G.R. No.
L-63915 December 29, 1986 It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
LORENZO M. TAADA
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the
following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that
the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be
dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in
the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in
only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4
refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court
required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening
events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that
publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was
not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both
on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
"one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
1|Page
dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after
an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect
before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the
law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the
presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to,
among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member
of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting
him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but
to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the
Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"),
the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital
law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were
categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that
publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the
need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is
therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in
the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by
existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we
have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been
published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice
but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever
reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we
do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a
request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no
further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once
again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public
scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all
government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority
to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their
lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking
in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber
that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen
days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
LORENZO M. TAADA
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
2|Page
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103,
171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661,
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166,
1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108,
116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-
224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-
269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-
303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641,
642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196,
1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-
1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600,
1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-
1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868,
1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454,
457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,
531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563,
567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-
27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360-
378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to
bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the
alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of
Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is
that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those
cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with
the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd
ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private
individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel
the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in
America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason
for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent.
The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator
is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of
the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition.
Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were
not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine
qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates
the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
3|Page
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette
[1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people
have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates
and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated,
much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall
be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is
to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden
or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in
Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members
of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken
the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
 The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the
Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9
sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had
accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of
the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof
are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents
of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or
in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they
shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO,
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of
D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to
his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy
and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in
Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival
(DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15
p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while
victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo
4|Page
[were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of
the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board
a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by
2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached
to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the
chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole
[p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of
the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who
luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the
[p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the
falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the
pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows
prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning
capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision
of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following
grounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS
APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART
OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER
ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and,
therefore, inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being
an entry in official records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his
perception.4 A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned
from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth
of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies,
suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the
bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed
by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes
evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9 among which are
entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of
Chief Justice Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the
above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of
the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner
contends that the last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also
testified before the trial court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which
involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also
testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible
for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who
executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was
available for cross-examination, the portions of the report which
were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his
perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the
report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based
on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as
well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the
offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be
considered as independently relevant statements which were
gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted
as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been
said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement,
the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay
rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant
as to the existence of such a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners
on his Report and made himself available for cross-examination by
the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain
utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed
from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in
open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the
matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in
said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary
rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v.
Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is
daily needed; the occasions in which the officials would
5|Page
be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a
witness are numberless. The public officers are few in
whose daily work something is not done in which
testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there
no exception for official statements, hosts of officials
would be found devoting the greater part of their time to
attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition
before an officer. The work of administration of
government and the interest of the public having business
with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these
reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded
such documents, which is not extended to private
documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers
that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts
with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts
they do in discharge of their duty may be given in
evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a
degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of
each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was
not presented to testify on his report. In that case the applicability of
Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and
this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said
report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was
not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of
Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being
no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the
statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving
the truth of the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it
constitutes part of the testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which
were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as
a result of the elevator crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the
morgue,12 making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also
conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform
was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also
required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police headquarters.
Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that
the cause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain
block. It is claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to
certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application
of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a
presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the
person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while
the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give
rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on
the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with
negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused
the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such
as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who
had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
 absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendants want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary
evidence is absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of
the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a
bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches
over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the
matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on
the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show
that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of
defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly,
some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had
no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the
accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has
superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at
bar:
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th
floor of a building to the basement while he was working with
appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of
appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a
carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the
situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would
occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or
its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to
know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that
likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also
present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees
deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the
requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants
negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of
res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was
negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the
accident which befell respondents husband."
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As
stated earlier, the defendants negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the
plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once
the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then
shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted
or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances
6|Page
disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh
the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of
say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application
of the doctrine has been established.1wphi1.nt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand
Fabro executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care.
According to Fabros sworn statement, the company enacted rules and
regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman
and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due
care but, in arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the
part of petitioners employees, also assails the same statement for being
hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible.
Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the
affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.28 The inadmissibility of
this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of
the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly
known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but
by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements which
may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner,
therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than
private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husbands death.
Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to
establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the
death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from
claiming from the deceaseds employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the
liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive
damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery
of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-
one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the
System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens
Compensation Act, provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a
personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under
said Act as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting
decisions. The Court finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining
Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees
of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in
violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased
employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance
(CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of
the Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company,
held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right
under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular
 courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of
both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the
Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in
the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu
Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot
pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring
supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed
with their suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits
provided under the Workmens Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its
motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that
the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry
Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted
notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of
the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full
as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was
admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to
dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up
the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmens
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the
committee created to investigate the accident which established the
criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report
was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits
under the Workmens Compensation Act, such my not preclude
them from bringing an action before the regular court because they
became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its
contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the
Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser
amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based
on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was
not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the
petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
[Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was
reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs.
Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case,
the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act
could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by
workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under
the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in
favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under
the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under
the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has
already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still
sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening
facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception
because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she
filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private
respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the
police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the
criminal complaint against petitioners personnel. While stating that there was
7|Page
no negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor
nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in
nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged
negligence of appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of
the police investigators report. The appellee merely executed her
sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her
personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her
knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellants employees. It
was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and
his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutors office. This is a
standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee
may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is
mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in
her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent
Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the
appellee did not have a chance to appear before the public
prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said
memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law
waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there
was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee.
Hence, notice of appellants negligence cannot be imputed on
appellee before she applied for death benefits under ECC or before
she received the first payment therefrom. Her using the police
investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991
may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6,
1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutors Office dismissing the
criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that:
"The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the
part of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this
case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.) Considering the
foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation that
she learned about appellants negligence only after she applied for
and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that
will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca
ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts,
but of her rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only
elementary school for her educational attainment; that she did not
know what damages could be recovered from the death of her
husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more
from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent
"failed to allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from
the ECC were attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue
submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate
that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of
the facts because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the
complainant in a criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to
Homicide" against petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991, two months
before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a
resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against
petitioners employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show
that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and
every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of
remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits
from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between
inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or
proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the
other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to
both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people
responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by
election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously
pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of
action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is
deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be
generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person
against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of all
material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to
make an intelligent decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver
is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record
or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the
basis for the exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as
plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the
ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with
raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to
plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41 otherwise, the
defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded
waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to
her husbands death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of
fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the
negligence of petitioners employees, of which private respondent purportedly
learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be
civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its
violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of
government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a
conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a
conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore,
that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been
misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband
died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her
application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated
November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner
filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies
available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary,
private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine
legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance
of this Courts ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory
and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the
provision, which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or
her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent
a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her
ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records
do not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the
ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as
initial payment representing the accrued pension from November 1990 to March
1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was
8|Page
P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total
amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of
P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to
speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination.
Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC,
payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall
be deducted from the trial court' award of damages. Consistent with our ruling
in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of
the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that
awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant
to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118180 September 20, 1996
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
This is a petitioner for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28
February 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 37158, as well as the resolution dated 11
August 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed:
Private respondents were the original owner of a parcel of agricultural land
covered by TCT No T-1432, situated in Barrio Capucao, Ozamis City, with an
area of 113,695 square meters, more or less.
On 30 May 1977, Private respondents mortgaged said land to petitioner. When
private respondents defaulted on their obligation, petitioner foreclosed the
mortgage on the land and emerged as sole bidder in the ensuing auction sale.
Consequently. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10913 was eventually issued in
petitioner's name.
On 6 April 1984 petitioner and private respondents entered into a Deed of
Conditional Sale wherein petitioner agreed to reconvey the foreclosed property
to private respondents.
The pertinent stipulations of the Deed provided that:
WHEREAS, the VENDOR acquired a parcel of land in an
auction sale by the City Sheriff of Ozamiz City, pursuant
to Act 3135, As amended, and subject to the redemption
period pursuant to CA 141, described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the VENDEES offered to repurchase and the
VENDOR agreed to sell the above-described property,
subject to the terms and stipulations as hereinafter
stipulated, for the sum of SEVENTY THREE THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED ONLY (P73,700.00), with a down
payment of P8,900.00 and the balance of P64,800 shall
be payable in six (6) years on equal quarterly
amortization plan at 18% interest per annum. The first
quarterly amortization of P4,470.36 shall be payable
three months from the date of the execution of the
documents and all subsequent amortization shall be due
and payable every quarter thereafter.
xxx xxx xxx
That, upon completion of the payment herein stipulated
and agreed, the Vendor agrees to deliver to the
Vendee/s(,) his heirs, administrators and assigns(,) a
good and sufficient deed of conveyance covering the
property, subject matter of this deed of conditional sale, in
accordance with the provision of law. (Exh. "A", p. 5,
Records)2
On 6 April 1990, upon completing the payment of the full repurchase price,
private respondents demanded from petitioner the execution of a Deed of
Conveyance in their favor.
Petitioner then informed private respondents that the prestation to execute and
deliver a deed of conveyance in their favor had become legally impossible in
view of Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or
CARL) approved 10 June 1988, and Sec. 1 of E.O. 407 issued 10 June 1990.
Aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Ozamis City,
Branch XV. During the pre-trial court narrowed down the issue to whether or not
Sec. 6 of the CARL (Rep. Act 6657) had rendered legally impossible
compliance by petitioner with its obligation to execute a deed of conveyance of
the subject land in favor of private respondents. The trial court ordered both
parties to file their separate memorandum and deemed the case submitted for
decision thereafter.
On 30 January 1992, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant
to execute and deliver unto plaintiffs a deed of final sale
of there land subject of their deed of conditional sale
Lot 5259-A, to pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as nominal
damages, P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, P3,000.00 as litis
expenses and costs.3
The trial court held that petitioner interpreted the fourth paragraph of Sec. 6,
Rep. Act 6657 literally in conjunction with Sec. 1 of E. O. 407.
The fourth paragraph of Sec. 6, Rep. Act 6657 states that:
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition,
lease, management contract or transfer of possession of
private lands executed by the original landowner in
violation of this act shall be null and void; Provided,
however, that those executed prior to this act shall be
valid only when registered with the Registers of Deeds
after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of
Deeds shall inform the DAR WITHIN 320 days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five
hectares.
while Sec. 1 of E.O. 407 states that:
Sec. 1. All government instrumentalities but not limited to
. . . financial institutions such as the DBP . . . shall
immediately execute deeds of transfer in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines as represented by the
Department of Agrarian Reform and surrender to the
latter department all land holdings suitable for agriculture.
The court a quo noted that Sec 6 of Rep. Act 6657, taken in its entirety, is a
provision dealing primarily with retention limits in agricultural land allowed the
landowner and his family and that the fourth paragraph, which nullifies any sale
. . . by the original landowner in violation of the Act, does not cover the sale by
petitioner (not the original land owner) to private respondents.
On the other hand, according to the trial court, E.O. 407 took effect on June
1990. But private respondents completed of the price for the property, object of
the conditional sale, as early as 6 April 1990. Hence, with the fulfillment of the
condition for the sale, the land covered thereby, was detached from the mass of
foreclosed properties held by DBP, and, therefore, fell beyond the ambit or
reach of E.O. 407.
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), still insisting that
its obligation to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of private respondents had
become a legal impossibility and that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the demands of police power.
On 28 February 1994, the CA rendered judgment dismissing petitioner's appeal
on the basis of the following disquisitions:
It is a rule that if the obligation depends upon a
suspensive condition, the demandability as well as the
acquisition or effectivity of the rights arising from the
obligation is suspended pending the happening or
9|Page
fulfillment of the fact or event which constitutes the
condition. Once the event which constitutes the condition
is fulfilled resulting in the effectivity of the obligation, its
effects retroact to the moment when the essential
elements which gave birth to the obligation have taken
place (8 Manresa, 5th Ed. Bk. 1, pa. 33). Applying this
precept to the case, the full payment by the appellee on
April 6, 1990 retracts to the time the contract of
conditional sale was executed on April 6, 1984. From that
time, all elements of the contract of sale were present.
Consequently, the contract of sale was perfected. As
such, the said sale does not come under the coverage of
R.A. 6657.
It is likewise interesting to note that despite the mandate
of Sec. 1, R.A. 6657, appellant continued to accept the
payments made by the appellant until it was fully paid on
April 6, 1990. All that the appellant has to do now is to
execute the final deed of sale in favor of the appellee. To
follow the line of argument of the appellant would only
result in an unconscionable injury to the appellee.
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith (Flavio Macasaet & Associates, Inc. vs.
Commission on Audit, 173 SCRA 352).
Going now to E.O. 407, We hold that the same can
neither affect appellant's obligation under the deed of
conditional sale. Under the said law, appellant is required
to transfer to the Republic of the Philippines "all lands
foreclosed" effective June 10, 1990. Under the facts
obtaining, the subject property has ceased to belong to
the mass of foreclosed property failing within the reach of
said law. As earlier explained, the property has already
been sold to herein appellees even before the said E.O.
has been enacted. On this same reason, We therefore
need not delve on the applicability of DBP Circular No.
11.4
In the present petitioner for review on certiorari, petitioner still insists on its
position that Rep. Act 6657, E.O. 407 and DBP Circular No.11 rendered its
obligation to execute a Deed of Sale to private respondents "a legal
impossibility."5 Petitioner also questions the award of attorney's fees, nominal
damages, and cost in favor of private respondents, as not in accord with law
and the evidence.6
We rule in favor of private respondents.
In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment
or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event
which constitutes the condition.7
The deed of conditional sale between petitioner and private respondents was
executed on 6 April 1984. Private respondents had religiously paid the agreed
installments on the property until they completed payment on 6 April 1990.
Petitioner, in fact, allowed private respondents to fulfill the condition of effecting
full payment, and invoked Section 6 of Rep. Act 6657 only after private
respondents, having fully paid the repurchase price, demanded the execution of
a Deed of Sale in their favor.
It will be noted that Rep. Act 6657 was enacted on 10 June 1988. Following
petitioner's argument in this case, its prestation to execute the deed of sale was
rendered legally impossible by Section 6 said law. In other words, the deed of
conditional sale was extinguished by a supervening event, giving rise to an
impossibility of performance.
We reject petitioner's contention as we rule as the trial court and CA have
correctly ruled that neither Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657 nor Sec. 1 of E.O. 407
was intended to impair the obligation of contract petitioner had much earlier
concluded with private respondents.
More specifically, petitioner cannot invoke the last paragraph of Sec. 6 of Rep.
Act 6657 to set aside its obligations already existing prior to its enactment. In
the first place, said last paragraph clearly deals with "any sale, lease,
management contract or transfer or possession of private lands executed by the
original landowner." The original owner in this case is not the petitioner but the
private respondents Petitioner acquired the land through foreclosure
proceedings but agreed thereafter to reconvey it to private respondents, albeit
conditionally.
As earlier stated, Sec. 6 of Rep. Act 6657 in its entirety deals with retention
limits allowed by law to small landowners. Since the property here involved is
more or less ten (10) hectares, it is then within the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to determine whether or not the property
can be subjected to agrarian reform. But this necessitates an entirely differently
proceeding.
The CARL (Rep. Act 6657) was not intended to take away property without due
process of law. Nor is it intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the
same manner must E.O. 407 be regarded. It was enacted two (2) months after
private respondents had legally fulfilled the condition in the contract of
conditional sale by the payment of all installment on their due dates. These laws
cannot have retroactive effect unless there is an express provision in them to
that effect.8
As to petitioner's contention, however, that the CA erred in affirming the trial
court's decision awarding nominal damages, and attorney's fees to private
respondents, we rule in favor of petitioner.
It appears that the core issue in this case, being a pure question of law, did not
reach the trial stage as the case was submitted for decision after pre-trial.
The award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code is more of an
exception to the general rule that it is not sound policy to place a penalty on the
right to litigate. While judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees is not
entirely left out, the same, as a rule, must have a factual, legal or equitable
justification. The matter cannot and should not be left to speculation and
conjecture.9
As aptly stated in the Mirasol case:
. . . The matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once
and only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The
text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's
fees are being awarded. The court, after reading through
the text of the appealed decision, finds the same bereft of
any findings of fact and law to justify the award of
attorney's fees. The matter of such fees was touched but
once and appears only in the dispositive portion of the
decision. Simply put, the text of the decision did not state
the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded, and
for this reason, the Court finds it necessary to disallow
the same for being conjectural. 10
While DBP committed egregious error in interpreting Sec. 6 of RA 6657, the
same is not equivalent to gross and evident bad faith when it refused to execute
the deed of sale in favor of private respondents.
For the same reasons stated above, the award of nominal damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 should also be deleted.
The amount of P3,000.00 as litigation expenses and cost against petitioner
must remain.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the
decision of the CA is hereby AFFIRMED, for lack of any reversible error, with
the MODIFICATION that attorney's fees and nominal damages awarded to
private respondent are hereby DELETED.
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,1 is this: Is
Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located
in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"?
Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
10 | P a g e
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known
as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in
haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan,
Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan,
Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities
of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated
from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and
independent municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of
government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new
municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven
general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within
the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of
Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August
15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and
for other election purposes, the Commission RESOLVED that
pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del
Sur shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung
situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios
of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of
Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the
President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to
Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by
correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,
declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato,
and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967
and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral purposes, be
nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision
contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain
from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second.
The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the
spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its
deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,
which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to
its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local
application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of
an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue
all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them
to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as
guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading;
and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need
not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or
put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than
its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional
requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be
kept in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed
statute. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the
Province of Lanao del Sur"8 projects the impression that solely the province
of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading,
deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose
combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the
province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full
impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces
resulting in "the substantial diminution of territorial limits" of Cotabato province
is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in
Cotabato are taken away "need not be expressed in the title of the law." This
posture we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of
territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area,
population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of
the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title
did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as
controlling here. The Felwa case is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act
(Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as
unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section, 8
thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were
not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of
merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide
for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly
germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute
now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of
barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural
nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A
11 | P a g e
change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily
creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs.
Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears
the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of
Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the
state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the counties of
Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby
constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This
statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an
action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including
taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the
Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one
object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the
statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to
uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this
case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport,"
would have been a sufficient title, and that the words, "in the county
of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant
that the words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as
surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a
part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving the act. Schmalz
vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the
attention of those affected by the act to its provisions." Savings Bank
vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of
Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restriction. As was said
in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst
degree, for it is misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which
legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, were likewise declared
unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with
reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in
Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away
the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other
province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act
still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing,
that where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder
valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black,
however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and
connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be
carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected,
must fall with them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the
jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant
to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order
to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid
portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have
enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the
statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever,
 and what remains must express the legislative will independently of
the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to
create the restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in
Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of
Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer
must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an
instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government.
Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local
affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their
own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether
a group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent
municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was
apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247
creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which
comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate
population is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain
an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to
govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality
of the twenty-one barrios not nine barrios was in the mind of the
proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig,
which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the
reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient
to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only
nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the
said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a
municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent
municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be
derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and
other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of
these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to
answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are
afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that
Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community,
large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that
Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-
one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this
unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility
point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and
tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of
powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton
town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if
these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress,
not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its
totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that
petitioner has no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the
implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is
that petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the
constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in its title.
Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or
interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang,
Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial
hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by
legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not
dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is
recognized in this jurisdiction.15
12 | P a g e
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right
to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He
may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual
residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are fanned into the new town; he may prefer to remain in
the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights
and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the
new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may
feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be
shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on
the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and
to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral
purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial
capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to
two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises
in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our
ruling in People v. Mapa.1
The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of
September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal.
.22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and
four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not
guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the
revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite
license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,
although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in
question.
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as
claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated
December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit,
and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the
detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and
order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect
to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng,
illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby
appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the
appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you
have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent,
your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and
particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order
in this province and to make reports thereon to me once
or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any
abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your
appointment and immediate separation from the service.
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will
 have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described
below, for use in connection with the performance of your
duties.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the
performance of your duties by taking your oath of office
and filing the original thereof with us.
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish
information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms,
subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was
temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for
his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-
mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority
to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial court, while conceding on the
basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the
firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision
dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm
and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the
cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the
appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v.
Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the
trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown
that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition
without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor
as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the
detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and
ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no
authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from
the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category
of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who
under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary
use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful
purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In
Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication,
that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following
ground:
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically
allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess
any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The
next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors,
or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the
Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial
prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for
use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879,
Revised Administrative Code.)
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial
Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down
by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967.
13 | P a g e
The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis
of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in
view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in
Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly
recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of
the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a
law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement
of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine
laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of
the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm
in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act
be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments
as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero,
under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in
spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time
it was done was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant
is acquitted, with costs de oficio
G.R. No. L-38161 March 29, 1974
JUAN BELLO, FILOMENA C. BELLO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, * HON. FRANCISCO LLAMAS, as Judge of
Pasay City Court, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Martinez and Martinez for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court holds that the court of first instance of Pasay City in an appeal
erroneously taken to it from the city court's judgment convicting petitioners-
accused of the charge of estafa within the concurrent original jurisdiction of said
courts should grant petitioners-accused's timely petition for certifying their
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court rather than peremptorily
grant the prosecution's motion for dismissal of the appeal and order the remand
of the case to the city court for execution of judgment. The appellate court's
decision denying the relief sought by petitioners of compelling the elevation of
their appeal to it as the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the
court of first instance as a nominal party notwithstanding that it was duly
represented by the respondent People as the real party in interest through the
Solicitor General who expressed no objection to the setting aside of the court of
first instance's dismissal order is set aside as sacrificing substance to form and
subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality.
Petitioners spouses were charged on August 25, 1970 for estafa before the City
Court of Pasay1 for allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring with a value
of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on
commission basis. After trial, they were convicted and sentenced under
respondent city court's decision of February 26, 1971 to six (6) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional and to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P1,000.00 with costs of suit.
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of
First Instance of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss
appeal" on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent jurisdiction
of the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the city court had
been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of
Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as
amended.2
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the
analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in
cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify
the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds
therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the appeal to have
been wrongly brought before it, to certify the same "to either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court."3
The court of first instance per its order of October 29, 1971 did find that the
appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the
dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court "for
execution of judgment."4
Petitioners aver that they were not notified of the order of dismissal of their
appeal and learned of it only when they were called by the Pasay city court for
execution of the judgment of conviction. Hence, they filed with the city court
their "motion to elevate appeal to Court of Appeals" of December 7, 1971
stating that "through inadvertence and/or excusable neglect" they had
erroneously filed a notice of appeal to the court of first instance instead of to the
Court of Appeals as the proper court and prayed that the city court, following
precedents of this Court remanding appeals before it to the proper court instead
of dismissing appeals, "elevate the records ... to the Court of Appeals for proper
review."5
Respondent city court per its order of December 11, 1971 denied petitioners'
motion "for having been erroneously addressed to this court" instead of to the
court of first instance6 ignoring petitioners' predicament that the court of first
instance had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their
appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to
execute its judgment of conviction against them.
Petitioners spouses then filed on January 14, 1972 their petition for prohibition
and mandamus against the People and respondent city court to prohibit the
execution of the judgment and to compel respondent city court to elevate their
appeal to the Court of Appeals.7
The Solicitor General filed respondents' answer to the petition manifesting that
"we shall not interpose any objection whichever view point is adopted by this
Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing
principles of law finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision," after
observing that "(F)rom the view point of equity considering that petitioners' right
to appeal lapsed or was lost through the fault, though not excusable, of their
counsel, and compounded by the alleged error of judgment committed by the
Court of First Instance to which the appeal was erroneously brought, we
sympathize with petitioners' plight."
The Court of Appeals, however, per its decision of December 17, 1973
dismissed the petition, after finding that the city court's judgment was directly
appealable to it. Although recognizing that the "CFI instead of dismissing
appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be
endorsed to this Court of Appeals" it held that since petitioners did not implead
the court of first instance as "principal party respondent" it could not "grant any
relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve some
equities," as follows:
... therefore, when they appealed to CFI, that was
procedurally wrong; of course, CFI instead of dismissing
appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers,
directed appeal to be endorsed to this Court of Appeals,
but when instead of doing so, it dismissed, it also had
power to do so, and correction of it is difficult to see to be
remediable by mandamus, but ignoring this altogether,
what this Court finds is that since it was CFI that
dismissed the appeal and according to petitioners,
wrongly, it must follow that if CFI was wrong, this plea for
mandamus to compel it to act "correctly" should have
been directed against said CFI, it should have been the
CFI, Hon. Francisco de la Rosa, who should have been
made under Rule 65 Sec. 3, herein principal party
respondent, but he was not, this being the situation, this
Court can not see how it can grant any relief at all even
on the assumption that petitioners can be said to deserve
some equities.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration on January 2, 19748 and for elevation of
their appeal to the Court of Appeals, stressing the merits of their appeal and of
14 | P a g e
their defense to the charge, viz, that the offended party Atty. de Guzman had
represented their son who was a suspect with two others for robbery before the
Pasay city fiscal's office and upon dismissal of the charge demanded payment
from them as parents the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and since they
had no money to pay him required them to sign the receipt dated June 25, 1970
in his favor for an imaginary lady's ring to sell "on commission basis" for
P1,000.00 (their "commission" to be any overprice) to assure payment of the
sum by the stated deadline of July 9, 1970 under penalty, of criminal
prosecution for estafa; and that they had then newly met Atty. de Guzman,
whose services had been secured not by them but by the family of one of the
other suspects, implying the incredibility of his entrusting a lady's ring to both of
them (husband and wife) for sale on commission basis when his only
association with them was his demand of payment of his P1,000-attorney's fee
for having represented their son-suspect.
Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court "for lack of sufficient
merit," petitioners filed the present petition for review.9 The Court required the
Solicitor General's comment on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and
upon receipt thereof resolved to consider the case as a special civil action with
such comment as answer and the case submitted for decision in the interest of
justice and speedy adjudication.
The Court finds merits in the petition and holds that the court of first instance
acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners-accused's appeal
which was erroneously brought to it and ordering remand of the records to the
city court for execution of judgment instead of certifying and endorsing the
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as timely prayed for by
petitioners-accused in their opposition to the prosecution's motion to dismiss
appeal. We find that the Court of Appeals also acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their petition instead of setting aside the challenged
order of the court of first instance peremptorily dismissing the appeal pursuant
to which respondent city court was poised to execute its judgment of conviction
simply because the court of first instance which is but a nominal party had not
been impleaded as party respondent in disregard of the substantive fact that the
People as plaintiff and the real party in interest was duly impleaded as principal
party respondent and was represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor
General.
The appellate court while recognizing that petitioners' appeal taken to the court
of first instance was "procedurally wrong" and that the court of first instance "in
the exercise of its inherent powers could have certified the appeal to it as the
proper court instead of dismissing the appeal, gravely erred in holding that it
could not "correct" the court of first instance's "wrong action" and grant the relief
sought of having the appeal elevated to it since said court's presiding judge
"who should have been-made under Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party
respondent, but he was not." The Court has always stressed as in Torre vs.
Ericta 11 that a respondent judge is "merely a nominal party" in special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and that he "is not a person "in
interest" within the purview (of Rule 65, section 5 12)" and "accordingly, he has
no standing or authority to appeal from or seek a review on certiorari" of an
adverse decision of the appellate court setting aside his dismissal of a party's
appeal and issuing the writ of mandamus for him to allow the appeal.
It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or presiding
judge who issued the challenged order or decision is but a nominal party, the
real parties in interest being "the person or persons interested in sustaining the
proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the duty of appearing and
defending the challenged act both "in their own behalf and in behalf of the court
or judge affected by the proceedings." Hence, the formal impleading of the
court of first instance which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not
indispensable and could be "overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication."
13
Since the real party in interest, the People as plaintiff in the criminal proceeding
against petitioners-accused was duly impleaded and represented by the
Solicitor General to defend the proceedings in the court of first instance and had
expressed no objection to the appellate court's setting aside of the court of first
instance's dismissal order, in the interest of justice and equity the appellate
court's act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing
the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non impleader of the court
of first instance as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to
form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural
technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners mis-directing their appeal to
the court of first instance rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had
timely sought to correct in the court of first instance itself by asking that court to
certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be
over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and
leave them without any remedy.
The Court therefore grants herein the relief denied by respondent appellate
court of mandamus to compel respondent city court to elevate petitioners'
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court as being within the context
and spirit of Rule 50, section 3, providing for certification to the proper court by
the Court of Appeals of appealed cases erroneously brought to it, 14 particularly
where petitioners-accused have shown prima facie (and without this Court
prejudging the merits of their appeal) that they have a valid cause for pursuing
in good faith their appeal (as against a manifestly dilatory or frivolous appeal)
and to have a higher court appreciate their evidence in support of their defense
that they were prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment (for estafa) for failure
to pay a purely civil indebtedness (the attorney's fee owed by their son to the
complainant).
Here, petitioners-accused's counsel, misdirected their appeal to the court of first
instance, confronted with the thorny question (which has confused many a
practitioner) 15 of concurrent criminal jurisdiction of city courts and municipal
courts of provincial and sub-provincial capitals with courts of first instance under
sections 44 (f) and 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act where the appeal from the
municipal or city court's judgment should be taken directly to the Court of
Appeals as held in Esperat vs. Avila 16 as distinguished however from
judgments of ordinary municipal courts in similar cases within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the courts of first instance where as held by this Court in People
vs. Valencia 17 the appeal should nevertheless be brought to the court of first
instance which retains its appellate jurisdiction under section 45 of the Judiciary
Act.
It certainly was within the inherent power of the court of first instance in exercise
of its power to "control its process and orders so as to make them conformable
to law and justice" 18 to grant petitioners-accused's timely plea to endorse their
appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court and within the context and
spirit of Rule 50, section 3. In a mis-directed appeal to the Court of Appeals of a
case that pertains to the court of first instance's jurisdiction, the said Rule
expressly provides that the Court of Appeals "shall not dismiss the appeal but
shall certify the case to the proper court" viz, the court of first instance in the
given example. There is no logical reason why in all fairness and justice the
court of first instance in a misdirected appeal to it should not be likewise bound
by the same rule and therefore enjoined not to dismiss the appeal but to certify
the case to the Court of Appeals as the proper court. The paucity of the
language of the Rule and its failure to expressly provide for such cases of
misdirected appeals to the court of first instance (owing possibly to the fact that
at the time of the revision of the Rules of Court in 1963 section 87 (c) had been
newly amended under Republic Act 2613 approved on June 22, 1963 to
enlarge the jurisdiction of city courts and municipal courts of provincial capitals
and provide for their concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance and
direct appeal from their judgments in such cases to the Court of Appeals)
should not be a cause for unjustly depriving petitioners of their substantial right
of appeal.
This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always
cautioned against "narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of
the legislator" " 19 and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or
absurdity)" 20 and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it
would be unjust or lead to absurd results". 21 In the construction of its own
Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to
avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void that is
certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate repugnancy and
inconsistency by holding as it does now that courts of first instance are
equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely
made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition is
hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
petition for prohibition against respondent city court which is hereby enjoined
from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and
further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners' appeal from its
judgment to the Court of Appeals for the latter's disposition on the merits. No
costs.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in
his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No.
049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
15 | P a g e
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its
February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property
Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in
1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of
Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he
explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in
obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real
estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good
during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to
71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for
income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income
tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in
the total amount of 26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax
refund or tax credit.9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to
submit additional documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its
claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review11
in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond
the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax
credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national
internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not
such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of
two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of
any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however,
That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any
tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998.
Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of
thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229
of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because
the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731
days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an
appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It
ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year
and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a
particular year is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by
April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still
be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear
and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption,
should be strictly construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC
should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been
consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax
credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns.23
Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within
730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA
within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is
correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the
final adjusted return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be
computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National
Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365
days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted.
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in
which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific
month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to
sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days
in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month."29 To
illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1,
2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be
from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is
revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more
recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31 Section
27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the
provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been
clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the
subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and
they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365
days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code
of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this
reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Lex posteriori derogat priori.
16 | P a g e
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to
this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent
filed its final adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar
months, computed as follows:
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed
on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final
adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A.
Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA
vs.
FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR.
Petitioner Lynette G. Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the order dated May
2, 1996 of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc
suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
The facts are undisputed. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections
nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. On March 16, 1996,
petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of
Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that petitioner,
who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the age
limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid down in Section 3 [b]
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
On April 2, 1996, petitioner filed a "Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bangui-
Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. In a decision dated April 18, 1996,
the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered her registration as member
and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 1 The Board of Election Tellers
appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. 2 The presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited himself from acting on the
appeal due to his close association with petitioner. 3
On April 23, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of
Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April 23, 1996, respondent
Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor
Noli Pipo, 4 disapproved petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her
age. 5 Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon
A. Asperin who set aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run.
6
On May 2, 1996, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner informing
her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why her certificate of
candidacy should not be disapproved. 7 Earlier and without the knowledge of
the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival
candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC
en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy"
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her
certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile 8 and registered mail
on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day respondent Rios issued the memorandum to
petitioner, the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of
Election Tellers and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend
the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election. The order
reads as follows:
Acting on the Fax "Petition for Denial And/Or Cancellation
of Certificate of Candidacy" by petitioner Florencio G.
Sales, Jr. against Lynette G. Garvida, received on April
29, 1996, the pertinent allegations of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
 5. That the said respondent is disqualified to become a
voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she
will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6,
1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be
gleaned from her birth certificate, copy of which is hereto
attached and marked as Annex "A";
6. That in filing her certificate of candidacy as candidate
for SK of Bgy. San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, she
made material representation which is false and as such,
she is disqualified; that her certificate of candidacy should
not be given due course and that said candidacy must be
cancelled;
xxx xxx xxx
the Commission, it appearing that the petition is
meritorious, hereby DIRECTS the Board of Election
Tellers/Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte, to suspend the proclamation of
Lynette G. Garvida in the event she garners the highest
number of votes for the position of Sangguniang
Kabataan [sic].
Meantime, petitioner is hereby required to submit
immediately ten (10) copies of his petition and to pay the
filing and legal research fees in the amount of P510.00.
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private
respondent's votes of 76. 10 In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the
COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as
the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed petitioner
the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte. 11 The proclamation was "without prejudice to any further action
by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." 12 On July 5,
1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang
Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and
was proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon. 13
Petitioner raises two (2) significant issues: the first concerns the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC en banc to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of
candidacy; the second, the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the
ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official
of the SK.
I mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at
Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that the
conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision of the COMELEC and shall
be governed by the Omnibus Election Code. 14 The Omnibus Election Code, in
Section 78, Article IX, governs the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy, viz:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before election.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has
made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition
may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by
the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the
COMELEC itself. 15
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a
certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc.
17 | P a g e
Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc
when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider
decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are
resolved by the COMELEC en banc. 16 It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in
Divisions that can hear and decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3
of the said Rules thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. The
Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and
decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special
actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt
and special proceedings except in accreditation of
citizens' arms of the Commission. 17
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its
Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the petition and issued the
order of May 2, 1996. 18
II
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself
did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. These requirements are:
Sec. 1. Filing of Pleadings. Every pleading, motion and
other papers must be filed in ten (10) legible copies.
However, when there is more than one respondent or
protestee, the petitioner or protestant must file additional
number of copies of the petition or protest as there are
additional respondents or protestees.
Sec. 2. How Filed. The documents referred to in the
immediately preceding section must be filed directly with
the proper Clerk of Court of the Commission personally,
or, unless otherwise provided in these Rules, by
registered mail. In the latter case, the date of mailing is
the date of filing and the requirement as to the number of
copies must be complied with.
Sec. 3. Form of Pleadings, etc. (a) All pleadings
allowed by these Rules shall be printed, mimeographed
or typewritten on legal size bond paper and shall be in
English or Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
Every pleading before the COMELEC must be printed,
least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the
proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered
mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only two (2)
copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC. 19 Also, the COMELEC en
banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the petition transmitted by facsimile,
not by registered mail.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. 20 The current is transmitted as a signal
over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver
to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the
correct shade. 21 The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that
produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile. 22
Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A facsimile is not a
genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the
marks of an original. 23 Without the original, there is no way of determining on
its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading. The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have
restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and issuing the
questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received
the petition filed by registered mail.
 III
To write finis to the case at bar, we shall now resolve the issue of petitioner's
age.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree No.
684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization
composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less
than 18 years of age. 24 The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its
members a medium to express their views and opinions and participate in
issues of transcendental importance. 25 Its affairs were administered by a
barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were
actual residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18
years of age. 26 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local
Government Code, raised the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay
members from "less than 18 years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."
The Local Government Code of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into
the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members
laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more than 21 years old. 27 The affairs of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan are administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
composed of a chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. 28 The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Barangay. 29 A member of the SK holds office for
a term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes
permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office. 30
Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific qualifications
laid down by the Local Government Code of 1991, viz:
Sec. 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan. The katipunan ng
kabataan shall be composed of all citizens of the
Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least
six (6) months, who are fifteen (15) but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age, and who are duly
registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in
the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may become a candidate
for the Sangguniang Kabataan if he possesses the following
qualifications:
Sec. 428. Qualifications. An elective official of the
sangguniang kabataan must be a citizen of the
Philippines, a qualified voter of the katipunan ng
kabataan, a resident of the barangay for at least one (1)
year immediately prior to election, at least fifteen (15)
years but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on
the day of his election, able to read and write Filipino,
English, or the local dialect, and must not have been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the
barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
(d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official
barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the
Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21
years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must
not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections 424 and
428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No. 2824 and defined
how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan becomes a qualified voter and an
elective official. Thus:
Sec. 3. Qualifications of a voter. To be qualified to
register as a voter in the SK elections, a person must be:
a) a citizen of the Philippines;
b) fifteen (15) but not more than twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day that is, he must have been born
between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and
18 | P a g e
c) a resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year
and actually residing in the barangay wherein he
proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the elections.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Qualifications of elective members. An elective
official of the SK must be:
a) a qualified voter;
b) a resident in the barangay for at least one (1) year
immediately prior to the elections; and
c) able to read and write Filipino or any Philippine
language or dialect or English.
Cases involving the eligibility or qualification of
candidates shall be decided by the city/municipal Election
Officer (EO) whose decision shall be final.
A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in
the May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but
not more than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must
be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a
resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual
resident of the barangay at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the elections. A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess
the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be a resident in the
barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections;
and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a member
and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the Sangguniang
Kabataan. Petitioner 's age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that Section 3 [b]
of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and beyond the scope of Sections
424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991. She contends that the
Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on
election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years
old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore
qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as
candidate for the SK elections.
A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between
the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the
maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a
member's maximum age at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to
when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand,
Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21
years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "or the day of
his election" is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21
years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than
21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable
considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK
official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis
est ratio. 31 The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances
showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. 32
The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21
years of age on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only
in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. 33 Since a "qualified voter" is not
necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is
a "member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not
provide that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is
determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit of a voter for the
SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21
years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government
Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is
understood that years are of 365 days each. 34 One born on the first day of the
year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after his birth
the last day of the year. 35 In computing years, the first year is reached after
completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the
second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the second cycle, the person
turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21
years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-day cycle. This means on his 21st
birthday, he has completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this
birthday, the 365-day cycle for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th
day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the
365th day.
The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not
beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years and
one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more than 21
365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to "less than 22
years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not state that the
candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age qualification
of a barangay youth official was expressly stated as ". . . at least fifteen years of
age or over but less than eighteen . . ." 36 This provision clearly states that the
youth official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17 years and a fraction
of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen years. When the Local
Government Code increased the age limit of members of the youth organization
to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as to make the youth
"at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention of the Code's framers
was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they should have stated so
expressly instead of leaving the matter open to confusion and doubt. 37
Former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the sponsor and principal author of the
Local Government Code of 1991 declared that one of the reasons why the
Katipunan ng Kabataan was created and the Kabataang Barangay discontinued
was because most, if not all, Kabataang Barangay leaders were already over
21 years of age by the time President Aquino assumed power. 38 They were
not the "youth" anymore. The Local Government Code of 1991 fixed the
maximum age limit at not more than 21 years 39 and the only exception is in
the second paragraph of Section 423 which reads:
Sec. 423. Creation and Election.
a) . . . ;
b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term
of office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one (21)
years shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of
the term for which he was elected.
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of
21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows
him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was
elected. According to Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have
"been elected prior to his 21st birthday." 40 Conversely, the SK
official must not have turned 21 years old before his election.
Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the
latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on
the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must
therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in
relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not
ultra vires insofar as it fixes the maximum age of an elective SK
official on the day of his election.
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996,
the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was
twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she
was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1,
1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10)
days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a
member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the
age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government
Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was
ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan
elections.
The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on
public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be
declared ineligible. 41 In the same vein, if the candidate is over the maximum
age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that the candidate
was elected will not make the age requirement directory, nor will it validate his
election. 42 The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure
the vice of ineligibility. 43
19 | P a g e
The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996 elections, to be
declared elected. 44 A defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office. 45 Moreover, despite his claims, 46 private respondent has failed to
prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's ineligibility
and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of misapplying their
franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit of her rival candidate.
47
Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the Local
Government Code petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang
Kabataan member who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6,
1996 elections. 48 Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan
Chairman "refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, 49 is convicted of a felony,
voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office,
or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months."
The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility.50 Being
"eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen." 51
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed
in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. 52 Ineligibility is not
one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK
Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it necessary to
order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by the incumbent SK
members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority
from among themselves. The member chosen shall assume the office of SK
Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers
and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette G.
Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy
in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan, and is ordered to
vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Sangguniang Kabataan member voted
by simple majority by and from among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan
members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the
office of Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL.
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had
three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which
he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order
and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00
to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have
been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first
and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis
and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E.
Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of
stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service
of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings,
the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions
and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower
court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent
is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is
not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the
properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however,
of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine
of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
20 | P a g e
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This
is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11
of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art.
16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this
that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it
would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867,
870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-
appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of
commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"),
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge
of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of
one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a
previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the
couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their
matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby
Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a
piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was
broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor,
Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and
they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To
facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did
not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after
the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that
she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke
(t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought
priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he
believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the
lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place,
because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose
name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San
Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day
in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with
her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March
1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as
endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and
Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not
prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"),
but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition
(Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study,
and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two
years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for
the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu
to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten
children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he
charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It
allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta
F. Escao liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the
heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for damages;.
21 | P a g e
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the
plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from
the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us.
Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and
both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest
(army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere
shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize
marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest
and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not
only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613
of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are
the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis
supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and
this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage
shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of
the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that
the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee
Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes
and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning
her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she
was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been
in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake,
the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by
fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void,
but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a
competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-
prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District
Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta
Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No.
386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce,
quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further
emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil
Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and,
even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign
decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation
of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph
of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce
decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination
in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should
have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our
law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.);
and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort
cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier,
95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused
through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit
nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute,
contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person
not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the
basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an
invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court
on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the
approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As
a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo
before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of
the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to
the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore,
under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully
applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated
in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The
claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel
Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The
children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word
"descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from
Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the
case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a
person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the
question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the
answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands
are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of
the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if
22 | P a g e
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws
are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto
Escao and his wife, the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of
their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was
begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these
letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for
the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride,"
"effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to
visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not
have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as
good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of
Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one
was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was
had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the
refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to
compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her
decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her
money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should
not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided
and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she
appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her
parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in
the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good
faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law
distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the
marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the
liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will
justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not
liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even
where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of
the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or
interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held
that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and
afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or
cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has
more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a
married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice
given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or
social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled
by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven
facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account,
against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a)
the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by
publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to
the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to
remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character
of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that
appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's
fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
Escao and Mena Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said
defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable
affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person
other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992
AMELITA CONSTANTINO
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision1 dated April
30, 1981 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed
petitioner's complaint and set aside the resolution2 dated October 21, 1976 of
the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the
dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private
respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as
his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child;
(3) to pay complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and
moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed
an action for acknowledgment, support and damages against private
respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th
Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita
Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of August,
1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila,
where she worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan
invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while
dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time
to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening,
Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the
pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and
through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the
23 | P a g e
latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a
married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the months of
September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of
which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf
ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who
is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint;
that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a
waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly
income of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the
unborn child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at
Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations
with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of
action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary
damages and litigation expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the
malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend
the complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was
born on August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court
admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended
complaint reiterating his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is
his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino
and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to
pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of
actual and moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00,
as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay
the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for
reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the
award of damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the
other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino
as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita
Constantino's motion for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion
of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino
and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against
defendant Ivan Mendez ordering the latter to pay Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and
moral damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of
payment of the hospital and medical bills incurred during
the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to
recognize as his own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor
Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all the rights,
privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such
status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of
plaintiff Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and
the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees.
The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21,
1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside
and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court
of Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial
court and in dismissing the complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual
findings of the trial and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also
pointed out that the appellate court committed a misapprehension of facts when
it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first or
second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception
of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only
a persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to
review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as
may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a re-
examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and
conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155
SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, this Court will review only errors of law committed by the Court of
Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the oral
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts
of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158
SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record,
that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her
claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Such
conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling on
this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial
court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as
the illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration,
it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976.
Amelita's testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan
in Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974 (TSN, December 8,
1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she could not remember the
date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual
contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is
the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she
merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of
September, October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so
that as correctly pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical
science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean
duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be
close to 267 days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place
about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of
November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan
in November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own
evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan
Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty.
Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances
of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is
four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual
pregnancy, the child was conceived on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8,
1975, p. 65) is belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez
where she revealed the reason for her attachment to Ivan who possessed
certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a
quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an
irritant in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The
burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is
the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 193 & 214 of
the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she
surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that
more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and
mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was
already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN,
December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan
when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August,
1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual
24 | P a g e
intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage
was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. vs. SHIRLEY G. QUIONES
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of
Court are the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2
dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed decision
reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the
assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Michelle Ybaez (Ybaez).
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation Ticketing
Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA
Boutique at the second floor of Robinsons Department Store (Robinsons) in
Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided
to purchase the black jeans worth 2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to
the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinsons and Mercury
Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee
approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She,
however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in
her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office
located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the
Guess employees as agreed upon.8
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly
subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly
demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her
wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another argument.
Respondent, thereafter, went home.10
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director
of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it
did not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off
duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to
the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinsons, but the latter again refused to receive it.12
Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of
Robinsons was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an
investigation for purposes of canceling respondents Robinsons credit card.
Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging
letter.13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered
physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension,
besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the
Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California
Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda
Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybaez. She demanded the payment of moral,
nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation
expenses.16
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of
the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier
(Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did
it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the
employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt,
Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which
the former believed to mean that the item has already been paid.18 Realizing
the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he
saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to
whether or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to
the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office.
Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where they
talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation
that respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They
emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was
the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.21 As counterclaim,
petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees and litigation expenses.22
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint
and counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court
concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith
that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no motive to fabricate
a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when they
demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the
honest belief that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it
damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in front of Cebu
Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that
situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu
Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees,
because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate
respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on
the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.23
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for:
Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle
Ybaez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
appellant Shirley G. Quiones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) and attorneys fees in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.24
While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith
when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the
alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of evidence
showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to
respondents employer. It found respondents possession of both the official
receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the
findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacifics
director was sent to respondents employer not merely to ask for assistance for
the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation
and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that
Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad
faith and malice when it dragged respondents employer who was not privy to
the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter
contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged
acts of respondent in trying to evade payment.27 The appellate court thus held
that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral
damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made
liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection
of its employees; while Ybaezs liability stemmed from her act of signing the
demand letter sent to respondents employer. In view of Hawayon and
Villagonzalos good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28
Ybaez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same
was denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT
HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR
INJURY.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.30
The petition is without merit.
Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of
abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations.
Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they
insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop
despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop.
The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify
from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to
believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without
limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of
duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.
The Courts pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is noteworthy:
25 | P a g e
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or
omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or
recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into
our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts
which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct.
First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse
of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x32 The
elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.33
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between
the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to
respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and
discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans
was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make
such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the
question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went
overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be
liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.34 Good
faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable
and unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other
hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether
she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the
Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour
when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the
CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views
insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was
in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official
receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such
payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have
been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard
and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the
guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to
respondents employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1wphi1 Petitioners claimed that
after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was
noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she
was not completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances
of payment, thus:
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly
left (sic) the store. x x x
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank
expression and told me, "I cant remember." Then I asked her how much money
she gave, she answered, "2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told
her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our
cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she
received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I dont remember." After
asking these simple questions, I am very certain that she is not completely
being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear
these matters but she vehemently refused saying that shes in a hurry and very
busy.37
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that
she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the
shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of
the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,
likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment.
Contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop
or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not
have a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to
respondents employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in
collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondents reputation in the
eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and
despite the latters possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case,
petitioners obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20
and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages
and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant
s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases
specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41
Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief
and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt
caused and the gravity of the wrong done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the
complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.43
We find that the amount of 50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA
is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was
compelled to litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of
of20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated
November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
G.R.NO. L-36249 March 29, 1985
ANIANO OBAA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETO SANDOVAL
Petitioner seeks a review of the Decision of respondent Appellate Court (in CA-
G.R. No. 44345-R) ordering him in an action for Replevin to return to Aniceto
SANDOVAL, private respondent herein, 170 cavans of rice or to pay its value in
the amount of P37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the
Complaint until fully paid.
SANDOVAL is the owner and manager of the "Sandoval and Sons Rice Mill"
located in Rosales, Pangasinan. He is engaged in the buying and selling of
palay.
On November 21, 1964, SANDOVAL was approached by a certain Chan Lin
who offered to purchase from him 170 cavans of clean rice (wagwag variety) at
the price of P37.26 per cavan, delivery to be made the following day at
petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union, with payment to be made thereat
by Chan Lin to SANDOVAL's representative. SANDOVAL accepted the offer as
he knew petitioner and had had previous transactions with him.
As agreed, the 170 cavans of rice were transported the following day on a truck
belonging to SANDOVAL to petitioner's store in San Fernando, La Union. Chan
Lin accompanied the shipment. Upon arrival thereat, the goods were unloaded
but when the truck driver attempted to collect the purchase price from Chan Lin,
the latter was nowhere to be found. The driver tried to collect from petitioner,
but the latter refused stating that he had purchase the goods from Chan Lin at
P33.00 per cavan and that the price therefore had already been paid to Chan
Lin.
Further demands having been met with refusal, SANDOVAL, as plaintiff, filed
suit for replevin against petitioner, then the defendant, before the Municipal
Court of San Fernando, La Union, which ordered petitioner-defendant to pay to
SANDOVAL one-half () of the cost of the rice or P2,805.00.
26 | P a g e
On appeal by petitioner-defendant to the then Court of First Instance of La
Union, the parties agreed to adopt SANDOVAL's testimony before the
Municipal Court. After trial de novo, judgment was rendered dismissing the
complaint against petitioner-defendant.
On appeal to respondent Appellate Court, SANDOVAL obtained a reversal in
his favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside
and another one entered ordering defendant-appellee to
return the one hundred and seventy cavans of rice to
plaintiff- appellant or to pay its value in the amount of P
37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid and with costs against the
appellee. 1
Before us, petitioner-defendant takes issue with the following Appellate Court
findings:
From the evidence presented by the parties, it is evident
that this is a simple case of swindling perpetuated by
Chan Lin at the expense of the plaintiff and the
defendant. The act of Chan Lin in purchasing plaintiff's
rice at the price of P 37.25 per cavan and thereafter
offering the same goods to defendant at a much lower
price is an indication that it was never his intention to
comply with his obligation to plaintiff. It is clear that Chan
Lin's only purpose in entering into said contract with
plaintiff was to acquire the physical possession of the
goods and then to pass them on to defendant on the
pretext that he is the owner thereof. Premises
considered, therefore, Chan Lin cannot be considered as
the owner of the goods at the time the same was said to
have been sold to the defendant-appellee. Considering
that defendant acquired the 170 cavans of rice from a
person who is not the owner thereof, it is therefore clear
that he acquired no greater right than his predecessor-in-
interest.
Finally, on principle of equity, it is but proper that plaintiff-
appellant be allowed to recover the one-hundred and
seventy cavans of rice or its value. Being the undisputed
owner of the above mentioned goods, the appellant
cannot be deprived of its ownership without the
corresponding payment. 2
We agree with petitioner-defendant that there was a perfected sale. Article 1475
of the Civil Code lays down the general rule that there is perfection when there
is consent upon the subject matter and price, even if neither is delivered.
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price.
xxx xxx xxx
Ownership of the rice, too, was transferred to the vendee, Chan Lin, upon its
delivery to him at San Fernando, La Union, the place stipulated 3 and pursuant
to Articles 1477 and 1496 of the same Code:
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof.
Art. 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by
the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any
of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
At the very least, Chan Lin had a rescissible title to the goods for the non-
payment of the purchase price, but which had not been rescinded at the time of
the sale to petitioner.
However, from petitioner-defendant's own testimony
before the Court of First Instance, he admits that three
days after the delivery, he was repaid the sum of
P5,600.00 by Chan Lin, who was then accompanied by
SANDOVAL's driver, and that he had delivered the rice
 back to them. On rebuttal, however, the driver denied that
the rice had ever been returned. 4 The driver's version is
the more credible, for, as SANDOVAL's counsel had
manifested in open Court, if return of the rice had been
effected, they would have withdrawn the complaint. 5
Following is the admission made by petitioner-defendant:
Q After the third day ... when that request for you to hold
the rice was already overdue, what happened?
A This is what happened. Chan Lin and the driver with
the same truck that they used to unload the rice, came to
me.
Q What day was that?
A That was I think, Thursday, about 4:30 P.M.
Q Do you know the date?
A November 26, I think.
Q What did they do when this driver and Mr. Chan Lin
came back?
A They told me that they wanted the rice back and give
my money back.
Q Did they give you your money back?
A Yes.
Q How much?
A They gave me P5.600.
COURT:
Q They gave you that amount?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GUALBERTO:
Q Did they tell you why they were getting back the rice
and giving you back your money?
A Yes. The complete rice, and Vallo (SANDOVAL's
driver) told me, he wanted to return the rice to the ricemill,
that is what Vallo and the Chinese agreed with Aniceto
Sandoval.
Q Did the Chinese tell you that he made agreement with
Sandoval to get back the rice?
A Yes.
COURT:
Q Did you receive the money?
A Yes , sir6
Having been repaid the purchases price by Chan Lin , the sale, as between
them, had been voluntarily rescinded, and petitioner-defendant was thereby
divested of any claim to the rice. Technically, therefore, he should return the
rice to Chan Lin, but since even the latter, again from petitioner-defendant's
own testimony above-quoted, was ready to return the rice to SANDOVAL, and
the latter's driver denies that the rice had been returned by petitioner-defendant
cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another by
holding on to property no longer belonging to him.7 In law and in equity,
therefore, SANDOVAL is entitled to recover the rice, or the value theref since
hewas not paid the price therefor.
WHEREFORE, albeit on a different premise, the judgment under review is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163794 November 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
HON. NORMELITO J. BALLOCANAG,
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated June 4, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52261, which
affirmed the Joint Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, dated December 28, 1998.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought the
subject 182,941-square-meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro [subject land] from one Regina Castillo (or Castillo)
in whose name it was titled under Original Transfer Certificate of
Title No. P-2388 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606. Right
27 | P a g e
after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements and planted the
land with fruit trees, including about a thousand mango[es], more
than a hundred Mandarin citrus, and more than a hundred
guyabanos. He also had the title transferred in his name and was
issued TCT No. 45232.
Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith.
Unfortunately, it turned out that about 162,500 square meters of this
land is part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro and, therefore,
cannot be subject to any disposition or acquisition under any existing
law, and is not registrable.
Thus, in the Complaint (Annex "A", pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for
"Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion" filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (or OSG) in behalf of the Republic [petitioner], as
represented by the Bureau of Forest Development (or BFD), it was
explained that the source[,] Original Transfer Certificate of Title No.
P-2388 of Castillo, issued pursuant to Free Patent No. V-79606, is
spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued on account of:
a) ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (162,500) SQUARE METERS, more or less,
of the land covered by OCT No. P-2388 was, at the time
it was applied for patent and or titling, a part of the
timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD Land
Classification Map Nos. 2319 and 1715. Copy of said
maps are attached hereto as Annexes "B" and "C";
b) The 162,500 square meters covered by OCT No. P-
2388 are entirely inside the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry
Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Augusto
D. Marte4 [Atty. Marte], copy of the Map of AFFLA No.
175 and AFFLA No. 175 are attached hereto as Annexes
"D" and "E";
c) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property because
the rightful occupant is Atty. Augusto D. Marte by virtue of
the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement [AFFLA] No.
175, issued to him by the Ministry of Natural Resources in
1986 to expire on December 21, 2011;
d) Since the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 45232, in
the name of defendant Danilo Reyes, is a part of the
timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD Land
Classification Map Nos. 2319 & 1715, the same cannot
be the subject of any disposition or acquisition under any
existing law (Li Hong Giap vs. Director of Lands, 55 Phil.
693; Veno vs. Gov't of P.I. 41 Phil. 161; Director of Lands
vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5). (pp. 18 to 19, rollo)
Aside from the documentary evidence presented to support these
allegations, the Republic presented as well and called to the witness
stand:
a) Armando Cruz, the supervising cartographer of the
DENR, who explained that based on Land Classification
Map No. 1715 (Exh. "A") which was later amended to LC
Map No. 2319 (Exh. "B"), the plotting shows that the
162,000 square meters covered by OCT No. 2388 are
entirely inside the 140 hectares of the Agro-Forestry
Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Marte
and the alienable and disposable area of Castillo's land is
only around two (2) hectares;
b) Alberto Cardio, an employee of the DENR who
conducted the survey on the land under litigation,
corroborated the testimony of Cruz that only two hectares
is alienable and disposable land; and
c) Vicente Mendoza, a Geodetic Engineer, who
expounded on the procedure before the title could be
issued to an applicant for a disposable and alienable
public land. He clarified that he did not make the survey
for Castillo but upon presentation to him of the carpeta in
open court he noticed that, while it appears to be valid, it
however has no certification of the Bureau of Forestry -
an essential requirement before title could be issued.
 For his side, Reyes presented evidence showing his extensive
development of and investment in the land, but however failed to
traverse squarely the issue raised by the Republic against the
inalienability and indisposability of his acquired land. His lame
argument that the absence of the Certification by the Bureau of
Forestry on his carpeta does not necessarily mean that there was
none issued, failed to convince the court a quo.
Hence, Judge Edilberto Ramos, the then Presiding Judge of Branch
41 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
held5 that:
The defendants in this case did not assail the evidence of the
plaintiff but concentrated itself to the expenses incurred in the
cultivation and in the planting of trees in that disputed areas. Aside
thereto, the plaintiff cited that it is elementary principle of law that
said areas not being capable of registration their inclusion in a
certification of ownership or confer title on the registrant. (Republic of
the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Judge Jaime de los Angeles of the
Court of First Instance of Balayan, Batangas, et al., G.R. No. L-
30240) It is also a matter of principle that public forest [are non-
alienable public lands. Accession of public forests] on the part of the
claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private
property. (Vano v. Government of PI, 41 Phils. 161)
In view thereof, it appears that the preponderance of evidence
is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and
therefore it is hereby declared that Free Patent No. V-79606
issued on July 22, 1957 with Psu No. 155088 and OCT No. P-
2388 in the name of Regina Castillo and its derivative TCT No.
45232 in the name of Danilo Reyes is hereby declared null and
void; and the defendant Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered to
surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 45232 and to
vacate the premises and directing the defendant Register of
Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, to cancel the title as null
and void ab initio; and declaring the reversion of the land in
question to the government subject to the Agro-Forestry Farm
Lease Agreement No. 175, to form part of the public domain in
the province of Oriental Mindoro.
The two-hectare lot, which appears disposable and alienable, is
declared null and void for failure to secure certification from the
Bureau of Forest Development.
The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby denied for lack of
merit, with cost against the defendant.6
Reyes appealed the aforementioned RTC Decision to the CA. In its Decision7
dated September 16, 1996, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. His motion for
reconsideration was denied.8
Thus, Reyes sought relief from this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
But in our Resolution9 dated June 23, 1997, we resolved to deny his petition for
failure to sufficiently show that the CA had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment. On November 24, 1997, this Court denied with finality
Reyes' motion for reconsideration.10
On February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion11 to Remove Improvements
Introduced by Defendant Danilo D. Reyes on the Property which is the Subject
of Execution in Accordance with Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (motion).12 There he averred that: he occupied in good
faith the subject land for around thirty years; he had already spent millions of
pesos in planting fruit-bearing trees thereon; and he employed many workers
who regularly took care of the trees and other plants. Reyes prayed that he
and/or his agents be given at least one (1) year from the issuance of the
corresponding order to remove his mango, citrus and guyabano trees, and that
they be allowed to stay in the premises within that period to work on the cutting
and removal of the said trees. He also asked the RTC that in the meantime that
these trees are not yet removed, all the unharvested fruits be appropriated by
him, as provided for by law, to the exclusion of all other persons who may take
advantage of the situation and harvest said fruits.
Petitioner opposed the motion, citing the principle of accession under Article
44013 of the Civil Code. It further argued that the subject land, being timber
land, is property of public dominion and, therefore, outside the commerce of
man and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of any contract. This
being the case, there are no improvements to speak of, because the land in
question never ceased to be a property of the Republic, even if Reyes claimed
that he was a purchaser for value and in good faith and was in possession for
more than thirty (30) years. Moreover, petitioner averred that, assuming Reyes
28 | P a g e
was initially a planter/sower in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot
be of absolute application since from the time the reversion case was filed by
the petitioner on May 13, 1987, Reyes ceased to be a planter/sower in good
faith and had become a planter/sower in bad faith.14
Meanwhile, on March 2, 1998, Atty. Marte filed a Complaint for Injunction With
an Ancillary Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order against Reyes for allegedly encroaching upon and taking possession by
stealth, fraud and strategy some 16 hectares of his leased area without his
permission or acquiescence and planted trees thereon in bad faith despite the
fact that the area is non-disposable and part of the public domain, among
others.
But the respondent RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed Joint
Order and ruled in favor of Reyes, finding Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable. The RTC ratiocinated:
Under the circumstance, it is but just and fair and equitable that
Danilo Reyes be given the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of his labor
on the land which he honestly believes was legally his. He was not
aware that his certificate of title which was derived from OCT No. P-
2388 issued in 1957 by the government itself in the name of Regina
Castillo contained legal infirmity, otherwise he would not have
expoused (sic) himself from the risk of being ejected from the land
and losing all improvements thereon. Any way, if the court will grant
the motion for the defendant's (sic) Danilo Reyes to remove his
improvements on the disputed property, it will not prejudice Augusto
Marte, otherwise, as the court sees it, he will immensely [benefit]
from the toils of Danilo Reyes.
and then disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to remove
improvements filed by defendant Danilo Reyes dated January 28,
1998 is hereby GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of section 10,
paragraph (d) of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
he is given a period of one (1) year from the issuance of this ORDER
to remove, cut and appropriate the fruit-bearing trees which he had
planted in the property in disputes (sic).
The COMMENT filed by the Office of the Solicitor General dated
August 11, 1998 is hereby denied for lack of merit.
The [C]omplaint for Injunction filed by Augusto D. Marte on March 2,
1998 against Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
merit.
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed its Motion for Reconsideration15 which was
denied by the RTC.16 Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure17 ascribing to the RTC grave abuse of
discretion and acting without jurisdiction in granting Reyes' motion to remove
improvements.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, and affirmed the ruling of
the RTC, in this wise:
It is notable that in the course of the suit for "Cancellation of Title
and/or Reversion" there was not an iota of evidence presented on
record that Reyes was in bad faith in acquiring the land nor in
planting thereon perennial plants. So it could never be said and held
that he was a planter/sower in bad faith. Thus, this Court holds that
Reyes sowed and planted in good faith, and that being so the
appropriate provisions on right accession are Articles 445 and 448
also of the Civil Code.18
Hence, this Petition based on the sole ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HOLDING THAT THE MOTION
TO REMOVE IMPROVEMENTS FILED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IS BUT AN INCIDENT OF THE REVERSION CASE
OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT STILL HAS JURISDICTION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DECISION IN THE REVERSION
CASE HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.19
The OSG posits that Reyes' assailed motion is barred by prior judgment under
Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because said motion
merely sprang from the civil case of reversion tried and decided on the merits
by the RTC, and the decision is already final, after it was duly affirmed by the
CA and by this Court. The OSG stresses that one of Reyes' assigned errors in
the reversion case before the CA was that the RTC "erred in not granting his
(Reyes') counterclaims as well as his claims for improvements." The OSG
claims that such assigned error was duly resolved by the CA when it held, to
wit:
The non-award of appellant's "counterclaims" is understandable.
To begin with, no evidence whatsoever was presented by the
appellant to sustain his plea for damages. In fact, appellant never
testified to prove his allegations as regards his counterclaims.
Then, too, there is no showing that appellant paid the docket fees for
the court to acquire jurisdiction over his purported counterclaims
(Metal Engineering Resources Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 203
SCRA 273).
Lastly, the allegations made in the Answer in support of the so-called
"counterclaims" clearly negate the nature of the claims as
compulsory counterclaim like that of reimbursement of the useful
expenses (Cabangis vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 414).20
Thus, the OSG posits that the issue of the improvements cannot be made the
subject of the assailed motion on the pretext that such removal of
improvements is merely incidental to the reversion case. The OSG submits that
the consideration of the issue is now barred by res judicata. Lastly, the OSG
argues that: the RTC and CA cannot vary a decision which has already attained
finality; for purposes of execution, what is controlling is the dispositive portion of
the decision; the RTC, except to order the execution of a decision which had
attained finality, had long lost jurisdiction over the case; and the RTC erred and
acted without jurisdiction when it granted Reyes' motion to remove the
improvements when the dispositive portion of the decision in the reversion case
did not provide for the removal of the same.21
In his Comment22 on the OSG petition, Reyes avers that the points raised by
the OSG are merely rehashed arguments which were adequately passed upon
by the CA. He fully agrees with the ruling of the CA that: he is a planter/sower in
good faith, as such, Articles 445 and 448 of the New Civil Code are applicable;
his motion is not entirely a new case, but merely an incident to the reversion
case, a consequence of its grant and a legal solution to an important issue
overlooked, if not ignored by the State and by the courts in their decisions in the
reversion case; under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
he is allowed to remove the improvements; and the instant Petition failed to
abide with the proper manner as to the "proof of service" required under Section
13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Most importantly, Reyes
avers that the land on which about 1,000 mango trees, 100 mandarin citrus
trees and 100 guyabano trees are planted, was leased by the government to
Atty. Marte, who entered into the possession of the subject land when the trees
were already bearing fruits. Thus, if said trees are not removed, Atty. Marte
would be unduly enriched as the beneficiary of these fruits without even
spending a single centavo, at the expense of Reyes. Reyes posits that it is a
well-established fact, unrebutted by the petitioner, that he planted these trees
and to deny him the right to remove them would constitute a grave injustice and
amount to confiscation without just compensation which is violative of the
Constitution.
The OSG counters that copies of the instant Petition were properly served as
shown by the photocopies of the registry return cards. Moreover, the OSG
avers that granting, without admitting, that another person would stand to be
benefited by the improvements that Reyes introduced on the land is beside the
point and is not the fault of the petitioner because the particular issue of the
improvements was already resolved with finality in the reversion case. The
OSG claims that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders
of a superior court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts
and nullify the essence of review - a final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding
on the whole world.23
The instant Petition lacks merit.
In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit
State ownership of the disputed land.24 Indeed, the ownership over the subject
land reverted to the State by virtue of the decisions of the
RTC and CA and our Resolution on the matter. But these decisions simply
ordered the reversion of the property to the State, and did not consider the
improvements that Reyes had introduced on the property or provide him with
any remedy relative thereto. Thus, Reyes was left out in the cold, faced with the
prospect of losing not only the land which he thought he owned, but also of
forfeiting the improvements that he painstakingly built with his effort, time and
money.
29 | P a g e
We cannot agree with the OSG that the denial by the CA of Reyes'
counterclaim in the reversion case had the effect of completely foreclosing
whatever rights Reyes may have over these improvements. We note that the
counterclaim was denied because Reyes failed to prove that it was in the nature
of a compulsory counterclaim, and he did not pay docket fees thereon, even as
the CA found that Reyes "never testified to prove his allegations as regards his
counterclaims." Yet, the records of the reversion case reveal that Reyes
adduced ample evidence of the extent of the improvements he introduced and
the expenses he incurred therefor. This is reflected in the findings of the CA in
the case at bench, and we concur with the appellate court when it said:
But this Court notes that while Reyes was half-hearted in his
opposition to the reversion, he instead focused on proving the
improvements he has introduced on the land, its extent and his
expenses. Despite these proofs, the Decision of April 13, 1992 made
no mention nor provision for the improvements on the land. With this
legal vacuum, Reyes could not exercise the options allowed the
sower and planter in good faith. This thus left him no other
alternative but to avail of Paragraph (d) of Section 10 of Rule 39 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order to collect or get a return of
his investment as allowed to a sower and planter in good faith by the
Civil Code.
Correlatively, the courts in the reversion case overlooked the issue of whether
Reyes, vis--vis his improvements, is a builder or planter in good faith. In the
instant case, the issue assumes full significance, because Articles 44825 and
54626 of the Civil Code grant the builder or planter in good faith full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made. A builder or planter in good faith is one who builds or
plants on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof, unaware of any flaw
in his title to the land at the time he builds or plants on it. 27
On this issue, we are disposed to agree with the CA that Reyes was a planter in
good faith. Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the subject land; in
fact, a TCT over the property was issued in his name. He tilled the land, planted
fruit trees thereon, and invested money from 1970. He received notice of the
Republic's claim only when the reversion case was filed on May 13, 1987. The
trees are now full-grown and fruit-bearing.
To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the
State -- because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is
part of inalienable forest land and belongs to the State is already final and
immutable -- would inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the State at the
expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.28 This basic doctrine on unjust
enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at another's expense.29 There is unjust enrichment when a
person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience.30 Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule in this
wise:
ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.
The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant case.
There is enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State would come into
possession of -- and may technically appropriate -- the more than one thousand
fruit-bearing trees planted by the private respondent. There is impoverishment
on the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the improvements he had
painstakingly planted and invested in. There is lack of valid cause for the State
to acquire these improvements, because, as discussed above, Reyes
introduced the improvements in good faith. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
commit any error in ruling that Reyes is entitled to the benefits of Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code.
Thus, even if we accept the OSG's submission that Reyes' entitlement to these
benefits is not absolute because he can no longer claim good faith after the
filing of the reversion case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying that prior to that
all the way back to 1970 he had possessed the land and introduced
improvements thereon in good faith. At the very least, then, Reyes is entitled to
these benefits for the 17 years that he had been a planter in good faith.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the subject land is currently covered by
Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 issued by the Ministry
of (now Department of Environment and) Natural Resources in favor of Atty.
Augusto D. Marte, which will expire on December 21, 2011. By the terms of the
AFFLA, the lessee shall, among others, do all in his power to suppress fires,
cooperate with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) in the protection and
conservation of the forest growth in the area and undertake all possible
measures to insure the protection of watershed and environmental values within
the leased area and areas adjacent thereto. This obligation to prevent any
damage to the land subject of the lease is consonant with fundamental
principles and state policies set forth in Section 16,31 Article II and Section 4,32
Article XII of the Constitution.
To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject
land, even if he is legally entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage
to the land. It would negate the policy consideration underlying the AFFLA -- to
protect and preserve the biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any
damage to the land. Further, it would violate the implicit mandate of Article 547
of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without
damage to the principal thing, the possessor in good faith may
remove them unless the person who recovers the possession
exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code have been restricted. It is no longer feasible to permit him to
remove the trees he planted. The only equitable alternative would be to order
the Republic to pay Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the
property. This is only fair because, after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon
the expiration of the lease or upon its cancellation if there be any violation or
breach of its terms, all permanent improvements on the land shall pass to the
ownership of the Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify the
lessee.
However, the AFFLA is not due to expire until December 21, 2011. In the
interim, it is logical to assume that the lessee, Atty. Augusto D. Marte, will
derive financial gain from the fruits that the trees planted by Reyes would yield.
In fact, Atty. Marte may already have profited therefrom in the past several
years. It is, therefore, reasonable to grant the Republic the right of subrogation
against the lessee who may have benefited from the improvements. The
Republic may, thus, demand reimbursement from Atty. Marte for whatever
amount it will have to pay Reyes for these improvements.
As to the OSG's insistent invocation of res judicata and the immutability of final
judgments, our ruling in Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees Union (TSIEU)-
FFW, et al. v. Federation of Free Workers (FFW), et al.33 is instructive:
It is axiomatic that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. Any act
which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not
confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily
known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial
powers had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of a final
judgment are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity,34 we rule in
favor of Reyes pro hac vice. We reiterate that this Court is not precluded from
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for
technicality.35 Indubitably, to order the reversion of the subject land without
payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard of the rights of Reyes over
the improvements which he, in good faith, introduced therein, would not only be
unjust and inequitable but cruel as well.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4,
2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:
1) The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 41, is hereby DIRECTED to determine the actual
improvements introduced on the subject land, their current value and
the amount of the expenses actually spent by private respondent
Danilo Reyes for the said improvements thereon from 1970 until May
13, 1987 with utmost dispatch.
30 | P a g e
2) The Republic, through the Bureau of Forest Development of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, is DIRECTED
to pay private respondent Danilo Reyes the value of such actual
improvements he introduced on the subject land as determined by
the Regional Trial Court, with the right of subrogation against Atty.
Augusto D. Marte, the lessee in Agro-Forestry Farm Lease
Agreement No. 175.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988
ELADlA DE LIMA
vs.
LAGUNA TAYABAS CO.
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision De Lima vs.
Laguna Tayabas Co. of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the decision of the
court a quo with modification to include an award of legal interest on the
amounts adjudged in favor of the petitioners from the date of the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the time of actual payment.
This present action arose from a collision between a passenger bus of the
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) and a delivery truck of the Seven-up Bottling
Co. of the Philippines which took place on June 3, 1958 resulting in the death of
Petra de la Cruz and serious physical injuries of Eladia de Lima and Nemesio
Flores, all passengers of the LTB bus. Three civil suits were filed against herein
respondents which were consolidated for trial before the Court of First Instance
of Laguna (San Pablo City).
On December 27, 1963, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered against the
defendants LTB Co. Inc. and Claro Samonte, who are
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally, the resolve
plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. SP-239 and SP-240 filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision seeking an award of legal interest on the
amounts adjudged in their favor from the date of the said decision but their
motion was not acted upon by the court a quo.
All of the plaintiffs voluntarily desisted from appealing the decision by reason of
financial necessity and in the hope that the defendants LTB Co. and its driver
Claro Samonte will be persuaded to make immediate payment to them as
adjudged by the court a quo. Only the said defendants appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals.
In the motion of petitioners dated December 29, 1971 filed with the Court of
Appeals, 2 they sought for an immediate decision of the case with a prayer for
the granting of legal interest from the date of the decision of the court a quo and
for the increase to P12,000.00 of the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 awarded for
the death of Petra de la Cruz.
On January 31, 1972, the now disputed decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. 3
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this decision 4 seeking its
modification so that the legal interest awarded by the Appellate, Court will start
to run from the date of the decision of the trial court on December 27, 1963
instead of January 31, 1972, the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner potenciano Requijo as heir of the deceased Petra de la Cruz further
sought an increase in the civil indemnity of P3,000.00 to P 12,000.00.
The Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration holding that since
the plaintiffs did not appeal from the failure of the court a quo to award interest
on the damages and that the court on its own discretion awarded such interest
in view of Art. 2210 of the Civil Code, the effectivity of the interest should not be
rolled back to the time the decision of the court a quo was rendered. 5
Hence this petition.
The assignment of errors raised the following issues, to wit:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeal; erred in granting legal interest on
damages to start only from the date of its decision instead of from the date of
the trial court's decision;
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not increasing the indemnity for
the death of Petra de La Cruz (in Civil Case No. SP-240) from P3,000 to
P12,000.00.
We find merit in the petition.
Under the first issue, petitioners contend that the ruling of she Appellate Court
departs from the consistent rulings of this court that the award of the legal rate
of interest should be computed from the promulgation of the decision of the
tonal court.
Respondents counter that petitioners having failed to appeal from the lower
court's decision they. are now precluded from questioning the ruling of the
Court of Appeals.
It is true that the rule is well-settled that a party cannot impugn the correctness
of a judgment not appealed from by him, and while he may make counter
assignment of errors, he can do so only to sustain the judgment on other
grounds but not to seek modification or reversal thereof, 6 for in such case he
must appeal. 7 A party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain
any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained
from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. 8
However, respondents failed to note that the legal interest was awarded by the
Appellate Court in its discretion based on equitable grounds which is duly
sanctioned by Art. 2210 of the Civil Code which provides
Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed
upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
Thus, the Appellate Court pointed out
We take note of the fact that petitioners are litigating as paupers. Although they
may not have appealed, they had filed their motion for reconsideration with the
court a quo which unfortunately did not act on it. By reason of their indigence,
they failed to appeal but petitioners De Lima and Requijo had filed their
manifestation making reference to the law and jurisprudence upon which they
base their prayer for relief while petitioner Flores filed his brief.
Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be construed liberally in order that
the litigants may have ample opportunity to pursue their respective claims and
that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities may be
avoided. 11
Moreover, under the circumstances of this case where the heirs of the victim in
the traffic accident chose not to appeal in the hope that the transportation
company will pay the damages awarded by the lower court but unfortunately
said company still appealed to the Court of Appeals, which step was obviously
dilatory and oppressive of the rights of the said claimants: that the case had
been pending in court for about 30 years from the date of the accident in 1958
so that as an exception to the general rule aforestated, the said heirs who did
not appeal the judgment, should be afforded equitable relief by the courts as it
must be vigilant for their protection. 12 The claim for legal interest and increase
in the indemnity should be entertained in spite of the failure of the claimants to
appeal the judgment.
We take exception to the ruling of the Appellate Court as to the date when the
legal interest should commence to ran. In view of the consistent rulings of this
Court, We hold that the legal interest of six percent (6) 13 on the amounts
adjudged in favor of petitioners should start from the time of the rendition of the
trial court's decision on December 27, 1963 instead of January 31, 1972, the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 14
As to the second issue, civil indemnity for the death of Petra de la Cruz was
properly awarded by virtue of Art. 1764 in relation to Art. 2206 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines which allows a minimum indemnity of P3,000.00 for the death
of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence the indemnity of P3,000.00 should be
increased to P30,000.00 and not P12,000.00 as prayed for by petitioner.

A further examination of the record will also show that the

plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. SP-239 and SP-240 moved If the transportation company had only accepted the judgment of the trial court
for the reconsideration of the decision appealed from to and paid its just awards instead of appealing the same to the Court of Appeals,
include the award of legal interest on the amounts no further delay would have been occasioned on the simple issue of interest
adjudicated from the date of the decision, but said motion and indemnity. To mitigate the impact of such a great delay in this case the
was not acted upon by the court a quo. Although said Court finds ample justification in the aforesaid award for interest and indemnity.
plaintiffs failed to appeal on this issue, and did not file We hope this relief is not too late.
their brief to reiterate their claim for interest thereon, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. SP-268, Nemesio Flores, filed WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the subject decision is
his brief and prayed for the imposition of interest from the modified in that the legal interest on the damages awarded to petitioners
date of the decision. We are not left without discretion to commences from the date of the decision of the court a quo until actual
resolve this issue, considering the provision of Article payment while the civil indemnity for the death of Petra de la Cruz is increased
2210, New Civil Code, stating that "Interest may, in the to P 30,000.00. This judgment is immediately executory and no motion for
petition of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded extension of time to file motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
for breach of contract." There is no doubt that the
damages awarded in these civil cases arise from the SO ORDERED
breach of a contractual obligation on the part of the
defendants- appellants. But to grant the imposition of
interest on the amounts awarded to and as prayed for by
one of the plaintiffs and deny the same to the others
considering that the cases arose from one single incident
would be, to Our mind, unfair and inequitous. In the light,
therefore, not only of the provision of the Civil Code
above referred to, but also the facts and circumstances
obtaining in these cases. We believe that on equitable
grounds legal interest, should be allowed on the amounts
adjudged in favor of the plaintiffs from the date of this
decision up to the time of actual payment thereof.

Also noteworthy is the case of Fores v. Miranda 9 where this Court upheld the
granting by the Court of Appeals of attorney's fees even if the respondent, a
jeepney passenger injured in a vehicular accident, did not appeal from the
decision of the trial court. The Appellate Court found the award to be justified
because the respondent asked for damages in his answer and the said court
considered the attorney's fees as included in the concept of damages which
can be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil
Code of the Philippines).

At any rate, this Court is inclined to adopt a liberal stance in this case as We
have done in previous decisions where We have held that litigations should, as
much as possible be decided on their merits and not on technicality. 10

31 | P a g e