Republic vs. CA and Carantes 125 SCRA 476, Gr. No.

L-56984, September 30, 1987 REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Forest Development and the Director of Lands, Petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING
PIRASO, Respondents.

Facts: "It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the late Salming Piraso and
later by his successors-in- interest, who are his children for a period of more than thirty years up to this date, they
have shown to have a registerable title on the property which the Court therefore confirms and affirms in
accordance with the law. Let the land so described in the technical description of the survey made of the same and
in accordance with the corresponding plan be so registered." (p. 50, Rollo) On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S.
Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of Salming Piraso filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet, Land Registration No. N-287, covering the following described property On January 13, 1970, the Director
of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the application for registration stating, among
others:jgc:c "That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said parcel of
land the same not having been acquired by them either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; "That the whole area applied for
registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217, dated
February 16, 1929; "That the area sought to be registered is neither released for disposition nor alienation; and
that the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole parcel of land either in fact or in law." (p. 14,
Rollo)hanrobles.com.ph]

Issue: 1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve;

Ruling: It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation
and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of
Philippine Islands.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY (now Director of Forest
Development) vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MIGUEL MARCELO, CELIA ZURBITO, HEIRS OF JOSE
ZURBITO, namely, SOLEDAD VDA. DE ZURBITO, GASPAR, GUADALUPE, ADELAIDA, FELIPE, JOSE and
CECILIO, all surnamed ZURBITO

Facts: The proceedings in the court a quo started on February 8, 1955 when herein private respondent Miguel
Marcelo filed an application for the registration of two parcels of land with an aggregate area of 116.8441 hectares,
situated in Sitio Calulod Barrio Pauwa Masbate, Masbate. Oppositions were filed by the Government and private
parties. The opposition of the Director of Forestry (now Forest Development), which is the one involved in the
present recourse, was based on the ground that the 22 hectares of the aggregate area of the two parcels of land
applied for form part of Timberland Block F, Land Classification Project No. 3, L.C. Map No. 452, Masbate, Masbate,
certified on December 22, 1924. The spouse Jose and Soledad Zurbito occupied and cultivated these properties and
their possession was peaceful, adverse, public, open, and in the concept of owners since 1909

Issue: whether the 22 hectares area which forms part of the land applied for registration by and decreed in favor
of herein private respondents is disposable agricultural land.

Held: Yes. It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project No. 3, classifying the 22-hectare area as
timberland, was certified by the Director of Lands only on December 22, 1924, whereas the possession thereof by
private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest commenced as early as 1909. While the Government has the
right to classify portions of Public land, the primary right of a private individual who Possessed and cultivated the
land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-
events which could not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government, in the first instance may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such reservation is made. On the matter of classification of the land into either
agricultural or forestal area, petitioner's invocation of Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code is not in
point since said provision is merely a general conferment of authority and administrative control on the Director of
Forestry to lease or grant to qualified persons, under the conditions therein stated, permits for the use of forest
lands or vacant non-agricultural public lands. However, as to whether the particular land in question is forestry or
any other class of land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case.

Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983 [G.R. No. L-36847. July 20, 1983.]
SERAFIN B. YNGSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL
RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, Defendants-Appellees.

Facts: The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares,
more or less, situated in sitio Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental.
In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their
applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes. The first applicant was Teofila
Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed his on
October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as
communal forest and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes. "On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant
Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of
the respondents- appellees, Anita de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the
same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications were filed by the aforesaid parties in the
instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only released for said purpose
on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the Director of
the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-
appellant and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de
Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources where their appeals were docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal).
"In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division of the area in question into
three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective
applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be
declared null and void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

Issue: Whether or not the Priority Rule established in FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 is applicable to
fishpond applications

Ruling: The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14,
1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease
permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed their applications. After the area was
opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course to Yngsons application and
rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngsons priority of application. we
reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a
statute should be given controlling weight. All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim
to have a preferential right over another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those
applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the swampland for disposition and utilization, within a
period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment. Whether or not the
administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity
of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His
application was filed almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private
respondents, who filed their applications within the one year period, do not object to sharing the area with the
petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the least right to the fishpond leases. As a
matter of fact, the respondent Secretarys order states that all three applications must be considered as having
been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of the
66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the
decision of the lower court be affirmed in toto.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against Petitioner-
Appellant

Dir. of Forestry vs. Munoz G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968

Facts: Piadeco claims to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of Angat,
Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal.
Piadecos evidence of ownership consist of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136, dated April 25, 1894, 4 and a deed of
absolute sale of July 12, 1962, in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration as private woodland some 10,000
hectares of this land. The Bureau of Forestry, on December 4, 1963, issued in Piadecos name Certificate of Private
Woodland Registration No. PWR 2065-New, covering but a portion of the land with an aggregate area of 4,400
hectares and an average stand of 87.20 cubic meters, situated in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray, and San
Jose del Monte, all of the province of Bulacan, and Montalban, in Rizal. It was to expire on December 31, 1964. By
virtue of the registration certificate, Piadeco conducted logging operations. The controversy in these cases began
on April 11, 1964, when Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-
New. He required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco
had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed
Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate. 5 On June 1, 1965, Judge Muoz granted Piadecos
motion. In line therewith, on June 3, 1965, the corresponding writ of execution was issued, directing a special
sheriff to make effective and execute the aforesaid lower courts decision of December 29, 1964. Execution
notwithstanding, the forestry officials still refused to permit Piadeco to haul its logs. Because of this, on June 11,
1965, Piadeco asked the court below to declare the forestry officials and those acting under them in contempt. On
June 30, 1965, the forestry officials opposed. They averred that Piadecos registration certificate already expired on
December 31, 1964; that despite this expiration, Piadeco continued illegal logging operations, which resulted in the
seizure of its logs; that after December 31, 1964, the December 29, 1964 decision of the court below became
functus officio and could no longer be executed. Piadecos rejoinder of July 1, 1965 was that its registration
certificate is not expirable and that it is not a license.
Issue: Whether or not Seizure made by the government authorities of logs illegally cut can be branded as illegal

Ruling: In this case, it is undisputed that Piadecos title which it sought to register was issued by the Spanish
sovereignty Titulo de Propiedad No. 4138, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is unmistakably not one of those
enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously,
registration thereof can never be renewed. 2. Piadeco is nonetheless insistent in its plea that it can still cut, gather,
and remove timber from its alleged private woodland, upon payment of forest charges and surcharges. Seizure
made by the government authorities here of logs illegally cut cannot be branded as illegal. It was but in obedience
to Bureau of Internal Revenue General Circular No. V- 337 of May 24, 1961, which prescribed rules on the
disposition of illegally cut logs, pursuant to a directive from the Office of the President to the Secretary of Finance
on March 22, 1961. Section 3 of Circular V-337. The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have
spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any countrys natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a
number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes
which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As
waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property
crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations
should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue. Because of the importance of forests to the nation, the States
police power has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forest and forest reserves.

23 SCRA 1183 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529 Spanish Titles

Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging. It was given
a Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72,000 hectare land. It also has a Titulo de
Propriedad which it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime.

In 1964, the NAWASA (National Water and Sewerage Authority) director ordered the cancellation of Piadecos
certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and
Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a
settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry.
The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a
Certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.

HELD: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There should be no
question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant
to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the
department head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation
of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products
for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end. Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects
and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

Tan vs Director of Forestry

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the
Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL)
subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000
hectares for extension)

Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on
December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary
timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by
the Director of Forestry .

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On
March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago).
Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources denied the motion.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)

RULING:
I
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore void ab initio. In the first
place, in the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public
forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the
petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The license was released to
the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue license
was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to
release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is
the date of the release or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly
revoke his timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper
exercise of police power.

II

Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the respondent
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President
has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to
take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Tan vs Dir. of Forestry G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983 WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF
FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO,
respondents-appelllees, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO
COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO MALLARI, intervenors,

Facts: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a
certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May
22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land, consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S.
Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the United States
Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).chanrobles virtual law library On May 5, 1961,
petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees
and posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29,
rec.).ch Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant
Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders
Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the
Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.chanrobles virtual law library On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon - who succeeded Secretary Cesar M. Fortich in office - issued
General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state: SUBJECT: Revocation of
General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 - 1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume
and Nature of the work of the Department, the authority delegated to the Director of forestry under General
Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered
thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not
exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the issuance of' new licenses , including
amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On February 12, 1964,
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial
Company and Jorge Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for
reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the
grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations.chanrobles
virtual law lib

Issue: whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action

Ruling: Petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of
his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in
the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250, Feb. 28, 1959), this Court
held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or entitled to
the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now
seeks indemnity, the said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same
case, this Court further held that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its
annexes where it clearly appears that the claim of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is
predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition must be dismissed due to lack of cause of
action. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power (Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968).
The State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society
(Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970). V As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject
to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and disposition of forest resources is directly under the
control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license from the
Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control
of the Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who,
therefore, may impose reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of
Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May 5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over bureaus
and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan
vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Merida v People (Natural Resources)

MERIDA V PEOPLE (DEFINITION OF TIMBER, AUTHORITY OF FOREST OFFICERS)
G.R. No. 158182
June 12, 2008

FACTS:

on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco
reported the matter to Florencio Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998, 7 Royo
summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra
tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix (Calix)
who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro
sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife.

On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

* DENR forester: ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.

On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw that the
narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited them
for safekeeping with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree
remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter.

* RTC (upon complaint of Tansiongco): Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon,
Branch 81 (trial court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing]
and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over
which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership.

* CA: affirmed trial court.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was based on a
complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer; and

YES, DENR has jurisdiction.

[NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases requires
complaint to be filed first with the DENR, but the preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor]

Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:

SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x

Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses defined in this Chapter, not committed in
the presence of any forest officer or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be
investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was allegedly committed, who shall
thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report or complaint.

If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the investigating forest officer shall file the
necessary complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of the deputized officers
or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen
who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."

At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a
complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive
original jurisdiction.

2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

YES.
Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod
Property and that he did so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the
tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind him.

3) Is the narra tree timber?

YES.
The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes
"lumber" or "processed log."

In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions or certain "stand age" or
"rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with a similar task of having to
define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under
that provision. In ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common usage
meaning to refer to "processed log or timber,"

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in its common
acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings
or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered
timber.

Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for
carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.

MOMONGAN VS OMIPON 242 SCRA 332

FACTS: On November 14, 1992, police officers of the Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended
Dionisio Golpe while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck and logs were impounded.
A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists against Mr. Cabig but he
ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the DENR filed the complaint against respondent Judge alleging that
his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally cut forest products violated PD 705 and AO 59 S.1990
claiming that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr.
Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office for appropriate disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge violated PD 705 by releasing the owner of the truck used in transporting
illegally cut lumbers.

RULING: The respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally
justifiable because there is no mandatory duty on the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, The Revised
Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which it was committed." However, this
cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for offense."
In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the
event accused therein be convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted.

When respondent Judge released the truck after he conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied himself
that there was no reason to continue keeping the truck, he did not violate Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm. Order No.
59. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The
confiscation proceedings under Adm. Order No. 59 is different from the confiscation under the Revised Penal Code.
Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion
to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12 thereof
categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to
any criminal action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any person who used the conveyance in the
commission of the offense."

NOTE: Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No. 59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices, deputized military
personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances
shall notify the nearest DENR field offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances for proper action
and disposition.

AQUINO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

594 SCRA 332

Facts:

On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which
had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters, were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.
On May 19, 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the
City Architect and Parks Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut. Thereafter,
Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the cutting of 14 trees subject to
certain conditions.
On July 23, 1993, Forest Rangers received information that pine trees were being cut at Teachers Camp
without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest
ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago
and Mike Masing on the site, together with Salinas and Nacatab who were also supervising the cutting of the
trees. The forest rangers found 23 tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of
the trees cut with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was 16.55 cubic
meters.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705) was filed against
petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago.
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a copy of the
permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner who claimed to be in
possession of the necessary permit. Santiago also testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He
stated that petitioner was in possession of the permit. While also Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were
merely hired as sawyers and they merely followed petitioners instructions.

Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the permit was
issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He allegedly
informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the permit. However, he still
supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be
cut. He claimed that he could not prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and
Santiago were accompanied by three other men.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68 of PD 705.

Ruling:
No.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:

(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority; and

(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations.[13]

The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to supervise the implementation of the permit. He was
not the one who cut, gathered, collected or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD
705. He was not in possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for
repairs. Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his co-accused
were acquitted of the charges against them.

Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from cutting trees more
than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled, petitioner could have informed his superiors
if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all, this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his
acts. It is not enough to convict him under Section 68 of PD 705.

Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is not an officer of a
partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering, or collection, or is in possession of the
pine trees.

Petitioner Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705.

Mustang Lumber vs C.A. G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996 M ustang Lumber vs CA june 18, 1996

DOCTRINE: Possession of lumber is not a crime under PD 705. Timber is the punishable act

FACTS The authorities got wind of a suspicious stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs that were seen inside
the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Readily, the SAID organized a team of foresters and
policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at thesaid lumberyard.During the sting operation, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loadedwith lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transportdocuments, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR
compound at Visayas Avenue, QuezonCity. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the
refusal of the owner.On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's
lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4- 092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in writing within fifteen
days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent
another letter to Robles informing the latter that the petitioner had already secured therequired documents and
was ready to submit them. None, however, was submitted. In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the
warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which wasmoving out from the
petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without
coveringdocument showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that
search and seizure must besupported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted
exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz ., a search of a moving vehicleThe trial court,
however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation of the seized articles in
favor of theGovernment for the reason that since the articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by
Executive Judge Osorio they shouldhave been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.On 7
July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to Suspend Proceedings based
on thefollowing grounds: (a) the information does not charge an offense, for possession of lumber , as opposed to
timber , is not penalized inSection 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the samemay not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by
virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90- 53648 of Branch 35of the RTC of Manila, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of the seizure,raises a prejudicial
question

ISSUE:Whether the complaint charges an offense

Ruling: (q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa,
rattan, or other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical, recreational and geological
resources in forest lands. It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The
public and the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information. Accordingly,
even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted above fall within the ambit of the
said section, and as to them, the information validly charges an offense That when inside the compound, the team
found approximately four (4) truckloads ofnarra shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra
lumber, and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa
which are classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied) In the same vein, the dispositive portion of
the resolution 31 of the investigating prosecutor, which served as the basis for the filing of the information,
does not limit itself to lumber; thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an
information be filed against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended
by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied) The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be
construed as an affirmance of the respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a
crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is
included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads: (aa) Processing plant is any
mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw
materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood
products. This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code
uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."
32 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
33 And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex
non distinguere debemus Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we distinguish.A maxim meaning that
new legal distinctions should not be ...

TAOPA v. PEOPLE

FACTS: the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded
with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species without any
authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, prejudicial to the public
interest.) and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent
detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners
of the seized lumber. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were charged with violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac, Catanduanes. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on
arraignment. After trial on the merits, RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Only Taopa and
Cuison appealed to CA, Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's conviction was affirmed.4 The dispositive portion of the
CA decision read: In this petition, Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him alleging that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the
lumber was seized.

ISSUE: WON taopa is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended?

HELD: YES Petition is denied. CA decision affirmed with modification. Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided for by law. Both RTC and CA gave no
consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cusion's testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of
the seized lumber RTC and CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's house and that
Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized.
These facts proved Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the truck.
The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted possession of timber or other forest products
without the required legal documents. The mere fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the
police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. Court is convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the
seized lumber. However, Court disagree with RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on Taopa. Section 68 of PD
705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed
on violators. Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft.8 The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. Articles 309 and 310 read: Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft
shall be punished by: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
(emphasis supplied) 2. xxx Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied). The
actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9 Following Article 310 in relation to Article
309, the imposable penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period ranging
from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an additional period of four years for the excess of
P47,630. The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa shall be the penalty next lower
to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to
14 years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the medium period11 of reclusion temporal in
its medium and maximum periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days of
reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere between 16 years, five months and 11 days of
reclusion temporal to 22 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

Galo Monge, vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170308 March 7, 2008

Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the
cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or
other forest products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations. DENR
Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other
forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires for the transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of
lumber origin duly issued by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR.
In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting gathering, collecting and removal of forest
products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents consummates
the crime.

It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the subject mahogany lumber and their
subsequent failure to produce the requisite legal documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal liability
under Section 69 of PD No. 705, particularly second act punished thereunder.

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court whereby petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his conviction as well as the discharge of
accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.
***

Monge and Potencio were found by barangay tanods in possession of and transporting three (3) pieces of
mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be
shown the requisite permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
but neither Monge nor Potencio was able to produce any. Monge fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio
was brought to the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO). The DENR-CENRO issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber
indicating that the items, totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from
Potencio.[5] Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencios whereabouts had been unknown since the time of
the seizure[6] until he surfaced on 3 January 1998.[7]

An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35 charging petitioner and Potencio
with violation of Section 68[8] of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[9] as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No.
277, series of 1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 oclock in the morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo,
Iriga City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating with each other, without any authority of law, nor armed with necessary permit/license or other
documents, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, transport and have in their
possession three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n] appropriate volume of seventy-seven
(77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18) cubic meter with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the DENR in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. [11]

Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the apprehension but for failing to appear
in court for cross examination, his testimony was stricken out.[12]
On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor.

Accordingly, he testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely
requested by Monge, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from the mountain. Potencios
testimony was materially corroborated by Molina. Monge did not contest the allegations, except that it was not he
but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to what Potencio had stated in court, it was the
latter who hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into pieces.

The trial court found Monge guilty as charged. Monge was imposed nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to ten (10) years and eight (8) months ofprision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay
the costs.

Aggrieved, Monge elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as a
state witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute
necessity for his testimony. The appellate court dismissed this challenge and affirmed the findings of the trial court.
However, it modified the penalty to an indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as maximum. His motion for reconsideration
was denied, hence the present appeal whereby Monge reiterates his challenge against the discharge of Potencio.

The petition is utterly unmeritorious.

Monge and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in possession of, processed mahogany
lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Monge has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate
himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in
hauling the log down from the mountain and in transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The
contention is unavailing.

Monges challenge against Potencios discharge as a state witness must fail. Not a few cases established the
doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn state witness is left to the exercise of the trial courts
sound discretion limited only by the requirements set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively
an absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court, it being
competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with respect this highly factual
issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion. No such grave
abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in
the trial court as they cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.

Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from the information in order that he may testify
for the prosecution has the effect of an acquittal.

Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future development showing that any or all of the conditions
provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal consequence of an
acquittal. Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in moving for the discharge and of the court
in granting the motion no question of jurisdiction being involved will not deprive the discharged accused of the
benefit of acquittal and of his right against double jeopardy.

A contrary rule would certainly be unfair to the discharged accused because he would then be faulted for a failure
attributable to the prosecutor.

It is inconceivable that the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy of placing the fate of the discharged accused
at the mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution.

Indeed, the only instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is when he deliberately
fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his commitment as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119.
Potencio lived up to his commitment and for that reason, Monges challenge against his discharge must be
dismissed.

TIGOY vs. CA Case Digest

RODOLFO TIGOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 144640. June 26, 2006

FACTS: Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly
introduced by his friend Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent the trucks of Ong to
transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was
supposedly entered into between Ong and Bertodazo.
In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy to bring
the two trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte. He instructed the two drivers to leave the trucks
in Larapan for the loading of the construction materials by Lolong Bertodazo. Thus, after meeting with Bertodazo,
Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly went home to return to Larapan at four o'clock in the morning the next
day. When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were half-covered with canvas.

That same morning of October 4, 1993, the Ozamis City police received a report that two trucks, a blue and green
loaded with cement, did not stop at the checkpoint. Thus, some police officers boarded their patrol vehicle to
intercept the two trucks. Upon inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the cement
bags in both trucks. The police officers inquired if the drivers had a permit for the lumber but the latter could not
produce any.

After an investigation was held by the police and the DENR office in the city, an Information was filed against
Nestor Ong, Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest products without legal
permit in violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, Series of
1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the arraignment. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
found both Ong and Tigoy guilty. On appeal, Ong was acquitted while Tigoys conviction was upheld.

ISSUE: Is Tigoy guilty of possession of forest products without permit?

HELD: Yes. There are two ways of violating the said Section 68: 1) by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or
other forest products without a license; and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required
legal documents.

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a permit which is punishable under
Section 68 of the Code. The appellant, Sumagang and the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police
officers in flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan to Dipolog City. Tigoy
contends that he did not know that the truck was loaded with timber without the necessary permit. However, the
circumstances shows otherwise. Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they fear inspection of
their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in street parlance is grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of
the trucks? The only logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers knew that they were carrying
contraband lumber.

In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law such as in the
present case, the commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent
to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done knowingly and consciously. Direct proof of
previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence. It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by which the offense is
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. It is not even required that the participants have an agreement for an
appreciable period to commence it.

PALLADA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 131270. March 17, 2000

FACTS: DENR officers, assisted by the PNP, raided the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation. The
company is engaged in rice milling and trading. They found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a
chain saw.
As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L.
Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give
credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What
is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill
operator. Accordingly, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized and the petitioner was charged with
violation of 68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended.
RTC convicted the petitioner. The trial court did not give credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by
petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.
His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, petitioner then filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber.
2. Whether the presence of erasures in the certificate of timber origin render them valueless as evidence.

HELD: Different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.
The issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and
responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities
and defects found in the documents presented by the latter.
The irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid
and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same. The presence of such glaring irregularities
negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION as to the penalty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL v QUE

GR No. 120365, December 17, 1996

Facts
The Provincial Task Force on illegal logging received information that a ten-wheeler truck with illegally cut lumber
will pass through Ilocos Norte. Ques truck was spotted and discovered to contain cocounut slabs with sawn
lumber inserted in between. He failed to give the cargos supporting documents: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2)
certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the
forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. All he could show was a certification 7 from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut
slabs.
Issues
1. Whether there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for
possession of timber and other forest products.
2. Whether the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held
liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal.
Held
1. No, appellant interprets the phrase existing forest laws and regulations to refer to those laws and regulations
which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. However, the suggested interpretation is
strained and would render the law inutile. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing
at the time of possession of timber or other forest products.
DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and
other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides that the movement of logs, lumber, non-
timber forest products and wood-based or wood based shall be covered with the appropriate Certificates of Origin.
The transport of lumber shall be accompanied by CLO (Certificate of Lumber Origin).
2. No, because there are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705. In the first offense,
one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, mere possession of
forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a
legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.

Dagudag v Judge Paderanga

FACTS:
Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. were seized by the DENR. The items were
found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently abandoned by the unknown owner.
Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated products. Respondent Judge
issued the writ despite the fact that an administrative case was already pending before the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a judge.
HELD:
Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative
agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. He went straight to
court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross
ignorance of the law.
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to
the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to
maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep
themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws. The rule that courts cannot
prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for
Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma
had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright.

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA
G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000

Facts:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR apprehended two motor vehicles. One is loaded with 1,026 board feet of illegally
sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75, with Plate No. HAK-733, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by Jose
Vargas. The other is loaded with 1,224.97 board feet of illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, with plate
number FCN 143, being driven by one Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. The
drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team seized
and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued but
the drivers refused to accept the receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then
filed before the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda for violation of
Section 68 [78), Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code. On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon and Abuganda from the
custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion
against Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public Prosecutor.
The vehicle driven by Constancio Abuganda was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in
Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was
again loaded with forest products with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub
duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia, and several John for violation of
Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code. Although Abegonia and Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable, the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action
may be filed against Noe Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It
appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle , with plate number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for
replevin, is a suit against the State.
Held:
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an
offense in violation of Section 78. In addition, Section 78 makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of
theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess
and transport said load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found
by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation
of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. The DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code.
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported without pertinent documents that could
evidence title to or right to possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load
was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give
a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda,
drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again,
when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were
not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because
private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and
their load was done upon their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to
require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view
the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law.
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two impounded vehicles, with an
application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public
officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the
scope of their authority in good faith and without wilfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for
which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the
Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of
the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a
suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the States
consent.

Paat vs CA Admin Law Digest

Leonardo Paat
vs
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to
Bulacan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in
the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to
explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents
brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC
against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending,
inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court
could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction
then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual
and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5)
when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the
subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the
replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the
case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

DY V. CA
G.R. No. 121587
March 9, 1999
Ponente: Mendoza

FACTS: On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 93-01 creating Task Force Kalikasan
to combat illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber,
flitches and other forest products in that city. The team was composed of personnel of the Philippine Army, PNP,
DENR and the Office of the City Mayor of Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was the acting chief of
civilian security in the mayors office, was a member of the team. On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force
received confidential information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to Butuan City from
the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the team set up a checkpoint along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan
City. Therafter upon catching up with the two cars in the latters compound, the caretaker of the compound was not
able to produce any documents proving the legality of possession of the forest products. DENR officers then seized
the truck and lumber, and since there were no claimants after posting the notice of confiscation, it was deemed
forfeited in favor of the government.
2 months after the said forfeiture, petitioner herein filed a suit for replevin to recover the trucks and
lumber, to which respondent Lausa filed a motion for approval of counterbond and dismissal of the replevin since
the seizure was pursuant to the Revised Forestry Code. Trial court for petitioner, but was reversed in the CA in
favor of Lausa. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the Regional Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit, considering that the object
was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705
(Revised Forestry Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277. NO.

RATIO: The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. In a
long line of cases, we have consistently held that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded by the administrative
processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted first before a courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
a courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals correctly set
aside the assailed orders of the trial court granting petitioners application for a replevin writ and denying private
respondents motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as amended, the lumber properly
came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to
that agency.
The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the respondent agent of the DENR to file a
counterbond in order to recover custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to
dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have done was to dismiss the case without
prejudice to petitioner filing her claim before the DENR .