International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 3845

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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

Political inequality and local government capacity for Disaster Risk MARK
Reduction: Evidence from Mexico

Naxhelli Ruiz-Riveraa, , Carlos R. Melgarejo-Rodrguezb,1
a
Institute of Geography, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico
b
Paseo de la Reforma 342-26, Col. Jurez, Cuauhtmoc, 06600 Mexico City, Mexico

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The susceptibility of dierent territorial units to be aected by natural hazards has been usually associated with
Disaster Risk Reduction the type and intensity of the hazard itself, together with the socio-economic conditions of the population.
Political inequality However, the political conditions that underlie planning and emergency response have been less explored. We
Decentralisation argue that the capacity of local governments to reduce and manage risk in decentralised countries varies is
Institutional capacity
inuenced by internal political inequalities regarding nancial, normative and operative resources. This paper
reviews the conceptual links among political inequalities, decentralisation and risk reduction, and applies these
categories to a quantitative analysis of the correlation between capacity resources and disaster and emergency
declarations issued for hazard-exposed municipalities in Mexico. The evidence shows the extent to which in-
stitutional capacities are unequally distributed among municipalities and proves that even in cases with better
levels of capacity resources, such resources have not translated into less emergency and disaster declarations.

1. Introduction coordination among levels of government with dierent responsibilities

Risk relates to the probability of serious harm overcoming the re-
sources of a social group and damaging its most valuable assets and
development priorities. The susceptibility of the population of dierent
territorial units to be negatively aected by natural hazards is usually
associated with the type and intensity of the hazard itself and its in-
teraction with the socio-economic conditions of the local population;
the political conditions that underlie planning and emergency response
are usually overlooked. Even though risk reduction and civil protection
have been progressively recognised as part of any states priorities, only
a minority of works in the eld of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) have
addressed political and institutional capacity for reducing risk.
In spite of the well-established body of literature about decen-
tralisation processes, few studies have focused on the relationship be-
tween decentralisation and DRR policies ([41], 15), particularly from a
comparative perspective [40]. One of the key gaps here relates to the
spatial dierences that stem from a decentralised policy scheme, which
in the eld of DRR includes law and regulations but also diverse ad-
ministrative procedures and agreements (local laws, codes, provision
for natural hazard, planning acts, risk atlases, land use and urban de-
velopment plans) which vary between provinces and municipalities.
Issues of the distribution of nancial and normative resources and
have also been overlooked in the risk reduction literature.
In the case of Mexico, several reports have already assessed the
outcomes, strategic goals and action priorities related to the Hyogo
Framework of Action (HFA) in the country ([29,32,43]). However, in
spite of the optimistic view of these reports on the countrys advance-
ments in DRR, they fail to recognise the deep inequality in the im-
plementation of such measures in local contexts. Unequal access to
funds, varying institutional capacity and outdated legislation are
common across subnational units. This is because the ability of gov-
ernments and civil organisations to prevent risk and deal with disasters
and chronic vulnerability depends on wider social and political condi-
tions that include planning capacity, the normative institutional en-
vironment, chains of responsibility and penalties for noncompliance
with planning regulations. Understanding this inequality between dif-
ferent agents and their resources is crucial to understanding how risk is
generated, reproduced and dealt with by the social groups and terri-
tories facing risk.
Since 1983 Mexico, like many other countries, has experienced a
process of deep progressive political and administrative transformation
toward decentralisation. Municipalities, the smallest territorial units of
government, are in charge of many areas of public service delivery,
expenditure, and social development ([2], 100; [28], 7677), including

Correspondence to: Instituto de Geografa, Circuito de la Investigacin Cientca s/n, Ciudad Universitaria, Coyoacn, 04510 Mexico City, Mexico.
E-mail addresses: nruiz@igg.unam.mx (N. Ruiz-Rivera), arq.c.melgarejo@gmail.com (C.R. Melgarejo-Rodrguez).
1
CTI Consultora.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.05.024
Received 28 January 2017; Received in revised form 30 May 2017; Accepted 30 May 2017
Available online 31 May 2017
2212-4209/ 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
N. Ruiz-Rivera, C.R. Melgarejo-Rodrguez
urban zoning, the publication and enforcement of by-laws and regula-
tions ([48], 108), and the design and implementation of local civil
protection plans.
However, in spite of broad legal and institutional reforms that have
encouraged the strengthening of municipal governments, the formal
dimension of decentralisation in terms of regulations, functions and
economic resources has not necessarily made space for new and more
democratic political arrangements. As Moreno [28] points out, formal
democracy does not translate directly into better-quality government
output, particularly at the local level. It is necessary to challenge the
common assumption that the more formally regulated and decen-
tralised any area of public interest is, the better it will work.
This paper compares the basic institutional capacity input of local
governments throughout Mexico to identify the political inequalities
that inuence the dierential abilities of local governments to reduce
and deal with natural-hazard-related risks. The paper is based on a
quantitative enquiry into the current characteristics of Mexican muni-
cipalities hazard exposure and institutional capacity inputs, such as
their administrative and normative resources. The municipalities have
been grouped into three major categories, metropolitan, urban, and
rural, according to their demographic and spatial characteristics,
highlighting the extent to which Mexican municipalities are hetero-
geneous. The research design looks into the political and administrative
resources of local governments to explore how they inuence specic
risk reduction actions.
The article proceeds as follows: rst, it describes the role of local
governments as part of the National System of Civil Protection
(SINAPROC), which is at the core of the countrys risk reduction action,
and at how this system relies on Mexicos decentralised structure. Then
it presents a review of the current debates on institutional capacity,
political inequality and risk reduction. The following section discusses
the basis of the decentralised natural hazard risk management system in
Mexico.
The paper then describes the methodological approach taken, in-
cluding the features and scales of the data sources and the statistical
procedures selected. This leads to the presentation of the results, which
are divided into two types of evidence: the rst is a descriptive por-
trayal of the current situation of municipalities in terms of hazard ex-
posure, with several proxies of their institutional capacity inputs, and
the second is based on a statistical exploration of the two hypotheses
that synthesise the debates addressed in the paper:
Hypothesis 1. In 2014, Emergency and Disaster Declarations (EDD)
were issued for municipalities whose local governments have fewer
capacity inputs for risk management.
Hypothesis 2. EDD were issued for municipalities with greater hazard
exposure.2
These hypotheses seek to identify the extent to which institutional
capacity inputs correlates with critical situations in which a declaration
of disaster and/or emergency is needed, and the actual association
between the number of reported natural hazard events and an emer-
gency or disaster crisis in the municipal context. Such a declaration is
the mechanism for obtaining several types of nancial support from the
federal government from the Natural Disaster Fund (FONDEN) to deal
with critical situations linked to natural hazard events. Although re-
quested by provincial government, a declaration is an indirect way of
identifying a situation in which municipal government does not have
the capacity to deal with the eects of a climatic or geological hazard.
The correlation of EDD and reported natural hazard events is in-
tended to prove whether such EDD are associated with hazard exposure
and/or local governments capacity shortcomings. In the last part of the
paper we discuss the results of municipalities capacity inputs and of
2
The year of reference is 2014. Details on our data sources are provided in the
methodology section.
39
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 3845
our explorations based on the above hypotheses. We also discuss the
scope and limitations of our data sources, as well as the implications of
our results for this eld of knowledge.
2. Decentralisation and risk reduction action in Mexicos
municipalities
In the international context, the term DRR refers to a complex series
of public actions covering both prospective, preventive and reactive
actions in sectors such as health, land use, ecosystem conservation and
social development. Despite the wide diversity of these sectors, most
policy actions associated with the eld of DRR in Mexico have been
developed under the concept of civil protection. As a consequence,
most DRR responsibilities and duties fall upon civil protection agents
such as municipal/provincial emergency committees and reghter
organisations (Ruiz-Rivera and Lucatello, forthcoming). Although DRR
involves much more than civil protection (reactive actions that take
place in an emergency context to protect the population from serious
damage), we consider that it is premature to address DRR actions as a
comprehensive eld in the country. Both national and local govern-
ments have been slowly integrating civil protection actions with other
areas such as urban planning, economic development and environ-
mental protection, but this has been a dicult process because all
government structures in Mexico are organised by sector. As risk re-
duction policies are mostly contained in the civil protection sector,
priorities and main courses of action in that matter are still contained in
the National Programme for Civil Protection, which changes every six-
year presidential term.
To understand the conditions under which key DRR actions are
carried out by local governments it is important to know that respon-
sibility for Mexicos natural hazard management is divided between
multiple agencies under a principle of subsidiarity. The primary gov-
ernment structure that handles the eects of natural hazards is
SINAPROC, which is not an agency itself but a coordination mandate
between multiple national, provincial and municipal government or-
ganisations and several specialized federal agencies such as the
National Centre of Disaster Prevention, Mexican Petroleum and the
National Water Commission, among others ([32], 7273; [38], forth-
coming). SINAPROCs head is the National Board of Civil Protection
(Consejo Nacional de Proteccin Civil), which is a top-down government
structure based in the Ministry of Internal Aairs (SEGOB). This oce
commands specic emergency management actions and the im-
plementation of plans and programmes through dierent coordination
arrangements with provincial and municipal governments ([3], 23;
[32], 66).
The legal issues around DRR are contained in the General Law of
Civil Protection (2012) and its Regulations (2014). Each of Mexicos 32
provinces has its own local Law of Civil Protection, which must align
with the General Law. Adjustment of the content of local laws to the
most recent national regulation is an ongoing process, and many pro-
vincial laws are outdated. In addition to the laws and the National
Programme, other relevant normative and operative instruments in-
clude provincial risk atlases, hazard-specic provincial emergency
plans, municipal emergency plans and municipal risk atlases. None of
these are strictly mandatory: their content is operative rather than
prescriptive.
Municipal governments are responsible for the initial response to an
emergency event through the local civil protection oce. This level of
government is also in charge of all urban land-use provisions and many
public services, particularly water and sanitary services and basic in-
frastructure. Municipal government is the primary government struc-
ture that deals with natural-hazard-related land-use policies as well as
with emergency situations. Provincial governments are responsible for
integrated emergency planning processes and act as nancial, technical
and political intermediaries between the federal and local governments.
N. Ruiz-Rivera, C.R. Melgarejo-Rodrguez
Provincial and municipal civil protection agencies are supposed to be a
key and very active part of SINAPROC.
However, when a municipality faces a situation with which local
government is unable to cope with an actual or highly probable
emergency linked to a natural hazard, the provincial government trig-
gers a process in which the federal government allocates nancial re-
sources from FONDEN to reduce the impact of the disaster. FONDEN
mainly covers recovery, reconstruction and the contracting of risk
transfer instruments. Its procedure is based on issuing a declaration of
emergency or disaster once all other local government resources for
dealing with natural hazard events have been exhausted.
Once a declaration has been issued by the Ministry of Internal
Aairs (SEGOB), there are two main ways of accessing the emergency
funds. The Revolving Fund (APIN) provides resources for the acquisi-
tion of aid supplies to respond to the immediate needs of the aected
population, and the Reconstruction Programme provides emergency
assistance and nances for post-disaster rehabilitation and the re-
construction of public infrastructure ([13] 1112).
Although municipal governments have no authority whatsoever
over the management of these funds, emergency aid obtained via the
Revolving Fund may be distributed to the local population by local
government sta. This has provoked criticism of the political use of
these funds and their unintended eects on the few preventive actions
carried out by local governments. It means that local governments have
little incentive to develop strategic local emergency systems, particu-
larly where land-use planning and other preventive instruments are
concerned.
This issue is even more relevant in a context in which risk man-
agement issues and settlement planning are completely separate in
terms of legal instruments and policy design, making it dicult to apply
risk-prevention measures that should be taken through land-use reg-
ulation. Land use and urban development responsibilities have also
been decentralised in municipalities, whose basic normative instrument
is their Municipal Urban Development Plan. The plan includes urban
land-use zoning and in many cases denes land held for future urban
development. Contrary to natural hazard provisions, land-use zoning is
mandatory.
The relationship between the Municipal Urban Development Plan
and the various natural hazard provisions managed by civil protection
ocers proves to be the most relevant to the actual implementation of
DRR measures at the municipal level. This relationship has been par-
tially acknowledged, given that existing natural hazard atlases have
been funded by the Ministry of Agrarian, Urban and Territorial
Development (SEDATU) and municipal urban development units.
Nevertheless, this critical connection has been overlooked by most as-
sessments of risk reduction in Mexico, which do not acknowledge the
extent to which municipal government performance varies and why. In
order to understand these variations, the following section presents
conceptual elements relating to how political inequality can become in
decentralised systems, and the consequences of this for local govern-
ments risk-reduction and emergency management capacity.
3. Conceptual framework
Inequality is a broadly-explored issue in most social sciences.
However, although it is accepted that any form of inequality includes
political content, political inequality as a eld of study still has room for
growth, particularly regarding political processes in developing coun-
tries. According to Dubrow [11], political inequality refers to struc-
tured dierences in the distribution and acquisition of political re-
sources, which are viewed as a dimension of social stratication,
including the ability to inuence both governance processes and public
policy. Political inequality is understood, then, as dierential access to
key resources needed for the exercise of citizenship, enforcement, de-
cision-making and the protection of rights [46].
Inequality can be embodied in dierent types of structure and agent.
40
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 3845
Political inequality as dened from this perspective is embedded in
collective agents such as local governments with dierences in jur-
isdiction, scope and resources. Decentralisation plays a substantive role
in explaining such dierences because it has brought signicant new
resources and power to local decision makers ([15], 4). According to
Grindle, in addition to these new responsibilities, decentralisation also
increases the complexity of the relationship between levels of govern-
ment, as well as with citizens.
A growing number of scholars has been identifying the contrasting
outcomes of decentralisation in local government performance [15].
Interestingly, some of their contributions relate to factors that explain
dierentiated access to key political, human and nancial resources,
many of which can be seen as an expression of political inequality as
dened by Dubrow [11]. For this reason, inequality and decentralisa-
tion are linked in order to identify the factors that inuence local
governments institutional capacity to deal with natural-hazard-related
risk reduction at the municipal level.
Even though risk reduction has been addressed much more fre-
quently from a hazards perspective than from one of policy analysis,
there is a body of literature in areas such as risk management and post-
disaster development aid in which the concept of the development of
capacity for DRR is widely discussed. While some works focus on the
need to improve the eectiveness of aid in disaster and risk manage-
ment, the debate has gradually moved to the sustainability of such
development interventions ([6,26]). This is a more comprehensive
perspective that encompasses multiple political, nancial, cultural,
scientic and social dimensions ([22]). Capacity development for DRR
should be seen as a multiscale, multistakeholder process ([16,40]).
The main shortcomings and inequalities in local governments in-
stitutional capacity have been identied as part of an institutional
vulnerability ([47], 39; [27], 3). Institutional vulnerability refers to
factors that prevent communities and state agents from generating both
preventive and reactive responses to disasters in terms of knowledge,
coordination and training, due to existing arrangements, laws, and
customs. ([18], 38). Such institutional vulnerability is still the single
element on which there is not enough detailed empirical evidence for
its adequate integration into DRR processes. This dimension of vul-
nerability is based on institutional capacity, which is generally dened
as the set of abilities that potentially allow agents organisations or
individuals to achieve their objectives ([8], 57). These abilities should
cover the technical, administrative, organisational and human re-
sources needed to match government objectives ([28], 67).
Identifying and measuring such institutional capacity of local gov-
ernments for DRR and how it translates into specic government out-
comes is a major conceptual challenge. The term institutional capacity
has been used in several elds of study, from specic policy evaluation
[35,45], to decentralisation ([31]) and governance [17]. It is important
to highlight that many studies use related terms such as state capacity
[33], capacity-building referring to overall mechanisms for improving
public interventions ([14,23]) and government quality [28,36,42],
which, according to these authors, usually includes government fea-
tures such as the rule of law, responsiveness and eciency. In theore-
tical terms, sometimes the concept of institutional capacity is clearly
nested within new institutionalist approaches dealing with the political
dimension of the rules of the game, while in other cases it is understood
in a much more functional and technical way.
While extensive examination of the concept of institutional capacity
in both DRR scientic literature and political science is beyond the
scope of this paper, some basic points in the current debate around this
concept support our research. The most important is that institutional
capacity and the resources to guarantee key development-oriented
government action are the raison dtre of decentralised democracies. A
second point is that such capacity should be reasonably distributed
among jurisdictions, so that political equality that ensures fair and
impartial public action is part of any assessment of government quality
[36]. The consequences of a shortcoming in a local governments
N. Ruiz-Rivera, C.R. Melgarejo-Rodrguez
institutional capacity could even be considered part of vulnerability
production [10]. A third important point is that in a context of de-
centralisation, institutional capacity also relates to the political, scal
and administrative arrangements between dierent levels of govern-
ment, and how their interplay inuences the dierential distribution of
resources among local governments [49].
Our literature review reveals major challenges in measuring the
factors that inuence government performance and the eciency of
specic policies. Understanding institutional capacity as part of an in-
tegrated policy process is much more complex than the available data
usually permits, given the diculties in linking information about in-
stitutional capacity inputs (e.g. nances, level of education, technical
means) with that about specic policy outcomes (e.g. environmental
improvements, educational attainments, risk reduction). Despite this
diculty, institutional capacity inputs are key to understanding the
direction of and extent to which public action is possible in specic
domains.
Several studies focusing on measuring government means and
policy results have already been developed in relation to Mexico (see
for example [5,9,25]). There are also several assessments of the per-
formance of the National System of Civil Protection on a national scale
([12,21,32,34,39]) in response to growing interest in understanding
institutional capacity in DRR.
Other authors have analysed the responsibilities and problems that
specic municipal governments face in risk-reduction processes, given
the relevance of their implementing role in a decentralised system
[1,20,30,37,44,48]. However, these studies focus on specic regions or
municipalities, and no eort has been made to identify local govern-
ments institutional capacity for risk reduction or the vulnerability that
stems from capacity shortcomings nationwide. The following section
addresses this gap, identifying some elements of political inequality in
risk reduction and emergency management action in Mexicos munici-
palities.
4. Data and methodology
4.1. Sources
Our research is based on information from ve datasets: Mexicos
National Census of Municipal Governments, published in 2015 by the
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI)3; the National
Coordination of Civil Protections Disaster, Emergency and Climatic
Contingency Declarations from 2000 to 2015; the catalogue of muni-
cipal risk atlases contained within the National Risk Atlas published by
the National Centre for Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED) in 2016; 7];
the Flood Hazard Index published by CENAPRED in 2016; 7]; and the
National Urban System catalogue of municipalities, published in 2012
by the National Population Council (CONAPO). These datasets provide
nationwide information covering all 2457 of Mexicos municipalities.
Although the selected sources were produced by ocial government
bodies and in most cases are the only nationwide sources of information
on the variables used in this study, they have been constructed under
very dierent conditions. The Disaster, Emergency and Climatic
Contingency Declarations database includes complete information di-
rectly from the government body in charge of national civil protection
policies, while the National Census of Municipal Governments collects
information from dierent members of municipal bureaucracies who
ll out a questionnaire according to their function. Although our da-
tabase-processing strategy included crosschecking for validity, the
census shows some major inconsistencies with other sources of similar
variables, due to the contested nature of this type of information for
local governments. In cases where inconsistencies were detected, we
carefully evaluated which source was the most reliable. For instance,
3 4
Based on information collected in 2014.
41
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 3845
information from the National Census of Municipal Governments about
risk atlases availability was substituted with information from the
National Risk Atlas databases.
The Flood Hazard Index is a database built by CENAPRED on the
basis of the National Water Commission (CONAGUA) ood maps. The
database is composed by 1019 valid cases, 1409 cases with no available
information (value 0) and 29 missing cases. In the public version of this
database, the original index value for the valid cases was reduced to an
ordinal scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high). We used the valid cases as a
sample of municipalities exposure to climatic hazards.
The fth source of information was the National Urban System, a
catalogue of metropolitan, urban and rural municipalities that classies
all of Mexicos municipalities according to their demographic and ter-
ritorial characteristics.
Other sources reviewed for this article include the Municipal Risk
Index created by the Institute of Engineering at the National
Autonomous University of Mexico in 2010 for the Ministry of Social
Development (SEDESOL); and the National Institute of Federalism and
Municipal Development (INAFED)s System of Budgetary Information,
although none of these were included in the data analysis due to the
number of missing cases and data incompatibility.
Additionally, it is necessary to mention that the National Census of
Municipal Governments has a section with a list of hazards that took
place in the municipality. Nevertheless, the comparison between the
questionnaire and dataset results shows a possible misunderstanding
between phenomenon, hazards and emergency events by the people in
charge of lling it; this is linked to a methodological aw in the census
data collection process. We used this database for some other statistical
tests, particularly the Z test of hypothesis for the mean, which con-
rmed that it is seriously biased; some variables had up to 40 standard
deviations.
The only alternative source of nationwide hazard information is the
well-known DesInventar Project database4; however, DesInventar re-
cords collect information about disasters rather than hazards and was
not built to provide information on a municipal level, aecting its us-
ability with other information. Data limitations were an important issue
for this research; we will go back to this subject in the Discussion sec-
tion.
4.2. Statistical procedure
Firstly, we summarised key descriptive information to characterise
municipalities as metropolitan, urban (non-metropolitan), or rural. This
information encompassed events of 2014 as a year of reference and
included information about municipalities exposure to natural hazards
during the year; the distribution and type of their normative and ad-
ministrative resources; the role of local government in natural hazard
management responsibilities; and the actual number of EDD issued for
each type of municipality by the federal government. The results were
grouped according to their metropolitan, urban or rural category; these
categories synthesise the diversity of Mexican municipalities in demo-
graphic, economic and territorial terms. Contingency tables and histo-
grams that condense the most relevant information in this regard are
presented. Also, since climatic hazards are associated with a high per-
centage of Mexicos overall disaster costs (an average of 90% in
20032014, according to CENAPRED ([7] 6), and in most cases have a
much shorter recurrence interval than geological hazards, we con-
centrate on that type of phenomenon.
Secondly, we explored the correlations between the number of EDD
and a proxy for local governments institutional capacity: the man-
agement capacity index (MCI), which reects the municipalities op-
erative and normative resources. We measured the intensity and sig-
nicance of the correlation to test whether there is an inversely
http://www.desinventar.org/en, last accessed Nov 12th, 2016.
N. Ruiz-Rivera, C.R. Melgarejo-Rodrguez International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 3845

proportional relationship between the number of EDD and the level of 4000
capacity input in the municipalities to which those declarations were
issued in 2014, as the subsidiarity principle of SINAPROC would ideally
3000

Reported events
promote.

2000
5. Results

With regard to hazard exposure, the analysed datasets revealed a 1000

higher number of climatic than of geological events. Interestingly, the
Census collects a greater number of reported events in metropolitan
0
than in rural areas, although metropolitan municipalities constitute Metropolitan Urban Rural
only 15% of the total. This reveals an interesting unevenness in the Type of municipality
number of reported hazards which must be taken into account when Geological Climatic
analysing disaster occurrence. This is undoubtedly problematic, since it
is inuenced by several factors such as the mean recurrence interval of Fig. 1. Natural hazard events reported by type of municipality, 2015.
Source: National Census of Municipal Governments (2015). Geological events include
each phenomenon (which might induce important hazard sub-reports,
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, landslides, subsidence and other geological
since not all types of event occur in a single year); the possible re- phenomena. Climatic events include hurricanes, tropical storms, extreme rain, oods,
peating across the data of a single event that aected several munici- storms (hail, snow and dust), frost, drought, hot and cold waves, tornados and other
palities; and the lack of standardised denitions and measurements climatic events.
across the hazard reports collected for the census. The reported events
are presented here anyway, as they represent a crucial reference to the Table 1
physical components of risk for the selected year and there is no other Climatic EDD by type of municipality, 2014.
nationwide hazard database. Source: Disaster and Emergency Declarations of the National Coordination of Civil
Protection
Although the most recent version of the National Risk Atlas has an
extensive dataset on hazard, vulnerability and risk indicators, it does Metropolitan (15%) Urban Rural Total
not provide information on the number, intensity and coverage of (13%) (72%)
natural events by year, as most of its information has been processed
Disaster 37 (15%) 61 (25%) 149 (60%) 247 (100%)
into indices or other types of measurement (e.g. multi-seasonal).5
Emergency 117 (13%) 148 (17%) 608 (70%) 873 (100%)
The information in Fig. 1 contrasts with that presented in Table 1, in Total 154 (14%) 209 (19%) 757 (68%) 1120 (100%)
which percentages of EDD (shown in parentheses) are more evenly
distributed according to the proportion of each of the three types of
municipality: rural municipalities received more than a half of climatic Table 2
EDD, but metropolitan reported the highest number of hazard events. Civil protection (emergency management) capacity inputs by type of municipality.
Sources: National Census of Municipal Governments (2015);
Both variables are not geographically distributed in the same way. Even
more, the correlation coecient between global EDD and natural ha- Metropolitan* Urban* Rural* Total
zard events (r = 0.016) showed that they are not related; the t-test
value (t = 0.79)6 indicates that the result is not signicant. Number of 367 312 1778 2457
municipalities
It is here that the issue of institutional capacity inputs comes to the
Population (2015)** 67,861,221 29,280,447 22,389,085 119,530,753
surface. Table 2 shows the extent to which ve dierent types of ca- Civil protection 192 (52) 170 (54) 361 (20) 723
pacity input in the eld of risk reduction are present in Mexican mu- regulations
nicipalities: civil protection regulations, the Natural Hazards Atlas, Natural Hazards 151 (41) 120 (38) 109 (6) 380
hazard contingency plans, the civil protection committee and the civil Atlas***
Hazard contingency 253 (69) 245 (79) 802 (45) 1300
protection municipal government oce. Table 2 includes the percen- plans
tage of each type of municipality (metropolitan, urban and rural) that Civil protection 314 (86) 277 (89) 1093 (61) 1684
has each resource. committee
Table 2 shows an interesting panorama of the more frequent and Civil protection 193 (53) 167 (54) 814 (46) 1174
government
uncommon inputs. The most relevant information relates to the dif-
oce
ference between the existence of civil protection government oces
and civil protection committees in each group; the former constituting * National Urban System catalogue of municipalities (2012);
the government unit in charge of all emergency management and some ** INEGI Intercensal Population Survey (2015);
preventive measures, and the latter a network of agents such as public *** CENAPRED Catalogue of Municipal Risk Atlases (2015).
security and re-ghting organisations and business associations that
create and implement local hazard contingency plans. The gures The heterogeneity of the capacity inputs reviewed above, is clearer
above suggest that in about half of all municipalities there are no in Table 3. The accumulated inputs in each municipality, grouped in
specialised civil protection sta in local government, whether they are three levels, summarise the absence or presence of the ve elements
absorbed into other government sections or do not exist at all. discussed in Table 2. Shadowed cells emphasise the level with the
This table also gives relatively good coverage of hazard contingency highest percentages of inputs.
plans (in 69% of metropolitan and 79% of urban municipalities). These Table 3 shows that in all three groups (metropolitan, urban and
plans may have been developed by municipal or provincial govern- rural) most municipalities have a medium level of available capacity
ments. Natural hazard atlases have mainly been produced where urban inputs (two or three elements). A classic measure for inequality, the
issues matter the most; coverage of rural areas, even those highly ex- Gini coecient, was used to calculate the distribution of civil protec-
posed to intense hazards, is weak (6%). tion capacity inputs and produced a medium-low value (0.32); that is, it
does not reect wide inequality among municipalities. Nevertheless,
rural areas are clearly behind in institutional capacity compared to
5
http://www.anr.gob.mx/descargas, last accessed Nov 12th, 2016. urban and metropolitan areas, which tend to be better endowed. Also,
6
Level of condence 95%, signicance 0.05, t-test critical value (two tails) 1.96

42
N. Ruiz-Rivera, C.R. Melgarejo-Rodrguez International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 3845

Table 3 Table 4
Level of civil protection capacity inputs by type of municipality. Results of Pearson correlation of management capacity index (MCI) and number of cli-
Sources: National Census of Municipal Governments (2015); National Urban System matic EDD by type of municipality, 2014.
catalogue of municipalities (2012); CENAPRED Catalogue of Municipal Risk Atlases
(2015). Territorial category n r t-test

Metropolitan Urban Rural Total Metropolitan 367 0.213 4.171

Urban 312 0.145 2.580
Number of municipalities 367 (100%) 312 (100%) 1778 2457 Rural 1778 0.002 0.080
(100%) (100%) Civil protection resources n r t-test
Low (01) 42 (11%) 23 (7%) 762 827 Low (01) 827 0.094 2.723
(43%) (34%) Medium (23) 1176 0.019 0.643
Medium (23) 189 (52%) 161 (52%) 826 1176 High (45) 454 0.002 2.747
(46%) (48%)
High (45) 136 (37%) 128 (41%) 190 454 Level of condence 95%, signicance 0.05, t-test critical value (two tails) 1.96
(11%) (18%)
Civil protection capacity 3.01 3.14 1.79 2.14
Table 5 shows how climatic EDD are distributed by groups of mu-
inputs (mean) 38.2% 34.7% 74.6% 65.4%
Coecient of nicipalities according to CENAPREDs scale for Flood Hazard Index
variation (FHI). The public version of this database is a sample of 1019 munici-
palities, in which the original index value was reduced to an ordinal
scale, from low to high. This scale is the basis of the Tables groups. The
the coecient of variation shows that rural municipalities are markedly rst line shows that the mean of declarations per municipality increases
unequal (74.6%) and that the variables value is scattered when ob- in each group in the same order as the FHI. However, the standard
served on a national scale (65.4%). deviation of such declarations is higher than the mean, which indicates
The information in Table 3 provides a basis from which to calculate that the data is biased; therefore, the evidence is not solid enough to
whether institutional capacity inputs are associated with the actual prove that higher exposure correlates to larger number of declarations.
number of EDD. This leads to the last set of results, which shows the
values of Pearson correlation coecients for the number of declarations
and local governments management capacity index, dened as: 6. Discussion

m BM
BMtot +
SpMm
+
CPm
SpMtot CPtot
MCI =
3
MCI = management capacity index.
BMm = number of basic management instruments available in each
municipality.7
BMtot = maximum number of basic management instruments.
SpMm = number of spatial management instruments available in
each municipality.8
SpMtot = maximum number of spatial management instruments.
CPm = number of civil protection instruments available in each
municipality.9
CPtot = maximum number of civil protection instruments.
The correlation between the municipal management capacity index
(MCI) and the number of climatic EDD is presented in two dierent
aggregations in Table 4: the municipality territorial category (me-
tropolitan, urban or rural), and the availability of their civil protection
resources (low, medium or high). Shadowed cells feature statistically
signicant r values. MCI reects the proportion of the actual resources
that local governments hold with regard to the maximum (and op-
timum) level of operative and normative instruments that munici-
palities require in order to deal with their multiple responsibilities.
Statistically signicant results illustrate that metropolitan and urban
municipalities have a positive but very low correlation between MCI
and EDD. With regard to the second part of the table (municipalities
grouped by a three-level scale of civil protection resources), the r values
are so low that it is possible to conclude that municipal management
capacity is not related to the number of declarations.
7
Basic management instruments comprise regulations for 1) public administration; 2)
police and good government; 3) public markets; 4) cemeteries; 5) slaughterhouses; 6)
urban cleaning and waste management; 7) public works; 8) public security; 9) the en-
vironment; 10) mobility and transport; 11) clean water; 12) citizen participation; 13)
competitiveness and regulatory improvement.
8
Spatial management instruments include 1) an urban development oce; 2) an urban
zoning or land use plan; 3) an urban development plan; 4) cadastral regulations; 5) a
building code.
9
Civil protection instruments comprise 1) a risk atlas; 2) a civil protection oce; 3) a
civil protection committee; 4) civil protection regulations; 5) natural hazard provisions.
The analysis presented in this paper nds that 1) institutional re-
sources of all the countrys municipalities are not greatly unequal, but
inequality is relevant when municipalities are examined by groups; 2)
even in cases with better levels of capacity input, such resources do not
correlate with fewer EDD; 3) there is a slight trend towards more de-
clarations being issued for municipalities with better capacity in-
dicators; and 4) climatic EDD appear to be more frequent in munici-
palities with higher exposure, but the evidence about this relation is not
statistically solid.
In terms of our rst hypothesis, the number of EDD issued for
Mexican municipalities, as a proxy of risk capacity outcomes, has no
correlation with the distribution of capacity inputs for natural-hazard-
related risk management. If EDD would aligned with the policy goals
contained at the General Law of Civil Protection and the National
Programme of Civil Protection, they would inversely correlate to mu-
nicipal governments distribution of capacity resources. Since the whole
System of Civil Protection is based on the subsidiarity principle, it is
correct to assume that local governments should have the resources to
deal with the most recurrent type of hazards. Under this interpretation,
the results imply that Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected but it cannot be
accepted either. These results are remarkable given the nancial in-
vestments in risk reduction programmes in past years and the extent to
which Mexico has been taken as international model in this matter
([32], 23).
A similar conclusion can be oered for Hypothesis 2. The mean of
declarations per municipality increases in each group in the same order
as our proxy of hazard exposure, but since the available data is biased,
the evidence is not conclusive.
Several implications can be identied from these results. Firstly,
they reveal a heterogeneous outcome of decentralisation when it comes
to the distribution of capacity inputs for risk management, providing a
rst glance at a fundamental problem that SINAPROC must face in the
near future if it is to meet Priority 2 (Strengthening disaster risk gov-
ernance to manage disaster risk) of the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction (SFDRR) 20152030. Even though our approach focuses
on capacity inputs and not capacity outcomes, the data analysis por-
trays the challenges that national government faces if it is to provide its
local governments with better scal, technical and normative resources
to support DRR practices [19].

43
N. Ruiz-Rivera, C.R. Melgarejo-Rodrguez
Table 5
Climatic EDD mean by categories of the Flood Hazard Index (FHI).
Sources: CENAPRED Flood Hazard Index (2016); Disaster and Emergency Declarations of
the National Coordination of Civil Protection
Climatic EDD mean
FHI Low Medium High
x= 0.22 0.48 0.53
s= 0.41 0.90 0.89
n= 65 792 162
In most cases the analysis shows low correlation values between the
capacity proxy explored in this paper, risk management resources, and
EDD. This means that FONDEN is not creating synergic practices
around risk reduction action; so far, this programme does not cooperate
with decentralisation policies that strengthen local government capa-
city, so operational disaster expenditure may be negatively inuencing
municipal expenditure on preventive action. Studies in other Latin
American countries point out similar problems with regard to the ef-
fects of national government transfers as part of disaster funding
schemes ([4], 5153; [24], 26); this is undoubtedly an area in which
further cross-country comparative work is needed.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the datasets analysed in this
paper are limited, as they do not directly measure local governments
capacity outcomes. They do not allow a nationwide, in-depth study of
municipalities exposure to hazard, which is fundamental to under-
standing local governments incentives to adopt and operationalise
capacity inputs into action. For this reason, our exploration of currently
available datasets on political inequality and capacity issues in Mexico
exposes the extent to which these matters are part of a key agenda for
research that has not been suciently addressed in the country.
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have explored some evidence with regard to the
distribution of institutional DRR and emergency management capacity
inputs among local governments in Mexico. The data analysed here
indicates that there are inequalities between urban/metropolitan and
rural municipalities in terms of how civil protection resources are dis-
tributed. Nevertheless, since the actual level of institutional capacity in
both nancial and normative terms does not correlate with our proxy of
risk management in municipal contexts emergency and disaster de-
clarations this data suggests that current strategies for the develop-
ment of municipal capacity in a context of decentralisation have not yet
resulted in risk reduction action.
The analysis developed in this paper highlights the importance of
further exploration of the inuence of political inequalities on Mexicos
commitments with regard to the SFDRR 20152030 and to other in-
ternational agreements relating to risk-reduction goals and sustainable
development. There is still a signicant knowledge gap regarding how
the political resources available to local governments are used for the
eective implementation of DRR actions, and the extent to which such
actions actually reduce the institutional dimension of vulnerability.
This article contributes to a better understanding of the still-un-
acknowledged importance of local government in these matters, and to
opening the research agenda that should be addressed in the future to
positively inuence global DRR outcomes.
Funding details
This work was supported by the National Autonomous University of
Mexico [Grant number PAPIIT IA300313].
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 3845
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the authors.
Datasets
Total [dataset] Instituto Nacional de Estadstica y Geografa (INEGI).
0.47 2015. National Census of Municipal Governments [Censo Nacional de
0.88 Gobiernos Municipales y Delegacionales] Aguascalientes: INEGI.
1019 http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/censosgobierno/
cngmd2015/default.aspx.
[dataset] Coordinacin Nacional de Proteccin Civil. 2016. Disaster,
Emergency and Climatic Contingency Declarations 20002015
[Declaratorias de Desastre, Emergencia y Contingencia Climtica
20002015]. Mexico City: Secretara de Gobernacin. http://www.anr.
gob.mx/descargas/ (File Declaratorias.zip).
[dataset] Centro Nacional de Prevencin de Desastres (CENAPRED).
2016. Catalogue of Municipal Risk Atlases contained within the National
Risk Atlas [Catlogo de Atlas de Riesgos Municipales del Atlas Nacional
de Riesgos]. Mexico City: CENAPRED. http://www.anr.gob.mx/
descargas/ (File AtlasMunicipales.xlsx).
[dataset] Consejo Nacional de Poblacin (CONAPO). 2012. National
Urban System. Catalogue of Municipalities [Catlogo. Sistema Urbano
Nacional]. Mexico City: CONAPO. http://www.conapo.gob.mx/en/
CONAPO/Catalogo_Sistema_Urbano_Nacional_2012.
File link:
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/work/models/CONAPO/Resource/
1212/1/images/BaseDatosCompleta_Indicadores_SUN.xlsx.
[dataset] Centro Nacional de Prevencin de Desastres (CENAPRED).
2016. Municipal Flood Hazard Index [ndice de Peligro por Inundacin].
Mexico City: CENAPRED. http://www.atlasnacionalderiesgos.gob.mx/
archivo/indicadores-municipales.html.
(File ndice_de_Peligro_Municipal_por_Inundaciones.dbf).
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