San Juan vs.

Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant;
thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay
Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position.
However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended
private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she
was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved
by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before
the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his
complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole
right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO
and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In
support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.

Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was

not expressly nominated by the provincial governor.

Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to

recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws
for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required
standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is
expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor
recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to
appoint anyone he fancies?

Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of

the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory
application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing
vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional

policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments
to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls
the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has
only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by
statute. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the
present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments"

Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the
list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the
legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the
necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

Pimentel vs. Aguirre

Facts:
In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year
by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to
LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43,
reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering

all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal
autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their

internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of
general supervision over local governments

Held:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise,
are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional
fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,
primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire
country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation
of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate
public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The
President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
(2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of
the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites
before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did
not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these
requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce,
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the

President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is
intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in
the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any
sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section
1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power
of control.

2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal

autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the
LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COADate: January 29, 1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad
Coalition Respondent: COA, et alPonente: CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the President
in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution,
created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to
prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the executive
departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in
identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It
shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-
formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR
and the Assembly and Executive Board shalle xist until such time as the autonomous
regional government is established and organized. In these cases, petitioners principally
argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, inthe exercise of her legislative powers
prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has virtually pre-
empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organicact and created an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue:WON EO 220 is valid
RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions
is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as
a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory
measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not
necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we
shall show later. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean
that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region
in the Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the
autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that
E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region,
covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. To determine
policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular
session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development
programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board.
The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental
structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the
mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the
agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-
governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.

Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion
that E.O. No. 220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political
subdivision. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it
did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a
larger subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and
political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces,
cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to
public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of
property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR
was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of
expediting the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of
1972, which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established
11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional centers and required departments
and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices
therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the
Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and
regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical,
efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional
offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with
local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be
provided by law.CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the
Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the
participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government
but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental
organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds
solely for that purpose.

Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in
more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is
not unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution.
And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress
enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No.
5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local
autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to
these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of ane xecutive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of
the autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory
coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy
into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of

the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker
of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed
the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there
shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice,
where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that
he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings
of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the
autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter

category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of
the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.

We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of

centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In
the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for
the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not
be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention
to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason,
we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional

Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that
the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was
still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC
received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because of its resolution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the
case moot and academic.

2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the

jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?

Ruling:
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of
the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to
make the petition moot and academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of
due process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without force and effect. First, there
is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also does not
appear that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft and
corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded
any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered
reinstatement of the petitioner.

2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12

by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the
Presidential Decree provides that the President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions... Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive
and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
president exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has not control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.

According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree

creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The
Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the second
place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly
administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.
Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be
invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member
and speaker of the Sanggunian.

Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed
against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the
Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the
matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned
Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa
suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the
governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which
provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given
by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to
that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in
connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or
person who shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can
exercise the power of control over a mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant
Executive Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with
the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been
granted only the power of general supervision as may be
provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has
direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of
any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is
confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend
to local governments over which, as already stated, the President
exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are
to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head
direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and
that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be
contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935
Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action
or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath
against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment
of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious,
he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally
or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not
being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in
question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the
power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes
relating to Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but
involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this
case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be
issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not because hes
acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him
by the Revised Administrative Code.
HEBRON v. REYES
July 28, 1958 | Concepcion, J. | Quo Warranto |

PETITIONER: Bernardo Hebron

RESPONDENT: Eulalio Reyes

SUMMARY: Petitioner and respondent were elected mayor and vice-mayor

respectively of the Municipality of Carmona in the province of Cavite in the
general elections of 1951. On May 1954, petitioner was preventively suspended
by the Office of the President due to certain administrative charges lodged against
him. During that period, respondent was directed to assume the office of Acting
Mayor. Since petitioner remained suspended for more than a year and 7 months
and there was no action on the administrative case, an action for quo warranto was
instituted on the ground that respondent was illegally holding and has unlawfully
refused to surrender the office. The Supreme Court
 DOCTRINE: Under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to
2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the
municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear
and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal
corporations and none has been cited to us said procedure is exclusive; that
the executive department of the national government, in the exercise of its general
supervision over local governments, may conduct investigations with a view to
determining whether municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting
the administrative action referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain
whether the provincial governor and the provincial board should take such action;
that the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial
governor and the provincial board to take said action, if the same is warranted, and
they failed to do so; that the provincial governor and the provincial board may not
be deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred
upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code; that such
would be the effect of the assumption of those powers by the Executive; that said
assumption of powers would further violate section 2191 of the same code, for the
authority therein vested in the Executive is merely appellate in character.

FACTS:
1. In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner, a member of the Liberal Party, and respondent of
the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor respectively of the Municipality of
Carmona, Province of Cavite for a term of 4 years beginning January 1952. Petitioner discharged
the duties and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24 1954 when he received a
communication from the Office of the President of the Philippines informing him that the
President has decided to assume directly the investigation of the administrative charges against
said petitioner for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office.
The Provincial Fiscal of said province was designated as Special Investigator of the said charges.
In the interim, petitioner was preventively suspsended and the Vice Mayor was directed to assume
the office of Acting Mayor during said period of suspension.
2. Respondent acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite investigated the
charges. After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal submitted his
report thereon on July 15, 1954. Since then the matter has been pending in the Office of the
President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of
petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he instituted the
present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally holding the Office
of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said office to
petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto. Respondent denied the alleged illegality of
petitioners suspension and claimed that the former was holding the office of the mayor in
compliance with a valid and lawful order of the President.
3. At the hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General and said amici curiae Dean
Vicente Sinco and Professor Enrique Fernando, appeared and argued extensively. Subsequently,
they filed their respective memoranda and the case became submitted for decision. The case could
not be disposed of, however, before the close of said year, because the members of the Court could
not, within the unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement on the decision thereon. Although
the term of office of petitioner expired on December 31, 1955, his claim to the Office of Mayor of
Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby become entirely moot, as regards such rights as may have
accrued to him prior thereto.

ISSUE: WoN a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be
removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines regardless of the preocedure set forth in
Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code NO
RULING: Petition GRANTED.

RATIO:
1. Referring to local elective officers, We held in Lacson v. Roque that the President has no inherent
power to remove or suspend them. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting
the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. By article VII, section 10,
paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision over all
local governments", but supervision does not contemplate control. Far from implying control or
power to remove the President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is qualified by the
proviso "as may be provided by law", a clear indication of constitutional intention that the
provisions was not to be self-executing but requires legislative implementation. It is significant to
note that section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive
power to remove specifically enjoins that the said power should be exercised conformably to law,
which we assume to mean that removals must be accomplished only for any of the causes and in
the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
2. Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code provide the causes, fashion, and the
procedure prescribed by law for the suspension of elective municipal officials. My. Justice Tuason,
in construing the aforementioned provisions states that the preceding sections should control in
the field of investifations of charges against and suspension of municipal officials. The minuteness
and care, in three long paragraphs, with which the procedure in such investigations and
suspensions is outlined, clearly manifests a purpose to exclude other modes of proceeding by
other authorities under general statutes, and not to make the operation of said provisions depend
upon the mercy and sufferance of higher authorities. Accordingly, when the procedure for the
suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to
strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist with
respect to municipal officers. What is more, the language of sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt that the law in the words of Mr. Justice Tuason
"frowns upon prolonged or indefinite suspension of local elective officials"
3. The policy manifested by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, which is consecrated
policy in other jurisdictions whose republican institutions this country has copied, requires speedy
termination of a case in which suspension has been decreed, not only in the interest of the
immediate party but of the public in general. The electorate is vitally interested, and the public
good demands, that the man it has elevated to office be, within the shortest time possible,
separated from the service if proven unfit and unfaithful to its trust, and restored if found innocent.
In the case at bar, petitioner was suspended in May 1954. The records of the investigation were
forwarded to the Executive Secretary since July 1954 yet the decision on the charges was not
rendered either before the filing of the complaint or before the expiration of petitioners term of
office.
4. Respondent cannot rely on Sections 79(c) and 86 of the Revised Administrative Code because
although the Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(C), he does not have the
same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation by any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under
his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of
Section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local
government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of
paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all local
government's is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79
(C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference
between the power of control and that of supervision. Section 86 of the Revised Administrative
Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the
administration of municipalities. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the
 same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(C) of the Revised
Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by
section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution. The word "offices", as used in section 79 (C), was
not deemed to include local governments, even before the adoption of the Constitution.
5. Section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code relied upon by respondent and the amici curiae,
provides that the President shall have authority "to order, when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of any action or conduct of any person in the
government services and in connection therewith, to designate the official committee or person by
whom such investigation shall be conducted. Since the powers specified therein are given to the
President, "in addition to his general supervisory authority", it follows that the application of
those powers to municipal corporations insofar as they may appear to sanction the assumption
by the Executive of the functions of provincial governors and provincial boards, under said
sections 2188 to 2190 would contravene the constitutional provision restricting the authority of
the President over local government to "general supervision."
6. The foregoing considerations are equally applicable to paragraph (b) of said Section 64. There is
no question of disloyalty in the present case. Upon the other hand, the power of removal of the
President, under the first sentence of said paragraph 64 (b), must be exercised "conformably to
law", which, as regards municipal officers, is found in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
7. If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code, on the other hand, and sections 2188 to 2191 of the same code, on the other,
the latter being specific provisions, setting forth the procedure for the disciplinary action that
may be taken, particularly, against municipal officials must prevail over the former, as general
provisions, dealing with the powers of the President and the department heads over the officers of
the Government.
8. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor directly, without any
opportunity on the part of the provincial governor and the provincial board to exercise the
administrative powers of both under sections 2188 to 2190 of the Administrative Code, cannot be
adopted without conceding that said powers are subject to repeal or suspension by the President.
Obviously, this cannot, and should not, be done without a legislation of the most explicit and
categorical nature, and there is none to such effect. Moreover, as stated in Mondano vs. Silvosa
(supra), said legislation would, in effect, place local governments under the control of the
Executive and consequently conflict with the Constitution (Article VII, section 10[1]).
9. The case of Rodriguez v. Montinola is enlightening as regards the lack of power of the Secretary
of Finance to disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board abolishing positions of 3 special
counsel in the province. The Court ruled that the power of general supervision granted the
President, in the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean
that he, or his alterego may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or
comply with their duties.
10. It might be helpful to recall that under the Jones Law the Governor General had both control and
supervision over all local governments, (Section 22, Jones Law) The evident aim of the members
of the Constitutional Convention in introducing the change, therefore, must have been to free local
governments from the control exercised by the central government, merely allowing the latter
supervision over them. But this supervisory jurisdiction is not unlimited; it is to be exercised "as
may be provided by law." Dean Sinco, in his work on Philippine Political Law expressed himself
as follows: Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over
an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over the supervised party. Hence,
the power of general supervision over local governments should exclude, in the strict sense, the
authority to appoint and remove local officials.
11. The respondents argue that although the power of general supervision of the President imposes
upon him the duty of non-interference in purely corporate affairs of the governments, such
limitation does not apply to its political affairs. n the Philippines, the constitutional provision
limiting the authority of the President over local governments to General supervision is
unqualified and, hence, it applies to all powers of municipal corporations, corporate and political
alike. In fact, there was no need of specifically qualifying the constitutional powers of the
President as regards the corporate functions of local governments, inasmuch as the Executive
 never had any control over said functions. What is more, the same are not, and never have been,
under the control even of Congress, for, in the exercise of corporate, non-governmental or non-
political functions, municipal corporations stand practically on the same level, vis-a-vis the
National Government or the State as private corporations
12. The case of Villena vs. Roque is substantially different from the one at bar. Administrative charges
were filed, against Mayor Villena, with the office of the President, which referred the matter to the
Provincial Governor of Rizal, but the Provincial Board thereof failed to act on said charges for an
unreasonable length of time. Under such facts it is understandable that the power of supervision of
the President was invoked, either to compel action, which the Provincial Board had the duty to
take, or, in view of its obvious unwillingness to comply therewith, to cause the charges to be
investigated by somebody else, in line with the responsibility of the Executive "to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." In the present case, however, the Provincial Board of Cavite
never had a chance to investigate the charges against petitioner herein. From the very beginning,
the office of the Executive assumed authority to act on said charges. Worse still, such assumption
of authority was made under such conditions as to give the impression that the Provincial
Governor and the Provincial Board were banned from exercising said authority.
13. In Villena, the majority held that the President of the Philippines, under sections 64 (b), and 2191
of the Revised Administrative Code, as the later has been amended, and section 11 (1), Article VII,
of the Constitution, is vested with the power to expel and suspend municipal officials for grave
misconduct, and it appears that the suspension was ordered by virtue of that authority; and (2) the
Secretary of the Interior acted within the powers conferred upon him by section 79 (c), in
connection with section 86, of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, in ordering an
administrative investigation of the charges against the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the
municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal. Those who dissented disagreed insofar as the majority
held that the acts of the department secretaries are presumptively the case of the executive and that
the suspension directed by the Secretary should be considered as decreed by the President himself.
More important still, said majority opinion and the aforementioned separate opinions cited
section 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code as the source of the power of the Executive to
suspend and remove municipal officials. However, said provision deals with such power of
suspension and removal on appeal from a decision of the Provincial Board in proceedings held
under sections 2188 to 2190 of the said Code. Nowhere in said opinions was anything said on the
question whether said appellate authority implies a grant of original power to suspend, either
without an appeal from said decision of the Provincial Board, or without any proceedings before
said Board calling for the exercise of its disciplinary functions under said provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code.

Paras, C.J. dissenting:

1. In the allocation of governmental powers, our Constitution ordains that "the Executive power shall
be vested in a President of the Philippines." (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Constitution). And the President is
enjoined in the same Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." (Sec. 10, par.
1, Art. VII, Constitution.) In the same breath, the Constitution provides that the President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, and shall exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law (Sec. 10, par. 1, Art. VII,
Constitution). In pursuance of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code declares that in
addition to his general supervisory authority, the President shall have such specific powers and
duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law.
2. In reference to the malfeasance of any person in the Government service, by virtue of Sec. 64(b)
and (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, enacted in consonance with the totality of his
executive power and, specifically, the power of supervision of all offices in the executive branch
of the government, the President has concurrent supervisory authority with the provincial
governor to order an investigation of charges against an elective municipal official. While the
provincial governor has to submit the charges to the Provincial Board for investigation, the
President may designate the official, committee or person by whom such investigation shall be
 conducted (Sec. 64 [c], Rev. Adm. Code). The President can remove even elective municipal
officials subject to the limitation that such removal must be conformable to law, which are that it
must be for a cause provided by law, as those enumerated in Sec. 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and conducted in a manner in conformity with due process.
3. Besides, if in administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and control means the power of an
officer to alter modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter, how will the
foregoing distinction affect the supervisory authority of the President to cause the investigation of
the malfeasance of a municipal official relating to and affecting the administration of his office,
and directly affecting the rights and interests of the public? If supervision and control meant by the
Constitution relate to the power to oversee, or modify, set aside or annul acts done by a
subordinate officer in the performance of his duties the supervisory authority to suspend and
remove a subordinate official prescribed the administrative code refers to disciplinary action on
account of his misconduct or malfeasance in office.
4. I see no cogent reason for disturbing our ruling in Planas vs. Gil; Villena vs. Sec. of Interior;
Lacson vs. Roque; and Villena vs. Roque, upholding the explicit supervisory authority of the
President under Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code to include that of ordering the
investigation of elective municipal officials, and to remove or suspend them conformably to law.

GANZON VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:50 PM
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:

Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of

suspension order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for
prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the
said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on
various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of
the President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:

The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation

authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government)
to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise
control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise
it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the
power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the
power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in
sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the

Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the
opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power
oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a

remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make
him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The
Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against
Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the
issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the
Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local
officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy
and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution
was mere supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the

Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left
the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the
power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces
disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to
the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or

modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably
inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in
his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in

suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped
by imposing a 600 day suspension.

Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null
and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances
and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in
the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional
and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the
decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec
187 of the LGC

1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who
shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally,
That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is
charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to
sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment
of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy

Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or
discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or
limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather
than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at
any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All
he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure,
without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside
the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of
certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness,
of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment

of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of
public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no
posting, no translation into Tagalog)

Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila
had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he
had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence
(consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial
court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the
public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the
hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the
proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21
and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3,
4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as
shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has
also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and
disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development
plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.

BITO-ONON VS FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 139813 January 31, 2001

FACTS:

Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra,
Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra,
Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both
Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in
the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the
province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said
election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of
Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.
RULING:

In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng
mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league
or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed
or elected government officials. The Local Government Code21 defines the liga ng
mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of
determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating,
articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration
and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.22 The liga shall
have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political
subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of
the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The
duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall
constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter.
The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the
Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall
constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.

We rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes
the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a
post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with
both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the
petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG
Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the
National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the
BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the
GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise
of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although
the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local
government units of such issuances.27 To monitor means "to watch, observe or
check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over
local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory
enactments.28 Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere
with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government

MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG vs. HON.

FELIX L. MOYA
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

G.R. No. L-41322 September 29, 1988

FACTS: From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created
respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8)
barrios of petitioner. For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries
between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of private respondent, to the
Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and decide. However, it appears that no action was
taken on the same. Private respondent then filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Davao, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the
Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of
collected taxes and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475
ISSUE: whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.
HELD: Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General (15 SCRA
569) is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no
Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no
corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and parcel of Kapalong. Based on
this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should have dismissed the case.
On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes is
administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the
government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate
occasions (Ibid., pp. 73-74).
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only entities authorized by law
may be patties in a civil action. Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has
no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not
be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case,
since further proceedings would be pointless.