Analysis
June 14, 2010
Summary: The Republican People’s
Party of Turkey, the major opposition,
has had an unexpected change of
leadership triggered by the appear-
ance of compromising video of the
party’s leader Deniz Baykal on the
internet. The resignation of Baykal
has opened the way for the election of
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as its new leader.
The party’s rank and file hope that
their new leader will turn around the
electoral fortunes of the party, but
success is not assured. The RPP as the
founding single party of the republic
has experienced difficulty in transform-
ing its role from one of protecting the
values of the Turkish revolution, to one
of a pragmatic party working to maxi-
mize electoral support. While the RPP
aspires to become a social democratic
party, its attempts to bring about the
needed transformation have had only
limited success. Whether the new
leader will be able to redefine a role for
the party, persuade membership to
accept it, and help the party complete
its adjustment to competitive political
life remains to be seen.
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Party Changes Leader.
Can Leader Change Party?
by İlter Turan*
ISTANBUL — Parties with ideological
missions face a major dilemma when
it comes to competitive politics. Their
commitment to ideology motivates
them to maximize converts, whereas
their aspirations to power necessitate a
maximization of votes. Increasing the
number of “true believers” dictates the
pursuit of hard-line, uncompromising
programs. Mobilizing electoral support,
on the other hand, necessitates mal-
leable policies incorporating contradic-
tory ideas and pragmatic positions that
might require working with unlikely
partners. Ideologically oriented single
parties therefore have to go through
a painful process of adjustment after
the transition to competitive politics.
Success is by no means assured, as entry
into political competition may lead to
diverse outcomes, from failure to trans-
formation to an electorally successful
organization.
The Republican People’s Party (RPP)
of Turkey began its life as a single
party, serving as the exponent of rapid
top-down modernization policies. But
democratic politics presented the party
with just such a dilemma: Would it
continue to serve as the representative
of “proper” ideology or accommodate
the expectations of the voters? The ini-
tial answer was clear: the party would
*
lter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Bilgi University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001.
The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of German Marshall Fund of the United
States (GMF).
defend the fundamental values on
which the republic was built, preferring
an ideological orientation over a prag-
matic one. The RPP was hardly alone
in this endeavor. The pillars of Turkish
modernization such as the bureaucracy,
the military, the judiciary, and the
universities were its natural allies. For
example, the military would probably
not have staged a coup in 1960 in the
face of growing authoritarianism of the
governing Democratic Party if it had
not been assured of the RPP’s support.
After the restoration of competitive
politics in 1961, the RPP did not fare
particularly well at the polls, despite
receiving the highest percentage of
the vote in the 1961 elections. As the
political role of the military declined,
so did the party’s vote in subsequent
elections. Gradually, the bureaucracy
and the universities began to reflect the
pluralistic nature of Turkish society,
and ceased to be reliable allies. Under
the circumstances, some party leaders
began to appreciate the fact that in a
democracy, a party had to develop a
support base by serving the interests
of some specific constituencies and
building patterned links with society.
In search of new ways to relate to the
electorate, the party’s general secretary,
Bülent Ecevit, proposed that the party
Analysis
move to a “left of center” ideology. Although its content was
not clearly defined, the expression resonated in both big cities
and the countryside.
Adopting a “left of center” idea was not without problems.
Some key party figures compared it with communism, which
the party had committed itself to combating. Twice—in 1967
and 1972—sizable factions broke away from the RPP to form
other parties. But when the party entered the elections of
1973 under its new leader Ecevit, its share of the vote rose to
33.3 percent in these elections from its historical low of 27.4
percent in 1969. The party continued to improve its electoral
standing and increased its share to 41.4 percent in 1977. Such
electoral achievements gave the party the opportunity to
lead coalition governments in 1973-1974 and 1978-1979. In
both instances, it quickly became apparent that the change
in slogans had not fundamentally altered the orientation of
the party, and it continued to see itself as an above-politics
defender of republican values. However, it also experienced
difficulties in converting its ideas into practical programs and
implementing them. In the by-elections of 1979, the party
lost badly.
The military intervention of 1980, coming in the midst of
continual public disorder, violence, and coalition govern-
ments characterized by infighting, led the military leadership
to abolish all political parties and ban the political rights
of their leaders and parliamentary deputies. When civilian
politics was eventually restored, the generals tried to fashion a
two-party system and, until after the 1983 elections, disal-
lowed the formation of new organizations that were seen as
continuations of pre-1980 parties. Several new parties tried to
appeal to former RPP supporters. These included the Popu-
lists Party, which the military leadership had promoted; the
Social Democratic Party led by Erdal İnönü, the son of the
RPP’s former leader İsmet Inönü; and the Democratic Left
Party Party, headed by Rahşan Ecevit, Bülent Ecevit’s spouse.
In 1985, the Social Democrats united with the Populist Party.
In 1992, when the reconstitution of the pre-1980 parties was
allowed, the RPP reappeared and soon the Social Democratic
Populist Party joined it. Thus, the old party returned to the
national scene.
The head of the new RPP was Deniz Baykal, former min-
ister of energy and public finance. Understandably, Baykal
directed his appeal to the traditional supporters of the party.
2
He failed to appreciate, however, the depth of the changes
Turkey had undergone during his involuntary absence from
politics. Within a decade, the Turkish economy had moved
from state-dominated import-substitution to export-led
growth in which private entrepreneurs had come to prevail.
Many state enterprises had been privatized and many more
were in the process of doing so. The voters, worn out from
the battles of the pre-1980 period were focused on pragmatic
policies aimed at meeting their needs, not ideology. They
were content with the system of elected governments and did
not appreciate a version of politics that was accepting of the
political clout of the military and the judicial activism of the
Constitutional Court. Predictably, therefore, the RPP’s elec-
toral successes under Baykal’s leadership were limited: 10.7
percent in 1995, 8.7 percent in 1999. The failure to pass the
national electoral threshold of 10 percent in this latter elec-
tion kept the party out of the parliament. Baykal resigned but
maintained his hold on convention delegates and returned
to power within six months. By picking up the votes of the
highly personalistic Democratic Left Party of Bülent Ecevit,
who died, the party’s electoral position improved in 2002 and
rose to 19.4 percent, then inched to 20.7 percent in 2007.
The lack of notable electoral successes did not motivate
Baykal to reconsider his ideas, his policies, or his approach to
politics. He limited his efforts to defending the strict
secularism of his party against a government that he accused
of leading Turkey into a religious state. Frequently, he turned
to the courts to achieve his political agenda. His politics of
polarization was aimed at retaining his electoral base rather
than expanding it. Political analysts noted that he failed to
offer an effective challenge to a government that successfully
concentrated on public service issues that were more
resonant with the voters.
While a change of leadership might have helped the party to
define a more appropriate role for itself in a democratic envi-
ronment, Baykal’s firm control of the party rendered easy by
a legal framework that lends itself to achieving a monopoly of
power made that seem impossible. It is only after the expo-
sure of compromising tapes on the Internet that he chose
to resign but with full anticipation that he could manage a
successful return. Retrospectively, it has become evident that
many party members desired a change but had long been re-
signed to the inevitability of his continued leadership. When
the opportunity finally presented itself, they seized it by
Analysis
electing Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as their leader at the May 22-23
party convention. Baykal’s immediate aides were also elimi-
nated from the party assembly, an elected consultative body
that also elects the party executive committee. Many who had
left the party after conflicts with Baykal returned while others
have announced their intention to do the same.
A euphoric mood characterizes the party’s and the public’s
response to change. The ruling party has shown signs of
nervousness about the emergence of a serious rival. It is
far from certain, however, that Kılıçdaroğlu will succeed in
turning his rank-and-file into a pragmatic party with a more
moderate approach to politics. In his speech to the conven-
tion delegates, he abandoned Baykal’s acid rhetoric, made
no reference to secularist ideology, and tried to appeal to the
needs of lower-income urban constituents. He depicted the
prime minister and his associates as people who had become
rich through politics. All this may seem natural for the leader
of a party that claims to be social democratic. The real ques-
tion that the RPP faces is whether a change of leader will
prove sufficient in helping the party adjust to a widely altered
political environment. In a party whose members and sup-
porters have been conditioned to the ideological politics of
polarization, this is no easy feat. The gates of change, how-
ever, have been opened.
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi
University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His pre-
vious employment included professorships at Koç University (1993-1998)
and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the chair of
the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the director of
the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East (1985-1993).
Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political Science Association
and has been a member of the Executive Committee and a vice president
of the International Political Science Association (2000-2006). He has
served as the program chair of the 21st World Congress of Political Science
in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is board chair of the Health and
Education Foundation and serves on the board of several foundations and
corporations. He is widely published in English and Turkish on compara-
tive politics, Turkish politics, and foreign policy. His most recent writings
have been on the domestic and international politics of water, the Turkish
parliament and its members, and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent
commentator on Turkish politics on TV and newspapers.
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