San Juan vs.

Civil Service Commisssion

GR No. 92299, 19 April 1991

Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter
Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position
and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and
recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she
was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the
DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the
Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest
on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the
nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from
his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No.
112.

Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not
expressly nominated by the provincial governor.

Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is
subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO.
Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall
short of the required standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM
is expected to reject the same. In the event that the Governor recommends an
unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?

Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local
chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance
with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution
under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power
to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of
public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy
in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as
embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated
February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and
principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of
centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments.
He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is
both general and circumscribed by statute. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even
more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments"

Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may
appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor.
If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor
explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre

Facts:

In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and
agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998
that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of
10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO
43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to
adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy
2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over
local governments

Held:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not
rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to
ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning
agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing,
coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire
country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies,
various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the]
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of
Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the
internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal
year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations
with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents
of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of
the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show
that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit.
Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local
governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to
reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with
his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government
agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not
contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section
1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition,
the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is

the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that
the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every
quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by
the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COA

Date: January 29, 1990Petitioner: Cordillera Broad Coalition Respondent: COA, et alPonente:
CortesFacts:-EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.
XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and
social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs
and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as
with the executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and
in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall
also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the
region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a
Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive
Board shalle xist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and
organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President,
inthe exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the
1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
organicact and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

Issue:WON EO 220 is valid

RULING:Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the
National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to
the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated
in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of
an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions, as we shall show later. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not
necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim
autonomous region in the Cordilleras". The Constitution provides for a basic structure of
government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and
special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find
that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region,
covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services. To determine policy, it created a
representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among
others, identifying priority projects and development programs. To serve as an implementing
body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not
supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government
agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the
existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups
or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.

Issue: WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.

Ruling: No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No.
220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision. After
carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial
and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly, the CAR is not a
public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that
are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own
and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the
CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and
services in the covered areas. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting
the delivery of services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was
made as part of the law of the land by virtue of PD 1, established 11regions, later increased to 12,
with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of
the National Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be
established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide
economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with
regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with
local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided
by law.CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created under the Reorganization
Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires the participation not only of the
line departments and agencies of the National Government but also the local governments, ethno-
linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations in bringing about the desired objectives
and the appropriation of funds solely for that purpose.

Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province)
andcity (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not unique to
the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And while there was
no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy
Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible
march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the
1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional
government with a basic structure consisting of ane xecutive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the
autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency
that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap
in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.

Limbona vs. Mangelin

GR No. 80391 28 February 1989

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in
his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue
with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed
the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no
session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing
of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it
declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of
the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines
of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous
governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the
autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them,
but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.

(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating
it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other
hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the
Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in
the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume
jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to

obey the clear mandate on local autonomy.

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in

Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be
weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions
were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents'
own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could
do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in
an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side.
For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.

Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly
or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu
Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives,
invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and
informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However,
on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he
was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null
and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the
petition had become "moot and academic" because of its resolution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and
academic.

2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction of the
national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?

Ruling:

1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of the expulsion
resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to make the petition moot and
academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that the
expulsion is without force and effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation. It also does not appear that the petitioner had been made aware that
he was charged with graft and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that
he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are
leveled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered
reinstatement of the petitioner.

2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential

Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the Presidential Decree provides that the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous
Regions... Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable, and
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves
the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The president exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law. He has not control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to
exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree, in the first place,
mandates that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions. In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
made to dischage chiefly administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.

Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be invalid.
Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the
Sanggunian.

Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him
for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive
Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently,
Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared
before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided
that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant
Executive Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a
committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such
investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the
power of control over a mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive
Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power
of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all
local governments over which he has been granted only the power of
general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as
agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments
as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to
bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments
over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as
may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he
may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in
office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10,
Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over
municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the
charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not
being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the
charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of
the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to
Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of
moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be
a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor
must suspend a mayor not because hes acting as an agent of the Executive but
because of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.
HEBRON v. REYES
 July 28, 1958 | Concepcion, J. | Quo Warranto |

PETITIONER: Bernardo Hebron

RESPONDENT: Eulalio Reyes

SUMMARY: Petitioner and respondent were elected mayor and

vice-mayor respectively of the Municipality of Carmona in the
province of Cavite in the general elections of 1951. On May 1954,
petitioner was preventively suspended by the Office of the President
due to certain administrative charges lodged against him. During that
period, respondent was directed to assume the office of Acting
Mayor. Since petitioner remained suspended for more than a year
and 7 months and there was no action on the administrative case, an
action for quo warranto was instituted on the ground that respondent
was illegally holding and has unlawfully refused to surrender the
office. The Supreme Court

DOCTRINE: Under the present law, the procedure prescribed in

sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, for the
suspension and removal of the municipal officials therein referred to,
is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to
the contrary, relative particularly to municipal corporations and
none has been cited to us said procedure is exclusive; that the
executive department of the national government, in the exercise of
its general supervision over local governments, may conduct
investigations with a view to determining whether municipal
officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative
action referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain
whether the provincial governor and the provincial board should
take such action; that the Executive may take appropriate measures
to compel the provincial governor and the provincial board to take
said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so; that
the provincial governor and the provincial board may not be
deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority
conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised
Administrative Code; that such would be the effect of the
assumption of those powers by the Executive; that said assumption
of powers would further violate section 2191 of the same code, for
the authority therein vested in the Executive is merely appellate in
character.

FACTS:
1. In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner, a member of the Liberal Party, and respondent
of the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor respectively of the Municipality
of Carmona, Province of Cavite for a term of 4 years beginning January 1952. Petitioner
discharged the duties and functions of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24 1954 when he
received a communication from the Office of the President of the Philippines informing him
 that the President has decided to assume directly the investigation of the administrative charges
against said petitioner for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct
in office. The Provincial Fiscal of said province was designated as Special Investigator of the
said charges. In the interim, petitioner was preventively suspsended and the Vice Mayor was
directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor during said period of suspension.
2. Respondent acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite investigated the
charges. After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal submitted
his report thereon on July 15, 1954. Since then the matter has been pending in the Office of the
President for decision. Inasmuch as the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of
petitioner, who remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he instituted the
present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally holding the
Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender said
office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto. Respondent denied the alleged illegality
of petitioners suspension and claimed that the former was holding the office of the mayor in
compliance with a valid and lawful order of the President.
3. At the hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General and said amici curiae
Dean Vicente Sinco and Professor Enrique Fernando, appeared and argued extensively.
Subsequently, they filed their respective memoranda and the case became submitted for
decision. The case could not be disposed of, however, before the close of said year, because the
members of the Court could not, within the unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement on
the decision thereon. Although the term of office of petitioner expired on December 31, 1955,
his claim to the Office of Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby become entirely moot, as
regards such rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto.

ISSUE: WoN a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may
be removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines regardless of the preocedure set
forth in Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code NO

RULING: Petition GRANTED.

RATIO:
1. Referring to local elective officers, We held in Lacson v. Roque that the President has no
inherent power to remove or suspend them. There is neither statutory nor constitutional
provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. By article
VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President "shall . . . exercise general
supervision over all local governments", but supervision does not contemplate control. Far from
implying control or power to remove the President's supervisory authority over municipal
affairs is qualified by the proviso "as may be provided by law", a clear indication of
constitutional intention that the provisions was not to be self-executing but requires legislative
implementation. It is significant to note that section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code
in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins that the said power
should be exercised conformably to law, which we assume to mean that removals must be
accomplished only for any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure.
2. Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code provide the causes, fashion, and the
procedure prescribed by law for the suspension of elective municipal officials. My. Justice
Tuason, in construing the aforementioned provisions states that the preceding sections should
control in the field of investifations of charges against and suspension of municipal officials.
The minuteness and care, in three long paragraphs, with which the procedure in such
investigations and suspensions is outlined, clearly manifests a purpose to exclude other modes
 of proceeding by other authorities under general statutes, and not to make the operation of said
provisions depend upon the mercy and sufferance of higher authorities. Accordingly, when the
procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed
mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary
which does not exist with respect to municipal officers. What is more, the language of sections
2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt that the law in
the words of Mr. Justice Tuason "frowns upon prolonged or indefinite suspension of local
elective officials"
3. The policy manifested by section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, which is
consecrated policy in other jurisdictions whose republican institutions this country has copied,
requires speedy termination of a case in which suspension has been decreed, not only in the
interest of the immediate party but of the public in general. The electorate is vitally interested,
and the public good demands, that the man it has elevated to office be, within the shortest time
possible, separated from the service if proven unfit and unfaithful to its trust, and restored if
found innocent. In the case at bar, petitioner was suspended in May 1954. The records of the
investigation were forwarded to the Executive Secretary since July 1954 yet the decision on the
charges was not rendered either before the filing of the complaint or before the expiration of
petitioners term of office.
4. Respondent cannot rely on Sections 79(c) and 86 of the Revised Administrative Code because
although the Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(C), he does not have
the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation by any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or
offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already
stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the
provisions of Section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as
conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official
of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision
over all local government's is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department
Head in section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a
distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. Section 86 of the
Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the
Department Head over the administration of municipalities. If it be construed that it does and
such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section
79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have
been abrogated by section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution. The word "offices", as used
in section 79 (C), was not deemed to include local governments, even before the adoption of
the Constitution.
5. Section 64 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code relied upon by respondent and the amici
curiae, provides that the President shall have authority "to order, when in his opinion the good
of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action or conduct of any person in the
government services and in connection therewith, to designate the official committee or person
by whom such investigation shall be conducted. Since the powers specified therein are given to
the President, "in addition to his general supervisory authority", it follows that the application
of those powers to municipal corporations insofar as they may appear to sanction the
assumption by the Executive of the functions of provincial governors and provincial boards,
 under said sections 2188 to 2190 would contravene the constitutional provision restricting
the authority of the President over local government to "general supervision."
6. The foregoing considerations are equally applicable to paragraph (b) of said Section 64. There
is no question of disloyalty in the present case. Upon the other hand, the power of removal of
the President, under the first sentence of said paragraph 64 (b), must be exercised "conformably
to law", which, as regards municipal officers, is found in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
7. If there is any conflict between said sections 64 (b) and (c), 79 (c) and 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code, on the other hand, and sections 2188 to 2191 of the same code, on the
other, the latter being specific provisions, setting forth the procedure for the disciplinary
action that may be taken, particularly, against municipal officials must prevail over the
former, as general provisions, dealing with the powers of the President and the department
heads over the officers of the Government.
8. The alleged authority of the Executive to suspend a municipal mayor directly, without any
opportunity on the part of the provincial governor and the provincial board to exercise the
administrative powers of both under sections 2188 to 2190 of the Administrative Code, cannot
be adopted without conceding that said powers are subject to repeal or suspension by the
President. Obviously, this cannot, and should not, be done without a legislation of the most
explicit and categorical nature, and there is none to such effect. Moreover, as stated in Mondano
vs. Silvosa (supra), said legislation would, in effect, place local governments under the control
of the Executive and consequently conflict with the Constitution (Article VII, section 10[1]).
9. The case of Rodriguez v. Montinola is enlightening as regards the lack of power of the
Secretary of Finance to disapprove a resolution of the Provincial Board abolishing positions of
3 special counsel in the province. The Court ruled that the power of general supervision granted
the President, in the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted
to mean that he, or his alterego may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall
perform or comply with their duties.
10. It might be helpful to recall that under the Jones Law the Governor General had both control
and supervision over all local governments, (Section 22, Jones Law) The evident aim of the
members of the Constitutional Convention in introducing the change, therefore, must have been
to free local governments from the control exercised by the central government, merely
allowing the latter supervision over them. But this supervisory jurisdiction is not unlimited; it is
to be exercised "as may be provided by law." Dean Sinco, in his work on Philippine Political
Law expressed himself as follows: Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the
power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority
over the supervised party. Hence, the power of general supervision over local governments
should exclude, in the strict sense, the authority to appoint and remove local officials.
11. The respondents argue that although the power of general supervision of the President imposes
upon him the duty of non-interference in purely corporate affairs of the governments, such
limitation does not apply to its political affairs. n the Philippines, the constitutional provision
limiting the authority of the President over local governments to General supervision is
unqualified and, hence, it applies to all powers of municipal corporations, corporate and
political alike. In fact, there was no need of specifically qualifying the constitutional powers of
the President as regards the corporate functions of local governments, inasmuch as the
Executive never had any control over said functions. What is more, the same are not, and never
have been, under the control even of Congress, for, in the exercise of corporate, non-
governmental or non-political functions, municipal corporations stand practically on the same
level, vis-a-vis the National Government or the State as private corporations
12. The case of Villena vs. Roque is substantially different from the one at bar. Administrative
 charges were filed, against Mayor Villena, with the office of the President, which referred the
matter to the Provincial Governor of Rizal, but the Provincial Board thereof failed to act on
said charges for an unreasonable length of time. Under such facts it is understandable that the
power of supervision of the President was invoked, either to compel action, which the
Provincial Board had the duty to take, or, in view of its obvious unwillingness to comply
therewith, to cause the charges to be investigated by somebody else, in line with the
responsibility of the Executive "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." In the present
case, however, the Provincial Board of Cavite never had a chance to investigate the charges
against petitioner herein. From the very beginning, the office of the Executive assumed
authority to act on said charges. Worse still, such assumption of authority was made under such
conditions as to give the impression that the Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board were
banned from exercising said authority.
13. In Villena, the majority held that the President of the Philippines, under sections 64 (b), and
2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the later has been amended, and section 11 (1),
Article VII, of the Constitution, is vested with the power to expel and suspend municipal
officials for grave misconduct, and it appears that the suspension was ordered by virtue of that
authority; and (2) the Secretary of the Interior acted within the powers conferred upon him by
section 79 (c), in connection with section 86, of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
in ordering an administrative investigation of the charges against the petitioner, in his capacity
as mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal. Those who dissented disagreed
insofar as the majority held that the acts of the department secretaries are presumptively the
case of the executive and that the suspension directed by the Secretary should be considered as
decreed by the President himself. More important still, said majority opinion and the
aforementioned separate opinions cited section 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code as the
source of the power of the Executive to suspend and remove municipal officials. However, said
provision deals with such power of suspension and removal on appeal from a decision of the
Provincial Board in proceedings held under sections 2188 to 2190 of the said Code. Nowhere in
said opinions was anything said on the question whether said appellate authority implies a grant
of original power to suspend, either without an appeal from said decision of the Provincial
Board, or without any proceedings before said Board calling for the exercise of its disciplinary
functions under said provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Paras, C.J. dissenting:

1. In the allocation of governmental powers, our Constitution ordains that "the Executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." (Sec. 1, Art. VII, Constitution). And the
President is enjoined in the same Constitution to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
(Sec. 10, par. 1, Art. VII, Constitution.) In the same breath, the Constitution provides that the
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, and shall
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law (Sec. 10,
par. 1, Art. VII, Constitution). In pursuance of the Constitution, the Revised Administrative
Code declares that in addition to his general supervisory authority, the President shall have
such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law.
2. In reference to the malfeasance of any person in the Government service, by virtue of Sec. 64(b)
and (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, enacted in consonance with the totality of his
executive power and, specifically, the power of supervision of all offices in the executive
branch of the government, the President has concurrent supervisory authority with the
 provincial governor to order an investigation of charges against an elective municipal official.
While the provincial governor has to submit the charges to the Provincial Board for
investigation, the President may designate the official, committee or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted (Sec. 64 [c], Rev. Adm. Code). The President can remove even
elective municipal officials subject to the limitation that such removal must be conformable to
law, which are that it must be for a cause provided by law, as those enumerated in Sec. 2188 of
the Revised Administrative Code, and conducted in a manner in conformity with due process.
3. Besides, if in administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and control means the power of an
officer to alter modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter, how
will the foregoing distinction affect the supervisory authority of the President to cause the
investigation of the malfeasance of a municipal official relating to and affecting the
administration of his office, and directly affecting the rights and interests of the public? If
supervision and control meant by the Constitution relate to the power to oversee, or modify, set
aside or annul acts done by a subordinate officer in the performance of his duties the
supervisory authority to suspend and remove a subordinate official prescribed the
administrative code refers to disciplinary action on account of his misconduct or malfeasance in
office.
4. I see no cogent reason for disturbing our ruling in Planas vs. Gil; Villena vs. Sec. of Interior;
Lacson vs. Roque; and Villena vs. Roque, upholding the explicit supervisory authority of the
President under Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code to include that of ordering the
investigation of elective municipal officials, and to remove or suspend them conformably to
law.

GANZON VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:50 PM
G.R. No. 93252 August 5 1991

FACTS:
Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by
Secretary of Local Government, filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar
Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced with 10
administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave
misconduct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the
President) has the authority to suspend and remove local officials.

RULING:
The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes
the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against
local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The Chief
Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she
did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise
disciplinary authority.

In those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove)
it was not because that the President cannot exercise it on account of his limited
power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in
which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little
difficulty in sustaining him.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of
Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary
of interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuse of discretion.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote

possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the
rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his
suspension permanent.

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against
him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local
Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the
merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600
days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the
suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove
local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and
strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents

alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision
by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control
given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things
which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law
supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But
from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in

suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.

Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the
Local Government Code1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code)
null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary
the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187
is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been
observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit
certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue:

1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances
and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the
enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal:
Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge
levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting
upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
 WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec
187 of the LGC

Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court,
is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the
executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to
sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version
of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did
in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing
their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but
of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them.
 Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy
Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a
tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the
exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or
not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would
smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned
before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same
latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in
his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion
on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on
two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds
affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the

enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written
notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public
hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)

Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of
Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only
because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him
all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We
agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been
observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as
evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-
3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the
Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the
approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2,
and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It
has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and
disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development
plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.

BITO-ONON VS FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 139813 January 31, 2001

FACTS:

Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is
the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private
respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the
Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of
Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial
Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said
election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election
Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.

RULING:

In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is
a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by
authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local
Government Code21 defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the
primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for
ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration
and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.22 The liga shall have chapters at
the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and
city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and
city barangays respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city
chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter.
The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan
Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga
ng mga Barangay.

We rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a
Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation
electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the
Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES
with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES
promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the
decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the
GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power
of control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power
to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to
merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such issuances.27 To monitor
means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG
Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments.28 Besides,
any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved
in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government
MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG vs. HON. FELIX L. MOYA
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

G.R. No. L-41322 September 29, 1988

FACTS: From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia
created respondent Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts
jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of petitioner. For many years and on several
occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was brought,
at the instance of private respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao for it to
consider and decide. However, it appears that no action was taken on the same.
Private respondent then filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of
Davao, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Felix L. Moya against the
Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary dispute,
recovery of collected taxes and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475
ISSUE: whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.
HELD: Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General
(15 SCRA 569) is clear that the President has no power to create municipalities.
Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to speak of It has no right to assert,
no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part
and parcel of Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits that respondent Judge
should have dismissed the case.
On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary
disputes is administrative in nature and should originate in the political or
administrative agencies of the government, and not in the courts whose power is
limited to judicial review on appropriate occasions (Ibid., pp. 73-74).
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only entities
authorized by law may be patties in a civil action. Now then, as ruled in the
Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since
private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil
action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case, since
further proceedings would be pointless.

CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005

(ARTICLE X Section 10: Creation, Abolition, Change of boundaries)

FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del
Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders
of Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered
null and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive
orders is EO107 creating Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident
of Andong (as a private citizen and taxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following:

(1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full-blown municipality (since there is a complete set
of officials appointed to handle essential tasks and services, it has its own high school,
Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc.
(2) 17 barangays with chairman;

(3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and
DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong.

In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f

the 33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of
discretion and unequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO
107, arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making
San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive
order. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal
corporation

HELD:
SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.chan

Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough
to afford title by prescription. The C e r ti fi ca ti o n h a s n o p o w e r o r i t d o e s n o t
b e a r a n y a u th o ri ty t o c re a t e o r r e va l i d a t e a municipality. Should the case of Andong
be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following reasons:

(A) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar:

(1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated
in Pelaez Case,

(2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and

(3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in
the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment.

( B ) A n do n g d i d n o t me e t th e re q u i s i t e s se t b y L o ca l Go ve r n me n t C o d e
o f 1 9 9 1 S e c. 4 2 p a r. d r e ga rd i n g municipalities created by executive orders. It
says:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to
exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
(C) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the
municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence
of the municipality.

(D) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House
of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines,
enumerates the various municipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include
Andong.

Heherson Alvarez vs Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

252 SCRA 695 Political Law Municipal Corporation LGU Requirement Income
Inclusion of IRAs
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed
in the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB
8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the
Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate
Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB
8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law
(RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said
law on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower
house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least
P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the
reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should
not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs
income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record
shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the
HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rdreading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its
1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate
(in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average
annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They
thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the
source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too,
to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical
definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when
the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

Cawaling vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite
conducted pursuant thereto.

OnAugust16,2000,formerPresidentJosephE.EstradasignedintolawR.A.No.8806,an
"ActCreatingTheCityOfSorsogonByMergingTheMunicipalitiesOfBaconAndSorsogonInThe
Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the
MunicipalitiesofBaconandSorsogonandsubmittedthematterforratificationproclaimed thecreation
oftheCityofSorsogonashavingbeenratifiedandapprovedbythemajorityofthevotescastinthe
plebiscite.

Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorariseekingtheannulmentoftheplebisciteonthefollowinggrounds:

A.TheDecember16,2000plebiscitewasconductedbeyondtherequired120dayperiodfromthe
approvalofR.A.8806,inviolationofSection54thereof;and

B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive
informationcampaignintheMunicipalitiesofBaconandSorsogonbeforeconductingtheplebiscite.

Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional
,contending,inessence,that:

1.ThecreationofSorsogonCitybymergingtwomunicipalitiesviolatesSection450(a)oftheLocal
GovernmentCodeof1991(inrelationtoSection10,ArticleXoftheConstitution)whichrequiresthat
only"amunicipalityoraclusterofbarangaysmaybeconvertedintoacomponentcity";and

2.R.A.No.8806containstwo(2)subjects,namely,the(a)creationoftheCityofSorsogonandthe(b)
abolitionoftheMunicipalitiesofBaconandSorsogon,therebyviolatingthe"onesubjectonebill"rule
prescribedbySection26(1),ArticleVIoftheConstitution.
 PetitionercontendsthatunderSection450(a)oftheCode,acomponentcitymaybecreated
onlybyconverting"amunicipalityoraclusterofbarangays,"notbymergingtwomunicipalities,as
whatR.A.No.8806hasdone.

Issue:(1)WONacomponentcitymaybecreatedbymergingtwomunicipalities.

(2)WONthereexista"compelling"reasonformergingtheMunicipalitiesofBaconandSorsogonin
ordertocreatetheCityofSorsogon

(3)WONR.A.No.8806violatethe"onesubjectonebill"ruleenunciatedinSection26(1),ArticleVI
oftheConstitution

(4)WONR.ANo8806isunconstitutional

Held: Yes.Petitioner'sconstrictedreadingofSection450(a)oftheCodeiserroneous.Thephrase"A
municipalityoraclusterofbarangaysmaybeconvertedintoacomponentcity"isnotacriterionbut
simplyoneofthe modes bywhichacitymaybecreated.Section10,ArticleXoftheConstitution
allowsthe merger oflocalgovernmentunitstocreateaprovincecity,municipalityor barangay in
accordancewiththecriteriaestablishedbytheCode.thecreationofanentirelynewlocalgovernment
unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the
Constitution,providedthatsuchmergerordivisionshallcomplywiththerequirementsprescribedby
theCode.

(2)ThisargumentgoesintothewisdomofR.A.No.8806,amatterwhichwearenotcompetent
torule.InAngarav.ElectoralCommission,thisCourt,madeitclearthat"thejudiciarydoesnotpass
uponquestionsofwisdom,justiceorexpediencyoflegislation."Intheexerciseofjudicialpower,we
areallowedonly"tosettleactualcontroversiesinvolvingrightswhicharelegallydemandableand
enforceable," and"maynotannulanactofthepolitical departments simplybecausewefeelitis
unwiseorimpractical.

3)No.Thereisonlyonesubjectembracedinthetitleofthelaw,thatis,thecreationoftheCity
ofSorsogon.Theabolition/cessationofthecorporateexistenceoftheMunicipalities ofBaconand
SorsogonduetotheirmergerisnotasubjectseparateanddistinctfromthecreationofSorsogonCity.
Suchabolition/cessationwasbutthelogical,naturalandinevitableconsequenceofthemerger.Therule
issufficientlycompliedwithifthetitleiscomprehensiveenoughastoincludethegeneralobjectwhich
thestatuteseekstoeffect,andwhere,ashere,thepersonsinterestedareinformedofthenature,scope
andconsequencesoftheproposedlawanditsoperation.

(4)No.Everystatutehasinitsfavorthepresumptionofconstitutionality.Thispresumptionis
rootedinthedoctrineofseparationofpowerswhichenjoinsuponthethreecoordinatedepartmentsof
theGovernmentabecomingcourtesyforeachother'sacts.Thetheoryisthateverylaw,beingthejoint
actoftheLegislatureandtheExecutive,haspassedcarefulscrutinytoensurethatitisinaccordwith
thefundamentallaw.ThisCourt,however,maydeclarealaw,orportionsthereof,unconstitutional
whereapetitionerhasshownaclearandunequivocalbreachoftheConstitution,notmerelyadoubtful
orargumentativeone.Inotherwordsthegroundsfornullitymustbebeyondreasonabledoubt,forto
doubtistosustain.Weholdthatpetitionerhasfailedtopresentclearandconvincingprooftodefeatthe
presumptionofconstitutionalityofR.A.No.8806.

League of Cities v. Comelec

24SEP
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the constitutionality
of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into
cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),
which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the
words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement
in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate
again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was
passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation
of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent
a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing
no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

Aquino III vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, January 31, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared
as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-
Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts
shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383
population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard
with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if
population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-
compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first,
error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via theRemedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void,
or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for
the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a
city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the
Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be
satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two
additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than
population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were
mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010

Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009
creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed
among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul
of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population
standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to
no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.26

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Municipality of Candijay, Bohol vs CA

G.R. No. 116702
28 December 1995

FACTS
The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial
jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia.
Lower Court: Barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality
of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory and further
permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia to respect plaintiffs control, possession
and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession
and ownership over the same barrio.
Court of Appeals: rejected the boundary line claimed by petitioner because it would place
practically all of barrio Pagahat and other barrios within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Candijay. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her
territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. After an examination of the respective survey
plans of petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits, that both plans are inadequate insofar
as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between Candijay and the Municipality of
Mabini.
After weighing and considering the import of certain official acts, including EO 265 (creating
municipality of Alicia and Mabini) dated September 16, 1949 and Act No. 968 of the Philippine
Commission dated October 31, 1903, concluded that Barrio Bulawan from where Barrio
Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of the Municipality
of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of Candijay. Therefore the CA,
applying the equiponderance rule, dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE
W/N the respondent lacked juridical personality as a result of having been created under a void
executive order? NO.

RATIO
Citing the case of Municipality of San Narciso v. Mendez:
Petitioners theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonable brought. EO
353 s validity was only contested after almost 30 years from its issuance. Granting that the EO was
a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
peculiar circumstances obtaining this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Equally significant
is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts organized
pursuant to the presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
The de jure status of the Municipality must now be conceded.
The above-cited case is strikingly similar to the present case. Respondent municipality of Alicia
should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 of the Local Government Code, and should
henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.