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G.R. No.

76265 April 22, 1992 TRESPASSING IGLESIA NI KRISTO PROPERTY SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 61969, July 25, 1984."
VIRGINIA CALALANG, petitioner,
vs. Briefly, the dela Cruz v. dela Cruz case is an action for reconveyance
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ADMINISTRATOR OF founded on breach of trust filed by Augustina dela Cruz, et al. against
NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION Lucia dela Cruz and INK. Augustina and her co-plaintiffs charged that the
ADMINISTRATION, LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, CONSTANCIO SIMANGAN parcel of land purchased by the INK from Lucia dela Cruz was actually a
and IGLESIA NI KRISTO, respondents. part of their inheritance share in the estate of their late grandfather,
Policarpio dela Cruz but which, in breach of trust known to the INK, Lucia
G.R. No. 83280 April 22, 1992 sold to the latter.

AUGUSTO M. DE LEON, JOSE M. DE CASTRO, JOSE A. PANLILEO, Augustina's suit was originally decided in her favor by the trial court. On
FELICIDAD VERGARA VDA. DE PINEDA, FERNANDO L. VITUG I, appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment was reversed and the
FERNANDO M. VITUG II, FERNANDO M. VITUG III, FAUSTINO TOBIA, questioned sale by Lucia dela Cruz to the INK was upheld. Consequently,
ELENA M. OSTREA and FELISA C. CRISTOBAL- Augustina went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review
GENEROSO, petitioners, on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 61969.
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BISHOP ERAO On July 25, 1984, the Court rendered a decision in affirming the decision
MANALO, respondents. of the Court of Appeals. The validity of the sale of Lucia to the INK was
thereby upheld and the title of INK to the subject realty (Lot 671) was
validated as well.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This Supreme Court decision spawned the two (2) petitions now before
us assailing the validity of Lucia dela Cruz's title over Lot 671 which in
The subject of controversy in these two consolidated petitions is a parcel turn was sold to INK.
of land Lot 671-A of the Piedad Estate located in Barrio Culiat,
Diliman. In G.R. No. 76265, petitioner Virginia Calalang alleged that she is the
registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A (subdivision plan PSD
The petitioners are individual lot owners who claim to have bought their 32221) as evidenced by TCT Nos. 17556, 17564 and 17562. She
respective portions from Amando Clemente in the 1950's. allegedly came to know of INK'S claim only when a prospective buyer
inspected the land on August 1986 and saw the "no trespassing" sign.
Amando Clemente is alleged to be the registered owner of said land
evidenced by Transfer of Certificate Title No. 16212 covering about Petitioner Calalang lost no time in inquiring into the status of the land and
81,160 square meters who converted it into a subdivision known as learned about the pending consulta case (LRC 1978) filed before the
Clemville Subdivision. Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA). This consulta came about when the Register
of Deeds doubted the registrability of the documents presented before it
Lot 671-A is actually part of a bigger parcel known as Lot 671 which is
in the light of his findings that the land affected was covered by two (2)
claimed by respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), which bought said property
sets of titles issued in the names of different owners.
from Lucia dela Cruz in 1975. Dela Cruz was adjudged the rightful owner
of Lot 671 in the case of dela Cruz v. dela Cruz (130 SCRA 666 [1984]).
INK began fencing the whole area and placed the following sign "NO On September 9, 1986, the petitioner filed a Motion to Intervene
requesting the Administrator to conduct an investigation of the supposed
anomaly committed in connection with the reconstitution of TCT No. RT- against it (Civil Case No. Q-45767) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
58 in the name of Lucia dela Cruz. This was denied by the Administrator Quezon City on September 12, 1985.
invoking our ruling in dela Cruz v. dela Cruz to the effect that TCT RT-58
in the name of respondent Lucia dela Cruz is the valid title. (Rollo, pp. 44- Despite opposition of the petitioner to respondent INK's Motion to
47) Intervene, presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw granted the motion of INK
and denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the issues
Consequently, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by herein petitioner raised in the instant petition (G. R. No. 76265) will not substantially affect
but this was likewise denied by the Administrator on October 20, 1986 on said civil case. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the
the ground that the issues raised therein have already been passed upon petitioner was likewise denied considering that no restraining order has
and that the issues being litigious in nature cannot be decided in been issued (Rollo, pp. 198-216).
a consulta case "where the only question to be determined is the
registrability of the document presented for registration." However, instead of filing an answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
49900, the petitioners filed on July 15, 1988 a supplemental petition
Hence, on October 27, 1986, the petitioner file the instant Special Civil before this Court to include as additional respondent, the Honorable
Action for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. No. 76265 against the Judge Benigno T. Dayaw and petitioner's children who were named as
Administrator of the NLTDRA, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and defendants in said Civil Case, as additional petitioners. At the same time
private respondents Lucia dela Cruz, Constancio Simangan and Iglesia ni the petitioner prayed for a restraining order (Rollo, p.197).
Kristo. Lucia dela Cruz and Constancio Simangan were impleaded as
they were predecessors-in-interest of INK. To this supplemental petition, the OSG in behalf of the Republic filed its
comment pursuant to the Court's resolution granting the petitioner's
INK and the Administrator filed their comments on January 5, 1987 and motion for leave to include additional parties and to admit supplemental
June 29, 1987 respectively. For failure to locate Constancio Simangan's petition (Rollo, p. 228).
whereabouts despite diligent efforts and considering further that INK is
the indispensable party and the one interested in upholding the validity of In the meantime, fire gutted the records of the Register of Deeds in
the reconstituted title of respondent Lucia dela Cruz, the petitioner moved Quezon City, so respondent Judge required the parties to agree to a
to drop him as respondent. This was granted by the Court in a resolution stipulation of facts instead of trial.
dated April 13, 1988. (Rollo, p. 189)
In G.R. No. 83280, the petitioners alleged that they and/or their
Taking the cue from the Administrator that present certificates of title must predecessors in interest were issued their corresponding titles to the lots
be cancelled to avoid duplication, the Register of Deeds, instead of filing purchased from Amando Clemente in the 1950's yet.
its comment initiated cancellation proceedings of more than 100 titles,
against 81 defendants which included herein petitioner on the basis of They alleged that they took physical possession of their lots in Clemville
this Court's declaration in the case of dela Cruz that the reconstituted title Subdivision by actually occupying the same, declaring them in their
of respondent Lucia dela Cruz is the valid title. This petition was filed by names for tax purposes, fencing or marking them off and entrusting their
the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) on January 5, 1987 with the care to "katiwalas". From the time they acquired their Torrens Title they
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-49900. and they alone to the exclusion of INK exercised all acts of undisturbed,
peaceful and uninterrupted ownership and possession including the
Consequently, the petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the payment of their realty taxes.
complaint was premature and maliciously filed with knowledge of the
instant petition with this Court. INK, on the other hand, filed a Motion to On or about the second week of August, 1985, INK started to enclose the
Intervene in said case. Claiming ownership over Lot 671, it prayed for entire Clemville Subdivision with "sawali" fences with billboards randomly
damages against some of the defendants namely Augusto de Leon, Jose posted which read:
M. Panlilio and Felicidad Vda. de Pineda who filed an injunction suit
NO TRESPASSING of a case, "De la Cruz v. De la Cruz", 130 SCRA 66
I.N.C. PROPERTY [1984], wherein the Honorable Supreme Court declared
SC DECISION the said reconstituted title null and void.
2ND DIVISION
G. R. NO. L 61969 The principal argument of petitioners that they were not
JULY 25, 1984 parties thereto can not be given serious extended
discussion as they could acquire no more rights than the
INK also destroyed the concrete/hollow block fence surrounding the lot of source of their titles. For brevity, at this initial stage,
petitioner de Castro and started the construction of housing structures suffice it to say that under the foregoing discussed
therein. At the same time, it commenced the delivery of construction circumstances, the petitioners have not shown a clear
materials to the former premises of petitioner Panlilio to erect a and positive right to a temporary relief. (Emphasis
permanent structures of strong materials on it. supplied) (Rollo, p. 35)

Thus, on August 22, 1985, the petitioners filed with the RTC-Branch 101 Assailing this order, the petitioners by way of certiorari elevated the
a petition for injunction with damages. This case was docketed an Civil matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08146.
Case No. 45767. Later, this petition was amended to include Elena
Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-Generoso as additional petitioners. On April 9, 1986, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision with the
following dispositive portion:
August 25, 1985, presiding Judge Santiago issued a restraining order
and set the case for hearing the writ for preliminary injunction on WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and is
September 5, 1985. hereby RESOLVED by setting aside the Order dated
December 6, 1985 in Civil Case No. Q-45767 and
The September 5 hearing was however, reset to September 19, 1985 directing that the application for preliminary injunctive
with respondent Erao Manalo volunteering to maintain the status relief therein be properly heard and evidence for or
quo until then or until the matter had been resolved by the trial court. against the same be adduced in due course. (Rollo, p. 39)

On September 19, by agreement of the parties and in open court, the On February 12, 1987, respondent INK filed with the lower court a motion
Judge issued an order, granting the parties' motion to enter into a to dismiss the petitioners' complaint for injunction on the ground that it
stipulation of facts instead of going on with the hearing and to maintain does not state a cause of action.
the status quo.
On August 7, 1987, the lower court issued an Order with the following
In the course of the exchange of pleadings between the parties, the trial dispositive portion:
judge issued an Order on December 6, 1985 denying the petitioners'
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the grounds WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding
that: respondent's Motion to Dismiss justified, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against
From the exchange of written arguments and the petitioners. (Rollo, p. 48)
authorities cited, it appears that the petitioners' titles
which were issued some ten years earlier than that of Seeking relief from the dismissal, the petitioners filed the two pleadings,
respondent's emanated from a reconstituted TCT No. RT- to wit:
52, which covered portion of Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate
of Quezon City. Petitioner's parcels of land are within that
estate. This reconstituted TCT No. RT-52 was the subject
1) "Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam" dated 58) was valid. As the registered and rightful owner, Lucia dela Cruz had
September 18, 1987 filed with the RTC, NCR, Branch 101 the perfect and legal right to sell, assign, and convert the property to
Quezon City; and respondent INK who as purchaser for value in good faith holds the same
free from all encumbrances except those noted in said certificate."
2) "Omnibus Motion Incident to Execution of the Decision
dated April 9, 1986" dated September 29, 1987 filed with With this Court's ruling promulgated in 1984, it is our considered view that
the Court of Appeals. the petitioner can not raise anew the question of ownership of Lucia dela
Cruz over Lot 671 which had been determined by the Court of Appeals
On December 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the dela Cruz case. Well-settled is
Omnibus Motion. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise the rule enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, 171
denied in a resolution by the RTC dated May 4, 1988. SCRA 408 [1989] that:

Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ITS as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon
DECEMBER 10, 1987 RESOLUTION, ERRED IN the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
HOLDING THAT THE ORDERS OF DECEMBER 12,
1986 AND AUGUST 7, 1986 RELATE TO INCIDENTS IN The Court's ruling has long been final and the issue on ownership of Lot
CIVIL CASE NO. 45767 TOTALLY ALIEN TO THE 671 finally disposed of several years ago. This declaration must be
SUBJECT MATTER OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 08146. respected and followed in the instant case applying the principle of res
judicata or, otherwise, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment. The less
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on
VALIDATING THE ORDER OF AUGUST 7, 1986. (Rollo, conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in
p. 16) the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined therein or which were necessarily included therein (De la
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 165 [1990]).
In a resolution dated August 30, 1989, G.R. No. 83280 was consolidated
with G.R. No. 76265.
Inevitably, the dela Cruz ruling should be applied to the present petitions
since the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
Although other minor issues are involved in these consolidated cases,
facts of the case before us now (See Rivas v. SEC, 190 SCRA 295
the principal and crucial issue that alone needs to be resolved is the
[1990]). Even the petitioners substantially adopt the same findings of
applicability of this Court's decision in the dela Cruz case to these cases
facts in their pleadings. The factual inquiry with regards to the history of
now before us.
Lot 671 has already been laid to rest and may no longer be disturbed. We
quote:
The petitioners argue that the dela Cruz case could not be applied to
them since they were not parties in that case nor were they ever notified
The undisputed facts indicate that the parcel of land in
of such case pending between the parties. The petitioners explained that
question is Lot 671 of the Piedad Estate, GLRO Rec. No.
the de la Cruz case was a case among the heirs of Policarpio de la Cruz.
5975, with an area of 184, 268 square meters, more or
Since they acquired their properties from an entirely different person,
less, situated in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City; that the
Amando Clemente and not from any of the heirs of Policarpio de la Cruz,
totality of the Piedad Estate consists of a vast tract of
they could not be considered privies to any of them.
land, registered on March 12, 1912, in the name of the
Philippine Government, under Original Certificate of Title
In denying applicability, however, the petitioners assail the Court's ruling (OCT) No. 614 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
that "the reconstituted title of Lucia dela Cruz over Lot 671 (TCT No. RT
Rizal; that when the Piedad Estate was subdivided (with (a) Lot No. 671-A containing an area of 30,000 square
Lot No. 671 as one of the resulting parcels) whoever was meters and covered by TCT No. 168320;
in possession of a particular lot was given priority and/or
preference in the acquisition thereof provided that the (b) Lot No. 671-B, containing an area of 4,268 square
price and the cost of titling would be paid; that upon such meters and covered by TCT No. 168321; and
payment, the government would issue the corresponding
certificate of title; that Policarpio dela Cruz and his wife (c) Lot No. 671-C, containing an area of 150,000 square
Luciana Rafael were originally in possession of the land; meters and covered by TCT No. 168322;
that they had three children, namely
that meanwhile TCT No. 40355 (already previously
(1) Maximo de la Cruz (married to Feliza Yabut); issued to and in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and
Dorotea de la Cruz) continued to exist; that when the title
(2) Filomeno de la Cruz (married to Narcisa Santiago); was transferred from the Rizal Registry to the Quezon
and City Registry, from the latter Registry assigned to this
TCT a new number, RT-52; that this same Lot (No. 671)
(3) defendant-appellant Lucia de la Cruz (a widow); was later subdivided into two lots, each with a title:

that the plaintiffs-appellees herein are the descendants of (a) Lot No. 671-A (TCT No. 16212)
the two sons (Maximo and Filomeno) of Policarpio; that
on April 25, 1940, Lot No. 671 was segregated from the (b) Lot No. 671-B (TCT No. 16213)
totality of the Piedad Estate, covered by OCT No. 614
and a separate title was issued in the name of both in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de
la Cruz; that the second lot (lot No. 671-B, with an area of
"Eugenia de la Paz, soltera" and "Dorotea de la Cruz, 103,108 square meters) was sold on December 17, 1952
viuda" to one Narcisa Vda. de Leon (to whom TCT No. 2009 was
later issued); that on May 6, 1964, Narcisa Vda. de Leon
(this was Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40355 of transferred the same Lot 671-B to Nieves Paz Eraa (who
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal); that on was later issued in her own name TCT No. 79971).
November 29, 1941, a deed of sale over Lot No. 671 was
executed by Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz The undisputed facts further show that in 1971, Nieves
(the registered owners) in favor of defendant-appellant Paz Eraa filed before the Court of First instance of
Lucia de la Cruz; that said deed of sale was registered Quezon City Civil Case No. 16125 for 'quieting of title'
with the office of the Register of Deeds on July 17, against Lucia de la Cruz, et al., praying that TCT No. RT-
1943 and the corresponding certificate of title was issued 58, (the reconstituted title of Lucia de la Cruz), as well as
to Lucia de la Cruz; that in 1971, Lucia de la Cruz all titles derived therefrom, be declared null and void; that
obtained from the land registration court a reconstituted the case ended with the parties submitting a compromise
title (TCT No. RT-59 over Lot No. 671), the transfer agreement with Lucia de la Cruz, among other things,
certificate of title previously issued to her in 1943 having paying plaintiff Eraa the amount of P250,000.00 to cover
been lost; that subsequently, Lot No. 671 (this time, the acquisitive cost of the 103,108 square meters of land
already covered by TCT No. RT-58) was subdivided into included in the certificate of title of defendant Lucia de la
three (3) lots, each of which was issued a separate title, Cruz; that on July 17, 1975, Lucia de la Cruz sold a
as follows: portion of Lot No. 671-C (one of the three portions to
which the lot included in RT-58 had been subdivided, and
which portion was covered by TCT No. We need not emphasize the fact that the Supreme Court
168322), consisting of 103,108 square meters to by tradition and in our system of judicial administration,
defendant-appellant Iglesia Ni Cristo, for the amount of has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter
P2,108,850.00; that this sale was later registered in the of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, with a new title, TCT Court from whose decisions all other courts should take
No. 209554 being issued in the name of the Iglesia Ni their bearings. Consequently, we cannot and should not
Cristo; that another deed of absolute sale was executed review a case already passed upon by the Highest
for the remaining 84,356 square meters in favor also of Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest.
the Iglesia and said sale was annotated on TCT (Church assistance Program, Inc. v. Sibulo, supra.).
No. 168322. In view of said sales and the fact that
registration of the involved parcels is now in the name The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz and the subsequent registration
(separately) of Lucia de la Cruz and the Iglesia Ni Cristo, thereof in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds, Manila constitutes
the present action for reconveyance with damages was constructive notice to the whole world. (Heirs of Maria Marasigan v.
instituted. (Emphasis supplied) Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA 253 [1987]; People v. Reyes,
175 SCRA 597 [1988])
Apparently, there is no mention of Amando Clemente in the above recital
of facts. A closer perusal of the records in G. R. 76265 would, however, Since it is the act of registration which transfers ownership of the land
reveal that TCT No. 16212 was issued for Lot 671-A in the name of sold (Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 169
Amando Clemente on August 9, 1951 per report of the Acting SCRA 244 [1989]). Lot 671 was already owned by Lucia dela Cruz as
Administrator of the NLTDRA (Rollo, p. 92). Amando Clemente's TCT No. early as 1943. Amando Clemente's alleged title meanwhile which was
16212 emanated from TCT No. 40355 in the name of Eugenia de la Paz issued on August 9, 1951 was very much later. Thus, the petitioners, who
and Dorotea dela Cruz. Thus, Amando Clemente's predecessors-in- merely stepped into the shoes of Amando Clemente cannot claim a better
interest are Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz whom the Court right over said land. "Prior est temporae, prior est in jura" (he who is first
found to have lost their rights over Lot 671 by virtue of the sale made to in time is preferred in right) (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 380
Lucia dela Cruz. [1980]). The fact that Amando Clemente possessed a certificate of title
does not necessarily make him the true owner. And not being the owner,
The Register of Deeds correctly observed that this is a clear case where he cannot transmit any right to nor transfer any title or interest over the
there is a duplication or overlapping of titles issued to different names land conveyed (Beaterio del Santisimo Rosario de Molo v. Court of
over the same land which thereby compelled him to file the consulta case Appeals, 137 SCRA 459 [1985]; Treasurer of the Phil. v. Court of
with the NLTDRA: Appeals, 153 SCRA 359 [1987]).

(1) Lucia dela Cruz's reconstituted title (RT-58) which was divided into 3 Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia dela Cruz which
Lots, Lot 671-A, Lot 671-B and Lot 671-C and was subsequently sold to the court held to be valid was a proceeding in rem. It is well established
INK; that in rem proceedings such as land registration constitute constructive
notice to the whole world. The petitioners cannot now claim that they
(2) Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz's reconstituted title (RT-52) were not notified of the reconstitution proceedings over said lot. Under
which was divided into 2 lots, Lot 671-A and Lot 671-B. the facts of the case, the title in the name of Lucia dela Cruz (TCT No. RT
58) has become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
Notwithstanding, it is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to Lucia dela Cruz
by Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz as evidenced by Entry No. Likewise, the INK was also issued a Torrens Title over Lot 671 as a result
258, page 7, Vol. 7, Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of of the sale made to it by the rightful owner, Lucia dela Cruz in 1975.
Manila. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra, pp. 697-698) This is a finding Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens Title became
which can not be disturbed. indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree (Tirado v.
Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 [1990]). A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive
evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. (Ching v. Court direct, and not a collateral attack. In fact, under the
of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 [1990]) It is, therefore, too late in the day for the existing law, Section 48 of the Property Registration
petitioners to reopen or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at Decree expressly provides that a certificate of title cannot
this time. be subject to collateral attack and can be altered,
modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
The petitioners also contend that what INK purchased from Lucia dela accordance with law. (at p. 542)
Cruz in 1975 was Lot 671-C-4 LRC 322534 which corresponds roughly to
Lot 671-B (Psd-32221) and did not affect Lot 671-A of Amando Clemente In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners try to convince
at all. This is, however, belied by the fact that the sale made by Dorotea us to look or inquire into the validity of the reconstitution proceedings
dela Cruz to Lucia dela Cruz (as indicated in Entry No. 258) was Lot 671 initiated by Lucia dela Cruz, contending that the implementation of de la
which was later on conveyed to INK. Cruz ruling would deprive them of their properties without due process of
law. We have looked long and hard into the records of the case but the
In challenging the validity of the reconstitution of Lucia dela Cruz's title, facts and circumstances plus law and jurisprudence on the matter do not
the petitioners are not alleging fraud, collusion and illegality in the warrant such action from the Court. INK's title over Lot 671 which
procurement of the certificate of title of Lucia dela Cruz. It must be necessarily included Lot 671-A had already become incontrovertible and
recalled that G.R. No. 76265 stemmed merely from a consulta case with indefeasible. To reopen or to question the legality of INK's title would
the National Land Titles and Deeds Administration. Undeniably, the defeat the purpose of our Torrens system which seeks to insure stability
arguments and issues raised by the petitioner require adjudication of by quieting titled lands and putting to a stop forever any question of the
facts which, under the circumstances of this case, we are not prepared to legality of the registration in the certificate or questions which may arise
do as this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, the present petition is not therefrom. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra.) In fairness to INK, as
the proper remedy in challenging the validity of certificates of titles since registered owner it is entitled to rest secure in its land title.
the judicial action required is a direct and not a collateral attack. (Natalia
Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534 [1989]). In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public interest and the
maintenance of the integrity and stability of the Torrens system of land
The Court had this to say: registration that all transfer certificates of title derived from the
reconstituted title of Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz be
We note with approval the lower court's patient annulled in order to prevent the proliferation of derivative titles which are
explanation that, inter alia the certificate of title issued in null and void. The legality or validity of INK's title over Lot 671 has been
the name of the plaintiff in accordance with the Land settled. The Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically
Registration Act (Act No. 496) is indefeasible after the and rightly so as to assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion.
expiration of one year from the entry of the decree of (see Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80 [1988])
registration. Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for
review of the decree must be presented within one year WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. Nos. 76265 and 83280 are hereby
after its entry as described and defined in Section 40 of DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the same. After the lapse of one year, the decree of
registration becomes incontrovertible and is binding upon SO ORDERED.
and conclusive against all persons whether or not they
were notified of or participated in the registration G.R. Nos. L-21703-04 August 31, 1966
proceedings. . . .
MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners and appellants,
Even assuming arguendo that said titles may still be vs.
challenged, the present case does not provide the vehicle MATEO RAVAL REYES, respondent and appellee.
for that remedy since the judicial action required is a
Harold M. Hernando for petitioners and appellants. Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of
Rafael Ruiz for respondent and appellee. possession.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: Subsequently, petitioners in the above cadastral cases, as plaintiffs,
commenced, on 15 January 1963, before the same court of first instance,
Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order of the Court of First an ordinary civil action seeking to recover the products of the disputed
Instance of Ilocos Norte, in its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L. R. C. Rec. lots, or their value, and moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval
No. 1188, and 42, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1994, denying petitioners' motion to Reyes, as defendant. This case was docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659.
compel respondent to surrender their owners' duplicates of Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066, as well as from a subsequent Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered the
order of the same court, refusing, upon petitioners' motion, to reconsider complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots,
the first order of denial. alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer and/or
opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession, i.e., he is their
The undisputed facts are: three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and (plaintiffs') co-owner, he having bought from plaintiffs' brother, Francisco
Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered owners of several H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and
parcels of land, to wit; Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of the participation to these disputed lots.
Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 22161, and also Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, of Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners presented,
the same cadastral survey, embraced in and covered by Original on 25 February 1963, in the cadastral cases aforementioned, a motion to
Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos compel respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to surrender and deliver to them
Norte. These titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration, dated the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and
31 May 1940. 8066. Respondent opposed this motion.

On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed, in The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the parcels
the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs of of land covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No.
possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of Title above 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on the merits by it.
referred to. Petitioners subjected the foregoing order to a motion for reconsideration,
but without success; hence, the present appeal.
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is
only in possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Petitioners-appellants dispute the above ruling of the trial court
22161, but denying that he possesses the lots covered by Original contending that, since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not
Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he claimed that he has been in, the lots covered by the titles in question but their products or value, and
and is entitled to, the possession thereof (i.e., Lots Nos. 20481 and moral damages, these lots are not in litigation in this ordinary civil case;
20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale (not recorded) from and that since respondent had already raised the issue of ownership and
petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third possession of these lots in his opposition to the (petitioners') motion for
(1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots. issuance of writ of possession and, despite this opposition, the court a
quo granted the writ, without any appeal being taken, respondent is
After due hearing of this appellant, the court a quo issued, on 20 barred and estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil
December 1962, the writ of possession with respect to Lot Nos. 15891 case, under the principle of res judicata. 1wph1.t

and 15896, which writ was, upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration,
amended, on 7 January 1963, to include all the other lots covered by On the other hand, respondent-appellee maintains that, having pleaded a
both titles. counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in said Civil Case No.
3659, the trial court correctly held that these lots are subjects of litigation
in this ordinary civil case. He also maintains that petitioners not having de titulo es ella y no la apelante (art. 41 de la Ley No. 496, tal
impleaded their brother, Francisco H. Reyes, or his heirs, as parties in como ha sido reformado).
their motion for issuance of writ of execution, and because these heirs
have not intervened in this particular incident, the writ of possession Alega la apelante que ella tiene tanto derecho como la apelada a
issued by the trial court is, at most, valid only with respect to their poseer el titulo porque el terreno a que se refiere es de la
(petitioners) undivided two-thirds (2/3) share and participation in these propiedad de las tres hermanas. La pretension no es meritoria
disputed lots; hence, he concludes that he is not barred and estopped Segun el articulo 41 de la Ley No. 496, conforme ha sido
from raising the issue of ownership and possession of the undivided one- enmendado, el duplicado para el dueno debe expedirse por el
third (1/3) share and participation of petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Registrador a nombre de la persona a cuyo favor se ha
Reyes, which share respondent allegedly bought from the latter. decretado el terreno y dispone, ademas, que dicho duplicado
debe entregarsele al dueo inscrito. Si la apelante cree que tiene
In their reply brief, petitioners-appellants refute the latter argument of derecho a participar en el lote No. 778, como coheredera, debe
respondent-appellee by showing that they had previously obtained ejercitar una accion independiente, encaminada a obtener su
special authority from the heirs of their deceased brother to represent participacion. (El Director de Terrenos contra Abacahin 72 Phil.
them in the proceedings had in the court below. 326).

The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who between It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an
petitioners-appellants or respondent-appellee has a better right to the independent civil action to recover his alleged co-owner's share in the
possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil Case No.
title. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and considering that he
may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on
While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects of notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of
litigation in Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as Court, for the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by the
defendant therein, had presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots titles in question are litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see
covered by the titles, we see no valid and plausible reason to justify, on no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners'
this ground, the withholding from the registered owners, such as the duplicates of certificates of titles.
petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and possession of the owners'
duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has already In view of the above considerations, we deem it unnecessary to pass on
held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said the merits of the second contention of petitioners-appellants.
land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more
preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than one Wherefore, the orders appealed from should be, as they are hereby,
whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish reversed; and, in accordance with this opinion, respondent Mateo Raval
his right to the possession thereto. Thus, this Court said: Reyes is hereby ordered to deliver to petitioners the owners' duplicates of
Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066. With costs against
Como acertadamente dijo el Juzgado, lo unico que se suscita es respondent-appellee, Mateo Raval Reyes.
si Ana Umbao de Carpio tiene derecho a la possession del
duplicado para el dueno del Certificado de Titulo Original No. G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004
698, con preferencia a la opositora-apelante. A nuestro juicio, la
solucion es clara e ineludible. Hallandose admitido que el decreto Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners,
final que se dicto en el expediente catastral en 28 de mayo de vs.
1936, en relacion con el lote No. 778, fue a favor de Ana Umbao ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.
y que el duplicado para el dueo del Certificado de Titulo Original
No. 698 se expidio por el Registrador de Titulos a favor de la
DECISION
misma es obvious que quien tiene derecho a poseer el certificado
PANGANIBAN, J.: As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo:

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under 1. 50,000.00 as moral damages;
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) 2. 50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This
provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under 3. 30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
the Torrens system.
4. Cost of suit."4
The Case
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision 2 and the July
The Facts
22, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows:
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original D E C I S I O
N of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001, is SET "As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents
ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in part amply summarized by the trial court:
and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from, as follows:
On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at
"1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the rightful Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No.
owner and with better right to possess the property in 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale
question, being an innocent purchaser for value therefor; became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the
vendor and the vendees.
"2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the following
to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of Dagupan
[Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit: City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement submitted
by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania was given one year
from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back the house and
As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:
lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and
1. 300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily vacate the premises without need
actual damages; of any demand. Gloria Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so
the [vendees] declared the lot in their name.
2. 50,000.00 as moral damages;
Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
3. 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved
[on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free
4. 30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.

5. Cost of suit.
On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, sold and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith
the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected. 8
Abrigo].
Hence, this Petition.9
On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to
Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a Issues
consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.
Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below:
On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible
Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before the "1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Villafania
Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil Case in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid.
No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a Motion
for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that neither of
"2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a
them can physically take possession of the property in question until the
purchaser for value in good faith.
instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.5
"3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title
"Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with the
over the property in question."10
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of documents,
injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages [against
respondent and Gloria Villafania]. In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses and
respondent has a better right to the property.
"After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed
Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to [petitioners] The Courts Ruling
as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was ordered to pay
[petitioners and private respondent] damages and attorneys fees. The Petition is bereft of merit.

"Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the Main Issue:
CA]."6
Better Right over the Property
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA held property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to
that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence dismissed the her.11 They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since
appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera.7 Since Gloria Villafania respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value. 12
had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita
Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was deemed void. Law on Double Sale

The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale.
found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property to
and attorneys fees. Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom petitioners, in
turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23, 1997, a second
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent Romana de Vera.
Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus: "x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act
(and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x."20
be movable property.
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the P-30522.21 The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title
Registry of Property. (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafanias name.22 As a consequence of the
sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the thereafter issued to respondent.
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the
provided there is good faith." proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in
the present case was already registered under the Torrens system,
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables petitioners registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for
transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title.13 There is no ambiguity in the application of this More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of
law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system. Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the
sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 152914 which another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act 3344.
provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument -- In that case, the "priority in time" principle was not applied, because the
except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the
effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. 15 Thus, if the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same reason,
sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the buyer inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under
but it does not affect innocent third persons.16 the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be upheld over
the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the
sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the rules
(Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property was covered by the of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this
Torrens system, they registered their respective sales under Act wise:
3344.17 For her part, respondent registered the transaction under the
Torrens system18 because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the "Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.19 unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a
better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does
system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs under not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not
Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice Edgardo L. anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to
Paras: somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
"The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals26 is a case in point. It second sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code.
was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing
application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her
case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso,
unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats
and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such
resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the
said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second
Revised Rules of Court,27 this Court held that Article 1544 of the buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the
Civil Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that
execution sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first
even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this sale and of the first buyers rights) ---- from the time of acquisition
is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs until the title is transferred to him by registration, or failing
execution sale only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, registration, by delivery of possession."34 (Italics supplied)
and merely acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of
the time the property was levied upon. Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and
"Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such certificate for
land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because the land no value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances,
longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time of the said except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. 35Thus, a person
execution sale."28 dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to
determine the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into the face of the register or certificate of title.36 Following this principle, this
believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once Court has consistently held as regards registered land that a purchaser in
registered, serves as a notice to the whole world. 29 All persons must take good faith acquires a good title as against all the transferees thereof
notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.30 whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the
sale.37
Good-Faith Requirement
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,38 petitioners contend that their prior
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent and
acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith.31 Mere negates her good faith at the time she registered the
registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the sale. Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C.
registration.32 We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of Vitug:
Appeals,33 which we quote:
"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time,
"Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second
or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs.
registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the
teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first
potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by to register, since such knowledge taints his registration with bad
the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26
rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June
1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the
protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty the property was still unregistered land.43 Such registration was therefore
buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale considered effectual.
(citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo
vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992). Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not on
all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not register
xxx xxx xxx the sale.44 In Taguba, registration was not an issue.45

"Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the second
the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the property
Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.
improve his standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that
registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights in good We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was
faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why
558). Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein:
can have the effect of constructive notice to the second
buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good "The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to
faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD
Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act
1544 has been held to be inapplicable to execution sales of that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12]
unregistered land, since the purchaser merely steps into the 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the
shoes of the debtor and acquires the latter's interest as of the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest
time the property is sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 as they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior
SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not
when there is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its
138)."39 (Emphasis supplied) face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has
actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,40 which held: such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to
registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336,
"Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs.
petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"46
the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No.
3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second Respondent in Good Faith
buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the
undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether
buyers], necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.47After its factual findings
of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it explained thus:
certificates of title in their names. x x x."41
"x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Veras vendor, appears to be
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is, registered in the
registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title and in
issuance of the TCT in their names.42 There was no registration under Act the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant [Respondent]
3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale under Act 3344, De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had
no notice of the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained
and verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the DECISION
subject property by examining her vendors title in the Registry of Deeds
and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the record ABAD, J.:
showing that when she bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew
or had the slightest notice that the same was under litigation in Civil Case This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the
No. D-10638 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, Government for its failure to acquire ownership of a privately owned
between Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a property that it had long used as a school site and to pay just
party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any compensation for it.
contrary evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know
anything about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after
The Facts and the Case
she had bought the same, and only then when she bought the same, and
only then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal
Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the [Respondent] Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by
De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the land petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through the
is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that her title Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of
under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. x x x."48 land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a
portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of
respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas) under Transfer
We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not
Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410.1
rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the general
averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to
consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the property, On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be
she would have found petitioners to be in possession.49 consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows:

This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses own admission Lot 1 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga
that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still the actual occupants
in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera purchased the Lot 2 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
property.50 The family members may reasonably be assumed to be
Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have notified respondent Lot 3 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and
of the first sale when she conducted an ocular inspection. Thus, good
faith on respondents part stands. Lot 4 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of
Lipa2
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT
T-11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and
SO ORDERED. Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but
no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for
G.R. No. 185091 August 8, 2010 Lot 4.3 Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DIVISION OF LIPA CITY (FOR City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right
PANINSINGIN PRIMARY SCHOOL), Petitioner, over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision
vs. plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the
PRIMO MENDOZA and MARIA LUCERO, Respondents.
City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has
the same. These improvements had also been tax-declared. 4 long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for
taxation purposes.14
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought
permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC
relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property decision.15 Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized the
since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained indefeasibility of the Mendozas registered title and the imprescriptible
registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-11410, which had nature of their right to eject any person occupying the property. The CA
only been partially cancelled. held that, this being the case, the Republics possession of the property
through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it ripen into ownership.
vacate the disputed property.5 When PPS declined to do so, on January
12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since it presented
Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for no documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of
unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ the government. Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas
of preliminary injunction.6 relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the governments favor,
the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the name or have its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas title. The CA
complaint on ground of the Republics immunity from suit.7 The Mendozas held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim
appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.
the Republics consent was not necessary since the action before the
MTCC was not against it.8 With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken
recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a
motion to render judgment in the case before it.9The MTCC denied the The Issue Presented
motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the
RTC upon appeal.10 Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the
MTCC,11 which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property
evidence.12 Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the that it had used for a public school.
RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.
The Courts Ruling
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered
PPS to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the
of possession since they were its registered owners. PPS, on the other Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not
hand, could not produce any document to prove the transfer of ownership mentioned by name in the application for registration or its
of the land in its favor.13 PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC notice.16 Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible.17 No
denied it. one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and
notorious possession.18 Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of
96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from ownership.
recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed
that the Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City
Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas title over the settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
property has not been disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession
plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of
been designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that the property at the time of taking that is controlling. 24
no new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion
that PPS had been occupying since 1957.19 Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from
the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the
That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its Mendozas right to just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered
improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas title. This Court the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their
has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.
absence of a certificate of title.20 Otherwise, they have little evidentiary
weight as proof of ownership.21 WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the
February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the
The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of
that it had held as government school site for more than 50 years. The respondents Primo and Maria Mendozas action for eviction before the
evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without
property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they prejudice to their filing an action for payment of just compensation
allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate, against the
when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the City of Lipa.
Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the City
Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that SO ORDERED.
the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the
government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. REMEDIOS R.
way back but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether
ESPIRITU, as guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, and
forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to
possession pending the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it ARMINIO RIVERA, Defendants-Appellees.
upon payment of just compensation. [G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956]

The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAFAEL LITAM.
his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right GREGORIO DY TAM, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, in her
to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such capacity as judicial guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA,
property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis,22 the failure counter-Petitioner, ARMINIO RIVERA, administrator-Appellee.
for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings covering a property that the government had taken
constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The Mendozas DECISION
remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not
ejectment. 1avvphi1
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court affirmed the above entitled case, which were jointly tried.
RTCs power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper
expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding No. 1537 of
compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary said court, entitled In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased
civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and Rafael Litam. The petition therein filed, dated April 24, 1952, states
damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is
that Petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, praying that her nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the
1951; that the deceased was survived by:
chan roble svirtualawlibrary chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary intestate estate of the deceased.
Li Hong Hap 40 years In due course, the court granted this petition and letters of administration
were issued to Arminio Rivera, who assumed his duties as such, and, later,
Li Ho 37 years
submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as
Gregorio Dy Tam 33 years said inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the petition,
Henry Litam alias Dy Bun Pho 29 years dated April 24, 1952, of Gregorio Dy Tam, the latter filed, on November 29,
1952, a motion for the removal of Rivera as administrator of the
Beatriz Lee Tam alias Lee Giak Ian 27 years aforementioned estate. This led to a number of incidents hinging on the
Elisa Lee Tam alias Lee Giok Bee 25 years question whether said properties belong in common to the decedent and
Marcosa Rivera or to the latter exclusively.
William Litam alias Li Bun Hua 23 years
Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special Proceeding No.
Luis Litam alias Li Bun Lin 22 years 1709 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who
that the foregoing children of the decedent by a marriage celebrated in had been declared incompetent. Thereafter, or on April 20, 1953, Gregorio
China in 1911 with Sia Khin, now deceased; that after the death of chan roblesvirtualawlibra ry
Dy Tam and his alleged brothers and sisters aforementioned, filed the
Rafael Litam, Petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the decedent complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court, against Remedios R.
had, during the subsistence of said marriage with Sia Khin, contracted in Espiritu, as guardian of Marcosa Rivera, and Arminio Rivera. In said
1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, Filipino cralaw
complaint, Plaintiffs therein reproduced substantially the allegations made
citizen; that the decedent left as his property among others, his one-
chan roblesvirtualawlibra ry
in the aforementioned petition of Gregorio Dy Tam dated April 24. 1952,
half (1/2) share valued at P65,000 in the purported conjugal properties except that the properties acquired during the existence of marriage
between him and Marcosa Rivera, which partnership consisted of the cralaw
between Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera and/or with their joint efforts
following real property acquired during the marriage between him and during the time that they lived as husband and wife were said to be more
Marcosa Rivera, to wit: chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary
than those specified in said petition, namely:
chanroble svirtuallawlibra ry

(1) Three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (1) 3 parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of
1228 of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Pampanga: chanroble svirtuallawlibra ry
Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga, issued on July 29, 1947;
(2) One (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011
of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Bulacan. (2) 2 Parcels of land, together with all buildings and improvements thereon
except those expressly noted in the title as belonging to other persons,
and that the decedent had left neither a will nor debt. Petitioner prayed,
situated in the Municipality of Navotas, Province of Rizal, covered by
therefore, that, after appropriate proceedings, letters of administration be
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836 of the Registry of Deeds for the
issued to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. Soon
Province of Rizal, issued on October 4, 1938;
thereafter, Marcosa Rivera filed a counter- petition: (1) substantially chanroble svirtuallawlibra ry

denying the alleged marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin, as well as the (3) 1 parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of
alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition; (2) asserting that chan roble svirtualawlibrary
Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 of the Registry of
the properties described herein are her paraphernal properties, and that the Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on June 12, 1933;
decedent had left unpaid debts, and certain properties in Bulan and (4) 1 parcel of land situated in Barrio of Kay-Badia, Municipality of Obando,
Casiguran, Sorsogon, and in Virac, Catanduanes, apart from shares of stock Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21809 of the
in a private corporation known by the name of Litam Co., Inc.; and (3) chan roble svirtualawlibrary

Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on May 25, 1939;
(5) 1 parcel of land (plan psu-93067, swo-16049) situated in Barrio of (3) Declaring that the properties in question, namely: the fishponds, chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary

Quibadia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer consisting of three parcels, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of certificate of Title No. 1228 of the land records of Pampanga, one-half
Bulacan, issued on April 9, 1943; undivided portion of the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in
Navotas, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, the parcel
Other properties are located in Bataan province.
of land with the improvements thereon situated in Malabon, Rizal, covered
All properties total an assessed value of approximately P150,000.00. by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248, both of the land records of Rizal,
In said complaint, Plaintiffs prayed that the judgment be rendered: and the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in Obando, Bulacan,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, both of the
chanroble svirtuallawlibra ry

(1) declaring the aforesaid properties as belonging to the conjugal land records of Bulacan, are the exclusive, separate and paraphernal
partnership or tenancy in common which existed between the deceased properties of Marcosa Rivera; and chan roble svirtualawlibrary

Rafael Litam and the incompetent Marcosa Rivera;


(4) Declaring that the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 (who are the same
(2) ordering the Defendants to deliver the aforesaid properties to the persons alleged to be children of Rafael Litam in the petition, dated April 24,
administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam (Rule 75, section 1952, filed by the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537) are not the children of the
2, Rules of Court); deceased Rafael Litam, and that his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa
(3) ordering the said Defendants further to render an accounting of the Rivera.
fruits they collected from the aforesaid properties and to deliver the same The two (2) Cases are now before us on appeal taken by the Petitioner in
to the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam; Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071. The
(4) ordering the said Defendants to pay the administration of the estate of issues for determination are: (1) Are Appellants the legitimate children of
chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary

the deceased Rafael Litam damages in double the value of the fruits Rafael Litam? (2) Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in
mentioned in the preceding paragraph which they embezzled; and chan roble svirtualawlibrary
question, or do the same constitute a common property of her and the
decedent?
(5) ordering the Defendants to pay the costs. The Plaintiffs further pray
for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the The first issue hinges on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in
premises. 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of Appellants herein. In this
connection, the lower court had the following to say:
In her answer to the complaint, Marcosa Rivera reiterated, in effect, the
chanroble svirtuallawlibra ry

allegations in her counter-petition, dated July 12, 1952, in Special the evidence weikhs very heavily in favor of the theory of
cralaw

Proceeding No. 1537, and set up some affirmative and special defenses, as the Defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 to the effect that the said deceased
well as a counter-claim for attorneys fees and damages in the aggregate Rafael Litam was not married to Sia Khin and that Plaintiffs, are not the
sum of P110,000.00. children of the said decedent. The Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and
the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 have utterly failed to prove their alleged
Owning to the identity of the issue raised in said Civil Case No. 2071 and in status as children of Rafael Litam by a marriage with Sia Khin.
the aforementioned incidents in Special Proceeding No. 1537, both were
jointly heard. Later on, the court rendered a decision. It appears from the evidence presented by the Defendants in civil Case No.
2071 and the administrator and the counter-Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537
(1) Dismissing Civil Case No. 2071, with costs against the Plaintiffs; that there was no such marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia
(2) Sentencing the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071, under the Defendants Khin and that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not children of
counterclaim, to pay jointly and severally each of the Defendants the sum of said deceased. The various official and public documents executed by Rafael
P5,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral damages; Litam himself convincingly show that he had not contracted any marriage
with any person other than Marcosa Rivera, and that he had no child. In the The birth certificate presented by the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071
marriage certificate, (Exhibit 55) it was clearly stated that he was single and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 cannot be given even little
when he married Marcosa Rivera on June 10, 1922. In the sworn application consideration, because the name of the father of the children appearing
for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950 (Exhibit 1), Rafael Litam therein is not Rafael Litam, but different persons. It is very significant to note
unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child. In the several other that the names of the father of the persons appearing in said birth
documents executed by him and presented in evidence, (Exhibits 19, 21, 22, certificates are Dy Tham, Li Tam, Lee Tham, Rafael Dy Tam, and that said
23, 46 and 46-A) Rafael Litam had consistently referred to Marcosa Rivera persons were born in different places, some in Amoy, China, another Fukien,
alone as his wife; he had never mentioned of Sia Khin as his wife, or of his
chan roblesvirtualawlibra ry China, and the other in Limtao, China. It also appears in said birth
alleged children. certificates that the childrens mothers named therein are different, some
being Sia Khim, others Sia Quien, the other Sia Khun, and still another Sia
The witnesses presented by the Defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 and the
Kian. These documents do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael
administrator and counter Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 positively testified
Litam and the persons named therein as father. Besides, it does not appear
to the effect that they know that Rafael Litam did not have any child, nor
in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner
was he married with Sia Khin. An impartial and disinterested witness, Felipe
intervened in the preparation and filing thereof.
Cruz, likewise testified that he has known Rafael Litam even before his
marriage with Marcosa Rivera and that said Rafael Litam did not have any The other documentary evidence presented by the
child. said Plaintiffs and Petitioner are entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to
prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin
On the other hand, the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the Petitioner in
and the alleged statue of the Plaintiffs as children of said decedent.
Sp. Proc. No. 1537 presented in support of their theory the testimony of
their lone witness, Luis Litam, and certain documentary evidence. It is It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs named in Civil
noteworthy that the said Plaintiffs and said Petitioner did not present in Case No. 2071 are not heirs of the said decedent, his only heir being his
evidence the marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera. (Emphasis ours.)
opinion of the Court, is the competent and best evidence of the alleged
The findings of fact thus made in the decision appealed from are borne out
marriage between them. No explanation has been given for the non-
by the records and the conclusion drawn from said facts is, to our mind,
presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has there been any showing of
substantially correct.
its loss. Neither have said Plaintiffs and said Petitioner presented any
competent secondary evidence of the supposed marriage. Appellants evidence on this point consists of the testimony of Appellant Li
Bun Lin, who said that he is, also known as Luis Litam; that his co-
The testimony of the lone witness, Luis Litam, cannot be given any
chan roble svirtualawlibrary

Appellants are his brothers and sisters; that their parents are the
credence and value at all. His testimony is mostly hearsay, as according to
chan roblesvirtualawlibra ry

decedent and Sia Khin, who were married in China in 1911; and that Sia
him, he was merely informed by Rafael Litam of the latters supposed
chan roble svirtualawlibrary

Khin died in Manila during the Japanese occupation. He likewise, identified


marriage with Sia Khin. His testimony is uncorroborated. The court noticed
several pictures, marked Exhibits I to S, which were claimed to be family
that the said witness was only 22 years old when he testified, and it appears
portraits, but the lower court rejected their admission in evidence. Although
in the petition filed by the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that said witness
we agree with herein Appellants that this was an error, it is clear to us that
is the youngest of all the alleged eight children of Rafael Litam. The Court is
said pictures and the testimony of Luis Litam, as well as the other evidence
at a loss to understand why one or some of the older alleged children of
adverted to in the above-quoted portion of the decision appealed from, are
Rafael Litam were not presented as witnesses in view of the unreliable
far from sufficient to outweigh, or even offset, the evidence in favor of
testimony of Luis Litam, and considering that older persons are better
the Appellees.
qualified to testify on the matters sought to be proved which allegedly
happened a long time ago.
It should be noted that the decedent had admittedly married Marcosa It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question
Rivera in 1922. In the very petition of Appellant Gregorio Dy Tam, in Special were bought by Marcosa Rivera with her separate and exclusive money. The
Proceeding No. 1537, dated April 24, 1952, he alleged that Marcosa Rivera is fishponds situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of
the surviving spouse of the decedent. In their complaint in Civil Case No. Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the
2071, Appellants specifically admitted and averred the existence of the fishponds situated in Navotas, Rizal with Transfer Certificate of Title No.
marriage between said Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera which would 35836, and the property situated in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, with
have been void ab initio, and, hence, inexistent legally, if Appellants Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 were all purchased by Marcosa Rivera
pretense were true or they believed it to be so and that they had lived as with the money she earned and accumulated while she was still single; chan

husband and wife. Again, although Gregorio Dy Tam, asserted, in his while the fishponds situated in Macabebe, Pampanga with Transfer
roblesv irtualawlibra ry

aforementioned petition, that he and his co-heirs came to know about the Certificate of Title No. 1228 were purchased by her with the money she
marriage of the decedent and Marcosa Rivera after the death of Rafael inherited from her late sister, Rafaela Rivera and with the money she
Litam, the very testimony of Li Bun Lin, as witness for the Appellants, show, received from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry she inherited
beyond doubt, that said Appellants knew, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam from her father Eduardo Rivera and her sister Rafaela Rivera. The properties
that he and Marcosa Rivera were living in Malabon, Rizal, openly and in question, having been bought by Marcosa Rivera, although during her
publicly, as husband and wife, and regarded her as his lawful wife. Indeed, in marriage with Rafael Litam, with her exclusive and separate money, said
the course of his testimony, said Li Bun Lin alluded to her as his mother. In properties are undeniably her paraphernal properties. (Art. 1396, Spanish
other words, aside from the circumstance that the wedding and marital life Civil Code, which is the same as Art. 148 of the Civil Code of the Phil.)
of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael Litam is undisputed, it is, also, an established
Great importance should be given to the documentary evidence,
fact that they had the general reputation of being legally married and were
vis: Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 19, 46 and 46-A, presented by the Defendants, in
so regarded by the community and by Appellants herein, during the lifetime
chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary

Civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and counter- Petitioner in Sp. Proc.
of Rafael Litam.
No. 1537, which prove beyond peradventure of any doubt that the
Upon the other hand, Appellants maintain, in effect, that Rafael Litam was properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera. In
guilty of the crime of bigamy; chan that he had, likewise, willfully and
roble svirtualawlibrary Exhibit 21, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under his oath that the
maliciously falsified public and official documents; and that, chan roble svirtualawlibrary money paid by Marcosa Rivera for the fishponds in Obando, Bulacan was her
although Appellants and Sia Khin were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera exclusive and separate money which was earned by her while she was still
whom Appellants knew resided only a few kilometers away, in single. In Exhibits 22 and 23, both dated June 16, 1947, same Rafael Litam,
Malabon, Rizal where Rafael Litam returned daily, after attending to his also under oath, acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00 and
business in Manila, the decedent had succeeded, for about thirty (30) years, P10,000.00 loaned by Marcosa Rivera to the spouses Catalino Pascual and
in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his alleged Juliana Pascual, and to Juliana Pascual, respectively, are the separate and
relations with the other. Apart from the highly improbable nature of the last exclusive money of Marcosa Rivera, in which money Rafael Litam had no
part of Appellants pretense, it is obvious that the same cannot be sustained interest whatsoever. In Exhibit 19, same Rafael Litam acknowledged the fact
unless the evidence in support thereof is of the strongest possible kind, not that he had obtained, before the outbreak of the second world war, from
only because it entails the commission by Rafael Litam of grave criminal Marcosa Rivera the sum of P135,000.00 which belongs exclusively to the
offenses which are derogatory to his honor, but, also, because death has latter, and that after the liberation, or more specifically, on January 4, 1946,
sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most effective means of defense. he stole from Marcosa Rivera the further sum of P62,000.00, also belonging
The proof for Appellants herein does not satisfy such requirement. exclusively to the latter, which amounts, totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of
interests, have not, according to the evidence, been paid to her up to the
As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the evidence thereon was
present. In Exhibits 46 and 46-A, it was acknowledged by Rafael Litam that
analyzed by the lower court in the following language:
he had not given any money to his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that they have
chanroble svirtuallawlibra ry
actually adopted a system of separation of property, each of them not as may be seen from the very documentary evidence (Exhibit EE, same as
having any interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other. Nxh. 50) presented by the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 themselves
These declarations and admission of fact made by Rafael Litam against his and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, she alone leased the properties in
interest are binding upon him, his heirs and successors in interests and third question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and the corresponding lease
persons as well. (Secs. 7 & 29, Rule 123, Rules of Court). contract, dated July 13, 1948 was signed by her as lessor and by Rafael
Suarez, Jr. as lessees. Furthermore, the properties in question have been
The finding of this Court that the properties in question are paraphernal
declared in the name of Marcosa Rivera alone, and she alone pays the real
properties of Marcosa Rivera, having been bought by her with her separate
estate taxes due thereon. (Exhibits 43, 44 & 45.)
and exclusive money, is further strengthened by the fact that, as it is clearly
disclosed by the evidence when Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal
1922, she was already rich, she having already earned and saved money as properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said
consignataria while she was still single. It also appears that she was born of properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of Marcosa
a rich family, her father, Eduardo Rivera, being the owner of fishponds, Rivera, married to Rafael Litam. This circumstance indicates that the
commercial and residential lands and buildings, (Exhibits 5 to 18, inclusive), properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as
with an assessed value of around P150,000.00 (Exhibits 25 and 42, her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering the
inclusive), now worth approximately a million pesos, and most of which same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa
properties as may be seen from the certificates of title were acquired by him Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam written after the name of
way back in the years 1916 and 1919. When Eduardo Rivera died on Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive
February 5, 1942, his cash and jewelry were inherited by his eldest daughter, of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties
Rafaela Rivera, and when the latter died single on July 2, 1943, Marcosa covered by said titles.
Rivera inherited her cash amounting to P150,000.00, Philippine currency,
On the other hand, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs in Civil Case
and and her pieces of jewelry. It is with this amount and with the proceeds
No. 2071 and Petitionerin Sp. Proc. No. 1537 in support of their contention
of the sale of some of said pieces of jewelry that Marcosa Rivera purchased
that the properties in question are conjugal is, in the mind of the Court, very
the fishponds in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga.
weak, unreliable, and mostly incompetent, and cannot overcome the clear,
On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when Rafael Litam convincing and almost conclusive proofs presented by the opposite party.
was on June 10, 1922, married to Marcosa Rivera, he was poor. He had to Scant or no consideration at all could be given by the Court to the
borrow from Marcosa Rivera, the sum of P135,000.00 belonging exclusively immaterial, incompetent and unbelievable testimonies of the witnesses
to her before the outbreak of the war, and to steal from her further sum of presented by the said Plaintiffs and Petitioners. The disputable presumption
P62,000.00 after the liberation (Exhibit 10). The said amounts totalling of law that the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal
P197,000.00, exclusive of the stipulated interests, according to the evidence, properties, upon which legal presumption
have not been paid to Marcosa Rivera up to the present. Rafael Litam did said Plaintiffs and Petitioner mainly rely has been decisively overcome by the
not contribute any amount of money or labor to the properties in question, overwhelming preponderance of evidence adduced in these cases that the
as he and Marcosa Rivera maintained an absolute separation of property properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera.
(Exhibits 46 and 46-A). Besides, during his lifetime he used to go his office in (Emphasis ours.)
Manila everyday.
Appellants counsel assail the decision appealed from upon the ground that
Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in question the lower court had been partial to the Appellees and had not accorded to
belong exclusively to Marcosa Rivera is the established fact that before she the Appellants a fair and just hearing.
became incompetent sometime in the early part of the year, 1953, she had
As above pointed out, His Honor the trial Judge could have been, and should
been administering said properties, to the exclusion of Rafael Litam. In fact,
have been, more liberal in the reception of evidence. Appellants witnesses
(Li Bun Lin, Dominador Gadi, Benigno Musni and Rafael B. Suarez) should Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have
have been allowed to testify on the alleged title of Rafael Litam to certain declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir
properties and on his alleged reasons for the language used in the public of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it
and official documents relied upon by the Appellees. However, it is apparent being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceeding
to us that said evidence cannot affect the decision in these cases. No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in
issue until the presentation of the project of partition.
The evidenciary value of the testimony of said witnesses would have
depended mainly upon their individual appraisal of certain facts, upon their Wherefore, with the elimination of the award for damages in favor of the
respective inferences therefrom and their biases or view points, and upon a herein Appellees, and of said declaration of heirship, the decision appealed
number of other factors affecting their credibility. At best, said testimony from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against
could not possibly prevail over the repeated admissions made by the the Appellants. It is SO ORDERED.
decedent against his own interest in Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
(adverted to in the abovequoted portion of the decision appealed from),
Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
which admissions are corroborated by the fact that the deceased father of
Marcosa Rivera was well to do; that aside from her share in his estate, she
G.R. No. 184148 June 9, 2014
chan roblesvirtualawlibra ry

had, likewise, inherited from a sister who died single and without issue; chan

that the lands in dispute were registered, and some were, also, leased, in
roblesv irtualawlibra ry

NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B.


her name, instead of hers and that of the decedent; and that the latter
chan roble svirtualawlibrary

CALALANG, Petitioners,
lived in her house in Malabon, Rizal. vs.
Appellants contend that the transactions covered by said Exhibits 19, 21 to ROSARIO CALALANG-GARCIA, LEONORA CALALANG-SABILE,
and CARLITO S. CALALANG, Respondents.
23 and 46 and 46-A, as well as by the other deeds referred to in the decision
appealed from, were caused to be made in the name of Marcosa Rivera, to
DECISION
the exclusion of her husband, in order to evade the constitutional provision
disqualifying foreigners from the acquisition of private agricultural lands, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
except by succession. Apart from being based, solely, upon a surmise,
without any evidentiary support, this pretense is refuted by the fact that Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
said residential property in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, was acquired on Decision dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008
1 2

April 12, 1933, or prior to the adoption of our Constitution (see Exhibits Z of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
and AA). Her transactions subsequently thereto, merely followed, therefore, 72531. The CA modified the Decision dated July 10, 2001 of the
3

the pattern of her activities before the drafting of said fundamental law. Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case
No. 370-M-91.
This notwithstanding, we do not believe that Appellants should be
sentenced to pay damages. The petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in Special The facts, as culled from the records, follow:
Proceeding No. 1537 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 contain
nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation of the herein Appellees. In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property
4

On the contrary, it may be surmised from said pleadings that Marcosa Rivera filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan on June 10, 1991, the
had no knowledge of the alleged previous marriage of the decedent to Sia respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and
Khin. Moreover, the records do not show that Appellants have acted in bad Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land
faith. against the petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang.
The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and specifically
identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol
2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly In their Answer, the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was
8

acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, acquired during the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B.
through succession as the latters compulsory heirs. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated that it was
issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba
According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two [Calalang]." Thus, the property belonged to the conjugal partnership of
marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. The petitioners
Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their likewise denied the allegation that the sale of the land was absolutely
parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain
grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession at the time of the sale. Moreover, they alleged that the respondents did
of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June 7, not have a valid cause of action against them and that their cause of
1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion action, if any, was already barred by laches, estoppel and prescription. By
Silverio. way of counterclaim, the petitioners also sought the payment to them of
moral and exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the filing of the
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage clearly unfounded suit.
with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan
and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it was only during On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the
this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the respondents. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads as
parcel of land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud follows:
in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the
land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
his first spouse. As a result, on September 22, 1974, the Register of against the defendants in the following manner:
Deeds of Bulacan issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2871 in
5

favor of Pedro Calalang only. 1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs,
their rightful share to three-fourth (3/4) of one-half (1/2) or a total
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to of 474.75 square meters at 158.25 square meters for each of the
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by
6
three plaintiffs, namely: Rosario, Leonora, and Juanito all
both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. Accordingly, the Register of surname[d] Calalang, of the real property covered by TCT No.
Deeds of Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer 283321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 in the name of Nora B. Calalang- their shares in the conjugal estate of the late Encarnacion S.
Parulan. On December 27, 1989, Pedro Calalang died.
7
Calalang [sic];

The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two 2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of 50,000.00
grounds. First, the respondents argued that the sale of the land was void for moral damages; 50,000.00 for attorneys fees and another
because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents 50,000.00 for litigation expenses.
who were co-owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of
Encarnacion Silverio, the respondents claimed that they acquired 3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims.
successional rights over the land. Thus, in alienating the land without
their consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro With costs against the defendants.
indiviso share in the property. Second, the respondents claimed that the
sale was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have
SO ORDERED. 9

the capacity to pay for the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale.
The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the
spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of
the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of With costs against the defendants.
Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the death of
Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942,the corresponding shares to the SO ORDERED.
disputed property were acquired by the heirs of the decedent according
to the laws of succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of the SO ORDERED. 10

disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal


partnership and allocated the other half to the three respondents and
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro
Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them. The trial court then
Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land.
ordered all of Pedros share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on
Firstly, it held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the
account of the sale. The trial court also ruled that because the application
disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of
for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud and
Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage. Secondly, the CA upheld
misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered as a trustee of
the indefeasibility of OCT No. P-2871. It held that although the free patent
an implied trust.
was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba
[Calalang]" this phrase was merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed the case to the Calalang at the time of the registration of the disputed property. Thus,
CA which rendered the assailed Decision on December 21, 2007. The contrary to the ruling of the trial court, upon the death of Encarnacion
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads, Silverio on June 7, 1942, the respondents did not acquire any
successional rights to the parcel of land which was exclusively owned by
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated July Pedro Calalang. However, applying the rules of succession, Pedros heirs
10, 2001of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito
MODIFIED to read as follows: Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando
Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the
and against the defendants in the following manner: respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale
by Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents were
their rightful share to the property owned by their common father unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property.
Pedro Calalang, equivalent to one half(1/2) portion of the whole As regards the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that the prescriptive
area or 633 square meters to be divided equally by the three period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten
plaintiffs, namely: years. Since the property was registered in the name of Nora in1984 and
the action for reconveyance was filed in 1991, the action has not yet
Rosario, Leonora and Carlito, all surnamed Calalang, prescribed.
each getting an area of 211 square meters of the property
covered by TCT No. 2883321 of the Registry of Deeds of On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration.
Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the property of The CA, however, denied their motion in its Resolution dated July 25,
their late father Pedro Calalang; 2008.

2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of 50,000.00 Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:
for moral damages; 50,000.00 for attorneys fees and another
50,000.00 for litigation expenses. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in rendering its December
21, 2007 Decision modifying the July 10, 2001 Decision of the trial court,
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims. and in issuing its July 25, 2008 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 23, 2008. 11
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether Pedro Calalang was the However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the
exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his records of this case would show that the records are bereft of any
daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to
respondents maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced
The petitioners argue that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of
partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying on the property as
Calalang as evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which was issued to Pedro far as she can remember and that the property was acquired by her
Calalang during the subsistence of his marriage to Elvira B. Calalang. On parents through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she
the other hand, the respondents claim that the disputed property was was unable to produce any document to evidence the said sale, nor was
transferred by their maternal grandmother, Francisca Silverio, to their she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax
parents, Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latters declaration issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we
marriage. Thus, the respondents argue that it belonged to the conjugal note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang
partnership of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion
Silverio. and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first
marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents submission that the
The petition is meritorious. subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and
was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the issue in this case requires
a reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented by the We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that the
parties in order to trace the title of the disputed property. What is involved disputed property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the second
is indeed a question of fact which is generally beyond the jurisdiction of marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground that
this Court to resolve in a petition for review on certiorari. However, a
12 the title was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira
recognized exception to the rule is when the RTC and CA have conflicting Berba [Calalang]."
findings of fact as in this case. Here, while the trial court ruled that the
13

disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio, the court a quo Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
declared that the evidence proved the sole and exclusive ownership of Registration Decree:
the disputed property of Pedro Calalang.
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the certificate of title shall set forth the full names of all persons whose
finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of interests make up the full ownership in the whole land, including their civil
the disputed property. status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as
their citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered
The trial court ruled that the respondents were able to establish that Lot belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names of
1132, Cad. 333 originated from the parents of Encarnacion, and therefore both spouses. 1wphi1

said property "either became property of Encarnacion in her own right or


jointly with her husband Pedro Calalang in 1936." In so ruling, the trial A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the
court relied on the testimony of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that her parents phrase "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" merely
built a nipa house on the subject lot and lived there before and after describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered
World War II. The trial court further noted that Rosarios testimony was owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is
corroborated by her cousin and adjacent neighbor Manolo Calalang. 14 conjugal. In Litam v. Rivera, we declared:
15
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989
properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their
properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of "Marcosa pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the
Rivera, married to Rafael Litam." This circumstance indicates that the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed
properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing
her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable
the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the
Marcosa Rivera. The words "married to Rafael Litam" written after the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property
name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles are on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares.
merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing
owner of the properties covered by said titles. evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to
prove fraud. The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of
20

It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant
16 Property must therefore be dismissed.
Pedro Calalang averred that the land was first occupied and cultivated by
him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants, WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on Decision dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008
the subject lot. But he applied for free patent only in 1974 and was issued of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
a free patent while already married to Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having 72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or the
possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed by
law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second the respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Malolos,
marriage, the subject property ipso jure became private property and Bulacan, on June 10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
formed part of Pedro Calalangs exclusive property. It was therefore
17

excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. 18


No pronouncement as to costs.

As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey SO ORDERED.
his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of
Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed
property when he alienated the same.
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,
vs.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
DECISION
decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the
19

fundamental tenets of succession:


PUNO, C.J.:
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is
basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who
the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died acquired real properties in the country as against his former Filipina
(Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered under the
908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Torrens system?
Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount
due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits The facts are as follows:
accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment,
was assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian he discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the
company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been
and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. mortgaged.
There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated
mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City.
dire need of additional income to support her children, respondent Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985
agreed. The tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a squatters and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16,
area in Gorordo Avenue. 1987 over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent
as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was
rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties
their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner
Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 1 and of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by
March 10, 19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991
referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, which Jambrich executed in his favor.
19873 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a
Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that
alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and
Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that
could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property
page 1, beside respondents signature as buyer on page 3, and at the in the Philippines.
bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued in At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial
respondents name alone. capacity to buy the disputed property with money from a supposed copra
business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and
Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich
39-MAN,4 and per Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City received while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz
dated May 5, 1988.5 Panker A.G.

However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found In its decision, the court a quo found
a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in
Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons for only two months Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and
after the break up. acquisition of [the] properties under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was
still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission
was engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaired made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrichs financial
speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed. 7
some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became
indebted to the latter for about 150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold xxx
his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for
250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." 6 On
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under
Jambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she was only working as a litigation was at the time when their relationship was still going smoothly
waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of 1,000.00 a month and and harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at
Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily accepted.
In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children . . . WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
are all stated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
(Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who
prepared the same when she was personally interviewed by her in
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the
connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So
residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land
that, if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her . . .
designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT
and if it was also true that during this time she was already earning as
Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of
much as 8,000.00 to 9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra
Mandaue City;
business, it would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be
living only in such a miserable condition since it is the observation of this
Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person 2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792
and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big issued in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the
saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she was already Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the
allowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not 3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT
enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her children.8 Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name of defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
acquire the properties under litigation or could contribute any amount for
their acquisition which according to her is worth more than 700,000.00 4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L"
when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning as avoided insofar as they appear to convey rights and interests
1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or less 2,000.00 she over the properties in question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a
could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that Descallar;
it is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she
met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him 5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the
because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children who amount of 25,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of
were already abandoned by her husband.9 10,000.00; and,

xxx 6) To pay the costs.11

The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April
included in [the contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 10, 2002,12 the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In
1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and
exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances
who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good involved in the case cited by the lower court and similar cases decided on
attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the
everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be
noted that in said cases, the title to the subject property has been issued On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to
in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et 1985 with a monthly salary of not more than 1,000.00. In 1986, when
al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by
Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a
SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 copra business were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was
SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the actually the business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She
title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All
of defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left
property he has no title thereto.13 standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report 15 submitted
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. adoption proceedings of respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed
that:
Hence, this petition for review.
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was
Petitioner assigns the following errors: accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had
no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are
(sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
there were no more foreigners coming because of the situation in the
DISREGARDING RESPONDENTS JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER
Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She was even
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICHS
renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It
PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES
was during her time of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm
IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself and her
children.16
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:
QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN
ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw
Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said Restaurants. He
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English
REVERSING THE WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL
language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of
COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN
additional income to support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned
PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14
by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon
at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue,
First, who purchased the subject properties? Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the family
particularly the children who were malnourished. After a few months
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent place.
between respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta
acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the who was miserable and financially distressed at that time accepted the
properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at offer for the sake of the children.18
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning an
estimated monthly salary of 50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as
Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary was approximately the source of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to
90,000.00. construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the
re-direct examination and during the proceedings for the adoption name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the
of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is
properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?
of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his
signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is
buyer. only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property.
installments was in postdated checks issued by Jambrich. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely
Receipts of the installment payments were also in the name of make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not
Jambrich and respondent. apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,23 and
that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.24 However, there are well-
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in
two children for ten months, where she was completely under the good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
support of Jambrich. consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did
not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings.
owner, bequeathed the subject properties to respondent. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.

Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land.
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, 26 which
of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991. is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The
capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of
or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred only
fact of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality
to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we
domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital
find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the
of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
appellate court did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court.
public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law
They differed only in their conclusions of law.
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private
lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the made by a former natural-born citizen.29
couples cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are
Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have
otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply.19 In the instant
been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the
case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and
properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-
for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent
ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino,
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner,
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.: vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary DECISION
to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from CARPIO, J.:
him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid. The Case

The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision1 dated 9
ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It March 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and
declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of the Resolution2 dated 3 August 2012 denying the motion for
strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 reconsideration. The Decision and Resolution dismissed the Appeal
and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed with modification the Decision3dated
certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent 24 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32
to pay petitioner 25,000 as attorneys fees and 10,000 as litigation (RTC-Manila).
expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
The Facts
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,32 is this since the ban on
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on
aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future generations of
9 June 1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never had common children,
Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
both of them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those
named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was
transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is
the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this
already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would
case.
be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved. Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin
Roxas (Crispin) when she married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on
18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its
Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of
MAN-1148 is REINSTATED. his wifes death in 1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968,
Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley,
Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining
SO ORDERED
portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf
sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas property was covered by Transfer
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013 Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres." 5
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban 1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
operated small business establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan
Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).6 2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino). 7 According to though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
Edilberto: considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present
at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391.
decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in cases until declared null and void.
Delpan Street. The amortizations, together with the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which Esteban requested During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorros daughter-in-law
as advance payment, were considered part of the purchase price of the Conchita Ventura (Conchita). In her first affidavit, Conchita claimed that
Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Crispin, who was a seaman, had been missing and unheard from for 35
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas properties and she years. However, Conchita recanted her earlier testimony and executed
shouldered his medical expenses.8 an Affidavit of Retraction.11

Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not
away on 31 July 1999. affect the status of the union. It applied our ruling in Nial v. Badayog: 12

Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. x x x
Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto
alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Estebans Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which [the]
nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
by Esteban and respondents.9 court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death
of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts.13
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban conjugal, and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to
was void from the beginning.10 Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the wit:
governing law at the time Esteban and Socorro were married, provides:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person shall be illegal and void from its property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
performance unless: or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan
charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation properties.16
in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. The Ruling of the CA

The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro and In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the
Esteban in the properties. It found that: RTC-Manila. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

with respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged
Vitas, Tondo, Manila covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road, Decision of the court a quo STANDS.
Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared that part of it
was first acquired by her father Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968 when SO ORDERED.18
he purchased the right of Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she x x x
bought the right to one-half of the remaining property occupied by
The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article
Ampiano Caballegan. However, during the survey of the National
148 of the Family Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code.
Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot to be registered in her
Article 148 of the Family Code states that in unions between a man and a
fathers name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits "8" to "11" x x x.
woman who are incapacitated to marry each other:
These documents prove that that she has been an occupant of the said
property in Vitas, Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got
married in June, 1980.14 x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, x x x Evangeline professed that in 1978,
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
before her father met Socorro Torres and before the construction of the
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
BLISS Project thereat, her father [already had] a bodega of canvas (lona)
and a sewing machine to sew the canvas being sold at 903 Del Pan
Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also operating Vangies Canvas If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
Store at 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, which was evidenced by co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued in her favor on 09 partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS project was constructed in 1980, faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the property became known as Units D-9 and D-10. At first, her father the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
[paid] for the amortizations for these two (2) parcels of land but when he
got sick with colon cancer in 1993, he asked respondents to continue The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
paying for the amortizations x x x. [Evangeline] paid a total of are in bad faith.
195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces of receipts x x x and
the aggregate amount of 188,596.09 for Unit D-10, as evidenced by 36 The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of Appeals,19 and held that
receipts x x x.15 the foregoing provision applies "even if the cohabitation or the acquisition
of the property occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code."20 The
The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for CA found that Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the
the acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co- purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties. Edilberto was unable to
provide any documentation evidencing Socorros alleged contribution. 21
On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 22 which was cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated 3 August 2012.23 properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.
Hence, this petition.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property
The Ruling of this Court shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro
because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December
We deny the petition. 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the
land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro
Torres."26
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties
acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by
actual contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely
1wphi1

v. Descallar24 in his petition: descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned
the property.27The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired
ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage.
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim
Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not
to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution
vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition wherein
do not apply.25
he quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
applied in the assailed decision:
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.
Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
marry each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect,
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not
credit. acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad some of the amortizations.28 Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties found that the Delpan property was acquired prior to the marriage of
are in bad faith. Esteban and Socorro.29 Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase
price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the
debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor
who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the
parties intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and
registered under the name of Esteban.

During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments


of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand,
1wphi1

Edilberto failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s alleged


monetary contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty
bound to prove the allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he
miserably failed to do so.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012


of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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