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EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-11005. October 31, 1957.]
SIARI VALLEY ESTATES, INC., petitioner, vs. FILEMON LUCASAN and Hon. W. M. ORTEGA, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte,respondents.
Orendain & Sarmiento for petitioner.
Hon. Wenceslao M. Ortega in his own behalf.
Barrios, Barrios & Lucasan for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; JUDGMENT; DISTINGUISHED FROM OPINION. The final judgment as rendered is the judgment
of the court, irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. The judgment must be distinguished from the opinion, the
former prevails over the latter.
2. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATORY DECISION, CONSTRUED. In construing confirmatory decisions of appellate courts the practice is to
regard the whole of the appealed judgment to have been upheld even if several points thereof have not been discussed or touched upon in
such confirmatory decision.
DECISION
BENGZON, J p:
This is an offshoot of our decision in G.R. No. L-7046, Siari Valley Estate Inc. vs. Filemon Lucasan, 1 wherein we affirmed, on appeal, the
judgment of Hon. Patricio Ceniza, of the Zamboanga court of first instance in its Civil Case No. 134. The dispositive part of such affirmed
judgment read as follows:
Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch
". . . judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating to the Siari of Filemon Lucasan specially the 321 heads that had been
entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of this Court and ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or
their value amounting to P40,000 to pay damages to the Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold since
1946 up to the date of the trial at the rate of P100 per head or P40,000 plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of
the trial of this case in January, 1951 and to pay the cost of the proceeding. In addition, the defendant is hereby ordered to
allow the Siari Valley Estate to round up all the buffaloes that may be found in his cattle ranch after the Siari Valley
Estate shall have posted a bond in the amount of P5,000 to answer for whatever damages the operation may cause to him.
With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the charges and he is hereby sentenced
to pay a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6 Rule 64 of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he fails to pay.
With regard to the three causes of action the counter-claim of the defendant, all of them are hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
Upon petition by the intervenors, the intervention had been dismissed in a previous order of this Court, without prejudice to
the filing of an independent action. (Italics ours.)
After our decision had become final, the expediente was returned to the court below for execution. Thereupon a dispute arose whether we
had affirmed alsothat part of Judge Ceniza's judgment underlined in the above quotation (concerning buffaloes). Lucasan pointed out that, in
quoting the dispositive paragraphs of the appealed judgment, our decision had omitted the underlined portion. Therefore, he argued, the
affirmance of the judgment did not include the directive about buffaloes. As the respondent judge sustained Lucasan's contention, this
petition for mandamus and other auxiliary remedies was promptly filed.
Knowing the extent and scope of our decision in said appealed case, we issued a preliminary injunction designed to protest petitioner's
interests. And now, after the parties have been heard, we turn to the principal question, which is: did we uphold the right given to plaintiff by
the court below "to round up the buffaloes"? The answer must be: we did. In the concluding part of our decision we found the appealed
judgment to be substantially in accordance with the facts and the law; and then we adjudged: "Therefore it is hereby affirmed with cost
against appellant."
Ordinarily the affirmed judgment is that contained in its dispositive part; in the said Siari Valley appealed case, the above- quoted four
paragraphs.
It is true that in the opening statements our decision quoted the dispositive part of the appealed judgment as follows:
"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating to the Siari Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found
in the cattle ranch of Filemon Lucasan, specially the 321 heads that had been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of
this Court and ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting to P40,000, to pay
damages to the Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold since 1946 up to the date of the trial at the rate of
P100 per head or P40,000 plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the trial of this case in January, 1951 and to
pay the costs of the proceeding.
With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the charges and he is hereby sentenced
to pay a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of

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insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he fails to pay."
thereby omitting the portion regarding buffaloes. But observe that we used elliptical signs, i.e. several *'s which indicated the omission of
some portion or portions. This did not evince any intention to "modify" the judgment by eliminating the omitted portion. 2 The judgment, we
decreed in concluding, "is hereby affirmed". We did not say, it is hereby modified. Neither did we say, "the quoted portion of the judgment is
hereby affirmed".
For that matter, would respondents maintain likewise that the last two paragraphs of the dispositive part of the appealed judgment (regarding
the counterclaim and the intervenors) were not equally affirmed, because they were not quoted?
We explained in Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil., 570, 44 Off. Gaz., 4306 that "the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court,
irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision", and that the judgment must be distinguished from the opinion. Our decree
was one affirming the appealed judgment. If any statement in the opinion preceding the decree seemingly excluded a portion (which we
deny), it must be overlooked, because the judgment or the decree prevails over the opinion.
In construing confirmatory decisions of appellate courts the practice is to regard the whole of the appealed judgment to have been
upheld 3 even if several points thereof have not been discussed "or touched upon in such confirmatory decision." 4
The truth is, as may be verified from our decision itself, our statement omitted the portion concerning buffaloes because it was immaterial for
the purpose of the appeal. It was not a point necessary to understand or decide the questions then before us. 5 Indeed the whole decision
made no reference to the subject of buffaloes, even as appellant's brief (Lucasan) failed to debate such aspect of the appealed judgment.
The argument is advanced that in as much as the plaintiff "never claimed the buffaloes in its amended complaint (and) the (lower court could
not have granted that which was not prayed", therefore the Supreme Court most probably had excluded the matter (of buffaloes) from its
confirmatory order. Such reasoning has no valid foundation, because Lucasan was not in default, there was a trial, and under the
circumstances the plaintiff could be granted any relief that was supported by the evidence "although not specified in his pleadings." 6
The other argument addressed to the proposition that this Court shouldn't have, and couldn't have affirmed that phase of the judgment is too
late, if not impertinent. The affirmance without modification of the judgment is final. And the parties should realize that the matter of
buffaloes was not such plain error (supposing it was error) as to call for special consideration by this Court even if ignored 7 by appellant's
counsel in his brief.
All the foregoing shows the respondent judge's mistake in declining to permit Siari Valley Inc. to round up its buffaloes roaming on
Lucasan's ranch. But the latter's resistance to such rounding-up, founded on a rather technical plea, despite his knowledge that he had
complained of such buffaloes grazing on his land (R.A. in L-7046 p. 140), was not a mere mistake but a rather sharp practice transcending
the limits of good faith. However overruling petitioner's contention Lucasan will not be declared to have committed contempt of court
considering on the one hand that his ground of objection appeared to be not so flimsy 8 as to make his conduct a "willful disregard or
disobedience" 9 or a "clear and contumacious refusal to obey" 10 and on the other hand remembering that the power to punish for contempt
should be conservatively exercised. 11
Wherefore, the petition for mandamus is granted, the respondent judge, and whoever may be acting in his place, is hereby ordered to enforce,
and the other respondent Filemon Lucasan is ordered to obey, the aforementioned judgment in full of Judge Ceniza which was totally
affirmed by this Court on appeal. Costs of this proceeding shall be paid by respondent Lucasan. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
||| (Siari Valley Estates, In.c v. Lucasan, G.R. No. L-11005, [October 31, 1957], 102 PHIL 390-395)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997.]
FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC., respondents.
Jose F . Manacop for petitioner.
Cesar D. Turiano for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and his company, F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a
compromise agreement. The trial court approved the agreement and enjoined the parties to comply in good faith. Three months thereafter, private
respondent filed a motion for execution, which the trial court granted. The sheriff levied on several personal and real properties of the petitioner
including the subject residential house and lot. The chattels were sold at public auction in partial satisfaction of the judgment debts. Petitioner
filed a motion to quash on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. Private respondent opposed the motion and petitioner's addendum
to the motion to quash the writ of execution assailing the inclusion of the subject residential house and lot, which by its very nature exempt from
execution. Private respondent alleged that the property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not be considered as a family home on the grounds that
petitioner was already living abroad and the same was not judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution. The trial court
denied petitioner's motion to quash the writ of execution. Petitioner and his company filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
assailing the order of the trial court. Hence, the present petition. The core issue raised by petitioner is whether a final and executory decision

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promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of said code.
The Supreme Court ruled that under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became petitioner's family home
under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said code, however, the case of Modequillo vs. Breva explicitly ruled that said provision
of the Family Code does not have a retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 5, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to
be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There being no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home, it follows that petitioner cannot avail of the law's protective mantle.
Petition denied.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; FAMILY HOME; CONTRIBUTION THEREOF HAS NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT; CASE AT BAR.
Under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became his family home under the simplified process embodied
in Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. In other
words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such. There
being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home, it follows that the law's
protective mantle cannot be availed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent
provisions of the Family Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "ACTUAL" OCCUPANCY BY OWNER OR "BENEFICIARIES" AS ENUMERATED BY LAW; EXCLUDES MAIDS AND
OVERSEER. The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must
be actual. That which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is
presumptive or constructible. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be
occupied by the beneficiaries" enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code. This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home
is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated
by the Code.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a house and lot
constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?
Statement of the Case
This is the principal question posed by petitioner in assailing the Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 1in CA-G.R. SP No. 18906
promulgated on February 21, 1990 and its Resolution promulgated on March 21, 1991, affirming the orders issued by the trial court commanding
the issuance of various writs of execution to enforce the latter's decision in Civil Case No. 53271. LibLex
The Facts
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop 2and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in
consideration of P75,000.00. 3The property, located in Commonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect. an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his
company entered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of which provides:
"c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but expeditiously
as possible as their collectibles will be collected." (sic)
On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with
the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23,
1986. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of
petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were
correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to
enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured as there
was no showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact been collected. They buttressed their motion
with supplements and other pleadings.
On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the motion on the following grounds: (a) it was too late to question the September 23, 1986
Order considering that more than two years had elapsed; (b) the second alias writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c) petitioner
and his company were in bad faith in refusing to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that from February 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had
collected the total amount of P41,664,895.56. On September 21, 1989, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner and his company's
addendum to the motion to quash the writ of execution. It alleged that the property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not be considered a family
home on the grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should have
been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.
On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by

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petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables
amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not
exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioner and his company filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the lower court's Orders of September 23,
1986 and September 26, 1989. On February 21, 1990, Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari. The appellate court quoted with approval the findings of the lower court that: (a) the judgment based on the compromise agreement
had become final and executory, stressing that petitioner and his company had collected the total amount of P57,224,319.75 but still failed to pay
their indebtedness and (b) there was no showing that petitioner's residence had been duly constituted as a family home to exempt it from
execution. On the second finding, the Court of Appeals added that:
". . . We agree with the respondent judge that there is no showing in evidence that petitioner Maacop's residence under
TCT 174180 has been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with law. For one thing, it is the clear implication of
Article 153 that the family home continues to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its beneficiaries enumerated in
Article 154 actually resides therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue as such family home if none of its beneficiaries
actually occupies it. There is no showing in evidence that any of its beneficiaries is actually residing therein. On the other
hand, the unrefuted assertion of private respondent is that petitioner Florante Maacop had already left the country and is
now, together with all the members of his family, living in West Covina, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A."

Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the ground that the property covered by TCT No. 174180 was
exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion. It anchored its ruling
on Modequillo v. Breva, 4 which held that "all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code."
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to this case, the Court of Appeals explained:
"The record of the present case shows that petitioners incurred the debt of P3,468,000.00 from private respondent
corporation on February 18, 1982 (Annex 'A', Petition). The judgment based upon the compromise agreement was rendered
by the court on April 18, 1986 (Annex 'C', ibid). Paraphrasing the aforecited Modequillo case, both the debt and the
judgment preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Verily, the case at bar does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided under Article 155 of the Family Code."
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari arguing that the Court of Appeals misapplied Modequillo. He contends that
there was no need for him to constitute his house and lot as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of the
same property from the time "it was levied upon and up to this moment."
The Issue
As stated in the opening sentence of this Decision, the issue in this case boils down to whether a final and executory decision promulgated and a
writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said
Code.
The Court's Ruling
We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision and Resolution are
supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.
No Novel Issue
At the outset, the Court notes that the issue submitted for resolution in the instant case is not entirely new. In Manacop v. Court of
Appeals, 5 petitioner himself as a party therein raised a similar question of whether this very same property was exempt from preliminary
attachment for the same excuse that it was his family home. In said case, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of money. As an
incident in the proceedings before it, the trial court issued a writ of attachment on the said house and lot. In upholding the trial court (and the
Court of Appeals) in that case, we ruled that petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. Hence, petitioner's family home was not exempt from attachment "by sheer force of exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of
the Family Code cited in Modequillo," where the Court categorically ruled:
"Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the
home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
'Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have

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rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.'


The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home
as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4,
one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). prcd
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his
family in 1960 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that 'the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.' It does not mean that Articles 152 and
153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for
the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability which
was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code." 6(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 153 of the Family Code
Has No Retroactive Effect
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence was not exempt from execution in view of his failure to show that the
property involved "has been duly constituted as a family home in accordance with law." He asserts that the Family Code and Modequillo require
simply the occupancy of the property by the petitioner, without need for its judicial or extrajudicial constitution as a family home. 7
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988, 8 the subject property became his family home
under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said Code. However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family Code
does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3, 1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code 9 had to be followed for a
family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home, it follows that the law's protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the
assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family Code.
List of Beneficiary-Occupants Restricted
to Those Enumerated in the Code
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to address the other arguments of petitioner other than to correct his misconception of the
law. Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He
asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This
contention lacks merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That
which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. 10 Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
"beneficiaries" enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.
"Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of the family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who
are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for lead support."
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. 11But the law definitely
excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by an
overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case 12 is insufficient compliance with the law. cdasia
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit. This Decision is immediately executory. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
||| (Manacop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97898, [August 11, 1997], 342 PHIL 735-744)

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THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 177703. January 28, 2008.]
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C.
ARRIOLA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the November 30, 2006 Decision 1and
April 30, 2007 Resolution 2of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93570.
The relevant facts are culled from the records.
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC)
against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the
decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent
Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the
decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola
in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;
2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the
defendants to the plaintiff;
3. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED. 3
The decision became final on March 15, 2004. 4
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale
through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it. 5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land. 6 The public auction
sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house (subject house) standing on
the subject land. 7 This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, 8 praying that
petitioners be declared in contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order 9dated August 30, 2005, for the reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the subject
house included in the auction, thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement erected on the property should not be
included in the auction sale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show
that nothing was mentioned about the house existing on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's
[respondent's] initiatory Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court
did not include the house in its adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the
same. It is a well-settled rule that the court can not give a relief to that which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on which it is built is in effect to add to
plaintiff's [a] right which has never been considered or passed upon during the trial on the merits.
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be partitioned in accordance to [sic] the
aforementioned Decision as the house can not be said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not
be declared as a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and due hearing thereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgment must stand even at the risk that it
might be erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED. 10
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. 11
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 12 where he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to
proceed with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.

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In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the
RTC, in Civil Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the
public auction sale of the subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the house constructed thereon.
SO ORDERED. 13(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution 14of April 30, 2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion for contempt of court.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than those advanced by petitioners.
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure
for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a
principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by
way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v.
Go, 15 we held:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the
filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory . . .:
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings.
While such proceeding has been classified as special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous
practice tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees
therefore and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the
second paragraph of this amended section.
xxx xxx xxx
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the
offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements
therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired
jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action.
Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified
petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees,
must be faithfully observed.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case where the indirect contempt charge
is not initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a
prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt
proceeding. Truly, prior to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, such practice can no longer be countenanced. 16(Emphasis ours.)
The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply with any of the
mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified
petition. He likewise did not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a certification against
forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed outright by the RTC.
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in respondent's unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it dismissed
the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA decision assailed herein, the appellate court committed the same oversight
by delving into the merits of respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought therein. Thus, strictly speaking, the proper disposition
of the present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of respondent's unverified motion for contempt filed in the
RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71.

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However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between the parties. A seed of litigation has already been sown that will
likely sprout into another case between them at a later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject house should be included in the public
auction of the subject land. Until this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation between the parties. We must therefore deal
with it squarely, here and now.
The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction should include the subject house. The RTC excluded the subject house
because respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof. 17 On the other hand, citing
Articles 440, 18 445 19 and 446 20 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house
which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-ownership by his heirs, the parties
herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the
subject house. 21 The CA further pointed out that petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the subject house in the partition of
the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August 5, 2004, the following swapping-arrangement:
Sir:
Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple people. We are very much pleased with
the decision of Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Pias, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of
a land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Pias City.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more than twenty (20) years, we wish to request
that the 1/3 share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item
(1) or item (2), detailed as follows:
(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal . . . .
(2) Cash of P205,700.00 . . . .
xxx xxx xxx 22
We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA. We qualify, however, that this ruling
does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive
proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding, the
subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court quotes
with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house constructed on the subject lot was
not alleged in the complaint and its ownership was not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot include
the house in its adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated that it cannot give a relief to [sic] which is not
alleged and prayed for in the complaint.
We are not persuaded.
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless the pertinent rule on accession. In
general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal.
So that even if the improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are
deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of
judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be
absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently attached
thereto. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased. 24 Petitioners never controverted such claim. There
is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties
herein, 25 any one of whom, under Article 494 26 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house. 27 Therefore,
respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of said common property
from the complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short
of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the
declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of
the common property. 28What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore
susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the exact nature of
the subject house.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. 29 Petitioners add that said house has been their
residence for 20 years. 30Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of
the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:

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Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the
dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues
to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a
family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil
Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the
dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the
specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the
moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. 31
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded
from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family
home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot
extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer
period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling
reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as
suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This
signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the
individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands cannot be partitioned at this time,
even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. 32Thus, for 10 years from said
date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be
partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.

The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals 33 that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house
although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The
same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the
family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of
10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by
TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-
ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public
auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Corona, * Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, [January 28, 2008], 566 PHIL 654-670)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170829. November 20, 2006.]

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PERLA G. PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Second Division, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated December 9, 2005 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to law
and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc
Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or
less. 2
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT
No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the
co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002, 3 the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc
G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned
may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. 4
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on August 11, 2003, 5 hence he appealed before the
Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on
December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue
despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court
found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses
Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. 6
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF
OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER
2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. aScIAC
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP. 7
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a
minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be
partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He argues that as
long as the minor is living in the family home, the same continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that
even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues
to be considered as the family home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a beneficiary of the said family home,
still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only
up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private
respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of the death of their father, 8 hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one's lifetime. 9 It is the dwelling
house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. 10 It is constituted jointly
by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. 11 The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. 12
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That
which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
"beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. 13

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Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate,
who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. ADHcTE
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless
the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who constituted the family home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
comments on the effect of death of one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the continuing existence of the family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who
consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home, the property will remain as family home for
ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of death,
we believe the family home will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for its existence. If there are
beneficiaries who survive living in the family home, it will continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs who are beneficiaries of the family
home keep it intact by not partitioning the property after the period provided by this article? We believe that although the
heirs will continue in ownership by not partitioning the property, it will cease to be a family home. 14 (Emphasis
supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family.
Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing
therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are already dead, the
family home will continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and
within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same except when there are compelling reasons which will justify the
partition. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home. 15 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family
home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues
until that beneficiary becomes of age.

It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following
the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his
or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until
that minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until
he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is
entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. CIcTAE
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a
beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family;
and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants"
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where
the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V.
Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who
are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents, especially his father,
herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under
Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.

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Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. 16 Legal support has the
following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be
renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount. 17
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of
nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. 18 We agree with
this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them.
Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer
relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. EHTIDA
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the
paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition
of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period
ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-
owners should be afforded every available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, 19 no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the
common property at any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property. 20
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule
69 of the Rules of Court. Not more than three competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as commissioners to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest
of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums
of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in
which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly. 21
The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil Code. 22 Under the law of
intestate succession, if the widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of the children. However, since
only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be
given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same share as each of her two surviving
children. Hence, the respective shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1) Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2)
Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, 23 we held that an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership
among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action. 24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to conduct a
PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein,
in the following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the property and
the proper share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to the
commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may
order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the
court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter
distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs. SDHETI
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
||| (Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, [November 20, 2006], 537 PHIL 595-610)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185920. July 20, 2010.]
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN,
SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, petitioners, vs. DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO
SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO ANTENOR, respondents.
DECISION

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CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint 1 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos
(Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. By Decision 2 of April 15, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered
Ramos and the company to pay the aggregate amount of P1,661,490.30 representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay.
The Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter issued on September
8, 2005 a writ of execution 3 which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a
property in Ramos' name covered by TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property).
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the
company moved to quash the writ of execution. 4 Respondents, however, averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home,
as it has another in Antipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact served as the company's business address as borne by the company's
letterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan property was indeed the family home, only the value equivalent to P300,000
was exempt from execution.
By Order 5 of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and the company appealed to the NLRC which
affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Order.
Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died and was substituted by herein
petitioners. Petitioners also filed before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, a Manifestation questioning the Notice to Vacate issued by the
Sheriff, alleging that assuming that the Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family home straddled two (2) lots, including the lot
covered by TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to vacate the house. The Labor Arbiter was later to deny, by Decision of May 7,
2009, the third-party claim, holding that Ramos' death and petitioners' substitution as his compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at
auction of the Pandacan property. And the NLRC 6 would later affirm the Labor Arbiter's ruling, noting that petitioners failed to exercise
their right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one (1) year period or until January 16, 2009. The NLRC brushed aside petitioners'
contention that they should have been given a fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos' death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to
redeem the property, holding that to do so would give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos'. aIAEcD
As to petitioners' claim that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos' share can be
levied upon, the NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim and that the phrase in the TCT indicating the registered owner
as "Ernesto Ramos, married to Juanita Trinidad, Filipinos," did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having merely described
Ramos' civil status.
Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in ruling that the market value of the property was P2,177,000 as assessed
by the City Assessor of Manila and appearing in the documents submitted before the Labor Arbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan
property was constituted as the family home in 1944, its value was way below P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code was
applicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution.
In the assailed Decision 7 of September 24, 2008, the appellate court, in denying petitioners' appeal, held that the Pandacan property was not
exempted from execution, for while "Article 153 8 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, [it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."
The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code, hence, there was still a need to
either judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property as petitioners' family home before it can be exempted; and as petitioners
failed to comply therewith, there was no error in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.
The only question raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the Court of Appeals Decision holding that the
levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the
dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must
remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. 9
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. 10 lays down the rules relative to the levy on execution over the family home, viz.: SCaITA
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be
proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a
family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The
family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the
family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in
urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All
existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and areprospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its

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beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home
must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. (emphasis
supplied)
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and
what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted
either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. 11 Judicial constitution of the
family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court's order with the Registry of Deeds of
the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 12 of the Civil Code and
involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one
of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute
extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
under Art. 154 13 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts
depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art.
155 14 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. IDCHTE
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges
that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved. 15
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must
comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos' family home, the law's protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the
records show that the sheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos' bank accounts 16 were already closed
while other properties in his or the company's name had already been transferred, 17 and the only property left was the Pandacan property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Ramos v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 185920, [July 20, 2010], 639 PHIL 192-202)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004.]
CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 15, 1996 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C
which compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to
the latter in the amount of P500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent
Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one
supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioner's household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought
her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner's child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in
March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner's wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her
to Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz
City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos. DSETcC
Petitioner Camelo Cabatania's version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he
hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return
to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner's wife, hence she was told to look for another job.

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In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year's Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the
Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to
lend her some money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and
when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioner's house hoping to be re-employed as a servant there.
Since petitioner's wife was in need of one, she was re-hired. However petitioner's wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about
the father of the unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go
home and they did not see each other anymore.
Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencia's counsel. She was demanding support for private respondent
Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to
Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house
for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that she misrepresented herself as a
widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the
child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minor's mother,
Florencia Regodos.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the plaintiff in support of the claim to "be
meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse with the plaintiff's mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied
paternity to the child. The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the
personal appearance of the child, then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with
plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos." 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:
The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not prejudice the right of petitioner-
appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a witness has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in
some particulars, it is not required that the whole of her testimony be rejected (People vs.Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is
perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other
facts (People vs.Delas, 199 SCRA 574, 575). There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse
with appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth to appellee
(TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit "A"). acADIT
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial court and there being no evidence
that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. 3
Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON
THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-
APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.4
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general rule, factual issues are not within the province
of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not
be reviewed on appeal except (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
justifies a different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions. 5
The trial court's finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was based on the testimony of the child's mother and
"the personal appearance of the child."
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. 6 An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. 7
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

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(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. SAcaDE
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
xxx xxx xxx
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or consent of
petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person. 8
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity. 9 Thus, certificates
issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted
indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. 10
Aside from Florencia's self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present
sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencia's testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of
Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her
testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencia's husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. 11 The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy. 12
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of
features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondent's petition for recognition and support is dismissed. aHICDc
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ ., concur.
||| (Cabatania v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124814, [October 21, 2004], 484 PHIL 42-52)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005.]
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondents.
Juan Orendain P. Buted for petitioner.
Stephen L. Monsanto for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; LEGITIMATE CHILDREN; THE LAW REQUIRES THAT EVERY
REASONABLE PRESUMPTION BE MADE IN FAVOR OF LEGITIMACY. The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor
of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: "Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress." The law requires that every
reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals.
"The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPUGNING THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD IS A STRICTLY PERSONAL RIGHT OF THE HUSBAND OR, IN
EXCEPTIONAL CASES, HIS HEIRS; CASE AT BAR. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1) (b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no
standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the
legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and

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thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY PROCEEDS FROM THE SEXUAL UNION IN MARRIAGE, PARTICULARLY
DURING THE PERIOD OF CONCEPTION. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during
the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the bases of Article 166 (1) (b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may
be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible. This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during
the period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
violation of prison regulations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ASSERTION BY THE MOTHER AGAINST THE LEGITIMACY OF HER CHILD CANNOT AFFECT THE
LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD BORN OR CONCEIVED WITHIN A VALID MARRIAGE; CASE AT BAR. An assertion by the mother against
the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. . . . A mother has no right to disavow
a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardo's legitimacy.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; NECESSARY ONLY WHEN THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD IS BEING QUESTIONED OR
WHEN THE STATUS OF A CHILD BORN AFTER THREE HUNDRED DAYS FOLLOWING THE TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE IS
SOUGHT TO BE ESTABLISHED. The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this
case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
formally offered. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. Although a record of birth or birth
certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is
necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of
marriage is sought to be established. Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested
collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case
was improper and uncalled for.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BETWEEN THE CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH WHICH IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE CHILD'S ILLEGITIMACY
AND THE QUASI-CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF LAW OF HIS LEGITIMACY, THE LATTER SHALL PREVAIL; CASE AT BAR.
[A] record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may
be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive
presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more
weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN, DISTINGUISHED. Law, reason and common sense dictate that a
legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to
bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance. On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half
of that of his legitimate counterpart. Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a 'bastard'
is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo
favors his interest.
8. ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE; IN CASE OF ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, VISITATION
RIGHTS IS GRANTED TO A PARENT WHO IS DEPRIVED OF CUSTODY OF HIS CHILDREN. In case of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such
visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other's company. There being no such parent-child relationship
between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
9. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to
provide protection to those of tender years. Through its law, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that
their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This
is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection before as well
as after birth. 1 In case of assault on his rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with
the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. 2 After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa's parents in Fairview, Quezon
City. 3 Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. 4
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his
marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. 5 He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980,
she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. 6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in
Loyola Heights, Quezon City. 7

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Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she never
lived with Mario at all. 8
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the
latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. 9
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the 'bastardization' of Gerardo.
She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision "INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the . . . decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-
called 'visitation rights' . . . between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday." 10 She argued that there was nothing in the law
granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child." 11 She further maintained that Jose Gerardo's surname should be
changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother's surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of 'Concepcion' as Jose Gerardo's surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa's motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something they should never do if
they want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must
have a father figure to recognize something that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the Court believes that the
emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with
his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of
Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known asthe Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration."
WHEREFORE, the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED. 12
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She
likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardo's surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate
and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 13
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the
appellate court affirmed the "best interest of the child" policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t bottom, it (was) the child's welfare and
not the convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours once a week." 14
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother's surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother,
should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry. 15
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the case for
oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues involved in the controversy. EHSAaD
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed
its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to
Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called
"marriage" with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma.
Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent 'marriage'
between [Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can
claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the
child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]);
it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible
rapprochement between the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship. 16
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose
Gerardo's birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movant's argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially
admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the
Family Code mandates:
"The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare
declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who

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are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even
the birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the
mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is. 17 (Emphasis
supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied. 18 Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. 19 Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. 20
As a guaranty in favor of the child 21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. 22 We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case
of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals 23 :
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) 24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma.
Theresa's husband Mario or, in a proper case, 25 his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his
wife. 26 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. 27 Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the
legitimacy of her child. DHAcET

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. 28 To overthrow this
presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could
have enabled the husband to father the child. 29Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 30
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. 31
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. 32 This may take place, for
instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. 33 Or, the husband
was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations. 34
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is
also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access
between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to
make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary.
There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa
and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa's statement in her answer 35 to the petition for annulment of marriage 36 that she never lived with Mario. He
claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardo's argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresa's statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This
declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family
Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child
born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together
with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed
that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardo's conception and birth. Far from
foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of
physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa's statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper
case, his heirs. 37 A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. 38 Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law
to question Jose Gerardo's legitimacy.

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Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her
offspring is illegitimate. 39 The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of
the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children. 40
Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The
fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an
agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to
make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband.
These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. 41 Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who
may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in
evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. 42
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. 43 Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be
used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, 44 as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only
when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is
sought to be established. 45
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the
husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 46 As prima facie evidence, the statements in the
record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements
made therein by the interested parties. 47Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo's illegitimacy and the
quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it
bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardo's illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the
child's interests at heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law,
the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full
inheritance. 48 On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can
claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. 49 Moreover (without unwittingly
exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a 'bastard' is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor.
Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons who were passionately declaring their
concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a
year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes
to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. 50 A person's surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from
parent to child. 51 Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardo's name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation
should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is
deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other's company. There
being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and
unequivocal:
Article 8. Child's Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child,
his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It
is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years. 52 Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents,

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to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family
acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and
lineage. ADEaHT
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., took no part.
||| (Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, [August 31, 2005], 505 PHIL 529-546)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002.]
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO,
PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
Castillo & Poblador for petitioner.
Quisumbing Ignacio Guia & Lambino Law Offices for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao.
Allegedly, Corazon is legally married to but living separately from Ramon Yulo, that Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao where a
child, herein petitioner, was then conceived and born. The issue is may petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
his supposed father, William Liyao?
The Court ruled in the negative. The fact that Corazon had been living separately from her husband at the time petitioner was conceived and born
is of no moment. Physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife, as a ground for impugning the legitimacy of the
child, may only be invoked by the husbandor in proper cases, his heirs. The petition initiated by Corazon Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then
minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr., as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao,
cannot prosper. The settled rule is that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Petition was denied.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; LEGITIMATE CHILDREN; DISCUSSED. Under
the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children
does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy
of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil
Code provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred
days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the
three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the husband; 2) By the fact
that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the serious illness of the husband. AaEcDS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPUGNING LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD; GROUNDS; PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE HUSBAND TO
HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITH HIS WIFE MAY ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE HUSBAND OR HIS HEIRS. The fact that
Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it
bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the
husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a
strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. It is settled that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter
cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child
cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. ACcDEa

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DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No.
45394 1 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all
successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein
respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. 2 The complaint was later amended to
include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao," petitioner
having been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime." 3
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the
said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They
lived together in the company of Corazon's two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely: Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo,
in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyao's legitimate children, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at
the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president, respectively. IcTCHD
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to
the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of
William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment,
Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital,
William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing
were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of
Billy's birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company 4 and
gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. 5 William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had
their pictures taken together. 6
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy's
godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao's legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. 7 Corazon also presented pictures in court to
prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. 8 During the
occasion of William Liyao's last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy
as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking
son." 9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William
Liyao by the latter's direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after
William Liyao's death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao
left his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last
moments with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her
children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely,
Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like
birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couple's residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would
usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often
visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close
friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and
knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and
matriculation fees for the two (2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyao's birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the
Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, "Look,
this is my son, very guapo and healthy." 10 He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make
it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring." 11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on
December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyao's funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue
and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph 13 as well as another shirt of lime green 14 as belonging to the deceased. A note was also
presented with the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From William." 15 Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mother's
birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married
to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire
cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited
Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and
Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazon's house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas

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of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to White Plains,
Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he
insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty.
Brillantes' wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house,
paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from
Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his
family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latter's death on December 2, 1975.
Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enrique's half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the
house as well as in the office. Enrique's testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing
Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. 16 Linda grew up and lived
with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that
there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo
Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would
change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other people's homes. Linda
described him as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As
a businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack
which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co.
He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign
his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred
legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary
restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3)
days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to
spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the records
from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment 17 of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon
Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda's father, Corazon went to Linda's office for
the return of the former's alleged investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company.
Linda added that Corazon, while still a vice-president of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of
William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things
again." 18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go.
Linda did not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of men's
clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San
Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her father's death on December 2, 1975. 19 Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests
(CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and he had to
stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication, takingaldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio
Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control. 20 Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated
that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William
Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late father representing
payment to lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by Corazon
Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latter's office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that
he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 o'clock in the morning. At past 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick.
It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly. Sometime in
September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for
the latter among which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of
Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyao's breast and decided later to carry and bring him to
the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.

Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she
was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as
if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the
garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latter's law office. Being the driver of
Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty.
Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers' wives. During his employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not
remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like shopping.

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On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao,
to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao,
entitled to all successional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit. 21
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William
Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein
petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as
securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging
petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the
child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife was
physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the
testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not secured legal
separation, were seen in each other's company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate
court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient
to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates
and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof
of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to
prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyao's signature and name do not appear
thereon. ETIDaH
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence
presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the
real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. 22 The presumption of legitimacy of
children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. 23
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code 24 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she
cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was
conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of Separation," 25 executed and signed by Ramon
Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the future. 26
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no
moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy
of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be
invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. 27 Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. 28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest
such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 29
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel

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recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child
born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. 30 We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or
in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed,
and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother's alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown,
the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. 31
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner
amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There
is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the
initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through
Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law. cACDaH
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioner's claim of
alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his
alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
||| (Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, [March 7, 2002], 428 PHIL 628-643)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000.]
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
Pablito C. Pielago, Sr. for petitioner.
Dulcesimo Tampus for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the
Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046. Respondent asserted that she was the only surviving child
of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Carinosa. Flora Guinto, the natural mother of herein petitioner and the housemaid of the late
spouses, caused the registration of the facts of birth of her child, without the consent of the spouses, by simulating that the petitioner was the child
of said spouses. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the birth certificate of petitioner null and void and ordering
the local civil registrar to cancel from the registry the questioned birth certificate. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's
decision and, accordingly, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Aggrieved by the decision, petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorariquestioning the decision rendered by the trial and appellate courts.
The Supreme Court found the petition devoid of merit. The Court ruled that the present case alleged and showed that Hermogena did not give
birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action did not impugn petitioner's filiation to spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. In sum, the Court found no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the
trial and appellate court that petitioner was not the child of respondent's parents. Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision
was affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ARTICLE 171 OF THE FAMILY CODE; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. Article 171 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn
petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
2. ID.; PRESCRIPTION; ACTION TO NULLIFY THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. The present action involves the
cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family

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Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; OFFICIAL DOCUMENT ENJOYS PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY; CASE AT BAR; EXCEPTION.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in
the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already
irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed
that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.Second, the circumstances
surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy,
such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the
pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were
possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age
necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital. ISHaCD
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was
already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because
her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the
said certificate. LexLib
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the
March 18, 1999 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals 3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in
Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows: cdphil
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto." 4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void 'ab initio';
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City
BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for private
respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (hereafter referred to as
TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
"From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted 'that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl
was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said
spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65
years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature x
x x ; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista
Guinto, in their house, assisted by 'hilot'; that the birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally
a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her
status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent Teofista Babiera's birth
certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is clinically and medically impossible for the
supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b)
Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was already 65 years old, that
the void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the
estate of cancelled and declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be]
render[ed] declaring x x x the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and
ordering the respondent local civil registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.

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"Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the
petition and the date of hearing thereof 'in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the
legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff
has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant
petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss.

"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of private
respondent Teofista Babiera. [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private respondent.'
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that
plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the
matter [is that] plaintiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her
Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student's Report Card x x
x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the
respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal
capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred
by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code." 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also
ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at
the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding
the advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local
civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy,
and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs
asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab
initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the mother. LibLex
Hence, this appeal. 6
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding
of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of
limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public record of
petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent." 7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Subject of the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 8 of the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be
impugned only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides
that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit." 9 The interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the
former. 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances
in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of
the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare
that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does
not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. cda
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:

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"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
xxx xxx xxx
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or
other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is
that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA
451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken.
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal
heir of the deceased.'" 12 (Italics supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170
of the Family Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
"ARTICLE. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of
the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where
it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth
of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier." LibLex
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy.
Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not
prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.13
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially Hermogena's testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot overcome the
presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in
the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already
irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. 14 More important, the Court of Appeals observed
that the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence
of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was
presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years
old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her
advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner, and
that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part: cdasia
"q. Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera, what
can you say about that?

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a She is not our child.


xxx xxx xxx
q Do you recall where she was born?
a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to time.
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?
a No, sir." 15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other than the said document to
show that she is really Hermogena's child. Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the
former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of
respondent's parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Vitug, J., is abroad on official business.
||| (Babiera v. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, [June 15, 2000], 389 PHIL 34-44)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994.]
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; ACTION TO IMPUGN THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD; RULE. A
careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child
by proving; (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE FOR ACTION TO CLAIM INHERITANCE OF A CHILDLESS DECEDENT. Doubtless then,
the appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an
action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat
Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, not an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADOPTION; CANNOT BE VALIDATED BY MERE REGISTRATION OF A CHILD IN BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS THE
CHILD OF THE SUPPOSED PARENT. Appellee's birth certificate with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly
questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly the
mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under the experienced,
skillful, and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would
have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was
supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife attending? At this juncture, it
might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption
to simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Vicente O. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he
could avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the

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parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come
around doing so either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal
rights of such child, and even amounts to stimulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
4. ID.; CIVIL REGISTER; BOOKS MAKING UP THE CIVIL REGISTRY AND ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING THERETO ARE
CONSIDERED PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND SHALL BE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS THEREIN STATED. We sustain the
findings in case at bar as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not negated by the documentary
evidence presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente
Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary evidence,
presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. Of said rebutting
evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian executed on July 20, 1982
by Vicente Benitez, and Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized document, they stated the "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants." In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated
the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty eight years after he
signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25,
1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez
Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br.
30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
"4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly establish,
given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and whose estate
had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa
Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally
adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . . ."
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of
Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate; (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late
Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared and
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that
the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr.
Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late
Vicente, then 77 years of age, 2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who were unable to
physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters of administration
and declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. LexLib
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive
portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is REVERSED and another one entered declaring that appellee Marissa
Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and,
therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED; said petition and the
proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of Special
Proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the Rules.

Costs against appellee.


SO ORDERED."
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.

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In this petition for review, petitioner contends:


"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the
provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in adopting or upholding
private respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child;
"2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's
birth, still the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial
evidence of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth
and sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
"3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a way not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches."
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These
articles provide:
"Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
"Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both
are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. cdrep
"Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
"1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse.
"2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband except
in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
"3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the
birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where
it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth
of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
"Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
Article only in the following case:
"1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
"2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
"3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies
as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err
when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending
that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless

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deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as follows:
". . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological
and blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that
said couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from
somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and
loved her as their own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she was really their
only daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.llcd
"The strong and convincing evidence referred to by us are the following:
"First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a
child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married for ten
years and was already about 36 years old and still she has not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had to
refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his
mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years. There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the
youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through law school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected
and consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her
youngest daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but
Isabel wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought
home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez
Lirio was already 77 years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo City, so that the taking of her
testimony by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her
advanced age and weak physical condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly
trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be interested in
material things anymore and can be expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There were also several
disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia
Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday
especially as she had a drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but that they never saw her to have been pregnant, in
1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all,
and that this is also true with the rest of their townmates. Resurreccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician
who used to set her hair once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see Isabel ever become
pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day
when she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the baby came from,
and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).

The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that
cannot be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant and could not have, therefore,
delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at
the rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure
that she is not the true mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly
questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who was already 36 years old at the time of the child's supposed
birth, was truly the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not have been born
in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino
Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been difficult and quite risky to her health and even
life? How come, then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the
expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps
Atty. Vicente O. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble if not the expense of adopting the
child Marissa through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife as the parents of the child in her birth
certificate. Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little older but did not come around doing
so either because he was too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an
adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982,
state in the extrajudicial settlement Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole heirs of the deceased
ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died without descendants or ascendants"? Dr. Chipongian, placed on the witness stand

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by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and that he
signed the same only because the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make
such a statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is really not his and his wife's daughter and descendant
and, therefore, not his deceased's wife legal heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document
without understanding completely the meaning of the words "descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This
we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec.
13, 1990). Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased
sister and brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives. LLpr
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa Benitez is really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death, would write a note to her husband and Marissa
stating that:
"even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my child or only daughter will inherit what is legally
my own property, in case I die without a will,"
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her husband
"that any inheritance due him from my property when he die to make our own daughter his sole heir. This
do [sic] not mean what he legally owns or his inherited property. I leave him to decide for himself regarding
those."
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since
Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her
husband to give appellee although without any legal papers her properties when she dies, and likewise for her husband to
give Marissa the properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their
daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the
date December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and
Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to
have the same birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and his
wife's child and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother."
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not negated by the
documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing
that her parents were the late Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been
signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related
above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of petitioner's
Certificate of Live Birth. Of said rebutting evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente Benitez, and Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized
document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants".
In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was
petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. LibLex
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
||| (Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, [January 24, 1994])

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 69679. October 18, 1988.]
VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON
FACTORY, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA MARIA
FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA, BONIFACIA FRIANEZA, HEIRS OF DOMINGO
FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA VILMA and DECIDERIA all surnamed
FRIANEZA, HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE FRIANEZA, in her behalf and as Guardian ad
litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all surnamed FRIANEZA, respondents.
Ethelwoldo R. de Guzman for petitioners.

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Tomas B. Tadeo, Sr. for private respondents.


SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURTS; CONCLUSIVE; CASE AT BAR. Petitioners' first and
fourth assignments of error raise factual issues. The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of
Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is conclusive upon Us. Well entrenched is the rule
that "factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs.
IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
2. ID.; PRIVATE WRITINGS; SECTION 22, RULE 132, RULES OF COURT; EVIDENCE OF EXECUTION, NOT NECESSARY; NOT
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "Where a private writing is more
than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given" does not apply to petitioners' Exhibit "5," the
supposed birth registry record of defendant Violeta Cabatbat showing that she was born on May 26, 1948, at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in
Dagupan City, and that her father and mother are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza, respectively. In rejecting that document, the
trial court pointedly observed: "This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza
Frianeza was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza was never admitted in the hospital as an obstetrics case before or after
May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15, 1948 (Stipulation of Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23, 1977, Record on Appeal, p.
117) . . . Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud
on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5.
3. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; ARTICLE 263, CIVIL CODE; ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY; INAPPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR. Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the protagonists are her sisters and the children of her
deceased brothers on one hand, and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child. LibLex
Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Lim Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of
the Intermediate AppellateCourt, now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV-67055), which affirmed the trial court's decision finding that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the offspring, hence, not a legal heir of the late Esperanza Cabatbat. LLphil
The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case
No. D-3841), praying for the partition of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate
was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the
child of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, Consorcia, Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed
Frianeza and the children of her deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo.
In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the
spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat were: 1) the absence of any record that
Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter was born; 2) the
absence of the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947
and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly born; 3) certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the Office
of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in
Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4) certification dated June 16, 1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied in the Calasiao Pilot Central
School, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as her guardians only, not as her parents; 5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she
was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21, 1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child there and that she became acquainted with a
patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat. cdphil
Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are the evidence of herein petitioners consisting of: 1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record which was filed
on June 15, 1948 showing that she was born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she is a legitimate child of the
spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat; 2) testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that Violeta is his child with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza; 3)
testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that
child; 4) the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride; 5) Deed of Sale dated May
14, 1960, wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat; and 6)
another Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat.
Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that Violeta Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses Esperanza and
Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

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"(1) Finding that defendant VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM is not a child by nature of the spouses, decedent Esperanza
Frianeza and defendant Proceso Cabatbat, and not a compulsory heir of the said decedent;
"(2) Declaring that the heirs of the decedent are her surviving husband, defendant Proceso Cabatbat and her sisters,
plaintiffs CONSORCIA, MARIA, BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and BONIFACIA alias ANASTACIA, all surnamed
FRIANEZA, her brothers deceased DANIEL FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse, Adela Vda. de Frianeza, and
their children, Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, all surnamed FRIANEZA, and deceased DOMINGO
FRIANEZA, represented by his surviving spouse Desideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza and their children, Francisco, Dona, Vilma
and Decideria, all surnamed FRIANEZA;
"(3) Finding that the estate left by the decedent are the thirty properties enumerated and described at pages 13 to 19 supra
and an equity in the Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum of P37,961.69 of which P13,221.69 remains after advances obtained
by the deceased during her lifetime and lawful deductions made after her death;
"(4) That of the real properties adverted to above, three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso is the share of defendant
Proceso Cabatbat, as the surviving spouse, one-half (1/2) as his share of the conjugal estate and one-half (1/2) of the
remaining one-half as share as heir from his wife (decedent's) estate, while the remaining one-half (1/2) of the other half is
the group share of the heirs of the brothers and sisters of his wife and of the children of the latter if deceased, whose names
are already enumerated hereinbefore in the following proportions: one-sixth (1/6) each pro-indiviso to Consorcia, Maria,
Benedicta alias Jovita, and Bonifacia alias Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6) to Adela B. Vda. de Fraineza, Darlene, Daniel, Jr.,
Dussel and Daisy Glen, as a group in representation of deceased brother DANIEL FRIANEZA, and one-sixth (1/6) to
Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and Decideria as a group in representation of deceased brother
DOMINGO FRIANEZA;
"(5) That of the balance of the equity of the deceased in the CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY in the sum of P13,221.69,
three-fourths (3/4) or P9,916.29 is the share of Proceso Cabatbat as surviving spouse and as heir of his deceased wife, and
the remaining one-fourth (1/4) to the plaintiffs under the sharing already stated in the preceding paragraph; (a) but because
defendant Proceso Cabatbat has overdrawn his share he is ordered to return to the estate the sum of P796.34 by depositing
the same with the Clerk of Court; and (b) defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, not being an heir, is ordered to return to the
estate the sum of P2,931.13 half of what she and her co-defendant Proceso Cabatbat withdrew from the equity of the
deceased under Exhibit 29, receipt dated April 30, 1977;

"(6) Ordering jointly defendants Proceso Cabatbat and Violeta Cabatbat Lim to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00,
the sum of P4,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and P1,000.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, and litigation
expenses in the sum of P1,000.00 from defendant Proceso Cabatbat and P200.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, to
the plaintiffs, and to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 236-239, Record on Appeal.)
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 25, 1984.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Petitioners have elevated the decision to Us for review on certiorari, alleging that the Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of Prospero and Esperanza Cabatbat;
2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of Court;
3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil Code;
4. In disregarding Exhibits 8,9,10, and 11 of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim.
Petitioners' first and fourth assignments of error raise factual issues. The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a factual finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is conclusive upon
Us. Well entrenched is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs.
IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). cdphil
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "Where a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody
in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given" does not apply to petitioners' Exhibit "5," the supposed birth registry record of defendant
Violeta Cabatbat showing that she was born on May 26, 1948, at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, and that her father and
mother are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza, respectively. In rejecting that document, the trial courtpointedly observed:
"This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission of the hospital does not show that Esperanza
Frianeza was ever a patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza was never admitted in the hospital as an
obstetrics case before or after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to June 15, 1948 (Stipulation of Facts, Pre-
Trial Order of May 23, 1977, Record on Appeal, p. 117).
"On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that only one woman by the name of the Benita Lastimosa
of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita
Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa (Exhibit S. Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p. 39, Record on Appeal, pp. 117-118).

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Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry
the birth certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates of the hospital
for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita Lastimosa." (pp. 3-4, CA Decision, pp.
13-14, Record on Appeal.)
Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the
genuineness of her Exhibit 5.
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased. LLphil
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of
Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving sisters of the deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate
pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
||| (Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69679, [October 18, 1988], 248 PHIL 684-691)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997.]
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
Benjamin P. Quitoriano for petitioners.
Ramoso Law Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; FILIATION; LEGITIMACY; GENERAL PRESUMPTION THAT CHILDREN BORN IN WEDLOCK ARE
LEGITIMATE; ISSUE THEREOF CANNOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled
is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes
Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for re-conveyance. This is aside from the further consideration that private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of
petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF. The burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in
their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift
the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must
adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and unless or until it
is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a presumption must be
followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus
established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. Indubitably, when private respondent opted not
to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted
the truth of such fact.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONIES; EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE; DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE;
CONDITIONS. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration
was made ante litem motam, that is, not before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY DISCUSSED. American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the
relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when men It must be
supported by evidence aliunde. The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant's estate, the relationship of the proved by the
declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the

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declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES NO FURTHER EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR. The present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declarant is rendered
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an
absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent. Where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's own
relationship to another person. it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the
declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
6. ID.; ID.; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; INSUFFICIENCY ADMITTED WHEN NOT TIMELY OBJECTED.
While the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the
considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time
they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered
in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waived. The
proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the
inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a
waiver of the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to
the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. Thus, for instance, failure to object
to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.
7. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. Private respondent may no longer be allowed to present
evidence by reason of the mandate under Section I of revised Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence."
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 1 which affirmed
the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to
Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment
thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero who is the sister of petitioners' father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant
or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3,
1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit
of Extrajudicial Settlement 2adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988,
Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in
the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that
they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. cdtai
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the
estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of
the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney' s fees for the willful and
malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands
and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said deceased; and

(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of the spouses Martin
Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to
prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller;
certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton

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Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora
Guerrero. 4Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment 5was filed by herein
private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation
with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it
falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and
the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is
inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the
baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof
required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue
on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per
se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are
basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for
reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We
disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that
civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: 'The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.' This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the
legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the
matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily
available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it,
in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory." 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present
action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the
legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the
presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial
court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well
as the time and effort necessitated thereby. cdtai
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to
establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the
presumption. 10The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming

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illegitimacy. 11And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the
contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may
stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. 14Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on
the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption
of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to
evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that
presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are
thereby considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of
the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage
certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which
she identified and explained in the course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to
the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration
was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the
other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the
pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration
itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
"One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the
admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do so by declarant's own statements as to declarant'
s relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving
nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a
member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common
family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from
the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite different. In such case the
declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is
admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not
the real ground for its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it
is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have noted
is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of
necessity." 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from
the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.
There must be some independent proof of this fact. 18As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the
declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be
relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there
was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving
such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that
declaration made by the decedent. cdtai
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further
proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration
is the declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the
very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by
reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. 22It is elementary

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that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, 23otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, 24since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the
question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may
be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. That objection to a
question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of
incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand,
where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the
documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection
thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of
said documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor
were already apparent at the time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which
objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia
Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30(Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the
names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and
the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter,
together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the children of
Hermogenes Dezoller these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is
in consonance with the rule that a prima facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31Finally, it may not
be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the
declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
"Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001."
"Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided
between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly
alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-
fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively. cdrep

All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs' evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless,
private respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and
private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourth (3/4) share therein,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J ., is on leave.
||| (Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, [July 31, 1997], 342 PHIL 550-567)

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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 95229. June 9, 1992.]
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT
CUYUGAN, respondents.
Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioner.
Jose P. Bondoc for E. Cuyugan.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JOINDER OF ACTIONS; PROPER IN ACTION TO COMPEL RECOGNITION AND THE
OTHER TO CLAIM INHERITANCE. Petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al., wherein we
said: "The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a
natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the
affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In
other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so
peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other
cases. . . . . "The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by
our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to
compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother . . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are
before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings."
2. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD UNDER THE FAMILY CODE; RULE. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, therefore, if the action is based on the
record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten
signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous
possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has
been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, 1989
ed., 249.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHETHER THE RIGHT OF A MINOR CHILD TO FILE THEREOF IS A VESTED RIGHT OR NOT; CASE AT
BAR. Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child
to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. (The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, pursuant to the clarification in Memorandum Circular No. 85 of the Office of the
President, dated November 7, 1988.) We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (l5
G.R. No. 92326, January 24, 1992.) where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to
have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired
by the enactment of a new law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY STATUTORY CHANGE IN MATTERS OF PROCEDURE. Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may
affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to
validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the
question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article l75 of the Family Code finds no proper
application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she
represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
DECISION
REGALADO, J p:
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito
Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated
on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed
petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being
petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No. 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9,
1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo

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Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:


"2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased
father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983;
"3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and
Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child
who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest ofsaid Atty. Ocampo;
"4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had been
sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be
gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which
are hereunder reproduced:
'. . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save
my heart to you and to Chad.'
'. . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our sake and for the child sake.'
'. . . Keep him. Take good care of him.'
'. . . I'm proud that you are his mother . . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me
entitle him to all what I am and what I've got.'
'. . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.'
'. . . How is CHAD and you . . .'
'. . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love each other and
CHAD is the product of our love."
"5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
"6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal property, located in
Baguio City, Angeles City and in the provinceof Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos;
"7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving
heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
"8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag,
Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is
filed;
"9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the
sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support
from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
"10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said
demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the
late Atty. Ocampo:" 3

xxx xxx xxx


Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and
personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to
give him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She
maintained by way ofaffirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit is
barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes ofaction. 4
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October
20, 1987:
xxx xxx xxx
"The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to adduce evidence on the various
claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides.
"WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring
additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case is set for pre-
trial . . ." 5

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With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth
Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the
complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded
in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
"The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the
'primary right to redress a wrong' (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the complaint,
plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is
therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action, despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and
then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after another is
definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents as
natural guardian that is instituting the action.
No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition within four years
from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code, Art. 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo,
is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The defendant's claim that there
was a misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to
entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
"The nature of the case 'CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE' does not control the body of the complaint.
"From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance and, therefore, the motion to
dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations of the complaint
are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists.
"WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED." 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
"a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER
DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OFTHIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the general
rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the special civil action of certiorari;
"b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before
Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this
Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval when
the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will; of Art. 175, Par. 2, in
relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish
illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action for
recognition of a natural child; and
"c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings." 10
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is
premature and the complaint states no cause of action. She submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action,
by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter.
Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there
exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private
respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter
alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court;

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and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants therein
be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action
and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that
case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate
child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that
it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one
to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi inPaulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely
alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein
the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al., 12 wherein we said: llcd
"The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the
opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the
two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that
the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to
the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally
applicable in other cases. . . . .

"The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent
supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled,
that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may
maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs . . . ; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . . In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious
reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before
the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings."
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed. cdphil
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the
reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action,
has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised
on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply
retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment ofhis majority;"
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the
parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on
other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the

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putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article
285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within
four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child. cdrep
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an
action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in the recent
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in
matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so
pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be governed by the law
regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family
Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a rightof private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is,
therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet
prescribed. LibLex
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the
case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
||| (Tayag v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95229, [June 9, 1992])

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998.]
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; PROVISIONS THEREOF CAN BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
SINCE NO VESTED RIGHTS WERE IMPAIRED; CASE AT BAR. The Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs
the present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco served as a judicial confirmation of Article 256 of the Family
Code regarding its retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true here, it appearing that neither the
putative parent nor the child has passed away and the former having actually resisted the latter's claim below.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN ACTION TO ESTABLISH ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION UNDER ARTICLE 172 REQUIRES HIGH STANDARD OF
PROOF; RATIONALE THEREOF. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. . . . For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the
second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of
proof" is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. The foregoing standard of proof
required to establish one's filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere
or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
3. ID.; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; LACHES; ELEMENTS THEREOF. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. The last element is the

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origin of the doctrine that stale demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his
legal rights.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THAT LACHES SETS IN INSPITE THE SUCCESSFUL SHOWING
OF RESPONDENTS, DELAY IN ASSERTING HER CLAIM; CASE AT BAR. As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it
was incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINA's delay in asserting her claim,
but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event, it must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. Since the instant case involves
paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial
then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; SCHOOL RECORDS, BIRTH AND BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATES NOT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE AS TO THE ISSUE OF PATERNITY, WHEN THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE PUTATIVE FATHER HAS PARTICIPATED
IN THE PREPARATION OF SAID DOCUMENTS; CASE AT BAR. MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar concerning her birth is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Simply
put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother
or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on the latter's part. In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates and
school records renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.
6. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE CANNOT BE ADMITTED INDIRECTLY AS
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local Civil
Registrar and the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible
in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
7. ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE; FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE; VARIOUS
NOTES AND LETTERS WRITTEN BY PUTATIVE FATHER'S RELATIVES ATTESTING FILIATION, INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS NOT CONSTITUTING "FAMILY POSSESSIONS"; CASE AT BAR. We hold that the scope of the enumeration
contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as
"family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have
been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a
family tradition." Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates. Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions"
as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130,
Section 41 regarding common reputation, it having been observed that: [T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the
general repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to
establish pedigree. . . . [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or
vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
8. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN ADJUDGING THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS;
PETITIONER'S TESTIMONY WHICH WAS COMPRISED OF MERE DENIALS, RIFE WITH BARE, UNSUBSTANTIATED RESPONSES,
LACKS CREDENCE; CASE AT BAR. Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCO's defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was
comprised of mere denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as "That is not true," "I do not believe that," or "None that I know." In
declining then to lend credence to FRANCISCO's testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the
truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early as 1921: The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the
natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing
numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his
demeanor the falsity of his message. For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately related
to the principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not
infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as "I don't know" or "I don't remember." . . .
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
32860 1 which reversed the decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 16373. 2 The latter
dismissed the complaint of private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco
Jison (hereafter FRANCISCO). cda

In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error, which, in this instance, necessitates an inquiry into the
facts. While as a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court, nevertheless, in light of the conflicting findings of facts of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls under an exception to this rule. 3

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In her complaint 4filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the
nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had
enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged
that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant
(CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
In his answer, 5 FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized
MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no
right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the
complaint and an award of damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.
After MONINA filed her reply, 6 pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on the following issues:
1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about the end of 1945 or the start of
1946?
2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latter's own acts and those of his
family?
3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by estoppel, laches and/or
prescription?
4. Damages. 7
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio
Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO for a total of six (6) years at Nelly
Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo residence. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCO's wife suffered a miscarriage or abortion,
thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCO's wife managed a nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which
operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby allowing FRANCISCO free access to MONINA's mother, Esperanza
Amolar, who was nicknamed Pansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya (nanny) of Lourdes from July 1946 up to February 1947.
Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden two (2) weeks before Adela started working for the Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in September 1946,
or about one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask FRANCISCO for support. As a result, Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife,
quarreled in the living room, and in the course thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her baby. To which, Lilia replied: "I
did not tell you to make that baby so it is your fault." During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly
inside the house listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he worked as FRANCISCO's houseboy at the latter's house on
12th Street, Capitol Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed
Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCO's daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a letter of introduction from Lagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of MONINA, 8and as he paid for the telephone bills, he
likewise identified six (6) telephone cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA arrived in Bacolod City, she introduced
herself to him as FRANCISCO's daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCO's house, but when the latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio would
"conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see her face." Once, Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCO's
sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in Silay City; another time, at the residence of FRANCISCO's cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez Cuaycong. Finally,
Arsenio declared that the last time he saw MONINA was when she left for Manila, after having finished her schooling at La Salle College in
Bacolod City.
On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA be hidden whenever
FRANCISCO and his wife were around; that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the Bacolod house only once, they called
each other "through long distance;" and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as "Daddy" during their lone meeting at the Bacolod house and
were "affectionate" to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod house twice: first for a month, then
for about a week the second time. On both occasions, however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad. Finally, Arsenio recalled that
FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat MONINA like his (FRANCISCO's) other daughters.
The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City, initially touched on how he and his wife were related to
FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's wife and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family trees of the Jison and Lopez families,
which showed that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, then told the court that the family of Vice-
President Lopez treated MONINA "very well because she is considered a relative . . . by reputation, by actual perception." Zafiro likewise
identified Exhibits X-13 to X-18, photographs taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando Lopez, which showed MONINA
with the former Vice-President and other members of the Lopez family.
Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for some of MONINA's school needs and even asked
MONINA to work in a hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCO's wife, a certain Remedios Lopez Franco,
likewise helped MONINA with her studies and problems, and even attended MONINA's graduation in 1978 when she obtained a masteral degree
in Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh. X-12). Moreover, upon Remedios' recommendation, MONINA was

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employed as a secretary at Merchant Financing Company, which was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the wife of another first cousin of
FRANCISCO's wife and among whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife and Danthea's husband. In closing, Zafiro identified MONINA's
Social Security Record (Exh. W), which was signed by Danthea as employer and where MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first cousin of her husband, Eusebio D. Lopez; and that she came
to know MONINA in the latter part of 1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for employment at Merchant Financing Co., which
Danthea managed at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea "as being reputedly the daughter of Mr. Frank Jison;" and on several
occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latter's husband understand that MONINA was "reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]."
While MONINA worked at Merchant Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the latter part of 1966, as
Remedios left for Manila and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with
them. During MONINA's 6-month stay with them, she was not charged for board and lodging and was treated as a relative, not a mere employee,
all owing to what Remedios had said regarding MONINA's filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from Merchant Financing as she
was called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Danthea's husband who lived in Bacolod City.
Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden in various capacities:
as a procurement officer, hacienda overseer and, later, as hacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971, Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask
"her daddy" (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her, but FRANCISCO answered that he did not have the money to give,
then told MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the middle of September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr.
Cruz at the Iloilo pier and bring him to the office of Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA entered a room while
Romeo waited outside. When they came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for MONINA to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be
released to MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol intended not to give MONINA a copy of the document
she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document she signed and ran outside.
Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his motive for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted to help MONINA be recognized as
FRANCISCO's daughter.

Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was employed by FRANCISCO's wife at the Baguio Military Institute
in Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy worked at FRANCISCO's office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda expenses, typing vouchers and office
papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for the haciendas. From the nature of his work, Rudy knew the persons receiving money from
FRANCISCO's office, and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job, Rudy gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4)
times, upon instructions of a certain Mr. Lagarto to give MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that he first met MONINA in 1965,
and that she would go to Nelly Garden whenever FRANCISCO's wife was not around. On some of these occasions, MONINA would speak with
and address FRANCISCO as "Daddy," without objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw FRANCISCO give MONINA money
thrice. Rudy further declared that in April 1965, FRANCISCO's office paid P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of MONINA's
mother. Finally, as to Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the court that he simply wanted to help bring out the truth "and nothing but the truth,"
and that MONINA's filiation was common knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly Garden.
On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCO's office to MONINA were not reflected in the books of the office, but were
kept in a separate book, as Mr. Lagarto explained that FRANCISCO's wife and children "should not know [of] this." Rudy further revealed that as
to the garden "meetings" between FRANCISCO and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and
before leaving, and FRANCISCO's reaction upon seeing her was to smile and say in the Visayan dialect: "Kamusta ka iha?" ("How are you,
daughter?"); and that MONINA was free to go inside the house as the household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes, MONINA would
join them for lunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Central Santos-Lopez in Iloilo from 1951 up to
1961, then at Nelly Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or
1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as office manager.
Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her P15.00 monthly allowance given upon FRANCISCO's
standing order. Alfredo further declared that MONINA's filiation was pretty well-known in the office; that he had seen MONINA and
FRANCISCO go from the main building to the office, with FRANCISCO's arm on MONINA's shoulder; and that the office paid for the burial
expenses of Pansay, but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it from FRANCISCO's wife. Alfredo also disclosed that the
disbursements for MONINA's allowance started in 1961 and were recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the allowances ceased when
MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in Bacolod City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as FRANCISCO's accountant-auditor.
Once when Alfredo went to the offices of Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCO's
income tax return, Alfredo chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked her how she came to work there, she answered that "her Daddy,"
FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza. Alfredo then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., was
the most trusted man of FRANCISCO.
Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCO's houseboy at Nelly Garden from November 1953 up to
1965. One morning in April 1954, MONINA and her mother Pansay went to Nelly Garden and spoke with FRANCISCO for about an hour,
during which time, Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters away. Due to the noise of the vacuum cleaner,
FRANCISCO and MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their conversation. As FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they
came, Pansay answered that they came to ask for the "sustenance" of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head and
asked: "How are you Hija?," to which MONINA answered: "Good morning, Daddy." After FRANCISCO told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he
pulled something from his wallet and said to Pansay. "I am giving this for the child."
In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagarto's office where Dominador was to get "the day's expenses," while MONINA was claiming
her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The next month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in the office that MONINA was there to
get her allowance "from her Daddy." In December 1960, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of
FRANCISCO's wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift "and she was calling Don Vicente, Lolo (grandfather)." At that time, FRANCISCO

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and his wife were not around. Then sometime in 1961, when Dominador went to Mr. Lagarto's office to get the marketing expenses, Dominador
saw MONINA once more claiming her allowance.
Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs. Franco's residence as
she recommended him for employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA, who was then about 15 years old,
together with Mrs. Franco's daughter and son. Mrs. Franco pointed at MONINA and asked Dominador if he knew who MONINA was. Dominador
answered that MONINA was FRANCISCO's daughter with Pansay, and then Mrs. Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs.
Franco) and that she was sending MONINA to school at the University of San Agustin.
Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that he worked for
FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to work at Elena Apartments in
Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments, where she revealed to Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her.
Lope then confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope "don't get hurt and don't cause any trouble, because I am willing to support your Inday
Pansay and my child." Three (3) days after this confrontation, Lope asked for and received permission from FRANCISCO to resign because he
(Lope) was hurt.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that
as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was
born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on 20 April 1965) and
FRANCISCO. 9MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her
father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto,
or saw FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different
schools, 10but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling. prLL
For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required a week's
hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963, she enrolled
at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school
supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she
was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two (2) semesters at University of San
Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of records (Exh. Z showing that FRANCISCO was listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1]), she transferred
to "De Paul College," just in front of Mrs. Franco's house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western Institute of
Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelor's degree in Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and
Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle
University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as "Guardian" (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).
MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to wit: Luz, the household cook; the houseboys Silvestre and
Doming; the housemaid Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente, Adelina; and others. MONINA likewise
enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto, Tingson, Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and others), and
identified them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then corroborated the prior testimony regarding her employment at Merchant
Financing Co., and her having lived at Hotel Kahirup and at Mrs. Cuaycong's residence in Bacolod City, while working at the hospital owned by
Mrs. Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO at Elena Apartments at the corner of Romero and Salas
Streets, Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs. Franco's mother, with whom she stayed up to
June 1968. Upon her return from Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she wanted to work, so the latter arranged for her employment at
Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she
would start working first week of September, sans examination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at her
Forbes Park residence in Makati. MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and asked him for money to go to Spain, but
FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak Spanish and would not be able find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO ordered a helper to
send MONINA out of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged
her, gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return to Bacolod City and promised that he would give her the money.

MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket (Exh. M) which FRANCISCO gave. She called Mr.
Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed by Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll cards (Exhs. G to L), with annotations at
the back reading: "charged and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison" and were signed by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-1). PLDT issued a
certification as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB). Likewise introduced in evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by
Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on MONINA's behalf (Exh. N).
MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo and sign a certain affidavit, before Mr. Cruz would turn
over the money promised by FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirol's office in Iloilo, but after going over the draft of the affidavit, refused to sign
it as it stated that she was not FRANCISCO's daughter. She explained that all she had agreed with FRANCISCO was that he would pay for her
fare to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew about her illegitimacy. She started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the
affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded that he was also a father and did not want this to happen to his children as they could not be blamed for
being brought into the world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to the latter's Forbes Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by
JRS courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod City where they discussed the affidavit which she
refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard about MONINA going abroad, the affidavit would
"keep her peace."
MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirol's office, she was accompanied by one Atty. Fernando Divinagracia, who advised
her that the affidavit (Exh. P) 11 would "boomerang" against FRANCISCO "as it is contrary to law." MONINA returned to Bacolod City, then met

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with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did not relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971, she signed the
affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA
received a Bank of Asia check for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO allegedly promised to give. As
Atty. Tirol seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son
of FRANCISCO's elder sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCO's elder brother), addressed to another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilio's
daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCO's
daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA
review, board exam and graduate studies. After finishing her graduate studies, she again planned to travel abroad, for which reason, she obtained a
letter of introduction from former Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as FRANCISCO's wife was going to arrive at the latter's
Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa
Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCO's wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice President Fernando Lopez and his wife,
Mariquit, even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible
employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez expressly recognized MONINA
as FRANCISCO's daughter. As additional proof of her close relationship with the family of Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified
photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14 April 1985.
MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr. (Junior) and Elena, but
MONINA had met only Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with Junior and the two (2) occasions when she
met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when she sought his blessings to get married.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 48. As
additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores
Argenal.
FRANCISCO declared that Pansay's employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the
other female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At that time, his
household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated
with him again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed
any knowledge about MONINA's birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINA's tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted
that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees despite
absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez, Zafiro
Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he fired Alfredo Baylosis upon discovering that Alfredo had
taken advantage of his position during the former's absence. FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy Tingson and Romeo Bilbao, but did not give the
reasons therefor.
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINA's long distance calls from his Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he subsequently
discovered this, he fired certain people in his office for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the caretaker of his Bacolod residence,
FRANCISCO explained that since MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycong's residence, the caretaker thought that he could allow people who lived at
the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCO's) house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nelly's Garden from 1963 up to 1974, then from 1980 up to 1986, the assistant overseer of
Hacienda Lopez, testified that he did not know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when he was informed by FRANCISCO that
MONINA had sued him; and that he never saw MONINA at Nelly's Garden, neither did he know of any instructions for anyone at Nelly's Garden
to give money to MONINA.
Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCO's bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986, testified that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo Baylosis due to
certain unspecified discrepancies; and that he never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr. Lagarto or Mr. Baylosis; Upon questions from
the trial court, however, Teodoro admitted that he prepared vouchers for only one of FRANCISCO's haciendas, and not vouchers pertaining to the
latter's personal expenses.
Iigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nelly's Garden from 1964 up to 1984 as a field inspector, paymaster, cashier and,
eventually, officer-in-charge (OIC). He confirmed Alfredo Baylosis' dismissal due to these unspecified irregularities, then denied that
FRANCISCO ever ordered that MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iigo never heard FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his
(FRANCISCO's) daughter.
Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCO's daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know) MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, on the
occasion of the birth of Lourdes' first son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes' aunt casually introduced Lourdes and MONINA to each other, but
they were referred to only by their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or 1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes' house in Sta. Clara
Subdivision requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was then job-hunting. However, Lourdes did not comply with the
request.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller & Cruz from 1968 up to 1971, however, he did not personally
interview her before she was accepted for employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening procedure before being hired. Jose
recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza, reported that MONINA claimed to be FRANCISCO's daughter. Jose then told Mr.
Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop her from spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with
MONINA, who told him that she planned to leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that purpose, and in exchange, she would sign
a document disclaiming filiation with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that

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meeting, MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienza's report. Jose then informed Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCO's personal lawyer, about the matter.
Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirol's) office in Iloilo. Jose then wrote out a letter of introduction for
MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol. Jose relayed Atty. Tirol's message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then later, Atty. Tirol told Jose to go to
Iloilo with a check for P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirol's office, Jose saw MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some
documents. MONINA then expressed her willingness to sign the document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that he drew the P15,000.00 from his
personal funds, subject to reimbursement from and due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.

Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946, testified that she knew that Pansay was Lourdes' nanny; that
Lourdes slept in her parents' room; that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment to Pansay, that there was no "unusual relationship"
between FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there was any, Dolores would have easily detected it since she slept in the same room as Pansay.
Dolores further declared that whenever FRANCISCO's wife was out of town, Pansaywould bring Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and
that Pansay would not sleep in the room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay stopped working for FRANCISCO and
his wife in October, 1944.
The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21 October 1986, thereby hearing only the testimonies of
MONINA's witnesses and about half of MONINA's testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera, Jr. heard the rest of MONINA's
testimony and those of FRANCISCO's witnesses.
In its decision of 12 November 1990 12 the trial court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the complaint with costs against MONINA. In the
opening paragraph thereof, it observed:
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against defendant Francisco
Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at the time when plaintiff, reckoned from her date of birth, was already
thirty-nine years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was instituted twenty years after the death of plaintiff's mother,
Esperanza Amolar. For the years between plaintiffs birth and Esperanza's death, no action of any kind was instituted against
defendant either by plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latter's parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such an action
against defendant immediately upon her mother's death on April 20, 1965, considering that she was then already nineteen
years old or, within a reasonable time thereafter. Twenty years more had to supervene before this complaint was eventually
instituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without, however, summarizing the testimonies of the
witnesses nor referring to the testimonies of the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of the issues.
The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for witness Lope Amolar to have noticed that Pansay was
pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena Apartments in November 1945, since Pansay was then only in her first month of pregnancy; that there was
no positive assertion that "copulation did indeed take place between Francisco and Esperanza;" and that MONINA's attempt to show opportunity
on the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider "that there was also the opportunity for copulation between Esperanza and one of the several
domestic helpers admittedly also residing at Nelly's Garden at that time." The RTC also ruled that the probative value of the birth and baptismal
certificates of MONINA paled in light of jurisprudence, especially when the misspellings therein were considered.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINA's evidence thereon "may either be one of three categories,
namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." To the first category belonged the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and
Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINA's filiation was based, as to the former, on "utterances of defendant's wife Lilia and Esperanza
allegedly during the heat of their quarrel," while as to the latter, Alfredo's conclusion was based "from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is
defendant's daughter, from his personal observation of plaintiff's facial appearance which he compared with that of defendant's and from the way
the two (plaintiff and defendant) acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had then opportunity to closely observe them together." To
the second category belonged that of Dominador Savariz, as:
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nelly's Garden and allegedly on those occasions when defendant's
wife, Lilia was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and
Esperanza related to the paternity of the latter's child. . .
The RTC then placed MONINA's testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded her by FRANCISCO's relatives under the third category,
since the latter were never presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the letters from FRANCISCO's relatives (Exhs. S to
V).
As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for it was of "the perception . . . that the benefits of Article
268 accorded to legitimate children may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same manner as the Family Code has so
provided;" or by laches, "which is [a] creation of equity applied only to bring equitable results, and . . . addressed to the sound discretion of the
court [and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this case immediately upon the death of her mother Esperanza in
1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, . . . there seems to be no inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff."
The RTC ruled however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she signed "when she was
already twenty-five years, a professional and . . . under the able guidance of counsel."
Finally. the RTC denied FRANCISCO's claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file the complaint with malice, she having been
"propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause."
MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and sought reversal of the trial court's decision on the grounds

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that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE THIS CASE AGAINST APPELLANT
DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANT'S DELAY IN FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER
CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANT'S WITNESSES AS
TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE AND INCREDIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS PART OF HER EVIDENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE ACTUAL ACT OF COPULATION
BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANT'S MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY TESTIFIED TO SAID
EFFECT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY IDENTIFIED NOTES AND
LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE APPELLEE AS HEARSAY.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT (EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR
AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF REINFORCING SAID CLAIM. 13
Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellee's Brief. 14
In its decision of 27 April 1995, 15 the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no vested or acquired rights were affected, the instant case was
governed by Article 175, in relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code. 16 While the Court of Appeals rejected the certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO did not sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other
means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, such as "the baptismal certificate of the child, a judicial admission, a family bible
wherein the name of the child is entered, common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses . . ." 17To the
Court of Appeals, the "bottom line issue" was whether or not MONINA established her filiation as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter by
preponderance of evidence, as to which issue said court found:
[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA] is the illegitimate daughter of
[FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such status by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were already sufficient
to establish MONINA's filiation:
As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolar's testimony by saying that Lope could not have detected
Esperanza's pregnant state in November, 1945 since at that point in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of pregnancy.
Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import of his
testimony. As . . . Lope . . . was asked about an incident that transpired more than 41 years back; [u]nder the circumstances,
it is unreasonable to expect that Lope could still be dead right on the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and confronted
his sister. At any rate, what is important is not the month that they met but the essence of his testimony that his sister
pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for her pregnancy, and that upon being confronted,
[FRANCISCO] assured him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would appear then that in an attempt to find fault
with Lope's testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even [FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not
deny that he was confronted by Lope about what he had done to Esperanza, during which he unequivocally acknowledged
paternity by assuring Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.
The Court of Appeals further noted that Casabuena and Savariz "testified on something that they personally observed or witnessed," which
matters FRANCISCO "did not deny or refute." Finally, said court aptly held:

Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies . . . let alone such circumstantial evidence as [MONINA's]
Birth Certificates . . . and Baptismal Certificates which invariably bear the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot
go along with the trial court's theory that [MONINA's] illegitimate filiation has not been satisfactorily established.
xxx xxx xxx
Significantly, [MONINA's] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCO's] former employees, Arsenio Duatin,
Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. . .

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xxx xxx xxx


Carefully evaluating appellant's evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-
a-vis [FRANCISCO's] controversion thereof, We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA]
and [her] witnesses . . . all bearing on [FRANCISCO's] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing that he had continuously
acknowledged [MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact [FRANCISCO]
himself, in his deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINA's] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with
respect to those given by [MONINA's] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired [them] from their employment.
Needless to state [FRANCISCO's] vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINA's]
testimonial evidence.
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court . . . does not hold sway in the face of
[MONINA's] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In
fact, she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the
consumption of his spouse . . . Further the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that led to the execution of the
affidavit . . . could not have been true, for as pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit . . . almost five months
after she had resigned from the Miller, Cruz & Co. . .
At any rate if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for
[FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to
sign the said affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of [MONINA] . . .
In fine, We hold that [MONINA's] filiation as [FRANCISCO's] illegitimate daughter has been conclusively established by
the uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee
himself had admitted his paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies of appellant; Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao,
Rudy Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant
to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de
Jesus, defraying appellant's hospitalization expenses providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral
expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child,
instructing his office personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance recommending appellant for employment at the
Miller Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having
appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his
surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5), appellee had continuously recognized
appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts of [FRANCISCO's] relatives acknowledging or treating
[MONINA] as [FRANCISCO's] daughter (Exh U) or as their relative (Exhs T & V). On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma,
former Mayor of Iloilo city, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez clan just like [FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA] has
been considered by the Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the appellee in the company of the Lopezes (Exhs
X-16 & X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellee's first cousin, testified that
appellant was introduced to her by appellee's cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison,
for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the Merchant's Financing Corporation of which she was the manager,
and further allowed her to stay with her family free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect, Dominador Savariz declared
that sometime in February, 1966 appellee's relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant as the daughter of
appellee Francisco Jison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as [MONINA's] Baptismal
Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial court admitted in evidence as part of [MONINA's] testimony, may serve as
circumstantial evidence to further reinforce [MONINA's] claim that she is [FRANCISCO's] illegitimate daughter by
Esperanza Amolar.
True it is that a trial judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. But the rule
admits of certain exceptions. One such exception is where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard
the witnesses testify. [citations omitted]. The other is where the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result
of the case. [citations omitted] In the presence case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINA's] witnesses . . . whose
testimonies were not given credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment . . .
The Court of Appeals then decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby entered for
appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and
privileges granted by law.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 29 March 1996, 18 FRANCISCO filed the instant
petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors of law:
I.
. . . IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE

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ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING [THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT


BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION WAS
SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.
II.
. . . IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.
III.
. . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS
EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT
BIND THE PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.
IV.
. . . IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SWORN STATEMENT (EXH. "P"/EXH. "2") IN A MANNER
NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
V.
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE PRESENT
PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES.
As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second paragraph of MONINA's complaint wherein she claimed that
he and Pansay had sexual relations "by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946," it was physically impossible for him and Pansay to have had
sexual contact which resulted in MONINA's birth, considering that:
The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private respondent in her complaint that her
mother was impregnated by FRANCISCO "at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946", she would have been born sometime in
late September or early October and not August 6, 1946 . . . The instant case finds factual and legal parallels in Constantino
vs. Mendez, 19 thus: . . .
FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by him at the time in question was unrebutted,
moreover, other men had access toPansay during the time of or even after her employment by him.
As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINA's testimonial evidence is "shaky, contradictory and unreliable," and proceeds to
attack the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have detected Pansay's pregnancy in November
1945 when they met since she would have been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting
between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an ulterior motive in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo
which was then under Central Bank supervision and MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and (d) Danthea Lopez was not related
to him by blood and whatever favorable treatment MONINA received from Danthea was due to the former's employment at Merchants' Financing
Company and additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides, Danthea admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of
paternity and filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not come into play.
FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the trial court as regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis.
FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINA's testimony that he answered for her schooling was self-serving and uncorroborated by any receipt or
other documentary evidence; and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a manifestation of kindness shown towards the family of a
former household helper.

Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO points to the fact that Pansay was the former
laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because she was in their employ at
Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs. Franco, Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong; and
MONINA's employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to her educational attainment, there being absolutely no
evidence to prove that FRANCISCO ever facilitated her employment thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot, 21 the quantum of evidence to
prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a preponderance thereof, was not met.
With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals' reliance on the certifications of the Local Civil Registrar
(Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is misplaced. First, their genuineness could not be
ascertained as the persons who issued them did not testify. Second, in light of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 22the contents of the baptismal
certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what was told to the priest who solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented
as a witness. Additionally, the name of the father appearing therein was "Franque Jison," which was not FRANCISCO's name. Third, in both
Exhibits E and F, the names of the child's parents were listed as "Frank Heson" and "Esperanza Amador" (not Amolar). FRANCISCO further
points out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is listed as "legitimate," while the father's occupation as "laborer." Most importantly, there was
no showing that FRANCISCO signed Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who reported the child's birth to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar. As to MONINA's educational records, FRANCISCO invokes Baas v. Baas 23which recognized that school records are prepared by
school authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to prove paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO
cites Colorado v. Court of Appeals, 24and further asserts that MONINA did not present any of the persons with whom she is seen in the pictures
to testify thereon; besides these persons were, at best, mere second cousins of FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and letters
written by his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as they were not identified by the authors. Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the
telephone cards (Exhs. G to L) nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his residence.

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Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of MONINA's affidavit of 21 September 1971
ran counter to Dequito v.Llamas, 25and overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was more than 25 years old and assisted by counsel.
As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals' failure to consider the long and unexplained delay in the filing of the
case.
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCO's arguments, leading FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.
On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which they
subsequently did.
A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles in
paternity suits. As to the former, plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the present controversy. As
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco 26served as a judicial confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code 27 regarding its
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the
child has passed away and the former having actually resisted the latter's claim below.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
that of legitimate children.Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of
the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of proof" 28is required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of
such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in
society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. 29
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time. 30
The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support may
create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is established by clear and convincing evidence.31
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e.,
preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's.
The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition
to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. 32
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.
FRANCISCO's arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse
will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, 33this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape
where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of
whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative father's
protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away
long before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of
her birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether
MONINA's evidence is coherent, logical and natural. 34
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay "by about the end of 1945." We agree with MONINA that this was
broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations between
FRANCISCO and MONINA's mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time
MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO and MONINA's mother was not at all
impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his

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daughter and that MONINA has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter.
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred
through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the
following facts:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the employ of
the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals
took pains to enumerate, thus:

[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the
Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellant's hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly
allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellant's mother, acknowledging appellant's paternal greetings
and calling appellant his "Hija" or Child, instructing his office personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance,
recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in
Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in
Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records
(Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5) . . .
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly, 35 spontaneously,
continuously and in an uninterrupted manner. 36
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error must fail.
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of some of MONINA's documentary evidence.
MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled
that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. 37Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth
certificate, e. g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere
certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter's part. 38In like manner,
FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z and AA) renders
these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the sacrament of baptism on
the date so specified. 39However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of
MONINA's testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her education.
We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates
may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation,
they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
As to Exhibits "S," "T," "U" and "V," the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison, Mariquit
Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINA's filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in
issue, 40as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents
may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the
declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question. 41As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130,
Section 40, however, this requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous
to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied)
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial
evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section
containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the scope
of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "[e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights
[and] family portraits."
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to
objects which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as
to the pedigree of a person. 42These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," 43or those "which, if
preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." 44Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a
family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, 45 monuments or coffin plates. 46
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of
Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, 47 it having

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been observed that:


[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the
family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. . .
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. 48
Their inadmissibility not withstanding, Exhibits "S" to "V," inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly be admitted as
part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his daughter.
We now direct our attention to MONINA's 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2), subject of the fourth assigned error, where she attests
that FRANCISCO is not her father. MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was jobless, had no savings and needed the money
to support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P upon the advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived
and that FRANCISCO's ploy would "boomerang" upon him. On the other hand, FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded
Exhibit P. as MONINA was already 25 years old at the time of its execution and was advised by counsel; further, being a notarized document, its
genuineness and due execution could not be questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of Miller &
Cruz, who declared that he intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might have had
deleterious effects upon the relationship between the firm and FRANCISCO. cdphil
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the Court of Appeals:
Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court . . . does not hold sway in the face of
[MONINA's] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In
fact, she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the
consumption of his spouse . . .
At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for
[FRANCISCO] or his lawyer to have secured [MONINA's] sworn statement . . . On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to
sign the said affidavit at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his
paternity of [MONINA]. . .
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have gone to such great
lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and properly appreciated by the Court of
Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution of the sworn statement in question, hence negating
FRANCISCO's theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of MONINA's father. Hence, coupled
with the assessment of the credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident that the standard to contradict a
notarial document, i.e., clear and convincing evidence and more than merely preponderant, 49has been met by MONINA.
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCO's defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare,
unsubstantiated responses such as "That is not true," "I do not believe that," or "None that I know." In declining then to lend credence to
FRANCISCO's testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid
down as early as 1921:
The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive
faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details,
he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his
demeanor the falsity of his message.

For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately related to the
principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested,
their answers not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as "I don't know" or "I don't remember." . . . 50
Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence FRANCISCO's
attempt to prove ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in MONINA's favor may not succeed. As may be gleaned, the only detail which
FRANCISCO could furnish as to the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his former employees was that Baylosis allegedly "took
advantage of his position" while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside from this bare claim, FRANCISCO's account is barren, hence
unable to provide the basis for a finding of bias against FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.
As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either. Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only came to know of
MONINA in June 1988; 51that during his employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall ever having seen MONINA there,
neither did he know of any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto FRANCISCO's office manager before passing away) regarding the
disbursement of MONINA's allowance. 52Teodoro Xulla corroborated Jalandoni's testimony regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly
Garden and MONINA's allowance; declared that Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies discovered after an audit, without any
further elaboration, however; but admitted that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to FRANCISCO's personal expenses, merely those
intended for one of FRANCISCO's haciendas. 53Then, Iigo Superticioso confirmed that according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza,
Baylosis "was dismissed by Mr. Jison for irregularities," while Superticioso was informed by FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for loss of
confidence. Superticioso likewise denied that MONINA received money from FRANCISCO's office, neither was there a standing order from
FRANCISCO to release funds to her. 54
It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are likewise insufficient to overcome MONINA's evidence. The

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former merely consist of denials as regards the latter's having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her allowance from FRANCISCO's office,
which, being in the form of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony; 55bare assertions as regards the dismissal
of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCO's personal expenses incapable of evincing that FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an
allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards the cause for the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what then serves as thecoup de grace is that
despite Superticioso's claim that he did not know MONINA, 56when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket indicating that on 18 May
1971, MONINA called a certain "Eing" at FRANCISCO's office, Superticioso admitted that his nickname was "Iing" and that there was no
other person named "Iing" in FRANCISCO's office. 57
All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation
when relying upon the provisions regarding "open and continuous possession" or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws;" moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant,
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 58The last element is the origin of the
doctrine that stale demands apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights. 59
As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements. However, he only
succeeded in showing MONINA's delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last element. In any event, it must be stressed that
laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud and injustice. 60 Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within
the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 27
April 1990 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is Affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.
||| (Jison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853, [February 24, 1998], 350 PHIL 138-184)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002.]
DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.
Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.
Pacifico B. Tacub & Associates for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Gardin Faith is the illegitimate child of petitioner and private respondent who was born on September 23, 1989. A year after the child's birth,
petitioner left for abroad leaving Gardin Faith in the care of private respondent. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for
guardianship over Gardin Faith and was appointed guardian of the child. When petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment the trial court
set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to file her opposition. Petitioner moved to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her. The same
was granted by the trial court. In a petition for certiorari filed by private respondent, the appellate court gave custody of Gardin Faith to private
respondent with whom the said child had been living since birth. Petitioner appealed.
It was held that in custody disputes, the welfare and well-being of the child is the paramount criterion. Thus, the temporary custody of the child
should be retained by private respondent; that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled
to keep them in their company; that although mothers are presumed to be the best custodian of unemancipated children, the role of the fathers is
not denigrated in the upbringing of children; and that in a petition for review, the issue of whether the mother is a fit parent, a question of fact,
cannot be properly entertained. The same should be threshed out in the special proceedings before the trial court.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; CUSTODY OF MINORS; WELFARE AND WELL-BEING OF THE CHILD,
PARAMOUNT CRITERION. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. In
arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the contending parents.
2. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PARENTS AND INDIVIDUALS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY ENTITLED TO CUSTODY OF
THEIR UNEMANCIPATED CHILDREN. In turn, the parents' right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the

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Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other
rights, "to keep them in their company." In legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child relationship encompasses much more than the
implication of ascendancy of one and obedience by the other.
3. ID.; ID.; PARENTAL AUTHORITY; MOTHER PRESUMED TO BE THE BEST CUSTODIAN. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court
in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." It will be observed that in both provisions, a
strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is
the best custodian.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPORTANT ROLE OF FATHER, NOT DENIGRATED. This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role
fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents "complement each other in giving nurture and
providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child."
Neither does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a father's sense of loss when he is separated from his child: For these reasons, even a
mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for "compelling reasons." Instances of unsuitability are
neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice.
The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child's preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance,
custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. cDAITS
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF MINORS; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, we are being
asked to rule on the temporarycustody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have
not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of
the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in
the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; FITNESS OF A PARENT FOR HER CHILD, A QUESTION OF FACT, NOT SUBJECT OF
THEIR PROCEEDING. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be. properly entertained in the special
proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in
the best position to assess the parties' respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as
the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought
in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to
imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to
mean as a statement against petitioner's fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present
and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final
judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of two (2) Resolutions dated August 29, 1995 and November 29, 1995 issued
by the former Second Division 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35971. The first resolution modified the appellate court's decision
promulgated in the said case, and granted custody of the minor, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, to private respondent. The second resolution denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth 2 to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent
Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived
with private respondent's parents and sister in the latter's house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the
family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith
was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the
minor, Gardin Faith.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on
May 27, 1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set aside its original judgment
and allowed petitioner to file her opposition to private respondent's petition. The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related
incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.
On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration and granting petitioner's
motion for custody of their child, Gardin. Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.
Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35971, questioning the actuations of the trial court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of merit.
However, after private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, the appellate court issued a Resolution 3 dated August 29, 1995 modifying

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its decision, as follows:


Although We do find the Petition dismissible, insofar as it assails the September 15, 1993 Resolution of the respondent
Court, giving due course to private respondent's Petition for Relief from Judgment, and the November 18, 1995 Resolution
denying his Motion for Reconsideration, We discern a good ground to let physical custody of subject child, Gardin Faith
Belarde Tonog, continue under the petitioner, with whom the said child had been living, since birth.

While it is understandable for private respondent, as mother, to assert and seek enforcement of her legal and natural rights
as the natural guardian of her child, the emotional and psychological effects upon the latter of a change in custody should
be considered. To be sure, transfer of custody of the child from petitioner to private respondent will be painful for the child
who, all her life, has been in the company of petitioner and her paternal grandparents.
Now, inasmuch as the issue of guardianship and custody over the same child is still pending determination before the
respondent Court, the possibility of petitioner's appointment as the guardian cannot be discounted. It would certainly wreak
havoc on the child's psychological make-up to give her to the custody of private respondent, only to return her to petitioner
should the latter prevail in the main case. Subjecting the child to emotional seesaw should be avoided. It is thus more
prudent to let physical custody of the child in question be with petitioner until the matter of her custody shall have been
determined by final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, promulgated here on March 21, 1995 is accordingly MODIFIED, and status quo with respect
to the physical custody of the child, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, is ordered. It is understood that the latter shall remain with
petitioner until otherwise adjudged.
Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution 4 dated November 29,
1995.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law
confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she had not,
as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. 5 In arriving at its decision as to whom
custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending
parents. 6
In turn, the parents' right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and
individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights, "to keep them in their company." In
legal contemplation, the true nature of the parent-child relationship encompasses much more than the implication of ascendancy of one and
obedience by the other. We explained this in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: 7
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by
law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code
provides that "[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213
where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.
No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the
rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not
to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the
baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation. 8
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized
that both parents "complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional,
psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child." 9 Neither does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a father's sense
of loss when he is separated from his child:
While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is

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bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the
other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is
the paramount consideration. 10
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for "compelling reasons." Instances
of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. 11 If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is
not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child's preference should the parent chosen be found to be
unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.12
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for
guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial
court. 13 It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess
the parties' respective merits vis-a-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin
Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, afortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent
should have the custody over her person.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative
to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioner's fitness to have final custody of
her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053. caCEDA
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053
upon notice of this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., is abroad on official leave.
||| (Tonog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122906, [February 7, 2002], 427 PHIL 1-10)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175080. November 24, 2010.]
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL
M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
Subject of this petition is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision
dated 7 July 1998 and Resolution dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five
hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title
came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property
was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada),
now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between
Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of
Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working
on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent
improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated
as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma.
Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents
of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance,
indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of

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the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property.
Respondents likewise demanded payment of damages. 2 During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed between Susana
and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement. 3 SDHETI
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo's occupation of the subject
premises was based on the former's mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any
person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to
the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the
same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by
respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had
no legal personality to file the present suit. 4
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial Adjudicator 5 concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against
defendant Eugenio R. Reyes and order is hereby issued:
1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;
2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein plaintiff Librada Mauricio over the subject
landholding;
3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein defendant;
4. No pronouncement as to costs. 6
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB, namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the
parties; and (2) whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and enforceable. The DARAB held that the Mauricio's are
former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the
subject property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the agricultural
lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB banked on theKasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the
leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB declared the
other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such a
contract. 7
Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB on 28 September 2004. 8
Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute Librada, who died during the pendency of the
case. 9 On 10 August 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It sustained the factual findings of the
DARAB with respect to the tenancy relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the Kasunduan. 10 aTcESI
Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists
that the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo and Susana in 1993 giving the former the right to occupy
and cultivate the subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having been entered into without his knowledge and consent. Eugenio
further asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo and
Eugenio with respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of the Court of Appeals in concluding that a tenancy
relationship existed between the parties despite the absence of some of the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship such as personal
cultivation and the subject land being agricultural. Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered into between him and
Librada wherein the latter agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was voluntarily entered into and the contents thereof were mutually
understood by the parties. 11
In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error
in its challenged decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues raised as factual. However, upon filing of a motion for
reconsideration by Eugenio, this Court reinstated the petition and required respondent Leonida to comment on the petition. 12
In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law
and not of facts. 13
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province
of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be raised. 14 Absent any of the
obtaining exceptions 15 to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on this Court.
The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo and the Mauricio's came about, thus:
This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents
of the herein Defendant-Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit "H" which is the Tax Declaration of the property in controversy
proves that upon the death of the parents of Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their extra-judicial
partition/settlement and this property was initially under the ownership of the appellant's sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes
until the same property was finally acquired/transferred in the name of Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-
affirm the fact that the Mauricios are really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed the Leasehold Contract with
Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the property and to prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest of

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Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes. . . . . The "Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan" alleging that their tenancy
relationship began in the year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental shall remain until further revised. 16 EcDSTI
This is a contest of "Kasunduans." Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of
tenancy.
Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since 1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana which reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the subject
land. On the other hand, Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and presented another Kasunduan executed between him and Librada on 28
September 1994 which effectively terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter allegedly agreed to vacate the subject premises in
exchange of monetary considerations.
This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
. . . Insofar as this "Kasunduan" is concerned, and after reading the transcript of the testimony of the old woman Librada
Mauricio, this Board is convinced that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her from the farmholding but that
Librada Mauricio wanted to return the money she received because the contents of the document was never explained to
her being illiterate who cannot even read or write. This Board is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the
testimonies that while the document was allegedly signed by the parties in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was
notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila, thus, the Notary Public was not in a position to explain much less ascertain the veracity
of the contents of the alleged "Kasunduan" as to whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee Librada Mauricio had really understood
the contents thereof. This Board further adheres to the principle that it cannot substitute its own evaluation of the testimony
of the witnesses with that of the personal evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the case at bar, had the best
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness Librada Mauricio while testifying on the circumstances relevant to the
execution of the alleged "Kasunduan." Furthermore, this Board adheres to the principle that in all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, mental
weakness or other handicap, the courts (and in the case at bar, this Board) must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New
Civil Code). In the case at bar, Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read nor write, thus,
she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark. 17
Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial
Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their
demeanor on the witness stand.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or
the transfer of legal possession of the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land
by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to
work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties,
and the sale or alienation of the land does not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the
purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In
case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations. (Emphasis
supplied) CHEDAc
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides:
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. The agricultural leasehold
relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by
the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates
or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Emphasis supplied)
As an incidental issue, Leonida's legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered
moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo's sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and
Librada, thus, not a legal heir. 18
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant
petition. 19
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. 20 Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the
Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies
under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the
legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles. 21
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 22 the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned

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only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack. 23
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, 24 this Court reiterated
that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent's estate. 25 Furthermore, inAustria v.
Reyes, 26 the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose
and cannot be subject to collateral attack. 27 STaCcA
Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that
supposedly favors petitioners' cause.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Peralta, * JJ., concur.

||| (Reyes v. Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, [November 24, 2010], 650 PHIL 438-449)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 190710. June 6, 2011.]
JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition for review on certiorari, we address this
question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision 1 dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing) 2 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother,
Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot in
Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen's
workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to
petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner's father was not stated in petitioner's certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told
petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent
allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent
ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent's offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up,
Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain. DCHIAS
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioner's certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner's baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner's
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings
of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel
therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to
be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order 3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to
file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may
appear and represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He
manifested inter aliathat: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and
therefore summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of
summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the
confidentiality of the subject matter. 4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner's Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons. 2005cdasia
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 5 Respondent averred that the petition was not
in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA

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testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner's father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled
on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondent's motion for reconsideration, issued an Order 6 dismissing the case. The court remarked
that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, 7 there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and
filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the
petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his
mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioner's statement as to what his mother told him
about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the
surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined
that, having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion
of the said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is
hereby DENIED. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on
October 20, 2008, it issued the Order 9 setting aside the court's previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered and set aside. cITaCS
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing on January 22, 2009 at
8:30 in the morning.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 10
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the petition is premature considering that a full-
blown trial has not yet taken place. The court stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a
certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on
for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the
petition were not of petitioner's personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed respondent's arguments that there is no
basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on
DNA Evidence 11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the court's instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest
in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition, 12 reiterating that (a) the
petition was not in due form and substance as no defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there
was no prima facie case, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing. 13
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19,
2009. DAcSIC
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. The assailed Orders dated
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP.
Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case
No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED. 14
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him. Respondent's
special appearance could not be considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction
of the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the
same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. HTSIEa
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the
proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met.
The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not really have been intended
to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not meant to be an instrument to promote disorder,
harassment, or extortion. It could have not been intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will
be the situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in
compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without requiring first the presentation
of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote harassment and
extortion.

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xxx xxx xxx


At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to
a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. . . . If at anytime, motu
proprio and without pre-conditions, the court can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases,
then the prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause
at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to harass them.
Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a
sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory
recognition case opens wide the opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for scandal. 15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit. 16
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT JURISDICTION WAS
NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE
RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT A QUO. AIaDcH
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE
TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT
OF DNA TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT DNA
TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE PETITIONER ESTABLISHESPRIMA FACIE PROOF OF
FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED RELIANCE ON THE CASE
OF HERRERA VS. ALBA, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE 'FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A
TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.' 17
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the court's lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence,
the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same, because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had
already voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking for affirmative relief, such as the (a)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex ParteMotion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner
points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on
Petitioner's Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does not state respondent's name, the body of
the petition clearly indicates his name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground
for the dismissal of cases. If the CA entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the
motion. 18 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof of filiation
before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as
enunciated in Herrera v. Alba. 19 Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings because
they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial. 20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CA's ruling on most issues raised in the petition for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous
arguments. However, on the issue of lack of jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, he raised the issue before
the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent denies that he waived his right to the service

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of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed
required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be
considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person. cTEICD
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for
illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case,
as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action forcertiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is
rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only
when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 21 In the present case, we discern no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss. ACaEcH
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the court's lack of jurisdiction over his person due to the absence of summons,
and (b) defect in the form and substance of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of
action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually
whether it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other
words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioner's action, that is, whether it
is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition
for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem. 22
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a
proceeding in rem orquasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal
process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
the court is recognized and made effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation
before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the
case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for
its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. 24 Through
publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements. 25 This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if
he so chooses. 26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the
lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this
case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the
proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondent's contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish
filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to
implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking
relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. 27 In this petition classified as an
action in rem the notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving
of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint
to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. 28 A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the
following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
in violation of said legal right. 29
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however,
contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner's personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter
of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence. CSHcDT
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of
the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 30 The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no
other. 31 The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. 32
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the

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court to deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of
the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits. 33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba 34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face
has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA's observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie case the first procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party's evidence and not
by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA
testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
hearing.
At any rate, the CA's view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the
Court's attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in
resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima
facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. CSaHDT
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system.
It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary
laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized
effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves
justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public." 35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; HCSEIT
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In
these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case
must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the
kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that,
as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to
the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood
testing. 37
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may,

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for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish
paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution
dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED. HCTAEc
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

||| (Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011], 665 PHIL 795-815)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.]
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother,
CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA
V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties:
FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Ramon N. Bernaldo for petitioners.
Fortun Narvasa & Salazar for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Upon the death of Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, born during the marriage of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus, were recognized in a
notarized document by the decedent Juan G. Dizon as his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Based on this notarized
acknowledgment, the petitioners filed a complaint, inventory and accounting of the Dizon estate. Private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that the case, while denominated as an action for partition, would call for the altering of the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of Sps. Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina Aves de Jesus
and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court ultimately dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being improper, decreeing
that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding.
On appeal, petitioners assailed the said order of the trial court maintaining that their recognition as being illegitimate children in an authentic
writing is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
The Supreme Court held that in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This cannot be done because the law itself
established their legitimacy which can only be contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN, HOW ESTABLISHED. The filiation of
illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside
of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations
is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment.
2. ID.; ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, WHEN CONCLUSIVE. A scrutiny of the records would show that
petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child
due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took
effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGITIMACY CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED; CASE AT BAR. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a

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civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected. . . . The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to
impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly
settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct
suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the
decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July
1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a
stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless
call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said
motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial considering that the certificates presented by
respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again
praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as
being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have
been able to establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine, that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise
ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and
for being improper. 1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking
the establishment of a status or right. cITAaD
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their
recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such
and does not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo. 2
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the case because there has been
no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the
case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, 3 which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and
accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally addressing the issue.

The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 4 The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. 5 In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. 6 Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment. 7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child

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due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. 9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, 10 and in proper cases Article 171, 11 of the Family
Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. 12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate
status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and only the father, 13 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by virtue
of a private document, signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be
somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to
declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and
Carolina de Jesus. ATCaDE
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioner's alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent
cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the
children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration
of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, 15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. 16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. 17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
||| (De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, [October 2, 2001], 418 PHIL 768-776)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157043. February 2, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) decision 2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66128, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte dated September 14, 1999 granting
a petition for change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on
September 9, 1998. In Special Proceeding No. R-481, 3 Capote as Giovanni's guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a
Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be
served with summons and other court processes;
2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in
Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated [August 18, 1998] . . . authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of
name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother [who is residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan, Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than
fifteen (15) years prior to the filing of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since his birth
[in 1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine (9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado
Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his
mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has
been known by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan,

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Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and up to the present, failed to take up his
responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovanni's pleas] for
attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears . . .;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to
that of his mother's surname;
8. [Giovanni's] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United States and [his] continued use of
the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child;
and cCaIET
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit
of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx 4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on Giovanni's birth certificate. Having found
respondent's petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. 5 Publication of the petition in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered. 6 The trial court also
directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order. 7
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed
commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni
Nadores. 8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred
in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. 9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition for change of name
despite the non-joinder of indispensable parties. 10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador 11 and claims that the purported
parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by the child's change of name should have been made respondents to make the
proceeding adversarial. 12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his
name." 13 Understandably, therefore, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. 14 This is a reasonable requirement
for those seeking such change because a person's name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved in the
process and decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, 15 a
separate and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually dealing only with
innocuous or clerical errors thereon). 16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings
there. The point is whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to
petitioner, is not sufficient to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well as
successional rights. 17 Such issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are impleaded and due process is
observed. 18
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines), 19 the pertinent provision of the
Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by
only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours) cCHETI
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother's surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part
of Giovanni's putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. . . . (emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang 20 is enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they

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may bear the father's surname.


Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and
his mother' surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother's surname
as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
child. 21
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person's name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his
successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any
way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni's petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103
of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed)
that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni's petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is
entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name
will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother's intended petition to
have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner 22 in support of its position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, a proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with the application and
interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are
irrelevant and have no bearing on respondent's case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be
adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:

The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike
petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There is no doubt
that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by
granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change
in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by posting in
a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one
opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding
less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the
petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that
the proceedings in the lower court were not adversarial enough. 23 (emphasis supplied) cDCaTS
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. 24 Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules. 25 With this, all interested parties were deemed
notified and the whole world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy
of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, [February 2, 2007], 543 PHIL 72-81)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995.]
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
Orlando R. Pangilinan for petitioner.
Danilo G. Pineda for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS; PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is

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an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other
than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the
herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived
of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, Rule 102, 1 makes
no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother
of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. cdasia
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT OF SUPPORT; JUSTIFIED. The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to
petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give
any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992.
He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he
was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide
him with the "proper care and education." Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in
this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of
allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give
support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
3. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PARENTAL AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF MINOR CHILD OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE MUST BE
RESPECTED BY THE COURT. In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of
age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under
Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here
it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should
not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent). LLpr
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a
married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed
by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J. to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City
sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but
after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school
year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent:
1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner
Daisie T. David;
2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher J. T.
David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision; and
3. to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation
where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint
parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of
their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is
under the parental authority of the mother by express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support should be brought
in a case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for
their support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon
her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for

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the best interest of Christopher J. that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody
and support shall have been determined in a proper case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition for habeas
corpus on Special Proceeding No. 4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision.
Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases
where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot
arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaa v. Gaela, 1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the
parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar,
was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since,
admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. cdtai
Indeed, Rule 102, 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of
her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful
custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for
giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that
she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per
month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist,
Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She
works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for the time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the
support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are
characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough,
however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.
The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the
filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by Dasie, except the meager
amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he
filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale
because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He
prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and education."
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that
private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the
grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless,
in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided
by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age the mother's custody over him
will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code,
courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of
support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher
J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the hereinafter petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00 pending the
fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., is on leave.
||| (David v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111180, [November 16, 1995], 320 PHIL 138-145)

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THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143256. August 28, 2001.]
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C.
FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES petitioners,vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO
FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY
FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and
GREGORIO FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Tanopo & Serafica for petitioners.
Napoleon B. Arenas for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondents, nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, filed an action to declare the extra judicial partition of the estate and
the deed of sale both between Generosa de Venecia, the surviving spouse, and petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez void ab initio. The complaint alleged
that the partition was void as Rodolfo is not a child of their uncle's wife and that the sale in his favor of 119.5 sq. m. portion of the 194 sq. m. lot
including the whole residential building erected thereon in favor of Rodolfo was without any consideration. Rodolfo, to prove his legitimacy,
failed to submit any birth certificate but presented the deceased' application for recognition of back pay rights under Act No. 897 wherein he was
listed as a son of the deceased and his own baptismal certificate. He also alleged that he enjoys and possesses the status of being a legitimate child
of the spouses openly and continuously until they died. He testified that the money he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract
worker in Saudi Arabia. This, private respondents failed to controvert. The trial court found that Rodolfo is not the legitimate son of the spouses.
Rodolfo, then a month old, was purchased by the spouses from a certain Miliang when their only son died. Judgment was rendered declaring the
partition and the deed of sale null and void, ordering petitioners to reconvey the subject property to private respondents. This was affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this recourse. DaECST
As a rule, the issue of filiation cannot be the subject of a collateral attack except when necessary to the full resolution of the case.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they
carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court.
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. Therefore, the surviving
spouse in the case at bar is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the conjugal property and one-half (1/2) of the remaining one-half (1/2) share as heir from
her husband's estate, or a total of three-fourth (3/4) of the entire property.
The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FILIATION, NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK; RULE DOES NOT APPLY WHERE CHILD IS
ALLEGED NOT TO HAVE BEEN BORN OF BOTH SPOUSES; CASE AT BAR. It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was
for the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to
impugn one's legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfo's right to the
deed of extra judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that one's legitimacy can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in the instant case considering that respondents' claim
was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased, spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they
(respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle's wife. Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra
judicial partition.
2. ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL; PARTIES, ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON ISSUE THEY SQUARELY RAISED.
In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely
raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief filed before the trial court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial court's ruling on
Rodolfo's status.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMING THAT OF TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY AFFIRMED ON
APPEAL. We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses
Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even more weight when the Court
of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court. We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent court's evaluation
of the evidence presented.
4. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; PARTITION WHICH INCLUDED A PERSON, BELIEVED TO BE AN HEIR, BUT WHO IS NOT, VOID
WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PERSON; CASE AT BAR. Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the
spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez
between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code.
5. ID.; ID.; SHARE OF SURVIVING SPOUSE WITHOUT CHILD; CASE AT BAR. Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as

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provided in Article 1001, she is entitled to the 1/2 of the inheritance and the respondents to the other 1/2. In effect, 3/4 pro indiviso is the share of
Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., 1/2 as her share of the conjugal property estate and 1/2 of the remaining 1/2 as share as heir from her
husband's estate. Thus, we find well taken the petitioners' assertion that the annulment of the extra judicial partition between Generosa and
petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in respondents' having exclusive right to the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the
respondent court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of her property without other limitations than those established
by law, which right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; CAUSE OF ACTION; PARTIES NOT PRIVY TO, BUT PREJUDICED BY CONTRACT MAY SEEK
ANNULMENT OF CONTRACT. As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a
contract. However, when a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced
in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which
he had no intervention. As we have discussed above, respondents are entitled to the 1/4 of the entire conjugal property,ie., lot and building;
however considering that widow Generosa, during her lifetime, sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been
deprived of their 1/4 share therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their 1/4 share in the building.
Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the annulment of said deed of sale.
7. ID.; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; CONTRACT PRESUMED WITH SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION; PRESUMPTION NOT
CONTROVERTED IN CASE AT BAR. Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated because there was no
consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the money he paid for
the sale came from his savings as overseas contract worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by presenting
evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
consideration. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
8. ID.; ID.; NOTARIAL DOCUMENT, PRESUMED REGULAR; ALLEGATION OF FORGERY, NOT PROVED. Respondents also claim
that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was not that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with both legs amputated before she
died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving
the same; a burden respondents failed to discharge. The respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override the evidentiary value of
the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor
the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
9. CIVIL LAW; CO-OWNERSHIP; SALE OF ENTIRE BUILDING HELD IN COMMON WITHOUT CONSENT OF CO-HEIR, NULL AND
VOID AS TO SAID CO-OWNER. We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did
not only sell her 3/4 undivided share in the building but also the 1/4 share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire building
without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer,
petitioner Eddie, a co-owner of the 3/4 share of the building together with the respondents who owned the 1/4 share therein.

10. ID.; DAMAGES; CLAIM MUST BE ACTUALLY PROVED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY; CASE AT BAR. Finally, anent the
issue of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A party is entitled to an
adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proven. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be
capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he suffered around P100,000
actual damages was not supported by any documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the petitioners that the respondent court
should not have awarded moral damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorney's fees should likewise be deleted for lack of factual
basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorney's fees, which is in violation of
the proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate. TaDAIS
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1999 affirming the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City in an action for nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and
damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows: 3
"The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Dagupan City covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the two-storey building
constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named
Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug.
31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased from a certain
Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the
herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He lived
with the couple until they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an
estate consisting of the following:
(a) "A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral
Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan.

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Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street;
and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred Ninety Four (194) square meters,
more or less. Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds."
(b) "A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and wood, G. I. roofing with a floor area of
154 square meters and 126 square meters of the first and second floor, respectively. Declared under Tax
Decl. No. 22- 592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00."
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating
to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellant's son over
the following:
"A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters including the building and/or all
existing thereon to be taken from the southwestern portion of the parcel of land described as follows, to wit:
'A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No.
41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE.
by Lot No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131.
Containing an area of One Hundred and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of Deeds" (Exh. "8", Exhibits for the
Defendants) ACETIa
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and
Gregorio, all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being
a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale
void ab initio (docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of
depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of
rights to succession or inheritance, taking advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa
de Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded and conspired with each other in causing the fake,
simulated grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989 and jointly on the same date, caused
the execution of the deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same property described
in the deed of extra-judicial partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants were able to secure new land titles in their
favor (Records, pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared void from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
"16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were husband and wife blessed with one child the
herein defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they acknowledged during their lifetime. (italics supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late
Generosa de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez which are now in question were all
made with the full knowledge, consent and approval of the parties thereto and for
value." (Records, pp. 20-21, Answer)."
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. "3 ), the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8"), the TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the house
and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.

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SO ORDERED."
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. Rodolfo's claim as a son of the deceased spouses
Fernandez was negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school and was told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr.
Fernandez, (2) he failed to present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected people
such as Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita Coquia-Sison, showed the genealogy of the family of Dr. Jose and
Generosa Fernandez without a child; a pedigree may be admitted in evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that entries in a family bible or
other family books or charts, engravings or rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree, 5 (4) the certification
issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that there was no available information about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the
spouses Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful
considering that there were blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfo's baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since
there were no available records of baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936, while Rodolfo's baptismal certificate which was
issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed of absolute sale
were prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances which rendered the documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al. appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's judgment in its assailed
decision dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez' filiation with the deceased
spouses. It found that appellants' evidence which consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez and the
application for recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did
not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court concluded that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they were evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that while the application for back pay was a public document, it was not
executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the public document contemplated
inArticle 172 of the Family Code referred to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission
of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay
under Republic Act No. 897.

Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al. filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000. 6
Rodolfo Fernandez et al. filed the instant petition for review with the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE
DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS HEREIN, TO RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE
PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE POSSESSION OF THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION BECAUSE
THE SAID ORDER IS PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE,
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: cCSEaA
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES
OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE VENECIA BY CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT
HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND CANNOT SUCCEED AB INTESTATOTO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1)
THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '3'), THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. '8'), TCT NO. 54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID FOR
THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED DEEDS, HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO
CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE
VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD NOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN
AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION THEREOF THAT PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE
FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.

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IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE
RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY SUCH
AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa Fernandez,
widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr. Jose
Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however, that the burden of proof lies with the respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of
Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no power to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not be collaterally
attacked in the present action but in a separate and independent action directly impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents' principal action was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial
partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn one's legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfo's right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez.
While we are aware that one's legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents' claim was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and
Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncle's wife. The case
of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals, 7 which has a similar factual backdrop is instructive:
"A careful reading of the above articles 8 will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or
other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not where the
heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451,
457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the Family Code) is not well taken. This
legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal
heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased.""
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of
determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo
Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial
brief 9 filed before the trial court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial court's ruling on Rodolfo's status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Such
is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they carry even more weight 10 when the Court of Appeals affirms
the factual findings of the trial court. 11 We accordingly find no cogent reason to disagree with the respondent court's evaluation of the evidence
presented, thus: 12
"The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On
October 11, 1995, it issued a certification worded as follows: HIETAc
"This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan, Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not
on file with the National Archives, hence, there is no available information about the birth of Rodolfo V.
Fernandez alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa de
Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan" (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public
document and a conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation between him and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants'
Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document
nevertheless, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein
appellant. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written admission of filiation
embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein

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the public document was executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No.
897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"SECTION 32. Public documents as evidence Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer areprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date
of the latter."
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document are conclusive evidence against the contracting
parties as to the truthfulness of the statements made therein. They constitute only prima facie evidence of the facts which
give rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the
Spanish regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by the parish priest from his own knowledge such
as the administration of the sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth in the certificate; but it does not
constitute proof of the statements made therein concerning the parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence, 1994
ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Buan vs.Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion
vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their execution and of the date
of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be false; but
they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties
(Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).

Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez
filed said application on June 5, 1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the declaration and statement
contained in the said application that concern the relationship of the applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not
a conclusive proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez the contents being, only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and
continuously until they died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants' Brief). Open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child
such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to
the child's support and education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents (Sempio-Diy, The
Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 245-246). However, it must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132
SCRA 590, possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to
compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene
Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating therein that appellant is a
child of the late spouses having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1" Exhibits
for the Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to
prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk (Reyes vs.Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this
case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the
Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records
of baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p. 148, Exh. "G"). Neither the family portrait
offered in evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals) (supra). In fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation.
Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de
Venecia is null and void."
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose
Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo
is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned 13pursuant to Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code which states:
"A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person."
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property in question was the conjugal property of the late spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez
and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely of 1/2 pro indiviso of the conjugal
property and the other half belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the
respondents nephews and nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the 1/2 share of the decedent's estate while the 3/4 share of the conjugal
property will still belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial court's order reconveying the possession of the subject
lot and building to respondents was contrary to the admitted facts and law since respondents are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda.
de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
"Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."

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Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the 1/2 of the inheritance and
the respondents to the other 1/2. In effect, 3/4 pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., 1/2 as her share of the conjugal
property estate and 1/2 of the remaining 1/2 as share as heir from her husband's estate. Thus, we find well taken the petitioners' assertion that the
annulment of the extra-judicial partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not necessarily result in respondents' having exclusive
right to the conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent court. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of
her property without other limitations than those established by law, 14 which right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner
Eddie Fernandez. HAaDTE
Petitioners assails respondents' right, not being heirs of Generosa, to question the validity of the deed of sale since the action for the annulment of
contracts may only be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. 15
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a contract
prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of
the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. 16 As we
have discussed above, respondents are entitled to the 1/4 of the entire conjugal property, i.e., lot and building; however considering that widow
Generosa, during her lifetime, sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their 1/4 share therein,
thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their 1/4 share in the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause
of action to seek the annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring null and void the deed of sale executed between Generosa and petitioner
Eddie Fernandez concluding that the same was simulated or false and in affirming the trial court's findings that the deed was prepared and
executed under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without however, particularly stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated because there was no consideration for the sale. However, this assertion was
controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez' declaration, that the money he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract
worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. 17 Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code,
consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of sale was not that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with both
legs amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence 18 and whoever
alleges it has the burden of proving the same; 19 a burden respondents failed to discharge. The respondents had not presented any convincing
proof to override the evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal
manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing
and more than merely preponderant. 20
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her 3/4 undivided share
in the building but also the 1/4 share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire building without the consent of the respondents is
not null and void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner Eddie, a co-owner of the 3/4 share
of the building together with the respondents who owned the 1/4 share therein. 21
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A
party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proven. 22 Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. 23 Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. 24 The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he
suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the petitioners
that the respondent court should not have awarded moral damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorney's fees should likewise be
deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorney's
fees, which is in violation of the proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate. 25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the 1/4 share of the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose
and Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued
pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the 3/4 share of Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled
and a new title should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the 3/4 and 1/4 shares respectively in
the conjugal building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorney's fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

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||| (Fernandez v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 143256, [August 28, 2001], 416 PHIL 322-344)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005.]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected
as JULIAN LIN WANG,
JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL
REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought
to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-
Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22,
1998, . . . they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child's name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. . . .
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there
together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. . . . Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person's name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also
be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore's
Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that
the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. 1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought
in the petition that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his middle name did not fall
within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has
an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken
from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could
then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name. 3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004. 4 The trial court maintained
that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who
intends to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore
instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent
purpose would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable. 5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) 6 arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 7 of the Family
Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping
of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best
interest of the child." 8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State
and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or
pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for
the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary
to previous cases 9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name. 10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment 11 positing that the trial
court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to
the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name "Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is
not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry. 12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any

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compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioner's allegation that the continued use
of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the
trial court that the dropping of the child's middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence,
while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even
assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually
proscribed by Singaporean law. 13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied. acITSD
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. 14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be 'proper and reasonable cause' for which the change is sought. 15 To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest. 16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts. 17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and
adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name
usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the given name 18 and none
on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to
answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a person's name is relevant at this point. We quote, thus:
. . . For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community
in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished
from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of
persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been
held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.

The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or family name. The
given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals.
The name or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by
law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being
confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed,
unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4)
It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible. 19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same
given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. 20 The Family
Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, 21 while illegitimate children shall use the surname of
their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's surname. 22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother's surname, and
does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged illegitimate child. EHDCAI
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The
registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a

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surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate
himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic 23 and Calderon v. Republic, 24 which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to
change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using
their mother's surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World
War; and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the
petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mother's
husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child.
The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry
if she continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of
any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other
people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic, 25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the
surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even the family name of the
mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since
childhood, in her school records and in her voter's registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that
while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle
for her to choose to use the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant
her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioner's reason of convenience for the change of his name against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name.
Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the
presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that
time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioner's election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not used
her registered name in her school records and voter's registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion. SEcAIC
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites
this case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest
in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner
therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the
matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. 26 As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our
laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
||| (Julian Lin Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, [March 30, 2005], 494 PHIL 149-163)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner,
DECISION

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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised
in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition 1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to "Catindig," his
surname.
On March 23, 2001, 3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the
petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by
law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the
grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioner's care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than
enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. TacESD
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED." 4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001, 6 the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted
child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as
middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
"Garcia" (her mother's surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed
by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle
name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not
prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother." 7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have a name. DCATHS
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the

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child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname 10 of an individual whatever may be
his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a
widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as 'Mrs.'
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname.
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or
surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior' can be used
only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx xxx xxx"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 11 of the Family Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what
middle name a child may use. EAHDac
The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother's surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted
child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on
the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use
the surname of the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child's mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father, thus:
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child
because the father's surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the
father's surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written?

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Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname
of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa's point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile's correct surname is Ponce since the mother's
surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David's family name is Gutierrez and his
mother's surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to
use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane
stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are
just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father
should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second
given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be
before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the
suggestion." 12 (Emphasis supplied) ETDSAc
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters." 13 Again, it is silent whether he can
use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. 14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child. 15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation. 16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. 17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to
the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. 18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998," 19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted. 20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
189 21 of the Family Code and Section 17 22 Article V of RA 8552. 23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 24 , Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and
"Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. 25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, 26 hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail."

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This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful
or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law." 28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mother's surname "GARCIA" as her middle name. cTSHaE
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
||| (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, [March 31, 2005], 494 PHIL 515-528)

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