1. Republic vs.

Grisaldo

Whether the loss of chattel mrotgage extinguishes the obligation

The appellant likewise maintains, in support of his contention that the appellee has no cause of
action, that because the loans were secured by a chattel mortgage on the standing crops on a land
owned by him and these crops were lost or destroyed through enemy action his obligation to pay
the loans was thereby extinguished. This argument is untenable. The terms of the promissory
notes and the chattel mortgage that the appellant executed in favor of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd.
do not support the claim of appellant. The obligation of the appellant under the five promissory
notes was not to deliver a determinate thing namely, the crops to be harvested from his land, or
the value of the crops that would be harvested from his land. Rather, his obligation was to pay a
generic thing the amount of money representing the total sum of the five loans, with interest.
The transaction between the appellant and the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. was a series of five contracts
of simple loan of sums of money. "By a contract of (simple) loan, one of the parties delivers to
another ... money or other consumable thing upon the condition that the same amount of the
same kind and quality shall be paid." (Article 1933, Civil Code) The obligation of the appellant
under the five promissory notes evidencing the loans in questions is to pay the value thereof; that
is, to deliver a sum of money a clear case of an obligation to deliver, a generic thing. Article
1263 of the Civil Code provides:

In an obligation to deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same
kind does not extinguish the obligation.

The chattel mortgage on the crops growing on appellant's land simply stood as a security for the
fulfillment of appellant's obligation covered by the five promissory notes, and the loss of the
crops did not extinguish his obligation to pay, because the account could still be paid from other
sources aside from the mortgaged crops.

2. Bagtas

Is it contract of lease or loan

Lease

The appellant contends that the Sahiniwal bull was accidentally killed during a raid by the Huk
in November 1953 upon the surrounding barrios of Hacienda Felicidad Intal, Baggao, Cagayan,
where the animal was kept, and that as such death was due to force majeure she is relieved from
the duty of returning the bull or paying its value to the appellee. The contention is without merit.
The loan by the appellee to the late defendant Jose V. Bagtas of the three bulls for breeding
purposes for a period of one year from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949, later on renewed for another
year as regards one bull, was subject to the payment by the borrower of breeding fee of 10% of
the book value of the bulls. The appellant contends that the contract was commodatum and that,
for that reason, as the appellee retained ownership or title to the bull it should suffer its loss due
to force majeure. A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous.1 If the breeding fee be
considered a compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article 1671 of
the Civil Code the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith,
because she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract. And even if the
contract be commodatum, still the appellant is liable, because article 1942 of the Civil Code
provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum

. . . is liable for loss of the things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event:

(2) If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated . . .

(3) If the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a
stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event;

3. Quintos

The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because under it the
plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reserving for herself the
ownership thereof; by this contract the defendant bound himself to return the furniture to the
plaintiff, upon the latters demand (clause 7 of the contract, Exhibit A; articles 1740, paragraph 1,
and 1741 of the Civil Code). The obligation voluntarily assumed by the defendant to return the
furniture upon the plaintiff's demand, means that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at
the latter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply with this obligation when he merely
placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters and the
four eletric lamps. The provisions of article 1169 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the
parties are not squarely applicable. The trial court, therefore, erred when it came to the legal
conclusion that the plaintiff failed to comply with her obligation to get the furniture when they
were offered to her.

As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the
latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel her to bear the expenses occasioned by the
deposit of the furniture at the defendant's behest. The latter, as bailee, was not entitled to place
the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the
furniture, because the defendant wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric
lamps.

3. Producers bank

Commodatum or mutuum?/

No error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it ruled that the transaction between
private respondent and Doronilla was a commodatum and not a mutuum. A circumspect
examination of the records reveals that the transaction between them was a commodatum. Article
1933 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two kinds of loans in this wise:

By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another, either something not consumable
so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in which case the contract is
called a commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the same
amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a
loan or mutuum.

Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.

Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.

In commodatum, the bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, while in simple loan,
ownership passes to the borrower.

The foregoing provision seems to imply that if the subject of the contract is a consumable thing,
such as money, the contract would be a mutuum. However, there are some instances where a
commodatum may have for its object a consumable thing. Article 1936 of the Civil Code
provides:

Consumable goods may be the subject of commodatum if the purpose of the contract is not the
consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition.

Thus, if consumable goods are loaned only for purposes of exhibition, or when the intention of
the parties is to lend consumable goods and to have the very same goods returned at the end of
the period agreed upon, the loan is a commodatum and not a mutuum.

The rule is that the intention of the parties thereto shall be accorded primordial consideration in
determining the actual character of a contract.1[27] In case of doubt, the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the parties shall be considered in such determination.2[28]

As correctly pointed out by both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the evidence shows that
private respondent agreed to deposit his money in the savings account of Sterela specifically for
the purpose of making it appear that said firm had sufficient capitalization for incorporation, with
the promise that the amount shall be returned within thirty (30) days.3[29] Private respondent
merely accommodated Doronilla by lending his money without consideration, as a favor to his
good friend Sanchez. It was however clear to the parties to the transaction that the money would
not be removed from Sterelas savings account and would be returned to private respondent after
thirty (30) days.

4. Puig

Probable cause for qualified theft, relationship of bank and clerk

The portion of the Information relevant to this discussion reads:

1

3
 A]bove-named [respondents], conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence, being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of
the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or consent of the management of the Bank x x x.

It is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a Bank who come
into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence reposed in them by their
employer. Banks, on the other hand, where monies are deposited, are considered the owners
thereof. This is very clear not only from the express provisions of the law, but from established
jurisprudence. The relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor
and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil Code, as appropriately pointed out by
petitioner, provide as follows:

Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires
the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same
kind and quality.

Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning loan.

In a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly established the nature of
possession by the Bank of the money deposits therein, and the duties being performed by its
employees who have custody of the money or have come into possession of it. The Court has
consistently considered the allegations in the Information that such employees acted with grave
abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of the Bank, without particularly referring to it
as owner of the money deposits, as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft.