Assignment

for Sep. 16, 2017

Topics: Alien employment, special workers (apprentices, learners, handicapped), women workers, minor
workers, househelpers, night workers

Coverage: Art. 40-81, Art. 130 - 161 and related provisions of the Omnibus Rules

Statutory References:

RA 7796 (TESDA Act), RA 7796 (Dual Training Systems Act)
RA 7277 (Magna Carta for Disabled Persons)
RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act)

RA 10151 (Act Allowing Employment of Night Workers)
RA 9710 (Magna Carta for Women)
RA 7610 as amended by RA 7658 on employment of children below 15 years old
RA 10361 (Kasambahay Law)
RA 7655 (minimimum wage of househelpers)

Cases:

General Milling vs. Torres, 196 SCRA 215, GR 93666, Apr. 22, 1991

Nitto vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 654, GR 114337, Sep. 29, 1995
Bernardo vs NLRC, 310 SCRA 186, GR 122917, Jul. 12, 1999
PLDT vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 596, GR 118978, May 23, 1997
Phil. Aelous vs. NLRC, 331 SCRA 237, GR 124617, Apr. 28, 2000
Apex Mining vs. NLRC, 196 SCRA 251, GR 94951, Apr. 22, 1991





























G.R. No. 93666 April 22, 1991 Deliberating on the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioners have failed to
show any grave abuse of discretion or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION and EARL TIMOTHY CONE, petitioners, respondent Secretary of Labor in rendering his decision, dated 23 April 1990, revoking petitioner Cone's
vs. Alien Employment Permit.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, HON. BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment, and BASKETBALL COACHES The alleged failure to notify petitioners of the appeal filed by private respondent BCAP was cured when
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. petitioners were allowed to file their Motion for Reconsideration before respondent Secretary of Labor.1

Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon Law Office for petitioners. Petitioner GMC's claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer's prerogative has no legal basis at all.
Rodrigo, Cuevas & De Borja for respondent BCAP. Under Article 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an
employment permit from the Department of Labor. Petitioner GMC's right to choose whom to employ is,
of course, limited by the statutory requirement of an alien employment permit.

Petitioners will not find solace in the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As pointed out by the
R E S O L U T I O N Solicitor-General, no comparison can be made between petitioner Cone and Mr. Norman Black as the
latter is "a long time resident of the country," and thus, not subject to the provisions of Article 40 of the
FELICIANO, J.:
Labor Code which apply only to "non-resident aliens." In any case, the term "non-resident alien" and its
On 1 May 1989, the National Capital Region of the Department of Labor and Employment issued Alien obverse "resident alien," here must be given their technical connotation under our law on immigration.
Employment Permit No. M-0689-3-535 in favor of petitioner Earl Timothy Cone, a United States citizen,
Neither can petitioners validly claim that implementation of respondent Secretary's decision would
as sports consultant and assistant coach for petitioner General Milling Corporation ("GMC").
amount to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of the Labor Code and its
On 27 December 1989, petitioners GMC and Cone entered into a contract of employment whereby the Implementing Rules and Regulations requiring alien employment permits were in existence long before
latter undertook to coach GMC's basketball team. petitioners entered into their contract of employment. It is firmly settled that provisions of applicable
laws, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into
On 15 January 1990, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation contracts.2 Private parties cannot constitutionally contract away the otherwise applicable provisions of
approved petitioner Cone's application for a change of admission status from temporary visitor to pre- law.
arranged employee.
Petitioners' contention that respondent Secretary of Labor should have deferred to the findings of
On 9 February 1990, petitioner GMC requested renewal of petitioner Cone's alien employment permit. Commission on Immigration and Deportation as to the necessity of employing petitioner Cone, is, again,
GMC also requested that it be allowed to employ Cone as full-fledged coach. The DOLE Regional Director, bereft of legal basis. The Labor Code itself specifically empowers respondent Secretary to make a
Luna Piezas, granted the request on 15 February 1990. determination as to the availability of the services of a "person in the Philippines who is competent, able
and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which an alien is desired."3
On 18 February 1990, Alien Employment Permit No. M-02903-881, valid until 25 December 1990, was
issued. In short, the Department of Labor is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of
availability of local workers. The constitutional validity of legal provisions granting such jurisdiction and
Private respondent Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines ("BCAP") appealed the issuance of authority and requiring proof of non-availability of local nationals able to carry out the duties of the
said alien employment permit to the respondent Secretary of Labor who, on 23 April 1990, issued a position involved, cannot be seriously questioned.
decision ordering cancellation of petitioner Cone's employment permit on the ground that there was no
showing that there is no person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing to perform the Petitioners apparently also question the validity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, specifically
services required nor that the hiring of petitioner Cone would redound to the national interest. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, as imposing a condition not found in the Labor
Code itself. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Implementing Rules, provides as follows:
Petitioner GMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration and two (2) Supplemental Motions for
Reconsideration but said Motions were denied by Acting Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma in Section 6. Issuance of Employment Permit the Secretary of Labor may issue an employment permit to
an Order dated 8 June 1990. the applicant based on:

Petitioners are now before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari, dated 14 June 1990, alleging that: a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of Section 2 hereof;

1. respondent Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion when he revoked petitioner Cone's alien b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of any person in the Philippines
employment permit; and who is competent and willing to do the job for which the services of the applicant are desired.

2. Section 6 (c), Rule XIV, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code is null and void as it (c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant will redound to the national
is in violation of the enabling law as the Labor Code does not empower respondent Secretary to interest;
determine if the employment of an alien would redound to national interest.
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate government agencies if the Petitioners have very recently manifested to this Court that public respondent Secretary of Labor has
applicant will be employed in preferred areas of investments or in accordance with the imperative of reversed his earlier decision and has issued an Employment Permit to petitioner Cone. Petitioners seek
economic development; to withdraw their Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has become moot and academic.

x x x x x x x x x While ordinarily this Court would dismiss a petition that clearly appears to have become moot and
academic, the circumstances of this case and the nature of the questions raised by petitioners are such
(Emphasis supplied) that we do not feel justified in leaving those questions unanswered.4

Article 40 of the Labor Code reads as follows: Moreover, assuming that an alien employment permit has in fact been issued to petitioner Cone, the
basis of the reversal by the Secretary of Labor of his earlier decision does not appear in the record. If
Art. 40. Employment per unit of non-resident aliens. Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines for
such reversal is based on some view of constitutional law or labor law different from those here set out,
employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an alien for
then such employment permit, if one has been issued, would appear open to serious legal objections.
employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the Department of Labor.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Costs against
The employment permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a
petitioners.
determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at
the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired. Fernan, C.J., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
For an enterprise registered in preferred areas of investments, said employment permit may be issued
upon recommendation of the government agency charged with the supervision of said registered
enterprise. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners apparently suggest that the Secretary of Labor is not authorized to take into account the
question of whether or not employment of an alien applicant would "redound to the national interest"
because Article 40 does not explicitly refer to such assessment. This argument (which seems impliedly to
concede that the relationship of basketball coaching and the national interest is tenuous and unreal) is
not persuasive. In the first place, the second paragraph of Article 40 says: "[t]he employment

permit may be issued to a non-resident alien or to the applicant employer after a determination of the
non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of
application to perform the services for which the alien is desired." The permissive language employed in
the Labor Code indicates that the authority granted involves the exercise of discretion on the part of the
issuing authority. In the second place, Article 12 of the Labor Code sets forth a statement of objectives
that the Secretary of Labor should, and indeed must, take into account in exercising his authority and
jurisdiction granted by the Labor Code,

Art. 12. Statement of Objectives. It is the policy of the State:

a) To promote and maintain a state of full employment through improved manpower training, allocation

and utilization;

x x x x x x x x x

c) To facilitate a free choice of available employment by persons seeking work in conformity with the
national interest;
d) To facilitate and regulate the movement of workers in conformity with the national interest;
e) To regulate the employment of aliens, including the establishment of a registration and/or work
permit system;

x x x x x x x x x

Thus, we find petitioners' arguments on the above points of constitutional law too insubstantial to
require further consideration.1avvphi1
G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995 Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang
comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.
NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.
Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi
pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.

KAPUNAN, J.: (Sgd.) Roberto Capili

Roberto Capili
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision1 rendered by
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in
Arbiter. consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.4

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration
Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired benefits.
Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced
by an apprenticeship agreement2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private
1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage. respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the
ruling reads:
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was
working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims
hospital. dismissed for lack of merit.

Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial
premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without assistance.
authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover
the medication of private respondent. SO ORDERED.5

The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter3 which reads: Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was
valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement
August 2, 1990 when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow
worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper training.6
"TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay
pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya. On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop
na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate
kanyang sariling kamay. complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were
withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod: complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.

Emergency and doctor fee P715.00 SO ORDERED.7

Medecines (sic) and others 317.04
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus:
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang
kamay. As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship agreement
filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990. basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28,
1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng
Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3,
siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent, pursuant Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of
to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)
Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we
cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed.8 In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was
executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and
representative was present. submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was
filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads: Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered
at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last Employment.
performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is,
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-
apprentice relationship.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program
The issues raised before us are the following:
through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to
I establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into
existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE. DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.

II Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and
effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante")
THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by
THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT. Article 280 of the Labor Code:

We find no merit in the petition. Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed
agreement was executed.
for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
employer-apprentice relationship. nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

Petitioner's argument is erroneous. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides: broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of
apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their
apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below welfare."9
the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum
wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process,
substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the
dismissal becomes void.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This
simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend

himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11
As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written
notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee
of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which
informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book
V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the
requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which,

any judgment reached by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498
[1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after
he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and
deliberate.

Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or
"pahinante").

He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation
letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that
anyway, he did not have a choice. 13

Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's

alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of
both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.












MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL ________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at
ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO __________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).
M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS
REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS, WITNESSETH: That
COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E.
WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide
SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D.
disabled and handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials,
AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA
uplift their socio-economic well being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful
MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE
citizens to enable them to fully integrate in the mainstream of society;
CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA, ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S.
PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, petitioners vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped
AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents. persons, particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens
and authorized government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these
D E C I S I O N
positions;
PANGANIBAN, J.:
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible
The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same employment with the BANK;
terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80
status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding
of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this
written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or
Employment Contract as follows:
accommodation, but on justice for all.
1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and
The Case
faithfully work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter.
Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari[1] before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision[2] of the National
2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),[3] which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter
Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor arbiters Decision disposed as follows:[4] i Sort out bills according to color;
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit. ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;
Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution[5] of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;
Reconsideration.
iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and
The Facts
v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.
The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:[6]
3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determine
Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.
1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a
uniformly worded agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, 4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment
Records) The full text of said agreement is quoted below: in the sole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15th and end of the month.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS 5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru
Fridays, at eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as
This Contract, entered into by and between: circumstance may warrant, for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation
of 125% of his daily rate if performed during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a]
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing
rest day.
under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla,
Intramuros, Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, 6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:
(hereinafter referred to as the BANK);
i. Proportionate 13th month pay based on his basic daily wage.
- and -
ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.
iii. SSS premium payment. Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz:[7]

7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed
and Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.
1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment
2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94
program of the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied
in his/her case. Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and 3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93
conditions of the employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANKs regular
employee are not applicable to the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the 4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94
EMPLOYEEs employment with the BANK shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by
the applicable rules and regulations that the Department of Labor and Employment may issue in 5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94
connection with the employment of disabled and handicapped workers. More specifically, the
6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94
EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor Code of the Philippines as
amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not applicable to him/her. 7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93

9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier 8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
terminated by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract
shall be in writing and therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless 9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN 94
renewed in writing by the BANK.
10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of 11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
_________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.
12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990,
nineteen (19); in 1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were 13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
renewed every six months such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who
were employed by respondent under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma 14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and whose contract expired on July 1993. 15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
x x x x x x x x x 16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93

Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company 17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93
maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were
hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by 18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to
pakiusap which must be considered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate 19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
philosophy as well as its career and working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of 20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
professionals trained and qualified officers and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders
from excellent schools which is an unbending policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition 21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 93[8] 1 AUG 93
to this, training continues so that the regular employee grows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of
hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a special arrangement basis; that it adopted 22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93
the special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workers such as deaf-mutes like the
23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93
complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of counting and sorting
of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the counting and 24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93
sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the
tellers normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent 25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94
Bank plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting
26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV 93
chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of
Arturo Borjal, the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes 27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93
without creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in
the Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations. 28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93
29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air 26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93 II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment
contracts signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were
30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93 valid.
31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94
III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the
32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV 93 Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against
disabled persons.[11]
33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93
In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.
34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
This Courts Ruling
35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94
The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and
36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93 whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.
37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93 Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari
38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93 Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is
not allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the
39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air 20 APR 89 29 OCT 93
findings of public respondents that petitioners were not regular employees.
40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in
41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [SIC] a certiorari proceeding. In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall
not change the facts found by the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC
42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94 committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from
the assailed Decision.
43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93

As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?
recourse to this Court.[9] Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money
sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank.They further allege
The Ruling of the NLRC
that their contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from
In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular becoming regular employees.
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and
follows:
should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.[12] Rather, they
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that were special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never
complainants were hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities solicited the services of petitioners, whose employment was merely an accommodation in response to
whose employment[s] were covered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration the requests of government officials and civic-minded citizens. They were told from the start, with the
of contract as specified under Art. 80. Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of assistance of government representatives, that they could not become regular employees because there
the contract shall be the law between the parties.[10] were no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used to be performed by tellers. Their
contracts were renewed several times, not because of need but merely for humanitarian
The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the
prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case. petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew
anymore their special employment contracts.
Issues
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to
In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause: provide employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of
society. However, we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it
I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners -
now deems their employment irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna
money sorters and counters working in a bank - were not regular employees.
Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be
deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to
protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time
for a just and reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
automatically expire at the end of the term. That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
of the Labor Code, which provides:
The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,[14] in which this Court
ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an held:
employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed; between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of
the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work
of the applicable legal minimum wage; performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the
employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous
(c) The duration of employment period; and
and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers. evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment
is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of
respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited than six months. Thus, the following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular
provision. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller,
Persons),[13] however, justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code. Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E.
Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero,
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian,
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993.Verily, the renewal Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S.
of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their Pardo.
tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they
were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of
render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them
probationary appointments, ad infinitum.[15] The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should employment, during which the bank determined the employees fitness for the job. When the bank
be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby
the Magna Carta provides: became regular employees.[16] No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its
employees.
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities
for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their
conditions of employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such
allowances as a qualified able bodied person. cause,[17] these twenty-seven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back
wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.[18] Considering the
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no longer available because it has been
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-
assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged,[19] petitioners are hereby awarded
bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.[20]
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to
hence not entitled to the same benefits.
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed Applicability of the Brent Ruling
for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora[21] in which the Court upheld the validity of an engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the
employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is entitled to security of tenure
footing. It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment.
Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal.
x x x x x x x x x
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were
disabled, and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in
Article 80 of the Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled subsequent cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive
persons who, under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to
employment enjoyed by qualified able-bodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because perform but the day certain agreed upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their
petitioners are qualified for their positions. The validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, employment relationship. But this Court went on to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent
imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief sought to be addressed that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they
by the new law. should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working
interest.[22] Provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are class, but also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna
not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the
regulations by simply contracting with each other.[23] Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners
the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated
which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees. renewal of their employment contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are
physically impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them,
Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours
from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause.[28]
reasons that this task could not be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the
risky for them to travel at night.[24] We find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks
August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Respondent Far East Bank and Trust
to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This excuse cannot justify the termination of their
Company is hereby ORDERED to pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-
employment.
seven (27) petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr.,
Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V.
Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not change Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia
the nature of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa,
and the length of service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them. Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby directed to compute the exact amount due
each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations, within fifteen days from the finality of
Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit this Decision. No costs.
petitioners, and that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC,[25] the Court held
that the determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word SO ORDERED.
of the employer, and the procedure of hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities performed by the
employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its continued existence. Romero, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become
regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this

point. Still, we are not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is
determined not by stipulations in the contract, but by the nature of the work performed.[26] Otherwise,
no employee can become regular by the simple expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract
of employment.

In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC:[27]

Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be
secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements
inconsistent with the concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,* petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that
COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents. she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of
company rules.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor
REGALADO, J.: arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the
subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T. However, the decision of the
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for
Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company
three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other
funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent
respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of
Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her
private respondent in her employment with PT&T.
having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company
policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its
by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code. resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the
labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter.
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went 1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect
on maternity leave.[1] Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit
employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so
June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents services as pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and
reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the
leave during both periods.[2] After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social
services were terminated. legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and
retention.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of
furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions.To cite a few of the primordial ones,
was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.[3] Section 14, Article II[8] on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of
women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever
before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII[9] (the progenitor whereof
agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned
dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection
about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a
to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an
memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum,
assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article
she was reminded about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment.[4]
XIII[10] mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that
In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&Ts would enable them to reach their full potential.
policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true
2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years
civil status.[5] Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent
since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our
was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992,[6] which she readily contested by initiating
countrys commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).[11]
(COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio
City. Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727[12] which explicitly prohibits discrimination
against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training
At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the
opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955[13] which bans the mail-order-bride practice for a fee and the
information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed
export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers;
to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory note for that
Republic Act No. 7192,[14] also known as the Women in Development and Nation Building Act, which
amount in favor of petitioner.[7] All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement
affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment,
of the parties and/or their counsel.
admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces
On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; Republic Act No. 7322[15] increasing the maternity
private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by benefits granted to women in the private sector; Republic Act No. 7877[16] which outlaws and punishes
petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No.
correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied 8042,[17] or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which prescribes as a matter of
policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where simulated.[24] It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code,[18] womens employers caprices.[25] Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded. improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 In the present controversy, petitioners expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because
thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so
right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her
to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it
nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with
employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a womans right against interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim that
discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around.
this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the
marriage of a female employee. Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its
female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was
3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at the same
to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words,
severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through PT&T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity
substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted
employee, ones labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such
employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of
On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so- reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with
called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of responsible advocacy.
workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of
employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees.[19] As put in a case, This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which
an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its
employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be unlawful policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which
provided by law.[20] compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy
alone which was the cause of private respondents secretive conduct now complained of. It is
In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, caused.
afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to
petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly
dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings
merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that
she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioners
the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that youre fully submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a
aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private
you.[21] Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was
was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave.In fact, it was merely
of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the companys policy against agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the
marriage (and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case.
company.)[22] Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the
initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When
highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.[23] she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary
period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.[27] On the
she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular
that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be necessary in the usual trade and business of PT&T.[28] The primary standard of determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all policies
the business or trade of the employer.[29] and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of
Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards
cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor
back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.[30] However, as that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set forth
she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants.
of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must
be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be
the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9
totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her of the New Constitution, which provides:
compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting
therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension. Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between
4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows: bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work x x x.

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondents proposition that termination from employment of flight
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health,
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of
merely by reason of marriage. marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-
pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on
This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it
148,[31] better known as the Women and Child Labor Law, which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of had been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976.
Republic Act No. 679,[32] entitled An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to
Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes. The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of
on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social
employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of non-marriage.
establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of
time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions,
It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. Philippine considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one
Air Lines,[33] a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program
Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events.
separated from the service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in
Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. Thus: Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have
categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations,
Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondents policy or regulation with the codal provision is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of non-discrimination on the
of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employment of women.
employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in
extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial
their chosen profession. Corporation[34] considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing
from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female employees in the
We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married
controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral
148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the
those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain employer as an example of discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment
a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer
12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the
136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on Constitution.
November 1, 1974.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions
relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a sex-plus discrimination where it is
imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not
inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination

laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply to
married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main
federal statute prohibiting job discrimination against employees and applicants on the basis of, among
other things, sex.[35]

Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married
women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not against married men,
the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful.[36] Upon the other hand, a requirement that a
woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification, or

BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that
nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants,
was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight
attendants.[37]

5. Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the
right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her

employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a
woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as
an intangible and inalienable right.[38] Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish
any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.[39]Carried to its logical consequences, it
may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the
parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much
public interest that the same should yield to the common good.[40] It goes on to intone that neither

capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience
of the public.[41] In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by
petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.[42] That it must be
effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct
derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.







PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTOMOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS CHUA, petitioners, NLRC ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent Cortez to her former position with back wages
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSALINDA C. CORTEZ, respondents. computed from the time of dismissal up to her actual reinstatement.[5]

D E C I S I O N On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was
denied;[6] hence, this petition for certiorari challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The crux of the controversy may be narrowed down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely
This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996 of abused its discretion in holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is entitled
public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95 (NLRC NCR Case to damages in the event that the illegality of her dismissal is sustained. Jjjuris
No. 00-12-08759-94) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioners not guilty of
illegal dismissal. The Labor Code as amended provides specific grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the
services of an employee,[7] which grounds should be strictly construed since a persons employment
Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and constitutes "property" under the context of the constitutional protection that "no person shall be
existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" and, as such, the burden of proving that
C. Cortez was a company nurse[1] of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7 November there exists a valid ground for termination of employment rests upon the employer.[8] Likewise, in light
1994. Jlexj of the employee's right to security of tenure, where a penalty less punitive than dismissal will suffice,
whatever missteps may have been committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so
On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of
severe.[9]
petitioner corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain
within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a A perusal of the termination letter indicates that private respondent was discharged from employment
stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives against him on 2 August for "serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and fraud or willful breach of trust."
1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr. Specifically -justice
Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time
card thus making it appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6 September 1994 when in fact 1. On August 2, 1994, you committed acts constituting gross disrespect to your superior Mr. William
she was not. The memorandum however was refused by private respondent although it was read to her Chua, the Plant Manager.
and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the required explanation, so that while
her case was pending investigation the company placed her under preventive suspension for thirty (30) 2. On August 23, 1994, the Plant Manager entrusted you the amount of P1,488.00 to be sent to CLMC for
days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994. Lexjuris Mr. Fang but the money was allegedly lost in your possession and was not recovered.

On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was 3. On September 6, 1994, you caused someone else to punch-in your time card to show that you were at
issued by petitioner corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action work when in fact you were doing a personal errand for Richard Tan. As per time card you were in at
should be taken against her for allegedly failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co- 8:02 A.M. but you only arrived at 12:35 P.M.
employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994 private respondent also refused to
4. On July 28, 1994, you received an amount of P900.00 from Miss Lucy Lao to open an ATM card of nine
receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
(9) employees. On September 24, 1994, one of the employees complained by the name of Tirso Aquino
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her last known address
about the status of his ATM Card and upon query from the bank it was found out that no application and
by registered mail. Jurismis
no deposit for said person has been made. Likewise, it was found out that you did not open the ATM
Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00 Card and deposit the P800.00 for the 8 other employees. It turned out that said deposit was made after a
and the punching-in of her time card by a co-employee. month later.[10]

On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant
her termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was receiving
duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust.[2] special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her "for a date," which she would as often
refuse. On many occasions, he would make sexual advances - touching her hands, putting his arms
On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The special
non-payment of annual service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and its treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but she never
president Francis Chua.[3] reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her
understand that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination from the
On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out one day that her
legal, at the same time dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit.[4] table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal belongings
was transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which
On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor
reason, an argument ensued when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged with
Arbiter and found petitioner corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The
gross disrespect.[11]
Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the second charge, that the money entrusted to her for them.[19] The negligence, to warrant removal from service, should not merely be gross but
transmittal was not lost; instead, she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal also habitual. Likewise, the ground "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
as evidenced by a receipt duly signed by the latter.[12] employer" must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly
prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may
With respect to the third imputation, private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in her fairly be made to rest.[20] All these requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence are wanting in the
time card because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers, Richard Tan, case at bar.
and that was with the permission of William Chua. She maintains that she did it in good faith believing
that she was anyway only accommodating the request of a company executive and done for the benefit On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled
of the company with the acquiescence of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was apparently to recover such damages for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by
tolerated as the employees were not getting any reprimand for doing so.[13] malice or bad faith or that it acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her
services. In disbelieving the explanation proffered by private respondent that the transfer of her table
As to the fourth charge regarding her alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees, was the response of a spurned lothario, public respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter -
private respondent claims that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all, she was
employed as a company nurse and not to process ATM cards for her co-employees. Jksm Complainants assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant Manager where she
threw a stapler to him and uttered invectives against him was her refusal to submit to his advances to
The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, her which started from her early days of employment and lasted for almost four years, is hardly
has ruled that for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious; believable. For indeed, if there was such harassment, why was there no complaints (sic) from her during
(b) must relate to the performance of the employees duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has that period? Why did she stay there for so long? Besides, it could not have taken that period for the Plant
become unfit to continue working for the employer.[14] The act of private respondent in throwing a Manager to react. This assertion of the complainant deserves no credence at all.[21]
stapler and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be considered, from a
lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider it a serious misconduct Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4)
that would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the performance of her years to expose William Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more
duties as would show her to be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts complained of, prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William
under the circumstances they were done, did not in any way pertain to her duties as a nurse. Her Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public
employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and no respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely
other.[15] Also, the memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights. Esmm is
investigation of her case was addressed to her as a nurse.[16]
We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the
As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may
punch-in her time card, although a violation of company rules, likewise rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period
does not constitute serious misconduct. Firstly, it was done by her in good faith considering that she was within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary
asked by an officer to perform a task outside the office, which was for the benefit of the company, with depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the
the consent of the plant manager. Secondly, it was her first time to commit such infraction during her employee. Esmso
five (5)-year service in the company. Finally, the company did not lose anything by reason thereof as the
offense was immediately known and corrected. Es m Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her
employer's sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that
On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners to can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not
private respondent dated 20 October 1994[17] and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994, issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only
the money entrusted to her was in fact deposited in the respective accounts of the employees speculate how much longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to
concerned, although belatedly. We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that -Es msc transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily "monster"
roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one's employment easily but to hang on to
The mere delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by itself, to support it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent's mind, for as long as she could
a conclusion that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties. First, petitioner did not show outwit her employer's ploys she would continue on her job and consider them as mere occupational
that opening an ATM is one of her primary duties as company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to show hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years,
that Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly, and purposely delayed the opening of ATM accounts for and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all
petitioners employees. It is of common knowledge that a bank imposes upon an applicant certain that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private respondent's
requirements before an ATM account can be opened, i.e. properly filled up application forms, heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged
identification cards, minimum deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that the delay was her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he "found" the perfect reason to terminate
caused by Rosalindas neglect or willful act (emphasis supplied).[18] her. Mse sm

Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire In determining entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, we restate the bases therefor. In moral
absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid damages, it suffices to prove that the claimant has suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched
reputation and social humiliation by reason of the act complained of.[22] Exemplary damages, on the
other hand, are granted in addition to, inter alia, moral damages "by way of example or correction for
the public good"[23] if the employer "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner."[24]

Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager

showed an obvious partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he
would terminate her services if she would not give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an
imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee's spirit in her capacity for
advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private respondent
should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered,
petitioners should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive
manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to

lecherous officers and employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over their
employees. Ex sm
All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions
committed considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or
that she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently
inimical to her employers interest.[25] Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was
pending investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the
dismissal of private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners

Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation and/or Francis Chua to pay her back wages computed
from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED. However, in view of the
strained relations between the adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent,
petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every
year of service until finality of this judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private
respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. Costs against
petitioners. Kyle

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.



















G.R. No. 94951 April 22, 1991 SO ORDERED.1

APEX MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations
vs. Commission (NLRC), wherein in due course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO, respondents. 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the appealed decision. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Bernabe B. Alabastro for petitioner.
Angel Fernandez for private respondent. Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately should be a special civil action
for certiorari, and which in the interest of justice, is hereby treated as such.2 The main thrust of the
GANCAYCO, J.: petition is that private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not
as a regular employee of petitioner.
Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee
of the said firm? This is the novel issue raised in this petition. The petition is devoid of merit.

Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or
1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the "domestic servant" are defined as follows:
beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly
basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month. The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to
any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which
On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers
she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.3
supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer, Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she
was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. De la Rosa The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in
offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to the employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
quit her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners,
return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988. houseboys and other similar househelps.

On March 11, 1988, private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a
Employment. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of
to the case on August 24, 1988 the latter rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or
follows: gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its premises. They may not be
considered as within the meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
WHEREFORE, Conformably With The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent,
Apex Mining Company, Inc., Masara, Davao del Norte, to pay the complainant, to wit: The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or
1 Salary laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their
circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case,
Differential P16,289.20
whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other
2. Emergency Living agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the
business of the employer. In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the
Allowance 12,430.00 business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee.
3. 13th Month Pay Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain
aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as
Differential 1,322.32
such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such distinction. The mere fact that the
4. Separation Pay househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in
relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
(One-month for employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic
every year of
servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
service [1973-19881) 25,119.30
Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that respondent
or in the total of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND 42/100 (P55,161.42). abandoned her work.1wphi1This argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that
because of an accident which took place while private respondent was performing her laundry services,
she was not able to work and was ultimately separated from the service. She is, therefore, entitled to
appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be
interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent
NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.