Fujiki v.

Marinay (1)

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could
not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one another.
In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage being
dissolved.Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish
contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a
Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in
2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). In this case, petitioner prayed that:(1)
the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay
and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).The trial court dismissed the petition
on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara)
may file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for
Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule applied only to
cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and not in a petition
for recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for
comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of
bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court provide the procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is
no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro and Nial v. Bayadog which declared that [t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked.
Issue:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.

Ruling:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action

for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family Code further
confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that [w]here a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Petition was granted and
the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.

Bayot v. Bayot (Part of Bayot v. CA) [2]

Facts:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in
Muntinlupa. They had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.In February
22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed as
Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued
Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4,
1997.She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's
alleged psychological incapacity,docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of
the conjugal partnerships of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter
Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce.RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set
aside RTC's incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's
motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce
decree was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominica

Ruling:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.Rebecca at that time she applied and
obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one, being born to American
parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American
citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American
passport.She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen,
as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in
Dominican Republic.Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce.The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's property relations.The
Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be
proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.The fact that Rebecca
was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree
duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.Thus the foreign
decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind
both Rebecca and Vicente.The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995
Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a
divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.

Noveras v. Noveras (3)

Facts:
Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in
the Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003,
David abandoned his family to live with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an
affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the
Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before
the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial decree of divorce in June 2005,
the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for judicial separation of
conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC regarded the petition for judicial
separation of conjugal property as a petition for liquidation of property since the spouses
marriage has already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute community
because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the
trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law
should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not
submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in the Philippines to
David, subject to the payment of the childrens legitimes. Upon Leticias appeal to the CA, the
CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally between the spouses and that both
should pay their children P520k. David argues that the Court should have recognized the
California judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share
in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all the US
properties.

Issue:
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved.
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper.

Ruling:
1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof. Such publication must be authenticated by a seal of a consular official.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a
correct copy of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the
divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
2. 2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 135. Any of the following shall
be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: xxxx (6) That at the
time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to
grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial courts decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute
community of properties. The records of this case are replete with evidence that
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is
highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
 decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia
heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who
represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the
hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita
listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in
June 2005. Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at
least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.

In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim (4)

Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle
and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the
word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Del Socorro for and in behalf of her minor child Van Wilsem v. Van Wilsem (5)

Facts:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued bythe appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

Issue:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law.

Ruling:
Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Normas son altogether. In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign
law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parents
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Universal International Group of Taiwan (6)

Facts:
On 25 May 1995, a Lease and Development Agreement was executed by respondent UIG
and petitioner SBMA under which respondent UIG shall lease from petitioner SBMA the
Binictican Golf Course and appurtenant facilities thereto to be transformed into a world class 18-
hole golf course, golf club/resort, commercial tourism and residential center. The contract in
pertinent part contains pre-termination clauses, which provide: Section 22. Default(a) The
following acts and omissions shall constitute default by Tenant (each an Event of Default): (ii)
Tenant or any of its Subsidiaries shall commit a material breach or violation of any of the
conditions, covenants or agreements herein made by Tenant or such Subsidiary (other than those
described in Sections 22.2 [a] [l] and such violation or failure shall continue for thirty (30) days
after notice from the Landlord, or, at Landlords sole discretion, sixty (60) days if such violations
or failure is reasonably susceptible of cure during such 60 day period and Tenant or such
Subsidiary begins and diligently pursues to completion such cure within thirty (30) days of the
initial notice from Landlord; (b) If an event of default shall have occurred and be continuing,
Landlord may, in its sole discretion; (i) Terminate this Lease thirty (30) days after the expiration
of any period granted hereunder to cure any Event of Default and retain all rent and other
amounts previously paid by tenant and its Subsidiaries. Thereafter, Landlord may immediately
reenter, renovate or relet all or part of the Property to others, and cancel all rights and privileges
granted to Tenant and its Subsidiaries without any restriction on recovery by Landlord for rents,
fees and damages owned by Tenant and its Subsidiaries. On 4 February 1997, Petitioner SBMA
sent a letter to private respondent UIG calling its attention to its alleged several contractual
violations in view of private respondent UIGs failure to deliver its various contractual
obligations, primarily its failure to complete the rehabilitation of the Golf Course in time for the
APEC Leaders Summit, and to pay accumulated lease rentals and utilities, and to post the
required performance bond. Respondent UIG, in its letter of 7 February 1997, interposed as an
excuse the alleged default of its main contractor FF Cruz, resulting in their filing of suit against
the latter, and committed itself to comply with its obligations within a few days. Private
respondent UIG, however, failed to comply with its undertakings. On 7 March 1997, petitioner
SBMA sent a letter to private respondent UIG declaring the latter in default of its contractual
obligations to SBMA under Section 22.1 of the Lease and Development Agreement and required
it to show cause why petitioner SBMA should not pre-terminate the agreement. Private
respondents paid the rental arrearages but the other obligations remained unsatisfied. On 8
September 1997, a letter of pre-termination was served by petitioner SBMA requiring private
respondent UIG to vacate the premises. On 12 September 1997, petitioner served the formal
notice of closure of Subic Bay Golf Course and took over possession of the subject premises. On
even date, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner SBMA for Injunction and
Damages with prayer for a writ of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
On 3 October 1997, respondent court issued the two assailed orders subject of the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in ruling that petitioners
action of extra-judicially recovering the possession of the subject premises is supposedly illegal
[as it] runs counter to the established law and [the] applicable decisions of the Supreme Court on
the matter.

Ruling:
Petitioners contend that UIG does not have the capacity to sue because it is a foreign non-
resident corporation not licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business in
the Philippines. They contend that the capacity to sue is conferred by law and not by the parties.
As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations cannot file suits in the
Philippines. Section 133 of the Corporation Code specifically provides: Sec. 133. No foreign
corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns,
shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or
administrative agency of the Philippines, but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against
before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized
under Philippine laws. A corporation has legal status only within the state or territory in which it
was organized. For this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to
file suits in the Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the
country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the SEC and appoint an
agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the Philippines.