THIRD DIVISION
that it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant
[G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000]
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO
FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners
of a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof
that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence,
mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result
in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] (CA), which reversed the October 7, 1997 Order
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).[2] The dispositive part of the
CA Decision reads: Jur-is
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the
questioned orders of the court a quo dated October 7, 1997 and
November 11, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The judgment of the court a quo dated June 5, 1997 is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents."[3]
The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows: Supr-ema
"Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June 5, 1997
affirming in toto the appealed judgment of the [MTC] is hereby
reconsidered and a new one is entered reversing said decision of
the [MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the above-entitled
case."[4]
Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
"[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
6756, an action for ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the
MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against [herein Petitioner]
Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their
complaint dated July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they
are the absolute owners of an apartment building located at
ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-
private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last
seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent;
Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other
defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental,
which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants;
that they have demanded several times [that] the defendants x x
x vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the
construction of a new building; and that they have also
demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos
representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of
P143,600.00 from Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven
(7) years, but the said demands went unheeded. They then
prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the property in
question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals, as well as to
jointly pay P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
"[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an
answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez
spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-
owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell
wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in
question together with [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She then
asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
"After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15,
1996, the MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings
within ten (10) days from receipt of such order, pursuant to
section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position
paper on November 29, 1996, while the [respondents] filed their
position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto their
marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the
Contract to Sell over the disputed property. The MTC thereafter
promulgated its judgment on January 22, 1997[.]Scs-daad
xxxxxxxxx
"Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two other]
defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez and [Petitioner] Guillerma had
an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in
question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their two (2)
children for around ten(10) years, and that Guillerma
administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees
of the other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent
Mario] deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. It was
also during the early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario]
accused her of being unfaithful and demonstrated his baseless
[jealousy].
"In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two other]
defendants further averred that it was only recently that Toto
Tumlos was temporarily accommodated in one of the rooms of
the subject premises while Gina Tumlos acted as a nanny for the
children. In short, their presence there [was] only transient and
they [were] not tenants of the Fernandez spouses.
"On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in
toto the judgment of the MTC. S-daad
"The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed
a motion for reconsideration on July 3, 1997, alleging that the
decision of affirmance by the RTC was constitutionally flawed
for failing to point out distinctly and clearly the findings of facts
and law on which it was based vis--vis the statements of issues
they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They also
averred that the Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs
which named the buyer as Mario P. Fernandez, of legal age,
married to Lourdes P. Fernandez, should not be given credence
as it was falsified to appear that way. According to them, the
Contract to Sell originally named Guillerma Fernandez as the
spouse of [Respondent Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its
judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued by the sellers
naming the [respondents] as the buyers after the latter presented
their marriage contract and requested a change in the name of
the vendee-wife. Such facts necessitate the conclusion that
Guillerma was really a co-owner thereof, and that the
[respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to deprive her
of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized by law.
Sd-aamiso
xxxxxxxxx
"The [RTC], in determining the question of ownership in order
to resolve the issue of possession, ruled therein that the Contract
to Sell submitted by the Fernandez spouses appeared not to be
authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of the wife of
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Hence, the contract presented
by the [respondents] cannot be given any weight. The court
further ruled that Guillerma and [Respondent Mario] acquired
the property during their cohabitation as husband and wife,
although without the benefit of marriage. From such findings,
the court concluded that [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a
co-owner of the subject property and could not be ejected
therefrom.
"The [respondents] then filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of reversal, but the same was denied by the [RTC]."[5]
As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this Petition
filed by Guillerma Tumlos only.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rejected petitioners claim that she and Respondent
Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property. The
CA ruled: Scnc-m
"From the inception of the instant case, the only defense
presented by private respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-
owner of the subject property[.]
xxxxxxxxx
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven by
Guillerma, as correctly held by the trial court. No other evidence
was presented to validate such claim, except for the said
affidavit/position paper. As previously stated, it was only on
appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the
petitioner-husband without the benefit of marriage, and that she
bore him two (2) children. Attached to her memorandum on
appeal are the birth certificates of the said children. Such
contentions and documents should not have been considered by
the x x x (RTC), as they were not presented in her
affidavit/position paper before the trial court (MTC).
xxxxxxxxx
"However, even if the said allegations and documents could be
considered, the claim of co-ownership must still fail. As [herein
Respondent] Mario Fernandez is validly married to
[Respondent] Lourdes Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract
dated April 27, 1968, p. 45, Original Record), Guillerma and
Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the
property relations governing their supposed cohabitation is that
found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines[.]
xxxxxxxxx
"It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision,
in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household
are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The care given by
one party [to] the home, children, and household, or spiritual or
moral inspiration provided to the other, is not included in Article
148 (Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia
V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p. 209). Hence, if actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares (Agapay, supra at p. 348, citing
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines Volume I by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1990 ed., p. 500).
"In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by
Guillerma Tumlos in the purchase of the subject property was
presented. Her only evidence was her being named in the
Contract to Sell as the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez.
Since she failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the subject apartment building, We find no
basis to justify her co-ownership with [Respondent Mario]. The
said property is thus presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there
being no other proof to the contrary (please see Article 116 of
the Family Code).
"The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent Mario] has
two (2) children with Guillerma who are in her custody, and that
to eject them from the apartment building would be to run
counter with the obligation of the former to give support to his
minor illegitimate children, which indispensably includes
dwelling. As previously discussed, such finding has no leg to
stand on, it being based on evidence presented for the first time
on appeal. Nc-mmis
xxxxxxxxx
"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly
presented, the RTC failed to consider that the need for support
cannot be presumed. Article 203 of the Family Code expressly
provides that the obligation to give support shall be demandable
from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. x x x. Nc-m
"In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court,
the RTC instead presumed that Guillerma and her children
needed support from [Respondent Mario]. Worse, it relied on
evidence not properly presented before the trial court (MTC).
"With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto Tumlos, a
close perusal of the records shows that they did not file any
responsive pleading. Hence, judgment may be rendered against
them as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint
and limited to what is prayed for therein, as provided for in
Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. There
was no basis for the public respondent to dismiss the complaint
against them."[7] (emphasis in the original) Ol-dmiso
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for
the consideration of the Court:
"I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion
in not outrightly dismissing the petition for review filed by
respondents.
"II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not
the co-owner of the property in litis.
"III. Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in applying
Art. 148 of the Family Code in the case at bar. Man-ikan
"IV. The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the substantive
right of support vis--vis the remedy of ejectment resorted to by
respondents."[8]
In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the
petitioner a co-owner of the property? (b) Can the claim for
support bar this ejectment suit? We shall also discuss these
preliminary matters: (a) whether the CA was biased in favor of
respondents and (b) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit. Manik-s
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of
herein respondents. This bias, she argues, is manifest in the
following: Man-ikx
1. The CA considered the respondents Petition for Review[9]
despite their failure to attach several pleadings as well as the
explanation for the proof of service, despite the clear mandate of
Section 11[10] of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court and
despite the ruling in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
Ricafort.[11]
2. It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not
attached.
3. It considered respondents Reply dated May 20, 1998, which
had allegedly been filed out of time. Ne-xold
4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without
first determining whether to give due course to the Petition,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.[12]
The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in
this wise: Mi-so
"It is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural
error after we have rendered the decision. More importantly,
when the private respondent filed their comment to the petition
on April 26, 1998, they failed to question such alleged
procedural error. Neither have they questioned all the
resolutions issued by the Court after their filing of such
comment. They should, therefore, be now considered in estoppel
to question the same."[13]
We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never raised these
matters before the CA. She cannot be allowed now to challenge
its Decision on grounds of alleged technicalities being belatedly
raised as an afterthought. In this light, she cannot invoke
Solar[14] because she never raised this issue before the CA.
Spp-edjo
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on
petitioners part to rely, on the one hand, on these procedural
technicalities to overcome the appealed Decision and, on the
other hand, assert that the RTC may consider the new evidence
she presented for the first time on appeal. Such posturing only
betrays the futility of petitioners assertion, if not its absence of
merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the court of
origin, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), did not have
jurisdiction over the "nature of the case," alleging that the real
question involved is one of ownership. Since the issue of
possession cannot be settled without passing upon that of
ownership, she maintains that the MTC should have dismissed
the case. Josp-ped
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership may be
passed upon by the MTC to settle the issue of possession.[15]
Such disposition, however, is not final insofar as the issue of
ownership is concerned,[16] which may be the subject of
another proceeding brought specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now move on to
petitioners substantive contentions. Spped
First Issue: Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents
action for ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the
property with Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first instance
before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that
she was his spouse. The MTC found this document insufficient
to support her claim. The RTC, however, after considering her
allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as
shown by evidence presented before it,[17] ruled in her favor.
Misspped
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence
adduced before the RTC could no longer be considered because
they had not been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the
appellate court concluded that "[t]he claim of co-ownership was
not satisfactorily proven x x x."[18]
We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in
considering the evidence presented before it. Nonetheless, we
reject her claim that she was a co-owner of the disputed
property. Missc
Evidence Presented on Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the
evidence presented by petitioner, the CA relied on the doctrine
that issues not raised during trial could not be considered for the
first time during appeal.[19]
We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or
issues belatedly raised during the appeal before the RTC. The
defense invoked by petitioner at the very start was that she was
a co-owner. To support her claim, she presented a Contract to
Sell dated November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario
Fernandez was legally married to her. The allegation that she
was cohabiting with him was a mere elaboration of her initial
theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on
considerations of fair play. Respondents never objected when
the assailed evidence was presented before the RTC. Thus, they
cannot claim unfair surprise or prejudice. Scmis
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and
the RTC, we cannot accept petitioners submission that she is a
co-owner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the
Civil Code.[20] As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law
is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the
Family Code which provides:
"Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article,[21] only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith." Sc
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship
between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry
each other,[22] or to one in which the marriage of the parties is
void[23] from the beginning.[24] It does not apply to a
cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it
would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the
man and his lawful wife.[25]
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those
submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that
Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because
he was legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear
that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario
in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil
Code is inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and
Respondent Mario Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy points out[26] that
"[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the
property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage." x-sc

Hence, petitioners argument -- that the Family Code is
inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition of the
property occurred before its effectivity -- deserves scant
consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it
can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or
acquired rights.[27] In this case, petitioner failed to show any
vested right over the property in question. Moreover, to resolve
similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code
retroactively.[28]
No Evidence of Actual Joint Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners claim that
she is a co-owner of the property. In Agapay,[29] the Court
ruled:
"Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed that the actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
family and household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares." (emphasis ours) xl-aw
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had
made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property.
Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her
cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during
the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by
itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Article 148 of the
Family Code provides that the administration of the property
amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in
ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the premises. Sc-lex
Second Issue: Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez
failed to repudiate her claim regarding the filiation of his alleged
sons, Mark Gil and Michael Fernandez, his silence on the matter
amounts to an admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for
support, she advances the theory that the childrens right to
support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the
right of respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment
suit whereby respondents seek to exercise their possessory right
over their property. It is summary in character and deals solely
with the issue of possession of the property in dispute. Here, it
has been shown that they have a better right to possess it than
does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on
their tolerance. Scl-aw
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez alleged failure to
repudiate petitioners claim of filiation is not relevant to the
present case. Indeed, it would be highly improper for us to rule
on such issue. Besides, it was not properly taken up below.[30]
In any event, Article 298[31] of the Civil Code requires that
there should be an extrajudicial demand.[32] None was made
here. The CA was correct when it said:
"Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly
presented, the RTC failed to consider that the need for support
cannot be presumed. Article [298] of the [New Civil Code]
expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive
the same need it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date of judicial and extrajudicial demand."[33]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Rtc-spped
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 140528 December 7, 2011
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely:
EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and children: CLARO,
MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all
surnamed TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO VDA. DE
RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO
TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: JOSE and
DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA; EUFROSINA
TORBELA ROSARIO, represented by her heirs, namely:
ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO,
ROMULO T. ROSARIO and ANDREA ROSARIO-
HADUCA; LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO
TORBELA, represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO T.
TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T.
ZULUETA, CANDIDO T. TORBELA, FLORENTINA T.
TORBELA and PANTALEON T. TORBELA; DOLORES
TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN,
represented by her heirs, namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO,
CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed AGUSTIN; and
SEVERINA TORBELA ILDEFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and LENA DUQUE-
ROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 140553
LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK,
Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Presently before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, both
assailing the Decision1 dated June 29, 1999 and Resolution2
dated October 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 39770.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 140528 are siblings Maria Torbela,3
Pedro Torbela,4 Eufrosina Torbela Rosario,5 Leonila Torbela
Tamin, Fernando Torbela,6 Dolores Torbela Tablada, Leonora
Torbela Agustin,7 and Severina Torbela Ildefonso (Torbela
siblings).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 140553 is Lena Duque-Rosario
(Duque-Rosario), who was married to, but now legally
separated from, Dr. Andres T. Rosario (Dr. Rosario). Dr.
Rosario is the son of Eufrosina Torbela Rosario and the nephew
of the other Torbela siblings.
The controversy began with a parcel of land, with an area of 374
square meters, located in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (Lot No.
356-A). It was originally part of a larger parcel of land, known
as Lot No. 356 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, measuring
749 square meters, and covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 16676,8 in the name of Valeriano Semilla
(Valeriano), married to Potenciana Acosta. Under unexplained
circumstances, Valeriano gave Lot No. 356-A to his sister Marta
Semilla, married to Eugenio Torbela (spouses Torbela). Upon
the deaths of the spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was
adjudicated in equal shares among their children, the Torbela
siblings, by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition9 dated
December 3, 1962.
On December 12, 1964, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim10 over Lot No. 356-A in favor of Dr.
Rosario. According to the said Deed, the Torbela siblings "for
and in consideration of the sum of NINE PESOS (9.00) x x x
transfer[red] and convey[ed] x x x unto the said Andres T.
Rosario, that undivided portion of THREE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FOUR square meters of that parcel of land
embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 16676 of the land
records of Pangasinan x x x."11 Four days later, on December
16, 1964, OCT No. 16676 in Valerianos name was partially
cancelled as to Lot No. 356-A and TCT No. 5275112 was issued
in Dr. Rosarios name covering the said property.
Another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim13 was subsequently
executed on December 28, 1964, this time by Dr. Rosario,
acknowledging that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the
Torbela siblings and was already returning the same to the latter
for 1.00. The Deed stated:
That for and in consideration of the sum of one peso (1.00),
Philippine Currency and the fact that I only borrowed the above
described parcel of land from MARIA TORBELA, married to
Eulogio Tosino, EUFROSINA TORBELA, married to Pedro
Rosario, PEDRO TORBELA, married to Petra Pagador,
LEONILA TORBELA, married to Fortunato Tamen,
FERNANDO TORBELA, married to Victoriana Tablada,
DOLORES TORBELA, widow, LEONORA TORBELA,
married to Matias Agustin and SEVERINA TORBELA, married
to Jorge Ildefonso, x x x by these presents do hereby cede,
transfer and convey by way of this ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM
unto the said Maria, Eufrosina, Pedro, Leonila, Fernando,
Dolores, Leonora and Severina, all surnamed Torbela the parcel
of land described above.14 (Emphasis ours.)
The aforequoted Deed was notarized, but was not immediately
annotated on TCT No. 52751.
Following the issuance of TCT No. 52751, Dr. Rosario obtained
a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) on
February 21, 1965 in the sum of 70,200.00, secured by a
mortgage constituted on Lot No. 356-A. The mortgage was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 on September 21, 1965 as Entry
No. 243537.15 Dr. Rosario used the proceeds of the loan for the
construction of improvements on Lot No. 356-A.
On May 16, 1967, Cornelio T. Tosino (Cornelio) executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim,16 on behalf of the Torbela siblings.
Cornelio deposed in said Affidavit:
3. That ANDRES T. ROSARIO later quitclaimed his rights in
favor of the former owners by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim which he executed before Notary Public Banaga, and
entered in his Notarial Registry as Dec. No. 43; Page No. 9;
Book No. I; Series of 1964;
4. That it is the desire of the parties, my aforestated kins, to
register ownership over the above-described property or to
perfect their title over the same but their Deed could not be
registered because the registered owner now, ANDRES T.
ROSARIO mortgaged the property with the DEVELOPMENT
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, on September 21, 1965, and for
which reason, the Title is still impounded and held by the said
bank;
5. That pending payment of the obligation with the
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES or
redemption of the Title from said bank, I, CORNELIO T.
TOSINO, in behalf of my mother MARIA TORBELA-
TOSINO, and my Aunts EUFROSINA TORBELA, LEONILA
TORBELA-TAMEN, DOLORES TORBELA, LEONORA
TORBELA-AGUSTIN, SEVERINA TORBELA-ILDEFONSO,
and my Uncles PEDRO TORBELA and FERNANDO, also
surnamed TORBELA, I request the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan to annotate their adverse claim at the back of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52751, based on the annexed
document, Deed of Absolute Quitclaim by ANDRES T.
ROSARIO, dated December 28, 1964, marked as Annex "A"
and made a part of this Affidavit, and it is also requested that the
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES be informed
accordingly.17
The very next day, on May 17, 1967, the Torbela siblings had
Cornelios Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and
Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28,
1964 annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos. 27447118 and
274472,19 respectively.
The construction of a four-storey building on Lot No. 356-A
was eventually completed. The building was initially used as a
hospital, but was later converted to a commercial building. Part
of the building was leased to PT&T; and the rest to Mrs. Andrea
Rosario-Haduca, Dr. Rosarios sister, who operated the Rose
Inn Hotel and Restaurant.
Dr. Rosario was able to fully pay his loan from DBP. Under
Entry No. 520197 on TCT No. 5275120 dated March 6, 1981,
the mortgage appearing under Entry No. 243537 was cancelled
per the Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage executed by
DBP in favor of Dr. Rosario and ratified before a notary public
on July 11, 1980.
In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) sometime in 1979-1981.
Records do not reveal though the original amount of the loan
from PNB, but the loan agreement was amended on March 5,
1981 and the loan amount was increased to 450,000.00. The
loan was secured by mortgages constituted on the following
properties: (1) Lot No. 356-A, covered by TCT No. 52751 in
Dr. Rosarios name; (2) Lot No. 4489, with an area of 1,862
square meters, located in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, covered by
TCT No. 24832; and (3) Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A, with an area
of 1,001 square meters, located in Nancayasan, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, covered by TCT No. 104189.21 The amended loan
agreement and mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was annotated on
TCT No. 52751 on March 6, 1981 as Entry No. 520099.22
Five days later, on March 11, 1981, another annotation, Entry
No. 520469,23 was made on TCT No. 52751, canceling the
adverse claim on Lot No. 356-A under Entry Nos. 274471-
274472, on the basis of the Cancellation and Discharge of
Mortgage executed by Dr. Rosario on March 5, 1981. Entry No.
520469 consisted of both stamped and handwritten portions, and
exactly reads:
Entry No. 520469. Cancellation of Adverse Claim executed by
Andres Rosario in favor of same. The incumbrance/mortgage
appearing under Entry No. 274471-72 is now cancelled as per
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage Ratified before Notary
Public Mauro G. Meris on March 5, 1981: Doc. No. 215; Page
No. 44; Book No. 1; Series Of 1981.
Lingayen, Pangasinan, 3-11, 19981
[Signed: Pedro dela Cruz]
Register of Deeds 24
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife, Duque-Rosario
(spouses Rosario), acquired a third loan in the amount of
1,200,000.00 from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
(Banco Filipino). To secure said loan, the spouses Rosario again
constituted mortgages on Lot No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot
No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. The mortgage on Lot No. 356-A was
annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry No. 53328325 on
December 18, 1981. Since the construction of a two-storey
commercial building on Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was still
incomplete, the loan value thereof as collateral was deducted
from the approved loan amount. Thus, the spouses Rosario
could only avail of the maximum loan amount of 830,064.00
from Banco Filipino.
Because Banco Filipino paid the balance of Dr. Rosarios loan
from PNB, the mortgage on Lot No. 356-A in favor of PNB was
cancelled per Entry No. 53347826 on TCT No. 52751 dated
December 23, 1981.
On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, a
Complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No.
356-A, plus damages, against the spouses Rosario, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. U-4359. On the same day, Entry
Nos. 593493 and 593494 were made on TCT No. 52751 that
read as follows:
Entry No. 593494 Complaint Civil Case No. U-4359 (For:
Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages. (Sup.
Paper).
Entry No. 593493 Notice of Lis Pendens The parcel of land
described in this title is subject to Lis Pendens executed by
Liliosa B. Rosario, CLAO, Trial Attorney dated February 13,
1986. Filed to TCT No. 52751
February 13, 1986-1986 February 13 3:30 p.m.
(SGD.) PACIFICO M. BRAGANZA
Register of Deeds27
The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan from
Banco Filipino. As of April 2, 1987, the spouses Rosarios
outstanding principal obligation and penalty charges amounted
to 743,296.82 and 151,524.00, respectively.28
Banco Filipino extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages on Lot
No. 356-A, Lot No. 4489, and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
During the public auction on April 2, 1987, Banco Filipino was
the lone bidder for the three foreclosed properties for the price
of 1,372,387.04. The Certificate of Sale29 dated April 2, 1987,
in favor of Banco Filipino, was annotated on TCT No. 52751 on
April 14, 1987 as Entry No. 610623.30
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed before the RTC
their Amended Complaint,31 impleading Banco Filipino as
additional defendant in Civil Case No. U-4359 and praying that
the spouses Rosario be ordered to redeem Lot No. 356-A from
Banco Filipino.
The spouses Rosario instituted before the RTC on March 4,
1988 a case for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure and
damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, against Banco Filipino, the
Provincial Ex Officio Sheriff and his Deputy, and the Register
of Deeds of Pangasinan. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. U-4667. Another notice of lis pendens was annotated on
TCT No. 52751 on March 10, 1988 as Entry No. 627059, viz:
Entry No. 627059 Lis Pendens Dr. Andres T. Rosario and
Lena Duque Rosario, Plaintiff versus Banco Filipino, et. al.
Civil Case No. U-4667 or Annulment of ExtraJudicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage The parcel of land
described in this title is subject to Notice of Lis Pendens
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Mauro G. Meris,
as Doc. No. 21; Page No. 5; Book 111; S-1988. March 7, 1988-
1988 March 10, 1:00 p.m.
(SGD.) RUFINO M. MORENO, SR.
Register of Deeds32
The Torbela siblings intervened in Civil Case No. U-4667.
Eventually, on October 17, 1990, the RTC issued an Order33
dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. U-4667 due to the
spouses Rosarios failure to prosecute.
Meanwhile, the Torbela siblings tried to redeem Lot No. 356-A
from Banco Filipino, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Upon
the expiration of the one-year redemption period in April 1988,
the Certificate of Final Sale34 and Affidavit of Consolidation35
covering all three foreclosed properties were executed on May
24, 1988 and May 25, 1988, respectively.
On June 7, 1988, new certificates of title were issued in the
name of Banco Filipino, particularly, TCT No. 165812 for Lot
No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and TCT No. 165813 for Lot No. 356-A
.36
The Torbela siblings thereafter filed before the RTC on August
29, 1988 a Complaint37 for annulment of the Certificate of
Final Sale dated May 24, 1988, judicial cancelation of TCT No.
165813, and damages, against Banco Filipino, the Ex Officio
Provincial Sheriff, and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. U-4733.
On June 19, 1991, Banco Filipino filed before the RTC of
Urdaneta City a Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.
In said Petition, docketed as Pet. Case No. U-822, Banco
Filipino prayed that a writ of possession be issued in its favor
over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and Lot No. 356-A, plus the
improvements thereon, and the spouses Rosario and other
persons presently in possession of said properties be directed to
abide by said writ.
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and
Pet. Case No. U-822. The Decision38 on these three cases was
promulgated on January 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the real estate mortgage over Lot 356-A covered by
TCT 52751 executed by Spouses Andres Rosario in favor of
Banco Filipino, legal and valid;
2. Declaring the sheriffs sale dated April 2, 1987 over Lot 356-
A covered by TCT 52751 and subsequent final Deed of Sale
dated May 14, 1988 over Lot 356-A covered by TCT No. 52751
legal and valid;
3. Declaring Banco Filipino the owner of Lot 356-A covered by
TCT No. 52751 (now TCT 165813);
4. Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot
356-A together with the improvements thereon (Rose Inn
Building). The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue
a writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino;
5. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to render
accounting to Banco Filipino the rental they received from
tenants of Rose Inn Building from May 14, 1988;
6. [The Torbela siblings] are hereby ordered to pay Banco
Filipino the sum of 20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
7. Banco Filipino is hereby ordered to give [the Torbela
siblings] the right of first refusal over Lot 356-A. The Register
of Deeds is hereby ordered to annotate the right of [the Torbela
siblings] at the back of TCT No. 165813 after payment of the
required fees;
8. Dr. Rosario and Lena Rosario are hereby ordered to
reimburse [the Torbela siblings] the market value of Lot 356-A
as of December, 1964 minus payments made by the former;
9. Dismissing the complaint of [the Torbela siblings] against
Banco Filipino, Pedro Habon and Rufino Moreno in Civil Case
No. U-4733; and against Banco Filipino in Civil Case No. U-
4359.39
The RTC released an Amended Decision40 dated January 29,
1992, adding the following paragraph to the dispositive:

Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession over Lot-5-F-
8-C-2-[B]-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-122471,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 104189 of the Registry
of Deeds of Pangasinan[.]41
The Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario appealed the foregoing
RTC judgment before the Court of Appeals. Their appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 39770.
In its Decision42 dated June 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals
decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification. Items No. 6 and 7 of the
appealed decision are DELETED. Item No. 8 is modified
requiring [Dr. Rosario] to pay [the Torbela siblings] actual
damages, in the amount of 1,200,000.00 with 6% per annum
interest from finality of this decision until fully paid. [Dr.
Rosario] is further ORDERED to pay [the Torbela siblings] the
amount of 300,000.00 as moral damages; 200,000.00 as
exemplary damages and 100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Costs against [Dr. Rosario].43
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution44 dated October 22,
1999, denied the separate Motions for Reconsideration of the
Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario.
The Torbela siblings come before this Court via the Petition for
Review in G.R. No. 140528, with the following assignment of
errors:
First Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM EXECUTED BY
[DR. ANDRES T. ROSARIO] IN FAVOR OF THE
[TORBELA SIBLINGS] DATED DECEMBER 28, 1964 AND
THE REGISTRATION OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE
CLAIM EXECUTED BY THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS],
SERVE AS THE OPERATIVE ACT TO CONVEY OR
AFFECT THE LAND AND IMPROVEMENTS THEREOF IN
SO FAR AS THIRD PERSONS ARE CONCERNED.
Second Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
COVERED BY T.C.T. NO. 52751 IS CLEAN AND FREE,
DESPITE OF THE ANNOTATION OF ENCUMBRANCES
OF THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM AND THE DEED
OF ABSOLUTE QUITCLAIM APPEARING AT THE BACK
THEREOF AS ENTRY NOS. 274471 AND 274472,
RESPECTIVELY.
Third Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE NOTICE OF ADVERSE
CLAIM OF THE [TORBELA SIBLINGS] UNDER ENTRY
NO. 274471 WAS VALIDLY CANCELLED BY THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PETITION
DULY FILED IN COURT FOR ITS CANCELLATION.
Fourth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK IS A
MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH.
Fifth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE FILING OF A CIVIL
CASE NO. U-4359 ON DECEMBER 9, 1987, IMPLEADING
RESPONDENT BANCO FILIPINO AS ADDITIONAL
PARTY DEFENDANT, TOLL OR SUSPEND THE
RUNNING OF THE ONE YEAR PERIOD OF
REDEMPTION.
Sixth Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE OWNERSHIP OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS PREMATURELY
CONSOLIDATED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.
Seventh Issue and Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS
AT LEAST WORTH 1,200,000.00.45
The Torbela siblings ask of this Court:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
[Torbela siblings] most respectfully pray that the questioned
DECISION promulgated on June 29, 1999 (Annex "A",
Petition) and the RESOLUTION dated October 22, 1999
(Annex "B", Petition) be REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and/or
further MODIFIED in favor of the [Torbela siblings], and
another DECISION issue ordering, among other reliefs, the
respondent Banco Filipino to reconvey back Lot No. 356-A,
covered by T.C.T. No. 52751, in favor of the [Torbela siblings]
who are the actual owners of the same.
The [Torbela siblings] likewise pray for such other reliefs and
further remedies as may be deemed just and equitable under the
premises.46
Duque-Rosario, now legally separated from Dr. Rosario, avers
in her Petition for Review in G.R. No. 140553 that Lot No. 4489
and Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A were registered in her name, and
she was unlawfully deprived of ownership of said properties
because of the following errors of the Court of Appeals:
A (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE PERIOD TO REDEEM THE
PROPERTY HAS NOT COMMENCED, HENCE, THE
CERTIFICATE OF SALE, THE CONSOLIDATION OF
OWNERSHIP BY [BANCO FILIPINO], ARE NULL AND
VOID.
B
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
REFUSING TO RULE THAT THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT BEFORE THE COURT A QUO BY THE
[TORBELA SIBLINGS] HAD ALREADY BEEN
PRESCRIBED.47
Duque-Rosario prays that the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals be reversed and set aside, and that Lot No. 4489 and
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A be freed from all obligations and
encumbrances and returned to her.
Review of findings of fact by the RTC and the Court of Appeals
warranted.
A disquisition of the issues raised and/or errors assigned in the
Petitions at bar unavoidably requires a re-evaluation of the facts
and evidence presented by the parties in the court a quo.
In Republic v. Heirs of Julia Ramos,48 the Court summed up
the rules governing the power of review of the Court:
Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse, the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially where such
findings coincide with those of the trial
court.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february201
0/169481.htm - _ftn The findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are, as a general rule, conclusive and binding upon this
Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.
The above rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions,
such as (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both parties;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.49
As the succeeding discussion will bear out, the first, fourth, and
ninth exceptions are extant in these case.
Barangay conciliation was not a pre-requisite to the institution
of Civil Case No. U-4359.
Dr. Rosario contends that Civil Case No. U-4359, the Complaint
of the Torbela siblings for recovery of ownership and possession
of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, should have been dismissed by
the RTC because of the failure of the Torbela siblings to comply
with the prior requirement of submitting the dispute to barangay
conciliation.
The Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 on
February 13, 1986, when Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the
Barangay Level, was still in effect.50 Pertinent provisions of
said issuance read:
Section 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. The Lupon
of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except:
1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a
fine exceeding 200.00;
4. Offenses where there is no private offended party;
5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may
in the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Section 3. Venue. Disputes between or among persons actually
residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving
actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the
election of the complainant. However, all disputes which
involved real property or any interest therein shall be brought in
the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated.
The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:
1. involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin
each other; and
2. involving real property located in different municipalities.
xxxx
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint.
No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section
2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary,
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
The Court gave the following elucidation on the jurisdiction of
the Lupong Tagapayapa in Tavora v. Hon. Veloso51 :
The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the
conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay "shall have
authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable
settlement of their dispute: The parties must be "actually
residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time,
Section 3 while reiterating that the disputants must be
"actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different
barangays" within the same city or municipality
unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority"
over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities," except where
such barangays adjoin each other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon
shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not
actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where
the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.
It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose
Lupon shall take cognizance of a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD
1508 adds:
"However, all disputes which involve real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real
property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary
proviso and should operate as such.
The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its
normal function, which is to restrict or vary the operation of the
principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a
clear indication to the contrary.
"The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except
something from the enacting clause; to limit, restrict, or qualify
the statute in whole or in part; or to exclude from the scope of
the statute that which otherwise would be within its terms." (73
Am Jur 2d 467.)
Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to
restrict or vary the rule on venue prescribed in the principal
clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus: Although venue
is generally determined by the residence of the parties, disputes
involving real property shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or any part thereof is situated, notwithstanding
that the parties reside elsewhere within the same
city/municipality.52 (Emphases supplied.)
The original parties in Civil Case No. U-4359 (the Torbela
siblings and the spouses Rosario) do not reside in the same
barangay, or in different barangays within the same city or
municipality, or in different barangays of different cities or
municipalities but are adjoining each other. Some of them reside
outside Pangasinan and even outside of the country altogether.
The Torbela siblings reside separately in Barangay Macalong,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Barangay Consolacion, Urdaneta,
Pangasinan; Pangil, Laguna; Chicago, United States of America;
and Canada. The spouses Rosario are residents of Calle Garcia,
Poblacion, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Resultantly, the Lupon had no
jurisdiction over the dispute and barangay conciliation was not a
pre-condition for the filing of Civil Case No. U-4359.
The Court now looks into the merits of Civil Case No. U-4359.
There was an express trust between the Torbela siblings and Dr.
Rosario.
There is no dispute that the Torbela sibling inherited the title to
Lot No. 356-A from their parents, the Torbela spouses, who, in
turn, acquired the same from the first registered owner of Lot
No. 356-A, Valeriano.
Indeed, the Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which they transferred and
conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for the consideration of
9.00. However, the Torbela siblings explained that they only
executed the Deed as an accommodation so that Dr. Rosario
could have Lot No. 356-A registered in his name and use said
property to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of which
would be used for building a hospital on Lot No. 356-A a
claim supported by testimonial and documentary evidence, and
borne out by the sequence of events immediately following the
execution by the Torbela siblings of said Deed. On December
16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, covering Lot No. 356-A, was already
issued in Dr. Rosarios name. On December 28, 1964, Dr.
Rosario executed his own Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which
he expressly acknowledged that he "only borrowed" Lot No.
356-A and was transferring and conveying the same back to the
Torbela siblings for the consideration of 1.00. On February 21,
1965, Dr. Rosarios loan in the amount of 70,200.00, secured
by a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A, was approved by DBP. Soon
thereafter, construction of a hospital building started on Lot No.
356-A.
Among the notable evidence presented by the Torbela siblings is
the testimony of Atty. Lorenza Alcantara (Atty. Alcantara), who
had no apparent personal interest in the present case. Atty.
Alcantara, when she was still a boarder at the house of
Eufrosina Torbela Rosario (Dr. Rosarios mother), was
consulted by the Torbela siblings as regards the extrajudicial
partition of Lot No. 356-A. She also witnessed the execution of
the two Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim by the Torbela siblings
and Dr. Rosario.
In contrast, Dr. Rosario presented TCT No. 52751, issued in his
name, to prove his purported title to Lot No. 356-A. In Lee Tek
Sheng v. Court of Appeals,53 the Court made a clear distinction
between title and the certificate of title:
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the
Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented
by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with
title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The
TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.
Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant
may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To
repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the
best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should
not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used. x x x.54
(Emphases supplied.)
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such
title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better
title than what he actually has.55 Consequently, Dr. Rosario
must still prove herein his acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A,
apart from his submission of TCT No. 52751 in his name.
Dr. Rosario testified that he obtained Lot No. 356-A after
paying the Torbela siblings 25,000.00, pursuant to a verbal
agreement with the latter. The Court though observes that Dr.
Rosarios testimony on the execution and existence of the verbal
agreement with the Torbela siblings lacks significant details
(such as the names of the parties present, dates, places, etc.) and
is not corroborated by independent evidence.
In addition, Dr. Rosario acknowledged the execution of the two
Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 12, 1964 and
December 28, 1964, even affirming his own signature on the
latter Deed. The Parol Evidence Rule provides that when the
terms of the agreement have been reduced into writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.56 Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to
the terms in the two written Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim since
he did not put in issue in his pleadings (1) an intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the Deeds; (2) failure of
the Deeds to express the true intent and the agreement of the
parties thereto; (3) the validity of the Deeds; or (4) the existence
of other terms agreed to by the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario
after the execution of the Deeds.57
Even if the Court considers Dr. Rosarios testimony on his
alleged verbal agreement with the Torbela siblings, the Court
finds the same unsatisfactory. Dr. Rosario averred that the two
Deeds were executed only because he was "planning to secure
loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines and
Philippine National Bank and the bank needed absolute
quitclaim[.]"58 While Dr. Rosarios explanation makes sense
for the first Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 12,
1964 executed by the Torbela siblings (which transferred Lot
No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario for 9.00.00), the same could not be
said for the second Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December
28, 1964 executed by Dr. Rosario. In fact, Dr. Rosarios Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim (in which he admitted that he only borrowed
Lot No. 356-A and was transferring the same to the Torbela
siblings for 1.00.00) would actually work against the approval
of Dr. Rosarios loan by the banks. Since Dr. Rosarios Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964 is a declaration
against his self-interest, it must be taken as favoring the
truthfulness of the contents of said Deed.59
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from claiming or
asserting ownership over Lot No. 356-A based on his Deed of
Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's
admission in the said Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No.
356-A is deemed conclusive upon him. Under Article 1431 of
the Civil Code, "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it,
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon."60 That admission cannot now be denied by Dr.
Rosario as against the Torbela siblings, the latter having relied
upon his representation.
Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and
the Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario only holds Lot No. 356-A
in trust for the Torbela siblings.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the
legal title to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary
relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for
the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties
may either be express or implied. An express trust is created by
the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied
trust comes into being by operation of law.61
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.
Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are
required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
that a trust is clearly intended."62 It is possible to create a trust
without using the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely, the
mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate
an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is
whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of
relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial
whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends
to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the
precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a
trust.63
In Tamayo v. Callejo,64 the Court recognized that a trust may
have a constructive or implied nature in the beginning, but the
registered owners subsequent express acknowledgement in a
public document of a previous sale of the property to another
party, had the effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the
nature of an express trust. The same situation exists in this case.
When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No. 356-A in his
name under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964, an implied
trust was initially established between him and the Torbela
siblings under Article 1451 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 1451. When land passes by succession to any person and
he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust
is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true
owner.
Dr. Rosarios execution of the Deed of Absolute Quitclaim on
December 28, 1964, containing his express admission that he
only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the Torbela siblings,
eventually transformed the nature of the trust to an express one.
The express trust continued despite Dr. Rosario stating in his
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot
No. 356-A to the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained
registered in Dr. Rosarios name under TCT No. 52751 and Dr.
Rosario kept possession of said property, together with the
improvements thereon.
The right of the Torbela siblings to recover Lot No. 356-A has
not yet prescribed.
The Court extensively discussed the prescriptive period for
express trusts in the Heirs of Maximo Labanon v. Heirs of
Constancio Labanon,65 to wit:
On the issue of prescription, we had the opportunity to rule in
Bueno v. Reyes that unrepudiated written express trusts are
imprescriptible:
"While there are some decisions which hold that an action upon
a trust is imprescriptible, without distinguishing between
express and implied trusts, the better rule, as laid down by this
Court in other decisions, is that prescription does supervene
where the trust is merely an implied one. The reason has been
expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.
vs. Magdangal, 4 SCRA 84, 88, as follows:
Under Section 40 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, all actions
for recovery of real property prescribed in 10 years, excepting
only actions based on continuing or subsisting trusts that were
considered by section 38 as imprescriptible. As held in the case
of Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958, however, the
continuing or subsisting trusts contemplated in section 38 of the
Code of Civil Procedure referred only to express unrepudiated
trusts, and did not include constructive trusts (that are imposed
by law) where no fiduciary relation exists and the trustee does
not recognize the trust at all."
This principle was amplified in Escay v. Court of Appeals this
way: "Express trusts prescribe 10 years from the repudiation of
the trust (Manuel Diaz, et al. vs. Carmen Gorricho et al., 54
O.G. p. 8429, Sec. 40, Code of Civil Procedure)."
In the more recent case of Secuya v. De Selma, we again ruled
that the prescriptive period for the enforcement of an express
trust of ten (10) years starts upon the repudiation of the trust by
the trustee.66
To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would bar a
beneficiarys action to recover in an express trust, the
repudiation of the trust must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and made known to the beneficiary.67 The express
trust disables the trustee from acquiring for his own benefit the
property committed to his management or custody, at least
while he does not openly repudiate the trust, and makes such
repudiation known to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this
reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) declared that
the rules on adverse possession do not apply to "continuing and
subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts. In an express trust, the
delay of the beneficiary is directly attributable to the trustee who
undertakes to hold the property for the former, or who is linked
to the beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The
trustee's possession is, therefore, not adverse to the beneficiary,
until and unless the latter is made aware that the trust has been
repudiated.68
Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated the trust
on December 16, 1964, when he registered Lot No. 356-A in his
name under TCT No. 52751, so when on February 13, 1986, the
Torbela siblings instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-
4359, for the recovery of ownership and possession of Lot No.
356-A from the spouses Rosario, over 21 years had passed.
Civil Case No. U-4359 was already barred by prescription, as
well as laches.
The Court already rejected a similar argument in Ringor v.
Ringor69 for the following reasons:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in
trust for him by another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on
the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name
did not vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens
system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records
title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper
from the true owner. The Torrens system was not intended to
foment betrayal in the performance of a trust. It does not permit
one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does
not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens system of
registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot
rely on the registration of the lands in Joses name nor in the
name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result
they seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a
Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs. The beneficiaries
are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the
irrevocability of the Torrens title. The intended trust must be
sustained.70 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the more recent case of Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste v. Heirs
of Jose Labiste,71 the Court refused to apply prescription and
laches and reiterated that:
[P]rescription and laches will run only from the time the express
trust is repudiated. The Court has held that for acquisitive
prescription to bar the action of the beneficiary against the
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held
in trust it must be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the evidence thereon
is clear and conclusive. Respondents cannot rely on the fact that
the Torrens title was issued in the name of Epifanio and the
other heirs of Jose. It has been held that a trustee who obtains a
Torrens title over property held in trust by him for another
cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. The rule
requires a clear repudiation of the trust duly communicated to
the beneficiary. The only act that can be construed as
repudiation was when respondents filed the petition for
reconstitution in October 1993. And since petitioners filed their
complaint in January 1995, their cause of action has not yet
prescribed, laches cannot be attributed to them.72 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear that under the foregoing jurisprudence, the registration
of Lot No. 356-A by Dr. Rosario in his name under TCT No.
52751 on December 16, 1964 is not the repudiation that would
have caused the 10-year prescriptive period for the enforcement
of an express trust to run.
The Court of Appeals held that Dr. Rosario repudiated the
express trust when he acquired another loan from PNB and
constituted a second mortgage on Lot No. 356-A sometime in
1979, which, unlike the first mortgage to DBP in 1965, was
without the knowledge and/or consent of the Torbela siblings.
The Court only concurs in part with the Court of Appeals on this
matter.
For repudiation of an express trust to be effective, the
unequivocal act of repudiation had to be made known to the
Torbela siblings as the cestuis que trust and must be proven by
clear and conclusive evidence. A scrutiny of TCT No. 52751
reveals the following inscription:
Entry No. 520099
Amendment of the mortgage in favor of PNB inscribed under
Entry No. 490658 in the sense that the consideration thereof has
been increased to PHILIPPINE PESOS Four Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos only (450,000.00) and to secure any and all
negotiations with PNB, whether contracted before, during or
after the date of this instrument, acknowledged before Notary
Public of Pangasinan Alejo M. Dato as Doc. No. 198, Page No.
41, Book No. 11, Series of 1985.
Date of Instrument March 5, 1981
Date of Inscription March 6, 198173
Although according to Entry No. 520099, the original loan and
mortgage agreement of Lot No. 356-A between Dr. Rosario and
PNB was previously inscribed as Entry No. 490658, Entry No.
490658 does not actually appear on TCT No. 52751 and, thus, it
cannot be used as the reckoning date for the start of the
prescriptive period.
The Torbela siblings can only be charged with knowledge of the
mortgage of Lot No. 356-A to PNB on March 6, 1981 when the
amended loan and mortgage agreement was registered on TCT
No. 52751 as Entry No. 520099. Entry No. 520099 is
constructive notice to the whole world74 that Lot No. 356-A
was mortgaged by Dr. Rosario to PNB as security for a loan, the
amount of which was increased to 450,000.00. Hence, Dr.
Rosario is deemed to have effectively repudiated the express
trust between him and the Torbela siblings on March 6, 1981, on
which day, the prescriptive period for the enforcement of the
express trust by the Torbela siblings began to run.
From March 6, 1981, when the amended loan and mortgage
agreement was registered on TCT No. 52751, to February 13,
1986, when the Torbela siblings instituted before the RTC Civil
Case No. U-4359 against the spouses Rosario, only about five
years had passed. The Torbela siblings were able to institute
Civil Case No. U-4359 well before the lapse of the 10-year
prescriptive period for the enforcement of their express trust
with Dr. Rosario.

Civil Case No. U-4359 is likewise not barred by laches. Laches
means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. As the Court
explained in the preceding paragraphs, the Torbela siblings
instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 five years after Dr. Rosarios
repudiation of the express trust, still within the 10-year
prescriptive period for enforcement of such trusts. This does not
constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting one's right. A delay
within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not
considered to be a delay that would bar relief. Laches apply only
in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period.75
Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.
Having determined that the Torbela siblings are the true owners
and Dr. Rosario merely the trustee of Lot No. 356-A, the Court
is next faced with the issue of whether or not the Torbela
siblings may still recover Lot No. 356-A considering that Dr.
Rosario had already mortgaged Lot No. 356-A to Banco
Filipino, and upon Dr. Rosarios default on his loan obligations,
Banco Filipino foreclosed the mortgage, acquired Lot No. 356-
A as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and consolidated
title in its name under TCT No. 165813. The resolution of this
issue depends on the answer to the question of whether or not
Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good faith.
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential
requisites of the contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor
should be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged;
otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void. However,
an exception to this rule is the doctrine of "mortgagee in good
faith." Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the
owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of
public policy. This principle is based on the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title,
as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. This is the same rule that
underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers for value." The
prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in
good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor to the
property given as security and in the absence of any sign that
might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further
investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful
owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged
property, the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to
protection.76
On one hand, the Torbela siblings aver that Banco Filipino is
not a mortgagee in good faith because as early as May 17, 1967,
they had already annotated Cornelios Adverse Claim dated
May 16, 1967 and Dr. Rosarios Deed of Absolute Quitclaim
dated December 28, 1964 on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos.
274471-274472, respectively.
On the other hand, Banco Filipino asseverates that it is a
mortgagee in good faith because per Section 70 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, the notice of adverse claim, registered on May 17, 1967
by the Torbela siblings under Entry Nos. 274471-274472 on
TCT No. 52751, already lapsed after 30 days or on June 16,
1967. Additionally, there was an express cancellation of Entry
Nos. 274471-274472 by Entry No. 520469 dated March 11,
1981. So when Banco Filipino approved Dr. Rosarios loan for
1,200,000.00 and constituted a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A
(together with two other properties) on December 8, 1981, the
only other encumbrance on TCT No. 52751 was Entry No.
520099 dated March 6, 1981, i.e., the amended loan and
mortgage agreement between Dr. Rosario and PNB (which was
eventually cancelled after it was paid off with part of the
proceeds from Dr. Rosarios loan from Banco Filipino). Hence,
Banco Filipino was not aware that the Torbela siblings adverse
claim on Lot No. 356-A still subsisted.
The Court finds that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in good
faith. Entry Nos. 274471-274472 were not validly cancelled,
and the improper cancellation should have been apparent to
Banco Filipino and aroused suspicion in said bank of some
defect in Dr. Rosarios title.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the
disputed land is to apprise third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and
protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of
the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any
transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome
of the dispute.77
Adverse claims were previously governed by Section 110 of Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, quoted
in full below:
ADVERSE CLAIM
SEC. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of
the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in
this Act for registering the same, make a statement in writing
setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under
whom acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
adverse claimants residence, and designate a place at which all
notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled
to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon a petition
of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter
such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be
cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall
find that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it
may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its
discretion.
Construing the aforequoted provision, the Court stressed in Ty
Sin Tei v. Lee Dy Piao78 that "[t]he validity or efficaciousness
of the [adverse] claim x x x may only be determined by the
Court upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the
Court shall order the immediate hearing thereof and make the
proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And it is
ONLY when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration thereof may be cancelled." The Court likewise
pointed out in the same case that while a notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled in a number of ways, "the same is not true in a
registered adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only in one
instance, i.e., after the claim is adjudged invalid or
unmeritorious by the Court x x x;" and "if any of the
registrations should be considered unnecessary or superfluous, it
would be the notice of lis pendens and not the annotation of the
adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled
without adequate hearing and proper disposition of the claim."
With the enactment of the Property Registration Decree on June
11, 1978, Section 70 thereof now applies to adverse claims:
SEC. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest
in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registrations, may, if no
other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right,
or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the
name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the
adverse claimants residence, and a place at which all notices
may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The
adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from
the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided,
however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based
on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest
may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land
is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the
court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the
validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as
may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in
any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the
adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the
claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor
more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse
of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by
filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
(Emphases supplied.)
In Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,79 the Court squarely interpreted
Section 70 of the Property Registration Decree, particularly, the
new 30-day period not previously found in Section 110 of the
Land Registration Act, thus:
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every
part thereof be given effect and a construction that could render
a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
harmonious whole. For taken in solitude, a word or phrase
might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one
actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. In
ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse
claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three,
paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
"The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days
from the date of registration."
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict
the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above
provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but
should be read in relation to the sentence following, which
reads:
"After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim
may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by
the party in interest."
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto
lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it would
not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to
clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need
be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere
lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in
interest to do a useless act.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but
in its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact,
be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of
laws. Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be
reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its history,
origin, and its purposes may be examined by the courts in their
construction. x x x.
xxxx
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the
apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that
the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified
petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity
period. The law, taken together, simply means that the
cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and
shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse
claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said
period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of
cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be
cancelled," which obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision
making power, that the court may or may not order the
cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such
provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty
days from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by
such period as it would be inconsistent with the very authority
vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity
is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an
adverse claim which is the principal issue to be decided in the
court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a
proper hearing for the court to determine whether it will order
the cancellation of the adverse claim or not.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as
absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats
the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy
of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an
adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the registration of
such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property
Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties
dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest
or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the
validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the
adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue
where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or
revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence
of any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse claim.
This is in line with the provision immediately following:
"Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse
claim shall be registered by the same claimant."
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the
property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from
registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground.
It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim may
only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested
party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate
hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and
equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found
unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be
cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant
and giving notice and warning to third parties."80 (Emphases
supplied.)
Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act or
Section 70 of the Property Registration Decree, notice of
adverse claim can only be cancelled after a party in interest files
a petition for cancellation before the RTC wherein the property
is located, and the RTC conducts a hearing and determines the
said claim to be invalid or unmeritorious.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no hearing has
been conducted herein to determine the validity or merit of the
adverse claim of the Torbela siblings. Entry No. 520469
cancelled the adverse claim of the Torbela siblings, annotated as
Entry Nos. 274471-774472, upon the presentation by Dr.
Rosario of a mere Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage.
Regardless of whether or not the Register of Deeds should have
inscribed Entry No. 520469 on TCT No. 52751, Banco Filipino
could not invoke said inscription in support of its claim of good
faith. There were several things amiss in Entry No. 520469
which should have already aroused suspicions in Banco
Filipino, and compelled the bank to look beyond TCT No.
52751 and inquire into Dr. Rosarios title. First, Entry No.
520469 does not mention any court order as basis for the
cancellation of the adverse claim. Second, the adverse claim was
not a mortgage which could be cancelled with Dr. Rosarios
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage. And third, the adverse
claim was against Dr. Rosario, yet it was cancelled based on a
document also executed by Dr. Rosario.
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or mortgagee cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon
his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or
mortgagor. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or
his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence
of a defect in the vendor's or mortgagor's title, will not make
him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value, if it
afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defects as would have led
to its discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution
which may be required of a prudent man in a like situation.81
While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-274472
by Entry No. 520469 might not be evident to a private
individual, the same should have been apparent to Banco
Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an ordinary mortgagee, but is a
mortgagee-bank, whose business is impressed with public
interest. In fact, in one case, 82 the Court explicitly declared that
the rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely
solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks. In
another case,83 the Court adjudged that unlike private
individuals, a bank is expected to exercise greater care and
prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered
lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due
diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The
ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to
it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable
part of its operations.
Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good faith,
much less a purchaser in good faith at the foreclosure sale of Lot
No. 356-A. Hence, the right of the Torbela siblings over Lot No.
356-A is superior over that of Banco Filipino; and as the true
owners of Lot No. 356-A, the Torbela siblings are entitled to a
reconveyance of said property even from Banco Filipino.
Nonetheless, the failure of Banco Filipino to comply with the
due diligence requirement was not the result of a dishonest
purpose, some moral obliquity, or breach of a known duty for
some interest or ill will that partakes of fraud that would justify
damages.84
Given the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A to the Torbela
siblings, there is no more need to address issues concerning
redemption, annulment of the foreclosure sale and certificate of
sale (subject matter of Civil Case No. U-4733), or issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino (subject matter of
Pet. Case No. U-822) insofar as Lot No. 356-A is concerned.
Such would only be superfluous. Banco Filipino, however, is
not left without any recourse should the foreclosure and sale of
the two other mortgaged properties be insufficient to cover Dr.
Rosarios loan, for the bank may still bring a proper suit against
Dr. Rosario to collect the unpaid balance.
The rules on accession shall govern the improvements on Lot
No. 356-A and the rents thereof.
The accessory follows the principal. The right of accession is
recognized under Article 440 of the Civil Code which states that
"[t]he ownership of property gives the right by accession to
everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated
or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially."
There is no question that Dr. Rosario is the builder of the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A. The Torbela siblings
themselves alleged that they allowed Dr. Rosario to register Lot
No. 356-A in his name so he could obtain a loan from DBP,
using said parcel of land as security; and with the proceeds of
the loan, Dr. Rosario had a building constructed on Lot No. 356-
A, initially used as a hospital, and then later for other
commercial purposes. Dr. Rosario supervised the construction
of the building, which began in 1965; fully liquidated the loan
from DBP; and maintained and administered the building, as
well as collected the rental income therefrom, until the Torbela
siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 before the RTC on
February 13, 1986.
When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A, both the
Torbela siblings (as landowners) and Dr. Rosario (as builder)
are deemed in bad faith. The Torbela siblings were aware of the
construction of a building by Dr. Rosario on Lot No. 356-A,
while Dr. Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite
his knowledge that Lot No. 356-A belonged to the Torbela
siblings. This is the case contemplated under Article 453 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the
person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but
also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and
the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good
faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the
landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and
without opposition on his part. (Emphasis supplied.)
When both the landowner and the builder are in good faith, the
following rules govern:
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548,
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease
and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding
the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not
be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove
the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing
if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the
possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another, and
the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner
of the land. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has
acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa
calls a state of "forced co-ownership," the law has provided a
just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land
and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land
who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older
and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.85
The landowner has to make a choice between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder
to pay the price of the land. But even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must
choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to remove the building from the land without first
exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell
his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its
value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the
owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner
is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to
sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.86
This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the
determination of matters necessary for the proper application of
Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of the Civil Code. Such
matters include the option that the Torbela siblings will choose;
the amount of indemnity that they will pay if they decide to
appropriate the improvements on Lot No. 356-A; the value of
Lot No. 356-A if they prefer to sell it to Dr. Rosario; or the
reasonable rent if they opt to sell Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario
but the value of the land is considerably more than the
improvements. The determination made by the Court of Appeals
in its Decision dated June 29, 1999 that the current value of Lot
No. 356-A is 1,200,000.00 is not supported by any evidence on
record.
Should the Torbela siblings choose to appropriate the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A, the following ruling of the
Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals87 is relevant in the
determination of the amount of indemnity under Article 546 of
the Civil Code:
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the
useful improvements should be determined. The respondent
court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost
of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its
current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary
and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position
is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this
Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this Court
pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of
various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong
material based on the market value of the said improvements. In
Sarmiento vs. Agana, despite the finding that the useful
improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of
between eight thousand pesos (8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos
(10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the
builder in the amount of forty thousand pesos (40,000.00), the
value of the house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the
landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house,
a useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la
Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer
justice between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court
had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust
the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of
land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a
way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that
which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is
therefore the current market value of the improvements which
should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling
would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would
otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-
yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount.
Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce
evidence on the present market value of the apartment building
upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the
amount of reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.88
(Emphases supplied.)
Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits, such as rents,
belong to the owner of the building.89 Thus, Dr. Rosario has a
right to the rents of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A and is
under no obligation to render an accounting of the same to
anyone. In fact, it is the Torbela siblings who are required to
account for the rents they had collected from the lessees of the
commercial building and turn over any balance to Dr. Rosario.
Dr. Rosarios right to the rents of the improvements on Lot No.
356-A shall continue until the Torbela siblings have chosen their
option under Article 448 of the Civil Code. And in case the
Torbela siblings decide to appropriate the improvements, Dr.
Rosario shall have the right to retain said improvements, as well
as the rents thereof, until the indemnity for the same has been
paid.90
Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to the Torbela siblings.
The Court of Appeals ordered Dr. Rosario to pay the Torbela
siblings 300,000.00 as moral damages; 200,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and 100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Indeed, Dr. Rosarios deceit and bad faith is evident when,
being fully aware that he only held Lot No. 356-A in trust for
the Torbela siblings, he mortgaged said property to PNB and
Banco Filipino absent the consent of the Torbela siblings, and
caused the irregular cancellation of the Torbela siblings adverse
claim on TCT No. 52751. Irrefragably, Dr. Rosarios betrayal
had caused the Torbela siblings (which included Dr. Rosarios
own mother, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario) mental anguish, serious
anxiety, and wounded feelings. Resultantly, the award of moral
damages is justified, but the amount thereof is reduced to
200,000.00.
In addition to the moral damages, exemplary damages may also
be imposed given that Dr. Rosarios wrongful acts were
accompanied by bad faith. However, judicial discretion granted
to the courts in the assessment of damages must always be
exercised with balanced restraint and measured objectivity. The
circumstances of the case call for a reduction of the award of
exemplary damages to 100,000.00.
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Because of Dr. Rosarios acts, the Torbela siblings were
constrained to institute several cases against Dr. Rosario and his
spouse, Duque-Rosario, as well as Banco Filipino, which had
lasted for more than 25 years. Consequently, the Torbela
siblings are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and the
amount of 100,000.00 may be considered rational, fair, and
reasonable.
Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession for Lot No. 5-
F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
The Court emphasizes that Pet. Case No. U-822, instituted by
Banco Filipino for the issuance of a writ of possession before
the RTC of Urdaneta, included only Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A
and Lot No. 356-A (Lot No. 4489, the third property mortgaged
to secure Dr. Rosarios loan from Banco Filipino, is located in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, and the petition for issuance of a
writ of possession for the same should be separately filed with
the RTC of Dagupan City). Since the Court has already granted
herein the reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino
to the Torbela siblings, the writ of possession now pertains only
to Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A.
To recall, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance by the
RTC of a writ of possession in favor of Banco Filipino. Dr.
Rosario no longer appealed from said judgment of the appellate
court. Already legally separated from Dr. Rosario, Duque-
Rosario alone challenges the writ of possession before this
Court through her Petition in G.R. No. 140553.
Duque-Rosario alleges in her Petition that Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-
2-A had been registered in her name under TCT No. 104189.
Yet, without a copy of TCT No. 104189 on record, the Court
cannot give much credence to Duque-Rosarios claim of sole
ownership of Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A. Also, the question of
whether Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A was the paraphernal property
of Duque-Rosario or the conjugal property of the spouses
Rosario would not alter the outcome of Duque-Rosarios
Petition.
The following facts are undisputed: Banco Filipino
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage constituted on Lot No.
5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and the two other properties after Dr. Rosario
defaulted on the payment of his loan; Banco Filipino was the
highest bidder for all three properties at the foreclosure sale on
April 2, 1987; the Certificate of Sale dated April 2, 1987 was
registered in April 1987; and based on the Certificate of Final
Sale dated May 24, 1988 and Affidavit of Consolidation dated
May 25, 1988, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. 104189
and issued TCT No. 165812 in the name of Banco Filipino for
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A on June 7, 1988.
The Court has consistently ruled that the one-year redemption
period should be counted not from the date of foreclosure sale,
but from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the
Registry of Deeds.91 No copy of TCT No. 104189 can be found
in the records of this case, but the fact of annotation of the
Certificate of Sale thereon was admitted by the parties, only
differing on the date it was made: April 14, 1987 according to
Banco Filipino and April 15, 1987 as maintained by Duque-
Rosario. Even if the Court concedes that the Certificate of Sale
was annotated on TCT No. 104189 on the later date, April 15,
1987, the one-year redemption period already expired on April
14, 1988.92 The Certificate of Final Sale and Affidavit of
Consolidation were executed more than a month thereafter, on
May 24, 1988 and May 25, 1988, respectively, and were clearly
not premature.
It is true that the rule on redemption is liberally construed in
favor of the original owner of the property. The policy of the
law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his right
of redemption.93 However, the liberal interpretation of the rule
on redemption is inapplicable herein as neither Duque-Rosario
nor Dr. Rosario had made any attempt to redeem Lot No. 5-F-8-
C-2-B-2-A. Duque-Rosario could only rely on the efforts of the
Torbela siblings at redemption, which were unsuccessful. While
the Torbela siblings made several offers to redeem Lot No. 356-
A, as well as the two other properties mortgaged by Dr. Rosario,
they did not make any valid tender of the redemption price to
effect a valid redemption. The general rule in redemption is that
it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests his
desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied
by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. The
redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or
else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the
auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made
in good faith.94 In case of disagreement over the redemption
price, the redemptioner may preserve his right of redemption
through judicial action, which in every case, must be filed
within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the court
action to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer
to redeem, would have the effect of preserving his redemptive
rights and "freezing" the expiration of the one-year period.95
But no such action was instituted by the Torbela siblings or
either of the spouses Rosario.
Duque-Rosario also cannot bar the issuance of the writ of
possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A in favor of Banco
Filipino by invoking the pendency of Civil Case No. U-4359,
the Torbela siblings action for recovery of ownership and
possession and damages, which supposedly tolled the period for
redemption of the foreclosed properties. Without belaboring the
issue of Civil Case No. U-4359 suspending the redemption
period, the Court simply points out to Duque-Rosario that Civil
Case No. U-4359 involved Lot No. 356-A only, and the legal
consequences of the institution, pendency, and resolution of
Civil Case No. U-4359 apply to Lot No. 356-A alone.
Equally unpersuasive is Duque-Rosarios argument that the writ
of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A should not be
issued given the defects in the conduct of the foreclosure sale
(i.e., lack of personal notice to Duque-Rosario) and
consolidation of title (i.e., failure to provide Duque-Rosario with
copies of the Certificate of Final Sale).
The right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed
property becomes absolute upon the expiration of the
redemption period. The basis of this right to possession is the
purchaser's ownership of the property. After the consolidation of
title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem,
the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance
to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a
ministerial function.961avvphi1
The judge with whom an application for a writ of possession is
filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the
manner of its foreclosure. Any question regarding the validity of
the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for the
refusal to issue a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or
not there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or
the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual
outcome of the pending annulment case. The issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is a
ministerial act and does not entail the exercise of discretion.97
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition of the
Torbela siblings in G.R. No. 140528 is GRANTED, while the
Petition of Lena Duque-Rosario in G.R. No. 140553 is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 29, 1999 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39770, which affirmed with
modification the Amended Decision dated January 29, 1992 of
the RTC in Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-4733 and Pet. Case
No. U-822, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, to now
read as follows:
(1) Banco Filipino is ORDERED to reconvey Lot No. 356-A to
the Torbela siblings;
(2) The Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is ORDERED to
cancel TCT No. 165813 in the name of Banco Filipino and to
issue a new certificate of title in the name of the Torbela
siblings for Lot No. 356-A;
(3) The case is REMANDED to the RTC for further
proceedings to determine the facts essential to the proper
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
particularly: (a) the present fair market value of Lot No. 356-A;
(b) the present fair market value of the improvements thereon;
(c) the option of the Torbela siblings to appropriate the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A or require Dr. Rosario to
purchase Lot No. 356-A; and (d) in the event that the Torbela
siblings choose to require Dr. Rosario to purchase Lot No. 356-
A but the value thereof is considerably more than the
improvements, then the reasonable rent of Lot No. 356-A to be
paid by Dr. Rosario to the Torbela siblings;
(4) The Torbela siblings are DIRECTED to submit an
accounting of the rents of the improvements on Lot No. 356-A
which they had received and to turn over any balance thereof to
Dr. Rosario;
(5) Dr. Rosario is ORDERED to pay the Torbela siblings
200,000.00 as moral damages, 100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and 100,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(6) Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession over Lot-5-
F-8-C-2-B-2-A, covered by TCT No. 165812. The RTC Branch
Clerk of Court is ORDERED to issue a writ of possession for
the said property in favor of Banco Filipino.
SO ORDERED.
Article 498
1. G.R. No. L-40064 December 4, 1934
RESURRECCION TAGARAO, BUENAVENTURA
TAGARAO and SERAFIN TAGARAO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MARCOS GARCIA, ET AL., defendants.
MARGARITA GARCIA, ROSARIO GARCIA, DOLORES
RUFINO, and ELUETERIO RUFINO, appellants.
Oceeo and Alba for appellants M. Garcia, R. Garcia and D.
Rufino.
Vicente T. Remitio for appellant E. Rufino.
Rafael P. Guerrero for appellees.
DIAZ, J.:
This action was brought by the brothers and sisters Resurreccion
Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, and Serafin Tagarao, children
of the deceased Merced Garcia, daughter of the deceased
Buenaventura Garcia who was a brother of the defendant
Marcos Garcia, against the latter and the other defendants
named Paula Tabifranca, Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia,
Dolores Rufino and Eleuterio Rufino, praying that judgment be
rendered against the defendants ordering them to deliver to the
plaintiffs, after executing the necessary deeds of transfer, one-
fourth of the land known as lot No. 510 of cadastral case No. 11
of the municipality of Isabela, Occidental Negros (G. L. R. O.
Cad. Record No. 100), which was formerly covered, first by
original certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit M), later by
transfer certificate of title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3), and at present
by transfer certificate of title No. 8782 (Exhibit 7), all of the
office of the register of deeds of said Province of Occidental
Negros.

In their amended complaint of July 29, 1931, which was
reamended on March 8, 1932, said plaintiffs prayed that should
the defendants fail to deliver to them the required portion of the
land in question, the latter be ordered to pay them the value
thereof based on the assessed value of the whole property, and
that they furthermore be indemnified for the value of 1,407
cavans of palay at the rate of P4 a cavan, alleging that said 1,407
cavans represented their share in the products of said land from
the time the defendants took exclusive possession thereof.
Before the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on the date
above stated, the defendants Marcos Garcia, Paula Tabifranca,
Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino filed a
demurrer to said plaintiffs' original complaint, alleging that it
did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action and
was furthermore ambiguous, unintelligible and uncertain. The
lower court sustained said demurrer and ordered the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint within the reglementary period.
When the plaintiffs amended their complaint in the sense
expressed in their pleading of February 13, 1929, said five
defendants again filed another demurrer alleging this time that
the lower court lack jurisdiction to try the case by reason of the
subject matter involved and the lower court overruled said
demurrer ordering them to answer within the reglementary
period. In compliance therewith, the defendants on October 28,
1929, filed their answer wherein the first two defendants, or the
spouses Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, alleged that
although they formerly were the absolute and exclusive owners
of the land in question they already ceased to be so at that time,
having sold the half belonging to Paula Tabifranca to the
defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino, and the other half belonging to Marcos Garcia to
Eleuterio Rufino. On June 9, 1931, said two defendants filed a
petition of even date stating that they had no more interest in the
case, having sold their respective participations to the two
Garcias and two Rufinos and praying in succession that they be
absolved from the complaint.
A few days later, or on July 15, 1931, said two defendants
Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca filed a motion to include
Eleuterio Rufino among the defendants and on the following
day the lower court, granting the motion, ordered the inclusion
of Eleuterio Rufino in the case as one of the defendants. For this
purpose the plaintiffs filed their said amended complaint of July
29, 1931, which they reamended with a slight addition on March
8, 1932.
The defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca did not
answer the plaintiffs' last amended complaint but Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino jointly entered a
general denial of all the allegations contained therein, alleging
as a special defense (1) that they are the exclusive owners of
one-half of the land in question; (2) that the plaintiffs have
already lost their right of action because such right, if they ever
had any, has already prescribed; and (3) said plaintiffs cannot
invoke the decision rendered in civil case No. 4091 because
with respect to them it does not constitute res judicata.
The defendant Eleuterio Rufino, answering said plaintiffs' last
amended complaint, stated in his pleading of November 19,
1931, that he denied each and every allegation contained
therein, alleging as a special defense that one half of the land in
question was sold by Marcos Garcia and purchased by him in
good faith, paying the corresponding price therefor.
After due trial the lower court rendered judgment ordering the
defendants to deliver to the plaintiffs one fourth of the land in
question after executing the necessary deeds of transfer in favor
of said plaintiffs or, in lieu thereof, to indemnify them in the
sum of P3,882 plus the value of 1,000 cavans of palay at P3 a
cavan, with costs. In said judgment said court "declared the
deeds of sale executed by Marcos Garcia in favor of the
defendant Eleuterio Rufino and by Paula Tabifranca in favor of
the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino, null and void." The defendants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia, Dolores Rufino and Elueterio Rufino appealed
but Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca did not.1awphi1.net
In support of their appeal, the defendants Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia, and Dolores Rufino contend that the lower court
committed the eight alleged errors assigned in their brief as
follows:
1. The lower court erred in not sustaining the demurrer of
the defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
Dolores Rufino to the second amended complaint of the
plaintiffs.
2. The lower court erred in admitting, under objections of
the defendants-appellants, oral and documentary evidence
tending to attack original certificate of title No. 10009 in the
name of the spouses Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca issued
on May 17, 1918.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the deed of sale
made and executed by Paula Tabifranca with respect to her
undivided one-half () share of lot No. 510 of the cadastral
survey of Isabela in favor of Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino, was made without consideration and
declaring same null and void being fictitious.
4. The lower court erred in holding that the transaction
made by Paula Tabifranca in favor of Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia and Dolores Rufino had no other purpose than to deprive
the plaintiffs of their shares in lot No. 510, as legitimate heirs of
Ventura Garcia and Merced Garcia.
5. The lower court erred in condemning the defendants-
appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino, jointly and severally with the other defendants to return
to the plaintiffs one-fourth () of lot No. 510 of the cadastral
survey of Isabela, or in its place, to indemnify the plaintiffs the
sum of P3,882, value of said portion.
6. The lower court erred in condemning the defendants-
appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores
Rufino, jointly and severally with the other defendants, to pay
the plaintiffs one thousand cavanes of palay or its value at P3
per cavan.
7. The lower court erred in holding that the right of the
plaintiffs to present this action to recover a portion of lot No.
510 of the cadastral survey of Isabela has not
prescribed.lawphil.net
8. The lower court erred in denying the petition for a new
trial of the defendants-appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario
Garcia and Dolores Rufino.
The appellant Eleuterio Rufino also contends that said court in
rendering its judgment in question committed the four alleged
errors relied upon in his brief, which read as follows:
1. The lower court erred in admitting over the defendant's
objection oral as well as documentary evidence of the plaintiffs
tending to attack the stability of original certificate of title No.
10009 (Exhibit 5) in the name of the defendants Marcos Garcia
and Paula Tabifranca, relative to alleged facts that took place
prior to the issuance of said title.
2. The lower court erred in ordering the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino, jointly with his codefendants, to deliver to the
plaintiffs one-fourth () of said lot No. 510, or in lieu thereof to
indemnify them in the sum of P3,882 representing the value of
said portion.
3. The lower court erred in holding in its judgment that
the deed (Exhibit 8) is fictitious and fraudulent and declaring it
null and void.
4. The lower court erred in not absolving the defendant
and appellant Eleuterio Rufino from the complaint and in
denying his motion for a new trial.
Without losing sight of the purpose of the complaint of the
plaintiffs and appellees as expressed in the prayer of their
pleadings or last amended complaints, it is clear that the first
assignment of alleged error attributed to the lower court by the
appellants is unfounded on the ground that its purpose is not to
attack the validity of the decree by virtue of which original
certificate of title No. 10009 was issued in favor of Marcos
Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, or that under which transfer
certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782, were issued later, but to
compel the defendants to give them one-fourth of the land
described in said certificates and to pay them the indemnity
referred to therein.
The facts which have been clearly established at the trial,
according to the record and the evidence before us, may be
briefly stated as follows:
The land in question has an area of 31 hectares, 3 ares and 65
centares. It was originally purchased with pacto de retro by the
defendant Marcos Garcia and his brother Ventura Garcia from
Vidal Saravia on July 20, 1900. As the latter failed to exercise
his right of repurchase the two brothers became the absolute
owners of said land and it was so held by the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros in case No. 274 which was
instituted by Pedro Saravia, as administrator of the intestate
estate of Vidal Saravia, against said two brothers to compel the
latter to resell it to him (Exhibit L). When the two brothers
purchased said land, the defendant Marcos Garcia was yet single
because he had not even been married to his former wife, as the
defendant Paula Tabifranca is only his wife by a second
marriage. Marcos Garcia had by his first wife three children
who are the defendants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia and
the deceased Catalina Garcia, mother of the defendant Dolores
Rufino. Ventura Garcia, now deceased, also had two children:
Merced Garcia who was married to Rafael Ragarao, and Claro
Garcia.
While Merced Garcia was still living, or at least until June,
1914, the defendant Marcos Garcia had been delivering to her
and her brother Claro Garcia their share of the products
harvested from the land in question. Merced Garcia who, as
stated, died about the year 1914 and was followed years later by
her husband Rafael Tagarao, had three children, the herein
plaintiffs Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao. When this action was brought on
October 14, 1928, Resurreccion Tagarao was more than 24
years of age; Serafin was then only 23 years, 1 month and 1 day,
and Buenaventura, 18 years, 4 months and 3 days.
With the plaintiffs' grandfather, Ventura Garcia, and their
mother, Merced Garcia, already dead, the defendant Marcos
Garcia claimed the lands in question in cadastral case No. 11 of
the municipality of Isabela of the Province of Occidental Negros
(G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 100), known in said case as
lot No. 510, alleging in the pleading presented by him to that
effect (Exhibit I) that he had acquired it on July 20, 1904, when
he was yet unmarried to his codefendant Paula Tabifranca.
Before the original certificate of title acknowledging him to be
the owner of the land in question was issued to him, and during
the period within which any person could ask for the revision of
the decree issued to that effect, Marcos Garcia, fearing that
Claro Garcia, brother of the plaintiffs' mother, might frustrate
his designs by asking for said revision, executed in favor of
Claro Garcia a document binding himself to give to the latter
four hectares of said land upon the issuance to him of the
corresponding certificate of title. In view thereof, Claro did not
ask for the revision of the decree but he later brought an action,
case No. 4091 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros, against Marcos Garcia to recover from him four
hectares of said land, lot No. 510 of the cadastre of Isabela,
basing his claim on the document which Marcos Garcia
executed in his favor in order to promise and bind himself to
give Claro said four hectares, because after Marcos Garcia had
obtained his certificate of title he refused to comply with his
promise; and as a result said court, on October 10, 1927,
rendered judgment against Marcos Garcia ordering him to
segregate four hectares of said land to be delivered to Claro
Garcia and furthermore to pay to the latter as indemnity 90
cavans of palay, or the value thereof in the sum of P360.
In the certificate of title which was issued in favor of Marcos
Garcia on May 17, 1918 (original certificate of title No. 10009),
by virtue of his claim presented in said cadastral case No. 11 of
the municipality of Isabela. Occidental Negros, it was stated, as
in the decree ordering the issuance thereof, that one-half of the
land therein described belonged to him, and that the other half to
his wife by a second marriage, Paula Tabifranca.
A few years after the issuance of said certificate of title the
defendant Paula Tabifranca, second wife of the defendant
Marcos Garcia, sold her rights to the defendants Margarita
Garcia, Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino, her husband's
daughters and granddaughter, respectively, by his first marriage,
executing the deed Exhibit N dated December 31, 1921, while
the alleged purchaser Dolores Rufino was yet a minor. This was
agreed upon between her and her husband Marcos Garcia to
prevent the land, part of which belonged to her under said
certificate of title, from ever passing to her son by her first
marriage named Juan Tabigui, as she was already a widow when
she contracted marriage with said Marcos Garcia.
In the meantime the plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao was
informed that her uncle Claro Garcia had succeeded in obtaining
his share of the land in question and, desiring to protect her
rights and those of her brothers and coplaintiffs, she negotiated
with Marcos Garcia so that he might give them their
corresponding share. Marcos Garcia at first entertained her with
promises that he would see to it that she got what she wanted
but later, at her back, he sold his share of the land to the
defendant Eleuterio Rufino, brother of his son-in-law Lope
Rufino, husband of the defendant Rosario Garcia, executing in
favor of Eleuterio Rufino the deed Exhibit 8 wherein it was
made to appear that the price paid to him for only one-half of
the land, lot No. 510, was P6,567.
Twelve days after Paula Tabifranca had executed said deed of
transfer Exhibit N in favor of her stepdaughters Margarita
Garcia and Rosario Garcia and of her husband Marcos Garcia's
granddaughter named Dolores Rufino, said three defendants
together with Marcos Garcia obtained transfer certificate of title
No. 3001, after the cancellation of original certificate of title No.
10009, and two days after Marcos Garcia had executed in favor
of the defendant Eleuterio Rufino the deed of sale Exhibit 8
whereby he sold to the latter his half of the land described in the
above stated certificate of title No. 10009 (Exhibit M), he and
his daughters and granddaughter jointly with the defendant
Eleuterio Rufino succeeded in having said transfer certificate of
title No. 3001 (Exhibit 3) cancelled to be substituted, as it was
in fact substituted, by transfer certificate of title No. 8782
(Exhibit 7).
The transfer made by Paula Tabifranca in favor of her
stepdaughters Margarita and Rosario Garcia and her husband's
granddaughter Dolores Rufino, and that made by Marcos Garcia
in favor of Eleuterio Rufino, stated in said deeds Exhibits N and
8, are fictitious and feigned in view of the following reasons
inferable from the evidence of record:
Notwithstanding the fact that in the original certificate of title
No. 10009 Paula Tabifranca's right to one half of the property
therein described has been acknowledged, she was conscious
that she was not entitled thereto because it belonged exclusively
to her husband or, at least, he had acquired it long before he
married her. This explains the ease with which she parted with
her alleged right for a sum disproportionate to the true value of
the land sold by her. The alleged purchasers Margarita Garcia,
Rosario Garcia and Dolores Rufino were not in a financial
position to pay her the alleged purchase price which, according
to Exhibit N, amounted to P1,500; and Dolores Rufino, being
then of tender age, could not have taken part in said contract that
she was represented by her father Lope Rufino, because it does
not appear that the latter was then the guardian of her property
and it is a fact that minors cannot give consent to any contract.
Neither was Eleuterio Rufino in a financial position to pay what
he allegedly paid to the defendant Marcos Garcia for the latter's
share in the land in question on the ground that the amount of
six thousand five hundred sixty-seven pesos (P6,567) which is
the price allegedly paid by him to Marcos Garcia is a fortune
greater than the income he could have had for several years,
because his means of livelihood, according to his own
testimony, consisted simply of extracting tuba from about 200
coconut trees leased from different persons and in retailing fresh
fish bought by him for a lump sum in order to obtain a small
profit. He is a brother of the defendant Rosario Garcia's
husband, and notwithstanding that the deed Exhibit 8 was
executed in his favor, the land continues until now to be
registered for taxation purposes in the name of Marcos Garcia;
and notwithstanding the alleged deed of transfer Exhibit 8 the
land in question continues to be under the Isabela Sugar
Company Inc., of Occidental Negros, as property of named
"THREE SISTERS A," "THREE SISTERS B," and
"HACIENDA GARCIA," the first portion being under the
management of Macario Torilla, husband of the defendant
Margarita Garcia; the second under the management of Lope
Rufino, husband of the defendant Rosario Garcia; and the third
under that of Claro Garcia, uncle of the plaintiffs (Exhibit D). In
addition to these reasons, it may and should be stated that
Elueterio Rufino's testimony explaining how the transaction
between him and Marcos Garcia was effected, does not agree
with the text of the deed of transfer Exhibit 8. It is expressly
stated in said document that the price paid by him for the land in
question was P6,567 and that he also assumed the lien in the
form of a mortgage constituted on said land to secure the
payment of Candido Montilla of a loan in the sum of P4,675
from which it may be inferred that the total price paid by him
for said land was really P11,242. Notwithstanding this, he
testified that he paid only P1,892 to the defendant Marcos
Garcia. It should be stated furthermore that on December 1,
1928, or scarcely two and a half months from the time he bought
said land from Marcos Garcia, Eleuterio Rufino leased it,
according to Exhibit 9, to Marcos Garcia's sons-in-law and
husbands of the defendants Margarita Garcia and Rosario
Garcia, when it is natural that as he was poor and his business of
tapping tuba and reselling fishes was not lucrative, he should
have personally taken charge of the cultivation and exploitation
of the land bought by him. Furthermore, on January 10, 1930,
long after the alleged transfer of said land, Exhibit 8, Macario
Torilla and Lope Rufino, as Marcos Garcia's attorneys-in-fact,
the latter having executed in their favor the power of attorney,
Exhibit O-1, by virtue of which they mortgaged the land in
question in the name of their principal to Candido Montilla on
July 7, 1928, Exhibit O, paid to Montilla the sum of P514.25 as
interest on the loan secured by the mortgage above stated
(Exhibit 4). This last fact convinces us more that said deed of
transfer Exhibit 8 is fictitious because if it were genuine, there
being as in fact there is in said document a stipulation that the
purchaser Eleuterio Rufino assumed all the lien on said
property, Eleuterio Rufino, not Marcos Garcia, personally, nor
through his sons-in-law Macario Torilla and Lope Rufino,
should have paid said interest.
The foregoing proves to our satisfaction that errors 2, 3 and 4
relied upon by the appellants Margarita Garcia, Rosario Garcia
and Dolores Rufino in their brief are absolutely unfounded, and
so is alleged error No. 3 attributed to the lower court by the
appellant Eleuterio Rufino.
It follows from the foregoing conclusions and considerations
that errors 5 and 2 attributed to said court by the defendants
Garcia and Eleuterio Rufino, respectively, are likewise
unfounded. If the transfers made under the deeds which later
made possible the issuance to the interested parties of
certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) are
fraudulent, it is but proper, being in accordance with law, that
the defendants execute the deeds of transfer prayed for by the
plaintiffs in their complaint in order to give them what is theirs;
and this is undoubtedly one fourth of the entire land because if
one half belonged to the plaintiffs' grandfather who, as already
stated, had only two children: Claro Garcia, the plaintiffs' uncle,
and Merced Garcia, their mother.
But the question now arises whether or not the three plaintiffs
are entitled to what they jointly pray for in their complaint.
There is no doubt but that the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao are entitled thereto on the ground that the
former was only 23 years, 1 month and 1 day, when this action
was brought, and therefore the three years exception granted by
the provisions of section 42 of Act No. 190 had not yet elapsed
as to him, and because Buenaventura Tagarao, then being only
18 years, 4 months and 3 days of age, was yet a minor and the
period of prescription as to him is extended to three years after
he was attained majority.
The plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao, notwithstanding that she
was of legal age when this action was brought, contends that
neither has her right to seek the same relief prayed for by her
brothers and coplaintiffs prescribed, and cites in support of her
contention the ruling laid down in the case of Velazquez vs.
Teodoro (46 Phil., 757). It was truly stated in said case, citing
with approval a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the
State of Ohio in the case of Sturges and Anderson vs.
Longworth and Horne (1 Ohio St., 545), that:
Where the interests of two defendants are joint and inseparable,
and the rights of one are saved under the provision of the statute
of limitations, on account of his disability, such saving inures to
the benefit of the other defendant, although laboring under no
disability.
As may be seen, this ruling refers to cases in which the rights of
the defendants are joint and inseparable because when they are
not so, that is, when they are joint and several at the same time,
as is the case of the plaintiffs whose rights are joint and several,
the rule according to said court, interpreting the section from
which section 42 of Act No. 190 was copied, is different; and
said court stated that in said cases the disability which protects
an heir from the effects of prescription is no protection to
coheirs, or in other words, using the same language of the author
of the footnotes on the decision rendered in the case of Moore
vs. Armstrong, reported in 36 Am. Dec., 63, 78, wherein the
same Supreme Court of the State of Ohio sustained the latter
point of view, "where the rights of the parties are not joint, the
cases are uniform, and hold that the disability of one will
prevent the operation of the statute as to him, but that those who
are not under a disability will be barred."
The case of Moore vs. Armstrong, supra, has more points in
common with the case at bar than those of Sturges and
Anderson vs. Longworth and Horne, and Wilkins vs. Philips
cited in said case of Velazquez vs. Teodoro, supra. The question
for determination in the former case was whether or not the
period of prescription runs not only against the heir who is
laboring under disability but also against his coheirs who are sui
juris. The plaintiffs, to all appearances, were the heirs of one
Furgus Moore and the heiress who seemed to be laboring under
disability was a married woman named Mrs. Fleming. The
Supreme Court of Ohio decided the question in the negative
with the remark that whatever doubt might once have been
entertained on this subject, it was conclusively settled both in
Great Britain and in the United States that the statute is saved in
favor only of the person laboring under the alleged disability,
adding in succession that this is precisely the rule with respect
both to coparceners and tenants in common.
It cannot be argued that the separation of rights among the
plaintiffs was not practicable in the sense that one of them could
not have disposed of or alienate his legal portion of the thing
possessed in common without the consent of the others, because
the law provides otherwise. It says:
Every part owner shall have the absolute ownership of his part,
and of the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he may,
therefore, sell, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are
involved, but the effect of the sale or mortgage, with respect to
the other participants, shall be limited to the share which may be
allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the
community.
Furthermore, whosoever among said plaintiffs should have
desired the partition of the property of which he was a coowner,
could have demanded such partition inasmuch as the law then
allowed and still allows such act (article 400, Civil Code; and
section 181, Act No. 190). What particularly distinguishes the
case at bar from that of Sturges and Anderson vs. Longworth
and Horne, supra, and the other cases wherein it was established
that when the rights and joint the exception which saves one of
the interested parties also inures to the benefit of the others, is
that it was assumed in the latter cases that the rights and
interests involved therein pertained to joint tenancy, not tenancy
in common, which are two distinct relations, each having its
own juridical meaning. The distinguishing feature between the
one and the other, as stated in the case of Mette vs. Feltgen (148
Ill., 357, 371), is that the surviving coowner in joint tenancy is
subrogated in the rights of the deceased coowner immediately
upon the death of the latter, by the mere fact of said death, but
this does not take place in cases of tenancy in common which
corresponds to what is known in our law as community of
property (articles 392 et seq. of the Civil Code). For this reason,
according to American jurisprudence, a coowner in joint
tenancy can not dispose of his share or interest in the property
which is the subject matter of the joint tenancy, without the
consent of the other coowner because in so doing he prejudices
the other's rights and interests.
That the separation of rights and interests among the plaintiffs
was practicable is further evidenced by the fact that Claro
Garcia with whom they were entitled to one-half of the land in
question could recover his legal portion thereof from Marcos
Garcia, although certainly not in its entirety, having failed to
assert his rights. This being so, and it being known as it is in fact
known that the purpose of the statute of limitations is no other
than to protect the diligent and vigilant, not the person who
sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and taking no trouble of
exercising them one way or another to show that he truly has
such rights, it is logical to conclude that the right of action of the
plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao is barred, and the fact that that of
her brothers and coplaintiffs Serafin and Buenaventura Tagarao
still subsists does not inure to her benefit.
Although Resurreccion Tagarao could have enforced the right
which she exercised in this case on May 17, 1918, when Marcos
Garcia and Paula Tabifranca obtained original certificate of title
No. 10009 (Exhibit M) or shortly afterwards, or long before,
that is, from the death of her mother Merced Garcia in 1914 or
1915, she did nothing to protect her rights. On the contrary, she
allowed said spouses to perform acts of ownership on the land
covered by said certificate, publicly, peacefully, uninterrupted
and adversely to the whole world including herself, and from
that time until the filing of her first complaint more than ten
years had elapsed. It is for this reason why it cannot be sustained
that the defendants Marcos Garcia and Paula Tabifranca, after it
has been shown that the transfers made by them are null and
void, being fictitious and false, hold the land in question in trust,
because if they ever held it in said capacity it had been during
the lifetime of the plaintiffs' mother to whom said defendants
used to give part of the fruits thereof. But after she had died,
their possession was under the circumstances above stated and
the law provides that in whatever way the occupancy by a
person claiming to be the owner of a real property may have
commenced, if said occupancy is under claim of title and is
furthermore open, continuous for ten years and adverse, it
constitutes sufficient title for the occupant thereof (sections 40
and 41 of Act No. 190), and there can be no other exception to
this rule than the disability of persons who are entitled to said
property, by reason of age, some mental defect, or
imprisonment, for whom the same law provides the exceptions
contained in its section 42.
It having been established by the evidence for both the plaintiffs
and the defendants that Candido Montilla holds a lien on the
land in question, which is noted at the back of transfer
certificates of title Nos. 3001 and 8782 (Exhibits 3 and 7) for a
loan in the sum of P4,675 which he granted to Marcos Garcia in
the honest belief that the latter was the true owner of the land
described in certificates of title Nos. 10009 (Exhibit M), 3001
(Exhibit 3), and 8782 (Exhibit 7), it is but just that said lien be
acknowledged by the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao, with the necessary reservations in favor
of said two plaintiffs.
It should be stated in passing that the land in question, lot No.
510 of cadastral case No. 11 of Isabela, Occidental Negros, is
assessed at P15,530, and therefore one-twelfth (1/12) thereof is
worth P1,294.17 on that basis.
As to the indemnity which the plaintiffs claim for the
defendants, the conclusion arrived at by the lower court in its
decision and judgment is supported by the evidence, that is, the
plaintiffs' share of the crops from 1918 to 1929, including that
of Resurreccion Tagarao, should be 1,000 cavans of palay.
However, it being clear that Resurreccion Tagarao's action is
barred, it should be understood that only the plaintiffs Serafin
Tagarao and Buenaventura Tagarao are entitled to compel the
defendants to pay to them the value of two-thirds of the 1,000
cavans of palay at the rate of P3 a cavan.
For all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in
so far as it favors the plaintiffs Serafin Tagarao and
Buenaventura Tagarao, and said defendants are hereby ordered
to execute in favor of said Tagarao brothers and deed or deeds
necessary to transfer to them, by virtue of this judgment, two-
twelfths (2/12) of the entire lot No. 510 of the cadastre of
Isabela, Occidental Negros, including the portion transferred to
Claro Garcia (G. L. R. O. Cad. Record No. 100); to indemnify
each of them in a sum equal to what he may pay to the mortgage
creditor Candido Montilla to free his said portion from the lien
thereof in favor of said Montilla; or likewise to pay to each of
them, upon failure of the defendants to deliver said portion and
execute the necessary deed of transfer, the sum of P1,294.17;
and furthermore to pay, as indemnity, the value of two-thirds of
1,000 cavans of palay, at the rate of P3 a cavan, with costs
against the defendants. Said judgment is reversed as to the
plaintiff Resurreccion Tagarao. So ordered.
Street, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 56550 October 1, 1990
MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and
SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION,
Presiding Judge, CFI of Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV,
SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO,
EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and
ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO, respondents.
CORTS, J.:
On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint
for injunction and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-
572, seeking to enjoin private respondents Socorro Marquez
Vda. De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero
from selling to a third party their pro-indiviso shares as co-
owners in eight parcels of registered land (covered by TCT Nos.
A-1316 to A-1322) located in the province of Cavite, with an
aggregate area of about 96 hectares. Petitioner claimed that
under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners,
had a preferential right to purchase these shares from private
respondents for a reasonable price.
On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, on the ground
that petitioners' registered notice of lis pendens was ample
protection of their rights.
On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons
and copies of the complaint. Private respondents then filed their
answer with counterclaim, praying for the partition of the
subject properties. Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero
filed a motion for intervention dated April 29, 1980, adopting
therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim.
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following
stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor
are the pro-indiviso co-owners of the properties cited and
described in the complaint;
2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land
covered by TCT No. T-1319; approximately twelve (12)
hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-1320; and the entire
parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject of
expropriation proceedings instituted by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) now pending before this Court in Civil Case
Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein
parties in the aforecited expropriation cases, the current
valuation of the land and the improvements thereon is at
P95,132.00 per hectare;
4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written
notice from the defendants and the intervenor that the
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION had offered to buy the latter's share in the
properties listed in the complaint subject to the following terms:
1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100
(P12.50) PESOS per square meter, or a total price of NINE
MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total area of
SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;
2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%)
PERCENT of the selling price, or a minimum downpayment of
TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,700,000.00) PESOS;
3. The balance of the purchase price to be payable within
THREE (3) YEARS from the date of downpayment in THREE
(3) EQUAL, ANNUAL PAYMENTS with interest at the legal
rate prevailing at the time of payment;
4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK
GUARANTEE of payments and shall not be governed by Art.
1250 of the Civil Code.
(Cf. Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)
5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the
plaintiffs were requested:
a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase
defendants' and intervenor's shares under the above-quoted
terms; or
b) To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or
c) To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the
intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION at the price and under the
terms aforequoted.
6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION is ready, willing and able
to purchase not only the aliquot shares of the defendants and the
intervenor, but also that of the plaintiffs, in and to all the
properties subject of this case, for and in consideration of the net
amount of TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square
meter and under the afore-quoted terms;
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]
The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows:
PLAINTIFFS
1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical
partition;
2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly
excessive;
3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right
for an amount of not more that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is
the fair and reasonable value of said properties;
4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-
emptive right was suspended upon the filing of the complaint;
DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR
1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is
P12.50 per square meter;
2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed
upon their failure to exercise the same within the period
prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that
the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive, it
would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs to sell their shares
to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and
good faith is beyond question, as the same was admitted by the
parties herein;
4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95
hectares may be physically partitioned without difficulty in the
manner suggested by them to plaintiffs, and as graphically
represented in the subdivision plan, which will be furnished in
due course to plaintiffs' counsel.
[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]
Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-
trial order dated July 9, 1980 granting petitioners a period of ten
days from receipt of the subdivision plan to be prepared by a
competent geodetic engineer within which to express their
approval or disapproval of the said plan, or to submit within the
same period, if they so desire, an alternative subdivision plan.
On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the
counsel for petitioners a letter enclosed with a subdivision plan.
On August 4, 1980, petitioners filed their comment to the pre-
trial order, contending that the question of reasonable value of
the subject properties remains a contentious issue of fact
ascertainable only after a full trial. Petitioners likewise insisted
on their pre- emptive right to purchase private respondents'
shares in the co-ownership after due determination of the
reasonable price thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for
petitioners another subdivision plan prepared by a geodetic
engineer. Still, no definite communication was sent by
petitioners signifying their approval or disapproval to the
subdivision plans.
In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the
parties, private respondents filed a motion dated December 16,
1980 requesting that petitioners be required to formally specify
which of the two options under Article 498 of the New Civil
Code they wished to avail of: that petitioners' shares in the
subject properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of
P12.50 per square meter; or that the subject properties be sold to
a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
(claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the pre-trial as
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof distributed among
the parties.
Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the
purpose of determining the applicability of Article 498 of the
New Civil Code, respondent trial judge issued an order dated
February 4, 1981 which directed the parties to signify whether
or not they agree to the scheme of allotting the subject
properties to one of the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per
square meter, or whether or not they know of a third party who
is able and willing to buy the subject properties at terms and
conditions more favorable than that offered by VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order contained a series of
questions addressed to all the parties, who were thereupon
required to submit their answers thereto.
Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they
were willing to allot their shares in the subject properties to
Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero, at the rate of P12.50 per
square meter, and that they did not know of any other party who
was willing and able to purchase the subject properties under
more favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.

However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries
posed by respondent trial judge, petitioners filed a motion for
clarification as to the true identity of the third party allegedly
willing to purchase the subject properties.
On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected
petitioners' motion on the ground that it was irrelevant.
Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading
captioned "Compliance and Motion", (1) reiterating the
relevance of ascertaining the true identity of the third party
buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-
BUSINESS CORPORATION or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
RESORTS, INC., (2) expressing their view that there is actually
no bona fide and financially able third party willing to purchase
the subject properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter,
and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive right to
purchase the shares of private respondents in the co-ownership
at a "reasonable price", which is less than that computed
excessively by the latter at the rate of P12.50 per square meter.
Petitioners therein prayed that further proceedings be conducted
in order to settle the factual issue regarding the reasonable value
of the subject properties.
On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order
denying petitioners' motion. The judge ruled that petitioners did
not possess a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents'
shares in the co-ownership. Thus, finding that the subject
properties were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge
ordered the holding of a public sale of the subject properties
pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale
was issued setting the date of public bidding for the subject
properties on April 13, 1981.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the
above order. Respondent trial judge reset the hearing on
petitioners' motion for reconsideration to April 6, 1981, and
moved the scheduled public sale to April 14, 1981.
Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, alleging that
the respondent trial judge acted without jurisdiction, or in grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
issuing his order dated March 16, 1981 which denied petitioners'
claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents'
pro-indiviso shares and which, peremptorily ordered the public
sale of the subject properties. On April 8, 1981, this Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of the
subject properties at public auction.
With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues
joined and the case submitted for decision.
The Court finds no merit in the present petition.
The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated
March 16, 1981 is ultimately premised on petitioners' claim that
they had a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares
of their co-owners, private respondents herein, at a "reasonable
price". It is this same claim which forms the basis of their
complaint for injunction and damages filed against private
respondents in the court a quo.
This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the
legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any of the
owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to
purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners'
reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced.
Article 1620 provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in
case the shares of all the co-owners or of any of them, are sold
to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they
may respectively have in the thing owned in common [Emphasis
supplied].
Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has
alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very
nature of the right of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to
redeem is invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners
are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-ownership [See
Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at
the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and
damages against private respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-
indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus, Article
1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to the case at
bar.
There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private
respondents had acknowledged the pre-emptive right of
petitioners to purchase their shares at a "reasonable price".
Although it appears that private respondents had agreed to sell
their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the offer was made at a
fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated
July 9, 1980, Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It
cannot be said that private respondents had agreed, without
qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. Hence,
petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase the shares at a
price lower than the selling price of private respondents.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private
respondents from alienating their pro-indiviso shares to a third
party. The rights of a co-owner of a property are clearly
specified in Article 493 of the New Civil Code, thus:
Art. 493.Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. The
law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage shall be
limited only to the portion of the property which may be allotted
to him upon termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado v.
Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB
v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404, June 25,
1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,]
and, as earlier discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the
right to redeem, within a specified period, the shares which may
have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the
New Civil Code.]
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial
judge committed no grave abuse of discretion when he denied
petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents' pro-indiviso shares.
Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial
judge's order for the holding of a public sale of the subject
properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 498 of the New
Civil Code. After a careful examination of the proceedings
before respondent trial judge, the Court finds that respondent
trial judge's order was issued in accordance with the laws
pertaining to the legal or juridical dissolution of co-ownerships.
It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with
counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the partition of the subject
properties in the event that the petitioners refused to purchase
their pro-indiviso shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter.
Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase the
other co-owners' pro-indiviso shares, private respondents'
counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties is
recognized by law, specifically Article 494 of the New Civil
Code which lays down the general rule that no co-owner is
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads as
follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which
shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the
case at bar. Private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of
the subject properties was therefore entirely proper. However,
during the pre-trial proceedings, petitioners adopted the position
that the subject properties were incapable of physical partition.
Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But after
petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pretrial order
issued by respondent trial judge, and stubbornly insisted on
exercising an alleged pre-emptive right to purchase private
respondents' shares at a "reasonable price", private respondents
relented and adopted petitioner's position that the partition of the
subject properties was not economically feasible, and,
consequently, invoked the provisions of Article 498 of the New
Civil Code [Private respondents' "Motion To Allot Properties To
Defendants Or To Sell the Same Pursuant To Article 498 Of
The Civil Code", Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-49].
Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact
that the subject properties should not be partitioned, and private
respondents continued to manifest their desire to terminate the
co-ownership arrangement between petitioners and themselves,
respondent trial judge acted within his jurisdiction when he
issued his order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to
answer certain questions for the purpose of determining whether
or not the legal conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of
the New Civil Code were present in the case.
Art. 498 provides that:
Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners
cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
distributed.
The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above
article is resorted to when (1) the right to partition the property
among the co-owners is invoked by any of them but because of
the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its
subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil Code] would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule
69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-owners are not
in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned
the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of the
other co-owners.
Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the
queries posed by respondent trial judge and to insist that
hearings be conducted in order to ascertain the reasonable price
at which they could purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso
shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and Motion" dated February
27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].
Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to
respondent trial judge that the parties could not agree on who
among them would be allotted the subject properties, the Court
finds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the holding of a public sale for the subject
properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square
meter), and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the
co-owners, as provided under Article 498 of the New Civil
Code.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further
hearings in the case because it is apparent from the various
allegations and admissions of the parties made during the pre-
trial proceedings, and in their respective pleadings, that the legal
requisites for the application of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code were present in the case. No factual issues remained to be
litigated upon.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is
hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179205 July 30, 2014
HEIRS OR REYNALDO DELA ROSA, Namely:
TEOFISTA DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE SANTIAGO AND
JOSEPH DELA ROSA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO A. BA TONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL,
JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL
AND LOURDES BA TONGBACAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 pursuant to Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 7 December 2006
Decision2 and 8 August 2007 Resolution3 of the Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64172. In
its assailed Resolution, the appellate court modified its earlier
ruling and proceeded to direct petitioners to execute the
requisite Deed of Sale over the subject property.
The Facts
The subject prope1iy consists of a 3, 750 square meter-portion
of the 15,00 l square meters parcel of land situated in Barrio
Saog, Marilao, Bulacan denominated as Lot No. 1, and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
1074494 under the names of Reynaldo Dela Rosa (Reynaldo),
Eduardo Dela Rosa (Eduardo), Araceli Dela Rosa (Araceli) and
Zenaida Dela Rosa (Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the subject property
to Guillermo Batongbacal (Guillermo) and Mario Batongbacal
(Mario) for 50.00 per square meter or for a total of
187,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo received an
advance payment of 31,500.00 leaving a balance of
156,000.00. As shown in the document denominated as Resibo
and signed by Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties agreed
that the amount of 20,000.00 as part of the advance payment
shall be paid upon the delivery of the Special Power-of-Attorney
(SPA), which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject
property on behalf of his co-owners and siblings namely,
Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The balance thereon shall be paid
in 10,000.00 monthly installments until the purchase price is
fully settled, to wit:
RESlBO
Tinaggap ko ngayong araw na ilo kay Engr. Guillermo A.
Batongbacal, ng Poblacion II, Marilao, Bulacan, ang halagang
sampung libong piso (10,000.00) salaping Pilipino, hilang
bahaging hayad sa bahagi ng lupang may sukal na 3,750 sq.m.
na aking kabahagi sa isang (1) lagay na lupang nasasaog,
Marilao, Bulakan, sinasaklcrw ng T.C.T. No. T-107449, ng
Bulakan, na ipinagkasundo kong ipaghili sa naulil na Engr.
Guillermo A. Batongbacal sa halagang Limampung Piso
(50.00) salaping Filipino, bawat isang (1) melrong parisukal.
Ang paunang bayad na aking tinanggap ukol sa lupang
nabanggil sa ilaas ay 21,500.00, nuong Abril 14-18, 1984. Ang
halagang dapal pa niyang bayaran sa akin ay P 156,000.00, na
ang halagang dalawampung Ii bong piso (20,000.00) ay
babayaran niya sa akin sa arcrw na nag power-of-attorney nina
Zenaida dcla Rosa, at Enrique Magsaloc ay aking nabigay sa
nasabing Engr. Guillermo A. Batongbacal; na ang nalalabing
hahaging bayad ay kanyang habayaran sa akin ng Sampung
libong piso (P 10,000.00) salaping Filipino, bawat buwan
hanggang sa matapusan ang pagbabayad ng kabuuang halaga na
Isang Daang at Walumput Pitong libo Limang Daang Piso
(187,500.00). An,g- bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay ang Lote
No. I, may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita sa nakalakip na
sketch plan na aking ding nilagdaan sa ikaliliwanag ng
kasulutang ito.5
Subsequent to the execution of the said agreement, Mario and
Guillermo, on their own instance, initiated a survey to segregate
the area of 3,750 square meters from the whole area covered by
TCT No. T-107449, delineating the boundaries of the
subdivided parts. As a result, they came up with a subdivision
plan specifically designating the subject property signed by a
Geodetic Engineer.6 Mario and Guillermo thereafter made
several demands from Reynaldo to deliver the SP A as agreed
upon, but such demands all went unheeded.
Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an action for
Specific Performance or Rescission and Damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, seeking to
enforce their Contract to Sell dated 18 February 1987. In their
Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 215-M 90,7 Mario and
Guillermo asserted that they have a better right over the subject
property and alleged that the subsequent sale thereof effected by
Reynaldo to third persons is void as it was done in bad faith. It
was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be directed to
deliver the SPA and, in case of its impossibility, to return the
amount of 31,500.00 with legal interest and with damages in
either case.
To protect their rights on the subject property, Mario and
Guillermo, after initiating Civil Case No. 215-M-90, filed a
Notice of Lis Pendens registering their claim on the certificate
of title covering the entire property.
In refuting the allegations of Mario and Guillermo in their
Complaint. Reynaldo in his Answer8 countered that the
purported Contract to Sell is void, because he never gave his
consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted that he was made to
understand that the contract between him and the Batongbacals
was merely an equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed that
the latter will loan to him the amount of 3 l ,500.00 payable
once he receives his share in the proceeds of the sale of the land
registered under TCT No. T-107449.
Following the pre-trial conference without the parties reaching
an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.9 Both parties
proceeded to present, in open court, documentary and
testimonial evidence to substantiate their claims.
For failure of Mario and Guillermo as plaintiffs therein to
adduce sufficient evidence to support their complaint, the RTC,
in a Decision10 dated 24 March 1999, dismissed Civil Case No.
215-M-90 and ordered Reynaldo to return to the former the sum
of 28,000.00 with 12% annual interest. Reynaldo failed to
convince the court a quo that the contract he entered into with
Mario was an equitable mortgage. It was held by the trial court,
however, that the supposed Contract to Sell denominated as
Resibo is unenforceable under Article 1403 of the New Civil
Code because Reynaldo cannot bind his co-owners into such
contract without an SPA authorizing him to do so. As such,
Reynaldo cannot be compelled to deliver the subject property
but he was nonetheless ordered by the court to return the amount
he received as pmi of the contract price since no one should be
allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
The RTC disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is
hereby DISMISSED.
However, [Reynaldo is] hereby ordered to return to [Mario and
Guillermoj the sum of 28,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum
from the date of this decision until fully paid.11
On appeal, the Comi of Appeals, in its Decision12 dated 7
December 2006, brushed aside the claim of equitable mortgage
and held that the sale effected by Reynaldo of his undivided
share in the property is valid and enforceable. According to the
appellate court, no SPA is necessary for Reynaldo's disposition
of his undivided share as it is limited to the portion that may be
allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The
Batongbacals could have validly demanded from Reynaldo to
deliver the subject property pursuant to the Contract to Sell but
such option is no longer feasible because the entire property has
already been sold to third persons to whom a new title was
issued. The appellate court thus proceeded to rescind the
contract and ordered Reynaldo to return the amount he received
as consideration thereby restoring the parties to their situation
before entering into the agreement. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 24, 1999 is
AFFIRMED with modification that appellee is ordered to return
to appellants the amount of 31,500.00 plus 12% interest per
annum from the date of decision of the trial court until full
payment thereof.
In addition, the appellee is ordered:
1. To pay appellants 50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
50,000.00 as moral damages; and 30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
2. To pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses of 50,000.00;
and
3. Double costs.13
In seeking modification of the appellate court's decision, Mario
and Guillermo pointed out that the title of the subject property
has not yet been transferred to third persons, and thus, Reynaldo
can still be compelled to execute a deed of conveyance over his
undivided share of the entire property.
In a Resolution14 dated 8 August 2007, the Court of Appeals
granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Mario and Guillermo
and directed Reynaldo to convey the subject property to them,
viz:
WHEREFORE, [Reynaldo's] Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED for lack of merit.
Upon the other hand, [Mario and Guillermo] Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated
December 7, 2006 is PARTIALLY RECONSIDERED ordering
defendant-appellee Reynaldo dela Rosa or his successor-in-
interest to execute the requisite Deed of Sale over his Y-i
undivided share in the subject property covered by TCT T-
107449 and to accept the consideration of 156,000.00 within
thirty (30) days from the finality of the decision.
In case of failure of [Reynaldo] to execute the deed of sale, the
Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Br. 16 of Malolos, Bulacan is
directed to execute the same and receive the 156,000.00
balance on the purchase price on behalf of Reynaldo de la
Rosa.15
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was notified of the
death or Reynaldo, and his heirs sought to be substituted as
party in this case.16
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this Court via this
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the Court
of Appeals Decision and Resolution be reversed on the ground
that it was rendered not in accordance with the applicable law
and jurisprudence.
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE
BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA ROSA AND GUILLERMO
BATONGBACAL;
II.
ASSUMING THAT THERE IS A CONTRACT OF SALE,
WHETHER OR NOT GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL
COMPLIED WITII I IIS OBLIGATION [UNDER THE
CONTRACTl;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
LACHES;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT MARIO BATONGBACAL IS A PARTY
TO THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN REYNALDO DELA
ROSA AND GUILLERMO BATONGBACAL;
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDEN'qS] ARE ENTITLED TO
AN A WARD OF DAMAGES;
VI.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO AW ARD OF DAMAGES. WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS" A WARD OF DAMAGES
WAS EXCESSIVE.17
The various contentions revolve on the sole issue of whether the
contract entered into by parties was a Contract to Sell or an
equitable mortgage. The Court will not delve into questions
which arc factual in nature, consistent with the rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts.
The Court's Ruling
In assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution,
petitioners are unflinching in their stand that the disputed
contract purporting to be an absolute deed of sale was an
equitable mortgage with the subject p roperty as security for a
loan obligation. To prove their point, petitioners asserted that
the consideration in the amount of 187,500.00 for a property
consisting of 15,001 square meters is grossly inadequate
because the land valuation in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, at
the time the transaction was entered into by the parties in 1984,
was already 80.00 to 100.00 per square meter. The gross
inadequacy of the price, the Heirs of Reynaldo argued, is telling
of the intention of the parties to mortgage and not to sell the
property with the end view of affording the mortgagor an easy
opportunity to redeem the property should his means permit him
to do so.
An equitable mortgage is defined as one although lacking in
some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded
by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to
charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing
impossible or contrary to law. For the presumption of an
equitable mortgage to arise, two requisites must concur: (1) that
the parties entered into a contract denominated as a sale; and (2)
the intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.
Consequently, the non-payment of the debt when due gives the
mortgagee the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property
and apply the proceeds of the sale for the satisfaction of the loan
obligation.18 While there is no single test to determine whether
the deed of absolute sale on its face is really a simple loan
accommodation secured by a mortgage, the Civil Code,
however, enumerates several instances when a contract is
presumed to be an equitable mortgage, to wit:
Article 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase
another instrument extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase
price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing
sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real
intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit
to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be
considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws.
A perusal of the contract denominated as Resibo reveals the
utter frailty of petitioners' position because nothing therein
suggests, even remotely, that the subject property was given to
secure a monetary obligation. The terms of the contract set forth
in no uncertain terms that the instrument was executed with the
intention of transferring the ownership of the subject prope1iy to
the buyer in exchange for the price. Nowhere in the deed is it
indicated that the transfer was merely intended to secure a debt
obligation. On the contrary, the document clearly indicates the
intent of Reynaldo to sell his share in the property. The primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the
intention of the parties.19 If the words of a contract appear to
contravene the evident intention of the paiiies, the latter shall
prevail.20 Such intention is determined not only from the
express terms of their agreement, but also from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.21 That the
parties intended some other acts or contracts apart from the
express terms of the agreement, was not proven by Reynaldo
during the trial or by his heirs herein.22 Beyond their bare and
uncorroborated asseverations that the contract failed to express
the true intention of the parties, the record is bereft of any
evidence indicative that there was an equitable mortgage.
Neither could the allegation of gross inadequacy of the price
carry the day for the petitioners.1wphi1 It must be underscored
at this point that the subject of the Contract to Sell was limited
only to '14 pro-indiviso share of Reynaldo consisting an area of
3,750 square meter and not the entire 15,001-square meter
parcel of land. As a co-owner of the subject property,
Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in the
property held in common is sanctioned by law. The applicable
law is Article 493 of the New Civil Code, which spells out the
rights of co-owners over a co-owned property, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the foll ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his
proindiviso share in the co-owned property even without the
consent of his coowners.23 This right is absolute and in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has a
full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person for
its enjoyment.24 In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-
owner from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal share in the
property held in common.25
In Vaglidad v. Vaglidad, Jr., a case nearly on all fours to the
present petition, the Court upheld the right of the co-owner to
alienate his proindiviso share in the co-owned property as part
of his right of dominion. It was even pointed out that since the
previous sale is valid, the subsequent conveyance effected by
the co-owner is null and void pursuant to the principle that "no
one can give what he does not have," nemo dat quod non habet,
thus:
LORETO sold the subject property to GABINO, JR. on May 12,
1986 as a co-owner. LORETO had a right, even before the
partition of the property on January 19, 1987, to transfer in
whole or in part his undivided interest in the lot even without
the consent of his co-heirs. This right is absolute in accordance
with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership
of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and substitute another person for its enjoyment.
Thus, what GABINO, JR. obtained by virtue of the sale on May
12, 1986 were the same rights as the vendor LORETO had as
co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given
under their transaction.
LORETO sold some 1,604 square meters of Lot No. 1253 to
GABINO, JR. Consequently, when LORETO purportedly sold
to WILFREDO on December 7, 1989 the same portion of the
lot, he was no longer the owner of Lot No. 1253-B. Based on
the principle that "no one can give what he does not have,"
LORETO could not have validly sold to WILFREDO on
December 7, 1989 what he no longer had. As correctly pointed
out by the appellate court, the sale made by LORETO in favor
of WILFREDO is void as LORETO did not have the right to
transfer the ownership of the subject property at the time of
sale.26 (Emphasis supplied).
In the same breadth, a co-owner cannot be compelled by the
court to give their consent to the sale of his share in a co-owned
property. In Arambulo v. Nolasco, the Court intimated:
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the
Court, agree that co-owners such as respondents have over their
part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the
same as that or individual owners which is not diminished by
the fact that the entire property is co-owned with others. That
part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may
be disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of
their co-owners. So we rule in this case. The respondents cannot
be ordered to sell their portion of the co-owned properties. In
the language of Rodriguez v. Court of first Instance of Rizal,
"each party is the sole judge of what is good for him."27
(Underscoring ours).
Thus, even if the impression of the Court of Appeals were true,
i.e., that the entire property has been sold to thirds persons, such
sale could not have affected the right of Mario and Guillermo to
recover the property from Reynaldo. In view of the nature of co-
ownership, the Comi of Appeals correctly ruled that the terms in
the Contract to Sell, which limited the subject to Reynaldo's
ideal share in the property held in common is perfectly valid and
binding. In fact, no authority from the other co-owners is
necessary for such disposition to be valid as he is afforded by
the law fullownership of his paii and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto. J\ condition set forth in a sale contract
requiring a co-owner to secure an authority from his co-owners
for the alienation of his share, as seemingly indicated in this
case, should be considered mere surplusage and docs not, in any
way, affect the validity or the enforceability of the contract. Nor
should such a condition indicate an intention to sell the whole
because the contrary intention has been clearly written:
x x x Ang bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay ang f,ote No. 1, may
sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita sa nakalakip na sketch plan na
aking ding nilagdaan sa ikaliliwanag ng kasulatang ito.28
Indeed, the intention clearly written, settles the issue regarding
the purchase price. A contract of sale is a consensual contract,
which becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of minds of
the parties on the price and the object of the sale.29 The mere
inadequacy of the price docs not affect its validity when both
parties are in a position to form an independent judgment
concerning the transaction, unless fraud, mistake or undue
influence indicative of a defect in consent is present.30 A
contract may consequently be annulled on the ground of vitiated
consent and not due to the inadequacy of the price.31 In the case
at bar, however, no evidence to prove fraud, mistake or undue
influence indicative of vitiated consent is attendant.
As the parties invoking equitable mortgage, the Heirs of
Reynaldo did not even come close to proving that the parties
intended to charge the property as security for a debt, leaving us
with no other choice but to uphold the stipulations in the
contract. Basic is the rule that if the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control,32 we find that
the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for ruling, in
modification of its original judgment, that the sale effected by
Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property is valid and
enforceable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 501
1. G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO
OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO
LOPEZ, EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR,
CORAZON LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN,
FAUSTINA BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR,
ADORACION BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO GANOTICE and
ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.
Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited
property in a prolonged juridical condition of co-owner ship.
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of
Villasis, Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square meters as
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 15262.1 In
December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died, 2 leaving said property to
his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that time on,
the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally
partition the property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953,
Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a
deed of absolute sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand
two hundred and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more or less,
of the undivided portion of (their) interests, rights and
participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio
Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of
one thousand pesos (P1,000). 3
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed
of absolute sale of the "undivided" four thousand two hundred
and fifty-seven (4,257) square meters of the "eastern part" of
Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora
Gaspar, also in consideration of P1,000. 4 Each of the said
documents bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of
Candido.
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido
stated that a month prior to the execution of the deed of sale in
favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" of
Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a
position to purchase" said property. 5
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the
vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been paying the real
property taxes for their respectively purchased properties. 6
They also had been in possession of their purchased properties
which, being planted to palay and peanuts, were segregated
from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes. 7
More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the
counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo
Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to partition
the property so that they could acquire their respective titles
thereto without resorting to court action, and that, should they
fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court. 8
Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter since on
December 15, 1966, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a
complaint for partition and damages 9 in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan. 10
The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the
disputed properties was delivered to them with the knowledge
and consent of the defendants; that they had been paying the real
estate taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties were
offered to the other co-owners for sale but they refused to buy
them; that on February 18, 1953, the transactions were duly
annotated and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of
OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their desire to
segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated
by defendants' adamant refusal to lend them the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute a deed of partition
of the whole lot.
In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs
alleged that defendants also refused to allow them to survey and
segregate the portions bought by them. Plaintiffs prayed that the
court order the defendants to partition Lot 4685 and to allow
them to survey and segregate the portions they had purchased.
They also demanded payment of P800.00 as attorney's fees and
cost of the suit.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever
transpired as the alleged vendors could not have sold specific
portions of the property; that plaintiffs' possession and
occupation of specific portions of the properties being illegal,
they could not ripen into ownership; and that they were not
under any obligation to lend their copy of the certificate of title
or to accede to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement
of the property. As special and affirmative defenses, the
defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null and void
and hence, unenforceable against them; that the complaint did
not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action
if any, had prescribed.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated
demands, plaintiffs refused and failed to vacate the premises;
that the properties occupied by the plaintiffs yielded an average
net produce in palay and peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00
annually, and that the complaint was filed to harass them. They
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of
P1,600.00 per year from 1953 until plaintiffs shall have vacated
the premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying
all the allegations therein and stating that defendants never
demanded that plaintiffs vacate the portions of Lot 4685 they
had bought.
The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable
settlement between the parties without success. Hence, it set the
case for trial and thereafter, it rendered a
decision 11 declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale 12 and
ordering the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold
portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order that the
plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates of title over
their portions of said lot.
In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of
whether the two deeds of absolute sale were what they
purported to be or merely mortgage documents. It considered as
indicia of plaintiffs' absolute dominion over the portions sold to
them their actual possession thereof without any opposition
from the defendants until the filing of the complaint, their
payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited from the
produce of the land. The court ruled that the defendants'
testimonial evidence that the deeds in question were merely
mortgage documents cannot overcome the evidentiary value of
the public instruments presented by the plaintiffs.
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null
and void considering that the land subject thereof had not yet
been partitioned, the court observed that the total area of 8,514
square meters sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his
share should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687 square meters be
divided among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their
mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that
during his lifetime, and before Candido got married, Lorenzo
Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took
possession of their respective shares. *
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending
that the lower court erred in declaring the two deeds of absolute
sale as valid, in ordering the segregation of the sold portions of
Lot 4685 to enable the plaintiffs to obtain their respective
certificates of title, and in not considering their defense of
prescription.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in
issue in this case in view of the finding of the trial court that the
defendants admittedly do not question their due execution.13
What should pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of
said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of designated portions
of an undivided, co-owned property.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the
partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the
co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share
in the entire land or thing. 14
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership
is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code,
co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of
twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any agreement
to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year
period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in
division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said
stipulation shall be void only as to the period beyond such
maximum.15
Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in
division of a property for more than twenty years, it would be
contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the
period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation
expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered
meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the
co-ownership for more than twenty years. We hold that when
Candido and his mother (who died before the filing of the
complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they
validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of
law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint
for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally
considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions
of Lot 4685 in their possession, 16 merely served to put a stamp
of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of
terminating the co-ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the
complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of the
deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the defendants-
appellants, prescription might have barred its filing under the
general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article
494 specifically mandates that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence,
considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot
4685 in their favor and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the
Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly filed. 17
We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on
the compliance with the resolution of September 1, 1986 of
counsel for defendants-appellants. In said resolution, the court
required the parties to move in the premises "considering the
length of time that this case has remained pending in this Court
and to determine whether or not there might be supervening
events which may render the case moot and academic. 18 In his
manifestation and motion dated August 12, 1987, said counsel
informed the Court that he had contacted the defendants-
appellants whom he advised "to move in the premises which is
the land in question and to maintain the status quo with respect
to their actual possession thereon" and that he had left a copy of
said resolution with the defendants-appellants" for their
guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as specified
in said
resolution." 19
Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive
"to move in the premises." For the enlightenment of said
counsel and all others of similar perception, a "move in the
premises" resolution is not a license to occupy or enter the
premises subject of litigation especially in cases involving real
property. A "move in the premises" resolution simply means
what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform the Court
of developments pertinent to the case which may be of help to
the Court in its immediate disposition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it
declares the validity of the two deeds of sale and directs the
partition of Lot 4685, is AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby
ordered to facilitate with dispatch the preparation of a project of
partition which it should thereafter approve. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., concur in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75886 August 30, 1988
CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ERNESTO ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA
ROQUE, MARCELA ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN
ROQUE, respondents.
Lorenzo J. Liwag for petitioner.
Dominador Ad Castillo for private respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The subject of the present Petition for Review is the 31 July
1986 Decision of the former Intermediate Appellate Court in
AC-G.R. CV No. 02248 (entitled, "Concepcion Roque, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. Ernesto Roque, Filomena Osmunda Cecilia Roque,
Marcela Roque, Jose Roque and Ruben Roque, defendants-
appellants") which reversed and set aside on appeal the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch 9.
The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of land
situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan and designated as Lot
No. 1549 of the Cadastral Survey of Malolos. The property was
registered originally in the name of Januario Avendao, a
bachelor who died intestate and without issue on 22 October
1945.
On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario
Avendafio executed a document entitled "Paghahati at
Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman." 1 Through this
instrument, extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1549 was effected
among the intestate heirs as follows:
a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada
Avendao.
b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio
Avendafio and Miguel Avendao.
c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino,
Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao.
d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent
Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. 2
On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio,
Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all
surnamed Avendao, in consideration of the aggregate amount
of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided
threefourths (3/4) share in Lot No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto
Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and
complete ownership of the property. The transactions were
embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale both entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" 3 and both duly notarized.
Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" 4
dated 27 November 1961, Emesto and Victor Roque purportedly
sold a three-fourths (3/4) undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to
their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same
amount. The property, however, remained registered in the
name of the decedent, Januario Avendao.
Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and allegedly
of respondent Ernesto Roque, Lot No. 1549 was surveyed on 20
September 1975. Consequent thereto, a Subdivision Plan 5 was
drawn up by the Geodetic Engineer Identifying and delineating
a one-fourth (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the property as
belonging to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque (who
had died on 14 April 1962), upon the one hand, and a three-
fourths (3/4) portion (234 square meters) of the same property
as belonging to petitioner Concepion Roque, upon the other
hand. Petitioner claimed that preparation of the Subdivision
Plan, which was approved on 3 November 1975 by the Land
Registration Commission was a preliminary step leading
eventually to partition of Lot No. 1549, partition allegedly
having been previously agreed upon inter se by the co-owners.
Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque,
however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of
ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan
to divide the land.
Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through,
petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a
Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance" 6
(docketed as Civil Case No. 5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then
Court of First Instance of Malolos against respondents Emesto
Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. In her complaint,
petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of an
undivided threefourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue
of the 27 November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan"
executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. In
support of this claim, petitioner also presented an undated and
unnotarized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng
Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati
at Abuyan ng Bahagui" 7 said to have been signed by the
respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of
the Bilihan in favor of petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged that,
as a coowner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition
of the property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the
coownership of the same.
In an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim 8 filed on 28
December 1977, respondents (defendants below) impugned the
genuineness and due execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961 on the ground "that the
signatures appearing thereon are not the authentic signatures of
the supposed signatories ...." It was also alleged that petitioner
Concepcion Roque, far from being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549,
"occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance of
the [defendants]." Respondents also refused to honor the
unnotarized Kasulatan and, additionally, denied having had any
participation in the preparation of the Subchvision Plan.
On 27 June 1983, the trial court (now Branch 9, Regional Trial
Court of Malolos) rendered a Decision, 9 the dispositive portion
of which read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants;
1. Ordering the heirs of the late Victor Roque namely
Filomena Osmunda his spouse, his children, Cecilia Roque,
Marcela Roque, Jose Roque and Ruben Roque and their uncle
and co-defendant Emesto Roque, to execute a deed of
confirmation of the sale made by Emesto and Victor Roque in
favor of plaintiff Concepcion Roque, entitled "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan," executed on November 27, 1961, Exh. E, over the
3/4 portion of the subject property;
2. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land described in
par. 3 of tie complaint covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 1442 Bulacan issued in the name of Januario Avendafio, in
the proportion of 3/4 to pertain to Concepcion Roque, and 1/4 to
pertain to Emesto Roque and his co- defendants, his sister-in-
law, nephews and nieces, in accordance with the approved
subdivision plan (LRC Psd-230726).
3. Ordering defendants,jointly and severally, to pay to
plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as and for attomey's fees and the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The respondents appealed from this decision alleging the
following errors:
I
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered
defendantsappellants to execute a confirmation of the "Bilihan
Lubos at Patuluyan," Exh. "E."

II
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered the
defendantsappellant,s to deliver unto the plaintiff [a] 3/4 share
of the land in question.
III
The lower court erred in deciding this case in favor of the
plaintiff-appellee, based on an unnotarized and forged signature
of defendantappellant Ernesto Roque.
IV
The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
plaintiff-appellee Concepcion Roque despite [its] gross
inconsistencies. 10
Acting on the appeal (docketed as A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248),
the Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision 11 dated 31 July
1986, reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed
both the petitioner's complaint and the respondents' appeal. A
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Concepcion Roque
was denied.
The present Petition for Review was filed with this Court on 18
September 1986. In a resolution dated 27 July 1987, we gave
due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda.
1. On the matter of dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the
Intermediate Appellate Court stated in its decision:
While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the
defendantz, after denying plaintiff's assertion of co-ownership,
asserted that they are the exclusive and sole owners of the 314
portion of the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
Upon the issue thusjoined by the pleadings, it is obvious that the
case has become one ofownership of the disputed portion of the
subject lot.
It is well settled that an action for partition will not prosper as
such from the moment an alleged co-owner asserts an adverse
title. The action that may be brought by an aggrieved co-owner
is accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and
possession (Jardin vs. Hallasgo, 11 7 SCRA 532, 536, 537;
Paner vs. Gaspar, 3 CA Rep. 155, 158). (Emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of the facts of the present case, the
Intermediate Appellate Court's decision appears to imply that
from the moment respondents (defendants below) alleged
absolute and exclusive ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1549
in their Answer, the trial court should have immediately ordered
the dismissal of the action for partition and petitioner (plaintiff
below), if she so desired, should have refiled the case but this
time as an accion reinvindicatoria. Taking this analysis a step
further should the reivindicatory action prosper i.e., a co-
ownership relation is found to have existed between the parties
a second action for partition would still have to be instituted
in order to effect division of the property among the co-owners.
We do not agree with the above view. An action for partition-
which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner
of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom
the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners may be seen to
present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the
issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the
property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that the
plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the
secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between
plaintiff and defendant(s) i.e., what portion should go to
which co-owner.
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the
status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can forthwith
proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In
case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in
themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not
dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition but, on the contrary and
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of
whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court
find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as
co-owner, or that the defendants are or have become the sole
and exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will
necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This result
would be reached, not because the wrong action was
commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff
having been unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no
basis exists for requiring the defendants to submit to partition
the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court after trial
should find the eidstence of co-ownership among the parties
litigant, the court may and should order the partition of the
property in the same action. Judgment for one or the other party
being on the merits, the losing party (respondents in this case)
may then appeal the same. In either case, however, it is quite
unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action,
separate and independent from that for partition originally
instituted. Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to be
at once an action for declaration of coownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on the
matter. 12 and is sustained by the public policy which abhors
multiplicity of actions.
The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this
connection. It is sometimes said that "the action for partition of
the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio
familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe." 13 This statement
bears some refinement. In the words of Article 494 of the Civil
Code, "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concemed."
No matter how long the co-ownership has lasted, a co-owner
can always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided the
defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or
impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they cannot set up as a
defense the prescription of the action for partition. But if the
defendants show that they had previously asserted title in
themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite period
of time, the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as
a co-owner will have been lost by prescription and the court
cannot issue an order requiring partition. This is precisely what
happened in Jardin v. Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 532 (1982), which
the respondent appellate court cited to support its position
quoted above.
The case of Jardin involved, among others, two (2) parcels of
land which were inherited in 1920 by the brothers Catalino
jardin and Galo Jardin together with their half-brother, Sixto
Hallasgo. The three (3) held these lands in co-ownership until
Sixto later (the date was not specified) repudiated the
coownership and occupied and possessed both parcels of land,
claiming the same exclusively as his own. Sometime in 1973,
the heirs of Catalino and Galo instituted an action for partition
of the two (2) properties against Sixto's heirs, who had refused
to surrender any portion of the same to the former. The trial
court, assuming that prescription had started to run in that case
even before the Civil Code took effect, held that the action for
partition filed by the heirs of Catalino and Galo had already
prescribed. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court on this
point in the following terms:
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co- ownership" and that "each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned." It also provides
that 'no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common
(actio communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does
not prescribe, the co-ownership does not last forever since it
may be repudiated by a co-owner [i.e., Sixto]. In such a case, the
action for partition does not lie. What may be brought by the
aggrieved co-owner [i.e., the heirs of Catalino and Galo] is an
accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and
possession. That action may be barred by prescription.
If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the hereditary or
community property, holds the same in his own name, that is,
under claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the
property by prescription if his possession meets all the other
requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the
prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may lose their right
to demand partition, and their action may then be held to have
prescribed (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811).
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it will be seen that the
underscored portion of the Court's opinion in Jardin is actually
obiter. For there, the Court simply held the action for partition
by the heirs of Catalino and Galo had prescribed and did not
require such heirs to start a new action (which would have been
quite pointless); on the other hand, the Court remanded the case
to the lower court for further proceedings in respect of the
recovery of a 350 square meter lot which the evidence showed
was owned by the plaintiffs but wrongfully included by Sixto in
the cadastral survey of his share of the adjoining lot.
In Jardin, the claim of co-ownership asserted by the heirs of
Catalino and Galo was effectively refuted by the heirs of Sixto,
who not only claimed for themselves absolute and exclusive
ownership of the disputed properties but were also in actual and
adverse possesion thereof for a substantial length of time. The
Court found, further, that the action for partition initially
available to the heirs of Catalino and Galo had, as a result of the
preceding circumstance, already prescribed.
An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the case at
bar. First of all, petitioner Concepcion Roque-the co-owner
seeking partition has been and is presently in open and
continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the
property owned in common. The Court notes in this respect the
finding of the trial court that petitioner, following execution of
the "Bilihan Lubos at Pattlluyan" on 27 November 1961, had
been in "continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion of the lot ... up
to the present, and whereon plaintifrs house and that of her son
are erected. " 14 Respondents do not dispute this finding of fact,
although they would claim that petitioner's possession is merely
tolerated by them. Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither of the parties
involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and
exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to
that of any of the other co-owners: in other words, co-ownership
of the property had continued to be recognized by all the
owners. Consequently, the action for partition could not have
and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of
institution by Concepcion of the action below.
2. Coming now to the matter regarding dismissal of the
respondents'appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court held that
inasmuch as the attack on the validity of the "Bilihan Lubos at
Patuluyan" was predicated on fraud and no action for annulment
of the document had been brought by respondents within the
four (4) year prescriptive period provided under Article 1391 of
the Civil Code, such action had already prescribed.
We find it unnecessary to deal here with the issue of
prescription discussed by the respondent court in its assailed
decision. The facts on record clearly show that petitioner
Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open and continuous
possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 ever
since execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in
November of 1961. The Court notes that it was only in their
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court
in December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years later
that respondents first questioned the genuineness and
authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once
during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest
petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot
No. 1549. Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as
they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of Lot No.
1549, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or
tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major
portion (3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand,
contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth thereof.
This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very
substantial length of time during which petitioner all the while
remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation and
possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may
no longer dispute the existence of the co-ownership between
petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of
a threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are
deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced
in the coow,aership. 15 In this respect, we affirm the decision of
the respondent appellate court presently under review.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court dated 31 July 1986 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248 is SET
ASIDE with respect to that portion which orders the dismissal
of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, but is AFFIRMED
with respect to that portion which orders the dismissal of the
respondents'appeal in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248. The Decision
of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos dated 27
June 1983 in Civil Case No. 5236-M is hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY
MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-
FRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO
FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO,
HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES,
ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA,
JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA,
AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO
RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA
RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON
CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED)
SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO
INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES
VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA,
MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not
inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed
among the decedents heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the
March 14, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7, 2006 Resolution3
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the
owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property)
in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
(24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died
without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who
are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also
both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife
Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega,
Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted
respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children:
petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-
Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando.
Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha
Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and
Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria
Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is
survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-
Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo
Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.),
Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo
Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa
Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As
for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made party to
the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles
(Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias
grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property
belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil
Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs. In his
Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several
occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but
Gregorias heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter
reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a
certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that
Gregorias heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; that
portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera,
which portions must be collated and included as part of the
portion to be awarded to Gregorias heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo
Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner
Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property
and transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the
property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have
deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits of the property estimated
at 1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred expenses by
way of attorneys fees and litigation costs. Leonardo thus prayed
that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property;
that the same be partitioned after collation and determination of
the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregorias heirs be
ordered to execute the necessary documents or agreements; and
that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the amount of
1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorneys fees of 50,000.00,
and lawyers appearance fees of 500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo,
Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no
cause of action against them; that they have become the sole
owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez
(Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous,
actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on
the property; that Leonardos claim is barred by estoppel and
laches; and that they have suffered damages and were forced to
litigate as a result of Leonardos malicious suit. They prayed
that Civil Case No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be
declared to be without any right to the property; that Leonardo
be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the property;
and that they be awarded 20,000.00 as moral damages,
10,000.00 as temperate and nominal damages, 20,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and double costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera
were declared in default.9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned
Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes
and bounds of the property.10 The resulting Commissioners
Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary
Commissioners Report,12 were duly approved by the parties.
The parties then submitted the following issues for resolution of
the trial court:
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leons estate;
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
Whether Leonardos claim has prescribed, or that he is barred
by estoppel or laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly
substituted by his heirs, the respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional
relevant facts came to light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No.
4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the case was
dismissed and referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1366.
However, on March 4, 1997, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No.
1366 for lack of jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC can
take cognizance of the partition case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through
an unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in
turn allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25,
1943 via another private sale document;17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more
than 30 years, while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-
630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of
Ownership of Land19 claiming sole ownership of the property
which he utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration No.
16414 (TD 16414) over the property and to cancel Tax
Declaration No. 20102 in Leons name;20
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the
exclusion of Leonardo.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22
which decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs right of
action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil
Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be
the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and
by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered
cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is
directed to issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of
Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining,
one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4)
share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered
dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943
deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold
the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the
property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained
part of Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leons
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject
property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are
entitled to Romanas share as the latters successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years
from Leons death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to file
the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit
only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription. It
held that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for
partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land is a real action over immovable property which
prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held that for
his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well.
Consequently, the property should go to Gregorias heirs
exclusively.
Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was
denied by the RTC in its February 7, 2002 Order.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 74687, the appeal questioned the propriety
of the trial courts dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its
application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to
Gregorias heirs exclusively.
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27
which contained the following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is
GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8,
Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs
as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the
portion described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioners
Report (Supplementary) to the herein plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the
name of Leon Roldan and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is
directed to issue transfer certificates of title to the plaintiffs in
accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the sketch plan as
embodied in the Commissioners Report (Supplementary) and
the remaining portion thereof be adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial courts declaration of nullity of the
April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of
Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was
settled by petitioners failure to appeal the same. Proceeding
from the premise that no valid prior disposition of the property
was made by its owner Leon and that the property which
remained part of his estate at the time of his death passed on
by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which
thus makes the parties herein who are Romanas and
Gregorias heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares, the
appellate court held that only the issues of prescription and
laches were needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial courts pronouncement that
Leonardos action for partition was barred by prescription. The
CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leons
death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the Affidavit
of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation
of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying
the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA
held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration
over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a
repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was made,
which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-
year prescriptive period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.s sole possession of the
property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo
and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership
either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and
appropriation of its fruits even his continuous payment of the
taxes thereon while adverse as against strangers, may not be
deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and
conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or
deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of
assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a
showing that this was effectively made known to Leonardo.
Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the
appellate court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will
not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-owners but will be
held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he administers or
takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the
same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary,
lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the
issuance of a new tax declaration in his name do not prove
ownership; they merely indicate a claim of ownership.
Moreover, petitioners act of partitioning the property among
themselves to the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the latter;
nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership as it
has not been shown that the partition was made known to
Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as
against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is
controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to
defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to
deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted
respondents prayer for partition, directing that the manner of
partitioning the property shall be governed by the
Commissioners Report and Sketch and the Supplementary
Commissioners Report which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the
CA denied in its assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner [sic] who sent
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO
FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY
ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.33
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.s
purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession thereof
amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that
Leonardos admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.s
possession for such length of time operated to bestow upon
petitioners as Lucimo Sr.s successors-in-interest the
benefits of acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the
repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardos inaction from Lucimo
Sr.s taking possession in 1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo
filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo
amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the
proceedings before the Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo
was informed of Lucimo Sr.s purchase of the property in 1943;
this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against
Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case
No. 4983 which was eventually dismissed and referred to the
MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did nothing while
Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for
himself.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that
eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this case
for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in cases heard
before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served to
the offices concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were
not furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic] the
adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court of
Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be taken on such pleadings,
briefs, memoranda, motions, and other papers as fail [sic] to
comply with the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F.
[sic] by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth
Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the
Clerk of Court Supreme Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the
requirements of furnishing two (2) copies each concerned party
[sic] under the Rule of Courts [sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr.
had long been settled and had become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leons
estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial
court is whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1wphi1
The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in
favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It
then concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever
took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal.
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be
considered settled. Thus, petitioners insistence on Lucimo Sr.s
1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the
property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to
Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly remained
part of Leons estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and
Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings,
Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal
shares. In turn, Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has
herein became entitled to the property upon the sisters
passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject
property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and
Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof.
As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common,
provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it
is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the
co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights.37 They have the full ownership of
their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute
another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved.38 Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one
of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.40
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-
owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent
any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title
may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing."41
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial
court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which
Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962.
Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that
prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and
against the other co-owners only from the time he positively
renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation
to the other co-owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of the property
only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration
exclusively in his name, and informed the latter before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa of his 1943 purchase of the property.
These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by
Lucimo Sr.s act of withholding Leonardos share in the fruits of
the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in
his Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held
that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979
or even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to
claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus
concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just
under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period
prescribed under Article 1141.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts notice, however, is
that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that
may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the
fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an
heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law, being
married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family
Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half
blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the
property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of.
For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against
Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has
not been lost.
Likewise, petitioners argument that Leonardos admission and
acknowledgment in his pleadings that Lucimo Sr. was in
possession of the property since 1943 should be taken against
him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of
the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to
Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More
significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens
system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leons name. Leons
ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the
property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of
the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the
property at any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14,
2006 Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152658. July 29, 2005]
LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO, BEN
MAURICIO P. BRAVO,[1] ROLAND P. BRAVO, JR.,
OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS, HEIRS OF CORPUSINIA
BRAVO-NIOR namely: GERSON U. NIOR, MARK
GERRY B. NIOR, CLIFF RICHARD B. NIOR, BRYAN B.
NIOR, WIDMARK B. NIOR, SHERRY ANNE B. NIOR,
represented by LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO
as their attorney-in-fact, and HONORABLE
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati City, petitioners,
vs. EDWARD P. BRAVO, represented by his attorney-in-
fact FATIMA C. BRAVO, respondent, and DAVID B.
DIAZ, JR., intervenor-respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[2] assailing the
Decision[3] of 21 December 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. The Court of Appeals reversed the
Decision[4] of 11 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-1379 denying
respondents prayer to partition the subject properties.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Mauricio Bravo (Mauricio) and Simona[5] Andaya
Bravo (Simona) owned two parcels of land (Properties)
measuring 287 and 291 square meters and located along
Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. The Properties
are registered under TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal on 23 May 1958. The Properties
contain a large residential dwelling, a smaller house and other
improvements.
Mauricio and Simona had three children - Roland, Cesar and
Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without issue. Lily Bravo
married David Diaz, and had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. (David
Jr.). Roland had six children, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-
Guerrero (Elizabeth), Edward Bravo (Edward), Roland Bravo,
Jr. (Roland Jr.), Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio Bravo, and
their half-sister, Ofelia Bravo (Ofelia).
Simona executed a General Power of Attorney (GPA) on 17
June 1966 appointing Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact. In the
GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to mortgage or otherwise
hypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my
property, real, personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and
wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx.[6] Mauricio
subsequently mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.[7]
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage (Deed of Sale) conveying
the Properties to Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo and
Elizabeth Bravo[8] (vendees). The sale was conditioned on the
payment of P1,000 and on the assumption by the vendees of the
PNB and DBP mortgages over the Properties.
As certified by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, the Deed of Sale was notarized by Atty. Victorio Q.
Guzman on 28 October 1970 and entered in his Notarial
Register.[9] However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated on
TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to PNB
and DBP. The mortage loans and the receipts for loan payments
issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricios name
even after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in
1977.
On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his wife, Fatima
Bravo, filed an action for the judicial partition of the Properties.
Edward claimed that he and the other grandchildren of Mauricio
and Simona are co-owners of the Properties by succession.
Despite this, petitioners refused to share with him the possession
and rental income of the Properties. Edward later amended his
complaint to include a prayer to annul the Deed of Sale, which
he claimed was merely simulated to prejudice the other heirs.
In 1999, David Jr., whose parents died in 1944 and who was
subsequently raised by Simona, moved to intervene in the case.
David Jr. filed a complaint-in-intervention impugning the
validity of the Deed of Sale and praying for the partition of the
Properties among the surviving heirs of Mauricio and Simona.
The trial court allowed the intervention in its Order dated 5 May
1999.[10]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court upheld Mauricios sale of the Properties to the
vendees. The trial court ruled that the sale did not prejudice the
compulsory heirs, as the Properties were conveyed for valuable
consideration. The trial court also noted that the Deed of Sale
was duly notarized and was in existence for many years without
question about its validity.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision of 11 May
2000 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DENIES
the JUDICIAL PARTITION of the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 58999 and 59000 registered with the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Dissatisfied, Edward and David Jr. (respondents) filed a joint
appeal to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Article 166 of the Civil Code (Article 166), the Court of
Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void for lack of Simonas
consent. The appellate court held that the GPA executed by
Simona in 1966 was not sufficient to authorize Mauricio to sell
the Properties because Article 1878 of the Civil Code (Article
1878) requires a special power of attorney for such transactions.
The appellate court reasoned that the GPA was executed merely
to enable Mauricio to mortgage the Properties, not to sell them.
The Court of Appeals also found that there was insufficient
proof that the vendees made the mortgage payments on the
Properties, since the PNB and DBP receipts were issued in
Mauricios name. The appellate court opined that the rental
income of the Properties, which the vendees never shared with
respondents, was sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to
PNB and DBP.
The Court of Appeals declared the Deed of Sale void and
ordered the partition of the Properties in its Decision of 21
December 2001 (CA Decision), as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Metro-Manila, Branch 13[9] dated 11 May 2000[,]
review of which is sought in these proceedings[,] is
REVERSED.
1. The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real Estate Mortgage
(Exh. 4) dated 28 October 1970 is hereby declared null and
void;
2. Judicial Partition on the questioned properties is hereby
GRANTED in the following manner:
A. In representation of his deceased mother, LILY BRAVO-
DIAZ, intervenor DAVID DIAZ, JR., is entitled to one-half
(1/2) interest of the subject properties;
B. Plaintiff-appellant EDWARD BRAVO and the rest of the
five siblings, namely: LILY ELIZABETH, EDWARD,
ROLAND, JR., SENIA, BENJAMIN and OFELIA are entitled
to one-sixth (1/6) representing the other half portion of the
subject properties;
C. Plaintiff-appellant Edward Bravo, intervenor DAVID DIAZ,
JR., SENIA and BENJAMIN shall reimburse the defendant-
appellees LILY ELIZABETH, OFELIA and ROLAND the sum
of One Thousand (P1,000.00) PESOS representing the
consideration paid on the questioned deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage with interest of six (6) percent per
annum effective 28 October 1970 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, raising these issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF
THE DEED OF SALE WITH ASSUMPTION OF
MORTGAGE.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ORDERING THE PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION.[13]
At the least, petitioners argue that the subject sale is valid as to
Mauricios share in the Properties.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that they are co-owners
of the Properties by succession. Respondents argue that the sale
of the conjugal Properties is void because: (1) Mauricio
executed the Deed of Sale without Simonas consent; and (2) the
sale was merely simulated, as shown by the grossly inadequate
consideration Mauricio received for the Properties.
While this case was pending, Leonida Andaya Lolong
(Leonida), David Jr.s aunt, and Atty. Cendaa, respondents
counsel, informed the Court that David Jr. died on 14 September
2004. Afterwards, Leonida and Elizabeth wrote separate letters
asking for the resolution of this case. Atty. Cendaa later filed an
urgent motion to annotate attorneys lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and
59000. In its Resolution dated 10 November 2004,[14] the Court
noted the notice of David Jr.s death, the letters written by
Leonida and Elizabeth, and granted the motion to annotate
attorneys lien on TCT Nos. 58999 and 59000.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
The questions of whether Simona consented to the Deed of Sale
and whether the subject sale was simulated are factual in nature.
The rule is factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding
on this Court. However, there are exceptions, such as when the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory, or when the evidence on record does not support
the factual findings.[15] Because these exceptions obtain in the
present case, the Court will consider these issues.
On the Requirement of the Wifes Consent
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it declared the
Deed of Sale void based on Article 166, which states:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnerships before the effective date of this Code.
Article 166 expressly applies only to properties acquired by the
conjugal partnership after the effectivity of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Civil Code). The Civil Code came into force on 30
August 1950.[16] Although there is no dispute that the
Properties were conjugal properties of Mauricio and Simona, the
records do not show, and the parties did not stipulate, when the
Properties were acquired.[17] Under Article 1413 of the old
Spanish Civil Code, the husband could alienate conjugal
partnership property for valuable consideration without the
wifes consent.[18]
Even under the present Civil Code, however, the Deed of Sale is
not void. It is well-settled that contracts alienating conjugal real
property without the wifes consent are merely voidable under
the Civil Code that is, binding on the parties unless annulled by
a competent court and not void ab initio.[19]
Article 166 must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the
Civil Code (Article 173). The latter prescribes certain conditions
before a sale of conjugal property can be annulled for lack of the
wifes consent, as follows:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of
the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, only the wife can ask to annul a contract
that disposes of conjugal real property without her consent. The
wife must file the action for annulment during the marriage and
within ten years from the questioned transaction. Article 173 is
explicit on the remedies available if the wife fails to exercise
this right within the specified period. In such case, the wife or
her heirs can only demand the value of the property provided
they prove that the husband fraudulently alienated the property.
Fraud is never presumed, but must be established by clear and
convincing evidence.[20]
Respondents action to annul the Deed of Sale based on Article
166 must fail for having been filed out of time. The marriage of
Mauricio and Simona was dissolved when Mauricio died in
1973. More than ten years have passed since the execution of
the Deed of Sale.
Further, respondents, who are Simonas heirs, are not the parties
who can invoke Article 166. Article 173 reserves that remedy to
the wife alone. Only Simona had the right to have the sale of the
Properties annulled on the ground that Mauricio sold the
Properties without her consent.
Simona, however, did not assail the Deed of Sale during her
marriage or even after Mauricios death. The records are bereft
of any indication that Simona questioned the sale of the
Properties at any time. Simona did not even attempt to take
possession of or reside on the Properties after Mauricios death.
David Jr., who was raised by Simona, testified that he and
Simona continued to live in Pasay City after Mauricios death,
while her children and other grandchildren resided on the
Properties.[21]
We also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized
Mauricio to dispose of the Properties when she executed the
GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney for
an agent to execute a contract that transfers the ownership of an
immovable. However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878
refers to the nature of the authorization, not to its form.[22]
Even if a document is titled as a general power of attorney, the
requirement of a special power of attorney is met if there is a
clear mandate from the principal specifically authorizing the
performance of the act.[23]
In Veloso v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court explained that a
general power of attorney could contain a special power to sell
that satisfies the requirement of Article 1878, thus:
An examination of the records showed that the assailed power
of attorney was valid and regular on its face. It was notarized
and as such, it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution. While it is true that it was
denominated as a general power of attorney, a perusal thereof
revealed that it stated an authority to sell, to wit:
2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or otherwise
hypothecate lands, tenements and hereditaments or other forms
of real property, more specifically TCT No. 49138, upon such
terms and conditions and under such covenants as my said
attorney shall deem fit and proper.

Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and special power
of attorney since the general power of attorney had expressly
authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell the
subject property. The special power of attorney can be included
in the general power when it is specified therein the act or
transaction for which the special power is required. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, Simona expressly authorized Mauricio in the GPA
to sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real,
personal or mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever
situated, or any interest therein xxx as well as to act as my
general representative and agent, with full authority to buy, sell,
negotiate and contract for me and in my behalf.[25] Taken
together, these provisions constitute a clear and specific
mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties. Even if it is called a
general power of attorney, the specific provisions in the GPA
are sufficient for the purposes of Article 1878. These provisions
in the GPA likewise indicate that Simona consented to the sale
of the Properties.
Whether the Sale of the Properties was Simulated
or is Void for Gross Inadequacy of Price
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the
disposition of property for valuable consideration to descendants
or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces
the property taken from the estate.[26] There is no diminution of
the estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and
other dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be
included in the computation of legitimes.[27]
Respondents, however, contend that the sale of the Properties
was merely simulated. As proof, respondents point to the
consideration of P1,000 in the Deed of Sale, which respondents
claim is grossly inadequate compared to the actual value of the
Properties.
Simulation of contract and gross inadequacy of price are distinct
legal concepts, with different effects. When the parties to an
alleged contract do not really intend to be bound by it, the
contract is simulated and void.[28] A simulated or fictitious
contract has no legal effect whatsoever[29] because there is no
real agreement between the parties.
In contrast, a contract with inadequate consideration may
nevertheless embody a true agreement between the parties. A
contract of sale is a consensual contract, which becomes valid
and binding upon the meeting of minds of the parties on the
price and the object of the sale.[30] The concept of a simulated
sale is thus incompatible with inadequacy of price. When the
parties agree on a price as the actual consideration, the sale is
not simulated despite the inadequacy of the price.[31]
Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void
contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect the
validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the
consent or that the parties actually intended a donation or some
other contract.[32] Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a
contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue
influence.[33] In this case, respondents have not proved any of
the instances that would invalidate the Deed of Sale.
Respondents even failed to establish that the consideration paid
by the vendees for the Properties was grossly inadequate. As the
trial court pointed out, the Deed of Sale stipulates that, in
addition to the payment of P1,000, the vendees should assume
the mortgage loans from PNB and DBP. The consideration for
the sale of the Properties was thus P1,000 in cash and the
assumption of the P15,000 mortgage.
Respondents argue that P16,000 is still far below the actual
value of the Properties. To bolster their claim, respondents
presented the following: (1) Tax Declarations No. A-001-
00905[34] and A-001-00906[35] for the year 1979, which
placed the assessed value of the Properties at P70,020 and their
approximate market value at P244,290; and (2) a certified copy
of the Department of Finances Department Order No. 62-97[36]
dated 6 June 1997 and attached guidelines[37] which
established the zonal value of the properties along Evangelista
Street at P15,000 per square meter.
The subject Deed of Sale, however, was executed in 1970. The
valuation of the Properties in 1979 or 1997 is of little relevance
to the issue of whether P16,000 was a grossly inadequate price
to pay for the Properties in 1970. Certainly, there is nothing
surprising in the sharp increase in the value of the Properties
nine or twenty-seven years after the sale, particularly when we
consider that the Properties are located in the City of Makati.
More pertinent are Tax Declarations No. 15812[38] and No.
15813,[39] both issued in 1967, presented by petitioners. These
tax declarations placed the assessed value of both Properties at
P16,160. Compared to this, the price of P16,000 cannot be
considered grossly inadequate, much less so shocking to the
conscience[40] as to justify the setting aside of the Deed of Sale.
Respondents next contend that the vendees did not make the
mortgage payments on the Properties. Respondents allege that
the rents paid by the tenants leasing portions of the Properties
were sufficient to cover the mortgage payments to DBP and
PNB.
Again, this argument does not help respondents cause.
Assuming that the vendees failed to pay the full price stated in
the Deed of Sale, such partial failure would not render the sale
void. In Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,[41] the Court held:
xxx If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of
payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. xxx
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity
of a contract of sale. Payment of the price has nothing to do with
the perfection of the contract. Payment of the price goes into the
performance of the contract. Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration. The former results in a
right to demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation
under an existing valid contract while the latter prevents the
existence of a valid contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Neither was it shown that the rentals from tenants were
sufficient to cover the mortgage payments. The parties to this
case stipulated to only one tenant, a certain Federico M. Puno,
who supposedly leased a room on the Properties for P300 per
month from 1992 to 1994.[42] This is hardly significant, when
we consider that the mortgage was fully paid by 1974. Indeed,
the fact that the Properties were mortgaged to DBP and PNB
indicates that the conjugal partnership, or at least Mauricio, was
short of funds.
Petitioners point out that they were duly employed and had the
financial capacity to buy the Properties in 1970. Respondents
did not refute this. Petitioners presented 72 receipts[43] showing
the mortgage payments made to PNB and DBP, and the Release
of the Real Estate Mortgage[44] (Mortgage Release) dated 5
April 1974. True, these documents all bear Mauricios name.
However, this tends to support, rather than detract from,
petitioner-vendees explanation that they initially gave the
mortgage payments directly to Mauricio, and then later directly
to the banks, without formally advising the bank of the sale. The
last 3 mortgage receipts and the Mortgage Release were all
issued in Mauricios name even after his death in 1970.
Obviously, Mauricio could not have secured the Mortgage
Release and made these last payments.
Presumption of Regularity and Burden of Proof
The Deed of Sale was notarized and, as certified by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, entered in the notarial books
submitted to that court. As a document acknowledged before a
notary public, the Deed of Sale enjoys the presumption of
regularity[45] and due execution.[46] Absent evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, the
presumption must be upheld.[47]
Respondents evidence in this case is not even preponderant.
Respondents allegations, testimony and bare denials cannot
prevail over the documentary evidence presented by petitioners.
These documents the Deed of Sale and the GPA which are both
notarized, the receipts, the Mortgage Release and the 1967 tax
declarations over the Properties support petitioners account of
the sale.
As the parties challenging the regularity of the Deed of Sale and
alleging its simulation, respondents had the burden of proving
these charges.[48] Respondents failed to discharge this burden.
Consequentially, the Deed of Sale stands.
On the Partition of the Property
Nevertheless, this Court finds it proper to grant the partition of
the Properties, subject to modification.
Petitioners have consistently claimed that their father is one of
the vendees who bought the Properties. Vendees Elizabeth and
Ofelia both testified that the Roland A. Bravo in the Deed of
Sale is their father,[49] although their brother, Roland Bravo,
Jr., made some of the mortgage payments. Petitioners counsel,
Atty. Paggao, made the same clarification before the trial
court.[50]
As Roland Bravo, Sr. is also the father of respondent Edward
Bravo, Edward is thus a compulsory heir of Roland Bravo, and
entitled to a share, along with his brothers and sisters, in his
fathers portion of the Properties. In short, Edward and
petitioners are co-owners of the Properties.
As such, Edward can rightfully ask for the partition of the
Properties. Any co-owner may demand at any time the partition
of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the
co-ownership.[51] This action for partition does not prescribe
and is not subject to laches.[52]
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Decision of 21 December
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67794. We
REINSTATE the Decision of 11 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch No. 139, in Civil Case No. 97-
137, declaring VALID the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage dated 28 October 1970, with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. We GRANT judicial partition of the subject Properties in the
following manner:
a. Petitioner LILY ELIZABETH BRAVO-GUERRERO is
entitled to one-third (1/3) of the Properties;
b. Petitioner OFELIA BRAVO-QUIESTAS is entitled to one-
third (1/3) of the Properties; and
c. The remaining one-third (1/3) portion of the Properties should
be divided equally between the children of ROLAND BRAVO.
2. The other heirs of ROLAND BRAVO must reimburse
ROLAND BRAVO, JR. for whatever expenses the latter
incurred in paying for and securing the release of the mortgage
on the Properties.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55225 September 30, 1982
HEIRS OF CATALINO JARDIN, namely, RUSTICA,
CEFERINA, VICTORINA, REMEDIOS, ELSIE, CIRILA,
PURIFICACION, and VIRGINIA, all surnamed JARDIN,
and WALDERICO Z. JARDIN, as Heir of Galo Jardin,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
HEIRS OF SIXTO HALLASGO, namely, PAZ,
CORAZON, NERIO, and ELIODORA, all surnamed
HALLASGO, defendants- appellees.
Galdino B. Jardin for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bernardo Semine for defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the enforcement in 1973 of a 1920 partition of
certain unregistered lands. The following is a summary of the
allegations in the complaint filed in 1973 by the heirs of
Catalino Jardin and Galo Jardin against the heirs of Sixto
Hallasgo in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental in
Civil Case No. 4234:
The spouses Braulio Jardin and Maura Hallasgo were survived
by their two children named Catalino and Galo and by Sixto
Hallasgo, apparently Maura's child by her first husband.
In 1920, Catalino, Galo and Sixto partitioned in a private
document the following properties inherited from the Jardin
spouses:
(1) A residential lot in the poblacion of Jasaan, now Lower
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, with an assessed value of P1,000.
Catalino and Galo each received as their share 495 square
meters and seven coconut trees. The remainder of the lot and
seven coconut trees were allotted to Sixto.
(2) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Camposanto
planted to 2-1/2 gantas with an assessed value of P500. An area
planted to five gantas was given to Sixto while the remainder
was adjudicated to Galo and Catalino.
(3) A parcel of land located at Barrio Cabagtucan planted
to 21/2 gantas with an assessed value of P200 was assigned to
Galo and Catalino.
(4) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Canajawan
planted to fourteen gantas was assigned to Sixto.
(5) A parcel of land also located at Barrio Canajawan
planted to thirteen gantas with an assessed value of P500 was
assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(6) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Sagpolon planted
to ten gantas was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(7) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Mandagisiao
planted to five gantas was assigned to Sixto.
(8) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Calabugon
planted to six gantas was divided equally among the three heirs.
(9) A parcel of land located at Barrio Mingomon, Claveria,
Bukidnon, plus one cow, was assigned to Sixto in exchange for
a house of strong materials located at the poblacion.
Galo later ceded to Catalino his share of 495 square meters in
the lot at the poblacion of Jasaan in exchange for Catalino's one-
half share of the riceland in Barrio Sagpolon (No. 6). Catalino
became the owner of 990 square meters of the poblacion lot.
Galo became the sole owner of the riceland at Sagpolon.
In 1963, Sixto was allowed by Catalino's children to use as a
garden an area of 350 square meters which is a part of the 990
square meters owned by them. However, in 1964 Sixto
fraudulently and without the knowledge of Catalino's children
(Sixto's nephews and nieces) included said portion in the
cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot. Sixto and his
children refused to reconvey the said 350-square-meter portion
to Catalino's children.
Allegedly taking advantage of the minority of the children of
Catalino and Galo, who both died after the war, Sixto occupied
the parcels of land adjudicated to Galo and Catalino in the 1920
deed of partition including the house of strong materials. Sixto
used those lands after the death of Galo and Catalino and did not
give to their heirs any share of the harvests.
It was only in the early part of 1973 that the children of Galo
and Catalino came to know of the 1920 deed of partition which
was shown to them by Corazon Hallasgo during a confrontation
in the provincial commander's office at Camp Alagar when they
sought to recover the said portion of 350 square meters from the
Hallasgos.
On that occasion, the children of Galo and Catalino came to
know that the shares of Galo and Catalino in that partition
allegedly had been in the possession of Sixto and his children
"for a long time". In spite of earnest efforts, Sixto's heirsrefused
to settle the case amicably with the heirs of Galo and Catalino.
The heirs of Galo and Catalino prayed in their 1973 complaint
that Sixto's heirs be ordered to reconvey to them the lands
allocated to their parents in the 1920 partition and the portion of
350 square meters in the poblacion lot appropriated by Sixto.
The plaintiffs also prayed for damages.
Defendants Hallasgo filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court in
a minute order dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, citing Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857. The
plaintiffs appealed. They contend that their action had not
prescribed and that its dismissal had no factual basis. The
defendants did not file any brief.
Incidentally, plaintiffs-appellants also contend for the first time
that defendants' motion to dismiss, which was filed on August
22, 1973 and set for hearing on September 27, 1973, was a mere
scrap of paper. That contention is devoid of merit. The plaintiffs
interposed a written opposition to that motion. They were heard
before it was granted by the trial court.
The appellants invoke the rule that the action for partition
among co-heirs does not prescribe and that a co-owner's
possession of the community property is not deemed adverse to
the other co-owners. They argue that the 1920 handwritten
partition signifies that Sixto recognized the existence of the co-
ownership.
We find these contentions to be flimsy and untenable. The
poorly drafted complaint is vitiated by grave deficiencies and
loose ends. Its draftsman had not thoroughly studied the facts
and the law involved in the action.
There are no allegations as to the specific dates when Galo and
Catalino died (it was merely alleged that they died "after the
war") and when Sixto died; when the heirs of Galo and Catalino
became of age; the date when Sixto allegedly usurped the lands
allocated to Galo and Catalino; what lands are in the possession
of Galo and Catalino's heirs and why they did not sue Sixto
during his lifetime to recover what pertained to them.
The document of partition itself shows that it was already
implemented in 1920. Under that partition, the land located at
Barrio Cabagtucan planted to 2- gantas, the land located at
Barrio Canajawan and the land located at Barrio Sagpolon
planted to ten gantas (Nos. 3, 5 and 6) were definitely
adjudicated to Galo and Catalino. Sixto could not have usurped
those lands for if he did so his uterine brothers Galo and
Catalino would have resisted the usurpation. There was no co-
ownership as to these lands.
That the 1920 partition among the three heirs was implemented
is shown in the allegations of the complaint with respect to the
poblacion lot. As already stated, Galo and Catalino were each
given 495 square meters and seven coconut trees out of the
poblacion lot. The remainder of the lot and seven coconut trees
were given to Sixto.
That partition of the poblacion lot shows that the 1920
agreement was actually enforced. There was no co-ownership as
to the poblacion lot. If the 1920 partition was enforced as to the
poblacion lot, there would be no reason why it would not have
been implemented with respect to the other lands.
The only lands held in co-ownership under the 1920 partition
were the Camposanto cornland planted to 7- gantas and the
Calabugon riceland planted to six gantas (Nos. 2 and 8). But it
was not alleged with particularity when Sixto repudiated the co-
ownership as to those lands and claimed them as his own.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shag
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership" and that "each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned". It also provides
that "no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common
(actio communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does
not prescribe, the co-ownership does not last forever since it
may be repudiated by a co-owner. In such a case, the action for
partition does not lie. What may be brought by the aggrieved co-
owner is an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title
and possession. That action may be barred by prescription.
If the co-heir or co-owner, having possession of the hereditary
or community property, holds the same in his own name, that is,
under claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the
property by prescription if his possession meets all the other
requirements of the law, and after the expiration of the
prescriptive period, his co-heir or co-owner may lose their right
to demand partition, and their action may then be held to have
prescribed. (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811).
In the instant case, as the partition was made in 1920 and the
plaintiffs did not specify when Sixto Hallasgo repudiated the co-
ownership of the lands in Composanto and Calabugon, the trial
court assumed that prescription started to run even before the
Civil Code took effect,
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a period of ten years was the
maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive prescription.
Hence, the trial court concluded that the 1973 action was barred
by prescription.
With respect to the portion of 350 square meters of the
poblacion lot, the same is governed by other legal rules. That
portion was loaned to Sixto by his nephews and nieces by way
of commodatum or precanum (Art. 1947, Civil Code). In
grievous violation of the trust, he allegedly included it in the
cadastral survey of his share of the poblacion lot. (Whether he
obtained a Torrens title for it is not specified.)
The action of Catalino's children for the recovery of that 350-
square-meter portion from Sixto's heirs has not yet prescribed.
The trial court erred in dismissing that part of plaintiffs'
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the
modification that the plaintiffs' action for the recovery of the
350-square-meter portion of the poblacion lot may be
maintained. The defendants-appellees should answer that part of
the complaint referring to that lot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.