San Juan vs.

Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant;
thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay
Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position.
However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended
private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she
was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved
by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before
the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his
complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole
right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO
and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In
support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.

Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was

not expressly nominated by the provincial governor.

Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to

recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws
for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required
standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is
expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor
recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to
appoint anyone he fancies?

Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of

the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory
application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing
vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional

policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and
the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in
favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments
to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls
the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has
only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by
statute. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the
present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments"

Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the
list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the
legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the
necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre

Facts:
In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year
by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to
LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43,
reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering

all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal
autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their

internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of
general supervision over local governments

Held:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise,
are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional
fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,
primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire
country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation
of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate
public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The
President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
(2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of
the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites
before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did
not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an
unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these
requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce,
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the

President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is
intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in
the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any
sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section
1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power
of control.

2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal

autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the
LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COA

Date: January 29, 1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad Coalition Respondent: COA, et

alPonente: CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her
legislative powers under Art. XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was
created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for
the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is
to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the
region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the
executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices
and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the
region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional
Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shalle xist until
such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized. In
these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President,
inthe exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress
under the 1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated
task of enacting an organicact and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:WON EO 220 is valid

RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually
envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line
departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the
Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it
prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as
petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the
Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the
autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special
courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we
find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It
created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the
main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and
services. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly
only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority
projects and development programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created
the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant
the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government
agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings
together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government,
the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.

Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.

Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners'
assertion that E.O. No. 220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial
and political subdivision. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220,
we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge
existing ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or
a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the
powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and
be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the
covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting
the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972,
which was made as part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established
11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional centers and required
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set
up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be established
pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas;
(2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area;
(3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies
in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to
perform such other functions as may be provided by law.CAR is in the same genre as
the administrative regions created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O.
No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the line
departments and agencies of the National Government but also the local
governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in
bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that
purpose.
Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the
local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and
Mountain Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in
the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or,
cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local
autonomy is not unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the
1973 Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935
Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the
Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards
further enlargement of local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and
not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of ane xecutive department and a legislative assembly and special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous
regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency
that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of

the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker
of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed
the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there
shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice,
where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that
he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings
of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the
autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-
government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision"
over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter

category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of
the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.

We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of

centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987
sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII
Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the
"recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In
the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for
the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not
be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention
to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason,
we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional

Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee
on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity
as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that
the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was
still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC
received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's
membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which
should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the
respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic"
because of its resolution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the
case moot and academic.

2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the

jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?
Ruling:

1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of
the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to
make the petition moot and academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of
due process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without force and effect. First, there
is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also does not
appear that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft and
corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded
any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered
reinstatement of the petitioner.

2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12

by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the
Presidential Decree provides that the President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions... Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive
and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
president exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has not control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.

According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree

creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The
Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the second
place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly
administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.

Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be
invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member
and speaker of the Sanggunian.

Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed
against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the
Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate
the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned
Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa
suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining
the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which
provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order
given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with direct control,
direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any
act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office
under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a
committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can
exercise the power of control over a mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant
Executive Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested
with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been
granted only the power of general supervision as may be
provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has
direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct
of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and
does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated,
the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code
are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department
head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of
an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10,
Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath
against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges
are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case
suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action
by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercised by the Department Head over the administration of
municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes
relating to Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but
involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in
this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension
may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not
because hes acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the
power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.
HEBRON v. REYES
July 28, 1958 | Concepcion, J. | Quo Warranto |
 PETITIONER: Bernardo Hebron
RESPONDENT: Eulalio Reyes

SUMMARY: Petitioner and respondent were elected mayor and

vice-mayor respectively of the Municipality of Carmona in the
province of Cavite in the general elections of 1951. On May 1954,
petitioner was preventively suspended by the Office of the President
due to certain administrative charges lodged against him. During that
period, respondent was directed to assume the office of Acting
Mayor. Since petitioner remained suspended for more than a year
and 7 months and there was no action on the administrative case, an
action for quo warranto was instituted on the ground that respondent
was illegally holding and has unlawfully refused to surrender the
office. The Supreme Court

DOCTRINE: Under the present law, the procedure prescribed in

sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the
suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein referred to,
is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to
the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations and
none has been cited to us said procedure is exclusive; that the
executive department of the national government, in the exercise of
its general supervision over local governments, may conduct
investigations with a view to determining whether municipal
officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative
action referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain
whether the provincial governor and the provincial board should
take such action; that the Executive may take appropriate measures
to compel the provincial governor and the provincial board to take
said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so; that
the provincial governor and the provincial board may not be
deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority
conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised
Administrative Code; that such would be the effect of the
assumption of those powers by the Executive; that said assumption
of powers would further violate section 2191 of the same code, for
the authority therein vested in the Executive is merely appellate in
character.

FACTS:
1. In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner, a member of the Liberal Party,
and respondent of the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor
respectively of the Municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite for a term of 4
years beginning January 1952. Petitioner discharged the duties and functions of
 mayor continuously until May 22 or 24 1954 when he received a communication
from the Office of the President of the Philippines informing him that the
President has decided to assume directly the investigation of the administrative
charges against said petitioner for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority
and serious misconduct in office. The Provincial Fiscal of said province was
designated as Special Investigator of the said charges. In the interim, petitioner
was preventively suspsended and the Vice Mayor was directed to assume the
office of Acting Mayor during said period of suspension.
2. Respondent acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite
investigated the charges. After holding hearings in connection with said charges,
the provincial fiscal submitted his report thereon on July 15, 1954. Since then the
matter has been pending in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as
the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who
remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he instituted the
present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally
holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still
refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.
Respondent denied the alleged illegality of petitioners suspension and claimed
that the former was holding the office of the mayor in compliance with a valid and
lawful order of the President.
3. At the hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General and said
amici curiae Dean Vicente Sinco and Professor Enrique Fernando, appeared and
argued extensively. Subsequently, they filed their respective memoranda and the
case became submitted for decision. The case could not be disposed of, however,
before the close of said year, because the members of the Court could not, within
the unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement on the decision thereon.
Although the term of office of petitioner expired on December 31, 1955, his claim
to the Office of Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby become entirely moot,
as regards such rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto.

ISSUE: WoN a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines
regardless of the preocedure set forth in Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code NO

RULING: Petition GRANTED.

RATIO:
1. Referring to local elective officers, We held in Lacson v. Roque that the President
has no inherent power to remove or suspend them. There is neither statutory nor
constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove
municipal officials. By article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution
the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments",
but supervision does not contemplate control. Far from implying control or power
to remove the President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is qualified
by the proviso "as may be provided by law", a clear indication of constitutional
 intention that the provisions was not to be self-executing but requires legislative
implementation. It is significant to note that section 64(b) of the Revised
Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove
specifically enjoins that the said power should be exercised conformably to law,
which we assume to mean that removals must be accomplished only for any of the
causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
2. Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code provide the causes,
fashion, and the procedure prescribed by law for the suspension of elective
municipal officials. My. Justice Tuason, in construing the aforementioned
provisions states that the preceding sections should control in the field of
investifations of charges against and suspension of municipal officials. The
minuteness and care, in three long paragraphs, with which the procedure in such
investigations and suspensions is outlined, clearly manifests a purpose to exclude
other modes of proceeding by other authorities under general statutes, and not to
make the operation of said provisions depend upon the mercy and sufferance of
higher authorities. Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an
officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to
strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary which does
not exist with respect to municipal officers. What is more, the language of
sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for
doubt that the law in the words of Mr. Justice Tuason "frowns upon
prolonged or indefinite suspension of local elective officials"
3. The policy manifested by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which is consecrated policy in other jurisdictions whose republican institutions
this country has copied, requires speedy termination of a case in which suspension
has been decreed, not only in the interest of the immediate party but of the public
in general. The electorate is vitally interested, and the public good demands, that
the man it has elevated to office be, within the shortest time possible, separated
from the service if proven unfit and unfaithful to its trust, and restored if found
innocent. In the case at bar, petitioner was suspended in May 1954. The records of
the investigation were forwarded to the Executive Secretary since July 1954 yet
the decision on the charges was not rendered either before the filing of the
complaint or before the expiration of petitioners term of office.
4. Respondent cannot rely on Sections 79(c) and 86 of the Revised Administrative
Code because although the Department head as agent of the President has direct
control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as
provided for in section 79(C), he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation by any act or
conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department
is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to
local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only
general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of Section 79(C)
of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all
local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an
 official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would
be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the
Constitution. If "general supervision over all local government's is to be construed
as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (C) of the
Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or
difference between the power of control and that of supervision. Section 86 of the
Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities. If it
be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that
vested in the Department Head by section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative
Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by
section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution. The word "offices", as used in
section 79 (C), was not deemed to include local governments, even before the
adoption of the Constitution.
5. Section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code relied upon by respondent and
the amici curiae, provides that the President shall have authority "to order, when
in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any
action or conduct of any person in the government services and in connection
therewith, to designate the official committee or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted. Since the powers specified therein are given to
the President, "in addition to his general supervisory authority", it follows that the
application of those powers to municipal corporations insofar as they may
appear to sanction the assumption by the Executive of the functions of provincial
governors and provincial boards, under said sections 2188 to 2190 would
contravene the constitutional provision restricting the authority of the President
over local government to "general supervision."
6. The foregoing considerations are equally applicable to paragraph (b) of said
Section 64. There is no question of disloyalty in the present case. Upon the other
hand, the power of removal of the President, under the first sentence of said
paragraph 64 (b), must be exercised "conformably to law", which, as regards
municipal officers, is found in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
7. If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of the
Revised Administrative Code, on the other hand, and sections 2188 to 2191 of the
same code, on the other, the latter being specific provisions, setting forth the
procedure for the disciplinary action that may be taken, particularly, against
municipal officials must prevail over the former, as general provisions, dealing
with the powers of the President and the department heads over the officers of the
Government.
8. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor directly,
without any opportunity on the part of the provincial governor and the provincial
board to exercise the administrative powers of both under sections 2188 to 2190
of the Administrative Code, cannot be adopted without conceding that said
powers are subject to repeal or suspension by the President. Obviously, this
cannot, and should not, be done without a legislation of the most explicit and
categorical nature, and there is none to such effect. Moreover, as stated in
 Mondano vs. Silvosa (supra), said legislation would, in effect, place local
governments under the control of the Executive and consequently conflict with
the Constitution (Article VII, section 10[1]).
9. The case of Rodriguez v. Montinola is enlightening as regards the lack of power
of the Secretary of Finance to disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board
abolishing positions of 3 special counsel in the province. The Court ruled that the
power of general supervision granted the President, in the absence of any express
provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that he, or his alterego
may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or comply
with their duties.
10. It might be helpful to recall that under the Jones Law the Governor General had
both control and supervision over all local governments, (Section 22, Jones Law)
The evident aim of the members of the Constitutional Convention in introducing
the change, therefore, must have been to free local governments from the control
exercised by the central government, merely allowing the latter supervision over
them. But this supervisory jurisdiction is not unlimited; it is to be exercised "as
may be provided by law." Dean Sinco, in his work on Philippine Political Law
expressed himself as follows: Supervisory power, when contrasted with control,
is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over the supervised party. Hence, the power of general
supervision over local governments should exclude, in the strict sense, the
authority to appoint and remove local officials.
11. The respondents argue that although the power of general supervision of the
President imposes upon him the duty of non-interference in purely corporate
affairs of the governments, such limitation does not apply to its political affairs. n
the Philippines, the constitutional provision limiting the authority of the President
over local governments to General supervision is unqualified and, hence, it
applies to all powers of municipal corporations, corporate and political alike. In
fact, there was no need of specifically qualifying the constitutional powers of the
President as regards the corporate functions of local governments, inasmuch as
the Executive never had any control over said functions. What is more, the same
are not, and never have been, under the control even of Congress, for, in the
exercise of corporate, non-governmental or non-political functions, municipal
corporations stand practically on the same level, vis-a-vis the National
Government or the State as private corporations
12. The case of Villena vs. Roque is substantially different from the one at bar.
Administrative charges were filed, against Mayor Villena, with the office of the
President, which referred the matter to the Provincial Governor of Rizal, but the
Provincial Board thereof failed to act on said charges for an unreasonable length
of time. Under such facts it is understandable that the power of supervision of the
President was invoked, either to compel action, which the Provincial Board had
the duty to take, or, in view of its obvious unwillingness to comply therewith, to
cause the charges to be investigated by somebody else, in line with the
responsibility of the Executive "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
In the present case, however, the Provincial Board of Cavite never had a chance
to investigate the charges against petitioner herein. From the very beginning, the
 office of the Executive assumed authority to act on said charges. Worse still, such
assumption of authority was made under such conditions as to give the impression
that the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board were banned from
exercising said authority.
13. In Villena, the majority held that the President of the Philippines, under sections
64 (b), and 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the later has been
amended, and section 11 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution, is vested with the
power to expel and suspend municipal officials for grave misconduct, and it
appears that the suspension was ordered by virtue of that authority; and (2) the
Secretary of the Interior acted within the powers conferred upon him by section
79 (c), in connection with section 86, of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, in ordering an administrative investigation of the charges against the
petitioner, in his capacity as mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of
Rizal. Those who dissented disagreed insofar as the majority held that the acts of
the department secretaries are presumptively the case of the executive and that the
suspension directed by the Secretary should be considered as decreed by the
President himself. More important still, said majority opinion and the
aforementioned separate opinions cited section 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code as the source of the power of the Executive to suspend and
remove municipal officials. However, said provision deals with such power of
suspension and removal on appeal from a decision of the Provincial Board in
proceedings held under sections 2188 to 2190 of the said Code. Nowhere in said
opinions was anything said on the question whether said appellate authority
implies a grant of original power to suspend, either without an appeal from said
decision of the Provincial Board, or without any proceedings before said Board
calling for the exercise of its disciplinary functions under said provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code.

Paras, C.J. dissenting:

1. In the allocation of governmental powers, our Constitution ordains that "the

Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." (Sec. 1, Art.
VII, Constitution). And the President is enjoined in the same Constitution to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed." (Sec. 10, par. 1, Art. VII, Constitution.)
In the same breath, the Constitution provides that the President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, and shall exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law (Sec. 10, par. 1,
Art. VII, Constitution). In pursuance of the Constitution, the Revised
Administrative Code declares that in addition to his general supervisory
authority, the President shall have such specific powers and duties as are
expressly conferred or imposed on him by law.
2. In reference to the malfeasance of any person in the Government service, by
virtue of Sec. 64(b) and (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, enacted in
consonance with the totality of his executive power and, specifically, the power of
supervision of all offices in the executive branch of the government, the President
 has concurrent supervisory authority with the provincial governor to order an
investigation of charges against an elective municipal official. While the
provincial governor has to submit the charges to the Provincial Board for
investigation, the President may designate the official, committee or person by
whom such investigation shall be conducted (Sec. 64 [c], Rev. Adm. Code). The
President can remove even elective municipal officials subject to the limitation
that such removal must be conformable to law, which are that it must be for a
cause provided by law, as those enumerated in Sec. 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and conducted in a manner in conformity with due process.
3. Besides, if in administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and
control means the power of an officer to alter modify, nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter, how will the foregoing distinction
affect the supervisory authority of the President to cause the investigation of the
malfeasance of a municipal official relating to and affecting the administration of
his office, and directly affecting the rights and interests of the public? If
supervision and control meant by the Constitution relate to the power to oversee,
or modify, set aside or annul acts done by a subordinate officer in the performance
of his duties the supervisory authority to suspend and remove a subordinate
official prescribed the administrative code refers to disciplinary action on account
of his misconduct or malfeasance in office.
4. I see no cogent reason for disturbing our ruling in Planas vs. Gil; Villena vs. Sec.
of Interior; Lacson vs. Roque; and Villena vs. Roque, upholding the explicit
supervisory authority of the President under Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code to include that of ordering the investigation of elective municipal officials,
and to remove or suspend them conformably to law.

GANZON VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:50 PM
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:

Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of

suspension order by Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for
prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the
said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10 administrative complaints on
various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of
the President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:

The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation

authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government)
to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution
contains no prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise
control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary
authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because that the President cannot exercise
it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the
power elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him the
power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in
sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the

Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the
opinion that the Secretary of interior is exercising that power
oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a

remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make
him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all
intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were
filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office.
The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders
against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him
hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon
appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order
by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not
authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local
autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has
left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes
the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast
to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and
supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in
meaning and extent. In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or

modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over
local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president,

in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however
overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.

Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section
187 of the Local Government Code 1. The Secretary of Justice (on

1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax
ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who
shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally,
That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and
for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the

ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because
it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of
the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The
Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and
that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances
as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to
submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC

Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act

with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of
a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized
that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive
and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To
doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
infraction of the Constitution.

Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

Held:
 Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside
the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it
was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if
the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law,
that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control
but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If

they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone
or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion
to modify or replace them.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local

Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to
suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or
fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or
discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it
would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was
never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of
Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is
permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax
measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code
only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the

enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations:
No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance,
no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
 Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove
such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it
only five days within which to gather and present to him all the
evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.
We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found
in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the
proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila
Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits
Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved

but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its
publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the
text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this
requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and
public investment programs of the local government unit and not to
tax ordinances.

BITO-ONON VS FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 139813 January 31, 2001

FACTS:

Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra,
Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra,
Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the
Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both
Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in
the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the
province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said
election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of
Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.
RULING:

In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng
mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league
or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed
or elected government officials. The Local Government Code21 defines the liga ng
mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of
determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating,
articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration
and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.22 The liga shall
have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political
subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of
the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The
duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall
constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter.
The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the
Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall
constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.

We rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes
the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a
post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with
both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the
petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG
Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the
National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the
BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the
GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise
of the power of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although
the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local
government units of such issuances.27 To monitor means "to watch, observe or
check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over
local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory
enactments.28 Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere
with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government

MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG vs. HON. FELIX L. MOYA

Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

G.R. No. L-41322 September 29, 1988

FACTS: From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos
P. Garcia created respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the
latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of petitioner. For
many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries
between the two municipalities was brought, at the instance of private
respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and
decide. However, it appears that no action was taken on the same.
Private respondent then filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Davao, presided over by herein public respondent Judge
Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of
the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of collected taxes and
damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475
ISSUE: whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.
HELD: Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v.
Auditor General (15 SCRA 569) is clear that the President has no power
to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas
to speak of It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate
existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and parcel of
Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits that respondent Judge
should have dismissed the case.
On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of
boundary disputes is administrative in nature and should originate in
the political or administrative agencies of the government, and not in
the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate
occasions (Ibid., pp. 73-74).
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only
entities authorized by law may be patties in a civil action. Now then,
as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create
a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can
not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should
have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.

CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005

(ARTICLE X Section 10: Creation, Abolition, Change of boundaries)

FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in
Lanao Del Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the
Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of
Lanao Del Sur was considered null and void due to undue delegation of
legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating
Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong
(as a private citizen and taxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following:
(1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full-blown municipality (since there is a
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has
its own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc.

(2) 17 barangays with chairman;

(3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the
CENRO and DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong.

In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities

including 18 0f the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid
finds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong.
Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of
San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto
municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive order.
Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto
municipal corporation

HELD:
SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.chan

Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the

community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection
for period long enough to afford title by prescription. The
Certification has no power or it does not bear any
a u th o ri ty t o c re a t e o r re va l i d a t e a municipality. Should the case of
Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following
reasons:

(A) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case
at bar:

(1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated
in Pelaez Case,

(2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned

and
 (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was
included in the legislative district in the House of Representatives
apportionment.

( B ) A nd o n g d i d n o t me e t th e r e q u i si te s se t b y L o ca l G o ve rn me n t
C o d e o f 1 9 9 1 Se c. 4 2 p a r. d r e ga rd i n g municipalities created by
executive orders. It says:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall
continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office
at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities.

(C) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence
of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State
does not recognize the existence of the municipality.

(D) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats
for the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the
Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed in the
various districts) did not include Andong.