PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The
Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil
liability (supported by the Supreme Courts decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of
the accused claimed that in the Supreme Courts decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court
said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge
Kapunan further stated that civil liability is extinguished because there will be no party defendant in the case.
There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated it is, thus, evident that
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only
survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could
not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the
accused while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on which cases should civil liability be
extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. Therefore, Bayotass death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of.

Elcano vs Hill

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald
and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is
barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been
extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the
SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be
subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag, et. al., G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against Claudio Teehankee Jr.
allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, but before
the motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file
the amended information. The amended information filed on October 31, 1991 charges Teehankee of murder.

The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the petitioner refused to be arraigned
on the amended information contending the lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. The judge, then, ordered
the plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The
petitioner's counsel manifested that he did not want to take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue
raised. So, the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to represent the petitioner.

The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent judge's admittance of the
amended information, and to compel the judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the
amended information.

Issue: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.

Held: Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave
and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and
may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely
formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of
the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of
murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of
intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an
information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations
are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim,
the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in
the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold
that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended
information for murder is proper.
Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las
Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor
to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC
thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder
and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.

Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him.
Prior to this, the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial
court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on
to try the petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide.
From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision
of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a
defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would
be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary
investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of
determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.

What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the
claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however, make
much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of
hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with
extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010
FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on
the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while
Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his
arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing
his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MTC ordered his
arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether
reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our
penal laws, is nothing new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact
the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Petition granted.
G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.:

FACTS:
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any
risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of
bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?

HELD:
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He
simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of
discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present
then bail shall be denied. (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other
option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from
the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish
whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case
falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the
demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such
finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
 However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs where, between two alternatives or
among a possibly infinite number (of options), there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the
end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere
fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the
provision that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as
a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt
is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial
courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to
wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the
same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which
brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to
bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being
repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.