a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) or both at the Discretion of the Court. Provided
further that if the area requires rehabilitation or restoration as
determined by the Court, the offender shall also be required to
restore the same, whenever practicable or compensate for the
damage: Provided finally that if the offender is a government
employee, he or she shall likewise be removed from office.
Section 9. Administrative Confiscation and Conveyance - The
Secretary shall order the confiscation, in favor of the Government of
the cave resources gathered, collected, removed, possessed or sold
including the conveyance and equipment used in violation of Section
7 hereof.
Section 10. Fees - Any money collected by the DENR as permit
fees for collection and removal of cave resources, as a result of the
forfeiture of a bond or other security by a permittee who does not
comply with the requirements of such permit issued under this Act or
by way of fines for violations of this Act shall be remitted to the
National Treasury Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 165448 July 27, 2009

ERNESTO AQUINO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 5 June 1997
Decision2 and 24 September 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.

The Antecedent Facts

10
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the
Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume
of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers
Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team
composed of members from the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng), a
forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect
and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of
the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR,
issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees under the following
terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by
the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140)
pine seedlings in an appropriate place within the area. In the
absence of plantable area in the property, the same is required to
plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned which
shall be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance
growth and development of the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under
Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987;
and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or
violations of forestry laws and regulations shall render this permit
null and void without prejudice to the imposition of penalties in
accordance with existing laws and regulations.
11
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from
issuance hereof or as soon as the herein authorized volume is
exhausted whichever comes first.4
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea,
Daniel Salamo, Pablo Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester
Paul Apilis received information that pine trees were being cut at
Teachers Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site
where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from
CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They also
found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike Masing
(Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and
Andrew Nacatab (Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of
the trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only
12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut with
permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut
without permit was 16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the
trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and the forest charges
were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
7055 (PD 705) was filed against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing,
and Santiago, as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto,
in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any
authority, license or permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a total volume and market
price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price
P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or
having a total sum of P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City,
without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the
aforecited law.6lawphil
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit
as he was not given a copy of the permit. Masing stated that he cut
10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be
in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the
trees were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for
lumber. He stated that while he was cutting trees, petitioner and
Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He
stated that petitioner was in possession of the permit. He stated that
he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into lumber while two were
stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as
sawyers and they merely followed petitioners instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees
to be cut before the permit was issued. He stated that the trees cut
by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July
1993 and he saw Santiago and Masing cutting down the trees in
petitioners presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees
at Teachers Camp. He allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis,
that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However,
he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the
vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed
that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was
just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were accompanied by three
other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
7
In its 26 May 1994 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 5 (trial court), ruled as follows:
12
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO
AQUINO y ESTIPULAR, MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and
BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
Government in the amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25,
representing the market value of and forest charges on the Benguet
pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in
the costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby
declared forfeited in favor of the Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and
MIKE MASING y GANAS are acquitted on reasonable doubt, with
costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for their
provisional liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos.
139605 and 139646, dated February 4, 1996 and February 23,
1994, respectively, are ordered released to them upon proper receipt
therefor.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number
of the trees authorized to be cut. The trial court further ruled that the
cutting of trees went beyond the period stated in the permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts
Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial
courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The
accused-appellants Benedicto Santiago and Michael Cuteng are
hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant Ernesto Aquino
is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is
deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the
CENRO, DENR, petitioner had the duty to supervise the cutting of
trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with the terms of the
permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
while it was Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had
control over their acts. The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners
claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his fear
of Santiago because petitioner could have informed his superiors but
he did not do so. The Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners
contention that the law contemplated cutting of trees without permit,
while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the trees. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers
were not covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently
proven. As such, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution
failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of
Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following
orders as to which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the
permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September
2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of
merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
13
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied
because petitioner only raises questions of facts and not questions
of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 10 For
questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants.11 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances.12
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of
PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other
Forest Products Without License.-Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Section 68 of PD 705, to wit: Decree No. 705. Costs de officio.

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest SO ORDERED.
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; Republic of the Philippines
and SUPREME COURT
Manila
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.13 FIRST DIVISION

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest
SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,
land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from
vs.
private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit.
He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the DECISION
pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was
not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by CARPIO, J.:
Teachers Camp for repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be
The Case
convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-
accused were acquitted of the charges against them. This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and
the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to
June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of petitioner Sesinando
restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more than what was covered
Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section 68,3 Presidential Decree
by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have
No. 705 (PD 705),4 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The
informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at
Resolution dated 14 May 2003 denied admission of petitioner's
all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his acts.
motion for reconsideration.5
It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.
The Facts
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section
68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a partnership, association, or Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD
possession of the pine trees. 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and
remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil,
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June
Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private
1997 Decision and 24 September 2004 Resolution of the Court of
complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.6
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is

14
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998,
Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo),
the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998, 7 Royo
summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When
confronted during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner
admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the
permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner,
bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under
a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written
authorization signed by Calix's wife.8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester
Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. When
Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner
reiterated his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calix's
permission. Hernandez ordered petitioner not to convert the felled
tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner
had converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other
DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod
Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller
pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited
them for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt
to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod
Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the
matter.10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Romblon (Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner
with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. During the
preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit
reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with Calix's permission.
The Provincial Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner
15
and filed the Information with the trial court (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including
Tansiongco, Royo, and Hernandez who testified on the events
leading to the discovery of and investigation on the tree-cutting.
Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the
first time, that he had no part in the tree-cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found
petitioner guilty as charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's
favor.12 The trial court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view
of his repeated extrajudicial admissions that he cut the narra tree in
the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and
petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held
petitioner liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of
denial. Petitioner also contended that (1) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on a
complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided
under Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial
court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in
the government's favor.13 The Court of Appeals sustained the trial
court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions
of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR
permit. The Court of Appeals also found nothing irregular in the filing
of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR forest officer
considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation by the
proper officer who filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive
portion of its ruling, sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years of reclusion temporal. However, in the body of its
ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the penalty to be imposed on
[petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial
court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its
Resolution dated 14 May 2003, did not admit his motion for having
been filed late.15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED
PROHIBITING THE CUTTING, GATHERING, COLLECTING AND
REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS FROM
ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN
PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-
COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY
SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE
CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE STANDING AUTHORITY COMING
FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
AS MANDATED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO
MUST BE THE ONE TO INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.16
16
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) countered that (1) the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest officer, filed
the complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 2207 even though it was based on a complaint filed by
Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705,
as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be initiated by
a complaint filed by specified individuals, 18 non-compliance of which
ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. 19 However,
these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against
chastity20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer
for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. Section 80 of PD
705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of
any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or
officials, shall immediately be investigated by the forest officer
assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed,
who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or
complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or
report, the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary
complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to
conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases and file an
information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and
complaints" in Section 80 refers to "reports and complaints as might
be brought to the forest officer assigned to the area by other forest
officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or
any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest
laws not committed in their presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials" who
reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but
Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod
Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support
the complaint or report."23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not
precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules,
from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for
petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.24
Petitioner is Liable for Cutting Timber in Private
Property Without Permit
17
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts25 penalized under PD
705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting,
gathering, collecting, or removing of timber or other forest products
from any forest land without any authority; (2) the cutting, gathering,
collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority;26 and (3) the
possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations. 27
Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and
removed timber or other forest products from a private land 28 without
x x x the necessary permit x x x " thus his liablity, if ever, should be
limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and remov[ing]
timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution
evidence showed that petitioner did not perform any acts of
"gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the act of "cutting" a
lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether
petitioner "cut x x x timber" in the Mayod Property without a
DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property without a DENR permit, petitioner adopted conflicting
positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the
authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he
did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified,
petitioner denied cutting the tree in question. We sustain the lower
courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him. 30
Petitioner does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public officials
who testified under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the
stand to implicate petitioner in a serious criminal offense, not to
mention that the acts of these public officers enjoy the presumption
of regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's
authorization to Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the
narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner has no use of Calix's
authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree
in the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod
Property constitutes "timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only "forest product"
(which circuitously includes "timber.")31 Does the narra tree in
question constitute "timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court
came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that
"timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32 In other
jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified
dimensions33 or certain "stand age" or "rotation age." 34 In Mustang
Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court was faced with a similar
task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" -
to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that
provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be
18
taken in its ordinary or common usage meaning to refer to
"processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of
the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other
forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard,
blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter
alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply
put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And in so far
as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we. 36 x
x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under
Section 68 cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to
"wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." 37
Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as
posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered
timber.38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and
converted the same into "several pieces of sawn lumber, about three
(3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x consisting of 111
board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated in the
apprehension receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January
1999 which the prosecution introduced in evidence. 39 Further,
Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled log left in the
Mayod Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the big
end] while the smaller end measured 65 centimeters and the length
was 2.8 meters."40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and
converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or
joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as
Qualified Theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prisin mayor or reclusin temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
19
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos
but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos
but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but
does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value
does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of
the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not
exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions
of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50
pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and
the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty,
or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his
family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of
lumber measuring 111 board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if
the value of the log left at the Mayod Property is included, the
amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the
prosecution relied on Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as
stated in the apprehension receipt he issued, are his "estimates"
based on "prevailing local price."41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property
taken for fixing the penalty imposable against the accused under
Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present more than a
mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact.42 In the absence of
independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may
either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of
the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the
case.43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here, the accused was
charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for
possession of lumber without permit, the prosecution's evidence for
the lumber's value consisted of an estimate made by the
apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was
compounded by the fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate
was not presented in evidence. Accordingly, we imposed on the
accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6)45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into
account the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose
on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining here, the penalty of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and
the Resolution dated 14 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals with the
modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is sentenced to four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three
(3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184098 November 25, 2008
AMADO TAOPA, petitioner,
vs.
20
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with
illegally-cut lumber and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The
lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection.
On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a
certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,1 as amended, in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The
information against them read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 o'clock in
the morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of
Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck
bearing Plate No. EAS 839 and have in their control forest products,
particularly one hundred thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine
Mahogany Group and Apitong species with an aggregate net volume
of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Four (1,684) board feet with
an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand One Hundred
Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without any
authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment.
After trial on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged
beyond reasonable doubt.3
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was
affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with
respect to accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of
the crime charged on reasonable doubt, and MODIFIED with respect
to accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by
reducing the penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.5
In this petition,6 Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against
him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one
of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when
the lumber was seized.
We deny the petition.
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopa's alibi
because Cuison's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in
the transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA
found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's
house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck
driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized.
These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion
and control over the lumber loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa
(and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber
or other forest products without the required legal documents.
Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere
21
sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus
convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized
lumber.
However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty
imposed on Taopa.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on
violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is
punished as qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting, gathering,
collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of
qualified theft.
Articles 309 and 310 read:
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis
supplied)
2. xxx
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).
The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was
P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the
imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods or a period ranging from 14 years, eight months
and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for
the excess of P47,630.
The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on
Taopa shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC.
In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years
and one day to 14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and
the medium period11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years,
two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term
therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11
days of reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of
reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31,
2008 decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties
provided for by law.
[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000]
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA,
respondents.
22
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision.[1] dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by
herein petitioners for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order
to annul the Order dated May 27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had denied petitioners (a) Motion
to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein private respondents, as
well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a Writ
of replevin..[2] h Y
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement
Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles,
described as follows:
"1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand
and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued
at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a
certain] Jose Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand
two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of
illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one
Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon.
".[3]
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles,
failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the
apprehending team seized and impounded the vehicles and its load
of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and
Natural Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources)
Office in Catbalogan..[4] Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers
refused to accept the receipts..[5] Felipe Calub, Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the
Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against
Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68
[78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.[6] Mis sc
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by
Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting
DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave
coercion against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was,
however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor..[7]
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number
FCN 143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-
CENR in Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd
Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again
loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47
board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly filed a criminal
complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and
several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of
Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive
Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code..[8]
23
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and
Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But
note the trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished
the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action
may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible
for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it appeared that it
was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut
timber be loaded on it..[9]
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the
vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded
vehicles with an application for replevin against herein petitioners
before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application
for replevin and issued the corresponding writ in an Order dated April
24, 1992..[10] Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss which was denied
by the trial court.[11]
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the
present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
application for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining
Order. The Court issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge
from conducting further proceedings in the civil case for replevin;
and enjoining private respondents from taking or attempting to take
the motor vehicles and forest products seized from the custody of
the petitioners. The Court further instructed the petitioners to see to
it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized are kept in
a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property
being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme
Court..[12] In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court
referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate
disposition..[13]

On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack
of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to
the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended
by E.O. No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in
custodia legis. According to the appellate court, such authority of the
Department Head of the DENR or his duly authorized representative
to order the confiscation and disposition of illegally obtained forest
products and the conveyance used for that purpose is not absolute
and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or policies
on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate
court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation,
forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of
offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as
amended by E.O. No. 277..[14]
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners
failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of
the seizure to the DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the
owner of the vehicle, and to render a report of their findings and
recommendations to the Secretary. Moreover, petitioners failure to
comply with the procedure laid down by DENR Administrative Order
No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the admission of
petitioners counsel that no confiscation order has been issued prior
to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit.
Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the
appellate court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in
custodia legis..[15]
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners claim
that private respondents complaint for replevin is a suit against the
24
State. Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the
principle of state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in
the instant suit had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor
of the government. Moreover, according to respondent appellate
court, there could be no pecuniary liability nor loss of property that
could ensue against the government. It reasoned that a suit against
a public officer who acted illegally or beyond the scope of his
authority could not be considered a suit against the State; and that a
public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the
possession of the property of another..[16]
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners
based on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and
held in custody because they were contradicted by its own findings..
[17] Their petition was found without merit.[18] Rtc spped
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:.[19]
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE
SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-
A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277
DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT
CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL
SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF
P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS
NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate
number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against
the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all
conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of
Section 78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forestland,
or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Codeslx
mis
25
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and
punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as
prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the
present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products
at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was
duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of
the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the
persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by
the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the
Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the
same Code. They read as follows: Sc
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His
Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases
of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. -- A forest officer or
employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in
his presence any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and
equipment used in committing the offense... [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990,
implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. -- All
conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents,
found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of
P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or
disposed of in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies
on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. -- The Secretary
or his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers
and/or natural resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR
are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to policies and
guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and
officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest
products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field
offices, and turn over said forest products and conveyances for
26
proper action and disposition. In case where the apprehension is
made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with
the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for
safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported
without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to
possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved
vehicles and their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the
Revised Forestry Code. Slxs c
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined
in DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably
explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda,
drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles
from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor
vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the
petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR
Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied
for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was
done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry
Code. It would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice
and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the
circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles
were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal
process and considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise..[20]
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-
1264, promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to
be seized by a Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property
were already impounded by the DENR due to violation of forestry
laws and, in fact, already forfeited in favor of the government by
order of the DENR. We said that such property was deemed in
custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the property
already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by
way of partial Sheriffs Return, and wait for the judges instructions on
the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot
be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff
Magumun, we elucidated further:
". . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous
plaintiffs to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff
and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution.
Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are
implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in
this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be
undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin...".[21] Scslx
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession
of the two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit
against the State?
27
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued
without its consent..[22] And a suit against a public officer for his
official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to
hold the State ultimately liable..[23] However, the protection afforded
to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities
within the scope of their authority in good faith and without
willfulness, malice or corruption.[24] In the present case, the acts for
which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are
clearly official in nature.[25] In implementing and enforcing Sections
78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out,
petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of
the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was
no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the
petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the States consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office
of the Solicitor Generals line for the defense of petitioners
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to
recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible,
even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting
a claim, by a motion to dismiss..[26] If not invoked at the proper time,
this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the court
could take cognizance of the case and try it.[27] Mesm
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued
in the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take
possession of the subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143,
for delivery to the custody of and appropriate disposition by
petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be provided the Honorable
Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against any and all
persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised
Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional
Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO
DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,
Calbayog City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly
Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order
the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the
vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said
Code.
The Case
28
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the
June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog
City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby
declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO
LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR
employee who is taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services
vehicle St. Jude, with Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle
to the owner thereof.[3]
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration
challenging the last paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of
the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this
case as follows:
The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are
charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705
as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is
quoted herein below:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00
oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San
Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and
possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the
total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED furniture shop owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of
TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without loading his assorted lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral
first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the Services to be brought to his (Asans) house in Barangay Abrero,
proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree Calbayog City.
No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No.
277, series of 1989. The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario
Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to
CONTRARY TO LAW. dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be
merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion.
Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. A and B
entered the plea of not guilty. and their series. Its Exhs. C and series were rejected because the
photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].
Thereafter trial was conducted.
For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because
The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
his co-accused would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his
That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and testimony, the following facts have been established:
Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at
That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby
about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, while he was in his house in
Lucenecio instructed him to procure some wood shavings (sinapyo)
Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a vehicle named St. Jude with Plate
in San Jorge, Samar. He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross
No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca Aurora passed by. He
Funeral Services. His companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel
stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of assorted sizes
and Ragi Mabutol. They went to barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge,
[and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of 1
Samar and thereat, they got some wood shavings from the furniture
x 2 x 4, 16 pieces of 1 x 24 x 2.3 and 1 piece of 1 x 2 x 4. In his
shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded 20 sacks of wood
estimate at the price of P10.00 per board foot the total value of the
shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2 inches
lumber would be P729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the
in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings
lumber and he was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy.
[were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in
Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was
the coffin. After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan
owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio of the Holy Cross
Abing asked him a favor to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his
Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the vehicle
house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City where the Holy Cross Funeral
and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure
Services [was] also located. Asan himself personally loaded his
Receipt marked as Exhs. B and series. He also took photographs of
assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted lumber were
the lumber which are now marked as Exhs. C and series. Besides,
already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings. On
he signed a Joint Affidavit with Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest
their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion
Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio Daraman for some
stopped him and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired
papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he had none
about the assorted lumber and he told him that they were owned by
because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went
29
Asan, owner of the furniture shop in Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who
loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his (Asans) house in
Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion also that Asan
advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to
tell the person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in
his furniture shop at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo
Opinion, however, did not take his word and he instead impounded
the vehicle together with the assorted lumber. At about 5:00 oclock in
the afternoon, the vehicle was still not returned to him and so
Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at Brgy. Obrero,
Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened.[4]
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of
the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources-Community and Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted
administrative confiscation proceedings on the seized lumber and
vehicle in the presence of private respondents.[5] The two failed to
present documents to show the legality of their possession and
transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer
Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive
Director (RED) the final confiscation of the seized lumber and
conveyance.[6] Atty. Pastor C. Salazar filed a Memorandum dated
January 26, 1994, concurring with the recommendation to forfeit the
lumber and the vehicle seized from private respondents. The
Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan and
Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region
VIII, Tacloban City.[7]
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved
for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it
ordered the return of the said vehicle to the owner thereof.[8] He
contended that the vehicle had already been administratively
confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993, and that the RED
approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994.[9] He further claimed
30
that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which
had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to
Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of
evidence. The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was
that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former
agreed to take the lumber to the latters house in Calbayog City,
where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also located. Asan
advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing the
authorization for the lumber were in the formers shop in Barangay
Blanca Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio
to be likewise insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an
effect of the crime and ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for
Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive
grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did
not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his
disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering
that as found by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, St.
Jude, which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused
Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705.
Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused
Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of
the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x
possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by
the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber.
xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal,
thereby the same has long become final and executory.
Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation
proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera
of Samar on December 2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found
to be owned by Asan Abing. But notwithstanding this fact, for
reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan Abing was never
made an accused in the present case.
Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of
the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to
have conspired with any other persons who committed the violation
of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in
violating the said law. In the present case as shown by the evidence,
neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused Narciso
Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared
by the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver,
accused Gregorio Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of
the violation charged, and the decision has not been appealed.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the
Courts consideration:
(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to
order x x x the return of property already owned by the government.
31
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by
reason of mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their
duties.[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to
release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court
misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of
its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from
confiscating the vehicle administratively.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it
ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had
already become government property by virtue of the forfeiture
Order issued by DENR on January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or
his duly authorized representative, under Section 68-A of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277, may order the confiscation and disposition of
all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in illegally cutting,
gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A
comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705,
as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the
confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR
that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to
stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
Section 68 reads:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other
Forest Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: x x x.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.[14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His
Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases
of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations,
the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used
either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to
dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations
or policies on the matter.[15]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to
interpretation, on the presumption that its wording correctly
32
expresses its intent or will. The courts may not construe it differently.
[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in
the industrial arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities available
for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and
implements pertains to whatever may supply a want, especially an
instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include
conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The
implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a
manner that includes any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether
motorized or not, used either in land, water or air, or a combination
thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement of any forest
product.[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of
all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission
of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary
has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.
[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative
Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the
confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts
attributed to private respondents to willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of
assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining
any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x. The
Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the
transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or
abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as
amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture
(Annex C) is a false, falsified and perjurious document. The Order
was attached to and made part of the record only when petitioner
filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only
after the trial court rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it
appear, according to the private respondents, that RED Momongan
had approved the Memorandum on January 26, 1994. This does not
appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-charge (OIC) of
the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the Memorandum
recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog
City (Branch 32) ordered the provincial environment and natural
resources officer to transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of
lumber in connection with the prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.
[22] Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his office could not
deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.[23]
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of
Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed
Decision and Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the
vehicle was private respondents acquittal of the charge of violating
Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order issued by the
DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and
separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the
RTCs jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated
vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENRs Order of
Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus be presumed.[24] The
genuineness of the Order and its proper service upon them are
33
factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court, which is not a
trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a
lower court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions of the
DENR are reviewable by the courts only through special civil actions
for certiorari or prohibition.[27]
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held
that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very
owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other
violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993,
provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture
of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack
of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that
Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very
owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons
who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in
violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to
have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in
the criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under
Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest
products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the
authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus,
they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a
function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended,
does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the SO ORDERED.
regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation
of forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the
criminal liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles.
Section 68-A covers only the movement of lumber or forest products
without proper documents. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation is resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]

We also uphold petitioners argument that the release of the vehicle

to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the
implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in
EO 277 underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest
resources of the country for the benefit of the present and future
generations. Our forest resources may be effectively conserved and
protected only through the vigilant enforcement and implementation
of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy should not
be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its
clear intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]

Third Issue:

Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to

resolve petitioners third issue. It is no longer material to rule on
whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant
provincial prosecutors failure to comment on petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public
prosecutors disapproval does not vest in the trial court the
jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision

and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

34
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required
under forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable of
violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, 1 as
amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a valid defense.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28,
2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26720 which affirmed in all respects the Judgment3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68,
P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this petition is the
September 22, 2006 Resolution4 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
In a Criminal Complaint 6 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto
(Pioquinto), Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit
under the TL Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada)
and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria
35
(Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo)
and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of
Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.7
Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan
de Oro City issued a Resolution8 dated March 13, 1996
recommending the filing of an Information for the aforesaid charge
not only against Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac but also against
petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then Barangay Captain of
Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the complaint
against Sudaria was likewise recommended. Said Resolution was
then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through a
Resolution9 dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information
in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.
Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information10 was filed against
petitioners Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and
Boyatac, for violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
pursuant to RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public
officer being the Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with
salary grade below 27, taking advantage of his official position and
committing the offense in relation to his office, and the other above-
named accused, all private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo,
Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada, confederating and mutually
helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of
varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of
Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued
at P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulation to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation.12 They alleged that the Joint Affidavit13 of the
personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the
Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of
the crime while the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not
based on the personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted
that their indictment was based on polluted sources, consisting of
the sworn statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who
both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime
charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its
Order14 dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo
to file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information
in Court. On March 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for
Reinvestigation15 but same was, however, denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order16 dated May 15, 1997 because
the grounds relied upon were not based on newly discovered
evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to
the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07
or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in
Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise
opined that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-
accused.
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who
entered separate pleas of not guilty.17 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon,
prosecution witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public
utility jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver,
petitioner Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons,
one of whom was Boyatac while the rest could not be identified by
Granada.18 They alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10
36
to 15 meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan,
Cagayan De Oro City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor
Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number
MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber. 19 Being then
the president of a community-based organization which serves as a
watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,20 Pansacala even ordered a
certain Mario Bael to count the timber.21
At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain
Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)22 noticed that the pile of timber was
already placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any
scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover
that the timber would be used for the repair. After inquiring from the
people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and
Boyatac delivered the timber.23
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that
at seven oclock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought
a stick of cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile
of timber near the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered
the pile with coconut leaves.24
On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning,
prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV
personality of RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber25 hidden and
covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took footages of more
logs inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the following
evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.
On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force
Team measured the timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong
flitches and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet26 and
subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was
requisitioned by Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of
Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the
specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac
informed Villarin that the timber was already delivered on December
31, 1995.27
On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard
at the DENR Region 10 Office, received and signed for the
confiscated timber since the property custodian at that time was not
around.
The filing of the aforestated Information followed.
The Version of the Defense
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan,
Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City,
Villarin, decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project
was allegedly with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin
commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability
of timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for
the specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and
Boyatac to attend to the same. When the timber was already
available, it was transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the
timber flitches were seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and
taken to its office where they were received by Vera Cruz, the
security guard on duty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified
the court of Boyatacs demise.28 However, the trial court did not act
on such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability of
Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein
petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the
other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The
dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac
37
and Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.29
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:
Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a
Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one
who procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada
and Cipriano Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by
transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge.
The accused would like to impress upon the Court that the subject
fltiches were intended for the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and
were acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 110 of Barangay
Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There
is no dispute that the flitches were intended for the repair of the
bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains though
that the said forest products were obtained without the necessary
authority and legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.30
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration31 which was denied by
the
RTC in its Order32 dated August 20, 2002.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its
Decision dated June 28, 2005. The dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court
a quo finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano
Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. No pronouncement as to cost.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.33
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 34 which the appellate
court denied for lack of merit in its Resolution 35 promulgated on
September 22, 2006.
Issues
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following
issues:
1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE]
MATTER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN
ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;
2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM
WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING,
THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;
3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING
THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED
FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING]
VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL CONSIDERATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TO
REDUCE PENALTY].36
Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due process.
As Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being
included in the criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike
38
Force Team of the DENR, they claim that he was not afforded a
preliminary investigation. They also bewail the fact that persons who
appear to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not been included
in the Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for
reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary
investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty.
They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the
prosecutors Certification37 contained in the Information to the effect
that a preliminary investigation was conducted in the case.
Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had no
intention to possess the timber and dispose of it for personal gain.
They likewise claim that there was failure on the part of the
prosecution to present the timber, which were the object of the
offense.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal
complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.38 The said
complaint did not state the known addresses of the accused. Neither
was the notarized joint-affidavit of the complainants attached thereto.
The subpoena issued to the accused and the copy of their counter-
affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover, the complaint
did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said infirmities do
not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of
Villarin.
It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the
Office of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused
participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was
conducted prior to the filing of the criminal case.39 They knew about
the filing of the complaint and even denied any involvement in the
illegal cutting of timber. They were also given the opportunity to
submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating
prosecutor of their innocence.
Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the
assertion that Villarin was not afforded a preliminary investigation.
Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in denying Villarins motion for
reconsideration. It validly relied on the certification contained in the
Information that a preliminary investigation was properly conducted
in this case. The certification was made under oath by no less than
the public prosecutor, a public officer who is presumed to have
regularly performed his official duty.40 Besides, it aptly noted that
"Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated
January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot
prevail over the declaration of witnesses."41
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be
timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the
trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own
investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation,
which, necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of
the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused,
as well as the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing
of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."42
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a
preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However,
when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue
again. He accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not
guilty during his arraignment and actively participated in the trial on
the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the
trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again
39
assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration.43 Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding
the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore
been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the
trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been
included as a principal in the commission of the offense. However,
whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused
can no longer be raised on appeal. Any right that the petitioners may
have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria in the Information
should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the March
13, 1996 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria. 44
Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-
inclusion.
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other
Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are
aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without
further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations."45
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is
consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the
proper documents.
We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had
discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The
evidence of the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners were in custody of timber without the necessary legal
documents. Incidentally, we note that several transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the trial court. No
explanation was provided for these missing TSNs. Notwithstanding
the incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners culpability.
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber
was confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet 46 to
prove that the DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber
on January 13, 1996. The number, volume and appraised value of
said timber were also noted in the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were
also presented to prove that the confiscated timber were placed in
the custody of Alarcon47 and eventually taken to the DENR Office. 48
There was a photograph of the timber taken by the television crew
led by Casenas.49
40
The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of
eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that Latayada
and Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.50
More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who
commissioned the procurement of the timber 51 for the repair of the
Batinay bridge. He even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria
and gave Latayada P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later
informed him of the delivery of timber. However, he could not present
any document to show that his possession thereof was legal and
pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:
Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports
prior to the incident on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain
Camilo Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like
forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always
ride on his jeepney.
Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you
and not only by one but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi
even up to Barangay Pagalungan?
A Thats true because he even has a record with the police.
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was
supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein
lumber was being loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in
Lumbia, kilometer 5.
Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the
Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to load illegally cut lumber? lumber were already there. So, it was delivered.

A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was
ashamed because he was the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.
Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut
lumber occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally
cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan
transacted with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the
bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some
lumber to be used to build his house and he told me he will sell it for
the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.
Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?
A Boyatac.
Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay
Bridge.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid
Latayada the compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.
Q To whom did you give the advance?
A To Latayada.

Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of
materials for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan?
A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those
specifications.
Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of
those specification?
Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?
A No, Sir.
Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for
the transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the PROS. GALARRITA:

specifications and he let me sign it.
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the
Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria? lumber?

A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk A Yes, Sir.
anymore.
COURT:
Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your
Q Did you pay Latayada?
testimony before, Aniano Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you
ordered on board the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria? A Yes, Sir.
41
Q How much?
A P2,000.
Q And you gave this to the conductor?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did the conductor say?
A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the
transporting of lumber from Tagpangi.52 (Underscoring ours.)
Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is
malum prohibitum.
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and
as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. "However, the
prosecution must prove that petitioners had the intent to possess
(animus possidendi)" the timber.53 "Possession, under the law,
includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the crime]
is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime]
is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found."54
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession
of the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and
Latayada were personally involved in its procurement, delivery and
storage without any license or permit issued by any competent
authority. Given these and considering that the offense is malum
prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of the illegally
42
cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge
is, therefore, inconsequential.
Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime
Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the
corpus delicti had not been established. They assert that the failure
to present the confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of
the prosecution.
We disagree. "[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of
the crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its
legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" 55 or, in
this case, to the seized timber. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of
the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single
witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it
and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence."56
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was
established by the documentary and testimonial evidence on record.
The Tally Sheet, Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and
photograph proved the existence of the timber and its confiscation.
The testimonies of the petitioners themselves stating in no uncertain
terms the manner in which they consummated the offense they were
charged with were likewise crucial to their conviction.
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been
established that factual findings of a trial court are binding on us,
absent any showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or
circumstances of weight and substance.57 The legal precept applies
to this case in which the trial courts findings were affirmed by the
appellate court.58
The Proper Penalty
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as
qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these
provisions read:
Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen
is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxx
The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63
pieces of timber without the requisite legal documents measuring
4,326 board feet were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this
allegation, the prosecution presented Pioquinto to testify, among
others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure Receipts were also
presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the timber
exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its maximum, the
43
range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
ten (10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article
310 of the RPC was alleged in the Information, the penalty cannot
be increased two degrees higher.
In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to
be deducted from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00. This
remainder must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount
less than P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added
to the basic penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges
from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable
penalty should be taken anywhere within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree, without considering the modifying
circumstances. The penalty one degree lower from prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum period
of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.
Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his
demise even before the RTC rendered its Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
June 28, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 26720 are AFFIRMED with the modificationS that
petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
44