G.R. No. L-27702 September 9, 1977
She assailed the trial court's rulings that she is
ANDREA BUDLONG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUAN PONDOC, FABIO PONDOC, APOLINARIA
PONDOC, BENEDICTA PONDOC, FELICIDAD PONDOC
and FRANCISCO GARROTE defendants-appellees.
Eleuterio Ramo and Salvador Budlong for plaintiff-appellant.
Maximo C. Nuez for defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This is an action for the partition of Lot No. 5447, with an area
of 12,524 square meters, situated at Barrio Ubujan Tagbilaran
City, Bohol, at six hundred pesos in 1965.
On October 27, 1934 the sisters Isabela Pondoc and Crispina
Pondoc donated to Andrea Budlong in a notarial instrument their
two-thirds share in the said lot in consideration of the donee's
personal services to the donors. Andrea accepted the donation in
the same instrument. It was noted in the deed that the Court of
First Instance of Bohol had rendered a decision dated November
28, 1933 regarding the said lot.
The deed contains the statement "that by virtue hereof, the said
Andrea Budlong is hereby vested with full ownership and
property of the lot in question." It was acknowledged before
Genaro Visarra the mayor of Tagbilaran, an ex oficio notary.
Two years after the execution of the donation, or on October 27,
1936, Original Certificate of Title No. 4718 was issued for the
said lot. The title shows that the lot is owned by the following
co-owners: Crispina Pondoc 113; Isabela Pondoc 1/3; Francisco
Garrote 1/6, and Isabela Garrote-Pondoc 1/6.
Apparently, the donee, Andrea Budlong did not intervene in the
cadastral proceeding. She was not substituted for the donors in
that proceeding maybe because the hearing had already been
terminated when the donation was made to her. However, the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718 was in the ion of Andrea.
Sometime in January, 1965, Juan Pondoc talked with Andrea
about the sale of the lot. He got the said title from Andrea. When
the projected sale did not go through, Juan did not return the
title to her.
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc died without any
descendants in 1935 and 1937, respectively (p. 14, Appellees
Brie) Francisco Garrote an alleged brother of Isabela Pondoc
and Crispina Pondoc left Bohol thirty years before 1966 and had
never returned to that province. Isabel Garrote-Pondoc died and
was survived by her five children named Juan, Fabio, Apolinaria
Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed Pondoc y Garrote
Presumably, Andrea Budlong has been in possession of the lot.
She declared it for tax purposes in her name. She paid the realty
taxes thereon from 1936 to 1966. She planted the lot to
coconuts, bamboos, bananas and a mango tree.
Early in 1965 Andrea wanted to register the deed of donation.
The register of deeds in a letter dated April 1, 1965 asked Juan
Pondoc to surrender the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 4718. He
did not comply with that request.
On May 11, 1965 Andrea Budlong filed in the Court of First
instance of Bohol an action for the partition of the said lot. She
was allowed to sue as a pauper She retarded the action against
Francisco Garrote and the five children of Isabel Garrote-
Pondoc Francisco was summoned by publication. He was
declared in default.
Juan, Fabio, Apolinaria Benedicta and Felicidad all surnamed
Pondoc alleged in their answer that the donation was
"fraudulently executed". They relied on OCT No. 4718.
Visarra the notary, declared in his deposition that the deed of
donation was voluntarily executed by the donors.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
Andrea Budlong was guilty of laches and that the registration of
the lot extinguished her rights under the deed of donation. It
opined that she could not ask for the partition of the lot because
she does not appear as a co-owner in the title thereof. The court
intimated that she could ask for an indemnity from the assurance
fund.
From that adverse decision, Andrea appealed to this Court. She
stated in her notice of appeal that the lower court's decision is
contrary to law.
guilty of laches; that the one-year period provided in section 38
of Act No. 496 applies to this case; that it has no jurisdiction to
protect her right under the deed of donation, and that she could
not demand partition because she was no longer a co-owner of
the lot.
The trial court correctly held that the donation is valid.
Defendants-appellees' belated contention on appeal that the
donation is mortis causa (they did not raise that issue in their
answer or in the lower court) is wrong. There is not the slightest
indication in the deed that the donation would take effect upon
the donors' death. It is indisputably an inter vivos donation.
In the deed it is expressly stipulated that the ownership over the
two-thirds proindiviso share of the donors in Lot No. 5447 was
transferred to the donee. That notarial deed amounted to a
transfer of the ownership and ion of the lot because the
execution of a public instrument of conveyance is one of the
recognized ways by which delivery of lands may be made (Art.
1463, old Civil Code, now art. 1498; Ortiz vs. Court of Appeals,
97 Phil. 46).
We rind the appeal to be meritorious. The trill court erred in
assuming that the donee ceased to be a co-owner bemuse her
mm does not appear in OCT No. 4718 which was issued two
years after the execution of the deed of donation.
Overlooked by the trial court is the provision of section 70 of
Act No. 496 that registered land, and ownership therein, shall in
all respects be subject to the same burdens and incidents
attached by law to unregistered land", and that nothing in Act
No. 496 "shall in any way be construed "to change the laws of
descent, or the rights of partition between coparceners joint
tenants and other cotenants " "or to change or affect in any
other way any other rights or liabilities created by law and
applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act or in the amendments hereof". Section 70 is
quoted below:
LEGAL INCIDENTS OF
REGISTRATION LAND
SEC. 70. Registered land, and ownership
therein, shall in all respects be subject to the
same burdens and incidents attached by law to
unregistered land. Nothing contained in this
Act shall in any way be construed to relieve
registered land or the owners thereof from and
rights incident to the relation of husband and
wife, or from liability to attachment on mesne
process or levy on execution, or from liability
to any lien of any description established by
law on land and the buildings thereon, or the
interest of the owner in such land or buildings,
or to change the laws of descent, or the rights
of partition between coparcener joint tenants
and other cotenants or the right to take the
same by eminent domain, or to relieve such
land from liability to be appropriated in any
lawful manner for the payment of debts, or to
change or affect in any other way any other
rights or liabilities created by law and
applicable to unregistered land, except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in
the amendments hereof.
For clarity the rules in section 70 may be restated as follows:
1 Registered land is subject to the same legal burdens and
incidents as unregistered land and, therefore, fake unregistered
land, it is subject to attachment and execution for the payment of
debts. The rights and liabilities which are created by law and are
made applicable to unregistered land, are applicable to
registered land, except as otherwise provided in Act No. 496.
2. The rights arising from the relation of husband and wife are
applicable to registered lands.
3. Registered land is subject (a) to any alien of any description
established by law on land and the b thereon, or the interest of
the owner in such land or buildings, (b) to the laws of descent,
and (c) to the rights of partition between coparceners joint
tenants, will other cotenants except as otherwise expressly
provoked in Act No. 496. (As impossible between sections 39
and 70 of Act No. 496, see De Jesus vs. City of Manila, 29 Phd.
73).
The situation of Andrea Budlong is analogous to that of a spouse
whose name was not included in the Torrens title when conjugal
land was metered in the name of the other spouse. (The spouses
are of the conjugal assets as provided in article 143 of the Civil
Code.)
Thus, by reason of section 70, it was held that a parcel of land,
which was acquired during the marriage and which was
registered under the Torrens system in the name of one spouse,
is presumed to be conjugal unless proven otherwise. The
registration in the name of one spouse does not preclude the
application of the rule that "all property the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife"
(Art. 160, Civil Code, formerly article 1407; Flores vs. Flores 48
Phil. 288; Romero de Pratts vs. Menzi & Co. and Sheriff of
Rizal, 53 Phil. 51; Paterno Vda. de Padilla vs. Bibby Vda. de
Padilla, 74 Phil. 377; Seva vs. Nolan, 64 Phil. 374).
Section 70 was also applied to a case where the deceased was
survived by her legitimate daughter and an acknowledged
natural son. Although the eight parcels of land left by the
deceased were registered in the same of her natural son, the
daughter or her heirs could sue the natural son or his heirs for
the reconveyance of two-thirds of the eight parcels, that being
the daughter's share in her mother's estate as a legal heir under
the old Civil Code. The one-year period in 38 of Act No. 496
does not apply to that case. (Dayao vs. Robles, 74 Phil. 114).
In Sideco vs. Aznar, 92 Phil. 952, 961-2, it was held that, by
reason section 70, an application by the widower in a cadastral
long after the title to a parcel of land was registered in his name
in an ordinary land registration proceeding, to have the names of
his children included in the title as co-owners, could be granted.
The registration did not affect the children's hereditary rights.
The children were not held guilty of laches for having failed to
secure the issuance of the title in their names jointly with their
father. (See Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phd. 479, 494; Robles and
Martin vs. Lizarraga Hermanos 42 Phil. 584; Gonzalez vs.
Banzon, 51 Phil. 15, 20) Article 403 of the old Civil Code, now
article 497, provides that the assignees of the co-owners may
take part in the partition of the n property.
And article 400 of the old Code, now article 494, provides that
each co- owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property, a provision which implies that the action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
laches. @ art. 1965, old Civil Code).
The deed of donation made Andrea Budlong a co-owner of Lot
No. 5447. She became the successor-in-interest of the donors,
Isabela Pondoc and Crispina Pondoc The fact that in OCT No.
4718, which was issued subsequent to the donation, the donors
appear to be the co-owners and not Andrea Budlong did not
extinguish at all the rights of Andrea as a co-owner.
Section 70 of Act No. 496 is crystal clear. It unmistakably
provides that the conversion of unregistered land into registered
land does not affect the rights of the CO-owners nor the legal
rights and liabilities applicable to unregistered land.
That the registration did not wipe out the rights of Andrea, as the
successor- in-interest of the donors, is shown by the fact that she
remained in ion of the donated lot and that the owner's duplicate
of OCT No. 4718 was given to her and was in her custody from
1936 to January, 1965, when she entrusted it to defendant Juan
Pondoc because of the plan to self the lot and dissolve the co-
ownership.
The trial court erred in applying to this case section 38 of Act
No. 496 regarding review of the decree of registration on the
ground of fraud. This is not a case of fraudulent registration. Nor
is this a case where the rule on laches is applicable Moreover,
the defendants waived that defense because they did not invoke
it in their answer (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court; 1 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 263 citing
Bergeon vs. Mansour, 9 Fed. Rules Service, P. 61).
In conclusion, we hold that the 1934 donation should be given
effect. It was confirmed by plaintiff-appellant's ion of the
donated lot, her improvements thereon, her enjoyment of the
fruits thereof, and her payment of the realty taxes dues thereon
for the years 1936 to 1966.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is reversed and set
aside. If the parties cannot agree on the partition of the disputed
lot, then the trill court should conduct proceedings for the
partition thereof in conformity with Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court.
Defendant Juan Pondoc is ordered to surrender the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 4718 to the register of deeds of Tagbilaran
City within five days from his counsel's receipt of the notice
from the clerk of the lower court of the. remand of the records of
this case from this Court. The register of deeds is directed to
register the deed of donation, to cancel OCT No. 4718, and to
issue a new transfer certificate of title showing the two-thirds
interest of Andrea Budlong in Lot No. 5447. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL
DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR.,
BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and
PURIFICACION BACUS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA
(deceased), substituted by his legal heirs, namely:
FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN
NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA,
IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY
DELIMA, respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's judgment which
declared as null and void the certificate of title in the name of
respondents' predecessor and which ordered the partition of the
disputed lot among the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent
appellate court and by the trial court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the
Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on
installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in
1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely:
Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente
Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in
question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal
Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by
respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration
of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled
and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name
of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation
purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs
of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action for
reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment
of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo
Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as
party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter
in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor
of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the declared
owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla
 Friar Lands Estate presently covered by transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3009, each sharing a pro-
indiviso share of one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus,
Olimpio Bacus and Purificacion Bacus (on-fourth);
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano,
Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima
(one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda.
de Delima, Lily D. Arias, Helen Niadas and Dionisio,
Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed Delima
(one-fourth).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null
and void and the Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered
to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof another title
with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima
since 1958, the heirs of Galileo Delima are ordered to
turn a over to the other heirs their respective shares of
the fruits of the lot in question computed at P170.00
per year up to the present time with legal (interest).
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the
parties are ordered to petition the lot in question and
the defendants are directed to immediately turn over
possession of the shares here awarded to the respective
heirs.
Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim of
Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino
Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already
relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor,
considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining
balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes
thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that
the Court of Appeals erred:
1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand
partition of inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the
defenses of prescription and laches have already been
waived.
2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.
(p.13, Rollo)
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not
petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory
period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to
perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the
exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed
property. Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as
his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided
for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be
adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is
understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of
an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of
his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or
takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it
to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a
depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil,
857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165
SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at
any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In
other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1, 1987,
156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he
is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies
the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer
one of partition but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil.
23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa,
44 Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action
for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of
the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive
owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a
trustee. In order that such possession is considered adverse to
the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-
ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster
of the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation
had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the
evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez v.
Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA
375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question
executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained
the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and
the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner
of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the
ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute
of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action
instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of
the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA
549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the
date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of
adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted
(Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August 31, 1977, 78
SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal
heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was
cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima
and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the
issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to
the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title
constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession
by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest
title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice
to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such
rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against
them the period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed
their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by
prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have
validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this
time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124262 October 12, 1999
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALEJANDRO S.
MARQUEZ, CRISANTA DE CASTRO, ELPIDIA DE
CASTRO, EFRINA DE CASTRO, IRENEO DE CASTRO
and ARTEMIO DE CASTRO ADRIANO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the
Decision of the Court Appeals dated August 14, 1995, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 36349, and its Resolution dated March 15, 1996,
which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.1wphi1.nt
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for
Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They
alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Juan De Castro, died
intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate
heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San Juan, Morong,
Rizal, with an area of two thousand two hundred sixty nine
(2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim that in
1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by
their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made possible
when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the
property. It is the contention of private respondents that the sale
made by Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in
question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to
four fifths (4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special
defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The
trial court, after hearing the motion, dismissed the complaint in
an Order dated August 18, 1984. On motion for reconsideration,
the trial court, in an Order dated October 4, 1994, reconsidered
the dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order.
Petitioner filed its own motion for reconsideration but it was
denied in an Order dated January 5, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a)
the RTC has no jurisdiction to try and take cognizance of the
case as the causes of actions have been decided with finality by
the Supreme Court, and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the case.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of
Appeals, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court, dismissed the petition in a Decision dated August
14, 1995. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration but
it was denied in a Resolution dated March 15, 1996. Hence this
petition.
Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the granting
of the writ of certiorari in the present case:
FIRST GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79)
HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TRY
SUBJECT CASE (SP. PROC. NO. 118-M).
THE "CAUSES OF ACTION" HEREIN
HAVE BEEN FINALLY DECIDED BY THE
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL (BR. 31) MAKATI, METRO
MANILA, AND SUSTAINED IN A FINAL
DECISION BY THE HON. SUPREME
COURT.
SECOND GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT SUSTAINED
THE ORDERS OF THE HON. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) DATED OCTOBER
4, 1994, AND THE ORDER DATED
JANUARY 5, 1995, WHEN SAID RTC (BR.
79) INSISTED IN TRYING THIS CASE
AGAINST TCMC WHEN IT HAS RULED
ALREADY IN A FINAL ORDER THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT A "REAL PARTY" IN
INTEREST BY THE HON. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 170, ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE
CASTRO, ET. AL. vs. TOMAS CLAUDIO
MEMORIAL COLLEGE, ET . AL., WHICH
CASE INVOLVED THE SAME RELIEF,
SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND THE
SAME PARTIES.
THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT
CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY
DISREGARDED THE EXISTENCE OF RES
JUDICATA IN THIS CASE.
The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are: whether or not
the Regional Trial Court and/or the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether or not the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner invokes
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as its mode in obtaining a reversal
of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Before we dwell on the
merits of this petition, it is worth noting, that for a petition
for certiorari to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent
court committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment,
for certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are
correctible by appeal. 1 By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is
not enough it must be grave. 2
In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the public respondent. As correctly
pointed out by the trial court, when it took cognizance of the
action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. 3 Jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein. 4 Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court meant
to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the land
registration case mentioned by the petitioner.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, hence the court's jurisdiction cannot be made to
depend upon defenses set up in the answer or in a motion to
dismiss. 5 This has to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the
ends of justice would be frustrated by making the sufficiency of
this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in all cases.
Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction
any alleged errors committed in the exercise thereof will amount
to nothing more than errors of judgment which are revisable by
timely appeal and not by a special civil action
of certiorari. 6 Based on the foregoing, even assuming for the
sake of argument that the appellate court erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court, which earlier denied petitioner's
motion to dismiss, such actuation on the part of the appellate
court cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion, hence
not correctible by certiorari, because certiorari is not available
to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings
and conclusions.
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. It was petitioner who
elevated the instant controversy to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief
therefrom. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he
cannot thereafter challenge that court's jurisdiction in the same
case. 7 To do otherwise would amount to speculating on the
fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only
his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale. 8 Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the
sale or other disposition affects only the seller's share pro
indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his
grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action
in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for
the recovery of possession of the property owned in common
from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire
property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-
owners who possessed and administered it. 9Such partition
should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller
and its delivery to the buyer.1wphi1.nt
In the light of the foregoing, petitioner's defense of prescription
against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to
Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as
his share is concerned." In Budlong vs. Bondoc, 10 this Court has
interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for
partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription.
For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and
LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how
may marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review
on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals 1 Decision
promulgated December 1, 19942 and Resolution promulgated on
February 8, 19953 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner's action for
partition and damages.
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a
complaint 4 for partition and damages against Private
Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before
the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. 5 On October 25,
1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a
party.6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page
decision 7 in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:8
Considering therefore that this court is of the
opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of
Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to
inherit the property left by his deceased father
which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject
matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had
testified that he had been receiving [his] share
from said land before and the same was
stopped, there was no evidence introduced as
to what year he stopped receiving his share
and for how much. This court therefore cannot
rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial
court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each
other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in.
The assailed Decision disposed:9
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the
appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES
the [petitioner's] complaint and the
counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned
Resolution which reads: 10
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants'
motion for reconsideration, dated December
15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new
or substantial matters raised in the motion that
merit the modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition. 11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this
case, as follows: 12
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein
petitioner] filed with the Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for
partition of four (4) parcels of land, described
therein, claiming that he was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3)
children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the
original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio
Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4)
parcels of land to his three (3) children,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970,
plaintiff demanded from the defendants to
partition the land into three (3) equal shares
and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual
share of his late father, but the defendants
refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978,
defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of
the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he
died in 1941 , before plaintiff's birth.
Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived
with them, and claimed that the parcels of land
described in the complaint had been in their
possession since the death of their father in
1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a
share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were
the parents of three (3) children, namely,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio
died in 1940, survived by the above named
children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all
situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943,
claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria
Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23).
Sometime after the marriage, Arturio
demanded from the defendants that the above-
mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into
three (3) equal shares and that he be given the
one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late
father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by
both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of
the trial court's decision: 13
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita
Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she
testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain
of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972.
She testified that before being elected as
barrio captain she held the position of barrio
council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a
member of the] board of director[s] of the
Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff
because they are neighbors and she knows him
from the time of his birth. She knows the
father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad
and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were
already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944
and his wife died very much later. Witness
recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At
the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house
of the witness was about 30 meters away from
plaintiff's parents['] house and she used to go
there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows
both the defendants as they are also neighbors.
That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the
uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes
Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the
brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the
father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all
surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad
who is already dead but left several parcels of
land which are the 4 parcels subject of this
litigation. That she knows all these [parcels
of] land because they are located in Barrio
Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or
boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness
answered and mentioned the respective
adjoining owners. That she knew these 4
parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because
said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of
Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the
[war] and after his death the land went to his 3
children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and
Lourdes. Since then the land was never
partitioned or divided among the 3 children of
Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness
for identification and she identified a woman
in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes
Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was
identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the
defendant. The other woman in the picture
was pointed by the witness as the wife of the
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if
Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and
Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture
are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who
are the plaintiff and the defendants in this
case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was
presented to the witness for identification. She
testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes
Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad
was holding a child which witness identified
as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by
the court when . . . the picture [was] taken,
counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966.
When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized,
witness answered yes, as she had gone to the
house of his parents. Witness then identified
the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C.
The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as
Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and
mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit
C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was
also marked. The signature of Monsignor
Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that
she [knew] the land in question very well as
she used to pass by it always. It was located
just near her house but she cannot exactly tell
the area as she merely passes by it. When
asked if she [knew] the photographer who
took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B,
witness answered she does not know as she
was not present during the picture taking.
However, she can identify everybody in the
picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died]
without issue and he was survived by his only
sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-
defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL
MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow.
She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad
as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that
Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and
sister and that their father was Patricio
Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That
she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the
plaintiff, were married in New Washington,
Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of
Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad
Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well
because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of
land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and
Lourdes to help her during planting and
harvesting season. That she knows that during
the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them,
Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and
usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from
their father, Patricio. That upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession
of the property without giving the widow of
Inocentes any share of the produce. As
Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely:
Felix and Inocentes, she was the one
possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of
land up to the present. The witness testified
that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took
Arturio and cared for him when he was still
small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up
and got married. That while Arturio was
growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce
of the land while he was being taken care of
by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding
later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to
get his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad will
not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was
presented as witness. He testified that
defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are
his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and
sister of his father. That the parents of his
father and the defendants were Patricio
Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his
father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother,
Felicidad Molato, were already dead having
died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944
and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a
certificate of baptism which had been
previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth
certificate was burned during World War 2 hut
he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil
Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants
invited him to live with them being their
nephew as his mother was already dead.
Plaintiff's mother died when he was 13 years
old. They treated him well and provided for all
his needs. He lived with defendants for 5
years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the
defendants and lived on his own. He got
married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then
they were invited by the defendants to live
with them. So he and his wife and children
lived with the defendants. As proof that he and
his family lived with the defendants when the
latter invited him to live with them, he
presented a picture previously marked as
Exhibit B where there appears his aunt,
Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's daughter,
his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family
picture according to him. Another family
picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his
uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying
plaintiff's son. According to him, these 2
pictures were taken when he and his wife and
children were living with the defendants. That
a few years after having lived with them, the
defendants made them vacate the house for he
requested for partition of the land to get his
share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer
to handle his case. He testified there are 4
parcels of land in controversy of which parcel
1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10
coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is
100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of
coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are:
East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo
Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and
South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500
square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1
bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are: East-
Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico
Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad and South-
Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4
of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the
deceased father of the defendants and
Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000
square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two
times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are:
East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones;
South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna
Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey
of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of
540 square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey
of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310
with reference to one of the owners of the
land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia
Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863
of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is
in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to
Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in
the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name
of Anastacia Briones and another Tax
Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the
name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name
of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that
during the lifetime of his mother they were
getting the share in the produce of the land
like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further
testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad
and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They
were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a
certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this
Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New
Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does
not know because he was not yet born at that
time. That he does not have the death
certificate of his father who died in 1944
because it was wartime. That after the death of
his father, he lived with his mother and when
his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and
uncle, the defendants in this case. That during
the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother
receiving the share of the produce of the land.
That both defendants, namely Lourdes and
Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no
other nephews and nieces. That [petitioner's]
highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO
BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a
resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified
having known the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins
because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by
the name of Anastacia Briones and his father
are sister and brother. That he also knew
Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix
and Lourdes and he is already dead.
According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad
[died] in 1940 and at the time of his death
Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he
knew this fact because at the time of the death
of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing
with his aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to
Anastacia Briones who is mother of the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as
well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of
the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to
this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia
Trinidad, and with his children before 1940
for only 3 months. When asked if he knew
Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody
before his death, he answered, "That I do not
know", neither does he kn[o]w a person by the
name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when
asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of
Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody
with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived
as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered that he could not recall because he
was then in Manila working. That after the
war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt,
Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always
visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does
not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When
asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad,
he knew anybody who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to be a son of
Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered: "I do not know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified that
although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan, he stated to reside in Nalook, Kalibo,
as the hereditary property of their father was
located there. When asked if he was aware of
the 4 parcels of land which is the subject
matter of this case before the court, witness
answered that he does not know. What he
knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio
Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at
the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940,
according to the witness when cross
examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65
years old. That according to him, his aunt,
Anastacia Briones, was already dead before
the war. When asked on cross examination if
he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried
when he died in 1940, witness answered that
he was buried in their own land because the
Japanese forces were roaming around the
place. When confronted with Exhibit A which
is the alleged family picture of the plaintiff
and the defendants, witness was able to
identify the lady in the picture, which had
been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes
Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the
said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix
Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not
know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the
defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD.
She stated that she is 75 years old, single and
jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad
was her brother and he is already dead and he
died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That
before the death of her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he
stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon
in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from
Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he
died. While his brother was in Manila, witness
testified she was not aware that he had
married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived
in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get
married. When asked if she knew one by the
name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered
she knew her because Felicidad Molato was
staying in Tigayon. However, according to
her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad
Molato as husband and wife. When asked if
she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she
said, "Yes," but she denied that Arturio
Trinidad had lived with them. According to
the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with
the defendants but he stayed with his
grandmother by the name of Maria
Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato,
having died already. When asked by the court
if there had been an instance when the
plaintiff had lived with her even for days,
witness answered, he did not. When further
asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in
her house, witness also said, "He did not."
Upon cross examination by counsel for the
plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her
parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio
Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes
Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But
inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already
dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the
spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad,
testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died
without a wife and children, in the same
manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
died without a wife and children. She herself
testified that she does not have any family of
her own for she has [no] husband or children.
According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad
[died] in 1941, they buried him in their private
lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his
coffin as it was wartime and the municipality
of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese
forces. When further cross-examined that I[t]
could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died
in March 1941 because the war broke out in
December 1941 and March 1941 was still
peace time, the witness could not answer the
question. When she was presented with
Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture
wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of
Arturio Trinidad, she answered; "Yes." and the
child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad,
child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her,
she was only requested to hold this child to be
brought to the church because she will be
baptized and that the baptism took place in the
parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there
was a party, she answered; "Maybe there
was." When confronted with Exhibit A-1
which is herself in the picture carrying the
child, witness identified herself and explained
that she was requested to bring the child to the
church and that the picture taken together with
her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the
latter's child was taken during the time when
she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in
court yet. She likewise identified the man with
a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as
her brother, Felix. When asked if the child
being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is
another child of the plaintiff, witness
answered she does not know because her eyes
are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked
to identify the woman in the picture who was
at the right of the child held by her brother,
Felix, and who was previously identified by
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness
answered that she cannot identify because she
had a poor eyesight neither can she identify
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another
child in the picture for the same reason. When
asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows
that the one who took this picture was the son
of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito
Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness
testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was
BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified
that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was
her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner
that she also knew the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad
because they were her cousins. She testified
that a few months after the war broke out
Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola's house
whose names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She
further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had
lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he
went home only when his father fetched him
in Manila because he was already sick. That
 according to her, about 1 1/2 months after his
arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died.
She also testified that she knew Felicidad
Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never
been married to Inocentes Trinidad. According
to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad
died. According to her she was horn in 1928,
therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the
war broke out. When asked if she can
remember that it was only in the early months
of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied
Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She
further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was
buried in their private lot because Kalibo was
then occupied by the Japanese forces and
nobody would carry his body to be buried in
the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented
ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and
a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness
testified that . . . she knew both the [petitioner]
and the [private respondents] in this case very
well as her house is only around 200 meters
from them. When asked if it is true that
according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes
Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he
lived only for 15 days and died, witness
testified that he did not die in that year
because he died in the year 1944, and that
Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister,
Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only
across the street from her house. According to
the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that
Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had
a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom
he married on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact
because she was personally present when
couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a
protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness
testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived
from Manila he was in good physical
condition. That she knew both Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics
but that according to her, their marriage was
solemnized by a Protestant minister and she
was one of the sponsors. That during the
marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad
were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was
presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able
to present a marriage contract of his parents
but instead a certification dated September 5,
1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact
that records of births, deaths, and marriages in
the municipality of New Washington were
destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Court's Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or
otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court
ruled: 14
We sustain the appeal on the ground that
plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to
prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy
has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was
recognized, as a legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a
final judgment, in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument, or that he was
in continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz
Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants
that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died
single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren,
testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that
Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato
in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant
church and that she attended the wedding
ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence,
there was no preponderant evidence of the
marriage, nor of Inocentes' acknowledgment
of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July
21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not
prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
Where one of the interested parties openly and
adversely occupies the property without
recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs.
Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958)
acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D.
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol.
I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497).
Admittedly, the defendants have been in
possession of the parcels of land involved in
the concept of owners since their father died
in 1940. Even if possession be counted from
1964, when plaintiff attained the age of
majority, still, defendants possessed the land
for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring
ownership of the same by acquisitive
prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: 15
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-
appellee) has proven by preponderant
evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-
appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to
prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, brother of private respondents
(defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is
applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of
the Regional Trial Court having been
promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family
Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a
legitimate child can be attached collaterally by
the private respondents.
5. Whether or not of private respondent
(defendants-appellants) have acquired
ownership of the properties in question by
acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents'
marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to
collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive
prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late
Patricio's real properties requires preponderant proof that
petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate. 16 His
right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was
born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage
between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father
(Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully
discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed
Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's assessment of
the evidence presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be
disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But
in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and
the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to
meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in
this case. 17
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother
(Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during
the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent
Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the
question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To
prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the
matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and
the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. 19
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification 20 from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births,
deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact,
however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage
contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. 21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by
petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present
during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in
New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that
the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the
marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon
and former board member of the local parent-teachers'
association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice
or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. 22 On July
21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad
gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal
party held at the same house. 23 Her testimony constitutes
evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. 24 It further
gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. 25 Petitioner also presented his
baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother. 26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is
proved by the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or by an authentic document or
a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated
in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status
of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth,
authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may
be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. 27
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification 28 that records
relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world
war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground
on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in
evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and
Gerardo's testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-
5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4)
together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying
petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1).
Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit
B-1) carrying petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These
pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although
they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they
show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as
Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While
she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad,
the petitioner's daughter, she demurred that she did so only
because she was requested to carry the child before she was
baptized. 29 When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late
brother but not petitioner, his wife and the couple's children
slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an
alleged eye defect. 30
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof
of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules
of Court and special laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled
in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: 31
What both the trial court and the respondent
court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws,"
according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence
of proof in his favor that the defendant is her
father," according to the Family Code. Such
evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible
in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of
the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of
the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity, 32 her
testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding
pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish
petitioner's legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence
clearly preponderates over private respondents' self-serving
negations. In sum, private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes
died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private
respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died
in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because
nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in
Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His
testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with
the Trinidads for only three months, and his answers on direct
examination were noncommittal and evasive: 33
Q: At the time of his death,
can you tell the Court if this
Inocentes Trinidad was
married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of
death of Inocentes Trinidad,
where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said "them",
to whom are you referring to
[sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya,
Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the
Court for how long did you
stay with your aunt
 Anastacia Trinidad and his
children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time
of his death, Inocentes
Trinidad was single. Do you
know if he had cohabited
with anybody before his
death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by
the name of Felicidad
Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during
the lifetime of Inocentes
Trinidad if you have known
of anybody with whom he
has lived as husband and
wife?
A: I could not recall because
I was then in Manila
working.
Q: After the war, do you
remember having gone back
to the house of your aunt
Anastacia at Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How often did you go to
the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff
Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of
Inocentes Trinidad, do you
know if there was anybody
who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to
be a son of Inocentes
Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified,
that when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father
brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick.
Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco
Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one
and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew
Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but
denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes. 34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until
December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii,
the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes dies in March
1941. 35 The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January
2, 1942; 36 thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied
until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to
bury their dead in the cemetery In Kalibo, because of the
Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. 37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname
(Trinidad) without objection from private respondents a
presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child. 38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence
adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse
party. 39 Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written)
ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court's holding that
petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is
unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of
evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want thereof, and their personal
credibility. 40 Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and
convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's
favor. It declared:
. . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff
had lived with defendants enjoying the status
of being their nephew . . . before plaintiff
[had] gotten married and had a family of his
own where later on he started demanding for
the partition of the share of his father,
Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived
with the defendants . . . is shown by the
alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These
family pictures were taken at a time when
plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting
his father's share. . . . His demand for the
partition of the share of his father provoked
the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned
him as their nephew. . . . In this case, the
plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of
a status of the child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the defendants themselves,
which status was only broken when plaintiff
demanded for the partition . . . as he was
already having a family of his own. . . . .
However, the disowning by the defendant
[private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad,
of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her
nephew is offset by the preponderance of
evidence, among them the testimony of
witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio
captain. This witness was already 77 years old
at the time she testified. Said witness had no
reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a
PTA officer and the court sized her up as a
civic minded person. She has nothing to gain
in this case as compared to the witness for the
defendants who are either cousin or nephew of
Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the
case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being
already 75 years old, has no husband nor
children. 41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not
permitted. 42 Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to
present evidence of his filiation and of his parents' marriage.
Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this
doctrine to petitioner's cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription
sets in when one of the interested parties openly and adversely
occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership,
and because private respondents had been in possession in
the concept of owners of the parcels of land in issue since
Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired
ownership of the property in question by acquisitive
prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the
other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-
ownership.43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he
or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action
for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was
receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of
the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-
ownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is
no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-
ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further,
the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's name.
Although private respondents had possessed these parcels
openly since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the
produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they
manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held: 44
. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again
private respondents with respect to the filing
of the action for partition so long as the heirs
for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership. In the other words, prescription
of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated
by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55
[1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA
532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-
ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156
SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action
for partition may be seen to be at once an
action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved (Rogue vs.
IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed
reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim over the land in
dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170080 April 4, 2007
CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA, Petitioner,
vs.
CONSTANCIA Q. LICHAUCO, CONSUELO Q.
JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS, RICARDO
M. QUINTOS, JR., AILEEN M. QUINTOS and TYRONE
M. QUINTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Consolacion Q. Austria assails the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 68591 dated June 21,
2005 and its Resolution2 dated October 7, 2005, which
respectively affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 142, dated February 14, 2000 and its
order4 dated August 7, 2000, and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo Jalandoni,
defendants Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos, and
defendant-appellant Consolacion Austria are siblings of full
blood. Jose Alberto, Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and Tyrone, all
surnamed Quintos, are the nephews and niece of the defendant-
appellant.
The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2) parcels of
land with an aggregate area of six hundred sixty one (661)
square meters located in Palanan, Makati City. The aforesaid
parcels of land have permanent improvements thereon which
straddle both lots, namely, a residential bungalow and two (2)
units, two-storey apartments, the titles of which are registered
jointly in the names of the parties as co-owners thereof.
The plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the early part of
1996, they informed defendant-appellant of their desire to have
the subject properties partitioned based on the percentage of
each co-owners respective share.
A realtor was even engaged to prepare the schemes by which the
subject properties could be physically partitioned among the co-
owners. However, the defendant-appellant Austria refused to
accede to any of the schemes presented by the realtor for the
physical apportionment of the subject properties between the co-
owners thereof.
Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant Austria to
partition the property, and the inability of the co-owners to
mutually agree on an arrangement acceptable to all of them, on
July 1, 1997, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1485, against the defendant-
appellant Austria and two other defendants namely Benedicto
Quintos and Antonio Quintos (as unwilling co-plaintiffs) for
partition of the subject property.
Within the period for filing an answer, the defendant-appellant
Austria filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.
In its order dated November 10, 1997, the lower court denied
the omnibus motion to dismiss of the defendant-appellant
Austria, and directed the defendants to file their answer within
the remaining period provided by the Rules.
Within the prescriptive period, the defendant-appellant Austria
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 10, 1997
order, which the lower court denied in an order dated February
2, 1998.
Not satisfied, the defendant-appellant Austria filed before the
Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which was docketed
as CA-GR SP No. 46907, seeking to annul the orders of
November 10, 1997 and February 2, 1998.
In a Resolution dated July 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals
required the plaintiffs-appellees to comment, and temporarily
restrained the respondent judge, his agents, representatives, and
other persons acting in his behalf from proceeding with Civil
Case No. 97-1485 in order that the petition may not become
moot and academic.
On November 9, 1998, the defendant-appellant Austria received
a copy of the Decision dated October 30, 1998 dismissing her
petition for certiorari and prohibition. The defendant-appellant
Austria moved for the reconsideration thereof.
Subsequently, on July 19, 2001, defendant-appellant Austria
received a copy of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
July 9, 2001, denying her motion for reconsideration of the
decision denying her petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Undaunted, the defendant-appellant Austria then filed a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court.
In a resolution dated October 15, 2001, the Supreme Court
denied the said petition for review for non-compliance with the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to pay on time docket
and other fees and deposit costs in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 45
in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56.
Still not satisfied, on November 9, 2001, the defendant-appellant
Austria filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated
October 15, 2001 denying her petition for review.
In its resolution dated January 24, 2002, the Supreme Court
denied with finality the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
During the pendency of the defendant-appellants petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Court, the plaintiffs-
appellees filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 142 where the main case is pending, a motion dated
April 6, 1998 praying that a declaration of default be issued
against all defendants and for plaintiffs to be allowed to present
evidence ex-parte.
In an order dated July 13, 1998, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City held in abeyance the
proceedings before it while awaiting the resolution of the
motion for reconsideration pending before the Court of Appeals.
Notwithstanding the order holding in abeyance the proceedings
in the lower court, plaintiffs-appellees filed a Manifestation and
Motion dated September 14, 1998 praying for the resolution of
their Motion dated April 6, 1998. In its order dated September
25, 1998, the lower court deemed the incident submitted for
resolution.
While the motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant is
still pending before the Court of Appeals, the lower court in its
order dated July 6, 1999 declared the defendants in default, set
the reception of ex-parte evidence, and commissioned the
Branch Clerk of Court to receive the ex-parte evidence and to
submit her corresponding report thereon as soon as the same is
concluded.
On On August 4, 1999, the defendant-appellant Austria filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 6, 1999
with an urgent prayer to cancel plaintiffs ex parte presentation
of evidence on August 9, 1999, which was however denied by
the lower court, for lack of merit, in an order dated January 14,
2000.
The plaintiffs-appellees then presented their evidence ex-
parte on January 28, 2000.
The assailed decision was subsequently rendered by the lower
court on February 14, 2000, finding in favor of the plaintiffs-
appellees.
A motion for new trial was thereafter filed by the defendant-
appellant Austria, which was, in an order dated August 7, 2000,
denied for lack of merit.5
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
dismissed her petition and affirmed the trial courts decision but
deleted the order that petitioner pay reasonable rental for her use
of a portion of the disputed properties. The appellate court
denied reconsideration.
In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
avers that her motion for new trial and appeal of the judgment
by default are valid remedies under the Rules of Court. She
insists that the appellate court erred in not reversing the
declaration of default despite the fact that she questioned the
default order in the petition for review which she seasonably
filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner also contends that it
was error for the trial court to allow the sale of the entire
property in dispute.
Respondents filed a Comment6 dated March 30, 2006, arguing
that petitioner was correctly declared in default because of her
obstinate refusal to file an answer to the complaint despite being
ordered to do so by the trial court. They also allege that they
cannot be compelled to remain in co-ownership only because of
petitioners unjustified refusal to consent to a partition.
A Reply to Comment7 dated July 25, 2006 was filed by
petitioner who insisted that she was denied the right to fully
ventilate her case.
Only two issues are raised in this petition. The first issue
pertains to petitioners insistence that the judgment by default
rendered by the trial court, which was subsequently affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, is a denial of her day in court. The second
issue concerns the validity of the trial courts decision
alternatively ordering the partition of the subject property or
authorizing its sale.
A defendant declared in default has the following remedies: (a) a
motion to set aside the order of default under Sec. 3(b), Rule 9
of the Rules of Court; (b) a motion for new trial under Sec. 1(a),
Rule 37 if the default was discovered after judgment but while
appeal is still available; (c) a petition for relief under Rule 38 if
judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an appeal
from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 even if no petition to
set aside the order of default has been resorted to.8
In this case, petitioner did not move to set aside the order of
default rendered by the trial court but filed a motion for new
trial after a decision had already been rendered in the case. The
motion for new trial, however, was denied by the trial court for
lack of merit. She then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
assailing both the denial of her motion for new trial and the
adverse decision of the trial court.
Evidently, petitioner utilized the appropriate remedies available
to her. The fact, however, that she availed of the proper remedies
does not by itself result in a judgment in her favor or the
reversal of the assailed order and decision of the trial court. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioner was declared
in default because of her adamant refusal to file an answer
despite being required to do so.
The factual circumstances in the cases of Heirs of Akut v. Court
of Appeals9 and Ampeloquio v. Court of Appeals,10cited by
petitioner in pleading liberality, are markedly different from this
case. In Heirs of Akut, petitioners were not able to file an answer
within the reglementary period because they failed to obtain the
services of counsel on time and two of the petitioners were then
sick. In Ampeloquio, the trial courts order denying defendants
motion to dismiss was mistakenly served upon one of its
counsels on record and not upon the lawyer in charge of the
case. Consequently, the answer was not filed on time. In both
cases, there was no indication that the failure to answer was
intended to delay the case.
In contrast, the facts of this case suggest an intention on the part
of petitioner to delay the proceedings. The complaint was first
filed in 1997 but is only now being finally laid to rest because of
several procedural stumbling blocks, including the elevation of
the case to this Court on the issue of the propriety of the trial
courts denial of petitioners motion to dismiss, hurled by
petitioner one after the other.
Parenthetically, the appellate court initially issued a temporary
restraining order as an incident to the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioner questioning the trial courts order denying her
motion to dismiss but the restraining order was lifted after its
60-day validity.11 The expiration of the temporary restraining
order resulted in the running of the prescribed period to file an
answer and the continuation of the proceedings before the trial
court. Petitioners obstinate refusal to file an answer to the
complaint despite these circumstances clearly justifies the
declaration of default by the trial court and its affirmation by the
Court of Appeals.
This case has crept, ever so slowly, up the ladder of judicial
process. While we are not dissuading parties from availing of
the judicial remedies outlined in the Rules of Court, they should
be cautioned to be judicious in availing of these remedies. After
all, rules of procedure are intended to be, not tools of delay, but
of prompt and just disposition of every partys cause. Having
fully availed of, even exploited, these remedies, petitioner
cannot feign denial of her day in court. She has been given
every opportunity to fully ventilate her side.
Now, we turn to the second issue raised by petitioner, i.e., the
validity of the trial courts decision alternatively directing the
partition of the subject properties or authorizing their sale to a
third party.
There are two stages in every action for partition. The first phase
is the determination of whether a co-ownership in fact exists and
a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed, and
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested
in the property. This phase may end either: (a) with a declaration
that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a
co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or
(b) with a determination that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are
able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon.12
The second phase commences when it appears that the parties
are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In
that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties
have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question.13
The proceedings in this case have only reached the first phase. It
must be mentioned as an aside that even if the order decreeing
partition leaves something more to be done by the trial court for
the complete disposition of the case, i.e., the appointment of
commissioners, the proceedings for the determination of just
compensation by the appointed commissioners, the submission
of their reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the
partition, it is considered a final order and may be appealed by
the party aggrieved thereby.14
There is no question that a co-ownership exists between
petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court was
correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil Code
provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership.15
However, the trial court went astray when it also authorized the
sale of the subject properties to a third party and the division of
the proceeds thereof. What makes this portion of the decision all
the more objectionable is the fact that the trial court conditioned
the sale upon the price and terms acceptable to plaintiffs
(respondents herein) only, and adjudicated the proceeds of the
sale again only to plaintiffs. The pertinent portion of the trial
courts disposition states:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1) Directing the partition (physical division) of the
subject properties and all improvements thereon among
the co-owners in accordance with their respective
shares; or
2) Authorizing the sale, conveyance or transfer of the
above-described properties to a third-party at such
price and under such terms acceptable to plaintiffs
and thereafter, dividing the proceeds of said sale
among them in accordance with their proportionate
interests.16 [Emphasis supplied.]
It is true that petitioner did not assign this error on appeal
resulting in the appellate courts failure to rule on the matter.
Nonetheless, we cannot simply brush this issue aside
considering that its resolution is necessary in arriving at a just
disposition of the case.17 The rectification of the trial courts
decision is accordingly in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 is
REVERSED in so far as it affirms the portion of the decision
dated February 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 142, which authorizes the sale, conveyance or
transfer of the properties subject of this case and the division of
the proceeds of said sale to respondents herein. The Decision
dated June 21, 2005 and Resolution dated October 7, 2005 are
AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166790 November 19, 2014
JUAN P. CABRERA, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY YSAAC, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Unless all the co-owners have agreed to partition their property,
none of them may sell a definite portion of the land. The co-
owner may only sell his or her proportionate interest in the co-
ownership. A contract of sale which purports to sell a specific or
definite portion of unpartitioned land is null and void ab initio.
In this petition for review on certiorari,1 Juan P. Cabrera assails
the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 19, 2003 2and
resolution dated January 3, 2005.3 These decisions ruled that a
specific performance to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of
land is not available as a relief for Juan Cabrera.
It appears that the heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a
5,517-square-meter parcel of land located in Sabang, Naga City,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 506. 4 One of
the co-owners is respondent, Henry Ysaac.
Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to several
lessees. Juan Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased a 95-square-
meter portion of the land beginning in 1986.5
On May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and offered to sell
the 95-square-meter piece of land to Juan Cabrera. 6 He told
Henry Ysaac that the land was too small for his needs because
there was no parking space for his vehicle.7
In order to address Juan Cabreras concerns, Henry Ysaac
expanded his offer to include the two adjoining lands that Henry
Ysaac was then leasing to the Borbe family and the Espiritu
family. Those three parcels of land have a combined area of
439-square-meters. However, Henry Ysaac warned Juan Cabrera
that the sale for those two parcels could only proceed if the two
families agree to it.
Juan Cabrera accepted the new offer. Henry Ysaac and Juan
Cabrera settled on the price of 250.00 per square meter, but
Juan Cabrera stated that he could only pay in full after his
retirement on June 15, 1992.8 Henry Ysaac agreed but demanded
for an initial payment of 1,500.00, which Juan Cabrera paid.9
According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac informed him that the
Borbe family and the Espiritu family were no longer interested
in purchasing the properties they were leasing. Since Mamerta
Espiritu of the Espiritu family initially considered purchasing
the property and had made an initial deposit for it, Juan Cabrera
agreed to reimbursethis earlier payment. On June 9, 1990, Juan
Cabrera paid the amount of 6,100.00.10 Henry Ysaac issued a
receipt for this amount. 3,100.00 of the amount paid was
reimbursed to Mamerta Espiritu and, in turn, she gaveJuan
Cabrera the receipts issued to her by Henry Ysaac.11
On June 15, 1992, Juan Cabrera tried to pay the balance of the
purchase price to Henry Ysaac. However,at that time, Henry
Ysaac was in the United States. The only person in Henry
Ysaacs residence was his wife. The wife refused to accept Juan
Cabreras payment.12
Sometime in September 1993, JuanCabrera alleged that Henry
Ysaac approached him, requesting to reduce the area of the land
subject of their transaction. Part of the 439-square-meter land
was going to be made into a barangay walkway, and another part
was being occupied by a family that was difficult to eject. 13 Juan
Cabrera agreed to the proposal. The land was surveyed again.
According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac agreed to shoulder the
costs of the resurvey, which Juan Cabrera advanced in the
amount of 3,000.00.
The resurvey shows that the area now covered by the transaction
was 321 square meters.14 Juan Cabrera intended to show the
sketch plan and pay the amount due for the payment of the lot.
However, on that day, Henry Ysaac was in Manila. Once more,
Henry Ysaacs wife refused to receive the payment because of
lack of authority from her husband.15
On September 21, 1994, Henry Ysaacs counsel, Atty. Luis
Ruben General, wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Leoncio
Clemente, Juan Cabreras counsel.16 Atty. General informed
Atty. Clemente that his client is formally rescinding the contract
of sale because Juan Cabrera failed to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the land between May 1990 and May 1992.
The letter also stated that Juan Cabreras initial payment of
1,500.00 and the subsequent payment of 6,100.00 were going
to be applied as payment for overdue rent of the parcel of land
Juan Cabrera was leasing from Henry Ysaac.17 The letter also
denied the allegation of Juan Cabrera that Henry Ysaac agreed
to shoulder the costs of the resurveying of the property. 18 Juan
Cabrera, together with his uncle, Delfin Cabrera, went to Henry
Ysaacs house on September 16, 1995 to settle the
matter.19 Henry Ysaac told Juan Cabrera that he could no longer
sell the property because the new administrator of the property
was his brother, Franklin Ysaac.20
Due to Juan Cabreras inability to enforce the contract of sale
between him and Henry Ysaac, he decided to file a civil case for
specific performance on September 20, 1995.21 Juan Cabrera
prayed for the execution of a formal deed of sale and for the
transfer of the title of the property in his name. 22 He tendered the
sum of 69,650.00 to the clerk of court as payment of the
remaining balance of the original sale price. 23 On September 22,
1995, a notice of lis pendenswas annotated on OCT No. 560.24
In his answer with counterclaim, 25 Henry Ysaac prayed for the
dismissal of Juan Cabreras complaint.26 He also prayed for
compensation in the form of moral damages, attorneys fees, and
incidental litigation expenses.27
Before the Regional Trial Court decided the case, the heirs of
Luis and Matilde Ysaac, under the administration of Franklin
Ysaac, sold their property to the local government ofNaga City
on February 12, 1997.28 The property was turned into a
projectfor the urban poor of the city.29 During the trial, Corazon
Borbe Combe of the Borbe family testified that contrary to what
Juan Cabrera claimed, her family never agreed to sell the land
they were formerly leasing from Henry Ysaac in favor of Juan
Cabrera.30 The Borbe family bought the property from
NagaCitys urban poor program after the salebetween the
Ysaacs and the local government of Naga City.31
On September 22, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Naga City
ruled that the contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry
Ysaac was duly rescinded when the former failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price in the period agreed upon. 32 The
Regional Trial Court found that there was an agreement between
Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac as to the sale of land and the
corresponding unit price.33 However, aside from the receipts
turned over by Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family to Juan
Cabrera, there was no "evidence that the other adjoining lot
occupants agreed to sell their respective landholdings" to Juan
Cabrera.34 The Regional Trial Court also doubted that Juan
Cabrera was willing and able to pay Henry Ysaac on June 15,
1992. According to the trial court:
[A]fter the said refusal of Henry Ysaacs wife, plaintiff [Juan
Cabrera] did not bother to write tothe defendant [Henry Ysaac]
or to any of the co-owners his intention to pay for the land or he
could have consigned the amount in court at the same time
notifying [Henry Ysaac] of the consignation in accordance with
Article 1256 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, in September,
1993 [Juan Cabrera] was able to meet [Henry Ysaac] whenthe
latter allegedly talked to him about the reduction of the areahe
was going to buy. There is no showing that [Juan Cabrera] again
tendered his payment to Henry Ysaac. Instead, he allegedly
made his offer after he had the land resurveyed but defendant
was then in Manila. There is no evidence as to what date this
offer was made. . . . . .
[T]he court does not see any serious demand made for
performance of the contract on the part of [Juan Cabrera] in
1992 when he allegedly promised to pay the balance of the
purchase price. Neither could he demand for the sale of the
adjoining lots because the occupants thereof did not manifest
their consent thereto. At the most, he could have demanded the
sale of the lot which he was occupying. If his payment was
refused in 1995, he cannot demand for damages because the
rescission of the contract was relayed to him in writing in
Exhibit "4".35
The Regional Trial Court dismissed Juan Cabreras complaint
and Henry Ysaacs counterclaim.36 Juan Cabrera appealed the
Regional Trial Courts decision.37
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial Court that
there was a perfected contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and
Henry Ysaac.38 According to the Court of Appeals, even if the
subject of the sale is part of Henry Ysaacs undivided property, a
co-owner may sell a definite portion of the property.39
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the contract of sale
between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was not validly
rescinded.40 For the rescission to be valid under Article 1592 of
the Civil Code, it should have been done through a judicial or
notarial act and not merely through a letter.41
However, due to the sale of the entire property of the Ysaac
family in favor of the local government of Naga City, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the verbal contract between Juan Cabrera
and Henry Ysaac cannot be subject to the remedy of specific
performance.42 The local government of Naga City was an
innocent purchaser for value, and following the rules on double
sales, it had a preferential right since the sale it entered into was
in a public instrument, while the one with Juan Cabrera was
only made orally.43 The only recourse the Court of Appeals
could do is to order Henry Ysaac to return the initial payment of
the purchase price of 10,600.00 (1,500.00 and 6,100.00 as
evidenced by the receipts issued by Henry Ysaac to Juan
Cabrera, and 3,000.00 for the surveying expenses) as payment
of actual damages. The Court of Appeals likewise awarded
attorneys fees and litigation costs. To wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of
the lower court is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
as follows:
1. Declaring that there is no valid rescission of the
contract of sale of the subject lot between plaintiff-
appellant [Juan P. Cabrera] and defendant-appellee
[Henry Ysaac]; however, specific performance is not an
available relief to plaintiff because of the supervening
sale of the property to the City of Naga, an innocent
purchaser and for value;
2. Ordering [Henry Ysaac] to pay [Juan P. Cabrera]
actual damages in the amount of 10,600.00, with legal
interest of 12% per annum from September 20, 1995
until paid;
3. Ordering [Henry Ysaac] to pay [Juan P. Cabrera], the
amount of thirty thousand pesos (30,000.00) by way
of attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Henry Ysaac filed his motion for reconsideration dated July 14,
2003 of the decision of the Court of Appeals.44 On the other
hand, Juan Cabrera immediately filed a petition for reviewon
certiorari with this court.45 In the resolution dated October 15,
2003, this court denied the petition "for being premature since
respondents motion for reconsideration of the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals is still pending resolution."46
In the resolution dated January 3,2005, the Court of Appeals
denied Henry Ysaacs motion for reconsideration. On
February24, 2005, Juan Cabrera filed another petition with this
court, questioning the propriety of the Court of Appeals
decision and resolution.
This court initially noted that the petition was filed out of time.
The stamp on the petition states that it was received by this court
on March 24, 2005,47 while the reglementary period to file the
petition expired on February 28, 2005. Thus, the petition was
dismissed in this courts resolution dated April 27,
2005.48 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 49 However,
the same was denied with finality in this courts resolution dated
August 17, 2005.50
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, petitioner argued that it
would be unfair to him if a clerical error would deprive his
petition from being judged on the merits. Petitioner emphasized
that the registry receipts show that he filed the petition on
February 24, 2005, not March 24, 2005, as noted by this court in
his pleading.51 This court treated the letter as a second motion
for reconsideration. In the resolution dated March 31, 2006, this
court found merit in petitioners letter.52 The petition was
reinstated, and respondent was ordered to file his
comment.53Respondent filed his comment on September 18,
2006.54 This court required petitioner to file a reply, 55 which
petitioner complied with on January 15, 2007.56
The issues raised by petitioner and respondent are summarized
as follows:
1. Whether this court could take cognizance of issues
not raised by petitioner but by respondent in his
comment to the petition for review;
2. Whether there was a valid contractof sale between
petitioner and respondent;
3. Whether the contract ofsale still subsisted;
a. Whether the contract was terminated
through rescission;
b. Whether the contract was no longer
enforceable due to the supervening sale of the
property to the local government of Naga
City;
4. Whether petitioner is entitled to the execution of a
deed of sale in his favor; and
 5. Whether petitioner is entitled to actual damages,
attorneys fees, and costs of litigation.
The petition should be denied.
I common, and not because the suspensive conditions of the
This court can resolve issues raised by both parties
Petitioner stated that the errors inthis case are: (1) "the [Court of
Appeals] erred in holding that the relief of specific performance
is not available to [petitioner] supposedly because of the
supervening sale of [the] property to the City Government of
Naga";57 and (2) "consequently, the [Court of Appeals] erred in
not ordering the execution of the necessary deed of sale in favor
of [petitioner]."58 Petitioner argues that this court should limit its
adjudication to these two errors.59
On the other hand, respondent raised issues on the validity of the
contract of sale in favor of petitioner, and the propriety of the
award of actual damages with interest, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses.60
For petitioner, if respondent wanted to raise issues regarding the
Court of Appeals decision, respondent should have interposed a
separate appeal.61
Petitioners position is erroneous. This court can resolve issues
and assignments of error argued by petitioner and respondent.
This court "is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal,if it finds
that their consideration is necessary to arriveat a just decision of
the case."62 We can consider errors not raised by the
parties,more so if these errors were raised by respondent.
Respondent raised different issues compared with those raised
by petitioner. However, the assignment of error of respondent
was still responsive to the main argument of petitioner.
Petitioners argument works on the premise that there was a
valid contract. By attacking the validity of the contract,
respondent was merely responding to the premise of petitioners
main argument. The issue is relevant to the final disposition of
this case; hence, it should be considered by this court in arriving
at a decision.
II
There was no valid contract of sale between petitioner and
respondent
Petitioner agrees with the decision of the Court of Appeals that
there was a perfected contract of sale between him and
respondent.63
Respondent, however, argues that there was no contract between
him and petitioner because under Article 1475 of the Civil Code,
there has to be a meeting of the minds as to the price and the
object of the contract.64 Respondent argues that there was no
meeting of the minds as to the final price 65 and size66 of the
property subject of the sale.
In addition, while respondent admits that he was willing to sell
the property being leased from him by the Borbe family and the
Espiritu family, petitioner presented no evidence to show that
these families agreed to the sale in favor of petitioner. During
trial, Corazon Borbe Combe of the Borbe family testified that
her family never agreed to allow the sale of the property in favor
of petitioner.67 Respondent likewise alleged that Mamerta
Espiritu of the Espiritu family eventually bought the property
occupied by her family, which is contrary to the claim that
petitioner obtained the consent of Mamerta Espiritu to have the
land sold in his favor.68 Petitioner replied that respondent sold
113 square meters of the 321-square-meter property to the
Espiritu family on January 17, 1996.69 Petitioner argued that
Mamerta Espiritu was not a buyer in good faith because in 1990,
she voluntarily agreed to surrender the lot for sale in favor of
petitioner because she did not have the money to pay for the lot.
Hence, the sale in favor of Mamerta Espiritu should not
supersede the sale in favor of petitioner.70
The Regional Trial Court ruled that there was a valid contract of
sale, although it found that there was no evidence to support
petitioners claim that he was able to secure the consent of the
Espiritu family and the Borbe family to the sale of the
land.71 There was a valid contract of sale subject to a suspensive
condition, but the suspensive condition was not complied with.
For the Court of Appeals, there was a valid contract of
sale.72 The Court of Appeals ruling was based on the idea that a
co-owner could sell a definite portion of the land owned in
contract were complied with. In ruling this way, the Court of
Appeals relied on Pamplona v. Morato,73 which stated that:
. . . [A] "co-owner may validly sell his undivided share of the
property owned in common. (If the part sold happens to be his
allotted share after partition, the transaction is entirely valid).
Now then if there has been no express partition as yet, but the
co-owner who sells points out to his buyers the boundaries of
the parthe was selling, and the other coowners make no
objection, there is in effect already a partial partition, and the
sale of the definite portioncan no longer be assailed."74
We find that there was no contract of sale. It was null ab initio.
As defined by the Civil Code, "[a] contract is a meeting of
minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service."75 For there to be a valid contract, there must be consent
of the contracting parties, an object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation which is
established.76 Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates
himself to deliver a determinate thing and to transfer its
ownership to the buyer. In turn, the buyer pays for a price
certain in money or its equivalent.77 A "contract of sale is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price."78 The seller and buyer must agree as to the certain thing
that will be subject of the sale as well as the price in which the
thing will be sold. The thing to be sold is the object of the
contract, while the price is the cause or consideration.
The object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller.
If the seller is not the owner, the seller must be authorized by the
owner to sell the object.79
Specific rules attach when the seller co-ownsthe object of the
contract. Sale of a portion of the property is considered an
alteration of the thing owned in common. Under the Civil Code,
such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the other co-
owners.80 However, the rules also allow a co-owner to alienate
his or her part in the co-ownership.81
These two rules are reconciled through jurisprudence.
If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell
a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-
owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the
co-owned property.82 As summarized in Lopez v. Ilustre, 83 "[i]f
he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a
right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to
divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part
by metes and bounds."84
The undivided interestof a co-owner is also referred to as the
"ideal or abstract quota" or "proportionate share." On the other
hand, the definite portion of the land refers to specific metes and
bounds of a co-owned property.
To illustrate, if a ten-hectare property is owned equally by ten
coowners, the undivided interest of a co-owner is one hectare.
The definite portion of that interest is usually determined during
judicial or extrajudicial partition. After partition, a definite
portion of the property held in common is allocated to a specific
co-owner. The co-ownership is dissolved and, in effect, each of
the former co-owners is free to exercise autonomously the rights
attached to his or her ownership over the definite portion of the
land. It is crucial that the co-owners agree to which portion of
the land goes to whom.
Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common
property requires the consent of all co-owners because it
operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner
selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already
marking which portion should redound to his or her autonomous
ownership upon future partition.
The object of the sales contract between petitioner and
respondent was a definite portion of a co-owned parcel of land.
At the time of the alleged sale between petitioner and
respondent, the entire property was still held in common. This is
evidenced by the original certificate of title, which was under
the names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter Ysaac,
respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac, Luis
Ysaac, Jr., George Ysaac, Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen
Ysaac, Erlinda Ysaac, and Maridel Ysaac.85
The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interestin the
coownership. However, this was not the object of the sale
between him and petitioner. The object of the sale was a definite
portion. Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the
fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has "no right
to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the
thing owned in common, because his right over the thing is
represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication."86
There was no showing that respondent was authorized by his
coowners to sell the portion of land occupied by Juan Cabrera,
the Espiritu family, or the Borbe family. Without the consent of
his co-owners, respondent could not sell a definite portion of the
co-owned property.
Respondent had no right to define a 95-square-meter parcel of
land, a 439-square-meter parcel of land, or a 321-square-meter
parcel of land for purposes of selling to petitioner. The
determination of those metes and bounds are not binding to the
co-ownership and, hence, cannot be subject to sale, unless
consented to by all the co-owners.
In finding that there was a valid contract of sale between
petitioner and respondent, the Court of Appeals erred in the
application of Pamplona v. Moreto. 87 The ruling in Pamplona
should be read and applied only in situations similar to the
context of that case.
Pamplona involved the Spouses Moreto who owned three (3)
parcels of land with a total area of 2,346 square meters. The
spouses had six (6) children. After the wife had died, the
husband sold one of the parcels to the Pamplona family, even if
the conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated. The parcel
sold measured 781 square meters, which was less than the ideal
share of the husband in the estate. This court allowed the sale to
prosper because of the tolerance from the husbands co-heirs.
This court ruled:
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the
coowner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated
the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without
objection, protest or complaint bythe other co-owners, on the
contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or
termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created,
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, butalso his
heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against
the vendees petitioners any right or title in derogation of the
deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaviano
Moreto.88 (Emphasis supplied)
In Pamplona, the co-heirs of Flaviano Moreto only questioned
the sale to the Pamplona family nine (9) years after the sale. By
then, the Pamplona family had exercised several acts of
ownership over the land. That is why this court considered it
acquiescence or tolerance on the part of the co-heirs when they
allowed the Pamplonas to take possession and build upon the
land sold, and only questioned these acts several years later.
The ruling in Pamplonadoes not apply to petitioner. There was
no evidence adduced during the trial that respondents co-
owners acquiesced or tolerated the sale to petitioner. The co-
owners tolerated petitioners possession of a portion of their
land because petitioner was a lessee over a 95-square-meter
portion of the property, not the buyer of the 321-squaremeter
portion.
There was also no evidence of consent to sell from the co-
owners. When petitioner approached respondent in 1995 to
enforce the contract of sale, respondent referred him to Franklin
Ysaac, the administrator over the entire property. Respondents
act suggests the absence of consent from the co-owners.
Petitioner did not show that he sought Franklin Ysaacs consent
as administrator and the consent of the other co-owners. Without
the consent of the co-owners, no partial partition operated in
favor of the sale to petitioner.
At best, the agreement between petitioner and respondent is a
contract to sell, not a contract of sale. A contract to sell is a
promise to sell an object, subject to suspensive
conditions.89 Without the fulfillment of these suspensive
conditions, the sale does not operate to determine the obligation
of the seller to deliver the object.
A co-owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite portion
of the property. However, such contract is still subject to the
suspensive condition of the partition of the property, and that the
other co-owners agree that the part subject of the contract to sell
vests in favor of the co-owners buyer. Hence, the co-owners
consent is an important factor for the sale to ripen.
A non-existent contract cannot be a
source of obligations, and it cannot
be enforced by the courts
Since petitioner believes that there was a perfected contract of
sale between him and respondent, he argues that a deed of sale
should be formally executed. Petitioner agrees with the Court of
Appeals finding that there was no valid rescission of the
contract in accordance with Article 1592 of the Civil
Code.90 However, petitioner disagrees with the Court of Appeals
when it ruled that the contract was no longer enforceable due to
the supervening sale with the local government of Naga City.
Petitioner argues that the sale in favor of the local government
of Naga City was not made in good faith. Before the sale was
finalized between the local government and the heirs of Luis and
Matilde Ysaac, petitioner had a notice of lis pendens annotated
to OCT No. 506.91 It was presumed that the local government
had due notice of petitioners adverse claim, thus, it cannot be
considered an innocent purchaser.
For respondent, due to the inexistence of a valid contract of sale,
petitioner cannot demand specific performance from
respondent.92 Respondent disagrees with the Court of Appeals
when it stated that Article 1592 of the rescission of contract of
sale applies. There is no need to apply Article 1592 because
there was no contract to begin with.93 The contract between
respondent and petitioner was terminated by virtue of the letter
dated September 21, 1994.94
We rule in favor of respondent.
The absence of a contract of sale means that there is no source
of obligations for respondent, as seller, orpetitioner, as buyer.
Rescission is impossible because there is no contract to rescind.
The rule in Article 1592 that requires a judicial or notarial act to
formalize rescission of a contract of sale of an immovable
property does not apply. This court does not need to rule
whether a letter is a valid method of rescinding a sales contract
over an immovable property because the question is moot and
academic.
Even if we assume that respondent had full ownership of the
property and that he agreed to sell a portion of the property to
petitioner, the letter was enough to cancel the contract to sell.
Generally, "[t]he power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent on him."95
For the sale of immovable property, the following provision
governs its rescission:
Article 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even though it
may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the
time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take
place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the
period, as long as no demand for rescissionof the contract has
been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. After
the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.
This provision contemplates (1) a contract of sale of an
immovable property and (2) a stipulation in the contract that
failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon will cause the
rescission of the contract. The vendee or the buyer can still pay
even after the time agreed upon, if the agreement between the
parties has these requisites. This right of the vendee to pay
ceases when the vendor or the seller demands the rescission of
the contract judicially or extra judicially. In case of an extra
judicial demand to rescind the contract, it should be notarized.
Hence, this provision does not apply if it is not a contract of sale
of an immovable property and merely a contract to sellan
immovable property. A contract to sell is "where the ownership
or title is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full
payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive
condition and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious,
but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring binding force."96
In a similar case entitled Manuel v. Rodriguez,97 Eusebio
Manuel offered to buy the land owned by Payatas Subdivision,
Inc. The Secretary Treasurer of Payatas Subdivision, Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr., agreed to sell the land to Eusebio Manuel after
negotiations. Similar to this case, the agreement was only made
orally and not in writing. An initial payment was made, and a
final payment was to be madenine (9) to ten (10) months later.
Manuel never paid for the latter installment; hence, Eulogio
Rodriguez cancelled their agreement and sold the land to
someone else.
In Manuel, this court categorically stated that Article 1592 "does
not apply to a contract to sell or promise to sell, where title
remains with the vendor until fulfillment to a positive
suspensive condition, such as full payment of the price." 98 This
court upheld that the contract to sell was validly cancelled
through the non-payment of Eusebio Manuel. The same
conclusion applies in this case.
The law does not prescribe a form to rescind a contract to sell
immovable property. In Manuel, the non-payment operated to
cancel the contract. If mere non-payment is enough to cancel a
contract to sell, the letter given to petitioners lawyer is also an
acceptable form of rescinding the contract. The law does not
require notarization for a letter to rescind a contract to sell
immovable property. Notarization is only required if a contract
of sale is being rescinded.
Petitioner argued that he was willing to comply with the
suspensive condition on the contract to sell because he was
ready to pay the balance of the purchase price on June 15,
1992.99 However, his argument is unmeritorious. As ruled by the
Regional Trial Court, petitioner should have resorted to the
various modes of consignment when respondents wife refused
to accept the payment on respondents behalf.100
Therefore, even if we assumed that the contract between
petitioner and respondents were perfected, the strict requisites in
Article 1592 did not apply because the only perfected contract
was a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. The courts cannot
enforce the right of petitioner to buy respondents property. We
cannot order the execution of a deed of sale between petitioner
and respondent.
The question of double sale also becomes moot and academic.
There was no valid sale between petitioner and respondent,
while there was a valid sale between the local government of
Naga City and respondent and his coowners. Since there is only
one valid sale, the ruleon double sales under Article 1544 of the
Civil Code does not apply.101
Compensatory damages, attorneys
fees, and costs of litigation
Respondent argued that petitioner is not entitled to the
compensatory damages that the Court of Appeals awarded.
According to respondent, petitioner continues to occupy the 95-
square-meter property that he has been leasing since 1986
because the parcel was not included in the sale to the local
government of Naga City.102 Since April 30, 1990, petitioner has
not been paying rent to respondent despite his continued
occupation of the property. 103Therefore, there was no unjust
enrichment on the part of respondent when he applied
petitioners initial payment over the sale of the property as
payment for rent.
Respondent argued further that the award of attorneys fees and
litigation expenses in favor of petitioner was also erroneous
because prior to this litigation, respondent already informed
petitioner that his claim has no basis in law and fact. 104 Yet,
petitioner persisted on filing this case.105
We rule that petitioner is entitled to the return of the amount of
money because he paid it as consideration for ownership of the
land. Since the ownership of the land could not be transferred to
him, the money he paid for that purpose must be returned to
him. Otherwise, respondent will be unjustly enriched.
Respondents claim for rent in arrears is a separate cause of
action from this case.1wphi1 For petitioners earnestmoney
payment to be considered payment for his rent liabilities, the
rules of compensation under Article 1279 of the Civil Code must
be followed.106
It was not proven during trial if petitioner's rental liability to
respondent is due, or if it is already liquidated and demandable.
Hence, this court is limited to uphold the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, but such payment could be subject to the rule on
compensation.
However, petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees and the
costs of litigation. The Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees
to petitioner "just to protect his right [because petitioner]
reached this court to seek justice for himself."107
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling, we find that petitioner
did not have a clear right over the property in question. The
Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees and litigation costs on
the premise that the contract between petitioner and respondent
was perfected. Without a valid contract that stipulates his rights,
petitioner risked litigation in order to determine if he has rights,
and not to protect rights that he currently has. Hence, the award
of attorney's fees and litigation costs was not properly justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
decision dated June 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65869 is SET
ASIDE. The contract between petitioner and respondent is
DECLARED invalid and, therefore, cannot be subject to
specific performance. Respondent is ORDERED to return
10,600.00 to petitioner, with legal interest of 12% per annum
from September 20, 1995 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum
from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. The award of attorney's fees
and litigation expenses is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176858 September 15, 2010
HEIRS OF JUANITA PADILLA, represented by CLAUDIO
PADILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
DOMINADOR MAGDUA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing
the Orders dated 8 September 20062 and 13 February 20073 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34, in
Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.
The Facts
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a
piece of land located in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After
Juanitas death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of
Juanita, sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent
word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding
their plans for the partition of the land. In a letter dated 5 June
1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were
surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land for
himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was then
discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized
Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property4 (Affidavit) in favor of
Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land.
The records do not show that the land was registered under the
Torrens system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of
Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership,
possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare
void the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador
Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during the lifetime of
Ricardo.
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had
the land transferred in his name without the consent and
knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to
1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However,
when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left for
Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to third
parties.
Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the
Affidavit is highly questionable because on 15 May 1978
Juanita executed a written instrument stating that she would be
leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited
from her parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the assessed value of the land was within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte.
In an Order dated 20 February 2006,5 the RTC dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the
assessed value of the land in the amount of 590.00 was less
than the amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction
over the case.6
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued
that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of
deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond
pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription.
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its
previous stand and took cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9
of the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed
only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was
executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of an
heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-
heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all
other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that
since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land
under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could
also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardos
daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the
order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is
reconsidered in so far as the pronouncement of the Court that it
has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action. The dismissal
of the action, however, is maintained not by reason of lack of
jurisdiction but by reason of prescription.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration which the
RTC denied in an Order dated 13 February 2007 since
petitioners raised no new issue.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by
prescription.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners submit that the RTC erred in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners insist that
the Affidavit executed in 1966 does not conform with the
requirement of sufficient repudiation of co-ownership by
Ricardo against his co-heirs in accordance with Article 494 of
the Civil Code. Petitioners assert that the Affidavit became part
of public records only because it was kept by the Provincial
Assessors office for real property tax declaration purposes.
However, such cannot be contemplated by law as a record or
registration affecting real properties. Petitioners insist that the
Affidavit is not an act of appropriation sufficient to be deemed
as constructive notice to an adverse claim of ownership absent a
clear showing that petitioners, as co-heirs, were notified or had
knowledge of the Affidavit issued by their mother in Ricardos
favor.
Respondent Dominador, on the other hand, maintains that
Juanita, during her lifetime, never renounced her signature on
the Affidavit or interposed objections to Ricardos possession of
the land, which was open, absolute and in the concept of an
owner. Dominador contends that the alleged written instrument
dated 15 May 1978 executed by Juanita years before she died
was only made known lately and conveys the possibility of
being fabricated. Dominador adds that the alleged highly
questionable signature of Juanita on the Affidavit was only
made an issue after 35 years from the date of the transfer in
1966 until the filing of the case in 2001. As a buyer in good
faith, Dominador invokes the defense of acquisitive prescription
against petitioners.
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the
following circumstances: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.8
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on
the ground of prescription based solely on the Affidavit executed
by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the property
from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is speculative.
Thus, a review of the case is necessary.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by
Dominador based on Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
which states:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis
supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the
Affidavit was executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the
present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than 30
years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in
favor of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the
action to question the Affidavit had already prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly
relied on the Affidavit alone in order to dismiss the case without
considering petitioners evidence. The facts show that the land
was sold to Dominador by Ricardos daughters, namely
Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of
Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not presented as
evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos daughters had
any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent
evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to,
acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to
Dominador. In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily
concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal personality to sell
the property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal personality or right
to [sell] the subject property is of no moment in this case. It
should be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his]
daughters and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia
might have already consented to or ratified the alleged deed of
sale.9
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any
proof to show that Ricardos possession of the land had been
open, continuous and exclusive for more than 30 years in order
to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.10 Dominador
merely assumed that Ricardo had been in possession of the land
for 30 years based on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The
petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading filed with the
RTC for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and
damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he separated
from his wife sometime after 1966 and moved to another place.
The records do not mention, however, whether Ricardo had any
intention to go back to the land or whether Ricardos family ever
lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land
declared in his name for taxation purposes from 1966 after the
Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case was filed.
Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is
evidence of claim to possession of the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of
the land. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive
prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article
494 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order
that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites
must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or
other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have
been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.11
In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After
Juanitas death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of
their mothers land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified
about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998,
notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land
solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardos interest in the land
had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after
repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v.
Prangan-Valera,12 we held that in order that title may prescribe
in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that
he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before
the prescriptive period begins to run.
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to
run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice
of Ricardos repudiation of their claims to the land. Since
petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October
2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period
falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription
period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal
ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke
acquisitive prescription.
Further, Dominadors argument that prescription began to
commence in 1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is
erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit submitted
to the RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years. Dominador did not submit any other
corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos alleged possession
since 1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals,13 we
held that the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon
which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete
and conclusive in order to establish the prescription. Here,
Dominador failed to present any other competent evidence to
prove the alleged extraordinary acquisitive prescription of
Ricardo over the land. Since the property is an unregistered
land, Dominador bought the land at his own risk, being aware as
buyer that no title had been issued over the land. As a
consequence, Dominador is not afforded protection unless he
can manifestly prove his legal entitlement to his claim.
With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold
that the RTC did not err in taking cognizance of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
7691),14 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) except actions
for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x
On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil actions
which involve title to or possession of real property, or any
interest, outside Metro Manila where the assessed value does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00). The provision
states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared
for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."
In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of
the land was 590.00 according to the Declaration of Property
as of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based on the value
alone, being way below 20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction
over the case. However, petitioners argued that the action was
not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition
and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since
annulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.151avvphi1
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill, 16 we held
that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to
recover ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1)
the due execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by
Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole
owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim
to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of
the deed of sale executed between Ricardos daughters and
Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is something
other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the
RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted.17
In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence
relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of
prescription, insufficiently established Dominadors rightful
claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try
the case on the merits to determine who among the parties are
legally entitled to the land.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE
AND SET ASIDE the Orders dated 8 September 2006 and 13
February 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City,
Branch 34 in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B.
AGUILAR, respondents.
Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.
Siruello, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private
respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV
No. 03933 declaring null and void the orders of 23 and 26 April,
1979, the judgment by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of
22 October 1979 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City, Branch 30, and directing the trial court to set the
case for pre-trial conference.
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is
the youngest of seven (7) children of the late Maximiano
Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two
brothers purchased a house and lot in Paraaque where their
father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful
neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share
in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-
third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February
1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in
the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the
remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the
Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession
and enjoyment of the house together with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from
SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed
and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It
was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and
his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded
from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that
the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's
demands, the latter filed on 12 January 1979 an action to compel
the sale of the house and lot so that the they could divide the
proceeds between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale,
be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-
third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly
rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father
died.
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had
no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be
obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof
should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.
Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26
April 1979 with the lawyers of both parties notified of the pre-
trial, and served with the pre-trial order, with private respondent
executing a special power of attorney to his lawyer to appear at
the pre-trial and enter into any amicable settlement in his
behalf.1
On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for
respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial on the ground that
he would be accompanying his wife to Dumaguete City where
she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.
On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without
merit, the trial court denied the motion and directed that the pre-
trial should continue as scheduled.
When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April
1979, plaintiff and his counsel appeared. Defendant did not
appear; neither his counsel in whose favor he executed a special
power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial.
Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared
defendant as in default and ordered reception of plaintiff's
evidence ex parte.
On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus
motion to reconsider the order of default and to defer reception
of evidence. The trial court denied the motion and plaintiff
presented his evidence.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against
defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-
owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their
written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been
deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's
continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite
demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to
delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff
as co-owner to demand partition. Since plaintiff could not agree
to the amount offered by defendant for the former's share, the
trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person
and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property
and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals2 from January 1975 up to
the date of decision plus interest from the time the action was
filed.
On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for
new trial but on 22 October 1979 the trial court denied the
motion.
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that
the following orders and decision of the trial court be set aside:
(a) the order of 23 April 1970 denying defendants motion for
postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order
of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and authorizing
plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte; (e) the default
judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated 22 October
1979 denying his omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of
the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment
rendered by default., The appellate court found the explanation
of counsel for defendant in his motion to cancel pre-trial as
satisfactory and devoid of a manifest intention to delay the
disposition of the case. It also ruled that the trial court should
have granted the motion for postponement filed by counsel for
defendant who should not have been declared as in default for
the absence of his counsel.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals
erred (1) in not holding that the motion of defendant through
counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2)
in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial.
The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly
declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the
pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present his evidence ex-
parte, and whether the trial court correctly rendered the default
judgment against respondent.
We find merit in the petition.
As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of
parties at the pre-trial is mandatory. 3 A party who fails to appear
at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in
default.4 In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel
failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has
authority to declare respondent in default.5
Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-
trial hearing, the grant or denial thereof is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, which should take into account two
factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement,
namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and (b) the merits
of the case of movant.6
In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the
motion of counsel for respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be
without merit. Counsel's explanation that he had to go to by boat
as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her
to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979 where she
was one of the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it
insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-trial, and the
Court of Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We
sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion
in denying the postponement for lack of merit. Certainly, to
warrant a postponement of a mandatory process as pre-trial
would require much more than mere attendance in a social
function. It is time indeed we emphasize that there should be
much more than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial
procedure. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to
attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition
of cases.
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement
three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel
for respondent could not attend the pre-trial on the scheduled
date, respondent at least should have personally appeared in
order not to be declared as in default. But, since nobody
appeared for him, the order of the trial court declaring him as in
default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex
parte was proper.7
With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by
default, which respondent appellate court did not touch upon in
resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the basis of the
pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte,
petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and
lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of
the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such
demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided
equally according to their respective interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals
to petitioner from the time their father died in 1975 and to
vacate the house so that it can be sold to third persons. Petitioner
alleges that respondent's continued stay in the property hinders
its disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the part of
petitioner, he claims that he should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a
monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.
In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to
vacate the property so that it could be sold to third persons and
the proceeds divided between them equally, and for respondent
to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of
P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with their stipulated
sharing reflected in their written agreement.
We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except
as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by
respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence
only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in
accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner
may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule,
Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be,
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall
be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted
to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any
of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-
owners. In one case,8 this Court upheld the order of the trial
court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties
owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the
house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as
he may use the property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a
manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-
owners.9 Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises
his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division
is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and
every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use
and enjoyment of the
same. 10
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end
the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not
refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the
property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and
equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the
property so that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness
to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per
month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered
him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the
property appertaining to petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the
property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed
terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also
ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his
family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the
property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent
should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family
vacate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is REINSTATED,
with the modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is
ordered to vacate the premises in question within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B.
Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00 with interest at the legal
rate from the time he received the decision of the trial court
directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves the premises.
The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to
implement this decision conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil
Code and the Rules of Court. This decision is final and
executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by
GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage
involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce
obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces
Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November
11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City. 2 The
CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in
the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was
living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina
civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in
a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan
on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to
EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina
Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda
L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades
of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to
live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975,
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree
of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in
Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm
named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON)
where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA
purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th
Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for 1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for
36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit
was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment,
the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on
August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following
names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
(25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A.
Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of
ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan
in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko,
for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7,
1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100);
MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko
(50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same
was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The
parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until
the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium
unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment
found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNAs son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased
out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his
father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own
law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and
equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint
efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-
owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to
the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her share in
the said properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY.
LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latters last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio
Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject
properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared
the owner of the portion of the subject properties;that the
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the
condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be
conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad
administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY.
LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial
upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting
of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport
and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the
RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED
 THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN
LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE
MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE
UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA
AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE
UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT
APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED
BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO
PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the
trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE
RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed
modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY.
LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997. The absolute
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican
Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA
because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27,
2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting
of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic)
SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-
appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired
from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces
Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and
valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as
owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds
ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces
Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby
declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on
certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was
unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was
not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
recognizing the Dominican Republic courts approval
of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the
contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to
ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the
divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and,
secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late
Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in
property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10,
1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The
Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect
that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between
Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The
non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of
the spouses are residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and
the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up
to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms
to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon
the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided
bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the
divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into
any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September
10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage
settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of
the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership
of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately
by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for
any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175
of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article
191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of
a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation
of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the
petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as
well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any
petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe
hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition
for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take
such measures as may protect the creditors and other third
persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501
shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late
Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that
the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for
divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical
to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. 21 With the
divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine
law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public
law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid
and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia
subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered
void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous,
the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband
and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the
burden of proof to confirm such fact.1wphi1 To establish co-
ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to
offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in
her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired
by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The
claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were
parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties.
Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that
the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to
an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in
the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such
relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving
it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her
actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in
the aggregate amount of at least 306,572.00, consisting in
direct contributions of 159,072.00, and in repaying the loans
Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling 146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate
contributions of 306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire
share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit
amounting to 362,264.00 of the units purchase price of
1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks
were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which
Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had
the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases;
and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own
due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law
practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-
ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the
petitioners assertions on her actual contributions through the
following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the New
Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to
cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the
New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But
this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it
created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were
not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to
marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This
void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148
provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of
money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly
married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147.
The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad
faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an
inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not
recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an
actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to
establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed
used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of
the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for 55,000.00 payable to
Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which
was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of
Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on
April 29, 1978 in the amount of 97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was
for 49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979,
also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check,
Exhibit "M", for 4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None
of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to
the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium
unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of
100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for
SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of
the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the
same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA,
thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with
his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not
appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was
acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans
from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust
Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff
does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or
partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761
were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad
L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof
are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive
of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but
logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually
purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law
books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA
who bought the law office space and the law books from his
earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg
or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he
headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by
the CA both because they were substantiated by the records and
because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not
serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that
Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds
and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the
properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership
of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest)
who acquired real properties in the country as against his former
Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were
registered under the Torrens system?
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in
1983 after he was assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz
Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in
Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the
Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he
met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother
of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel.
Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in
English. In dire need of additional income to support her
children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in
Antoniettas residence at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together
in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they
transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro
Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell
dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 covering the
properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the
buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was
likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register
of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich
was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the
document. But it could be noted that his signature remained on
the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as
buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last
page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 over the properties were issued in respondents name
alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp.
Proc. No. 39-MAN,4 and per Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.5
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then,
respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live
with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported
respondents sons for only two months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986.
Petitioner was engaged in the real estate business. He also built
and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich
purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from
petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about
150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests
in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for 250,000, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." 6 On July
26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject
property has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property before the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the
Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986
and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over
the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as
buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since
respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price
and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid
for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was
the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner
acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed
in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not
pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she
claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal
funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots
in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited
to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged
financial capacity to buy the disputed property with money from
a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented
Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the
substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still
employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker
A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase
and acquisition of [the] properties under litigation that Wilhelm
Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of
Jambrich earning much is not only supported by documentary
evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrichs financial capacity to
acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed.7
xxx
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before
defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she
was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an
income of 1,000.00 a month and was . . . renting and living
only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave.,
Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her
children that he offered her a better life which she readily
accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and
her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child
Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which
facts she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same
when she was personally interviewed by her in connection with
the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that,
if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her .
. . and if it was also true that during this time she was already
earning as much as 8,000.00 to 9,000.00 as profit per month
from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievable and
impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable
condition since it is the observation of this Court that she is not
only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty
as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving
as clearly shown by her actuation when she was already
cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the
allowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is
not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her
children.8
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that
she could acquire the properties under litigation or could
contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to
her is worth more than 700,000.00 when while she was
working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning 1,000.00 a
month as salary and tips of more or less 2,000.00 she could not
even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that
it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress
when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and
live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for
her and her children who were already abandoned by her
husband.9
xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared
and was included in [the contracts to sell dated November 18,
1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale
dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as observed by
the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has
taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time
was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude
shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for
everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that
time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these
properties under litigation was at the time when their
relationship was still going smoothly and
harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over
the residential house of strong materials and three
parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which
are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792
issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791
and 24792 issued in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a
Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to
cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name
of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new
ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I,"
"K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they appear to
convey rights and interests over the properties in
question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys
fees in the amount of 25,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of 10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.11
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated April 10, 2002,12 the appellate court reversed the decision
of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of
Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The
circumstances involved in the case cited by the lower court and
similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the
validity of the title of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are
absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the
title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the
alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120
SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79
Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs.
Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De
Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138
SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject property is
not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-
appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property
he has no title thereto.13
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DISREGARDING RESPONDENTS JUDICIAL
ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICHS PARTICIPATION, INTEREST
AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE
TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT
THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELL-REASONED
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING
DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court,
who between respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial
capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the
acquisition of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was
gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an
Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary
of 50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost
one year where his monthly salary was approximately
90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from
1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not more than 1,000.00.
In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was
unemployed, as admitted by her during the pre-trial conference.
Her allegations of income from a copra business were
unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the
business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She
has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax
return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire,
and the last one left standing was already scrap. Further, the
Child Study Report15 submitted by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings
of respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she
was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At
first she had no problem with money because most of the
customers of St. Moritz are (sic) foreigners and they gave good
tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners
coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time.
Her financial problem started then. She was even renting a small
room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was
during her time of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm
Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself and her
children.16
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw
Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said
Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor
him in [the] English language. Antonietta accepted the offer
because she was in need of additional income to support [her] 2
young children who were abandoned by their father. Their
session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the
residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue,
Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the
family particularly the children who were malnourished. After a
few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family
into a decent place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good
for the children. Antonietta who was miserable and financially
distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the
children.18
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to
Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the three
parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
 (1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath,
during her re-direct examination and during the
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that
Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question,
but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute
Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his
signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed
as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land
in installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account
with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments
were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with
Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where
she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament,
where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties
to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights,
interests and participation over the subject properties to
petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on
July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The
findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of
exceptions. In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did
not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They
differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired
during the couples cohabitation also does not help respondent.
The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each
other, does not apply.19 In the instant case, respondent was still
legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.
In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to
prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties
in the name of respondent alone. Having found that the true
buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm
Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties
in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. 22 Certificates of title
are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact
that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her
name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make
her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does
not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title
is quiet,23 and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to
this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and
did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case.
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition
of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor
did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring
private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section
5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire private
land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." Private land may be transferred only to
individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least
60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule
now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-
Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except
only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made
by a former natural-born citizen.29
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-
Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an
Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had
not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a
Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v.
Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a
number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United
Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor
of petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm
Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio
since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines,
he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by
plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in
the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner
and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of
respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the
residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land
designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of
Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his
name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to pay
petitioner 25,000 as attorneys fees and 10,000 as litigation
expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board
for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases, 32 is this
since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers
made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is
already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen,
there would be no more public policy to be protected. The
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April
10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.