Antiporda vs Garchitorena (1999) G.R.

133289
Facts:
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of kidnapping, the case was filed
in the first division of Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit
amended information, which was complied evenly and the new information contained the place where
the victim was brought.

The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be conducted and the issuance
of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a
Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued
but the same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash Amended Information
for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit
their selves to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction over their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.

Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense
committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution
belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation filed with the
same court, it was they who challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and
clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction.

We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was
thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

Issue (2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.

Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would be impaired. In the
case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is
filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe
the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was brought when he
was kidnapped.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy.
It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation
of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see no cogent nor
compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the complex crime of direct assault with murder in
Criminal Case No. 2302. His arguments in the present appeal turn on the central question of unwarranted credence allegedly extended
by the trial court to the version of the criminal incident narrated by the sole prosecution witness. The totality of the evidence adduced,
however, indubitably confirms appellant' s guilt of the offense charged. Accordingly, we affirm.

An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime of direct assault with murder to herein appellant
Tiburcio Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations

"That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a person in authority being a member of the Integrated
National Police with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike said
Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood, which said accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the purpose while said P/Pfc.
Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in the performance of his official duties or on
the occasion of such performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality,
thereby inflicting upon him 'Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose' which wound directly
caused his death.

"That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was present." [1]

At his arraignment on June 7, 1983 appellant with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. [2] The trial conducted
thereafter culminated in the decision[3] of the trial court on February 3, 1989 finding appellant guilty as charged and meting out to him
the penalty of "life imprisonment, with the accessories of the law." Appellant was likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the sum of P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral damages; and
to pay the costs.[4]

As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan, Samar, appellant
assaulted the victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of March 20, 1983, which was then the day of the barangay fiesta
celebrations in Barangay Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near the house of appellant at the
said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session in front of the shanty of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated
just a few meters from the residence of appellant.

According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his employees in
his transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in earnings for that day.While Major Abalos was thus berating his
employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to scold them and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities. This
infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between father and son. [5]

While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue kami! Adi in mag-a-aringasa," meaning, "Police officer,
help us! Somebody's making trouble here." The victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos,
"What is it, sir?" The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine,
appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby
Ford Fiera vehicle.

He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the
back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he
sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right after appellant struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by
possible stray bullets[6] should a gunfight ensue.

Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits having struck Labine with a piece of wood during the
incident in question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his father was being attacked by a member of the New
People's Army (NPA). According to appellant, he was then seated inside their family-owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store
of Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue uniform suddenly accost his
father. At that time, appellant's father had just arrived from a trip from Wright, Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a
Ford Fiera.

The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and while the two were grappling for possession of
the gun, appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a piece of wood from Figueroa's store with which he then
clubbed Labine whom he did not recognize at that point. When Labine fell to the ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to
Barangay Mercedes nearby, fearing that the man had companions who might retaliate. When he came to know of the identity of his
victim the following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the authorities.[7]

As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented by appellant was roundly rejected by
the lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant ascribes reversible errors to the trial court (a) in not giving credence
to the evidence adduced by the defense, (b) in believing the evidence presented by the prosecution, (c) in relying on the prosecution's
evidence which falls short of the required quantum of evidence that would warrant a conviction; (d) in finding that treachery attended
the commission of the crime and failing to credit in appellant's favor his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.[8]

In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear traces of incredibility, particularly the fact that he
could not have had a clear view of the incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who
had called for help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the events. Appellant also assails as inherently
incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All
these, unfortunately, are flawed arguments.

From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and positive testimony of
Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness
was actuated by any evil motivation or dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused. [9] There was thus no
need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony
would only be corroborative in nature.

The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect
that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were inaccurate. [10] Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should
be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such testimony. [11] Also, no unreasonable
delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and intimated to the widow
of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband's slaying. [12]

Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his firearm is rather preposterous
considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman would assault a police officer of superior
rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at the time of the incident was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification
of appellant as the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the victim's violent death.

Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a long-time resident of that
municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the road and which, by appellant's own reckoning, was
just seventeen meters away from them.[13] Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination
cast by the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the combatants.

Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed
on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight. While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's
identification of him supposedly because of inadequate lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father's
assailant wearing a fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he saw his father clutching
the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held on tightly to the rifle.[14] What these facts establish is that
the lights in the area at the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's
pretense. Appellant's testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a credible
witness, but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.

Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true that he had merely
labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a member of the NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error
in personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was
the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee
from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was
then armed with a carbine. Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with no
weight in law.

On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be held accountable for the complex
crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148
of the Revised Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public
uprising. On the other hand the second mode is the more common way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a
weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. [15]

Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his
duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that
the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.[16]

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in
authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There is also no dispute that he was in the actual
performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay
Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman[17] and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his
uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that
he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an agent of the law.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of
direct assault with murder or homicide.[18] The killing in the instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through
treacherous means deliberately adopted. Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by
appellant's father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which
he deliberately got for that purpose.

Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry was a policeman who
could readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity, however, were not duly
proven, as correctly ruled by the court below. On the other hand, appellant's voluntary surrender even if duly taken into account by
the trial court would have been inconsequential.

The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death, the imposable penalty should have been death. The mitigating circumstance, in that context, would have been unavailing and
inapplicable since the penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. [19] At all events, the punishment of death could not be imposed
as it would have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription against the imposition of the death penalty.[20]

However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life imprisonment" is erroneous, as the same should
properly be denominated as reclusion perpetua.[21] Also, the death indemnity payable to the heirs of the victim, under the present
jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos should
be reclusion perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal
Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

HERBERT CANG VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:30 PM
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition.
Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the
rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already
granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the
children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly
support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned
them.

RULING:

Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its
known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has
abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court
find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and
send them packages catered to their whims.
G.R. No. 172142 October 17, 2007

DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Assailed via the instant Petition for Review is the Court of Appeals Decision2 of December 9, 2005 which set aside the August 20,
2004 Resolution3 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing the petition for review filed by respondent Jose Antonio Datuin.

On complaint for Estafa by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano,
Jr.,4 an Information for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed against respondent.

After trial, respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71 of Pasig City by Decision of May 3,
1999.5 Respondents appeal before the Court of Appeals, and eventually with this Court, was dismissed and the decision became
final and executory6 on October 24, 2003.

Later claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation against him was "false, unfounded and malicious" in light of
newly discovered (by respondent) evidence, respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, punishable
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City against petitioner and a certain
Yasunobu Hirota.7 The pertinent portions of respondents complaint-affidavit read:

I, JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence and postal address at No. 1 Commonwealth Avenue,
Diliman, Quezon City, under oath, depose and state:

xxxx

2. I was charged by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its President, Mr. David Campanano, Jr.
with the crime of Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, by virtue of a criminal information
filed against me by said prosecution office with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. x x x

xxxx

5. In a decision dated May 3, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, rendered a Decision
convicting me (accused-complainant) of estafa x x x;

xxxx

13. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15, 2003, I had my office rented, vacated the same, and had all of my things,
including my attach case, all my records, and other personal belongings, transferred and brought to my house;
that while I was sorting and classifying all my things, including the records, as well as those in the attach
case, I found the CASH VOUCHER evidencing my cash payment of the two (2) roadrollers, Sakai brand, which
I purchased from Mr. Yasonobu Hirota, representing Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos. The cash voucher was dated June 28, 1993, and it was signed by me
and Mr. Hirota. A copy of the said cash voucher is hereto attached as ANNEX "H" hereof;

14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin International Corporation[,] represented
by Mr. David Campanano, Jr.[,] and the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded
and malicious because they imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place I did not commit, as
evidenced by the fact that the subject two (2) units of roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation through Mr. Campanano, and the
information filed in court, had been purchased by me in cash from the said corporation and had already been
paid on June 28, 1993.

While I testified also in court, my testimony arose from my having forgotten that I have already fully paid for the
said two units of roadrollers, especially that I could not find the necessary document consisting of the cash
voucher in support of my defense. I could not say that I have fully paid for the said units of roadrollers because
at that time I was not in possession of any evidence or document to support my claim.
 15. In filing the complaint for Estafa fully knowing that it was baseless and without factual or legal basis,
Messrs. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be criminally liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent
Persons punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x8(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City9 dismissed respondents complaint for
incriminating innocent person in this wise:

It appearing that the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City, and the testimony given by respondent David Campaano, Jr. was also
made in Pasig City, this office has no jurisdiction on the above-entitled complainant.

Granting en arguendo that this office has jurisdiction over this case, the undersigned investigating prosecutor finds no basis to indict
the respondents of the crime imputed to them for it is an established fact that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City finds merit in the
estafa case filed by Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president, herein respondent David Campaano, Jr. In fact,
the petition for review, including the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by the herein complainant to [sic] the Honorable
Supreme Court was denied for lack of merit and with an order of Entry of Final Judgment.

As to the discovery of the alleged new evidence, the cash voucher, dated June 28, 1993[,] it is not this office that should determine
the materiality or immateriality of it.10 (Underscoring supplied)

By petition for review, respondent elevated the case to the DOJ which dismissed the petition outright by Resolution 11 of August 20,
2004, holding that "[it] found no such error committed by the prosecutor that would justify the reversal of the assailed resolution
which is in accord with the law and evidence on the matter." Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by DOJ
Resolution12 of April 11, 2005.

The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the resolutions of the DOJ by Decision of December 9, 2005, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course, and the assailed Resolutions of the Department of Justice are hereby SET ASIDE.
The case is directed to be remanded to the City Prosecutors Office of Quezon City for further investigation.13 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition, petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in the main:

. . . IN RULING THAT THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER DAVID B. CAMPANANO EXECUTED IN QUEZON

CITY ON NOVEMBER 30, 2003 AND NOT THE AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT JOSE
ANTONIO DATUIN THAT [sic] IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY PROSECUTORS
OFFICE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT DATUIN
AGAINST PETITIONER INCRIMINATING AGAINST INNOCENT PERSONS.

xxxx

. . . IN RULING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENT DATUIN BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION SINCE THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
APPEARS TO BE MERITORIOUS.14 (Underscoring supplied)

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction;15 and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. 16

For purposes of determining the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred." This is a
fundamental principle, the purpose of which is not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of
the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other
evidence in another place.17

The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on
August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any of its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City. The only
reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it is where respondent resides.18 Respondents complaint-affidavit was
thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that since petitioners November 20, 2003 Counter-
Affidavit19 to respondents complaint for incriminating innocent person was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous.

In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a clear probable cause of incriminating innocent person
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes "[a]ny person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or
impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime." The crime known as incriminating innocent person has the following
elements: (1) the offender performs an act; (2) by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the commission
of a crime; and (3) such act does not constitute perjury. 20

The pertinent portion of respondents complaint-affidavit reads:

14. In light of this newly discovered evidence, the complaint of Seishin International Corporation[,] represented by Mr. David
Campanano, Jr.[,] and the testimony of the latter in support of the complaint are false, unfounded and malicious because they
imputed to me a crime of Estafa which in the first place I did not commit, as evidenced by the fact that the subject two (2) units of
roadrollers, Sakai brand, subject of the criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City by the corporation
through Mr. Campanano, and the information filed in court, had been purchased by me in cash from the said corporation and had
already been paid on June 28, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 363 does not, however, contemplate the idea of malicious prosecution someone prosecuting or instigating a criminal
charge in court.21 It refers "to the acts of PLANTING evidence and the like, which do not in themselves constitute false prosecution
but tend directly to cause false prosecutions."22 Apropos is the following ruling of this Court in Ventura v. Bernabe:23

Appellants do not pretend, neither have they alleged in their complaint that appellee has planted evidence against them.1wphi1 At
the most, what appellee is alleged to have done is that he had filed the criminal complaint above-quoted against appellant Joaquina
Ventura without justifiable cause or motive and had caused the same to be prosecuted, with him (appellee) testifying falsely as
witness for the prosecution. These acts do not constitute incriminatory machination, particularly, because Article 363 of the Revised
Penal Code punishing said crime expressly excludes perjury as a means of committing the same.

Evidently, petitioner may not, under respondents complaint-affidavit, be charged with the crime of incriminating innocent person
under Article 363. Parenthetically, respondents conviction bars even the filing of a criminal case for false testimony against
petitioner.24

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of December 9, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint of respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against petitioner DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR. is DISMISSED.