TANADA vs TUVERA
The appellant was in possession of foreign
G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985
FACTS:
Petittioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent government officials to publish and/ or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation and administrative orders. The
petitioners are invoking the right to be informed on
matters of public concern (Sec. 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution). The petitioners are also invoking
that for laws to be valid and enforceable, they must be
published in the Official Gazette.
The respondents contended that the case should be
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have
no legal standing to carry out such petition since they
are not personally and directly prejudiced by the non-
publication of the issuances in question. Respondents
also contended that the publication in the Official
Gazette is a non-requirement for laws which provide
their own affectivity date. Since the issuances in
question contain the date of effectivity, publication is
not necessary.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal
personality or standing to carry out the instant petition
and whether publication is necessary for laws which
have its own effectivity date.
HELD:
The Court recognizes a private citizens legal
personality since the right sought to be enforced by
the petitioners is a public right recognized by the
Constitution.
The Court anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code
which states that:
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided.
Publication is indispensable because without such
publication, there would be no adequate notice to the
general public of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conducts as citizens. It
would render injustice to punish or burden a citizen for
the transgression of law which he had no notice.
It is the respondent officials duty to enforce the
Constitutional rights of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern. Thus, the publication of all
presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Unless so
published, laws shall have no binding force or effect.
PEOPLE vs QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. L-6791, 29 March 1954
FACTS:
Que Po Lay was convicted at the Court of First
Instance of Manila for violating Central Bank Circular
No. 20 in connection with Section 34 of Republic No.
265.
exchange consisting of U.S dollars, checks and
money orders amounting to about $ 7,000. He failed
to sell the said currency to the Central Bank through
its agents one day following the receipt of such
currency as required by Circular No.20. The appellant
was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine
of Php 1, 000.
The appellant based the appeal on the claim that said
circular was not published on the Official Gazette prior
to the act of omission of the appellant, thus, said
circular has no force and effect.
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the
year 1949. It was not published until November 1951,
or after three months after appelants conviction of its
violation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
1. Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, not
being a statute or a law should be subjected
to publication requirement stated in Article 2
of the Civil Code;
2. The appellant is liable to the said Circular
No. 20 when the latter was only published
after about three months of his conviction.
HELD:
1. Circular No. 20 is not a statute or a law but it
is being issued for the implementation of the
law authorizing its issuance, therefore it has
the force and effect of the law. Circulars and
regulations which prescribe a penalty for its
violation should be published before
becoming effective. It is based on the
general principle that before the public is
bound by penal provisions, the people
should be officially informed of its contents
and penalties.
2. Appellant could not be held liable for the
violation of Circular No. 20 for it was not
binding at the time he was found to have
failed to sell the foreign exchange.
CONSUNJI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 137873, 20 April 2001
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego,
a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria,
filed a complaint for damages at the RTC of Pasig
against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widows prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of the widow Maria Juego.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
 1. The petitioner can be held liable under the
grounds of negligence.
2. The injured employee or his heirs have the
right to choose between availing themselves
of the workers right under the Workmens
Compensation Act and suing in the regular
courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages in cases of employers negligence.
HELD:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the thing or
transaction speaks for itself recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct
proof. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present
in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or
inference of appellants negligence arises.
Claims for damages sustained by workers in the
course of their employment could be filed only under
the Workmens Compensation Law. In availing its
remedies, claimants are deemed to have waived their
right of the remedies provided by other laws.
However, this is an exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence
when she filed her claim for death benefits, otherwise,
she would have opted to avail of a better remedy than
that of which she already had.
CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127
30 May 1961
FACTS:
Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university
where plaintiff finished his law studies up to the first
semester of his fourth year. Plaintiff was awarded with
scholarship grants and his tuition fees were returned
to him at the end of each semester. Plaintiff left the
defendants law school and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year at the College of Law of
Abad Santos University where he graduated.
He applied to take the bar examination in with which
he needed the transcript of records from defendant
Arellano University. The defendant demanded that he
had paid back the P1, 033.87, noting the contract that
he signed stated that in consideration of the
scholarship granted to him by the University, he
waives his right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the
scholarship cash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract between Cui and the
respondent university, whereby the former waives his
right to transfer to another school without having
refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the
scholarship is valid or not.
HELD:
The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and
respondent on September 10, 1951, is a direct
violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and
void. The contract was contrary to sound policy and
civic honesty. The policy enunciated in
Memorandum No.38, 1949 is sound policy.
When students are given full or partial scholarships it
is understood that such scholarships are merited and
earned. The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when
they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution.
MICIANO vs. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
A will of an American testator provided that his estate
should be disposed of in accordance with the
Philippine law. The testator further provided that
whoever would oppose his wishes that his estate
should be distributed in accordance with Philippine
laws would forfeit their inheritance.
ISSUE:
Will there be forfeiture as stated in the will of the
testator?
HELD:
A testators wishes must be given paramount
importance, however, if the wishes of the testator
contravene a specific provision of law, then that
provision in a will should not be given effect. A
persons will is merely an instrument which is
PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It should be
subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws.
The case at bar falls under the Lex Rei Sitae doctrine;
where the estate of a decedent shall be distributed in
accordance with his national law. He cannot provide
otherwise.
The Supreme Court held that those who opposed
would not forfeit their inheritance because that
provision is not legal.
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
30 June 1989|
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married in
Germany to private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national. They have a child who
was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling
initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany on January 1983.The divorce decree was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the
child was granted to the petitioner.
Six months after the divorce was granted private
respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to
Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early
as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.
ISSUE:
Whether a person could still be prosecuted of bigamy
after a divorce decree was already issued?
HELD:
The law specifically provides that in prosecution for
adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and
nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines.
In the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and
has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse
at the time he filed suit.
ROEHR vs. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen,
married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14,
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union
were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Makati RTC. Meanwhile,
Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from Germany.
The decree provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed
a motion to dismiss the nullity case as a divorce
decree had already been promulgated, which was
granted by respondent Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case
should proceed for the purpose of determining the
issues of custody of children and the distribution of
the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge
Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the
purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody
of their children.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the granting the motion to dismiss the
nullity case valid ; it is valid to assume jurisdiction to
tackle child custody and support.
HELD:
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case
that has not yet attained finality. The court can modify
or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable. Where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring
such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory and when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or
when supervening events warrant it.
Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognized in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, such as custody must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give
the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, it must
be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so. In the
present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court. The trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.
GARCIA-RECIO vs RECIO
366 SCRA 4372
2 October 2002
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on
March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, their marriage was
dissolved by a divorce decree, issued by an
Australian Family Court.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J.
Garcia in Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995,
the couple lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. Their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with
their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998,
claiming that she only learned of Redericks marriage
with Editha Samson in November 1997.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce decree submitted by Rederick
Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal
capacity to marry petitioner and absolve him of
bigamy.
HELD:
The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as
shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is
a naturalized Australian. However, it does not prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. The
decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.
A document may be proven as an official record of a
foreign country by either:
 1. an official publication;
2. attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document;
3. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be:
4. accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper Philippine diplomatic or consular
officer stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and
5. authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court ordered thr RTC to remand trial in the
purpose of submitting evidence that Recio was legally
capacitated to marry Garcia in 1994, otherwise
declare the marriage null and void on the ground of
bigamy for having established two subsisting
marriages.
NIKKO HOTEL vs. REYES
GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while
having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was
approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years
back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to
join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels
former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff
agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and
carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He lined up
at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his
embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive
Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough
to be heard by the people around them. He was
escorted by a policeman out of the hotel. All these
time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff.
Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr.
Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite
him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes
was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it
personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking
over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt. She
asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant
specifically ordered that the party should be intimate
consisting only of those who part of the list. She was
even polite in asking the plaintiff to finish his food then
leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked
how close Ms.Lim was when she approached him at
the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close
because we nearly kissed each other. Considering
the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay
the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes
who made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking
Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act
abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on
the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary
precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be
humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Petitioners cannot be held liable for damages brought
under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Under the doctrine of violenti non fit injuria, to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury. The
doctrine refers to self-inflicted injuries or to consent to
it which precludes the recovery of damages by one
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.
QUISUMBING vs MERALCO
GR No. 142943, 3 April 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing
are owners of a house located at Greenmeadows
Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3,
1995, defendants inspectors were conducting a
routine on the spot inspection of all single phase
meters at the house. Permission was granted by the
plaintiffs secretary. It was found that the meter had
been tampered with and the information was relayed
to the secretary who conveyed the information to the
owners of the house. The inspectors brought the
meter to their laboratory for further verifications. If
proven that the meter was indeed tampered,
defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric
services.
The inspectors returned and informed plaintiff of the
findings of the laboratory. And unless they pay the
amount of P178, 875.01 representing the difference in
the bill, their electric supply will be disconnected.
The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
1. MERALCO acted without due process and
lack of regard for Quisumbings rights and
reputation.
2. The Quisumbings be entitled for damages.
HELD:
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of
individuals including right against the deprivation of
property without due process of law are violated.
Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed
by way of example or correction for public.
The Court recognized the effort of MERALCO in
preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any
action must be done in strict observance of the rights
of the people. Meralco may immediately disconnect
service in cases of meter tampering, but it has to be
personally witnessed and attested by an officer of the
law or by a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no
government official or ERB representative was
present.
Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to pay respondent
the billing differential 0f P193, 332. 96 while
MERALCO was ordered to pay petitioners moral and
exemplary damages including attorneys fees.
GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA
219 SCRA 115
FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27,
1987 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged breach of their agreement to get married.
She met the petitioner in Dagupan, he was an Iranian
medical exchange student. He later courted her and
proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to
Marilous house to secure approval of her parents.
The petitioner forced the respondent to live with him
in his apartment. She filed a complaint because the
petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He
even tied the respondent in the apartment while he
was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time
became pregnant but the petitioner administered a
drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and
told Marilou to not live with him since he is already
married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he
never proposed marriage, neither sought consent and
approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he
asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the
latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for
damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to
cause claim for damages.
HELD:
Breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. The court held that when a man
uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to
consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud
and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the
court found that petitioners deceptive promise to
marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to
marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge
with the woman and actual damages should be paid
for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner
even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the
laws of the country.
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAO
G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were secretly
married by a military chaplain in one of Pastors
friends house. Upon learning about the secret
marriage, Vicentas parents arranged for them to be
married properly in a church so as to validate their
marriage as advised by a priest. Vicenta opposed to a
second marriage after receiving an anonymous letter
alleging that Pastor and is having an amorous
relationship with matchmaker Pacita Noel. Vicenta
continued to live with her parents and Pastor went
back to work in Manila. Although still solicitous of her
husbands welfare in her letters, she was not as
endearing and becomes less and less until they
became estranged.
Vicenta filed for a petition to annul her marriage but it
was dismissed for non-prosecution because she
never went to any of the set hearings. Without
informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
indicating in her application that she was single and
left for the United States. She filed for divorce (1950)
against Pastor in Nevada on the ground of extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character which the Nevada
court granted even when she was not yet an
American citizen (1958).
Tenchavez had initiated a complaint in the against
Vicenta F. Escao, her parents Mamerto and Mena
Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections. He asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce decree granted
by the Nevada Court is valid
2. Can the parents be held liable for the failure
of the marriage
HELD:
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party.
That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-
habitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one party entitles the other to recover
damages;
That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004
FACTS:
Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Binas in 1955
and they separated in 1966. He contracted a second
marriage to Narcisa Arcena in 1966 then Narcisa went
to Japan. While Narcisa was in Japan, he married
Zenaida for the second time in 1989.
Narcisa came home in 1992 and discovered
Salvadors affair with Fe Corazon Palto and his
second marriage to Zenaida. The event was followed
by Salvadors filing of an annulment case and the
other hand, Narcisa filed for bigamy against Salvador.
In his defense, Salvador contended that Narcisa
consented to his marriage to Zenaida and that the
bigamy case should be suspended since the
annulment case is prejudicial.
ISSUES:
Is the resolution of the annulment case a requisite for
the bigamy case to prosper?
HELD:
Annulment has no bearing upon determination of
petitioners innocence or guilt in bigamy. The only
requirement for bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting when the second marriage
was contracted.
Even void and voidable marriages shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise by the Court. Salvadors
marriages to Zenaida and Narcisa are both
subsisting, which makes him guilty of bigamy.
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action considering that a crime is committed
against the state. Bigamy is a public offense which
can be denounced by even a civic-spirited citizen who
may come to know of it.
QUIMIGUING vs. ICAO
34 SCRA 132
FACTS:
The petitioner Carmen Quimiguing and the defendant
Felix Icao, were neighbors in Dapitan City. They had
close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that
Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
knowledge with plaintiff several times under force and
intimidation and without her consent. Carmen got
pregnant despite of the drugs supplied by defendant.
As a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.
Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month,
damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was
dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte
on the ground of lack of cause of action. Plaintiff
moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court
ruled that no amendment was allowable since the
original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff has a right to claim support and
damages.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that a conceive child, yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The conceive child may also receive
donations and be accepted by those persons who will
legally represent them if they were already born as
prescribed in Article 742.
Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40
aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao
being a married man forced a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of
Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim
compensation for the damage caused.
GELUZ vs. CA
2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Respondent Oscar Lazos wife Nita Villanueva, came
to know petitioner physician Antonio Geluz, through
her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some
time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally
married. To conceal the pregnancy from her parents,
she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had an
abortion again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC.
After two years, on February 21, 1955, she got
pregnant again and had yet another abortion at Geluz
clinic. Oscar at this time was in the province of
Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial
board. He doesnt have any idea nor has he given
consent on the abortion.
ISSUE:
Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from
the physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The concept of provisional personality cannot be
invoked to obtain damages in behalf of an aborted
child. Both trial court and Court of Appeals were
unable to find any basis for an award of moral
damages. Oscars indifference to the previous
abortions of Nita clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
affections.
Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case
against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to
personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of
which not only he but, including his wife would be the
beneficiaries.
It shows that his real motive is to obtain large money
from the payment to be made since he sued Geluz for
P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the
circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
DE JESUS vs. SYQUIA
G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant was an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila. He
got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant
was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even
wrote a letter to a Rev Father confirming that the child
is his and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he
continuously wrote letters which are solicitous of
Antonia and the babys welfare. He made hospital
arrangements through his friend for Antonias delivery.
After giving birth, they lived together for about a year.
When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,
defendant suddenly departed and married another
woma.
It should be noted that during the christening of the
child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name
Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.
that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre and the other
letters written by defendant to Antonia during
her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of
paternity.
2. Whether the defendant should be compelled
to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the
other letters to Antonia are sufficient proof of paternity.
The mere requirement is that the writing shall be
indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be
in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to
reveal the fathers resolution to admit the status.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower
court compelling Syquia to provide support for the
child Ismael Loanco.
LIMJUCO vs. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his
death, applied for a certificate of public convenience
to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal.
His intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service
Commission issued a certificate of public convenience
to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the
said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be
extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial
judicial personality because under the Civil Code,
estate of a dead person could be considered as
artificial juridical person for the purpose of the
settlement and distribution of his properties. It
should be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death.
One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public
Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes
of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public
Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante
must be deemed extended, within the meaning and
intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in
harmony with the constitution.
DUMLAO vs. QUALITY PLASTIC
G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
FACTS:
On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan
rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino
Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the
legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower
court directed that in case the defendants failed to
pay the said amount before its decision became final,
then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. is hereby
authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in
accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the
judgment.
Upon defendants failure to pay the amount of the
judgment and after the decision had become final, the
lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products,
Inc., ordered the foreclosure of the surety bond and
the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria
which he had given as security under the bond. The
sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of
November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long
before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed.
Orias death was not known to Quality Plastic AND
that Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was
pending. On March 1, 1963 all testamentary heirs in
Orias duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic
Products, Inc., for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land.
ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of
Orias estate?
HELD:
The lower courts judgment against Oria is void for
lack of jurisdiction over his person. He had no more
civil personality and his juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The execution sale of Orias land is also void.
However, Quality plastics cannot be held liable for
damages and other costs because they were in good
faith in including Oria as defendant for no one
informed them of his death.
MO YA LIM YAO vs. COMM. IMMIGRATION
41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeng came to the Philippines from
Hongkong in a temporary visitors visa good for 1
month. She was asked to pay a bond of P1, 000 with
the condition to depart on before the expiration period
to stay. She was able to obtain repeated extensions
until Feruary 13 1962, in a period of 10 months.
On January 1962, she got married to Mo Ya Lim Yao
a.k.a Edilberto Aguinaldo, a Filipino citizen. 18 months
after her first arrival, the Comm. On Immigration
confiscated her bond and ordered immediate arrest
and deportation on the grounds of expiration of
authorized stay. Defendant filed for injunction but was
denied.
Comm. On Immigration allege that marriage to Lim is
an evidence of evading the expiration of her
authorized stay. They also contended that Lau Yuen
Yeung is disqualified for naturalization because she
cannot read nor write English or Tagalog and lastly,
being a temporary visitor, she should depart and get
the necessary visa for permanent stay before
reentering the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Can the Court rightfully allege that the
marriage was done for convenience?
2. Is the inability to speak or write English or
Tagalog a ground for disqualification to be a
citizen?
3. Does marriage to a Filipino citizen
automatically makes an alien into a citizen?
HELD:
No one, not even the Court can rightfully allege that a
marriage is done for convenience to avoid
deportation. Marriage is a sacred vow between two
people in accordance with law and no person can be
a judge to the motives of those who contract
marriage. Lau Yuen Yeung became a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of her marriage to Edilberto
Aguinaldo.
The Comm. of Immigration or any of its
representatives is permanently enjoined from causing
the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the
bond of Lau Yuen Yeung.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 120295, 28 June 1996
FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee made a petition to
cancel the COC for being disqualified to seek public
office because he was not a Filipino Citizen, which
was granted by the COMELEC.
Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration which
remained unacted upon until after May 1995 election.
His candidacy continued and he was elected as
Governor. However, the COMELEC affirmed his
disqualification on May 11, 1995. Raul Lee having
garnered the 2nd highest number of votes was
proclaimed Governor.
Frivaldo filed a petition to annul the proclamation on
the grounds that: 1. He took an Oath of Allegiance on
June 30 as his petition for naturalization in September
1994 had been granted; 2. There is no more legal
impediment for his proclamation; 3. The Vice
Governor and not Lee should occupy the seat as
Governor in case of vacancy due to disqualification.
ISSUE:
Is Juan Frivaldo a Filipino Citizen during his election
as Governor?
HELD:
Yes. It is true that he was disqualified by the Court in
the 1988 and 1992 elections on the issue of his
citizenship and he was stateless when he filed his
COC for the 1995 elections, thus making him
ineligible to hold public office. But his case is unique
and the law should be interpreted liberally on his
favor.
1. He sought American citizenship to escape
prosecution of the Martial Law, not to
denounce his being a Fiipino.
2. He took an Oath of Allegiance every time he
files his COC despite being denied several
times.
3. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer
determination to re-acquire his citizenship
despite technical setbacks.
4. Assured of a life of ease and plenty as an
American Citizen he opted on returning and
serving his country which gives no doubt as
to his loyalty and dedication to this country.
5. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly
voted for him three times which makes him
deserving to govern the people.
Frivaldo was upheld as the rightful Governor of
Sorsogon and granted Filipino citizenship.
UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC
95 P.R. 890
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927,
where he also finished his primary and secondary
education. He went to the United States, where, from
1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford
Junior University, in California. In April of 1950 he
returned to the Philippines for a four -month vacation,
then on July 15, 1950, filed an application for
naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the United
States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical
engineering, in another educational institution. He
finished this course in July 1951 but did not return to
the Philippines until October 13, 1951.
Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the
word residence, as used in the aforesaid provision
of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with
domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical
absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that,
from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in,
and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose
in staying in the United States, at that time being,
merely to study.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for naturalization may
be granted, when petitioner left the Philippines
immediately after the filing of his petition.
HELD:
While domicile and residence mean the same thing,
residence combined with intention to remain,
constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed
permanently for a time for business or other
purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may
be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true
domicile.
Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately
after the filing of his petition for naturalization and did
not return until several months after the first date set
for the hearing, notwithstanding his explicit promise,
under oath, that he would reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of his petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship, he has not complied with the
requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in
his favor.
However, the denial of his petition does not bar him to
reapply for citizenship and undergo the same process
again. He has to be committed to comply with the
requirements.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda was a little over 8 years old when her parents
established domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. She finished
her studies and got her degree in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School
still in Tacloban. She went to Manila in 1952 to work
for her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in
his office at the House of Representatives. In 1954,
she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when
he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and
consequently became a registered voter there.
When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during
1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, also a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to
rectify by adding the words since childhood in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative
of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for
election purposes. The court favors the conclusion
supporting petitioners claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the
following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents.
Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought
them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is
actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose. In
the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the
husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained
a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile
after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of
Pres. Marcos, her action of returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her
domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers
house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
other important milestones.
The petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the
First District of Leyte.
STAR PAPER CORP. vs. SIMBOL
G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper
products. The company policies stated that:
New applicants will not be allowed to be
hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to
the 3rd degree already employed by the
company.
In case of two employees decided to get
married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
The complainants alleged that they were co-
employees and they got married co-e. They were
compelled to resign because of the company policy.
They lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice.
ISSUE:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses
from working in the same company violates the rights
of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor
Code or is it a valid exercise of management
prerogative
HELD:
There are two types of employment policies involving
spouses:
No-spouse employment policies policies
banning only spouses from working in the
same company
Anti-nepotism employment policies those
banning all immediate family members,
including spouses, from working in the same
company
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the
employer must prove two factors:
1. That the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation
of the job involved; and
2. That there is a factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job.
In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business
necessity. The employees were hired after they were
found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when
they married a co-employee. Star Paper failed to
show how the marriages of the employees could be
detrimental to its business operations. The policy is
premised on the mere fear that employees married to
each other will be less efficient.
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company)
initially hired Grace de Guzman as reliever for
employees on leave in two instances. On September
2, 1991, de Guzman was asked to join PT&T as a
probationary employee where probationary period will
cover 150 days. She indicated in the application form
that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner
learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor required her to explain the discrepancy.
Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about
the companys policy of not accepting married women
for employment.
She was dismissed from the company effective
January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down
decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that
petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had
already gained the status of a regular employee.
Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE:
Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can
be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective
laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee.
It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing,
according to their discretion and best business
judgment, except in those cases of unlawful
discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from
work any woman worker who contracts marriage is
afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all
women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de
Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women
are not qualified for employment in the company, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a
woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly
or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or
to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of marriage.
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a widow and works as a court
interpreter. She was charged with committing
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct under the
Administrative Code for living with a man not her
husband and having borne a child within the live-in
set-up. She asserted that her conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious belief and has the
approval of her congregation with the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness. It allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their
spouses to enter into marital relations, thus making
the union moral and bindings.
Soledad was abandoned by her husband when she
started the live-in set-up. Eventually, he died which
lifts her legal impediment to marry but her partner is
not eligible for marriage yet. The above-mentioned
declaration is done with diligent investigation as to
backgrounds of the members who avail of it.
Once all legal impediments are lifted, the validity of
the declaration ceases and the couple should legalize
their union.
ISSUE:
Can ones religious belief and practice enough reason
to dismiss the charge and to justify a conjugal
arrangement?
HELD:
Soledads conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized
as she made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religion.
Man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the State. Soledads sincerity and centrality of her
claimed religious belief and practice is beyond doubt.
The administrative complaint was dismissed.
GOITIA vs CAMPOS-RUEDA
35 PHIL 252
FACTS:
Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally
married in Manila on January 7, 1915. They
established their residence and lived together for a
month.
The husband demanded from his wife to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs
which the wife refused to perform. The husband
continually demanded such lewd acts from his wife.
The constant refusal of the wife induced the husband
to inflict physical injuries. This forced Eloisa to leave
the conjugal home and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
Eloisa demanded financial support from Jose. The
Court held that the defendant cannot be compelled to
support the wife except in his own house, unless it is
by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation.
ISSUE:
Would the husband be compelled to provide financial
support for his wife who refuses to live with him?
HELD:
The act of marriage creates an obligation on the part
of the husband to support his wife as a natural and
legal duty. This obligation is not terminated by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection.
Separation and divorce arguments to create financial
obligation is weak because separate maintenance is a
specific duty mandated by the State and is not
payable either as damages or as penalty.
EUGENIO vs. VELEZ
185 SCRA 45
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
confined by the petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his
palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. She
cohabited with the petitioner against her will and
always had the intention of escaping. She died of
heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios
residence on Aug. 28, 1988.
Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters
(Vargases) filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging. The court then issued a writ of
habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the
Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a
corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus
proceedings. The court ordered that the body should
be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but
Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE:
Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?
HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of
Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving
brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased
was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left
any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
nearest kin of the deceased.
Petitioners claim that he is the spouse cannot be
valid as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil
Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law
marriages where a man and a woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and
wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions.
In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, legal
impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON
237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
Complainants work in MTC-Tinambak, Camarines
Sur. They alleged that Judge Palaypayon solemnized
marriages even without the requisite of a marriage
license. Hence, couples were able to get married just
by paying the marriage fees to respondent. As a
consequence, the marriage contracts of the couples
did not reflect any marriage license number. In
addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he had to wait for
the marriage license to be submitted by the parties
which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged
against the respondent. Palaypayon contends that
marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under
Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the
marriage license requirement. According to him, he
gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to
furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and
to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter
failed to do so. The spouses subsequently formalized
the marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which
was then filed with the civil registrar.
The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized
because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage
contracts and the date and place of marriage are not
included. The marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to
the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment
with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge
Palaypayon were valid.
HELD:
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that
in the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite
shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. He was
found guilty of solemnizing marriages without a
marriage license
His claim that Abellano and Edralin executed a joint
affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost 6 years already would
show that Abellano is less than 13 years old when
they started living together which. He is found to be
negligent in his duty to ascertain the qualification of
the contracting parties who might have executed a
false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage
license requirement.
WASSMER vs. VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get
married. They applied and acquired marriage license
and set the wedding on September 4, 1954.
Necessary publication and preparations including
sending off invitations were done.
Two days before the scheduled wedding, Francisco
went home to his province without properly notifying
Beatriz. He sent a telegram that they have to
postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it.
He gave an assurance that he will return but he never
did.
Beatriz sued for damages, Francisco filed no answer
and was declared in default. The Court ordered
Francisco to pay for actual damages, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Francisco
filed a petition for relief from orders and motion for a
new trial. The court then proposed for amicable
settlement.
Francisco contended that his failure to marry beatriz
was due to fortuitous event and circumstances
beyond his control.
ISSUE:
Can a person be held liable for walking out of his own
wedding?
HELD:
YES. Breech of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong however, that the extent to which
acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code
provides that any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued
and their wedding was set. Necessary preparation
and publicity were done only for the defendant to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized. This is contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in
damages.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. This
Courts opinion, considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15, 000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.
NAVARRO vs. DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 19 July 1996
FACTS:
Rodolfo Navarro lodged a complaint against Judge
Hernando Domagtoy for two acts:
1. For solemnizing the wedding between
Gaspar Tabadan and Arlyn Borga. The
groom is merely separated from his wife. The
judge relied on the affidavit by the MTC
Judge of Basy that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost
seven years, thus the presumption that she
is already dead.
 2. For solemnizing a wedding between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma Del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy can be held liable of
the above acts.
HELD:
1. Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of the first
wifes presumptive death. In the absence of
which, he remains married to the first wife
thus, legally incapacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage. It was an error to have
accepted a joint affidavit. The judges
negligence resulted to solemnizing a
bigamous marriage.
2. The justification that the marriage of
Sumaylo and Del Rosario was solemnized in
his home on the basis of an affidavit
submitted by Gemma alone is erroneous.
According to the Family Code, marriage can
be solemnized outside of the Courts
jurisdiction upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months and
given a stern warning that repetition of similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
ARAES vs. JUDGE OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes alleges that on 17
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia
without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
Araes and Orobia as husband and wife until her
husband passed away. Since the marriage was a
nullity, she was deprived to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia and to receive the pensions
of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.
Respondent judge averred that he was requested by
a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the marriage of
the parties having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete. He
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at MTC
Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February
2000, Arroyo requested if respondent judge could
solemnize the marriage in Nabua because Orobia had
a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of
travelling to Balatan.
He discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license so he suggested resetting
it. Due to the earnest pleas of the parties, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that
their failure to give it would render the marriage void.
Respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala which
never materialized.
Petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28
August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. That after reading the Comment filed
by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
ISSUES:
Can the judge be liable for solemnizing a marriage
outside of his jurisdiction and without the requisite of
marriage license given his reason of human
compassion and given the fact that the petitioner
already desisted from her complaint?
HELD:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or
B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges
and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by
the Supreme Court. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down
in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability. The respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area
which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur
therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage
license. It is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the
Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. Otherwise,
the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well
as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M.
Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
LIM TANHU vs. REMOLETE
66 SCRA 425
FACTS:
Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon
Lim Po Chuan, a Chinese citizen partner, owner with
controlling interest of Glory Commercial Co. Antonio
Lim Tahhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were
partners in name but wer mere employees of Chuan,
both are naturalized Filipinos.
Tan Put alleged that Tan Hu and several others took
actual/active management of the partnership through
fraud and machination. She is claiming entitlement to
the share of capital and profits including assets
acquired during the lifetime of Chuan, being the
widow of the latter.
Chuan died in 1966 which dissolved the partnership
and shares corresponded to him ws given to his
legitimate wife Ang Siok Tin and his chidren, all
residing in Hongkong. Defendants contended that Tan
Put is merely a common-law wife. Their union was
dissolved by Chuan himself when he was still alive
and she was given a settlement. They were unable to
bear a child who would have been a lawful heir of
Chuan.
ISSUE:
Is Tan Put entitled to claim Chuans share in the
company?
HELD:
Primary evidence of marriage is the authentic copy of
the Marriage certificate. Other competent evidence
may also be accepted when the absence of the
Marriage Certificate is satisfactorily explained.
Certification of the person who solemnized the
wedding is not admissible evidence of marriage.
Agreement with Chuan which was signed by Tan Put
that she received settlement for property interests
when they terminated their common-law union has
greater weight over the certification issued by Mons.
Jose M. Recoleto which does not show the reason
why there was no Marriage Certificate. In as much as
the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
VDA DE CHUA vs. CA AND CASTRO
G.R. No. 118635, 5 March 1998
FACTS:
Florita Vallejo lived out of wedlock with Roberto Lim
Chua, single and begot two children with him. Chua
died intestate in May 28, 1992. Florita filed for petition
for declaration of heirship and guardianship for her
sons and real and personal properties of their minor
children.
Court ordered hearing and publication of the said
petition in Maguindanao, Cotabato City and Davao
City.
Antoinetta Garcia Vda de Chua filed an opposition to
dismiss due to improper venue since the deceased
died in Davao, then Davao RTC has the proper
jurisdiction. The court denied the motion for lack of
merit.
During the hearing, Garcia contended that she was
the legal wife and that Chua resides in Davao at the
time of his death. She presented a photocopy of their
Marriage Certificate. She also submitted TCT,
Residence certificate, ITR and passport all stating that
he is married.
Florita On the other hand submitted birth certificates
of their children as well as certification from the Local
Civil Registrar that Chua does not have existing
marriage registered. Judge Banzali also denied
having solemnized the said wedding.
ISSUE:
Where is the deceaseds residence and could
Antoinetta be the legal wife and heir of Chua?
HELD:
Evidence proved that Chuas residence is in Cotabato
although he frequents Davao and usually stays there
for business purposes.
Garcia was unable to establish proof of her alleged
marriage which consequently denies her entitlement
to oppose Vallejos petition.
Photostat copy of the marriage certificate
cannot be admitted as evidence. Only the
original or an authenticated copy would
suffice as evidence of marriage.
Certification from the Local Civil Registrar
that no such marriage was recorded and
certification from the alleged solemnizing
officer denying the act made her evidence as
well as the other documents worthless.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND CASTRO
G.R. No. 103047, 12 September 1994
FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro file a petition for judicial decree of
nullity of marriage with Edwin Cardenas on the
ground that no Marriage License was ever issued to
them prior to the solemnization of the marriage. Edwin
failed to file an answer and was declared in default.
Angelina and Edwin had a civil wedding with Judge
Pablo Malvar in Pasay City without the knowledge of
Castros parents. Cardenas procured the
requirements including the marriage license in Pasig
MM. They cohabited for four months and bore a child.
They parted and the child was adopted by Castros
brother with the consent of Cardenas.
SCRO of Pasay issued a certification that marriage
license of the spouses does not appear from their
registry. Castro also testified that she did not apply for
marriage license and did not sign anything until the
marriage certificate.
The lower court denied the petition stating that the
certification is inadequate to establish non-issuance of
the marriage license. The inability to locate the
marriage license is not conclusive to show that there
was none issued.
ISSUE:
Would the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented be sufficient to grant a decree of nullity?
HELD:
At the time of their marriage the governing law was
the New Civil code which states that the absence of a
marriage license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
The fact that only Castro testified cannot be
held against her. Her husbands default after
duly served with notice cannot be faulted on
Castro.
The documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by Castro which was undisputed
by any party, sufficiently established the
absence of the marriage license. Thus,
marriage was null and void ab initio.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino married Richard
Upton, a U.S. citizen in Hongkong in 1972. They had
two children. They got divorced in Nevada U.S.A in
1982 and both certified that they do not have any
community property to divide. Alice remarried to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Upton filed a suit in June 1983 stating that Reyes
business in Manila is conjugal property. He demands
to render an accounting to the business and declare
his right to manage the business. Reyes moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the action is
barred by the previous judgment in Nevada divorce
wherein they both acknowledged having no
community property as of June 11, 1982.
Reyes motion was denied by the lower court stating
that the property is located in the Philippines so that
the divorce decree has no bearing.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce of the parties
to their property in the Philippines?
HELD:
Pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He has no standing to sue
in the case where the husband is entitled to control
over conjugal assets.
The divorce obtained abroad being valid in
his countrys court may be recognized in the
Philippines. The divorce decree granted in
Nevada released Reyes from the marriage
for the marriage had been severed by one
party ceases to bind either.
Getting a divorce decree in the US court and
contending that it is not valid and binding in
the Philippines being contrary to local law
and public policy estopped Uptons
declaration.
REPUBLIC vs. ORBECINDO
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecindo and Lady Myros Villanueva got
married in May 24, 1981. Both are Filipino citizens.
They cohabited and had two children. Villanueva went
to the U.S. in 1986 with one son.
Villanueva became a naturalized American citizen and
sometime in the year 2000, Orbecindo learned that
his wife obtained a divorce decree and remarried.
Orbecindo then filed a petition for authority to remarry.
The court granted the petition since there was no
opposition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article
26 of the Family Code
HELD:
Petition for authority to remarry constituted a petition
for the declaratory relief. The following are the
requisites:
1. Justiciable controversy
2. Controversy must be between persons
whose interest are adverse
3. That the party seeking relief has a legal
interest
4. The issue is ripe for judicial determination
ARTICLE 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code should
be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who acquired foreign citizenship
and remarried can also be allowed to remarry.
However, the present petition of Orbecindo has no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record and are
only based on bare allegations that his wife was a
naturalized American citizen, had obtained divorce
decree and had remarried an American. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon
submission of evidence in his favor.
NIAL vs. BAYADOG
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. Almst two
years thereafter Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years
and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
Petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs
deceased father with defendant is valid
HELD:
The two marriages involved herein is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio.
The 5-year cohabitation period should be the years
immediately preceding the marriage and it should be
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. In the case at bar Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time he cohabited
with another.
It should be noted that their marriage was void hence
it is deemed as if it never existed. Void marriages can
be questioned even after the death of either party. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case.
MANZANO vs. SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja Manzano avers that she was the
lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966. They had 4 children.
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
Judge Sanchez. The Judge knew or ought to know
that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were separated.
In his comment, at the time he officiated the marriage
the two had been living together as husband and wife
for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. Had he
known that Manzano was married he would have
refused to solemnize the marriage
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and
Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore
ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of solemnizing a bigamous
marriage?
HELD:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a
subsisting previous marriage is a legal impediment,
which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living
apart from their respective spouses for a long time is
immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
Recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount
of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20, 000.
MARIATEGUI Vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953
and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He
acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a
bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia
Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera,
Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera
had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria,
Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina.
Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto.
Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they
had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got
married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco
and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The
spouses deported themselves as husband and wife,
and were known in the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby
they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the
Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary
registration proceedings and a decree ordering the
registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the
third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of
the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid and
entitles their children of heirship for the properties left
by Lupo.
HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to
prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover,
the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child
born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore
have successional rights
CHI MING TSOI vs. CA
256 SCRA 324
FACTS:
GINA LAO-TSOI and Chi Ming Tsoi got married on
May 22, 1988. Distraught, Gina filed a petition for
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity premised on the following reasons:
There was no sexual intercourse between
them on the first night or on the succeeding
nights until they separated in March of 1989;
That the defendant is impotent, a closet
homosexual;
Results of their physical examinations were
that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husbands examination was
kept confidential up to this time.
Chi Ming Tsoi married her, to maintain his
residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal
man.
Chi Ming Tsoi does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons:
That there is no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable;
If there are any differences between them, it
can still be reconciled and that if either has
some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured.
He admitted that since their marriage until
their separation they had no sexual contact
between them. He reasoned was that every
time he wants to have sexual intercourse, his
wife always avoided him. He forced his wife
to have sex with him only once but he did not
continue because she was shaking and she
did not like it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation.
HELD:
Both defendant and appellant admitted that
they did not have sexual relations after
almost ten months of cohabitation, when
both are not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder.
To procreate is based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation destroys the integrity or wholeness
of the marriage. The senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity, since
he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the
entire time.
DOMINGO vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
FACTS:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad
A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig entitled Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property against
petitioner Roberto Domingo. They were married on
November 29, 1976 unknown to her, he had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on
April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing. She came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlinda sued for bigamy.
Since January 23 1979 up to the present, she has
been working in Saudi Arabia while he has been
unemployed and dependent. Out of her personal
earnings, she purchased properties amounting to
P350k, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto. In June 1989, she
discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman and he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent.
The petition prayed that 1. temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
Roberto from exercising any act of administration and
ownership over said properties; 2. their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and
3. Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their
void marriage and such properties be placed under
the proper management and administration of the
attorney-in-factMoises Avera, her brother
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration
should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is required
for the purpose of remarriage. It is necessary for the
protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in
good faith that his partner was not lawfully married
thus free from being charged with bigamy.
The marriage of Soledad and Roberto was celebrated
while the formers previous marriage was still
subsisting, thus, bigamous and void ab initio.
Law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes.
There is no need for a separate action of partition of
property because it will simply be the necessary
consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage.
REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997
FACTS:
Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed of a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. They were married on April 14, 1985 and
begot a son, Andre O. Molina was born. After a year
of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility. He preferred to spend time with
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money. He depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job and since then
Roridel had been the sole breadwinner. In October
1986 the couple had a very intense fight, which
resulted to their estrangement until Reynaldo finally
abandoned them. Roridel desires to have the
marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage
from the start.
Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to Roridels strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even
after their marriage, Roridels refusal to perform some
of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
Roridels failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
The parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years. The petitioner is not asking support or for
damages. Their common child is in the custody of the
petitioner.
ISSUES:
Are opposing and conflicting personalities equivalent
to psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
The present case, does not show that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations.
Here is the guideline for psychological incapacity to
be established:
(The Molina Doctrine)
1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the
2. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition.
LEOUEL vs CA
G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995
FACTS:
Leouel Santos 1LT of the Philippine Army met Julia in
Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal
trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church
wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents. Julia
gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as
Leouel Santos Jr.
Occasionally, the couple would fight over a number of
things aside from the interference of Julias parents
into their family affairs. Julia left in 1988 to work in the
U.S. as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade
her. She only called her husband after 7 months;
promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989 but she never did.
Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately tried to
locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his
efforts were of no avail. He filed a complaint to have
their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. He argued that failure of
Julia to return home or to communicate with him for
more than 5 years show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.
Julia opposed the complaint and denied the
allegations, claiming that it was the petitioner who had
been irresponsible and incompetent.
ISSUE:
Does Julias behavior of refusing to come home in
spite of the pleas of her husband constitute
psychological incapacity?
HELD:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity- a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage (b) juridical antecedence-
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, the procreation and education of offspring, and
(c) incurability- inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in marriage;
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no
measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all
the specific answers to every individual problem.
REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO
G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero and Toshio Hamano started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in
the Philippines for a month. Toshio went back to
Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. They had a
child and in January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were
married
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities,
which incapacity became manifest only after the
marriage. One month after they Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but he never responded. She
learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their
child. June 1996 Lolita filed for annulment.
Exhaustive efforts were done to contact Toshio to no
avail so she was allowed by the court to submit
evidence ex parte. She testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family. She offered documentary
evidence to support her testimony.
Court found that respondent failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to
his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family.
Such indifference is a clear manifestation of
insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child
which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to
respondents mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life. Court granted her petition of
nullity.
ISSUES:
Can a mixed marriage be embraced in psychological
incapacity?
Is failing to meet a duty to live with, care for and
support a family and abandonment constitute
psychological incapacity?
HELD:
In proving psychological incapacity, court finds no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. Court cannot be lenient in the application of
the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. However, the totality of evidence presented
fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated.
Abandonment is a ground for legal separation.
Psychological defect cannot be presumed from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family.
CHOA vs. CHOA
G.R. No. 1473376, 26 November 2002
FACTS:
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or
not) to make out his case or sustain the issue. The
demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs
evidence to sustain a verdict.
The petitioner Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa,
respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Two
children were born. The respondent filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage to petitioner based on her
alleged psychological incapacity.
The testimony of respondent basically complains
about three aspects of petitioners personality;
namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their
children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of
procreative sexuality. The case went to trial with
respondent presenting his evidence.
Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence). The lower
court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed
thereafter. The RTC issued an order denying
petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
respondent established a quantum of evidence that
the petitioner must controvert.
ISSUES:
WON (1) lack of attention to their children, (2)
immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality constitute psychological incapacity
HELD:
None of the causes complained of against the
petitioner separately or collectively constitute
psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities do not
constitute psychological incapacity.
Mild character peculiarities, mood changes and
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes of psychological incapacity. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will.
Respondents contention that petitioner lacked the
intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by
the fact that two children were born during their union.
DEDEL vs. CA
G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon
L. Corpuz Dedel wedding on May 20, 1967. The union
produced four children. The conjugal partnership,
nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother and had extra-marital
affairs with several men. Sharon once underwent
treatment with a clinical psychologist but it did not
stop Sharon in her illicit affairs where she even had
two children out of wedlock.
Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two
children. Petitioner accepted her back and even
considered the two illegitimate children as his own.
December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to
join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children.
Petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of
nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was
suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and had
no capacity for remorse. Her repeated acts of infidelity
and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-
Social Personality Disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
ISSUES:
Does the totality of the evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated?
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term
psychological incapacity?
HELD:
Respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as
being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming. Neither could her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and abandonment constitute
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential marital obligations. The
manifestations presented refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
The grief, frustration and even desperation of
petitioner in his present situation cannot be denied.
While sympathy is warranted in the petitioners marital
predicament, the law must be applied no matter how
harsh it may be.
MORIGO vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
FACTS:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates for 4 years, after which they lost contact
with each other. They reconnected again in 1984 and
became sweethearts when Lucia was in Singapore
until she went to Canada in 1986.
They got married in Aug.1990, the following month
Lucia went back to Canada leaving Lucio behind.
Lucia filed for divorce in Canada which was granted
by the court to take effect on Feb 17, 1992. On Oct. 4,
1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago.
September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage with Lucia, on
the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place. Lucio was charged with Bigamy in information
filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio filed a petition for certiorari seeking a reversal of
his conviction. He should not be faulted for relying in
good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. The OSG counters that petitioners contention
that he was in good faith in relying on the divorce
decree is negated by his act of filing a petition for a
judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.
HELD:
The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has
been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not
been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a
subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent
marriage would have been valid had it not been for
the existence of the first.
The trial court held that the marriage of Lucio and
Lucia is void ab initio, in accordance with the Family
Code. What transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of
a solemnizing officer.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that
the accused must have been legally married. But in
this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete.
Petitioner has not committed bigamy. His defense of
good faith or lack of criminal intent is now moot and
academic.
WEIGEL vs. SEMPIO-DY
143 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity
of his marriage celebrated on July, 1978 with herein
petitioner Lilia Oliva Weigel on the g round that Lilia
has previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion performed on June 25, 1972
Lilia admitted the existence of said prior subsisting
marriage claimed that said marriage was null and
void. She asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence that:
The first marriage was vitiated by force
exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
The first husband was at the time of the
marriage in 1972 already married to
someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of
evidence because the existence of force exerted on
both parties of the first marriage had already been
agreed upon.
Lilia assailed the Order dated March 17, 1980 in
which the parties were compelled to submit the case
for resolution based on agreed facts; and the Order
dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioners motion to
allow her to present evidence in her favor.
ISSUE:
Could the resolution of the facts of the first marriage
change the result of the annulment case filed by
Weigel?
HELD:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming as such, the marriage will
not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil Code),
and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment
has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
the respondent she was still validly married to her first
husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is
VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
A marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married
woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. The marriage of Lilia
and Karl would be regarded VOID under the law.
VALDES vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
The petition for review is purely on a question of law.
Petitioner avers that the court has failed to apply the
correct law that should govern the disposition of a
family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is
declared void ab initio because of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to
the contract.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married
on 05 January 1971 and had five children. In 22 June
1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. In
29 July 1994, the court granted the petition. Judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
The marriage declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital
obligations;
The three older children shall choose which
parent they would want to stay with. The 2
younger ones shall be in the custody of their
mother, herein respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have
visitation rights over the children who are in
the custody of the other.
Petitioner and respondent are directed to
start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147
of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
same code, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this decision.
ISSUE:
What will govern the partition of property for annulled
marriages on the ground of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio.
The property regime shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
The properties acquired during their union are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares.
They own their family home and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares.
A court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage
a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
authority to resolve incidental and consequential
matters such as property partition.
PEOPLE vs. ARAGON
100 Phil 1033
FACTS:
On September 28, 1925, Proceso Rosima, contracted
marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in Cebu. While
marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, Aragon,
contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on
August 27, 1934. Accused and Maria Faicol
established residence in Iloilo while he maintained his
first wife in Cebu.
Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939
and the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu in
1940. Proceso and Maria Faicol did not live a happy
marital life. Faicol suffered injuries because of
physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused.
Proceso sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo to undergo
treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, he
contracted another marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953.
CFI Cebu held that even in the absence of an express
provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an
action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage
void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract
marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the
dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by
the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of
the nullity of such marriag.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage to Jesusa Maglasang
was bigamous.
HELD:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage
Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime
of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon
complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with
the appellant was not renewed after the death of the
first wife and before the third marriage was entered
into. Hence, marriage with Maglasang was a valid one
and appellants prosecution for contracting this
marriage cannot prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without
prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the
second bigamous marriage.
MERCADO vs. MERCADO
337 SCRA 122
FACTS:
In June 27, 1991 Dr. Vincent Mercado and
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married with which
a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by
the parties. The status indicated by the accused was
single.
At the time of the celebration of the wedding with Tan,
accused was actually a married man, having been in
lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976
Both marriages were consummated: Ma. Thelma
Oliva had two children and Tan had one. On October
5, 1992, bigamy was filed by Tan; where he was
convicted by the lower court.
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado assailed the decision the
ground that on November 13, 1992 accused filed an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva and was granted by the court.
While acknowledging the existence of the two
marriages, accused posited the defense that his
previous marriage had been judicially declared null
and void and that the private complainant had
knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of
petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy negates the guilt of petitioner. Is the
petitioner entitled to an acquittal on the basis of
reasonable doubt?
HELD:
The elements of BIGAMY are as follows: (1)That the
offender has been legally married; (2)That the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; (4)That the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. In the instant case, petitioner
contracted a second marriage without judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. That he
subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
the crime had already been consummated.
Justice VITUG dissenting opinion:
No judicial declaration of nullity should be
deemed essential when the marriage, is 1.)
between persons of the same sex or 2.)
when either or both parties had not at all
given consent to the marriage.
Complete nullity of a previously contracted
marriage, being a total nullity and inexistent,
should be capable of being independently
raised by way of a defense in a criminal case
for bigamy. No incongruence bet this rule in
criminal law and that of the Family Code,
and each may be applied within the
respective spheres of governance.
REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO
220 SCRA 20
FACTS:
Nolasco was a seaman and met Janet Monica Parker,
a British in a bar in England. 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
Antique. After marriage celebration, he obtained
another contract and left his wife with his parents.
In January 1983 his mother informed him that Janet
Monica had given birth to his son and that Janet
Monica had left Antique. He then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He
arrived in Antique in November 1983 (after 11 mos)
His efforts to look for her proved fruitless, respondent
stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker not knowing her background. He did
not report the matter of Janet Monicas disappearance
to the Philippine government authorities.
5 August 1988, Nolasco filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker or that the marriage be declared null
and void.
ISSUE:
Does the circumstances of Jessicas disappearance
constitute a presumptive death?
HELD:
There are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code: (1) That the absent spouse has been missing
for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code; (2)That the present spouse wishes to
remarry; (3)That the present spouse has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) That
the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
Respondent failed to prove a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead by failing to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief
Inquiring from friends instead of reporting to the
proper authorities among the other superficial
testimonies given by the respondent does not
constitute a diligent search
LUKBAN vs REPUBLIC
L-8492, 29 February 1956
FACTS:
In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of
LOURDES G. LUKBAN. Petitioner is a widow of
Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and
has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent
marriage.
Lourdes G. Lukban, married with Francisco Chuidian
on December 10, 1933. After 17 days Francisco left
after a violent quarrel then he has not been heard
from despite diligent search. She inquired from his
parents and friends but no one was able to indicate
his whereabouts. She believes that he is dead
because he had been absent for more than 20 years.
She intends to marry again and she desires that her
civil status be defined in order that she may be
relieved of any liability under the law.
Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground
that the same is not authorized by law.
ISSUE:
Can death be presumed by the nature of Francisco
Chuidans disappearance?
HELD:
Judicial declaration that Petitioners husband is
presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because
it is not authorized by law. The court cannot declare
the status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter
depend upon the fact of death of the husband which
the court can declare upon proper evidence, not
because he is merely presumed to be dead.
CIVIL CODE Section III Paragraph 2, General Orders
No. 68) requires that:
The former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage. The spouse present does
not know his or her former spouse to be
living.
that former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead;
the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage
ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO
G.R.No. 138467, 6 April 2000
FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several
parcels of land with an estimated value of
P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife,
herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Teodorico was
the second husband of Marietta who had previously
been married to James William Bounds who
disappeared without a trace on 11 Feb 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
later, without Marietta having secured a court
declaration that James was presumptively dead.
Antonia Armas, a sister of Teodorico, filed a petition
claiming to be the sole surviving heir. She alleged
marriage between Teodorico and Marietta being is
bigamous and thereby null and void. She asked the
court to have her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be
appointed administrator.
Marietta opposed, stating that her marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latters
absence for more than 11 years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Being
the surviving spous, she sought priority in the
administration of the estate.
Trial Court handed a judgment that Antonia Armas y
Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage contracted by Teodorico and Marietta
valid?
HELD:
The law in force at that time was the Civil Code: Art.
83 which states that:
Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
or
The first spouse had been absent for 7
consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive; or
If the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391.
The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
It remained undisputed that Mariettas first
husband, James William Bounds, had been
absent for more than 11 years before she
entered into a second marriage. This second
marriage, under the Civil Code, should thus
be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds. A
judicial declaration of absence of the
absentee spouse is not necessary as long as
the prescribed period of absence is met.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and
Marietta, without other evidence having been
adduced to indicate another property regime
between the spouses, pertains to them in
common. Upon its dissolution with the death
of Teodorico, the property should rightly be
divided in two equal portions. One portion
going to the surviving spouse and the other
portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse.
The dispositive portion thereof that the
children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
along with her, to the other half of the
inheritance the other one-half share of the
decedents estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own
children.
ANAYA vs. PALAROAN
35 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4
December 1953. Defendant Fernando filed an action
for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on
the ground that his consent was obtained through
force and intimidation.
Judgment was rendered dismissing Fernandos
petition, upholding the validity of the marriage and
granting Auroras counterclaim. Accordingly Fernando
had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his
prior to their marriage. The non-divulgement to her of
the pre-marital secret constituted FRAUD, in
obtaining her consent. Aurora further alleged that
Fernando sought to marry her so he could evade
marrying the close relative and he intended from the
beginning not to perform the marital duties and
obligations in order to appease the immediate
members of the family of the first girl.
Fernando in his answer, denied the allegation of
having had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative, thus having committed no fraud against her.
He courted a third girl with whom he cohabited and
had several children during the whole range of nine
years that the Civil Case had been litigated between
them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
Fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be
a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85,
No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides that a
marriage may be annulled for any of the following
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of
the contracting parties;
Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of
the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;
Concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband.
Any secret intention on the husbands part not to
perform his marital duties must have been discovered
by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action
for annulment based on that fraud should have been
brought within four years after the marriage. Since
appellants wedding was celebrated in December of
1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it
must be declared already barred.
BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT
72 Phil 19
FACTS:
This issue has been raised to this superiority by the
Court of First Instance of Baguio, as only raises a
question purely of law.
The plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938,
committed on Sept and got married on 26 November
the same year. After living together for 99 days ,Luisa
gave birth to a child of nine months, in February 23,
1939. Godofredo abandoned Luisa and did not return.
In March 29, 1939 GODOFREDO requests the
annulment of marriage with Luisa Buccat Mangonon
on the ground that he was defrauded in consenting to
the marriage with Luisa. She had assured him that
she was virgin but the circumstances of the birth of
the child after only 99 days of cohabitation speaks
otherwise.
Luisa failed to appear despite having been
summoned which allowed Godofredo to present
evidence. The lower court decided in favor of Luisa in
upholding the marriage. Godofredo appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Godofredos ground is valid to be
granted an annulment.
HELD:
The plaintiffs allegation of fraud is impossible after it
has been proven that Luisa is in advanced pregnant
condition by the time they were married. It seems
childish considering that the applicant was a freshman
in law.
Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the
foundation on which society rests. In this case no
evidence has satisfied the court to merit an
annulment. All the intendment of the law leans
towards the validity of marriage.
AQUINO vs. DELIZO
109 Phil 21
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissed
complaint for annulment of Fernando Aquinos
marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo. Complaint
which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on
the ground of fraud.
Conchita Delizo, concealed the fact that she was
pregnant by another man. Sometime in April, 1955, or
about four months after their marriage, she gave birth
to a child. She claimed that the child was conceived
out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth
certificate was presented to show that the child was
born within 180 days after the marriage between the
parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy
as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such
fraud as would annul a marriage dismissed the
complaint.
Fernando appealed the case with the following
information:
At the time he courted Conchita she was
living with his own brother Cesar Aquino who
admitted that he was the father of Conchitas
first-born. Cesar and Conchita hid her
pregnancy from Fernando.
Conchita is presently living with Cesar and
had 2 more children; he submitted the birth
certificates
Stating that it does not believe the veracity of the
contents of the motion and its annexes, the Court of
Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contentions alleged sufficient to
seek for annulment.
HELD:
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of
the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of
marriage. (Art. 85, par. 4)
The evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial,
taken together with what has already been adduced
would be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by
plaintiff. The Supreme Court found the appeal
meritorious and ordered a new trial for the annulment
case.
MENCIANO vs. SAN JOSE
89 Phil 63
FACTS:
Matilde Menciano filed a motion for declaration of
heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased
Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on
September 28, 1944. Before the marriage they lived
together as husband and wife, there having been no
impediment to their marriage. As a result of their
cohabitation the child Carlo Magno Neri was born,
baptized and was legitimized by the subsequent
matrimony of his parents. The second child Faustino
Neri, Jr., was born on April 24, 1945 is a legitimate
child.
Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, and Rodolfo
Pelaez, designated universal heir in the will of the
deceased filed a motion to question the declaration of
heirs.
They alleged that marriage between said deceased
and Matilde Menciano was in violation of the legal
provisions and requisites, because he was deprived
of free will due to his age and sickness. Accordingly,
Matilde Menciano took advantage of his condition, by
intrigue, deceit and threat of abandoning him, forced
Neri to marry her. The deceased was impotent and
congenitally sterile, the same as his brothers and
sister Conchita, who had no children therefore it
would have been impossible for him to have fathered
the children
Defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of
P286, 000 in cash, and for jewels and certain
properties, which, as alleged, were retained and
illegally disposed of by Matilde Menciano.
ISSUE:
1. Was the marriage between the deceased
Faustino Neri San Jose and Matilde
Menciano valid?
2. Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo
Magno Neri the legitimate children of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and
Matilde Menciano?
3. Did Matilde Menciano have illegally disposed
of the cash, jewels, and certain properties
above mentioned?
HELD:
The marriage of Matilde and Faustino was evidenced
by a valid Marriage License and Marriage Certificate
both of which were signed by the parties and properly
recorded at the Office of the Civil Registrar. Being
official and public documents, their validity can be
successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and
convincing oral testimony.
Faustinos meticulous signature cannot be signed by
one who is not of sound mind and of fair physical
condition. He may have been sick at that time, but not
to such a degree as to render him unconscious of
what he was doing.
Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual
intercourse. The presumption is in favor of potency.
The fact that the deceased was able to produce the
specimen as what was instructed by his doctor shows
that he was potent. The necessary conclusion is that
the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed
to be the legitimate son of the deceased Faustino Neri
with Matilde Menciano in lawful wedlock.
The trial court, after a careful and exhaustive review
of the evidence, correctly reached the conclusion that
allegation of illegally disposing money and jewelry has
not been substantiated.
JIMENEZ vs. CANIZARES
L-12790, 31 August 1960
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez filed a petition for a decree annulling his
marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares
contracted on 3 August 1950 upon the ground that the
condition of her genitals is incapable of copulation
and it existed at the time of marriage and continues to
exist. For that reason he left the conjugal home two
nights and one day after they had been married.
On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served
a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer so
the court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to
inquire whether there was collusion.
On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order
requiring the defendant to submit to a physical exam
to determine her physical capacity for copulation and
to submit, in ten days a medical certificate on the
result which she did not comply with. The Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage which
prompted the city attorney to file a motion for
reconsideration upon the ground that the defendants
impotency has not been satisfactorily established as
required by law; because the wife refused to be
examined.
Instead of annulling the marriage the Court should
have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and
submit a medical certificate. The decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples,
who want to end their marriage to collude or connive
with each other by just alleging impotency of one of
them.
ISSUE:
May the marriage in question be annulled on the
strength of the lone testimony of thhusband?
HELD:
The annulment cannot be decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony which is aimed at securing the annulment
he seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot
be deemed to have been satisfactorily established,
because from the commencement of the proceedings
until the entry of the decree she had abstained from
taking part therein. Her refusal to be examined and
failure to appear in court show indifference on her
part, yet presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not be inferred because women of this
country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would
not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority.
Impotency should not be presumed. The presumption
is always in favor of potency.
SIN vs. SIN
G.R. No. 137590, 26 March 2001
FACTS:
An appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing petitioner Florence Malcampo-Sins
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and
engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin,
a Portugese citizen, were married. On September 20,
1994, Florence filed for annulment which was
dismissed June of the following year. She appealed
and again dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Florence was given a fair trial.
HELD:
Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did
not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose
Danilo C. Jabson filed with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that
he found no collusion between the parties, he did not
actively participate therein. The Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates:
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear
on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation
and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure
of an invalid one as well.
Decision of the trial court as prematurely rendered
since the investigating prosecutor was not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence before
the judgment was rendered. This stresses the
importance of the participation of the State.
Supreme Court declined to rule on the factual
disputes of the case, this being within the province of
the trial court upon proper re-trial.
OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO
107 Phil 35
FACTS:
On July 5, 1955, petition for legal separation was filed
by Jose De Ocampo. It described their marriage
performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by
Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in
June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.
The defendant made no answer so the court
defaulted her, and directed the provincial fiscal to
investigate whether or not collusion existed between
the parties. There was none. The plaintiff presented
his evidence consisting of several testimonies which
established that they were married in April 5, 1938
and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They
begot several children who are now living with
plaintiff.
Plaintiff discovered on several occasions illicit
relations with one Jose Arcalas. He sent Serafina to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where
she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered
that while in the said city defendant was going out
with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas.
Towards the end of June, 1952 she left plaintiff and
since then they had lived separately.
The night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon
discovering the illicit connection with Nelson Orzame,
expressed his wish to file a petition for legal
separation and defendant readily agreed. Her
conformity to the legal separation was treated a
confession of judgment by the Appellate Court and
declared that under Art. 101, legal separation could
not be decreed.
ISSUE:
DOes the defendants conformity to the legal
separation constitute a confession of judgment that
proves collision?
HELD:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the
agreement between husband and wife as having
committed, a matrimonial offense or to suppress
evidence of a valid defense for the purpose of
enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This
agreement, if not express, may be implied from the
acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the
divorce. Collusion may not be inferred from the mere
fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and
thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it
What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively or mainly on defendants confession. If a
confession defeats the action ipso facto, any
defendant who opposes the separation will
immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent
it. Collusion implies more than consent or lack of
opposition.
LAPUZ vs. EUFEMIO
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio and he should
be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits. They were married civilly on 21 September
1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934. They
lived together as husband until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They had no child; that they
acquired properties during their marriage; and that
she discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March
1949.
Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special
defenses, and, along with several other claims
involving money and other properties, counter-
claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of
his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated
according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go
Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok
Before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on. Counsel
for petitioner duly notified the court of her death and
moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUES:
What is the effect of death of either party to a legal
separation case?
HELD:
The Article 100 of Civil Code allows only the innocent
spouse to claim legal separation; and in Article 108,
provides that the spouses can, by their reconciliation,
stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is
abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved, is that these rights are mere
effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not
come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
Property rights acquired by either party could be
resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.
As to the petition of Eufemio for a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, such action
became moot and academic upon the death of the
latter, and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union.
GANDIONCO vs. PENARANDA
G.R. No. 72984, 27 November 1987
FACTS:
Teresita Gandionco respondent and legal wife of the
petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a
petition for support and payment of damages presided
over by respondent Judge. The wife also filed a
separate concubinage case. On 14 November 1986,
application for the provisional remedy of
support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action
for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in
the civil case for legal separation. The respondent
judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986,
ordered payment of support pendente lite.
Petitioner Froilan Gandionco contends that the civil
action for legal separation and the incidents
consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite should be suspended in view of
the criminal case for concubinage filed against him
the private respondent. He also argues that his
conviction for concubinage will have to be first
secured before the action for legal separation can
prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for
legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordered support arising from a
legal separation case should be suspended until the
pending criminal case of concubinage is decided
upon.
HELD:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,
based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense even
if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of off
springs, support, and disqualification from inheriting
from the innocent spouse, among others.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of
in an action for legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount
of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he
can always file a motion to modify or reduce the
same.
BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033, 28 December 1956
FACTS
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan wherein on motion of the
defendant, the case was dismissed. The order of
dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but
said Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the
ground that there is absolutely no question of fact
involved.
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the U.S. Navy,
was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August
27, 1949 while on furlough leave. Immediately after
their marriage, the couple lived with his sisters in
Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July,
1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-
law and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to
Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
Benjamin received several information from different
people about his wifes infidelity. This prompted him to
go home and confront his wife. They stayed together
in his cousins house as husband and wife for a few
days. Instead of answering his questions, she left
which made him assume that it was an admission of
guilt. He filed for legal separation on the ground of
adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his assumption of his wifes guilt is
enough basis for a legal separation to be granted.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation or
conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed.
The act of the latter in persuading her to come along
with him, and the fact that she went with him to the
house of his cousin and slept as husband and wife for
one day and two nights; these facts show
reconciliation between them was effected and that
there was a condonation of the wife by the husband.
The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after
he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been
committed by the wife, the conduct of the husband
despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives
him of the right of any action for legal separation
against the offending wife, because his said conduct
comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil
Code.
PACETE vs. CARIAGA
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or
not the CFI of Cotabato, Branch I, gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension
of time to file their answer and in declaring petitioners
in default and in rendering its decision of which,
among other things, decreed the legal separation of
petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent
Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab
initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la
Concepcion.
Concepcion Alanis filed for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L.
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation and accounting and separation of
property. She averred that she was married to Pacete
on 30 April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo. She learned that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion. She and Pacete acquired vast property
that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the
names of his children with Clarita and other
dummies;
After having been summoned, the defendants
repeatedly asked the court for extension of filing for
an answer which eventually resulted to being
declared in default. Five months after the petition was
filed the court granted the issuance of a Decree of
Legal Separation and declared the properties in
question as conjugal properties of Alanis and Pacete
which were ordered forfeited in favor of Alanis. The
court also nullified his marriage to Clarita.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion
in deciding the case.
HELD:
No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or
for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to investigate whether or not collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the
Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a
cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The decision of the lower court was nullified.
MACADANGDANG vs. CA
108 SCRA 314
FACTS:
Filomena and Antonio contracted marriage in 1946.
From humble beginnings they slowly expanded their
business and wealth. They had six children. After
several setbacks in their relationship, each accusing
the other of infidelity, they separated in 1965.
Filomena left and resided in Cebu. When she
returned, she learned of the illicit affairs of her
estranged husband. She initiated a legal separation
against Antonio and later filed for a petition for the
appointment of an administrator for their properties.
Antonio opposed the appointment of an administrator.
No action was made on Antonios petition. In spite of
that, the court granted the legal separation with all its
legal effects particularly the dissolution and liquidation
of the community property. Pending the inventory and
dissolution of property, Antonio was ordered to pay
support to Filomena.
Filomena filed for another motion for administration to
impede unlawful sequestration of some conjugal
assets and clandestine transfers by Antonio. Antonio
opposed the move and filed a motion to stop the court
from executing orders for administration and to null
the legal separation. CA upheld the decision of the
lower court. Antonio appealed but he unexpected died
on November 30, 1979.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of Antonios death to the legal
separation case and the dissolution of conjugal
properties?
HELD:
Upon finality, legal separation shall have the following
effects: 1.) Spouses shall be entitled to live
separately, but the marriage bond shall be severed;
2.) Conjugal properties shall be liquidated and
dissolved but the offending spouse shall have no right
to any share of the profits earned by the partnership
or community.
The decision of the trial court on Jan 4, 1973 finding
Antonio guilty of concubinage and granting the legal
separation and all its legal effects along with the
division of conjugal property had long been final and
executory.
Upon the death of the guilty party, the liquidation of
the conjugal property can be resolved by the
application of the rules on intestate succession with
respect to the exclusive property of the deceased
petitioner. Thus, the process be:
1. Liquidation and distribution governing the
effects of the final decree of legal separation;
2. Whatever remaining properties allocated to
the deceased petitioner shall be governed by
intestate succession.
POTENCIANO vs. CA
G.R. No. 139789
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch
who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband
some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her
husband. It was denied for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed
with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari
pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband
Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with
another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his
children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio
appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his
wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.
One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of
her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia
were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio (which
he denied in court) to fraudulently deprive her of
property rights out of pure greed. She claimed that
her two children were using their sick and frail father
to sign away Potenciano and Erlindas property to
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also
argued that since Potenciano retired as director and
officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine
Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically
assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia
were the ones controlling the corporations.
Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her
position that as spouses, they are duty bound to live
together and care for each other.
ISSUE:
Can spouses be compelled to live together by an
order issued by the cout?
HELD:
The Court is not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio
was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see
his wife or not. As to whether the children were in fact
taking control of the corporations, these are matters
that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding,
irrelevant in habeas corpus.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity and is premised on spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not by any
legal mandate or court order
Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is
definitely for two loving adults who view the
relationship with amor gignit amorem respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
TY vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000
FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva both in civil and church ceremony.
However, on August 4, 1980, the marriage was
declared null and void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license. The church wedding was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of
the parties. Before the decree was issued nullifying
his marriage to Anna Maria, Reyes wed Ofelia P. Ty in
civil and a church.
Reyes filed a civil case for his marriage with Ty to be
declared null and void for having no marriage license
when they got married. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage
to Anna Maria had not yet been issued, thus, he was
still married to Anna Maria.
Ty pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. She
submitted their Marriage License issued at Rosario,
Cavite on April 3, 1979. He did not question this
document.
The Pasig RTC sustained Reyes civil suit and
declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and
void ab initio. Both parties appealed to respondent
Court of Appeals which ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage must first be
secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted and upheld the decision of the
lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be
entered into validly.
HELD
Art. 40 Family Code. The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. A declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense.
The Court finds that the provisions of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied to the present case,
for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of
petitioner and of her children. Petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and
formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two
ceremonies. So that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia
P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is
hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING
As for the payment of damages from her husband for
filing a baseless complaint for annulment, our laws do
not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation
AYALA INVESTMENTS vs. CA
G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added
security for the credit line extended to PBM,
respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President
of PBM, executed security agreements on December
10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself
jointly and severally answerable with PBMs
indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case
for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching.
The court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Alfredo Ching to jointly pay AIDC the principal amount
of P50, 300,000.00 with interests.
Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy
Sheriff of Rizal caused the issuance and service upon
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated
May 20, 1982 on three of their conjugal properties.
Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the
properties levied.
Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against
petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
The auction sale took place, being the only bidder,
AIDC was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner
Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon
expiration of the redemption period, issued the final
deed of sale which was registered on August 9, 1983.
ISSUES:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and
obligations contracted by the husband alone are
considered for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership which are chargeable against the
conjugal partnership?
HELD:
Article 122 of the Family Code provides that The
payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to
the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the
exercise of the industry or profession, by which he
contributes to the support of the family, cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
If the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot be categorized as falling within
the context of obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor (Corporate Debt of PBC) and not for the surety
or his family. Therefore, the spouses Chings conjugal
properties cannot be executed in favor of AIDC.
AGAPAY vs. PALANG
276 SCRA 341
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage Carlina (or
Cornelia) Vallesterol. A few months after the wedding,
he left to work in Hawaii. They had 1 child Herminia
Palang. Miguel returned twice but he stayed with his
brother, not his wife and child. It was found that as
early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce
Carlina in Hawaii.
In 1973, 63 year-old Miguel contracted second
marriage with 19 year-old Erlinda Agapay. Miguel and
Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land,
with the TCT issued in their names and a house and
lot with the TCT issued in Erlindas name. Miguel and
Erlindas cohabitation produced a son Kristopher.
Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to
settle a case filed by the latter. They agreed to donate
their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of
land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years
later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted
an action for recovery the rice land and the house and
lot both purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation
with Erlinda.
ISSUE:
Does Carlina have the right to recover the properties
acquired during Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation?
HELD:
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage, said
union was void because the marriage with Carlina
was subsisting and unaffected by the de facto
separation.
Article 148 of the Family Code provides that for cases
of cohabitation when parties are not capacitated to
marry each other, the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions.
Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed
money to buy the rice land. Consequently, the rice
land should revert to the conjugal partnership property
of the deceased Miguel and private respondent
Carlina Palang.
As to the house and lot, testimonies reveal
that Miguel Palang provided the money for
the purchase and directed that Erlindas
name be placed as the vendee. This too
should revert to the conjugal partnership.
As to Kristopher Palangs status and claim
as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguels
estate should be ventilated in the proper
probate court or in a special proceeding
instituted for the purpose.
MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES
38 SCRA 284
FACTS:
In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, Petronila Cervantes. Felix and
Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after
the deed of donation was executed. Five months
later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Cornelia Matabuena, being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a
claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the
land declared in her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon.
The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the
donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the
time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses,
rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as
the dictates of morality requires that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679,
1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations
in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, then there is every reason
to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to
appellee does not necessarily result in appellant
having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a
widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters
or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. CA
161 SCRA608
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the
amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory
note he signed in his own behalf and as a
representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented
an alleged special power of attorney executed by his
wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under
whose name the said business was registered,
purportedly authorized the husband to procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. 2 months prior the
procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their
children which in turn abandoned their conjugal
home. When the obligation became due and
demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of
fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of
Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests
over a construction contract executed by and between
the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ
hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and
not contented with the order; petitioner filed a motion
for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that
the properties attached by the sheriff were not
sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment
which was likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE:
Can A&L Industries can be held liable for the
obligations contracted by the husband.
HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose
registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship
was established during the marriage and assets were
also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed
that the property forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the
obligations contracted by the husband. However, for
the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by
the husband must have redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. The obligation was
contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at
the time he incurred such obligation, he had already
abandoned his family and left their conjugal home.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce
the obligation contracted by Augusto against his
conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of
attachment cannot be issued against the said
properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily
actual damages amounting to P660, 000.00.
MARMONT RESORT HOTEL vs. GUIANG
168 SCRA 373
FACTS:
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed between
Maris Trading and petitioner Marmont Resort Hotel
Enterprises, Inc. (Marmont). Under the agreement,
Maris Trading undertook to drill for water and to
provide all equipment necessary to install and
complete a water supply facility to service the
Marmont Olongapo, for a stipulated fee of
P40,000.00. In fulfillment of its contract, Maris Trading
drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion
of a parcel of land then occupied by respondent
spouses Federico and Aurora Guiang.
Five months later, a Memorandum of Agreement was
executed between Maris Trading and Aurora Guiang,
with Federico Guiang signing as witness. This
agreement states that in consideration of the sum of
P1, 500.00 the Guiangs sell and cede all rights and
claims over the lot where the water source of
Marmont is located unto and in favor of Maris Trading.
After some time, the water supply of the Marmont
became inadequate which prompted them to secure
the services of another contractor. They sought
permission from the Guiang spouses to inspect the
water pump which had been installed but it was not
granted. Marmont filed a Complaint against the
Guiang spouses for damages resulting from their
refusal. The claimed damages totaled P110, 000.
The Guiangs moved to dismiss the Complaint. They
assailed the validity of the second Memorandum of
Agreement, alleging that the subject matter thereof
involved conjugal property alienated by Aurora
Guiang without the marital consent of her husband,
Federico Guiang.
ISSUE:
Would the spouses be solidarily liable for the
damages claimed by Marmont?
HELD:
It was established that The Guiangs have acted
contrary to the principles of honesty, good faith and
fair dealing embodied in Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code when they refused petitioner Marmont access to
the water facility and to benefit from it which forced
Marmont to locate an alternative source of water
which resulted to their lost revenues. Therefore, they
are liable for damages.
The Memorandum of Agreement entered into by
Aurora Guiang was with full consent of Federico and
the proceeds thereof redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Therefore, they are solidarily
liable for the damages claimed.
UY vs. CA
G.R. No. 109557, 29 November 2000
FACTS:
The controversy came about when Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr.s suffered of a stroke which left him
comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties.
He is the father of respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and
husband of petitioner Gilda Jardeleza.
Gilda L. Jardeleza filed a petition regarding the
declaration of incapacity of Ernesto, assumption of
sole powers of administration of conjugal properties,
and authorization to sell the same. Gilda averred the
accumulated expenses sets the urgency to sell one
piece of real property.
RTC of Iloilo rendered a decided that Ernesto was
truly incapacitated to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of the
property was necessary to defray the mounting
expenses for treatment and hospitalization.
Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration
arguing that the petition for declaration of incapacity,
assumption of sole powers of administration, and
authority to sell the conjugal properties was a petition
for guardianship of the person and properties of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., as such, it cannot be
prosecuted on summary proceedings. He further
alleged that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired
vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that these
rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his
consent. While the motion for reconsideration was
pending, Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale
Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her
daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy for P 8 million.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. manage their conjugal
partnership property may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property
HELD:
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly In the event that one spouse is incapacitated
or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
A spouse who desires to sell real property as such
administrator of the conjugal property must observe
the procedure for the sale of the wards estate
required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
DELA CRUZ vs. DELA CRUZ
130 Phil 324
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant
were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children.
During their cohabitation, they acquired several
parcels of land and were engage in various
businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her
husband for the separation of their properties.
Alleging that her husband aside from abandoning her,
also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the
other hand, Severino contended that he had always
visited the conjugal home and had provided support
for the family despite his frequent absences when he
was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their
business.
Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling
instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory
although he paid short visits in the conjugal home,
which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected
that her husband had a mistress named Nenita
Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of
property for the fear that her husband might squander
and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the
concubine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been abandonment and
abuse of authority as administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:
To be legally declared as to have abandoned the
conjugal home, one must have willfully and with
intention of not coming back and perpetual
separation. There must be real abandonment and not
mere separation.
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of
his marital obligations and support of the family. In
fact, the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This
negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal
abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband
paid short visits implying more than one visit.
Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their
businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly
allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally
by the defendant or the witness himself.
Mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the
wife of the progress of the business does not
constitute abuse of administration. In order for abuse
to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of
the interest of the partnership evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to
the latter.
DEL MUNDO vs. CA
97 SCRA373
FACTS:
Respondents Antonio, Eugenia, Delfin and Marciana
all surnamed Alvarez are legitimate children of
Agripino Alvarez and his first wife Alejandra Martin.
After the death of Alejandra Martin, Agripino Alvarez
married Isidra de la Cruz in February 1927 and they
had one child named Teodora Alvarez.
Agripino Alvarez died intestate, survived by his widow
Isidra and his five children, the four plaintiffs and
Teodora. Through an Extra-judicial Partition with
Absolute Sale of Shares was executed by the widow
Isidra and her daughter Teodora Alvarez wherein,
after reciting that they are the legal and absolute
heirs they adjudicated to themselves in equal shares
then sold the entire property in Rizal to Pacifico C.
del Mundo who registered the instrument .
The children of Agripino by his first wife sold to
Simplicio Balcos four tenths (4/10) undivided share in
the property in question which they claim as their
share in the estate of their father. The deed of sale
has never been registered.
They filed a complaint against Isidra and Teodora in
order to annul the sale they made on the property.
The Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the
property in question is the paraphernal property of
Isidra de la Cruz. The CA reversed the decision
declaring the property to be conjugal and the four
children co-owners of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the property in question is the conjugal
property of Agripino Alvarez and Isidra de la Cruz or
the paraphernal property of the latter alone.
HELD:
The property in question is a paraphernal property of
Isidra de la Cruz as shown in the deed of sale
executed by Simplicio Dantes and Emilia Rivera of
the property to Isidra de la Cruz when the latter was
then single and the money with which the lot was
purchased her own money. The Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition submitted cannot change the
paraphernal character of the property. The open
acknowledgment of one spouse that the money used
to purchase the property was paraphernal funds of
the other cannot be contested by his heirs.
Granting that the property is conjugal to the spouses,
it should be liquidated and adjudicate one half of the
property in favor of the surviving spouse in full
ownership and the other half, to the deceased
husbands heirs, wherein Isidra shall likewise be
entitled to a portion thereof in usufruct equal to that
corresponding by way of legitime to each of the
legitimate children.
VILLANUEVA vs. IAC
192 SCRA 21
FACTS:
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land
from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modestos
illegitimate children, borrowed money from private
respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral
their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas
described themselves as the absolute co-owners.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting
to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and
thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest
bidder. He then consolidated his ownership over the
lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it within the
reglementary period, and had the title in the name of
Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his
name.
Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they
adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal
share pro-indiviso. In 1978, petitioner Consolacion
Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint
against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios
Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the
name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-
owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses
Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2
separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and
Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal
shares pro diviso, all of said Victorias shares from the
conjugal partnership property; and second Modestos
interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as
well as his separate properties bequeathed to
Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the
complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal
owners of the disputed property.
ISSUE:
Does Corazon have a right over the land and the
improvements thereon?
HELD:
The land was Modestos exclusive property since he
inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria
died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot
from him and therefore had nothing of the land to
bequeath by will of otherwise.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements,
whether for utility or adornment made on the separate
property of the spouses through advancements from
the partnership or through the industry of either
spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and
buildings constructed at the expense of the
partnership during the marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but
the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the
spouse who owns the same.
Without proof that the improvements comes from
conjugal funds, the presumption is that is belongs
exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible
to declare the improvements to be conjugal in
character.
Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the
property appears to be regular, he must therefore be
deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title
to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by
claims that he had no knowledge of.
BPI vs. POSADAS
56 Phil 215
FACTS:
BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased
Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila absolving
defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the
complaint filed against him in recovering the
inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the
plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under
protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the
proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914.
The wife was actually residing and living in Germany
when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter
while in Germany, executed a will in March 1926,
pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his
universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real
property situated in the Philippines but also personal
property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic
corporations. Included in the personal property is a
life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913
for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the
insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was
named the beneficiary without any qualification.
Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased.
BPI, as administrator of the decedents estate and
attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded
by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under
protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by
plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds
of the insurance.
HELD:
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy
payable to the insureds estate, on which the
premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership,
constitute community property, and belong one-half to
the husband and the other half to the wife,
exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with
paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds
are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and
conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-
insurance policy payable to the insureds estate as
the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary
administrator of the former as part of the assets of
said estate under probate administration, are subject
to the inheritance tax according to the law on the
matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it
is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these
Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the
plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the amount
of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance
policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze,
after deducting the proportional part corresponding to
the first premium.
JOCSON vs. CA
170 SCRA 333
FACTS:
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of
the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete.
Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without
her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently,
Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.
The controversy concerns the validity of three
documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his
lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by
sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently
covers almost all of his properties, including his one-
third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife.
Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents
and prays that they be declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be partitioned
between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their
deceased parents the properties in question being a
conjugal property of both.
He explained that there could be no real sale between
a father and daughter who are living under the same
roof, especially so when the properties sold were all
income-producing. Allegedly their father was induced
to sign the contract of sale through fraud.
ISSUE:
Are the properties involved conjugal properties of the
parents, therefore entitles Moises to claim his share
and make the sale void?
HELD:
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, a contract
of sale with a simulated price is void. The burden of
proof in showing that contracts lack consideration
rests on who alleged it. The degree of proof becomes
more stringent where the documents themselves
show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the
price, and more so where the documents were
notarized, as in the case at bar. Petitioner has not
sufficiently proven that the questioned documents are
without consideration.
As for the properties being conjugal, Article 160 of the
Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
There being no such proof, the condition sine qua
non for the application of the presumption does not
exist.
Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption
under Article 160 he must first present proof that the
disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of the parents. The fact that the properties
were registered in the name of Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete is merely descriptive of
the civil status of Emilio Jocson. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts.
Therefore, the Court ruled that the properties under
Exhibit 3 are the exclusive properties of Emilio
Jocson.
WONG vs IAC
200 SCRA 792
FACTS:
Romarico Henson married Katrina on January 1964.
They had 3 children however, even during the early
years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of
the time living separately. During the marriage or on
about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of
land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June
1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan
where the latter consigned the former pieces of
jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to
return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita
demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which was
dishonored due to lack of funds.
The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action
for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and
her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim
filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in
favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was
thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in
the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina
Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to
Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo
Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico
filed an action for annulment of the decision including
the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE:
Could the debt of the wife without the knowledge of
the husband be satisfied through the conjugal
property?
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the
wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The
husband had nothing to do with the business
transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into
such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during
the marriage with unclear proof where the husband
obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is
presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the
absence of proof that they are exclusive property of
the husband and even though they had been living
separately.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when
she purchases things necessary for support of the
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico and the execution of judgments extends
only over properties belonging to the judgment
debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for
Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the
latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also
no evidence submitted that the administration of the
partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as
much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned,
Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against
Katrina, personally and exclusively.
ZULUETA vs PAN-AMERICAN AIRWAYS
49 SCRA 1
FACTS
Petitioner Rafael Zulueta and his family were
passengers of respondent Pan-American Airways
bound to Manila from Wake Island. Before the plane
took off, Rafael got off the plane to relieve himself. It
took a full hour before he came back, which caused
the trip substantial delay. As a consequence, an
altercation happened between him and the airplane
captain. The heated argument prompted the captain
to order the crew that Rafael and his family to be off-
loaded from the plane.
Because of the humiliation and embarrassment, they
filed an action for damages. The court ordered the
airline to pay moral damages in the amount of P700,
000.
ISSUE:
Whether the amount of money collected as a result of
litigation forms a part of conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Moral damages have arisen from inter alia, a contract
was breached when the airline off-loaded the family
from the flight that they have paid for and the airline
has agreed to service them. This falls under those
acquired by onerous title during the marriage. Hence,
the rights accruing from such contracts including
those from breach thereof are presumed to belong to
the partnership
JOVELLANOS vs. CA
210 SCRA 126
FACTS:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a
lease and conditional sale agreement over a house
and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to
Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the
petitioners. When Leonor Dizon died, Daniel married
private respondent Annette with whom he begot two
children.
The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos
married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel
Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of
the premises.
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife
executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale
and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein
petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot
and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.
Respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the
lower court that the aforestated property was acquired
by her deceased husband while their marriage was
still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners
contend that the property, were acquired by their
parents during the existence of the first marriage
under their lease and conditional sale agreement with
Philamlife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property in question belongs to the
second marriage?
HELD:
In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is
not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon
full payment of the purchase price. Ownership is
transferred upon delivery. Daniel acquired ownership
only upon full payment of the said amount hence,
although he had been in possession of the premises
since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8,
1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute
sale in his favor.
As early as 1967, he was already married to Annette
H. Jovellanos. Article 118 of the Family Code on
property bought on installments, where ownership is
vested during the marriage, such property shall
belong to the conjugal partnership. Thus, the property
in question necessarily belonged to his conjugal
partnership with his said second wife.
Annette on the other hand is liable to pay the
corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who
helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot.
JOHNSON AND JOHNSON vs. CA AND PINTUAN
G.R. No. 102692, 23 September 1996
FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for
her retail business under the name of Vinluan
Enterprises incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for
which she issued seven checks of varying amounts
and due dates that bounced and were dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds. Partial
payments were made after several demands. When
no further payments were made to settle the
obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the spouses
for collection of the principal obligation plus interest
with damages.
RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and found that
there was no privity of contract between J&J and
defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the
obligations incurred by the wife. Husband was made
a co-owner of the enterprise after the obligation
involved in this action has been incurred. The court
then issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to
execute judgment on the properties of the wife.
The notices of levy on execution covered not only her
exclusive paraphernal properties but also the
properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
This led the husband to file a third-party claim seeking
the lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial
court denied the third-party claim since Alejos
consent became evident when he did not seek the
intervention of the Court to air his objections in his
wifes engaging business coupled by the fact that he
made several representations for the settlement of his
wifes account. Thus, even his capital may be liable
aside from the conjugal and paraphernal property.
ISSUE:
Can the husband be held liable for the debts incurred
by his wife?
HELD:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the
trial court cannot, in the guise of deciding the third-
party claim, reverse its final decision. Only the wife
and her paraphernal property can be held liable. And
since the power of the execution of judgment extends
only to properties belonging to the judgment debtor
alone, the conjugal property and the capital of the
husband cannot be levied upon. In any event that
Delilahs paraphernal properties are insufficient, in
order to bind the conjugal partnership properties, the
debts and obligations contracted by either the
husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership and that the husband must
consent to his wifes engaging in business.
The respondent court already found that the husband
did not give his consent neither did the obligation
incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the
family. Therefore, the conjugal property cannot be
held liable for the debts
LACSON vs. DIAZ
14 SCRA 183
FACTS:
Abelardo G. Diaz was sentenced to pay the Soledad
Lacson the sum P132,718.30.of from July 1, 1960
until fully paid. The Sheriff sent a notice to his
employer to garnish one-third of his monthly salary
and of any other personal properties belonging to said
defendant, to cover the total amount.
Diaz filed with the court a motion to quash the writ of
execution and to lift the notice of garnishmenton the
ground that the same are not enforceable against his
present family. The money-judgment arose out of a
contract entered into by him during his first marriage
said judgment cannot be enforced against his salaries
which form part of the conjugal properties of the
second marriage. Plaintiffs opposed this motion, for
the reason that re-marriage is not a cause for
extinction of obligations.
ISSUE:
Is Diazs contention correct?
HELD:
The appellant, who became a widower in 1951,
remarried in 1960. The writ of execution and notice of
garnishment in this case were issued and
implemented in 1961. The conjugal partnership of the
second marriage is different from that of the first
marriage, during which existence the obligation arose,
such obligation, as far as the second conjugal
partnership is concerned, is personal to the husband
and cannot be charged against the properties of the
second union. Since his salaries form part of the
conjugal asset the same cannot be garnished to
satisfy his personal obligations.
As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before the marriage, as well as fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However,
such obligations may be enforced against the
conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already been
covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive
property or the same is insufficient.
In the instant case, it is a personal obligation of the
husband, and it has not been established that the
latter does not have properties of his own or that the
same are not adequate to satisfy appellees claim.
Furthermore, there is no showing that the
responsibilities named in Article 161 of the new Civil
Code have already been covered in order that the
personal obligation of the husband may be made
chargeable against the properties of the second
marriage.
GARCIA vs. MANZANO
103 Phil 798
FACTS:
Plaintiff Gonzalo Garcia and defendant are husband
and wife but they have been living separately from
each other since 1948, all attempts at reconciliation
between them having failed. Plaintiff, veterinarian
used to be employed in the slaughter-house of the
City of Manila, while defendant, was engaged in
cattle and fresh meat business. As a result of their
joint efforts they acquired and accumulated real and
personal properties. Upon their separation the
defendant assumed the complete management and
administration of the conjugal partnership property
and even transferred or alienated a majority of said
property in favor of third persons. Defendant has
failed and refused to turn over and deliver to plaintiff
his rightful share.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action
because it does not allege any of the grounds
recognized by Article 191 of the new Civil Code for
decreeing a judicial separation of properties.
The lower court held that plaintiffs complaint is not
included under the provisions of Articles 190 and 191
of the new Civil Code providing for judicial separation
of the conjugal partnership property and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint without prejudice.
ISSUE:
Is the husband entitled to some relief?
HELD:
ART. 167. In case of abuse of powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership property by
the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may
provide for a receivership, or administration by the
wife, or separation of property.
ART. 178. The separation in fact between husband
and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the
conjugal partnership, except that:
1. In the spouse who leaves the conjugal home
or refuses to live therein without just cause,
shall not have a right to be supported;
2. When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by law,
judicial authorization shall be necessary;
3. If the husband has abandoned the wife
without just cause for at least one year, she
may petition the court for a receivership or
administration by her of the conjugal
partnership property, or separation of
property.
Action is dismissed in view of the impropriety of the
principal remedy sought, but without prejudice to
proper proceedings
TODA JR. vs. CA
183 SCRA 713
FACTS:
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were
married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with two
children. Individual differences and the alleged
infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal
union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on
December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition
for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged
mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds
against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid
further disagreeable proceedings, filed on April 1,
1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution
of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil
Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478,
which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case.
This petition which was signed by the parties on
March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise agreement
allocating to the spouses their respective shares in
the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with
prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No.
11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121
of this Court. The said petition and the compromise
agreement therein were approved by the trial court in
its order of June 9, 1981.
ISSUE:
Is a compromise agreement sufficient action in
dissolution and partition of property?
HELD:
Supreme Court is in agreement with the holding of the
Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement
became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when
it was approved by the trial court, and not on March
30,1981 when it was signed by the parties. Under
Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 In the absence of an
express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a
judicial order.
Hence, the separation of property is not effected by
the mere execution of the contract or agreement of
the parties, but by the decree of the court approving
the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon
judicial approval, without which it is void.
Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly
provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of
property.
MALLILIN vs. CASTRO
G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo was
alleged to be both married and with children but
separated from their respective spouses and
cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still
subsist. They established Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation during their union of which
petitioner was the President and Chairman and
respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They
likewise acquired real and personal properties which
were registered solely in respondents name. Due to
irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992.
Petitioner demanded his share from respondent in the
subject properties but the latter refused alleging that
said properties had been registered solely in her
name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife because they
were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership
shares while respondent filed a motion for summary
judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and
granted the latter.
ISSUE:
Can petitioner validly claim his share in the acquired
properties registered under the name of the
respondent considering they both have subsisting
relationship when they started living together?
HELD:
Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is
co-ownership even though the couples in union are
not capacitated to marry each other.
When CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition
on grounds of due process and equity, his right to
prove ownership over the claimed properties was
denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends
may be served by simply excluding from the action for
partition the properties registered in the name of
Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in
the case.
The case was remanded to lower court for further
proceedings.
VALDES vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition
in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
granted hence, marriage is null and void on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.
Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of
their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to
choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage.
During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a
joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their
father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be based
on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties are governed by the rules on co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
JUANIZA vs. JOSE
89 SCRA 306, 30 March 1979
FACTS:
Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision
with a freight train of the PNR that took place in
November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5
physical injuries of its passengers. That time,
Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been
cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant
for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision
rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay
damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza.
A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to
be reconsidered.
ISSUE:
Are Eugenio and Rosalia co-owners of the jeepney?
HELD:
The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only
when the parties are not incapacitated to marry.
Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership with the lawful wife.
The common-law wife not being the registered owner
cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its
operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability
in the damages arising from the death of and physical
injuries suffered by the passengers.
TUMLOS vs FERNANDEZ
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an
action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and
Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building that through their tolerance they
allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the
last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was
agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while
the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month
which was not complied with. Demand was made
several times for the defendants to vacate the
premises as they are in need of the property for the
construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and
Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It
was likewise alleged that they lived together in the
said apartment building with their 2 children for about
10 years and that Gullerma administered the property
by collecting rentals from the lessees until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of their marriage.
ISSUE:
Is Guillerma a co-owner of the said apartment under
Article 148.
HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were
co-owners of the subject property. The claim was not
satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no
other evidence presented to validate it except for the
said affidavit.
Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario
and that she bore him two children were true, the
claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario
is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and
Mario are not capacitated to marry each other.
The property relation governing their supposed
cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code.
Actual contribution is required by the said provision in
contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care
and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of
common property by one who has no salary, income,
work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If
actual contribution is not proven then there can be no
co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
DOCENA vs. LAPESURA
GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001
FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a
complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against
his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda
Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the land
based on the occupation since time immemorial. The
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial judge in issuing orders and that of the
sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed
the petition on the ground that the petition was filed
beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of
non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by
only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is sufficient that the certification of
non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the
petitioners.
HELD:
In view of the property involved which is a conjugal
property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition
thereof originated from an action for recovery brought
against the spouses and is clearly intended for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as
point out was in the province of Samar whereas the
petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid
application of the rules on forum shopping that would
disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in
his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh.
In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum
shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a
case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate
signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with the rules. The
two petitioners in this case are husband and wife and
their residence is the subject property alleged to be a
conjugal property.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the
conjugal property belongs to the husband and wife
jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management or administration does not
require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full
power of management alone, subject to the
intervention of the court in proper cases.
Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded
to CA for further proceedings.
GAYON vs. GAYON
39 SCRA 104
FACTS:
Pedro Gayon filed a complaint against the spouses
Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva Gayon, alleging that,
on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed of
sale whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum
of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land including the
improvements thereon, subject to redemption within
five years or not later than October 1, 1957. That said
right of redemption had not been exercised by
Silvestre and Genoveva or any of their heirs or
successors, despite the expiration of the period.
Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita by virtue of a deed
of sale sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro
Gayon for the sum of P614.00. The plaintiff had, since
1961, introduced improvements worthP1,00. He had
fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967.
Articles 1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code require a
judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and
to a land acquired through a conditional sale. Plaintiff
filed a suit praying that an order be issued in plaintiffs
favor for the consolidation of ownership of the
aforementioned property.
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged
that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6,
1954, long before the institution of this case. The
complaint is fictitious, for her signature was forged.
Neither she nor her deceased husband had ever
executed any document of whatever nature in
plaintiffs favor
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the Mrs. Gayon that
an earnest effort toward a compromise before the
filing of the suit is tenable.
HELD:
In the plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise, Art. 222
of our Civil Code provide:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but if the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035. It is noteworthy that the
impediment arising from this provision applies to suits
filed or maintained between members of the same
family.
The phrase, members of the same family, shall
include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2)
Between parent and child;(3) Among other
ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among
brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiffs sister-in-law, whereas her
children are his nephews and/or nieces, none of them
is included in the enumeration contained in said
Article.
HONTIVEROS vs. RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros
filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros who is the brother
of Augusto, and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners
alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in
Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the
land as a result of the filing of the land registration
case.
In the reply, private respondents denied that they
were married and alleged that Gregorio was a
widower while Teodora was single. They also denied
depriving petitioners of possession of and income
from the land. On the contrary, according to the
private respondents, the possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to petitioners
by virtue of the writ of possession.
Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were made, it was not verified
as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE:
Can the court validly dismiss the complaint due to
lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as
stated in Article 151?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private
respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria
Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the
scope of Article 151.
Under this provision, the phrase members of the
same family refers to the husband and wife, parents
and children, ascendants and descendants, and
brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora
and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are regarded
as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of
Article 151.
MANALO vs CA
GR No. 129242, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died intestate on February 1992,
was survived by his wife Pilar and his 11 children.
The deceased left several real properties in Manila
and a business in Tarlac. In November 1992, herein
respondents, 8 of the surviving children, filed a
petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of
the estate of their late father and for appointment of
their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
Hearing was set on February 11, 1993 and the herein
petitioners were granted 10 days within which to file
their opposition to the petition.
The only issue raised by petitioners is whether or not
the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the questioned orders of the respondent trial court
which denied their motion for the outright and to aver
that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving
members of the same family have been made prior to
the filing of the petition but that the same have failed.
ISSUE:
Is the case at bar covered by Article 151 where
earnest efforts toward compromise should first be
made prior the filing of the petition?
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the
nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and
the character of the relief were sought in the
complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The careful
scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement and distribution of the
estate belies herein petitioners claim that the same is
in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
The provision of Article 151 is applicable only to
ordinary civil actions. It is clear from the term suit
that it refers to an action by one person or persons
against another or other in a court of justice in which
the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords
him for the redress of an injury or enforcement of a
right. It is also the intention of the Code Commission
as revealed in the Report of the Code Commission to
make the provision be applicable only to civil actions.
The petition for issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of estate is a special
proceeding and as such a remedy whereby the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized
that herein petitioners are not being sued in such
case for any cause of action as in fact no defendant
was pronounced therein.
ALBANO VS. GAPUSAN
A.M. No. 1022-MJ, 7 May 1976
FACTS:
Redentor Albano filed a case for malpractice against
Judge Gapusan for having prepared and notarized a
document providing for the personal separation of
Sps. Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the
extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership
five years before his appointment to the bench. It was
stipulated in that document that if either spouse
should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case
may be, then the other should refrain from filing an
action against the other.
Respondent Judge denied that he drafted the said
agreement and explained that the spouses had been
separated for a long time when they signed it and the
wife had begotten children with her paramour. He
further added that there was a stipulation in the said
agreement that the spouse would live together in case
of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation
agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent
incidents between the spouses. Albano in filing the
malpractice charge is in effect asking the Court to
take belated disciplinary action against Judge
Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Gapusan should be disciplined
for notarizing the void agreement between the
spouses.
Held:
There is no question that the covenants contained in
the said separation agreement are contrary to law,
morals and good customs. Those stipulations
undermine the institutions of marriage and the family.
Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable
social institution. The family is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects.
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family,
the law considers as void any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife and every
extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudically
dissolving the conjugal partnership.
Gapusan as a member of the bar should be censured
for having notarized the void separation agreement
already mentioned. However, his notarization of that
document does not warrant any disciplinary action
against him as a municipal judge (he was appointed
in 1946 as justice of the peace) especially considering
that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by
the Commission on Appointments.
MONDEQUILLO vs. BREVA
1. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and
a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the
latters name. A motion to quash was filed by the
petitioner alleging that the residential land is where
the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under
Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in
Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to
be enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it
is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was
a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by
operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a
family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well-taken.
Article 162 of the Family Code, provides that the
provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.
It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
the execution for payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Code. The said article
simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the FC. The debt and liability which was the
basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity
of the Family Code. This does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled
that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights
the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was
dismissed.
MANACOP vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on
March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located
in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-
contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment
signed between petitioners corporation and private
respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).
The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the
sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the house of the former.
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned
by the Manacop Construction President, the
petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property
is a family home having been occupied by him and his
family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from
attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is indeed
exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a
family home by operation of law under Article 153 of
the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that
said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioners included, are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988.
Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the
effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore
not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
TANEO vs. CA
304 SCRA 308
FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case for recovery of
property in favor of private respondent Abdon Gilig,
two properties of the petitioner were levied to satisfy
the judgment amount. One was a parcel of land and
the other was the family home. The subject
properties were sold at public auction on February 12,
1966 to the private respondent as the highest bidder.
Consequently, after petitioners failure to redeem the
same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on
February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and
conveying said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an
action on November 5, 1985 to declare the deed of
conveyance void. The petitioners are the children and
heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died
on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984,
respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject
property and that said property has been acquired
through free patent, therefore inalienable and not
subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt
Private respondent refuted petitioners alleging that he
lawfully acquired the subject property which was a
private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs Sale. Said sale
has become final as no redemption was made within
one year from the registration of the Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale. .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the
sheriffs sale is prohibited; and whether or not the
family home is exempt from execution.
HELD:
The conveyance made by way of the sheriffs sale
was not violative of the law. The judgment obligation
of the petitioners against Abdon Gilig arose on June
24, 1964. The properties were levied and sold at
public auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder
on February 12, 1966. On February 9, 1968, the final
deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to
Abdon Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to
redeem the property after the reglementary period.
Pablo Taneos application for free patent was
approved only on October 19, 1973. Therefore, even
before the application for homestead had been
approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of
the land
The house was erected not on the land which the
Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco
Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the
family home is the dwelling house where a person
and his family resides and the land on which it is
situated, it is understood that the house should be
constructed on a land not belonging to another.
Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo
Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought
in order to escape execution of their property.
BALUYOT vs. BALUYOT
186 SCRA 506
FACTS:
Petitioners Victoria and Ma Flordeliza Baluyot filed a
petition for intervention in Special Proceedings No.
entitled Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique
Baluyut,. The petition alleged that petitioners have a
legal interest in the estate of the deceased Enrique M.
Baluyut being the illegitimate children of the
deceased, begotten out of wedlock by said deceased
and petitioners mother and guardian ad litemNorma
Urbano. They were conceived and born at the time
when Norma Urbano cohabited with the deceased
while the latter was already married to Felicidad S.
Baluyut and that they were in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of children of the
deceased during his lifetime by having supported and
maintained them.
Felicidad S. Baluyut, widow of Enrique and appointed
administratrix of his estate, opposed the petition for
intervention
ISSUE:
Were the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late
Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious
children?
HELD:
There are two modes of acknowledgment provided in
the New Civil Code; one, by the voluntary recognition
by the putative parent made in the record of birth, a
statement before the court of record, or in any
authentic writing (Art. 278, New Civil Code) and two,
by compulsory recognition under Article 283 of the
same law.
There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which
proves that the petitioners were recognized by the
deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children.
The petitioners records of birth, although in the name
of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter.
There was neither authentic writing presented nor any
statement in a court of record which would prove that
the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.
In order to prove the continuous possession of the
status of a natural child, the acts must be of such a
nature that they reveal, not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in
life, not accidentally, but continuously
The grounds relied upon by petitioners were the
alleged possession by the petitioners of the status of
recognized illegitimate spurious children and that they
were conceived at the time when their mother
cohabited with the deceased. The evidence presented
by petitioners failed to satisfy the high standard of
proof required for the success of their action for
compulsory recognition.
CASTRO vs. CA
G.R. No. 50974, 31 May 1981
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa
Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose
Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage
annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife
married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in
December 1980, whom according to the husband was
still alive and living. Trial court ruled that the son was
an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to
the wife while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued
that there was nothing in the law granting visitation
rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child. She further wanted to have the surname of the
son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use
his mothers surname. After the requested oral
argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the
son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence,
the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
ISSUE:
What is the real status of the child Jose Gerardo?
HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with
Gerardo was void ab initio, he never became
the formers husband and never acquired
any right to impugn the legitimacy of the
child. Theresas contention was to have his
son be declared as not the legitimate child of
her and Mario but her illegitimate child with
Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no
right to disavow a child because maternity is
never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted
by law to question the sons legitimacy.
Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the
child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. Having the best interest of
the child in mind, the presumption of his
legitimacy was upheld by the Court.
As a legitimate child, the son shall have the
right to bear the surnames of Mario and
Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of
Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot
then impose his surname to be used by the
child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is
not related to him in any way.
ANDAL vs. MACARAIG
GR No. 2474, May 30, 1951
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria
Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned
by her and Emiliano Andalon the premise that
Mariano is the legal heir being the legitimate son of
Emiliano. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant,
donated the land by virtue of donation propter
nuptias in favor of Emiliano.
Emiliano was suffering from tuberculosis in January
1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work
in his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak
that he can hardly move and get up from his bed.
Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with
Felix and lived at the house of Marias father until
1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the
wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943,
Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.
ISSUE:
Could Mariano Andal be a legitimate child of the
deceased?
HELD:
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943
and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is
presumed to be a legitimate son of the latter because
he was born within 300 days following the dissolution
of the marriage. The fact that the husband was
seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only
be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible
for the husband to have had access to his wife during
the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the
birth of the child.
Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes
absence during the initial period of conception,
impotence which is patent, and incurable; and
imprisonment unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of
prison regulations. Marias illicit intercourse with a
man other than the husband during the initial period
does not preclude cohabitation between husband and
wife.
Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate
son of the deceased making him the owner of the
parcel land.
BENITEZ-BADUA vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were
owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel
died in 1982 while her husband died in1989. Vicentes
sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance
of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor
of the nephew, herein private respondent. The
petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and
cared by the deceased spouses since childhood,
though not related to them by blood, nor legally
adopted.
The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child
of the spouses submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses name were
reflected as her parents. She even testified that said
spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente
declared that said spouses were unable to physically
procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the
biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of
the spouses.
Thus the present case
ISSUE:
Would the petitioners certificate of live birth suffice to
establish her legitimacy.
HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The
mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not
a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the
status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such
act amounts to simulation of the childs birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a
public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the
deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized
document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of
the deceased because she died without descendants
and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
the petitioner where it appeared that he was the
petitioners father.
MACADANGDANG vs. CA
100 SCRA 73
FACTS:
VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother and
guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, Claro Antonio
Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez. She met Carlito
sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis
courts. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her
two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit
sexual relationship six months after their first meeting.
The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner She did not
know that Carlito was married until the birth of her two
children. She averred they were married in civil rites
in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she
discovered that the marriage license which they used
was spurious.
Petitioners presented the following documentary
evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying
respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal
certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his
father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito
taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and
pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the
home of Violeta Esguerra.
Private respondent declared that he only learned he
was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners
as their father after he was sued for support. He
averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the
baptism of petitioner Claro.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary evidence presented
sufficient proof of filiation.
HELD:
Photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As
explained by the private respondent, he was in the
baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro.
There is no showing that private respondent
participated in the preparation of the baptismal
certificates naming him to be the father. Baptismal
certificates may be only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not competent evidence with
respect to the childs paternity.
The records do not show that private respondent had
a hand in the preparation of said certificates. A birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father therein
indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.
The court adopts the doctrine of res judicata as
additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for
recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering
the findings that petitioners evidence failed to
substantiate their cause of action.
Res judicataa matter judged a matter generally
may not be relitigated once it has been judged on the
merits.
BABIERA vs. CATOTAL
G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry
of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the birth
certificate is void, as it was totally a simulated birth,
the signature of informant forged, and contained false
entries. She alleged that: (1)That Teofista is the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena Cariosa; (2) Signature of the
mother, Hermogena, is falsified; (3) Teofistas correct
family name is GUINTO, not Babiera; (4) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an
illegitimate child; (5) It was clinically and medically
impossible for Hermogena to bear a child at 54 years
of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion
was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofistas
certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to order
the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect
the hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the
estate.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-
blooded sisters, as showed in her certificate of birth,
Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
She also filed a motion on the grounds that the
petition states no cause of action, being an attack on
her legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and
Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to
file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family
Code; that the petition was barred from prescription
pursuant to Art 172 of the family code.
ISSUE:
Does Presentacion have legal capacity to file the
special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171; whether the
special proceeding is improper and barred by the
statute of limitation; whether the public record of
Teofistas birth is superior to the oral testimony of
Presentacion.
HELD:
Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to
instances when the father impugns the legitimacy of
his wifes child. The present action does not impugn
Teofistas filiation to Eugenio and Hermogena, the
reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofistas
status is to protect her successional rights.
The present action involves the cancellation of
Teofistas Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate
does not prescribe because it was allegedly declared
void ab initio.
First, the totality of the evidence presented, negates
the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth
certificate. The birth certificate was not signed by the
local civil registrar, and the mothers signature
appears to be forged. Second, no medical records or
doctors prescription that provide as evidence of
Hermogenas pregnancy. It was impossible for her to
have given birth at 54 years of age.
DE JESUS vs. DE JESUS
G.R. No. 142877, 2 October 2001
FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got
married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan
G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de
Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate
on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that
petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon
estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of
Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a
stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing
that the complaint, even while denominated as being
one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering
the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of
Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The
trial court denied, due to lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can impugn their own
legitimacy.
HELD:
Petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The law
established the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to
the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would
impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus which
the law does not allow. The presumption of legitimacy
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latters
heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be
rejected.
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate offspring of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first been
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the
children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus born in lawful wedlock.
LIM vs. CA
270 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time
student. She also worked as a receptionist in
a Club where she met petitioner during her first night
on the job. Petitioner wooed her and Maribel
reciprocated his love and soon lived together. Maribel
left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and
returned to Manila in October of the same year. On
January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter
and he egistered the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim
on the childs birth certificate. After Joanna Roses
birth, the love affair between Maribel and petitioner
continued.
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that
petitioners feelings toward her started to wane. He
subsequently abandoned her and Joanna Rose.
Maribel then filed a complaint for support.
Petitioner negated all of Maribels claims and even his
paternity. The trial court rendered a decision on in
favor of Maribel ordering herein defendant, Raymond
Pe Lim to give support to his natural daughter.
Petitioner then elevated his case and argues before
the Court that there is no clear and convincing
evidence on record to show that there was actual
cohabitation between him and Maribel
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented sufficient to claim
filiation therefore, making the father liable for support.
HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
3. The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child;
4. Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on
record. His love letters to Maribel vowing to be a good
father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various
occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate
of Live Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.
CONSTANTINO vs. MENDEZ
209 SCRA 18
FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as
represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly
support from Ivan Mendez including Amelias
complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in
a restaurant in Manila where she was working as a
waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with Amelita. Afterwards, he admitted
being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated
their sexual contact. Subsequently, she became
pregnant and had to resign from work.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual
and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivans
illegitimate child and giving monthly support to the
latter which was set aside by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged illegitimate child is entitled
for the monthly support.
HELD:
Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the
father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual
contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week
of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not
even established on direct examination as she merely
testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in
the months of September, October and November,
1974.
More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to
Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated
that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was
the moving force to submit herself with Ivan.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
CONDE vs. ABAYA
13 Phil 249
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died in 1899 unmarried however
leaving two unacknowledged children by Paula
Conde. The two children died as minors in 1902 and
1903. The mother sued for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Casiano along with the
acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the
deceased.
The trial court, with the opposition of the Roman
Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment
bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as
legitimate heir of the decedents natural children.
ISSUES:
Can an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of
natural children be brought in special probate
proceedings?
Can the mother of a natural child now deceased, may
bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural
filiation in favor of such child in order to receive the
inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his
natural father?
HELD:
Section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First
Instance as to the lawful heirs of the deceased person
are, the testimony as to such controversy shall be
taken in writing by the judge, under oath, and signed
by the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive
share is affected by the determination of such
controversy, may appeal from the judgment
The power to transmit the right of such action by the
natural child to his descendants cannot be sustained
under the law, and still less to his mother. Only the
child can bring such action to the courts and lasts only
during the lifetime of the presumed parent. Presumed
parent died during the minority of the child
The court concluded that the right is not transmissible
to the heirs of the natural child by the following
argument:
It cannot place a natural child on a better position by
assuming that the right is transmitted to the heirs as a
general rule when it only grants exceptions to a
legitimate child
MARQUINO vs. IAC
GR No. 72078, June 27, 1994
FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial
Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was
born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in
that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino
family personally knew her since she was hired as
domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete.
She likewise received financial assistance from them
hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the
status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and
unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not
able to finish presenting her evidence since she died
on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition
was done while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs
were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed
decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs
of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can
continue the action already filed by her to compel
recognition and the death of the putative parent will
not extinguish such action and can be continued by
the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.
ISSUES:
Whether the right of action for acknowledgment as a
natural child be transmitted to the heirs; and whether
Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment
as a natural child can never be transmitted because
the law does not make any mention of it in any case,
not even as an exception. The right is purely a
personal one to the natural child. The death of
putative father in an action for recognition of a natural
child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former
since the party in the best position to oppose the
same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar
since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners
transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.
IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint
against Marquinos dismissed.
ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN
AM No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint
against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of gross
immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption
unbecoming of a judge.
With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she
contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence
of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and
Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand,
with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct,
petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3
illegitimate children with Priscilla be registered as
legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits
stating the delayed registration was due to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight
when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally
registered as legitimate.
The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed
since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he
married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither
bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970,
based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3
children (1970, 1971 and 1975).
ISSUE:
Whether the three children can be considered
legitimate.
HELD:
The three children cannot be legitimated nor in any
way be considered legitimate since the time they were
born there was an existing valid marriage between
Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents, who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation:
1. The rationale of legitimation would be
destroyed;
2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in
terms of successional rights;
3. There will be the problem of public scandal,
unless social mores change;
4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the
parents marry many years after the birth of
the child.
REPUBLIC vs. CA AND BOBILES
GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt
Jason Condat who had been living with her family
since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the
child, and the social worker assigned was served with
copies of the order finding that the petition was
sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also
posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody
appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment
declared that surname of the child be changed to
Bobiles.
The petition for adoption was filed when the law
applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare
Code), where such petition may be filed either of the
spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered
its favorable decision and while the case was pending
on appeal in Court of Appeals, Family Code took
effect where joint adoption of both spouses is
mandatory
ISSUE:
Whether the petition to adopt Jason should be
granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.
HELD:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law
applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare
Code), where such petition may be filed either of the
spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered
its favorable decision and while the case was pending
on appeal in Court of Appeals, Family Code took
effect where joint adoption of both spouses is
mandatory.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will
have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or
impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition,
she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right
under said law in force at the time and thus vested
and must not be prejudiced.
A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure
to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the
time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached
by the husband showed that he actually joined his
wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and
subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on
the form of the pleadings.
REPUBLIC vs. ELEPANO
G.R. No. 92542
FACTS:
The private respondent Corazon Santos Punsalan
filed a verified petition for adoption of the minors
Pinky Gonzales Punsalan, the daughter of her full
blood brother, and Ellyn Mae Punsalan Urbano, the
daughter of her full blood sister, be declared her
daughters. However, she received an urgent call from
the UN Office in Geneva, Switzerland requiring her to
report for work, so much so that she will not be able to
testify at the hearing of her petition yet to be
scheduled. The respondent judge ordered that notice
of the taking of the deposition be furnished to the
OSG.
The OSG subsequently filed an opposition averring
that the jurisdictional requirement of publication has
not been complied with, the lower court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. The
respondent judge denied the said Opposition. The
respondent judge granted the petition for adoption
ISSUE:
Whether the jurisdictional requirement of publication
should be complied first to allow the deposition taking
in adoption proceedings?
HELD:
The petition has no merit. While it is true that in an
action in personam, personal service of summons
within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case
is essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, in an adoption case
which involves the status of a person, there is no
particular defendant to speak of since the action is
one in rem. In such case, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is a non-essential condition for the
taking of a deposition for the jurisdiction of the court is
based on its power over the res, to render judgment
with respect to such thing (or status, as in this case)
so as to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection against the right so established.
Publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition
for adoption is necessary for the validity of a decree of
adoption but not for the purpose merely of taking a
deposition.
No abuse of discretion was committed by the
respondent judge in allowing the taking of private
respondents deposition. Due to urgent and
compelling reasons beyond her control, private
respondent could not be present to testify at the trial
of the main case for adoption. The OSG was notified
of the scheduled taking of the deposition, as well as of
all the hearings of the petition for adoption, but the
OSG chose not to attend ALL the said hearings,
without explanation. The OSG, therefore, has no
reason to invoke lack of procedural due process.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy
behind adoption statutes is to promote the welfare of
the child and every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote that objective.
TAMARGO vs. CA
209 SCRA 518
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and
killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifers
natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with
the RTC against Bundocs natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition
to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in
November 1982.
Adelbertos parents claimed that the spouses
Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to them from the
moment the petition for adoption was decreed.
Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto
was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and
granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court
dismissed the spouses Tamargos petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Rapisuras are parties to actions
committed by Adelberto.
HELD:
In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: Parents
and other persons exercising parental authority shall
be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defences
provided by law. In the case at bar, parental authority
over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural
parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It
follows that the natural parents are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
The Supreme Court held that parental authority had
not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened.
It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given
to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
when adopting parents had no actual custody over
the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential
if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child.
JAVIER vs. LUCERO
GR No. L-6706, March 29, 1953
FACTS:
Alfredo Javier Sr. and Salud Arca had begotten a son
before they got married, named Alfredo Jr. After the
celebration of marriage, the father went to US since
he was listed as US Navy. The mother and Alfredo Jr.
went to live with her parents while the husband was in
US. When the relationship between the spouses
becomes strained, husband petitioned for divorce
before State of Alabama. After the decree was
issued, Alfredo Sr. subsequently married twice
(having been divorced with the former before
celebration of subsequent marriage).
An action for alimony was filed where respondent
Judge ordered the father to give a monthly allowance
of P60 to his wife and son. The father filed notice of
appeal questioning the status of the wife; the fact that
his son was over 21 years old making him no longer
entitled to be supported and third, decision is vague
and silent in relation to granting the son entitlement to
support even if over 21 years old for purposes of
completing his education/ training for some
profession, trade or vocation. Nevertheless, the judge
directed the father to pay the monthly pensions
notwithstanding pendency of the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Alfredo Jr. is entitled for support being at the
age of majority.
HELD:
Under the new Civil Code, article 290 support also
includes the education of the person to be supported
until he complete his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation even beyond the age of
majority and on the basis of this article support was
granted to Alfredo Javier Junior. While it is true that
plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior, who was born on
December 2, 1931, has reached the age of majority
on December 2, 1952, yet, under the last part of
article 290 of the new Civil Code, support may be
given him even beyond the age of majority in order to
enable him to complete his education, for some trade
or profession.
If financial assistance is to be rendered only at the
termination of the appeal, his education or the
completion thereof would be unduly delayed. This is
a good reason for immediate execution. The father
claimed that based on the records, the son is no
longer studying. However, it might have resulted to
lack of means to support his studies considering that
the father admits that the son is just a pre-law
graduate.
LERMA vs. CA
G.R. No. 33352, 20 Decemder 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband
and wife. They married on May 19, 1951. On August
22, 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery
against the respondent and a certain Teodoro
Ramirez
The respondent filed with the lower court, presided by
Judge Leonor Ines Luciano, a complaint against the
petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of
properties, custody of their children 2 and support,
with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for
her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then
and until now is in her custody. The respondents
complaint for legal separation is based on two
grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life.
The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondents
application for support pendente lite, setting up as
defense the adultery charge he had filed against the
respondent.
Judge Luciano granted the respondents application
for support pendente lite in an order dated December
24, 1969, which she amended in an order dated
February 15, 1970 to the following effect: (1) the
respondent was declared entitled to support pendente
lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2)
the amount of such monthly support was reduced
from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
ISSUE:
Whether adultery is a good defense against the
respondents claim for support pendente lite.
HELD:
The right to separate support or maintenance, even
from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes
the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in
Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after
the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other.
A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is
himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a
ground for legal separation at the instance of the
other spouse, cannot be considered as within the
intendment of the law granting separate support. In
fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation
to give support shall cease when the recipient, be he
a forced heir or not, has committed some act which
gives rise to disinheritance; and under Article 921
one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is when
the spouse has given cause for legal separation. The
loss of the substantive right to support in such a
situation is incompatible with any claim for
support pendente lite.
DE ASIS vs. CA
303 SCRA 176, February 15, 1999
FACTS:
Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres
de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and
support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis
who failed to provide support and maintenance
despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew
the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel
denied paternity of the said minor and due to such
denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action.
They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint with the condition that Manuel will not
pursue his counter claim.
However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint
against the alleged father, this time as the minors
legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of
res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He
maintained that since the obligation to give support is
based on existence of paternity between the child and
putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim
support.
ISSUE:
Whether the action for support is already barred.
HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor
can it be transmitted to a third person. The original
agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial
complaint was in the nature of a compromise
regarding future support which is prohibited by law.
With respect to Manuels contention for the lack of
filial relationship between him and the child and
agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim,
the Court held that existence of lack of any filial
relationship between parties was not a matter which
the parties must decide but should be decided by the
Court itself.
While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation
or paternity must be first shown between the parties,
but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially
established and declaration is vested in the Court. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of
another action asking for the same relief (no force and
effect). Furthermore, the defense of res
judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since
future support cannot be the subject of any
compromise or waiver.
ESPIRITU vs. CA
242 SCRA 362
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in
Iligan City. Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a
nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status
sometime later. Reynaldo was sent by his employer
to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. Reynaldo and
Teresita began to maintain a common-law relationship
of husband and wife where a child was born, Rosalind
Therese. During their vacation in the Philippines,
Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the time
they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince
was born. The relationship soon deteriorated and
Teresita left her family to go back to California.
Because his assignment is not yet completed,
Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister,
Guillerma Layug, in the Philippines.
Teresita filed an action for custody. Result of
psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five
years old show that the child experiences great
anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S.
to live with her mother. She even stated in one of
these tests that she saw her mother kissing a bad
man who worked for her father. Both children are
now over seven years of age and prefer to stay with
their father and aunt.
ISSUE:
Whether the custody of the children should be
awarded to the mother.
HELD:
Both children are now over seven years of age, their
choice of parent should be given respect by the court.
The rule that a child below seven years of age should
not be separated from the mother, unless there are
compelling reasons is not applicable in this case
anymore. As the children can now ascertain what is
right and moral, the court should give due respect to
their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the
Philippines.
Furthermore, a mothers constant flirtations from one
man to another is considered by the court as a
compelling reason not to award the childrens custody
to her, for said behavior forms an immoral
environment especially to a growing child. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two
requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family
Code.
LUNA vs. IAC
137 SCRA 7
FACTS:
Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley
Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents Ma Lourdes
and Sixto Salumbies gave her to the petitioners
Horacio and Liberty Luna, a childless couple with
considerable means, who thereafter showered her
with love and affection and brought her up as their
very own..
A few months before September, 1980,the Lunas
decided to take Shirley abroad and show her
Disneyland and other places of interest in America,
when the petitioners asked for the respondents
written consent to the childs application for a U.S.
visa, the respondents refused to give it as a result, the
petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left
with the private respondents, upon the latters
request.
When the petitioners returned, they learned that the
respondents had transferred Shirley to another
school. The private respondents also refused to return
Shirley to them. Neither did the said respondents
allow Shirley to visit the petitioners.
The petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus
against the private respondents to produce the person
of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody.
After the filing of an answer and due hearing, a
decision was rendered declaring the petitioners
entitled to the childs custody and forthwith granted
the writ prayed for.
Upon appeal of the respondents, the decision was
reversed by the CA and a writ of execution was
issued to return Shirley to her biological parents.
However, testimony of the child shows that she would
rather stay with the Luna couple. She even made a
pronouncement that she will kill herself if she will be
taken by her biological parents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the
duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of
appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail
over and above the desire and preference of the child
HELD:
It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a
higher court is returned to the lower court, the only
function of the latter court is the ministerial one of
issuing the order of execution. However, the childs
manifestation to the trial court that she would kill
herself or run away from home if she should be forced
to live with the private respondents is a supervening
event that would justify the cancellation of the
execution of the final decision rendered by the Court
of Appeals. This means that the best interest of the
minor can override procedural rules and even the
rights of parents to the custody of their children.
Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the
minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she
can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do
no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and
substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in
an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and
intellectual development.
AMADORA vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the
school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted
of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action
for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,
its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the
physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other
students. Complaints against the students were
dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants
completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the
following reasons: 1. Since the school was an
academic institution of learning and not a school of
arts and trades 2. That students were not in the
custody of the school since the semester has already
ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal
gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the
necessary diligence through enforcement of the
school regulations in maintaining discipline.
Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was
under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission
of Physics reports).
ISSUE:
Wh0 can be held liable for the death of a student
inside the premises of the school?
HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the
custody of the authorities of the school. That classes
had formally ended when the incident happened was
immaterial. What was important is that he was there
for a legitimate purpose.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys
should be held liable considering that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and
later returned to him without taking disciplinary action
or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.
Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof
was shown to necessarily link this gun with the
shooting incident.
On the other hand, the rector, high school principal
and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in
the provision. Each was exercising only a general
authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of
particular classes.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held
liable under the provision because only the teacher of
the head of school of arts and trade is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student.
Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the
respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted
with Alfredo resulting to his death.
YLARDE vs. AQUINO
163 SCRA 697
FACTS:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal
of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan.
Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein.
The school had several concrete blocks which were
remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World
War II. Defendant decided to help clear the area so
he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered
them to dig beside a one ton concrete block in making
a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left
unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18
students including the Novelito Ylarde to complete the
excavation.
Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while
he went to see Banez for the key to the school
workroom where he can get some rope. It was
alleged that before leaving, he told the children not to
touch the stone. After he left, the children playfully
jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block
slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was
pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries
which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days
thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein
petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both
Aquino and Soriano.
ISSUE:
Whether both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable
for damages.
HELD:
The general rule where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student. As held in
Amadora vs CA, it is only the teacher and not the
head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students.
However, in case of establishments of arts and
trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall
be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the
acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as
principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the
school he heads is an academic school and he did
not give any instruction regarding the digging.
A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his tudents
should make sure that the children are protected from
all harm. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence
where instead of availing himself of adult manual
laborers he instead utilized his students.
Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to
cast away all serious danger that the concrete block
adjacent to the excavation would present to the
children. He is therefore ordered to pay damages to
the petitioners.
LIBI vs. IAC
209 SCRA 518
FACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts
until Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found
out that he was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell
wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so
it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there
were found dead from a single gunshot wound each
coming from the same gun.
The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a
civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover
damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the parents should be held liable for such
damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused
by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the
Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code
covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts
and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil
liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor
children is primary and not subsidiary and that
responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove
that they observe all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage.
Wendells mother testified that her husband owns a
gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a
drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had
their own key. She likewise admitted that during the
incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit
box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun
unless the key was left negligently lying around and
that he has free access of the mothers bag where the
key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and
exercise the required diligence of a good father to
prevent such damage.
LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC
GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City,
was married with Mr. Enrique. Santamaria on March
1939. Events led her to cease from living with
Enrique. A decree of legal separation was later on
issued to the spouses.. During their marriage, she
naturally used her husbands surname, thus adopted
Elisea L. Santamaria.
After the decree of legal separation was granted she
wanted to revert to her maiden name thus, filed this
petition to be permitted to resume in using Elisea
Laperal. She was claiming that continuing to use her
married name would give rise to confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
assets.
This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on
the ground that it violates Article 372 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in
general will prevail over the specific provision of Art.
372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman
legally separated from his husband.
HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected
by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. The finding that petitioners continued use
of her husband surname may cause undue confusion
in her finances was without basis.
It must be considered that the issuance of the decree
of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had
automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence,
there could be no more occasions for an eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient
ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to
hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
LLANETA vs. AGRAVA
G.R. No. 32054, 15 May 1974
FACTS:
Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer
with whom she had one child named Victoriano
Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four
years later Atanacia had relations with another man
out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresitas
birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila
where all of them lived with Atanacias mother-in-law,
Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the
household of the Ferrers, using the surname of
Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her
schooling.
When she was about twenty years old, she applied for
a copy of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon,
where she was born, as she was required to present it
in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the
Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered
that her registered surname is Llaneta not Ferrer
and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and
an unknown father.
On the ground that her use thenceforth of the
surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had
been using since she acquired reason, would cause
untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned
the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her
name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.
After trial duly had, the respondent judge denied her
petition upon reliance on the doctrine that disallows
such change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teresita can be allowed to continue
using the surname Ferrer
HELD:
The petitioner has established that she has been
using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can
remember; that all her records, her friends and
associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer. Even the
late Serafin Ferrers nearest of kin have tolerated and
still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. A
sudden shift by the petitioner to the name Teresita
Llaneta in order to conform to that appearing in her
birth certificate would result in confusion..
As to the false impression of family relationship, the
late Serafin Ferrers widowed mother, Victoria, and his
two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have
come forward in earnest support of the petition. Those
living who possess the right of action to prevent the
surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to
share it with her. Petition granted.