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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
G.R. No. 159116 (2009)
The transaction affecting unregistered lands covered by an
unrecorded contract, if legal, might be valid and binding on
the parties themselves, but not on third parties. In the case of
third parties, it was necessary for the contract to be
registered. Sec. 113 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also
known as the Property Registration Decree, provides, viz.:
Section 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered
ands. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other
voluntary instrument affecting land not registered under the
Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties
thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in
the manner herein prescribed in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
BBB's execution on March 10, 1976 of the deed of absolute
sale of real property in favor of the DDD, standing alone, did
not suffice to bind and conclude MMM. Pursuant to Sec. 113,
Presidential Decree No. 1529, the recording of the sale was
necessary. Besides, the deed, being the unilateral act of BBB,
did not adversely affect BBB, who was not her privy.
G.R. No. 164195 (2009)
Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of
money and the debtor incurs in delay, debtor incurs in delay,
the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is
six per cent per annum.
G.R. No. 164195 (2009)
Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of
extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency
at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the
basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is
stipulated, has strict application only to contractual
obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is
needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken
into account to alter the value of the currency.
G.R. No. 153736 (2010)
A decedent's compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves
a part of the decedent's estate are exclusively the persons
enumerated in Article 887, Civil Code, viz.:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
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(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by
legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one
another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three
classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and
to the extent established by this Code.
Only two forced heirs survived AAA upon her death, namely:
respondent PPP, her daughter, and MMM, her grandson. The
latter succeeded AAA by right of representation because his
mother, CCC, had predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a
right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if she were living or if she could have inherited.
Herein, the representative (MMM) was called to the
succession by law and not by the person represented (CCC);
he thus succeeded AAA, not CCC.
G.R. No. 154270 (2010)
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz. :
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
G.R. No. 154270 (2010)
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when
its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack
is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the
attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless
made as an incident thereof.
G.R. No. 154270 (2010)
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently
valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud
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or to quiet the title.
In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants,
not only to place things in their proper places, and to make
the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect
and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of
both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well
as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit.
G.R. No. 154270 (2010)
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing
ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in
the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
However, prescription was not relevant to the determination
of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his
right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain
period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had
been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners
themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.
G.R. No. 154270 (2010)
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of
the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last
analysis, probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff.
He established by preponderant evidence that he had a
superior right and title to the property. In contrast, the
petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other
than their copy of the reconstituted certificate of title. Such
proof was not enough, because the registration of a piece of
land under the Torrens system did not create or vest title,
such registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership.
The petitioners need to be reminded that a certificate of title
is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate,
or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner.
G.R. No. 157009 (2010)
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract,
unless there is fraud or bad faith. As an exception, moral
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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of
carriage that results in the death of a passenger, in accordance
with Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3), of the Civil
Code , which provide:
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be
awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning
Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a
passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common
carrier.
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to
the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to
the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or
intestate succession, may demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to
moral damages. The omission from Article 2206 (3) of the
brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the
legislative intent to exclude them from the recovery of moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The solemn
power and duty of the courts to interpret and apply the law do
not include the power to correct the law by reading into it
what is not written therein. Thus, the CA erred in awarding
moral damages to the respondents.
In case of death caused by quasi -delict, the brother of the
deceased was not entitled to the award of moral damages
based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 157009 (2010)
Essentially, the purpose of moral damages is indemnity or
reparation, that is, to enable the injured party to obtain the
means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic
event.
The conditions for awarding moral damages are: (a) there
must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological,
clearly substantiated by the claimant; (b) there must be a
culpable act or omission factually established; (c) the wrongful
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (d) the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 157009 (2010)
To be entitled to moral damages, the respondents must have
a right based upon law. It is true that under Article 1003 of the
Civil Code they succeeded to the entire estate of the late Dr.
Curso in the absence of the latter's descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, and surviving spouse. However, they
were not included among the persons entitled to recover
moral damages, as enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article,
in the order named.
Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in which moral
damages may be awarded. The provision does not include
succession in the collateral line as a source of the right to
recover moral damages. The usage of the phrase analogous
cases in the provision means simply that the situation must be
held similar to those expressly enumerated in the law in
question following the ejusdem generis rule. Hence, Article
1003 of the Civil Code is not concerned with recovery of moral
damages.
In fine, moral damages may be recovered in an action upon
breach of contract of carriage only when: (a) where death of a
passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty
of fraud and bad faith, even if death does not result. Article
2206 of the Civil Code entitles the descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, and surviving spouse of the deceased
passenger to demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.
G.R. No. 158298 (2010)
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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of
husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties,
and liabilities arising out of such relation.
The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence,
the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in
force at the time the marriage is contracted.
As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of
the governing law. To illustrate, a marriage between a
stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code,
but is not anymore prohibited under the Family C ode; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the
void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a
stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The
Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity
of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the
marriage ceremony.
G.R. No. 158298 (2010)
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresenciano's brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the
petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under
the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate
of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article
1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants,
ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes
collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the
deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the
petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of
whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving
heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
G.R. No. 158377 (2010)
The CA correctly concluded that the true agreement of the
parties vis-a-vis the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an
equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale. There was no
dispute that the purported vendors had continued in the
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

possession of the property even after the execution of the
agreement; and that the property had remained declared for
taxation purposes under Leoncia's name, with the realty taxes
due being paid by Leoncia, despite the execution of the
agreement. Such established circumstances are among the
badges of an equitable mortgage enumerated in Article 1602,
paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or
otherwise;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the
thing sold;
xxx xxx xxx
The existence of any one of the conditions enumerated under
Article 1602 of the Civil Code, not a concurrence of all or of a
majority thereof, suffices to give rise to the presumption that
the contract is an equitable mortgage. Consequently, the
contract between the vendors and vendees (Spouses Francia)
was an equitable mortgage.
G.R. No. 158377 (2010)
Considering that sa oras na sila'y makinabang, the period of
redemption stated in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli,
signified that no definite period had been stated, the period to
redeem should be ten years from the execution of the
contract, pursuant to Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil Code.
Thus, the full redemption price should have been paid by July
9, 1955; and upon the expiration of said 10-year period,
mortgagees Spouses Francia or their heirs should have
foreclosed the mortgage, but they did not do so. Instead, they
accepted Alejandro's payments, until the debt was fully
satisfied by August 11, 1970
Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years.
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
The acceptance of the payments even beyond the 10-year
period of redemption estopped the mortgagees' heirs from
insisting that the period to redeem the property had already
expired. Their actions impliedly recognized the continued
existence of the equitable mortgage. The conduct of the
original parties as well as of their successors-in-interest
manifested that the parties to the Kasulatan ng Biling
Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to be an
equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
G.R. No. 158377 (2010)
The provisions of the Civil Code governing equitable
mortgages disguised as sale contracts, like the one herein, are
primarily designed to curtail the evils brought about by
contracts of sale with right to repurchase, particularly the
circumvention of the usury law and pactum commissorium.
Courts have taken judicial notice of the well-known fact that
contracts of sale with right to repurchase have been
frequently resorted to in order to conceal the true nature of a
contract, that is, a loan secured by a mortgage. It is a reality
that grave financial distress renders persons hard-pressed to
meet even their basic needs or to respond to an emergency,
leaving no choice to them but to sign deeds of absolute sale of
property or deeds of sale with pacto de retro if only to obtain
the much-needed loan from unscrupulous money lenders. This
reality precisely explains why the pertinent provision of the
Civil Code includes a peculiar rule concerning the period of
redemption, to wit:
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage, in any of the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of
redemption or granting a new period is executed;
xxx xxx xxx
Ostensibly, the law allows a n e w period of redemption to be
agreed upon or granted even after the expiration of the
equitable mortgagor's right to repurchase, and treats such
extension as one of the indicators that the true agreement
between the parties is an equitable mortgage, not a sale with
right to repurchase. It was indubitable, therefore, that the
Magkasanib na Salaysay effectively afforded to Leoncia, Teolo,
Jose, Sr. and Jose, Jr. a fresh period within which to pay to
Alejandro the redemption price of P500.00.
G.R. No. 158377 (2010)
In order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse
to that of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the
following elements must concur:
1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation of the co-ownership amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

notorious.
G.R. No. 158377 (2010)
The respondents can only demand from the petitioners the
partition of the co-owned property and the reimbursement
from their co-owners of the amount advanced by Alejandro to
repay the obligation. They may also seek from their co-owners
the proportional reimbursement of the realty taxes paid for
the property, pursuant to Article 488 of the Civil Code. In the
alternative, they may opt to foreclose the equitable mortgage,
considering that the petitioners' period to redeem the
mortgaged property, which was ten years from the execution
on October 17, 1970 of the Magkakasanib na Salaysay, had
already long lapsed.
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other
co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of
the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one
of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by
renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such
waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
G.R. No. 165803 (2010)
It is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
G.R. No. 165803 (2010)
The power of administration does not include acts of
disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed
from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two
powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to
Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty.
Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the
property in question, and did not include or extend to the
power to administer the property.
G.R. No. 165803 (2010)
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the
consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may be
disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of disposition.
In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard to determine
the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who had title
to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was
required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to
prove good faith in such a situation, the buyers must show
that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also
in to the seller's capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal
property must observe two kinds of requisite diligence,
namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title
covering the property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into
the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal
property in behalf of the other spouse.
G.R. No. 179709 (2010)
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability "when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances." The Civil Code allows such damages to be
awarded "by way of example or correction for the public good,
in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages."
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would
make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of
the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within
the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code Civil
Code.
G.R. No. 153852
Escalation clauses like those affecting the petitioners were not
void per se, and that an increase in the interest rate pursuant
to such clauses were not necessarily void.
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

Escalation clauses are valid and do not contravene public
policy. These clauses are common in credit agreements as
means of maintaining fiscal stability and retaining the value of
money on long-term contracts. To avoid any resulting one-
sided situation that escalation clauses may bring, we required
i Ba o Filipi o the i lusio i the pa ties ag ee e t of a
de-escalation clause that would authorize a reduction in the
interest rates corresponding to downward changes made by
law or by the Monetary Board.
The validity of escalation clauses notwithstanding, we
cautioned that these clauses do not give creditors the
unbridled right to adjust interest rates unilaterally. Any
increase in the rate of interest made pursuant to an escalation
clause must be the result of an agreement between the
parties. The minds of all the parties must meet on the
proposed modification as this modification affects an
important aspect of the agreement. There can be no contract
in the true sense in the absence of the element of an
ag ee e t, i.e., the pa ties utual o se t. Thus, a ha ge
must be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, the change carries
no binding effect. A stipulation on the validity or compliance
with the contract that is left solely to the will of one of the
parties is void; the stipulation goes against the principle of
mutuality of contract under Article 1308 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 155830
A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens
system is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor
of the person whose name appears therein. The certificate of
title thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of
land; hence, anyone who deals with property registered under
the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go
beyond the title. This reliance on the certificate of title rests
on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title, which has
long been well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the
acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that
the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application.
Accordingly, we rule for the respondents on the issue of the
preferential right to the possession of the land in question.
Their having preferential right conformed to the age-old rule
that whoever held a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the
possession of the land covered by the title. Indeed,
possession, which is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of
a right, was but an attribute of their registered ownership.
G.R. No. 155830
It is beyond question under the law that the owner has not
only the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law, but also the right of
action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order
to recover it. He may exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal of the thing, and, for this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
G.R. No. 155830
In order to properly assail the validity of the TCT, he must
himself bring an action for that purpose. Instead of bringing
that direct action, he mounted his attack as a merely
defensive allegation herein. Such manner of attack against the
TCT was a collateral one, which was disallowed by Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration
Decree), viz:
Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
G.R. No. 155830
To be recoverable, moral damages must be capable of proof
and must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages. Yet, nothing was adduced here to justify the grant of
moral damages. What we have was only the allegation on
moral damages, with the complaint stating that the
respondents had been forced to litigate, and that they had
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded
feeli gs f o the petitio e s efusal to esto e the possessio
of the land in question to them. The allegation did not suffice,
for allegation was not proof of the facts alleged.
G.R. No. 155830
As to atto e s fees, the ge e al ule is that su h fees a ot
be recovered by a successful litigant as part of the damages to
be assessed against the losing party because of the policy that
no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Indeed,
prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code, such fees
could be recovered only when there was a stipulation to that
effect. It was only under the present Civil Code that the right
to olle t atto e s fees i the ases e tioned in Article
2208 of the Civil Code came to be recognized. Such fees are
now included in the concept of actual damages.
G.R. No. 157649
EEE failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband." But here, the
e pe t s testi o o Do i i s ps hologi al p ofile did ot
identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological
incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in
person before completing her report but simply relied on
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

othe people s e olle tio a d opi io fo that pu pose.
G.R. No. 157649
Expert testimony should have been presented to establish the
p e ise ause of p i ate espo de t s ps hologi al i apa it ,
if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the
policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. But the expert
evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of
the supposed psychological incapacity of DDD, much less show
that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of
the marriage.
G.R. No. 157649
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her,
cannot be equated with psychological incapacity
G.R. No. 157649
It as ot the a se e of the edi al e pe t s testi o alo e
that as u ial ut athe petitio e s failu e to satisfactorily
discharge the burden of showing the existence of
psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In
other words, the totality of the evidence proving such
incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the
crucial consideration.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article
36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the
expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine
the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability
of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while
highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
G.R. No. 157649
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person
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to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
esta lish the pa t s ps hologi al o dition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to.
G.R. No. 157649
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental,
not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to
observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and
support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for
ullifi atio of a iage, a pe so s ps hologi al affli tio
must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to
comprehend and comply with the essential objects of
marriage, including the rights and obligations between
husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the
time of marriage, and must be incurable.
G.R. No. 157649
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to
appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor
vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions
for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby
ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those
sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical
antecedence-would succeed.
G.R. No. 157917
A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to
transport or convey goods or persons from one place to
another, gratuitously or for hire. The carrier is classified either
as a private/special carrier or as a common/public carrier.
A private carrier is one who, without making the activity a
vocation, or without holding himself or itself out to the public
as ready to act for all who may desire his or its services,
undertakes, by special agreement in a particular instance only,
to transport goods or persons from one place to another
either gratuitously or for hire. The provisions on ordinary
contracts of the Civil Code govern the contract of private
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

carriage. The diligence required of a private carrier is only
ordinary, that is, the diligence of a good father of the family.
In contrast, a common carrier is a person, corporation, firm or
association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering such services to the public. Contracts
of common carriage are governed by the provisions on
common carriers of the Civil Code, the Public Service Act, and
other special laws relating to transportation. A common
carrier is required to observe extraordinary diligence, and is
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of
the loss of the effects of passengers, or the death or injuries to
passengers.
G.R. No. 157917
Article 1732 of the Civil Code avoided any distinction between
a person or an enterprise offering transportation on a regular
or an isolated basis; and has not distinguished a carrier
offering his services to the general public, that is, the general
community or population, from one offering his services only
to a narrow segment of the general population.
Nonetheless, the concept of a common carrier embodied in
Article 1732 of the Civil Code coincides neatly with the notion
of public service under the Public Service Act, which
supplements the law on common carriers found in the Civil
Code. Public service, according to Section 13, paragraph (b) of
the Public Service Act, includes:
x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate,
manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or
compensation, with general or limited clientle, whether
permanent or occasional, and done for the general business
purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or
passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever
may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class,
express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines,
ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop,
ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric
light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum,
sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems,
wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public
services. x x x.
Given the breadth of the aforequoted characterization of a
common carrier, the Court has considered as common carriers
pipeline operators, custom brokers and warehousemen, and
barge operators even if they had limited clientle.
G.R. No. 157917
The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or
extent of the business actually transacted, or the number and
character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether
the undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the
carrier that he has held out to the general public as his
business or occupation. If the undertaking is a single
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transaction, not a part of the general business or occupation
engaged in, as advertised and held out to the general public,
the individual or the entity rendering such service is a private,
not a common, carrier. The question must be determined by
the character of the business actually carried on by the carrier,
not by any secret intention or mental reservation it may
entertain or assert when charged with the duties and
obligations that the law imposes.
Applying these considerations to the case before us, there is
no question that as the operators of a school bus service were:
(a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business,
not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry
passengers over established roads by the method by which
the business was conducted; and (c) transporting students for
a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientle, they operated as
a common carrier because they held themselves out as a
ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a
particular school living within or near where they operated the
service and for a fee.
G.R. No. 157917
The o o a ie s sta da d of a e a d vigilance as to the
safety of the passengers is defined by law. Given the nature of
the business and for reasons of public policy, the common
carrier is bound "to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of
each case." Article 1755 of the Civil Code specifies that the
common carrier should "carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances." To successfully fend off liability in an
action upon the death or injury to a passenger, the common
carrier must prove his or its observance of that extraordinary
diligence; otherwise, the legal presumption that he or it was at
fault or acted negligently would stand. No device, whether by
stipulation, posting of notices, statements on tickets, or
otherwise, may dispense with or lessen the responsibility of
the common carrier as defined under Article 1755 of the Civil
Code.
G.R. No. 157917
Acting as a common carrier, they were already presumed to
be negligent at the time of the accident because death had
occurred to their passenger. The presumption of negligence,
being a presumption of law, laid the burden of evidence on
their shoulders to establish that they had not been
negligent. It was the law no less that required them to prove
their observance of extraordinary diligence in seeing to the
safe and secure carriage of the passengers to their
destination. Until they did so in a credible manner, they stood
to be held legally responsible for the death of Aaron and thus
to be held liable for all the natural consequences of such
death.
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

G.R. No. 157917
There is no question that the respondents did not overturn
the presumption of their negligence by credible evidence.
Their defense of having observed the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
driver was not legally sufficient. According to Article 1759 of
the Civil Code, their liability as a common carrier did not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employee. This was the reason why the RTC treated this
defense of the respondents as inappropriate in this action for
breach of contract of carriage.
G.R. No. 157917
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case has been aptly stated in the leading case of
Picart v. Smith, thuswise:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said
to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Pursuant to the Picart v. Smith test of negligence, the
espo de ts d i e as e tirely negligent when he traversed
the ail oad t a ks at a poi t ot allo ed fo a oto ist s
crossing despite being fully aware of the grave harm to be
thereby caused to his passengers; and when he disregarded
the foresight of harm to his passengers by overtaking the bus
on the left side as to leave himself blind to the approach of the
oncoming train that he knew was on the opposite side of the
bus.
G.R. No. 158597
Contracts of adhesion were valid but might be occasionally
struck down only if there was a showing that the dominant
bargaining party left the weaker party without any choice as to
be "completely deprived of an opportunity to bargain
effectively." That exception did not apply here, for, verily,
Marcos, being a lawyer, could not have been the weaker
party.
G.R. No. 158755
[G]ross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale.
In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be
invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when
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su h i ade ua sho ks o e s onscience as to justify the
courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives
the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at
public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price, the
easier it is for the owner to effect redemption. When there is a
right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material
because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or
else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he
claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the
execution sale. Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be
harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties
because it possesses the right of redemption. x x x
G.R. No. 158755
The mode of forced sale utilized by petitioner was an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage which is
governed by Act No. 3135, as amended. An examination of the
said law reveals nothing to the effect that there should be a
minimum bid price or that the winning bid should be equal to
the appraised value of the foreclosed property or to the
amount owed by the mortgage debtor. What is clearly
provided, however, is that a mortgage debtor is given the
opportunity to redeem the foreclosed property "within the
term of one year from and after the date of sale." In the case
at bar, other than the mere inadequacy of the bid price at the
foreclosure sale, respondent did not allege any irregularity in
the foreclosure proceedings nor did she prove that a better
price could be had for her property under the circumstances.
G.R. No. 158755
The law authorizes the contracting parties to make any
stipulations in their covenants provided the stipulations are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy. Equally axiomatic are that a contract is the law
between the contracting parties, and that they have the
autonomy to include therein such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may want to include.
G.R. No. 159594
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will.
It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and
the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility
and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that
he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness.
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

G.R. No. 159594
Psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the
Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability.
G.R. No. 159594
In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding
cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following
guidelines, viz:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. x x x.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have
remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases
grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the
Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each
case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established
by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity.
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G.R. No. 159709
A novation arises when there is a substitution of an obligation
by a subsequent one that extinguishes the first, either by
changing the object or the principal conditions, or by
substituting the person of the debtor, or by subrogating a
third person in the rights of the creditor. For a valid novation
to take place, there must be, therefore: (a) a previous valid
obligation; (b) an agreement of the parties to make a new
contract; (c) an extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) a
valid new contract. In short, the new obligation extinguishes
the prior agreement only when the substitution is
unequivocally declared, or the old and the new obligations are
incompatible on every point.
A compromise of a final judgment operates as a novation of
the judgment obligation upon compliance with either of these
two conditions.
G.R. No. 159709
To be clear, novation is not presumed. This means that the
parties to a contract should expressly agree to abrogate the
old contract in favor of a new one. In the absence of the
express agreement, the old and the new obligations must be
incompatible on every point.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is a
necessary element of novation which may be effected either
expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the
contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object
in executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one.
Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an
implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an
incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is
really no hard and fast rule to determine what might
constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about
novation, the touchstone for contrariety, however, would be
an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new
obligations.
There is incompatibility when the two obligations cannot
stand together, each one having its independent existence. If
the two obligations cannot stand together, the latter
obligation novates the first. Changes that breed incompatibility
must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The
incompatibility must affect any of the essential elements of
the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions
thereof; otherwise, the change is merely modificatory in
nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
G.R. No. 160453
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the
waters."
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both
lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in
the face of the fact that espo de ts e ide e did ot
establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the
Pa aa ue Ri e . The Repu li s su issio is o e t.
G.R. No. 160453
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along
the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be:
(a) gradual and imperceptible;
(b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and
(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
G.R. No. 160453
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of
imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
G.R. No. 160453
A creek is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under
Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public domain
which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the
government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does
not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
G.R. No. 160453
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
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implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore,
that there is a showing of a title from the State. Occupation of
public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil
Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the
right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto
belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural
change of course of the waters only after paying their value),
all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously
declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable.
Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be already
declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could
not be deemed to have acquired the property through
prescription.
G.R. No. 161909
As a general rule, indeed, moral damages are not recoverable
in an action predicated on a breach of contract. This is
because such action is not included in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code as one of the actions in which moral damages may be
recovered.
By way of exception, moral damages are recoverable in an
action predicated on a breach of contract: (a) where the
mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in
Article 1764,6 in relation to Article 2206, (3), of the Civil Code;
and (b) where the common carrier has been guilty of fraud or
bad faith, as provided in Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 161909
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
(1902a)
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
de a da le ot o l fo o e s o a ts o o issio s, ut also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

G.R. No. 161909
There is no question that Article 2224 of the Civil Code
expressly authorizes the courts to award temperate damages
despite the lack of certain proof of actual damages, to wit:
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty.
The rationale for Article 2224 has been stated in the following
manner:
Even if not recoverable as compensatory damages, plaintiff
may still be awarded damages in the concept of temperate or
moderate damages. When the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty, temperate
damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be
allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court
is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary
loss.
G.R. No. 161909
Although it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right
to litigate, we consider the grant to petitioners of reasonable
atto e s fees a a ted. Thei e title e t to atto e s fees
was by virtue of their having been compelled to litigate or to
incur expenses to protect their interests, as well as by virtue of
the Cou t o fu the dee i g atto e s fees to e just a d
equitable.
G.R. No. 189998
The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to
the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging
for their guests but also security to the persons and
belongings of their guests. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business. Applying by analogy Article 2000,
Article 2001 and Article 2002 of the Civil Code (all of which
o e ed the hotelkeepe s deg ee of a e a d espo si ilit
as to the personal effects of their guests), we hold that there
is much greater reason to apply the same if not greater degree
of care and responsibility when the lives and personal safety
of their guests are involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers
would simply stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted
access to all the hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors
of the guests, without being held liable should anything
untoward befall the unwary guests. That would be absurd,
something that no good law would ever envision.
G.R. No. 159213
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Subrogation under Article 2207 of the Civil Code gives rise to a
cause of action created by law. For purposes of the law on the
prescription of actions, the period of limitation is ten years.
Article 1144.The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
We find and hold that that the present action was not upon a
written contract, but upon an obligation created by law.
Hence, it came under Article contract, but upon an obligation
created by law. Hence, it came under Article 1144 (2) of the
Civil Code. This is because the subrogation of respondent to
the rights of Caltex as the insured was by virtue of the express
provision of law embodied in Article 2207 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
Article 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and
he has received indemnity from the insurance company for
the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of
contract complained of, the insurance company shall be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer
or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount
paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury
or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the
deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.
G.R. No. 159213
Article 2207 of the Civil Code is founded on the well-settled
principle of subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed
or damaged through the fault or negligence of a party other
than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the
assured, will be subrogated to the rights of the assured to
recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has
been obligated to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured
operates as an equitable assignment to the former of all
remedies which the latter may have against the third party
whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of
subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of,
any privity of contract or upon written assignment of claim. It
accrues simply upon payment of the insurance claim by the
insurer.
In legal contemplation, subrogation is the "substitution of
another person in the place of the creditor, to whose rights he
succeeds in relation to the debt;" and is "independent of any
mere contractual relations between the parties to be affected
by it, and is broad enough to cover every instance in which
one party is required to pay a debt for which another is
primarily answerable, and which in equity and conscience
ought to be discharged by the latter."
G.R. No. 162826
Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

liability. Article 89 (on total extinguishment) and Article 94 (on
partial extinguishment) of the Revised Penal Code list down
the various grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability.
Not being included in the list, novation is limited in its effect
only to the civil aspect of the liability, and, for that reason, is
not an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only the
State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused.
The role of novation may only be either to prevent the rise of
criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that the
breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a
deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of
the criminal information in court by the state prosecutors
because up to that time the original trust relation may be
converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor
situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist
on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have
taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court,
the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its
power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the
civil. The crime being an offense against the state, only the
latter can renounce it
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of
the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal
liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may
only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast
doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction,
whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise
to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to
appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.
G.R. No. 162826
Based on the express terms and tenor of the Kasunduan at
Katibayan, DDD received and accepted the items under the
obligation to sell them in behalf of the complainants ("ang
mga hiyas (jewelries) na natatala sa ibaba nito upang ipagbili
ko sa kapakanan ng nasabing Ginang"), and he would be
compensated with the overprice as his commission ("Ang
bilang kabayaran o pabuya sa akin ay ano mang halaga na
aking mapalabis na mga halagang nakatala sa ibaba nito.").
Plainly, the transaction was a consignment under the
obligation to account for the proceeds of sale, or to return the
unsold items. As such, he was the agent of the complainants in
the sale to others of the items listed in the Kasunduan at
Katibayan.
In contrast, according the first paragraph of Article 1458 of the
Civil Code, one of the contracting parties in a contract of sale
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, while the other party obligates himself to
pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Contrary to the contention of DDD, there was no sale on credit
to him because the ownership of the items did not pass to
him.
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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G.R. No. 162826
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi,
whether totally or partially, must appear by express
agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear
and unequivocal to be mistaken.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is
necessary element of novation which may be effected either
expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the
contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object
in executing the new contract is to extinguish the old one.
Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an
implied novation, and all that is prescribed by law would be an
incompatibility between the two contracts. While there is
really no hard and fast rule to determine what might
constitute to be a sufficient change that can bring about
novation, the touchstone for contrarity, however would be an
irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new
obligations.
G.R. No. 158361
In order that there may be substantial performance of an
obligation, there must have been an attempt in good faith to
perform, without any willful or intentional departure
therefrom. The deviation from the obligation must be slight,
and the omission or defect must be technical and
unimportant, and must not pervade the whole or be so
material that the object which the parties intended to
accomplish in a particular manner is not attained. The non-
performance of a material part of a contract will prevent the
performance from amounting to a substantial compliance.
G.R. No. 158361
It is basic that in obligations to do, there can be no payment
unless the obligation has been completely rendered.
G.R. No. 158649
Under the notion of relativity of contracts embodied in Article
1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs. Hence, the farmer-
participants, not being themselves parties to the contractual
documents signed by Gloria, were not to be thereby liable.
G.R. No. 158649
A contract of adhesion prepared by one party, usually a
corporation, is generally not a one-sided document as long as
the signatory is not prevented from studying it before signing.
G.R. No. 158649
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

Once a judicial demand for payment has been made, however,
Article 2212 of the Civil Code should apply, that is: "Interest
due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this
point."
G.R. No. 158649
The Usury Law had been rendered legally ineffective by
Resolution No. 224 dated 3 December 1982 of the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank, and later by Central Bank Circular
No. 905 which took effect on 1 January 1983. These circulars
removed the ceiling on interest rates for secured and
unsecured loans regardless of maturity. The effect of these
circulars is to allow the parties to agree on any interest that
may be charged on a loan. The virtual repeal of the Usury Law
is within the range of judicial notice which courts are bound to
take into account. Although interest rates are no longer
subject to a ceiling, the lender does not have an unbridled
license to impose increased interest rates. The lender and the
borrower should agree on the imposed rate, and such
imposed rate should be in writing.
Accordingly, the interest rate agreed upon should not be
"excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant;"
otherwise, the Court may declare the rate illegal.
G.R. No. 158649
As to atto e s fees, the ge e al ule is that su h fees a ot
be recovered by a successful litigant as part of the damages to
be assessed against the losing party because of the policy that
no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Indeed,
prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code, such fees
could be recovered only when there was a stipulation to that
effect. It was only under the present Civil Code that the right
to olle t atto e s fees i the ases e tio ed i A ti le
2208 of the Civil Code came to be recognized. Such fees are
now included in the concept of actual damages.
G.R. No. 159823
The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground
that A did not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of
the alternative remedies available to a contracting party under
Article 1191 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible.
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The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be
just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of
third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with
Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit
resolutory condition in reciprocal obligations. The condition is
imposed by law, and applies even if there is no corresponding
agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for
this is that in reciprocal obligations a party incurs in delay once
the other party has performed his part of the contract; hence,
the party who has performed or is ready and willing to
perform may rescind the obligation if the other does not
perform, or is not ready and willing to perform.
G.R. No. 161075
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud
and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a
criminal case.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
G.R. No. 161211
The reckoning point for purposes of the demand of
reconveyance based on fraud was their discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery was properly pegged on the date of the
registration of the transfer certificates of title in the adverse
pa ties a es, e ause egist atio as a o st u ti e oti e
to the whole world.
G.R. No. 162826
Based on the express terms and tenor of the Kasunduan at
Katibayan, Degaos received and accepted the items under
the obligation to sell them in behalf of the complainants ("ang
mga hiyas (jewelries) na natatala sa ibaba nito upang ipagbili
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

ko sa kapakanan ng nasabing Ginang"), and he would be
compensated with the overprice as his commission ("Ang
bilang kabayaran o pabuya sa akin ay ano mang halaga na
aking mapalabis na mga halagang nakatala sa ibaba nito.").
Plainly, the transaction was a consignment under the
obligation to account for the proceeds of sale, or to return the
unsold items. As such, he was the agent of the complainants in
the sale to others of the items listed in the Kasunduan at
Katibayan.
I o t ast, a o di g the st pa ag aph of A ti le of the
Civil Code, one of the contracting parties in a contract of sale
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, while the other party obligates himself to
pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Contrary to the contention of Degaos, there was no sale on
credit to him because the ownership of the items did not pass
to him.
G.R. No. 162826
Acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the
original relation between the complainant and the accused,
cannot produce novation. For the latter to exist, there must be
proof of intent to extinguish the original relationship, and such
intent cannot be inferred from the mere acceptance of
payments on account of what is totally due. Much less can it
e said that the a epta e of pa tial satisfa tio a ee t
the ulli atio of a i i al lia ilit that is full atu ed, a d
already in the process of enforcement. Thus, this Court has
ruled that the oe ded pa t 's a epta e of a p o isso
note for all or part of the amount misapplied does not
o lite ate the i i al oe se.
G.R. No. 162826
Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one
of sale a elie e a oe de f o an incipient criminal
liability, that did not happen here, for the partial payments
and the proposal to pay the balance the accused made during
the barangay proceedings were not at all incompatible with
DDD's liability under the agency that had already attached.
Rather than converting the agency to sale, therefore, he even
the e o ed his lia ilit as the sales age t of the
complainants.
G.R. No. 166836
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand
the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in
which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed
upon by a party bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the
remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must first
be a breach of the contract. The remedy has its roots in Article
1191 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x
x
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific
performance or rescission with damages.
G.R. No. 166836
As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of
rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article
1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution.
The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal
o ligatio s, su h that a pa t s ea h of the contract equated
to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to
rescission.
G.R. No. 170604
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a
deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The
terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action
for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the
plaintiff. For instance, when an action for quieting of title is
based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying
with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code
specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule
will come into play.
G.R. No. 170604
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase and the entry in the
primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did not
themselves establish the existence of the deed. They proved
at best that a document purporting to be a deed of sale with
right to repurchase had been registered with the Register of
Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the deed was not
conclusive proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the
registered owner of the property, which was precisely the
issue in this case. The explanation for this is that registration,
being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an
instrument is inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds
and annotated on the dorsal side of the certificate of title
covering the land subject of the instrument. It is relevant to
mention that the law on land registration does not require
that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose
of registration is only to give notice.
G.R. No. 170942
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

The Ba k s lia ilit as ot ased o its pu chase of loan
agreement with NHFC but on Article 20 and Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, viz:
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable
for damages.
Based on the provisions, a banking institution like CCC Bank is
obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as
high standards of integrity and performance in all its
transactions because its business is imbued with public
interest.
G.R. No. 170942
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered for the acts or actions referred to in Article 20 of
the Civil Code. Moral damages are meant to compensate the
claimant for any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly
caused.
G.R. No. 170942
The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good. The business of a bank is affected
with public interest; thus, it makes a sworn profession of
diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service.
For this reason, the bank should guard against injury
attributable to negligence or bad faith on its part. The banking
sector must at all times maintain a high level of
meticulousness. The grant of exemplary damages is justified
by the initial carelessness of petitioner, aggravated by its lack
of promptness in repairing its error.
G.R. No. 178312
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if
the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or
extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation.
As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent.
However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding
between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until
it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The
validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance
with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law.
Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and
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public order.
G.R. No. 179987
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as
either of public dominion or of private ownership.
Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is
intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without
being for public use, and is intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public
use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial
property of the State. Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.
G.R. No. 179987
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons.
G.R. No. 183952
Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tort-feasors are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage. Joint tort-feasors are
each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
It is likewise not an excuse for any of the joint tort-feasors that
individual participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared to that of the other.
G.R. No. 195825
Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is
required to maintain a register of landholdings that
guarantees indefeasible title to those included in the register.
The system has been instituted to combat the problems of
uncertainty, complexity and cost associated with old title
systems that depended upon proof of an unbroken chain of
title back to a good root of title. The State issues an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named
is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such
liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law
warrants or reserves.
G.R. No. 195825
A person dealing in registered land has the right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

inquiring further, except when the party has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry.
G.R. No. 206236
According to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty. For this purpose, the determination of the
temperate damages rests in the sound discretion of the
courts.
G.R. No. 171914
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the
nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the
husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
G.R. No. 171914
The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both
of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types
of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void
and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against
such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration
of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
G.R. No. 171914
Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a conjugal partnership
of gains thusly: Article 142. By means of the conjugal
partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for
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any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article
175 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the
marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue
of a judicial order.
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared
absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxx xxx xxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of
any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary dissolution
of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may
appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon
approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, the court shall take such measures as may
protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of
articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501
shall be applicable.
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late
Atty. LLL and EEE?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question
that the approval took place only as an incident of the action
for divorce instituted by Atty. LLL and EEE, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were
identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. With
the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under
Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy
and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. LLL
and EEE subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

G.R. No. 171914
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous,
or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly
states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous,
the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with
Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the
burden of proof to confirm such fact.
To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for
the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership,
without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
relief in her favor.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name
of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
G.R. No. 171914
AAA was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contention
in this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the
New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply
as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife but not married,
or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article
144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would
govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations
and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the
parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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Ponencia by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, 2017 Bar Chairman
impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal
partnership or absolute community between the man and his
lawful wife).
This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article
148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie
presumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise,
proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the coownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such
valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147.
The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad
faith. SDTIHA
Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of
gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable
social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the
Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 159031
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first
having a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, albeit on its face void and inexistent for lack of a
marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized
by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. No. 159031
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-
appellant LLL and private complainant PPP was void because
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of
cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding ceremony
could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so,
all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage
should be present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage
license except in those instances when this requirement may
be excused.
There having been no marriage license nor affidavit of
cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the
religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a
valid marriage in itself. But then, as the law and jurisprudence
say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant PPP
before marrying JJJ. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to JJJ. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
G.R. No. 159031
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view
of the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to
contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
G.R. No. 159031
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again. In fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a
judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
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G.R. No. 161380
Although a deed or instrument affecting unregistered lands
would be valid only between the parties thereto, third parties
would also be affected by the registered deed or instrument
on the theory of constructive notice once it was further
registered in accordance with Section 194, i.e., the deed or
instrument was written or inscribed in the day book and the
register book for unregistered lands in the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the realty was
located.
The non-registration of the aforesaid deed does not also affect
the validity thereof. Registration is not a requirement for
validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect
of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The
principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other
persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving
the property has been entered into. The conveyance of
unregistered land shall not be valid against any person unless
registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees,
and (3) third persons having actual notice or knowledge
thereof. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioners are the
heirs of Ignacio, the grantor of the subject property. Thus,
they are bound by the provisions of the deed of donation inter
vivos.
The effect on third parties of the constructive notice by virtue
of the registration of the deed or instrument was aptly
illustrated in Bautista v. Fule, where the Court pronounced
that the subsequent buyer of unregistered land sold at an
execution sale, which the purchaser at the public auction
registered under Act No. 3344 seven days after that sale, was
"deemed to have constructive notice" of the sale, and,
therefore, could not be "entitled to the rights of a purchaser in
good faith." It is worth mentioning that Act No. 3344
(approved on December 8, 1926) was the governing law at the
time of the execution of the deed of absolute sale.
G.R. No. 192123
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur
means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to
be under the management of the defendant, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." It is
simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of
certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some
explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence.
It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human
experience and on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is
applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge."
The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The
doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be
prima facie evidence thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving
a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence
is absent and not readily available.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the
following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit:
(1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
G.R. No. 192123
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of
this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when
the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of
such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the
cause of that harm. Although generally, expert medical
testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated
from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert
medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only
to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of
mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the
facts.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in
the following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body
of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a
healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area,
of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when
another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a
patient's jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his
tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under
the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation
for appendicitis, among others.
A.M. No. 2010-21-SC
In a contract of loan, according to Article 1933 of the Civil
Code, "one of the parties delivers to another, either
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COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR
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something not consumable so that the latter may use the
same for a certain time and return it, in which case the
contract is called a commodatum; or money or other
consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount
of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the
contract is simply called a loan or mutuum."
G.R. No. 154390
According to Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud
when one of the contracting parties, through insidious words
or machinations, induces the other to enter into the contract
that, without the inducement, he would not have agreed to.
Yet, fraud, to vitiate consent, must be the causal (dolo
causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente),
inducement to the making of the contract.
G.R. No. 154390
Causal fraud is defined as "a deception employed by one party
prior to or simultaneous to the contract in order to secure the
consent of the other."
G.R. No. 154390
Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Whoever alleges fraud affecting a
transaction must substantiate his allegation, because a person
is always presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns, and
private transactions are similarly presumed to have been fair
and regular. To be remembered is that mere allegation is
definitely not evidence; hence, it must be proved by sufficient
evidence.
G.R. No. 156407
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership
which may be instituted by the parties.
G.R. No. 156407
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties
is determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then
the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to
an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
G.R. No. 156407
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

With EEE and TTT having been married prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime
was the conjugal partnership of gains. For purposes of the
settle e t of EEE s estate, it as u a oida le fo TTT to
include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains.
G.R. No. 156407
Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir
and the su i i g spouse, he ei Te esita he self, to i g
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or
she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime
of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legiti e of ea h hei , a d i the a ou t of the pa titio .
G.R. No. 160600
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose
cause, object or purpose is contrary to law is a void or
inexistent contract. As such, a void contract cannot produce a
valid one. To the same effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code,
which declares that "a contract, which is the direct result of a
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent."
G.R. No. 160600
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty
parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from one another
and are not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are
in pari delicto or in equal fault.
G.R. No. 160600
The doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that holds
that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal
contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific
performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its
violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no
affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
other.
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto
is not always rigid. An accepted exception arises when its
application contravenes well-established public policy. In this
jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that principle of
the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or
against the public good."
G.R. No. 160600
The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public
policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that "[e]very person who through an act of
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performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him."
G.R. No. 160689
Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code pertinently provides:
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages:
xxxx
The ight to e se u ed i o e s pe so , house, pape s, a d
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
x x x x.
G.R. No. 160689
Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the standards to be observed
i the e e ise of o e s ights a d i the pe fo a e of o e s
duties, namely:
(a) to act with justice;
(b) to give everyone his due; and
(c) to observe honesty and good faith.
The law thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on all
rights that in the exercise of the rights, the standards under
Article 19 must be observed.
G.R. No. 160689
In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse
of rights, the following elements must be present, to wit:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty,
(b) which is exercised in bad faith, and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
G.R. No. 160827
As a general rule, all obligations shall be paid in Philippine
currency. However, the contracting parties may stipulate that
foreign currencies may be used for settling obligations. This is
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8183, which provides as follows:
Section 1. All monetary obligations shall be settled in the
Philippine currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
However, the parties may agree that the obligation or
transaction shall be settled in any other currency at the time
of payment.
G.R. No. 161151
Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do or the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In order that a party may be held liable for damages for any
injury brought about by the negligence of another, the
claimant must prove that the negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury.
G.R. No. 161151
P o i ate ause is defi ed as that ause, hi h, i atu al
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
esult ould ot ha e o u ed.
G.R. No. 161151
Res ipsa loquitur is a Lati ph ase that lite all ea s the
thi g o the t a sa tio speaks fo itself. Where the thing
that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants; and the
accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if
those who had management or control used proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient,
reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the
a ide t a ose f o o as aused the defe da t s a t of
care.
G.R. No. 161380
An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not
prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral,
attack.
G.R. No. 162063
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Whoever
owns the property has the right to possess it. Adjudication of
ownership includes the delivery of possession if the defeated
party has not shown any right to possess the land
independently of her rejected claim of ownership.
G.R. No. 162365
A sale with right to repurchase is governed by Article 1601 of
the Civil Code, which provides that: "Conventional redemption
shall take place when the vendor reserves the right to
repurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with
the provisions of Article 1616 and other stipulations which
may have been agreed upon."
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G.R. No. 162365
Article 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of
repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the
sale, and in addition: (1) The expenses of the contract, and any
other legitimate payments made by reason of the sale; (2) The
necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
G.R. No. 162365
In sales with the right to repurchase, the title and ownership
of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee,
subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the
vendor within the stipulated period.
G.R. No. 163654
A credit card contract is considered as a contract of adhesion
because its terms and conditions are solely prepared by the
credit card issuer. Consequently, the terms and conditions
have to be construed against BEC as the party who drafted the
contract.
G.R. No. 163767
Section 14 (1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decree
state:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
G.R. No. 163767
We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the public
domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared
alienable and disposable either by the President or the
Secretary of the DENR.
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification
issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the
application for registration, because the applicant must also
submit a copy of the original classification of the land as
alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

G.R. No. 163767
Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision
further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by prescription.
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State." It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong
to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth"
G.R. No. 164277
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may
take part in the division of the thing owned in common and
object to its being effected without their concurrence. But
they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless
there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding
a formal opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice
to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity.
G.R. No. 164408
For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being
possessed and occupied must already be classified or declared
as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of
possession would vest any right in the possessor if the
property has remained land of the public dominion.
G.R. No. 164408
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State." It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong
to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public
dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth."
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G.R. No. 164686
A ti le of the Ci il Code: [i]f the te s of a o t a t a e
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
pa ties, the lite al ea i g of its stipulatio s shall o t ol.
G.R. No. 164961
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need
only show that he relied on the face of the title to the
property. He need not prove that he made further inquiry for
he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the
title. Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient
only when the following conditions concur: first, the seller is
the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in
possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the
buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other
person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the
title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the
property.
G.R. No. 164985
The legal basis for recoupment by the buyer is the first
paragraph of Article 1599 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 1599. Where there is a breach of warranty by the
seller, the buyer may, at his election:
(1) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the seller, the
breach of warranty by way of recoupment in diminution or
extinction of the price;
(2) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against
the seller for damages for the breach of warranty;
(3) Refuse to accept the goods, and maintain an action against
the seller for damages for the breach of warranty;
(4) Rescind the contract of sale and refuse to receive the
goods or if the goods have already been received, return them
or offer to return them to the seller and recover the price or
any part thereof which has been paid.
When the buyer has claimed and been granted a remedy in
anyone of these ways, no other remedy can thereafter be
granted, without prejudice to the provisions of the second
paragraph of article 1191.
G.R. No. 164985
Legal compensation takes place when the requirements set
forth in Article 1278 and Article 1279 of the Civil Code are
present, to wit:
Article 1278. Compensation shall take place when two
persons, in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each
other."
Article 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is
necessary:
(1) That each of the obligors be bound principally, and that he
be at the same time a principal creditor of the other;
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

(2) That both debts consists in a sum of money, or if the things
due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the
same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated
in due time to the debtor.
G.R. No. 173988
Physical maltreatment was precisely prohibited by no less than
the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of
corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the person of the
child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
inflict corporal punishment upon the child.
G.R. No. 174433
A unilateral determination of the interest rates contravened
the principle of mutuality of contracts embodied in Article
of the Ci il Code, hi h p o ides that [t]he o t a t
must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance
cannot e left to the ill of o e of the .
A perusal of the Promissory Note will readily show that the
increase or decrease of interest rates hinges solely on the
discretion of petitioner. It does not require the conformity of
the maker before a new interest rate could be enforced. Any
contract which appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one
of the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result, thus
partaking of the nature of a contract of adhesion, is void. Any
stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract
left solely to the will of one of the parties is likewise invalid.
G.R. No. 174433
The Court has declared that a contract where there is no
mutuality between the parties partakes of the nature of a
contract of adhesion, and any obscurity will be construed
against the party who prepared the contract, the latter being
presumed the stronger party to the agreement, and who
caused the obscurity.
G.R. No. 174433
According to Nacar v. Gallery Frames, MB Circular No. 799 is
applied prospectively, and judgments that became final and
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executory prior to its effectivity on July 1, 2013 are not to be
disturbed but continue to be implemented applying the old
legal rate of 12% per annum. Hence, the old legal rate of 12%
per annum applied to judgments becoming final and
executory prior to July 1, 2013, but the new rate of 6% per
annum applies to judgments becoming final and executory
after said dater.
G.R. No. 195668
Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage. Joint tortfeasors are
those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a
tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit.
G.R. No. 195668
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the
damages may be adjudicated in criminal proceedings in the
discretion of the court.
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
A.C. No. 8261
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of the
Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with
real or personal property which complies with all the
requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said
instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and
that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not
registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the present or of such denial in writing, stating the
ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to
appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree.
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

A.C. No. 8261
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is
ministerial in nature. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If
the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor the exercise of judgment.
G.R. No. 159271
Pursuant to Article 1878, (5), of the Civil Code, a special power
of attorney was necessary for entering "into any contract by
which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or
acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration,"
the written authority must be a special power of attorney to
sell.
G.R. No. 160033
Article 1267 of the Civil Code provides that "(w)hen the service
has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released
therefrom in whole or in part," was factually unfounded. For
Article 1267 to apply, the following conditions should concur,
namely:
(a) the event or change in circumstances could not have been
foreseen at the time of the execution of the contract;
(b) it makes the performance of the contract extremely
difficult but not impossible;
(c) it must not be due to the act of any of the parties; and
(d) the contract is for a future prestation.
The requisites did not concur herein because the difficulty of
performance under Article 1267 of the Civil Code should be
such that one party would be placed at a disadvantage by the
unforeseen event. Mere inconvenience, or unexpected
impediments, or increased expenses did not suffice to relieve
the debtor from a bad bargain.
G.R. No. 163362
Under the Family Code, the classification of children is limited
to either legitimate or illegitimate. Illegitimate filiation is
proved in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code, to
wit:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified
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in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established in
accordance with Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code,
which state:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
G.R. No. 163928
In agency, the agent binds himself to render some service or
to do something in representation or on behalf of the
principal, with the consent or authority of the latter.
The basis of the civil law relationship of agency is
representation, the elements of which are, namely:
a the elatio ship is esta lished the pa ties o se t,
express or implied;
(b) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a
third person;
(c) the agent acts as representative and not for himself; and
(d) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
Whether or not an agency has been created is determined by
the fact that one is representing and acting for another. The
law does not presume agency; hence, proving its existence,
nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it.
G.R. No. 167797
It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the
employer of the tortfeasor-driver , and is made primarily liable
for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. For the purpose of
holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor
relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that
FFF is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing
damage in order that it may be held vicariously liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 202262
There are three kinds of estoppels, to wit:
(1) estoppel in pais;
(2) estoppel by deed; and
(3) estoppel by laches.
Under the first kind, a person is considered in estoppel if by
his conduct, representations, admissions or silence when he
ought to speak out, whether intentionally or through culpable
negligence, "causes another to believe certain facts to exist
and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, as a
consequence of which he would be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts." Under estoppel
by deed, a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from
denying any material fact stated in the deed as against the
other party and his privies. Under estoppel by laches, an
equitable estoppel, a person who has failed or neglected to
assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time is presumed to have abandoned or otherwise declined to
assert such right and cannot later on seek to enforce the
same, to the prejudice of the other party, who has no notice
or knowledge that the former would assert such rights and
whose condition has so changed that the latter cannot,
without injury or prejudice, be restored to his former state.
G.R. No. 204089
The application of the doctrine of estoppel, which is based on
public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, is only
appropriate because the purpose of the doctrine is to forbid
one from speaking against his own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of another to whom he directed
such act, representations, or commitments, and who
reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine springs from equitable
principles and the equities in the case, and is designed to aid
the law in the administration of justice where without its aid
injustice might result.
G.R. No. 154069
Art. 1293. Novation which consists in substituting a new
debtor in the place of the original one may be made even
without the knowledge or against the will of the latter but not
without the consent of the creditor" x x x.
G.R. No. 154069
Under the Civil Code, obligations may be modified by:
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(1) changing their object or principal conditions; or
(2) substituting the person of the debtor; or
(3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.
Novation, which consists in substituting a new debtor in the
place of the original one, may be made even without the
knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the
consent of the creditor.
G.R. No. 154069
Novation may [E]ither be extinctive or modificatory, much
being dependent on the nature of the change and the
intention of the parties.
Extinctive novation is never presumed; there must be an
express intention to novate; in cases where it is implied, the
acts of the parties must clearly demonstrate their intent to
dissolve the old obligation as the moving consideration for the
emergence of the new one. Implied novation necessitates that
the incompatibility between the old and new obligation be
total on every point such that the old obligation is completely
superseded by the new one.
The test of incompatibility is whether they can stand together,
each one having an independent existence; if they cannot and
are irreconcilable, the subsequent obligation would also
extinguish the first.
Novation is merely modificatory where the change brought
about by any subsequent agreement is merely incidental to
the main obligation (e.g., a change in interest rates or an
extension of time to pay; in this instance, the new agreement
will not have the effect of extinguishing the first but would
merely supplement it or supplant some but not all of its
provisions.
G.R. No. 154069
An extinctive novation would thus have the twin effects
of, first, extinguishing an existing obligation and, second,
creating a new one in its stead. This kind of novation
presupposes a confluence of four essential requisites:
(1) a previous valid obligation,
(2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract,
(3) the extinguishment of the old obligation, and
(4) the birth of a valid new obligation.
G.R. No. 160408
Article 2088 of the Civil Code prohibits the creditor from
appropriating the things given by way of pledge or mortgage,
or from disposing of them; any stipulation to the contrary is
null and void.
The elements for pactum commissorium to exist are as
follows, to wit:
(a) that there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein
property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

payment of the principal obligation; and
(b) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic
appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or
mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal
obligation within the stipulated period.
G.R. No. 160408
Dacion en pago is in the nature of a sale because property is
alienated in favor of the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in
money.
For a valid dacion en pago to transpire, however, the
attendance of the following elements must be established,
namely:
(a) the existence of a money obligation;
(b) the alienation to the creditor of a property by the debtor
with the consent of the former; and
(c) the satisfaction of the money obligation of the debtor.
To have a valid dacion en pago, therefore, the alienation of
the property must fully extinguish the debt.
G.R. No. 160408
According to Article 1318 of the Civil Code, the requisites for
any contract to be valid are, namely:
(a) the consent of the contracting parties;
(b) the object; and
(c) the consideration.
There is a perfection of a contract when there is a meeting of
the minds of the parties on each of these requisites.
G.R. No. 160408
Pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest shall be
due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
In order for monetary interest to be imposed, therefore, two
requirements must be present, specifically:
(a) that there has been an express stipulation for the payment
of interest; and
(b) that the agreement for the payment of interest has been
reduced in writing.
G.R. No. 163157
Easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on another's
property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the
owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow
somebody else to do something on his property for the
benefit of another thing or person." "It exists only when the
servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners.
It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on
the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an
acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the
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property belongs to another."
G.R. No. 163157
It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent
easement in the context of Article 622 of the Civil Code, which
provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and
discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing
Right of Way in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition
of the easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of
title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the
juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as law,
donation, contract, and will of the testator."
G.R. No. 163157
With the right of way rightfully belonging to them as the
owners of the burdened property, the Spouses remained
entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes of ownership
under the Civil Code, specifically: jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus
abutendi, jus disponendi and jus vindicandi. Article 428 of the
Civil Code recognizes that the owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
G.R. No. 163157
The award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is
governed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages is awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to
protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil case or proceeding
against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith
in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must
be reasonable.
G.R. No. 163157
The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as
part of damages because of the policy that no premium should
be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded
every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded
where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in
a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
G.R. No. 166890
The requisite period of possession of the property should
conform to that provided for in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which
has limited the right to apply for judicial confirmation to
citizens of the Philippines "who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. x x x"
The provision is reprised by Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
G.R. No. 167082
Based on Article 1345 of the Civil Code, simulation of contracts
is of two kinds, namely: (1) absolute; and (2) relative.
Simulation is absolute when there is color of contract but
without any substance, the parties not intending to be bound
thereby. It is relative when the parties come to an agreement
that they hide or conceal in the guise of another contract.
G.R. No. 167082
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The effects of simulated contracts are dealt with in Article
1346 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void.
A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third
person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the
parties to their real agreement.
G.R. No. 167082
A guarantor may bind himself for less, but not for more than
the principal debtor, both as regards the amount and the
onerous nature of the conditions (Art. 2054, Civil Code)
G.R. No. 167082
Art. 2047 of the New Civil Code provides that "(b)y guaranty, a
person called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to
fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter
should fail to do so."
G.R. No. 167082
According to Article 1169 of the Civil Code, there is delay or
default from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudically
demands from the obligor the fulfillment of his or her
obligation.
G.R. No. 167082
Under Article 1226 of the Civil Code, a penal clause is a
substitute indemnity for damages and the payment of
interests in case of noncompliance, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary.
G.R. No. 167082
Article 2212 of the Civil Code requires that interest due shall
earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded,
although the obligation may be silent upon this point.
G.R. No. 169694
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the
other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper
manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment
one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other
begins.
G.R. No. 169694
According to Article 1184 of the Civil Code, the condition that
some event happen at a determinate time shall extinguish the
RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING

obligation as soon as the time expires, or if it has become
indubitable that the event will not take place.
G.R. No. 171865
All-embracing or dragnet clauses have been recognized as
valid means to secure debts of both future and past origins.
Such clauses were an exceptional mode of securing
obligations, and have held that obligations could only be
deemed secured by the mortgage if they came fairly within
the terms of the mortgage contract. For the all-embracing or
dragnet clauses to secure future loans, therefore, such loans
must be sufficiently described in the mortgage contract.
G.R. No. 172682
Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not establish a presumption
of negligence because it explicitly makes the common carrier
liable in the event of death or injury to passengers due to the
negligence or fault of the common carrier's employees. It
reads:
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of
the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon
proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The liability of common carriers under Article 1759 is
demanded by the duty of extraordinary diligence required of
common carriers in safely carrying their passengers.
G.R. No. 172682
Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays down the presumption of
negligence against the common carrier in the event of death
or injury of its passenger, viz.:
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
1755.
G.R. No. 172682
The presumption of negligence applies so long as there is
evidence showing that:
(a) a contract exists between the passenger and the common
carrier; and
(b) the injury or death took place during the existence of such
contract.
In such event, the burden shifts to the common carrier to
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prove its observance of extraordinary diligence, and that an
unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the injury.
G.R. No. 172682
A common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising from
a fortuitous event pursuant to Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
But while it may free a common carrier from liability, the
provision still requires exclusion of human agency from the
cause of injury or loss. Else stated, for a common carrier to be
absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not
enough that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
The common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute
to the occurrence of the incident due to its own or its
employees' negligence.
G.R. No. 172682
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however,
(1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence,
or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must
be independent of human will;
(2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute
the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be impossible
to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
G.R. No. 172682
Article 1754. The provisions of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall
apply to the passenger's baggage which is not in his personal
custody or in that of his employees. As to other baggage, the
rules in Articles 1998 and 2000 to 2003 concerning the
responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be applicable.
xxxx
Article 1998. The deposit of effects made by travellers in
hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers
of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries,
provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees,
of the effects brought by the guests and that, on the part of
the latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers
or their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance
of their effects.
xxxx
Article 2000. The responsibility referred to in the two
preceding articles shall include the loss of, or injury to the
personal property of the guests caused by the servants or
employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by
strangers; but not that which may proceed from any force
majeure. The fact that travellers are constrained to rely on the
vigilance of the keeper of the hotel or inn shall be considered
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in determining the degree of care required of him.
Article 2001. The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the
hotel is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the
use of arms or through an irresistible force.
Article 2002. The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if
the loss is due to the acts of the guest, his family, servants or
visitors, or if the loss arises from the character of the things
brought into the hotel.
Article 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from
responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not
liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation to
the contrary between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby
the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to
2001 is suppressed or diminished shall be void.
G.R. No. 172682
The rule that the common carrier is always responsible for the
passenger's baggage during the voyage needs to be
emphasized. Article 1754 of the Civil Code does not exempt
the common carrier from liability in case of loss, but only
highlights the degree of care required of it depending on who
has the custody of the belongings. Hence, the law requires the
common carrier to observe the same diligence as the hotel
keepers in case the baggage remains with the passenger;
otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be exercised.
Furthermore, the liability of the common carrier attaches even
if the loss or damage to the belongings resulted from the acts
of the common carrier's employees, the only exception being
where such loss or damages is due to force majeure.
G.R. No. 172682
Actual delivery of the goods to the innkeepers or their
employees as unnecessary before liability could attach to the
hotelkeepers in the event of loss of personal belongings of
their guests considering that the personal effects were inside
the hotel or inn because the hotelkeeper shall remain
accountable. Accordingly, actual notification was not
necessary to render the petitioner as the common carrier
liable for the lost personal belongings of SSS. By allowing him
to board the vessel with his belongings without any protest,
the petitioner became sufficiently notified of such belongings.
So long as the belongings were brought inside the premises of
the vessel, the petitioner was thereby effectively notified and
consequently duty-bound to observe the required diligence in
ensuring the safety of the belongings during the voyage.
G.R. No. 172682
Also known as 'punitive' or 'vindictive' damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
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Wanton means characterized by extreme recklessness and
utter disregard for the rights of others; or marked by or
manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice or of rights or
feelings of others. Conduct is reckless when it is an extreme
departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a high
degree of danger is apparent. It must be more than any mere
mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion,
and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or
simple inattention.
G.R. No. 173140
Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could
contract in the name of another without being authorized by
the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him;
the contract entered into in the name of another by one who
has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has
been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting
party.
G.R. No. 164749
To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the
negligence need not be the event closest in time to the injury;
a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation
to the injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable
events into motion resulting ultimately in the damage.
G.R. No. 164749
An intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be "one
not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent
of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any cause
intervening between the first wrongful cause and the final
injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or
anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an efficient
intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its
character as the proximate cause of the final injury."
G.R. No. 164749
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who
voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and
appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result
therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person injured
has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation of
conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a
known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper
caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it is based on
voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a
known and appreciated risk; it may sometimes include
acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but
one does not ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which
he does not know and appreciate.
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G.R. No. 194226

The basic principle of relativity of contracts states that

contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs.

G.R. No. 211504

Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, a valid contract should

have the following essential elements, namely: (a) consent of
the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject
matter of the contract; and (c) cause or consideration.
Moreover, a contract does not need to be in writing in order
to be obligatory and effective unless the law specifically
requires so.

Pursuant to Article 1356 and Article 1357 of the Civil

Code, contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may
have been entered into, provided that all the essential
requisites for their validity are present.

To have knowledge, you must first have reverence for the Lord. (Proverbs 1:7)

COMPILED BY ATTY. R.A.L. CASABAR RESEARCHED BY J. MANINGDING