Garcia, Christian Joseph E.

JD-1D

Case: Intod v. CA
Topic: Impossible Crime; Art. 4
Facts:

Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandayas house

to ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina. The group had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be
killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed
with firearms arrived at Palangpangans house.

Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the

Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by
her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused
fired. No one was hit by the gunfire.

The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Petitioner Intod seeks a

modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an
impossible crime. Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence
from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets
made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the
crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute
an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent
likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that xxx. The crime of murder was not
consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other
that petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art.
3) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been
for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible.

Issue: Whether or not, petitioner is liable of an impossible crime.

Held:

Yes. Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender
cannot produce an offense against person or property because: 1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or
2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender

must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be
either 1) legal impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete

would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to
those circumstances where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; 3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and
4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this
category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts
his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latters wallet and finds the pocket empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place
where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was
not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his
end.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility

which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
Case: Valenzuela v. People of the Philippines
Topic: Proximate cause, Criminal Liability
Facts:

On February 20, 1996, the Petitioner and his brother, Hermi

Valenzuela, armed with a bladed instrument attacked Gregorio P. Cruz
inflicting upon him two (2) stab wounds at the back. The wounds were
found to be non-fatal and the timely medical attendance prevented the
death of the victim. The Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan
held the petitioner guilty of Frustrated Murder. Subsequently, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, ruling that
the crime committed was Attempted Murder. Hence, a petition for
Review on Certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime the petitioner committed should be Attempted

Murder based on the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.

Held:

No. The Court ruled out the attendance of abuse of superior strength as
a qualifying circumstance in consideration of the facts that the wounds
sustained by the victim were not fatal and the absence of a showing that
the wounds would have certainly caused his death if not for the timely
medical assistance. Hence, the Court granted the petition and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification from
Attempted Murder to Attempted Homicide.
Case: Jacinto v. People of the Philippines
Topic: Art. 4(2), impossible crime
Facts:
Jacinto along with Valencia and Capitle was charged with qualified
theft for having stolen and deposited a check with an amount of 10,000
php. Such check was issued by Baby Aquino for payment of her
purchases from Mega Foam, but the check was discredited Dyhengco
found out about the theft and filed a complaint with the NBI. An
entrapment operation was conducted, with the use of marked bills. The
entrapment was a success and the petitioner along with her co-accused
was arrested.

Issue:

Whether or not, accused is guilty of impossible crime and not qualified

theft.

Held:

This constitutes as an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible

crime are: 1. That the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property 2. That the act was done with evil intent 3. That its
accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual or the extraneous circumstance that
constituted it as a factual impossibility

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,

would not amount to a crime.
Case: People of the Philippines v. Campuhan
Topic: Art. 6
Facts:

That on May 27, 1997, Primo Campuhan was convicted guilty of

statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty
of death. The conviction was based on the statements of Ma. Corazon
Pamintuan, the mother of the victim Chrystel, saying that on April 25,
1996, she found the accused kneeling down on his 4-year old daughter
with his pants down and forcing his penis into Chrystels vagina.
However, the accused kept his innocence and contested that
Pamintuans statements were not credible for the latter has ill will against
him.

Issue:

Whether or not, the accused committed a consummated statutory rape.

Ruling:

The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primos penis
was able to penetrate Chrystels vagina. Failure to prove such
penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be considered consummated
rape, however, only attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Also,
there were no physical signs of injuries on the witness body to conclude
a medical perspective that a penetration has taken place. In rape cases,
it is important that a valid testimony and medical certificate complements
each other, for relying alone on testimonial evidence may create
unwarranted or mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully establish
a proof that the penis, in reality, entered the labial threshold of the female
organ to accurately conclude that the rape was consummated.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court on convicting Campuhan guilty

of statutory rape is MODIFIED. Hence, convicted of ATTEMPTED RAPE
instead.