Sie sind auf Seite 1von 272

Sultanov Chapay Ali oglu

The last blow from the


Empire
(Baku, 20 January, 1990)

BAKU 2004
CONTENTS

Why did the USSR collapse?


The beginning of Karabakh separatism in modern history
Sumgayit provocation organized by external forces as a powerful informational blow on
Baku
Gorbachev's planned blow was inevitable and predictable
Gorbachev's bloody blow on Baku, 20 January, 1990
Gorbachev's reasons to bring troops in Baku
"Heroes" of the introduction of troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990. Who is who?
After 20 January, 1990 the process started. Everywhere!
Consequences of the Armenian aggression initiated by Gorbachev on 20 January, 1990 and
continued by Armenian aggressors with the assistance of Yeltsin and his team
Necessary afterword
List of names
Literature
Enclosure-1
Enclosure-2
Enclosure-3
Enclosure-4
Enclosure-5
Enclosure-6
Enclosure-7
Enclosure-8
Enclosure-9

2
Why did the USSR collapse?

Before we deal the main subject of the book, it is necessary to dwell on some causes of the USSR
collapse, since that predetermined the development of further events in the former Soviet Union in many
ways. Certain events of Gorbachev's perestroika, in their turn, influenced the process of the USSR
breakdown.
Most importantly, the analysis of these causes will throw light on some aspects of introduction of
troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Yazov, Primakov and other members of
Gorbachev's team claimed their actions to be aimed at the preservation of the USSR.
So, the USSR collapsed. It was gone on 25 December, 07.00 p.m., when Gorbachev in public signed
the decree (N UP-3162) on divesting himself of Supreme Commander-in-Chief authority, which was
broadcasted on TV.
"I praise the Motherland I have, and I praise thrice the one that's GONE" . Gone!
About Gorbachev. "While in March 1985, he entered top class politics as the authoritative leader of
the world's largest superpower, in August 1991, he ended up sunk in intrigues, entangled in his own
incessant lies, serving as a paid agent provocateur of the USSR-hostile western states. A phenomenal
career that seems to be unprecedented in the world history of political scoundrelism", says Valery
Legostayev, characterizing the initial and terminal points of Gorbachev's political course that ended
together with the USSR collapse. The last empire had been existing for over 70 years and seemed solid
not long before it fell like a house of cards. Why did that happen, what is the reason? There are many of
them.
As early as in the war years, the US ambassador Harriman observed that the society Russia had built
was not the one of the future, but the one that belonged to the remote past of the mankind, which made its
end inevitable. Later, in 1960, Richard Nixon, the then US vice-president, dared to assert that Khruschev's
grandchildren would live in a free society. Nearly at the same time, Nikita Sergeyevich insisted that
Communism would bury every kind of capitalism after a while once and for all.
The downfall of the CPSU, he core of the Empire, is described by A. Lukyanov in the following
way, "The fact remains that the party surrendered almost without a struggle. Was it the whole party, the
whole 19 million Communists? Certainly not. As Andropov had warned once, two wings were forming
inside the party, the petit bourgeois bureaucratized layer was getting more pronounced; the layer was
isolated from the general party mass, from the millions of honest members. Hence the outflow of a
considerable number of Communists from the Party organizations in the period of Gorbachev's
innovations. Hence the confusion in the bulk of the Party organizations during the fascist attacks (which
is surely the right term) on the party committees and the ban on the CPSU in the end of August and
beginning of September 1991."
However, such a plain explanation by no means reveals the essence of the complicated processes that
were under way in the CPSU, especially in the post-Brezhnev period.
In 1986, the CPSU had 19 million members, which makes a record in the whole history of its
existence. Yet that people mass was no longer a dynamic organization but a frozen, breathless one. There
were neither centrists nor right or left deviationists, neither Bolsheviks nor Mensheviks, the party being
run by a handful of semiliterate persons on the Marxism-Leninism basis, moreover, by means of different
resolutions that generally had no realization mechanism and could not have it.
As the stability theory has it, every stable construction has to have certain vibration amplitude,
otherwise it is doomed in extreme cases. No one in the CPSU CC wished to be "vibration amplitude" in
the broad sense of the word, which showed itself in the election of every new General Secretary.
The academician V. Chelomey was not afraid of contradicting Stalin, Beriya, Malenkov and in the
Brezhnev period D. Ustinov, who hated him. He said in 1984, "All that was built not on natural basis is to
break!"
Everything was unnatural in the CPSU of those years, from with top officials to the majority of rank-
and-file members. The thin layer of committed Communists had already no influence on the events inside
the party.
It took Gorbachev and Yeltsin (they were unanimous in this case) little effort to shatter such a
construction; party members, with few exceptions, did not complain taking the order to die on the spot.
Taking an interview from a famous dissident writer of the 1960s A. Gladilin, the correspondent
remarked that oil reserves depletion was generally mentioned among the causes of the downfall of the
Soviet system. Gladilin replied, "I have a different theory. The system crumbled because it was crashed

3
by the only person who could do it, the chief person in the Soviet Union, General Secretary of the CPSU
CC, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev."
This is possible in only one case, in case of a rigidly centred system.
In his book On the Edge of 21st Century, President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev notes that the
USSR collapse was inevitable. According to him, one of the main reasons was the lack of national
relationship theory basing on scientific concepts. He believes that the ethnic point of development of
society and individual states is of a global, not local nature. Among other causes of the USSR collapse, he
distinguishes economy inefficiency, back-breaking arms race, science stagnation, bureaucratization,
human resources management mistakes, gerontocracy, concurrency of an administrative elite crisis and a
general crisis of the socialist system. However, when Nazarbayev was ideology secretary of the Central
Committee of Kazakhstan Communist Party, he would say quite the contrary.
THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY WAS FARFETCHED AND ITS CHIEF HERALDS WERE
INSINCERE, WHICH IS ALSO CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT KRAVCHUK IN UKRAINE
AND NAZARBAYEV IN KAZAKHSTAN AND GORBUNOV IN LATVIA WERE ALL
COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THEIR
REPUBLICS COMMUNIST PARTIES AND LATER CAME TO SUPPORT THE BREAKDOWN OF
COMMUNISM.
Honest Soviet scientists also realized that the USSR, and especially its core, the Communist Russia,
was on the verge of falling apart. "No one is going to fight us," scientists of Novosibirsk wrote then to the
CPSU CC, "all the talk about Pershings and tense relationship is bluff. Why should anyone fight us if our
sovereign state will collapse by itself in 12 or 15 years? A state, more than half population of which
consists of alcoholics and drunkards, is disabled and incapable of defence in principle." V. Astafyev said
the same, "Look around you and you will see an impress of degeneration on every second child. Russian
men live 50 years on average, and even less in the North, only 30-35. What kind of nation is this?! What
can it give?! What gene pool can we talk about?! This is the problem our politicians should deal instead
of arguing which one of them is more significant in history. Russia should live, gather strength, recover,
give birth to children and not look for guilty ones!"
And that was not a fault but a disaster of Russia!
President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov says, "The Russian people is not to blame for what is going on
today. It was brought to this point by the system. I visited Russian villages when I worked in the CPSU
CC, supervising Kursk and Belgorod regions. Peasants were ruining themselves by drinking even then.
And that was in Black Earth Belt! The area has not become rich in the USSR, has not made profit at
anyone's expense. Who was there to profit from, though? Khruschev was building a 100,000 capacity
stadium in Indonesia, while we did not have even an ordinary playground for our children. Heavy dump
trucks were sent to Congo, while we were transporting oil by donkeys and camels. We have common past
and take no offence at anyone, especially at Russia."
Discussing the USSR downfall, S. Zabelin and A. Shubin observe, "The events that led to the
collapse of the USSR social political and social economic structures can be considered as a combination
of several crises of growth limit in a system, relatively isolated from the world economy, which was our
country.
First, it was a crisis of growth limit of the price a society can pay for extraction of natural resources.
Such a crisis was described as early as in 1972, in the Club of Rome Growth Limits report. The
simulation demonstrated that when deposits start to peter out "the use of ever growing capital investments
in resource branches becomes necessary, as a result of which the share of investment in other branches
decreases. In the end, investment is so small that it is incapable of covering even capital depreciation, and
industrial production base crisis occurs". The above-mentioned was characteristic of the Soviet economy
in the 1980s. Production cost rising, the means received from the resources exploitation was spent by the
government not on modernization of the economy at all. The myth of inexhaustibility of resources
stipulated the lack of demand for engineering proposals capable of increasing production efficiency. That
led to the technologic fragility of the system. As long as resources were in abundance, technology update
process was slow, with extensive development prevailing. When difficulties increased in resources
extraction there were no means left for the necessary technology update. The USSR came to perestroika
with outdated technology and exhausted basic production facilities (the degree of exhaustion made up 70-
80% in some fields)
Second, the USSR economy was ruined by the crisis of monetary growth limit, crisis of hidden
inflation rate in a closed system of finance. In 1992, when the money bubble burst the country ended up
in debt and its every citizen lost their accumulated savings. As the financial crisis of the late 1997 in

4
Pacific Region shows, financial obligations volume in the world considerably exceeds real output. So, the
world financial market can burst any moment, as well as most stable currency systems.
Third, the crisis of environment pollution growth with respect to human ability to bear it. The crisis
manifested itself in a disastrous decrease of human immunological status, increased delicacy among new-
born children, life expectancy and population size reduction, death rate growth. Despite local successes in
ecology related to removing some unhealthy and hazardous industries from developed countries, the
world industry increases its devastating effect on humans.
And finally, it was the crisis of growth limits of the controlled system with respect to the controlling
one, the crisis of bureaucratic and managerial principles of administration against self-administration and
self-organization. Socialist system was a strictly hierarchical system of public administration, in which
the final decision eventually depends on the ability of one man to choose the optimum alternative from
the available variety. When interests or administration of actions of a hundred or a thousand subjects
(facilities, battalions, organizations) are concerned, this is still possible if the decision-maker is intelligent
and experienced and his assistants at least do not seek self-profit while suggesting alternatives. When
subjects number millions and billions, no brain is capable of making an objectively weighted decision. He
can guess it, but the more complicated the situation is, the less successful guesswork gets."
A book by P. Schweizer appeared in the West, titled Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret
Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union. The book gives a thorough and well-reasoned
analysis of the victory of the West in the cold war. The author distinguishes the following factors among
basic ones.
"Fatal" defects of the Soviet system that became pronounced by the 1980s.
Reagan's strategy of aggressive tactics of crashing Soviet forces in Afghanistan, in whole Eastern
Europe and within the Soviet territory, instead of defensive doctrine of containment. The Soviet Union
was forced to spend more than half its budget to maintain the balance.
To make the USSR spend vast amounts on quelling resistance, the Reagan's administration showed
considerable financial assistance to Polish "Solidarity" and Afghani Mujahidins.
Soviet oil supplies to Western Europe were blocked.
Undercutting in the world markets."
ACCORDING TO SCHWEIZER, THE LATTER WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE, DEPRIVING
THE USSR OF VAST CURRENCY SUPPLY.
AFTER REAGAN SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING SAUDI ARABIA TO SUPPORT THE USA
IN THAT MATTER, THE USSR ECONOMY SUFFERED A POWERFUL BLOW (highlighted by the
author).
Does not the influence of a large oil-producing country on the superpower seem strange? It does not
if we remember that THE USSR UNHEALTHY ECONOMY LIVED ON A UNIQUE DRUG, THE
DIFFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS PRICES. That economic
drug, alongside with subsidies invented by the Communist regime, and low oil and oil products prices
allowed feeding the country, keeping it warm and underselling the manufactured production. When the
drug ran out, even more sophisticated measures were introduced, such as dumping oil prices in the world
market. Such a policy harmed oil producing republics in the first place.
Planned economy managed to transform such valuable product as oil, often referred to as "black
gold", into an amazing economic drug. IN MANY OIL RPODUCING REGIONS, THIS BUSINESS
YIELDED TWENTY-FIVE-FOLD BUDGET SURPLUS, THE PROFIT BEING INVESTED IN THE
SAME FIELD AGAIN, AS THE MOST EFFICIENT. As other industries could not rise from ashes like a
Phoenix (equipment exhaustion being almost extreme in most facilities), they could not enter foreign
markets and had to stew in their own juice.
Economic efficiency of oil and gas deposits exploration was considerably decreased due to the
socialist methods of management. Deposits in hard-to-reach areas (northern regions, marshland, shelf
zone) are known to be explored in two ways, in rotating scheme and by housing infrastructure
development. The rest of the civilization would choose the former, while the USSR chose mainly the
latter, which entailed sharp price rise in this field. Later, rotating scheme was used in the USSR as well
(repair crews were even sent from Baku to Siberia). However, that was at the advanced stage of
exploitation when oil in those regions reached the limit of profitability.
The USSR increased production, trying to satisfy the sharp need of currency, as a result of which oil
prices started to drop intensively. The Arabs suffered considerable losses and the USSR budget got 50
billion dollars worth "hole".

5
The USSR debts to some countries are bewildering: Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Poland. Yet these
debts are due to the oil wealth of the USSR. The scheme of incurring of debt was simple. Oil was sold
to those countries at ridiculous prices and their light and food industries products were purchased
practically at world prices. We were fraternal peoples, weren't we?! The scheme cost the USSR 50 billion
dollars annually for twenty years. "Druzhba" oil pipeline made its contribution to the USSR collapse.
PARADOXICAL AS IT IS, CHEAP OIL BANGED OTHER INDUSTRIES OF THE USSR
ECONOMY, THE PHENOMENON TO BE CALLED "DUTCH DISEASE" AFTERWARDS.
One of the most informative characteristics of economy of one or another country is gold production
and the volume of its state reserve.
According to Elmar Guseynov, the Russian Empire applied the classic form of absolute liquidity of
gold, gold standard, when the volume of gold reserve was fully correspondent to the volume of paper
currency in circulation. That ruled out the necessity of gold export and encouraged the accumulation of
precious metal in the country's gold reserve. In the period from 1918 to 1991, the Soviet Union produced
11,000 tons of gold and sold 8,191 tons. The USSR entered the world gold market in 2953, after Stalin's
death. The considerable amount of gold was spent on grain purchase.
The agriculture of the country never recovered after collectivization. In the period of collectivization,
from 1929 to 1933, 25 million head of cattle was eliminated, including 10 million cows, 17.7 million
horses, over 10 million pigs and sheep.
"Grain is the most important currency", Stalin used to say. Understanding that well, the Communist
regime still failed to solve the problem in the whole 70 years. The state reserves now increased a little,
then was eaten away slightly. The grain situation never reached the sound level fit for a great power; in
the early 1960s the USSR had to start purchasing wheat for convertible currency regularly.
N.S. Leonov, General, a historian and analyst intelligence agent, writes, "In 1965-1979, we imported
15 million tons of grain from abroad. Russia put on the needle of imported food drug for the first time in
history. The ruling lazybones considered this solution of food problem the most plain and pleasant.
Injection after injection, the habit turned into an incurable disease In 1981-1985 it made up already 170
million tons followed by ever chaotic purchases. We, the intelligence, saw clearly the USA enjoying the
open wound in the USSR body, through which living juices of the people were flowing out. Refusing to
sell us complex technologies, they easily continued supplies of grain and food stuffs in general The
USA exchanged crop excess for our exhaustible resources, such as gold, oil stolen from our grandchildren
and great-grandchildren We kept on financing abundantly the flourishing West, turning the purchased
grain into some kind of fertilizer."
Here are the lines from the book by the famous polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen, Russia and the World.
"If we take four basic cereals, wheat, rye, barley and oats, we will see that before the war, in 1903-1913,
the cultivated area in the European Russia alone was 81.7 million hectare, thus making up a little more
than one third (34%) of the world cultivated area that covered nearly 240 million hectare.
The annual production in the European Russia both in the same period and with respect to the
considered four cereals equalled to 65 million tons, that is made up more than a quarter (27%) of the grain
production in the whole world. That concerns only the European region of Russia, the entire Russia
producing 72 million tons. By comparison, the annual crop of cereals in Canada, the USA and Argentina
reaches just 67 million tons in general. The annual export of grain from Russia reached 8.7 million tons,
thus exceeding the general export of Canada, the USA and Argentina. The export of those three
countries taken together made up merely 7.7 million tons per year."
According to the estimates of independent experts, the USSR could both provide grain for itself and
export it. The whole point was in labour efficiency, in collective farms in particular. That can be
demonstrated perfectly with the example of Azerbaijan. In 1913, when there were no collective farms or
doctored records, 29.7 million pood of grain was produced. In 1953, when there were both collective
farms and doctored records, the figure was 27.7 million. In 1963, it reached 31.7 million.
Increase in grain consumption in the USSR was explained by the ideologists of that time by the fat
that considerable amounts of it were used for feeding livestock. "Our grain is known to have been the
cheapest in the world," the ex-director of the USSR KGB V. Kryuchkov writes, "About seven million
tons of ready bakery products were annually disposed not accidentally at all. 10-12 million ton of grain
was fed to livestock. At the same time, there were years when grain import made up 40-45 million tons.
What a country could allow that? Can that be tolerable?"
We should say that there is a certain element of truth in that. But this truth is secondary, which was as
usually hushed by the official propaganda. Due to the ludicrous fuel and equipment prices, grain was sold

6
considerably below its cost. The latter made it profitable to feed grain to livestock and sell meat at higher
prices, i.e. the main reason was absurd price regulation.
The USSR collapse and Mikhail Gorbachev are some kind of Siamese twins that cannot be separated
by any surgery.
THE MODEL OF THE USSR COLLAPSE IMAGINED AS GLOBAL AND LOCAL ELEMENT,
GORBACHEV'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE LOCAL ONE IS RATHER SIGNIFICANT. HE SPED UP
THE PROCESS BY MEANS OF BLOOD AND, AS HE WOULD SAY, "THE PROCESS BECAME
IRREVERSIBLE".
"Caucasus is a special region of the Russian Empire. According to a historical theory, Kievan Russia
was preceded by a state situated in Tmutarakan (the present-day Taman). This state is associated with the
fairyland of Tsar Dodon described by A. Pushkin in his Tale of the Golden Cockerel. In the 19th century,
Caucasus became the area where valour or infidelity of the Russian nobility was checked. But the
Mountains took cruel revenge upon the Empire. It was the Caucasian depths that gave birth to the one
who turned the empire into its antipode, "evil empire". Another one came to Moscow from the Northern
Caucasian outskirts at the end of the century to lay the foundation of its downfall. SUMGAYIT,
KARABAKH, TBILISI, BAKU (highlighted by the author) virtually launched the chain reaction of the
USSR breakdown," writes Anatoly Gutsal in his article Caucasian Knot.
That ANOTHER is to be the curse for ages, and not only for the Azerbaijan people!
The most dreadful thing is that the process of the collapse was going on the wave of mutual hate
among the republics, hate of autonomous republics towards republics, hate of the "free republics brought
together by the great Russia", as the Soviet hymn had it, towards the Centre, mutual hate of yesterday's
forever "brothers". That was furthered by total political uncertainty, many political faces of Gorbachev,
which irritated everyone and caused general nervousness and loathing. All speeches made by Gorbachev
reminded a well-known expression often used in Odessa, "You are right in the way you speak."
In 1986, at the rise of perestroika, A. Zinovyev supposed that the launched reforms could lead to the
collapse of the USSR. He wrote, "Gorbachev's supporters intend to realize a drastic revision of the Soviet
history. The future will show what it can look like in practice. What we have now is convincing examples
of methods of revising a farther past."
An article was published in 1987, in the 12th issue of Communist magazine, devoted to the baptism
of Russia by Prince Vladimir. It is apparent from the article that the present-day reformer of the Soviet
Russia, Gorbachev, had a predecessor as far back as in the 10th century, Kievan Prince Vladimir. The
author asserted that the baptism of Russia was merely an exterior form of the events of that time, their
essence having been reformist activity of the leadership of Kievan Russia headed by Prince Vladimir. As
it happens, "a breakthrough and mastering top achievements of progressive countries of the time were
necessary in the country's development" as far back as 1,000 years ago, just like they are today.
Mark that a breakthrough in the country's development was necessary! Accelerated development, we
could add. Not a prince, but kind of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kievan Russian. What
was the mentioned breakthrough needed for? For "mastering top achievements of progressive countries of
the time" and "reaching the international standards level", it appears. This is exactly how Gorbachev
called the Soviet people to rise up to the level of top world achievements.
The Soviet Russia was facing the task of rising to the level of the leading capitalist countries. In the
10th century, according to Communist, Kievan Russia was to be "abreast with developed feudal
monarchies". At that time, the most progressive social system was feudalism, you see. We wonder if there
was a slogan on the palace of Prince Vladimir, saying "Long live feudalism, the bright future of the
mankind!"
By the way, Gorbachev was not the first to introduce the term "perestroika" in political sense.
Ribbentrop used it in the distant 1941. "I want to restructure relations with Moscow," he wrote in a coded
telegram to Molotov. We know well from history how that "restructuring" ended.
In the process of perestroika, Gorbachev's blatant economic ignorance led to the downfall of the
entire commodity-money system of the USSR. The political analyst S. Kara-Murza is right, observing
that "the Soviet industry was an extension of farming, the political economy of which was worked out by
A.V. Chayanov. Work collectives of plants were a variant of community. Production and life of such kind
of social organism are not regulated by money, the economy being non-monetarist in principle. In the
USSR, product exchange inside the industry was regulated by means of conventional, fictitious money,
"non-cash" (there were different kinds of them). They circulated through a strictly closed system and
could not turn into real money to be used in the consumer market. That is why there was no inflation, no
"non-payment crisis". When Gorbachev's team "opened the veins" of economy and allowed turning that

7
fictitious money into real one, the consumer market and financial system were ruined. Goods were swept
away from shelves, inflation began, treasure emptied."
Gorbachev began with anti-alcohol campaign that banged the USSR finances and caused animosity in
the society.
In his memoirs The Fate of an Intelligence Officer, the ex-deputy director of the USSR KGB, Colonel
General V.F. Grushko summarized the anti-alcohol campaign in the following way. "We got a whole
bunch of problems, including an astronomical surge of shadow income and accumulation of initial private
capital, riot growth of corruption, disappearance of sugar out of sale for the purposes of homebrew
manufacture In brief, the results proved to be quite the contrary to the prospects and the treasury was
short of vast budget sums with nothing to refund them."
The law on state enterprises and cooperatives passed in 1987 opened the valve, through which non-
cash funds were turned into cash, not secured with goods in the consumer market. At the same time, the
programme of "mechanic engineering recovery" was launched, which resulted in the empty inflating of
the economy with non-cash funds.
These two steps finished the financial system of Russia and the shadow sector took hold of huge
"official" funds.
The latter resulted in the unprecedented corruption in the USSR. Everyone received bribes from
everyone. The country became a giant market, like in Odessa, where one could buy nearly anything, from
modern weapons to any high public office.
The task of taking "test samples" was given to Komsomol functionaries, who began the "construction
of capitalism" in 1987. The first type of "high-ranking business" was conversion of money into cash.
Special organizations were established for this kind of financial activity, centres of technological creative
work for youth that became the driving force of "Komsomol economy" (and inflation as well). Many of
those Komsomol functionaries became rather dubious businessmen and bankers afterwards and inflicted
enormous damage on the Russian economy.
We by no means say that the "non-cash rouble" situation was normal at the Soviet time. But
Gorbachev's "credit" was that he made the already poor economic situation even worse. First millionaires
appeared after dubious banking operations had turned billions of bubble non-cash means into cash which
had been in no time used for purchasing something. Later, those billionaires made a tangible contribution
to the cause of breaking down the USSR.
The German Die Zeit wrote, "Gorbachev finally managed to lose Stalin's inheritance, and the
majority of the Russians mock him today, like a fool from Russian fairytales, for he has got down the
world power the Russians have been building for centuries and even its safety belt"
The USSR was historically doomed, and the blame for its collapse is not to be laid on Gorbachev.
Western experts once found 79 flash points in the disputable areas of the borders between various
republics and national districts of the USSR. The question is different. Instead of attempting to find some
ways of stabilization (like Antropov did) or at least make the process of collapse more civilized,
Gorbachev cared about only one thing, wishing to look like a historic person against this background,
receive various prizes and please the West.
The Karabakh conflict acted as a catalyst in the process of the USSR collapse.
K. Myalo writes, "Whereas Azerbaijan bears the palm in using criminal terror for the purposes of
solving ethnic and territorial conflicts (Sumgayit events speak for themselves), Armenia initiated the
transformation of the acute conflict into the weapon of a direct attack on the Union itself and its
breakdown
Neither Armenia nor Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast participated in the 17 March, 1991
referendum for the preservation of the Soviet Union. On 20 September, 1990, however, Levon Ter-
Petrosyan (then the head of Armenian Armed Forces) demanded from Yeltsin that the Soviet troops
should be withdrawn from the NKAO, alleging as his reason that the Soviet Armenia was used there as a
repressive body by the Centre and by Azerbaijan. That disregard of the Soviet Union itself that was
expressed in the choice of addressee (the USSR still existed, Etlsin was the head of the RSFSR) meant
much. I heard the word "occupants" addressed to Soviet soldiers and officers from Karabakh children. It
was surely put in their mouths by the grown-ups, and the latter outstripped even the Baltic republics in
their demand to withdraw the Soviet troops."
We can add that Sumgayit events are mysterious and the answer is to be sought not in Baku. But we
will touch on the subject later.
Major General of KGB V. Shironin writes, "We cannot deny the fact that the brewing of carnage in
Armenia and Azerbaijan began in 1987, the second year of perestroika. In the beginning of 1987

8
Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article by I. Belyayev Islam, the gist of which can be reduced to the
statement that this confession is evil and dangerous for our state, Muslims being insidious and treacherous
people. Let me remind you that battles were still on in Afghanistan at that time and sons of our land were
sent back home from there in zinc coffins. The campaign on shattering the public consciousness and
disrupting public views in all directions was launched in mass media as far back as then. The campaign
pursued two basic aims, to sow doubts in everything and everyone and to make people quarrel with one
another. Belyayev's article corresponded the spirit of this campaign.
Nevertheless, I support the opinion of Y. Pompeyev who wrote in his book Bloody Whirlpool of
Karabakh that "the worst was yet to come. The worst was in the "Armenian issue" that had always been
the West's trial balloon for intervention in internal affairs not only of Transcaucasia." In other words, we
cannot totally ignore the fact that being an expert on the Middle East and a skilled journalist, I. Belyayev
was well aware of the real objective of his article that attracted public attention. Especially as it was kind
of synchronized with some other remarkable events.
Numerous political analysts appeared, including Russian State Duma member S. Baburin, who think
that the USSR collapse and all negative consequences were caused by the events in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Those events had adverse effect both on the USSR and Russia, both on partocrates and democrats.
Ceausescu said to his wife before he died, "Goddamn Karabakh, everything started there!" These words
were often repeated in the houses of those killed in the Karabakh war, regardless of nationality.
G. Shakhnazarov, the aid of Gorbachev, wrote about the latter, "Why did not he show his cards at
once?.. A system is like a solid brick house and has not to be shattered with a heavy cannon ball but
pulled down block by block, even brick by brick if necessary."
Gorbachev chose Karabakh as such a "brick".
Even the devoted supporter of the Armenians, the former chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
N. Ryzhkov had to admit, "That was a stab in the back of the state (Nagorno-Karabakh - Author) and he
(Gorbachev - Author) stabbed himself."
Anatoly Chekhoyev, Russian State Duma member, said that the Karabakh conflict was worked out
and prepared by Moscow and after the test was accepted as the universal model for other regions.
Heydar Aliyev observed that the Karabakh conflict had been organized with the purpose of
preserving the USSR but it had become the beginning of its end.
With total connivance of the USSR authorities, criminals from the entire West rushed to Karabakh.
Economically inexplicable route Beirut - Yerevan became he axis between Karabakh and soldiers of
fortune all over the world. Diena newspaper reports that "even Lebanese sentenced to death for terrorism
in thirteen countries fight in Nagorno-Karabakh."
Speaking of terrorist brigades of separatists, a defender of Karabakh separatists, Victor Sheinis admits
without realizing it that terrorism was an element of the Karabakh separatism, "bands are formed mainly
of local population, NOT OF NEWCOMER TERRORISTS (highlighted by the author), and the
Armenians see them as their only protectors" he writes in Novoe Vremya, N 33, August 1991.
Different forces were dealing different problems. Whereas Armenia had the annexation of Nagorno-
Karabakh as its single and main purpose, other, more powerful forces contemplated the breakdown of the
USSR.
Ruslan Khasbulatov believes that the Chechen events also furthered the USSR collapse, "Let me
stress it once again that these events cannot be regarded as the consequence of the USSR collapse. Quite
the contrary, they caused this collapse. Just like Karabakh, Baltic republics, Dudayev supporters dealt a
powerful blow on the Soviet Union and paved the way for Belavezha Accords using even psychological
aspects of the charismatic leader."
The political analyst S. Kurghinyan went even further, "Chechnya is the Russian Karabakh. Many
believed that the small Karabakh would not be able to blow up the superpower. But it did. Russia broke
its back not in Chechnya but through Chechnya."
In another case, S. Kurghinyan wrote meaning the possible breakdown of Russia in connection with
what he thought inadequate reaction to the Chechen events of the autumn 1991, "The start of this
breakdown was almost symbolic - a visit to Nagorno-Karabakh, the point that laid the foundation of the
USSR breakdown. Now, the leader of Russia goes there and fails, which is obvious to everyone. The
point is not why he failed to solve the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh The one who dares to undertake
this task will inevitably acquire a political "rupture"."
When asked how he could explain the fact that all security agencies and special services of the USSR
could not withstand the country's downfall, the former KGB director of the Armenian SSR Usik
Arutyunyan answered, "It is very difficult to give a brief answer to this question, since the Soviet Union

9
was broken down in a day but systematically and gradually, by means of huge efforts made by the West.
It is not secret that CIA and other intelligence agencies planned and implemented appropriate operations.
I attended High school of KGB when I got acquainted with some documents and understood that the
USSR was on the way to its imminent failure. It was the question of actual immunity of party, Soviet,
Komsomol workers even if they accidentally came in sight of the KGB. The point was when the
breakdown will begin. Now we can probably disclose that copies of the Politburo draft decisions were
brought from the CIA safes and shown to M. Gorbachev. Only members and candidate members of the
Politburo had those draft decisions, that is 14-15 persons. And some of them fed the CIA with this
information. The seeds sown in 1990 began yielding fruit.
Let us remember who headed the country in the so-called stagnation years. Take Brezhnev alone in
the last years of his rule or the aged Chernenko! What existence of the state could be in question if the
country was run by half-wits?
The state ruled by half-wits was doomed. The Soviet Empire fell as any other does in the period when
power belongs to people that do not protect state interests or even do not understand them." Such a naive
and superficial approach to such a complicated matter, blaming two half-wits for everything! However, it
is characteristic that the list of those half-wits who ruined the USSR does not include the main "hero", the
windbag Mikhail Gorbachev, and such an affection of Usik Arutyunyan towards Gorbachev is
understandable enough. NKAO events are not mentioned in these terms either.
But Arutyunyan's answer includes an interesting point of classified information leakage from the
higher echelons of authorities. Who were the people surrounding Gorbachev and possessing all the
important information concerned with various aspects of the USSR affairs? They are well-known, and
Shakhnazarov, Aganbegyan, Sitaryan, Brutents were among them. As Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote,
Aganbegyan established "KEPS" and sold important state economic information through "East-West-
Project" joint venture. As for the source of information from the higher echelons of authorities, the USSR
KGB director Kryuchkov made hints about Shakhnazarov.
When the events in Karabakh, Sumgayit, Baku, Vilnius, Osh, Ferghana, Tbilisi, Tskhinvali occurred,
Gorbachev would invariably say that he was unaware of them and was nearly the last to hear. That was
something new in history of empires. All emperors, Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Peter I, Stalin etc.,
even if they tried to pass the desirable for reality, always emphasized that they were on top of issues in the
whole empire. Certainly, Gorbachev knew about those events much more than others but denied that in
public and very cynically. Such an attitude meant nothing but "do as you wish, and I sort of will know
later, latest of all". During the February plenary session Y. Ligachev said that Gorbachev, Yakovlev and
Shevardnadze had attended the Politburo meeting on 7 April, 1989, at which the decision had been taken
on the introduction of troops in Tbilisi. According to the journalist A. Zhilin, "had General I. Rodionov
told the whole truth at the meeting and demonstrated the documents on the tragedy in the capital of
Georgia, M. Gorbachev would not probably have become the first president of the USSR."
The USSR ambassador to England L.M. Zamyatin wrote about the Vilnius events, "Clearly,
Gorbachev did not like the note on which his British companion (British Foreign Secretary D. Hurd -
Author's remark) ended the conversation. All of a sudden, he said sarcastically, "To solve such a problem
at the time of Zamyatin took only 24 hours. Fist on the table and everything is in the right order! But how
long can we live in this way? Now, we should not slam fist on the table but remain cool facing pressure
and seek political solution of the issue. If that goes wrong, we will have to send for Zamyatin for him to
set things right in a week like they do it in Ulster."
Several weeks later, he himself demonstrated the way he intended to "solve problems". On 13
January, "emergency forces" ploughed Vilnius streets with tank tracks, battles were on around the
television broadcasting centre.
Did Gorbachev know that this could happen? I assert that he did. When street fighting in Vilnius
began, Gorbachev called to the Ministry of Defence in the presence of his aids and asked, "What is going
on there in Vilnius? Where are your reports?" His interlocutor at the other end of the wire dropped his
jaw, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, but we had a detailed conversation on this matter yesterday"
Cutting himself off the bloody events, Gorbachev did not see or did not wish to see that though such
behaviour he openly admitted that THE STATE WAS LOSING CONTROL AND HE HIMSELF DID
NOT POSSESS FULL INFORMATION ON THE EVENTS IN THE COUNTRY.
Did Gorbachev realize that those processes were leading to the USSR collapse? He certainly did. But
we have an impression that Gorbachev believed the main thing was to avoid problems in Russia, Ukraine
and Byelorussia, that is Slavic countries, and the rest would be there any time!

10
It seems that considering the attitude of the West, he had doubts as to what he should do with the
Baltic countries that had never been regarded as the USSR territory by the USA?
At the same time, it would be unfair to speak of the role of Gorbachev in the global component of the
USSR collapse model, like Communists never get tired to say, for the eventual collapse was laid in the
USSR at the moment of its formation.
Let us quote Doctor of Economy, the observer of Izvestiya Otto Latsis, "In the long chain of
anniversaries and recently celebrated dates, a round date remained forgotten that would not be avoided by
any newspaper of a different time. The fifth anniversary of the 28th CPSU Congress. That was a fair
chance for the country to walk the way of changes at minimum cost. Gorbachev could have divide the
CPSU in the civilized way into the two parties that had been always hidden within it, thus leaving the
reactionary part of his administration.
Similarly forgotten was the fifth anniversary of the constitutional convention of the Russian
Communist Party at which (long before Elsin) weeping about sovereignty began not sovereignty of
Russia, the party bureaucracy was little concerned about the fate of the latter, but about their own party
sovereignty. Gorbachev did not dare to loose that knot, take the side of democrats during the 28th
Congress, split the party thereby saving it. That alone could give a chance of preserving the Soviet Union
as well. The chance was missed.
Another cause of the breakdown of the country was the failure of the national economy where
Gorbachev made more mistakes than anyone else. He did nothing to strengthen the belief that it would be
a different Union, a democratic, not a Stalinist one. Then, he did not see the danger of strengthening
national elites, moreover, he relied on many of them.
And finally, nothing was done to oppose the quite obvious plan of the Soviet special services that
organized the bloodshed in Vilnius and tried to provoke it in Riga. That correlated perfectly to the so-
called law on secession, with separate (for some reason) consideration of opinion in the regions of
national minorities communities. In practice, that would mean that Estonia, for instance, could withdraw
only without Narva, Latvia without Riga, Georgia without Abkhazia etc. It should be pointed out that
some of those plans were realized, though in somewhat different form.
However, in August 1991 there still were chances of a weak, limited "Novo-Ogaryovo"confederation.
In these terms, Gorbachev's attempts were not hopeless. But the putsch did away with them for good.
Seeing this no, not face but muzzle of Moscow, republics reacted immediately. In Belavezhskaya
Pushcha, just the act of divorce was formalized (and not in its best form but rather rudely, using the
situation against Gorbachev personally)."
The causes of the USSR collapse mentioned by the observer analyst are certainly informative but
have little weight in comparison with other factors, in our opinion. However, there is one interesting fact
in that statement. Readers can easily notice that Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh were not included in
the list of the blackmailed republics. This is not without a reason. At the dawn of the Karabakh events, in
his interview to the West German television O. Latsis characterized them as "national liberation
movement". When the west-German journalist reasonable remarked that this could be the beginning of
the USSR collapse, Latsis said, "No, these events are of local nature and can by no means influence the
USSR in general." With such an approach, Mr Latsis can enter the list of co-authors of double standard
"democracy".
Some causes of the USSR collapse are pointed out by the former CIS executive secretary B.
Berezovsky. In particular, he writes, "Alongside with working out the optimum model of interaction, the
CIS members need to answer some other questions.
1. What other reasons beside the main one, the insolubility of national issue, furthered the USSR
collapse?
2. What exactly has been done wrong in the last seven years, why did the model of united integration
fail to be determined?"
The answer to the first question is of exceptional relevancy, for many proposals on the improvement
of the CIS are subconsciously dictated by our past Soviet experience. We mechanically compare all losses
and gains since 1991. Estimating advantages of integration, we also count from the time of the USSR.
However the point is that the restoration of the USSR in its old form is impossible not only for political
reasons but also for economic ones.
In 1991, it was not just the USSR that collapsed, but also the Russian Empire another form of which
was the Soviet Union. Why did not the empire fall apart in 1917? Why did not it collapse in 1941 when
Hitler hoped it would? It was transition to a market economy that pushed the Soviet Union to the collapse.

11
In 1917, economic system was changing in the entire territory of the Russian Empire mainly in one
direction, as the war and devastation had led to the domination of the levelling ideas of military
Communism. In 1941, there was no question of changing economic system at all.
The situation was different in 1991. An intensive process of searching for a new model of economy
for the country had begun in 1985. By 1991, several of such models had appeared. Let us say two, for
convenience, the liberal model of "shock therapy" and the model of "smooth" transition.
"The CIA report on the economic and domestic political situation in the USSR. Analytical account
for President, Government and the US Congress. 1978" is very significant.
"At the present time, a clear tendency shows itself towards the split in the central body of the
CPSU and in the leadership of Communist parties of the Soviet republics. The main reason of that is the
graceful degradation of economic situation in the country. Stagnation of all industries, sustained decline
in production, catastrophic loss of labour efficiency, persistent crop failure were even aggravated with the
drop in world prices for traditional Soviet export goods, such as oil, gas and raw timber. Voluminous and
totally unbalanced military production is expanded annually, ruining all other industries and subjecting
the country to the import of wide range of essential goods, including food stuffs. Meanwhile, the aged
leadership of the USSR does not see the fatality of this course and moreover draws the country into
further global expenses that it cannot sustain either in theory or in practice. To maintain trade relations
with the West at least on some level, the USSR is forced to explore unprofitable mines, which requires
billions-worth state subsidies, produce low-quality oil in remote and hard-to-reach regions of the country
where its prime cost is very high, driving itself into some kind of economic vicious circle with no exit in
sight Brezhnev visited India and signed an agreement on issuing a loan of 820 million dollars for the
government of Gandhi. Besides, he promised to decrease oil supplies to India by 1 million tons. He also
signed a secret agreement on weapon supplies, including 25 MIG-25 aircrafts totalling 1.6 billion dollars.
The preferential credit for weapon supplies has been as usual drawn in the way that it makes one doubt if
India is going to call it in at all There is only evaluation data available how much those raw materials
and finished products supplies to the satellite countries cost the USSR annually. However, the USSR
annually spends convertible currency on the above-mentioned countries increasing its own debt to the
West that makes up 17 billion 900 million dollars at the moment. Apart from that, Kremlin undertook
obligations of Western loans guarantor for Eastern Europe countries, potentially shouldering another 60
billion dollars debt.
There is accurate data on annual dollar subsidies to the satellite countries (Table 1.27).
Table
During the last 10 years, the USSR has spent 85.8 billion dollars distributing the means in the
following way. Kuba - 15.4906 billion dollars; Vietnam - 9.1312; Syria - 7.426; Iraq - 3.7656; Ethiopia -
2.8605; North Korea - 2.2341; Mongolia - 9.5427; India - 8.9075; Poland - 4.955; Afghanistan - 3.055;
Algeria - 2.5193; Angola - 2.0289 billion dollars.
Furthermore, Kremlin makes investments in the capitals of well-known firms and companies that
not only have nothing to do with the international Communist movement but quite the contrary are
officially stigmatized by Moscow as ones constituting the military industrial complex of the West.
Paradoxically enough, Moscow invests in our defence system instead of spending those funds on its own
ailing economy. In the course of the recent contacts between the Soviet leaders and the leaders of the
USA and Western European countries (visits of Brezhnev and Gromyko) repeatedly declared the acute
need in receiving Western loans for modernization of the entire primary sector of economy as the basic
purpose of these contacts. However, the proposals of the Western countries on the appropriate equipment
supplies were rejected and a desire was expressed to receive purely money loans, since the Soviet party
had not chosen the vendors yet and intended to organize a competition for firms. The received loans
almost fully accumulated on the Western bank accounts and are actually redistributed to personal
accounts of high party officials One can have the impression that some part of the CPSU leaders has
seen the imminent disaster in the country much more clearly from inside than we have from outside and
prepared to escape to the West by building up material resources for that. The latter fact obviously defines
all the USSR home and foreign policy that has no other explanation. Such a policy led to the threefold
gold reserves reduction in the last 30 years, and the gold reserves continue to decrease rapidly. The
continually advancing industrial decline threatens to go out of control and entail a total economic chaos,
which will create a perfect opportunity to eliminate the USSR as a great world power without resorting to
military means. We regard it efficient to attempt to expand the list of the client countries of the USSR
in the nearest future thereby increasing its prohibitive expenses (a better way is its direct involvement in

12
some large regional conflict) and widening the split in the Kremlin leadership by means of the elaborate
loan policy"
To receive the Soviet aid, it was sufficient merely to declare war on "American imperialism" or
accept Marxism as good for the people. There was a time when even the
notorious cannibal emperor Bokassa received support from the USSR for
abusing American imperialism.
The incompatibility of the USSR economy and the world economy also
contributed to the collapse. According to the American scientist R. Keohane,
"once the world capitalist system is established it is subject to favouring
capitalist governments and damaging socialist ones."
We can add here the destructive power of the USSR military doctrine.
Right after the end of the Second World War, without even having its wounds healed, the USSR entered
the "cold war" against the West, the war that lasted for decades. The economic powers were unequal in
this war, for the US economy exceeded the Soviet one two or three times. In addition, if we take into
account the confrontation of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty countries on the one side, and the USA,
NATO and SEATO on the other side, the economic power of the latter will exceed that of the former four
or five times. Geopolitics of the USSR generated the corresponding geo-economy that broke down as
well. The colossus with feet of clay crumbled.
As far back as in 1968, General de Gaulle said that no country could be considered completely
independent without nuclear weapon. Picture 1 gives the available data on nuclear tests in the USSR and
the USA from 1945 to 1989. Politburo members at different times could not even suspect that every
nuclear explosion they set off produced an economic explosion as well. The picture of air and
underground nuclear tests conducted by these powers in the above-mentioned years is as follows. 512 air
explosions and 1,525 underground explosions were carried out in total. The underground (815) and air
(215) explosions leader is the USA followed by the USSR, France, Great Britain, China and India.
Picture 1 reflects the data on the number of explosions in per cents from the totality of nuclear
explosions in the world alongside with the US GDP income in percentage terms. It is obvious that the
correlation between the total number of tests in the world and GDP income of the USA is within due
limits both in the developed countries (the USA, France and Great Britain) and in the developing
countries.

The USSR is a phenomenon in this respect, as the considered correlation is different here. GDP of the
USSR amounting to 38% from that of the USA, the USSR carried out 35.1% of the totality of nuclear
explosions in the world. Such a destructive strategy can be understandable if a country prepares for a nu-
clear attack or expects it. In any other case this is economic insanity that was to and did lead to the break-
down of the USSR.
There is a model of the relation of the number of nuclear explosions to the economy of a country built
up for the world nuclear powers. Picture 1 demonstrates that two nuclear strategies existed in the world in
the period under review, one was nuclear sufficiency to repel aggression, which France, India, China,
Great Britain stood by, the other being the achievement of nuclear power balance with the USA. The
USSR stood by the latter strategy. Had the USSR chosen nuclear sufficiency strategy, it would have been
enough to carry out three times less explosions.
Henry Kissinger wrote, "The paranoid feeling of insecurity made Russia produce 20,000 nuclear
warheads." Only a country with a powerful free economy can afford such a programme, which was con-
firmed later by the historical events.
But the most dreadful thing was that the arms race could not provide the USSR full safety. The
American professor Alexander Yanov said that in the beginning of the 1980s the Americans made a con-
siderable breakthrough in the antimissile system technology. Had such systems been produced in full
measure, the number of missiles and missile-carriers possessed by one or another country would have be-
come of no significance at all. The "petrodollars - military-industrial complex" model proved to be unten-
able. By the way, according to Yanov, it was this fact that prompted Gorbachev to launch perestroika, for
(and we agree) the USSR was incapable of constructing such systems and the nuclear pistol would be put
to the country's head. Few people could be convinced then by the ardent speeches of Academician Velik-
hov on Central Television Channel, who tried to assure everyone that such antimissile systems were im-
possible to construct.

13
The Swedish economist Aslund calculated that the Soviet GDP made up only one fifth of the Ameri-
can one on average. Clearly, a nuclear competition with the entire world was to lead to the economic col-
lapse of a country with such capabilities.
The mentioned data shows that the USSR thoughtless nuclear strategy that did not provide the coun-
try security was one of the causes of the USSR economic collapse. There were favourable conditions for a
military industrial complex in the command and administration System. However, the balance between
economy of the country and nuclear safety was not and could not be found.
The state leaders disclosed the USSR military strategy quite explicitly and clearly. L.M. Zamyatin
writes in this connection, "Khruschev, who was far from diplomatic refinement, bullied the West declar-
ing in public that missiles come off the assembly line at the USSR plants "like sausages." The discreet
Brezhnev usually tried to avoid public statements but I happened to witness him expressing his "creed" to
the minister of defence, "The Americans and NATO may have a certain number missiles, we will have as
much plus 50%!"
This approach suited the US military industrial complex well, as it received huge military orders. To
maintain the USSR on the rails of the destructive arms race, the US military industrial complex, that has a
strong influence on the higher echelons of authorities of the country, kept the USSR leaders in constant
fear. This campaign was particularly successful with the coward Gorbachev. "Sometimes, we would send
our bomber aircrafts to the North Pole for the Soviet radars to locate them. Sometimes, we sent a bomber
to the airspace of the border areas in Asia and Europe," remembers General Cheney, the head of the
American strategic air forces in the 1980s, as Schweizer writes in his book Victory.
These actions recurred with frightening regularity. "Speaking at the Princeton University conference
in May 1993, the last foreign minister of the USSR Alexander Bessmertnikh admitted that. Schweizer
quotes him triumphantly, "All the information leakage and reports from our intelligence service in the
USA demonstrated that Washington seriously thought about eliminating the Soviet Union at first at-
tempt," Kalashnikov writes.
Considerable means were spent on the war against the Western anti-Soviet propaganda. For instance,
the "voice" of the West has been jammed all over the USSR since 15 April, 1949. "Jamming stations "
appeared in all the USSR cities and towns. The one in Baku, for instance, was a vast carefully guarded
area packed with the most up-to-date equipment. According to expert estimations, this large-scale cam-
paign required as much energy as the Dnieper hydroelectric power station produced.
Nonetheless, low-frequency waves were impossible to jam and the Soviet people could still listen to
Western voices by means of the then popular radio receiver "Spidola". The West was well aware of the
fact that its radio broadcasting was jammed and yet continued broadcasting understanding the volume of
funds the USSR spent on jamming.
Another important cause of the USSR collapse was the fact that there were actually two scientific and
technical and industrial bases in the USSR, civil and military ones. Best brains and most considerable
funds were used in the military sphere. No elaborate system of interaction between those two monsters
existed, each developing on its own. It was amazing that any technological innovation introduced in mili-
tary industry was immediately secured and remained in such state many years until it got out-of-date. So,
best brains and most considerable funds invested in the military industrial complex were going waste.
Their designation was to protect Motherland against enemies. Meanwhile, the "enemies" exhibited their
achievements, except the classified, strictly military ones, seizing more and more markets.
G. Tabachnik writes, the Soviet reality can be summarized in six points.
1) There is no unemployment in the Soviet Union but no one works either.
2) No one works but production grows.
3) Production grows but store shelves are empty.
4) Store shelves are empty but tables groan with food at family celebrations.
5) Tables groan but everyone is discontent.
6) Everyone is discontent but everyone votes affirmatively.
If labour efficiency does not grow but aggregate income increases (such things can be observed in
Russia as well), the reason can be only the sale of raw material resources. Clearly, such a perverse
economy was unable to exist without currency inflow, which were petrodollars gained by means of
setting speculative prices both at home and abroad.
The sociologist P.P Maslov, in his book Statistics in sociology published in the 1970s, discovered that
the population distribution according to incomes was subject to Gauss's law that differs fundamentally
from Pareto law functioning in Western capitalist countries. Let us remark without going into detail that
those laws are the eventual result of command and market economy. Whereas Gauss's distribution

14
distinctly reflects levelling (the modal value virtually reproducing cost of living), Pareto law says that
each gets income according his labour and abilities.
But the basic cause of the USSR collapse is undoubtedly planned economy. Plan is, geometrically
said, when a straight line is drawn between two points with thousands of obstacles present and no
economic lever functioning in proper way. By assigning certain values of obstacles, one can demonstrate
through simple mathematic calculations that tin such conditions plan is the beginning of chaos. Chiefs of
different ranks tried a variety of tricks to fulfil the plan, since fulfilment of the plan meant high posts,
material and moral remuneration, peace of mind etc., while non-fulfilment of the plan meant the reverse,
often redoubled with initiation of criminal case. Planned economy led to giant economic perversion and
eventually caused the downfall of the system. N. Khruschev once said, "If people could stop stealing just
for one day we would have reached Communism a long ago." However, Khruschev, who believed that he
would be able to live till Communism, did not or did not want to understand that the political and
economic mechanism of planned economy itself was thievish and had to be halted for good.
Turin University professor Roberto Ponizzi noted that "planned economy implies a great battle
between the Soviet people and the State Planning Committee and ministries. This contradiction digs into
the system sooner or later. That is why planned economy is incapable of developing and can be only
extensive, stagnating and historically doomed."
Throughout the entire period of the existence of the Soviet power, Communists have been standing by
a tragicomic model, hoping to improve the state of affairs by making some new efforts and patching up
something somewhere. Nariman Narimanov wrote to his son on 28 January, 1925 in his letter of will,
"Perhaps, you will read these lines when Bolsheviks are already gone. However, that does not mean
Bolshevism was no good but that we failed to maintain it, that we underestimated it, did not work hard.
To be quite honest about it, that power made us so arrogant that we missed the basic plunging in trifles
and squabbles. Power spoils many. And that is the case already; power eventually spoiled many quite
good, even outstanding workers who had dared to take the fate of a great state into their hands and
become dictators without control That was necessary in the beginning but to follow this course further
would mean to bring Bolsheviks close to failure." These words show the heartache of the outstanding
Azerbaijan Bolshevik who was unable to rise above the system and thought of improving it from within.
At the well-known State Emergency Committee conference, Yanayev said that the first thing they
wanted to do was to revise material and technical and other resources available in the USSR and
redistribute them fairly. With the nineties coming, Communist methods still remained the same, to take
away and redistribute.
The perversity of planned economy is demonstrated by means of the following example. In the
stagnation period, an economic experiment was conducted under the guidance of Melnikov, the deputy
head of the CPSU CC construction department. The experiment was widely covered on Central
Television Channel. The point of that "Rzhev" experiment was that equipment, workers, engineers etc.
were drawn up from the entire USSR to speed up the construction of new objects. As a result, objects
were delivered turnkey before the scheduled date. Optimality of the process was of no importance, the
necessary amount of equipment was not defined, no one estimated what happened to the object, where the
machinery was taken from etc. The amount of equipment available for the experiment exceeded the
necessary amount several times. This example is characteristic of the command-and-control method.
We live, as the economist N. Shmelev fairly noted, in a false mirrors kingdom, where everyone says
one thing but does another. This is the lot of all rigidly determined models imposed on the probabilistic
diverse world, in which everyone has his own peculiarities. Hoare's law of big problem says, "Inside any
big problem there is a smaller one trying to break through." In the case of free liberal entrepreneurship
and market economy this law gets full scale. In the case of command and administration system not a
single smaller problem can break through if it contradicts the main line drawn by the party.
We cannot say that the leaders of the country did not take some measures from time to time in
attempts to change the situation drastically. There were periods, especially in the beginning, when
Bolsheviks realized that administrative planned system was gradually ruining the country's economy.
That is why Lenin launched New Economic Policy and his loyal supporter F. Dzerzhinsky noted the
weakness of the situation when "foreign trade monopoly belonged to only one organization incredible
abuse and stagnation occurred owing to that fact."
Another attempt was planned after Stalin's death. S. Beria writes in his book that his father, L. Beria,
prepared new economic strategy. To be impartial, we should point out that the recently declassified
documents confirm that. Isaac Deitscher wrote in 1953 in Reporter magazine that Beria was killed right at

15
the moment when drastic reforms were being carried out, the ultimate purpose of the latter being
decentralization of management of the country and establishment of autonomous formations.
A third attempt was made by N. Khruschev who set up two party bureaus managing agriculture and
industry, introduced councils of national economy that functioned alongside with the Council of
Ministers, etc.
A fourth attempt was made by A. Kosyghin in the late 1960s who declared self-support the basic
factor of economy.
The next was Y. Andropov who believed that the situation could be profoundly improved by
corruption control and establishment of order all over the country.
And the final attempt was made by M. Gorbachev.
Even one of the most active members of State Emergency Committee V. Kryuchkov understood that
a powerful destruction process was on the run in the country, "Policy fully built on ideology and devoid
of sound pragmatism was not optimal and had to be changed sooner or later," he observes. What
hampered those changes? "Those changes were hampered by our closed-minded world outlook that
immediately rejected any ideas going beyond the rigid frames of the extremely ideologized official
doctrine."
It is obvious that al those attempts were doomed to fail, since "socialism with human face" remained
the foundation of the society. A number of the suggested measures were naive. How could self-support be
in question in the case of rigid price regulation? Or what could Khruschev's management system yield in
the administrative command system? And surely, M. Gorbachev miscalculated his undertakings. "We did
not expect such a collapse," he confessed to his associates.
But Bolsheviks could not give up administrative command system and monopoly, as those were the
core of their existence in power.
The total price regulation, which was the basis of planned economy, hit currency-consuming products
worst (oil, cotton etc.). It follows from Le Chatelier-Samuelson principle that change in price of a certain
product accepted as money measure of another product is the maximal in case if all prices can change
freely.
As a system, the USSR could not exist for the reason that it could not exist as a system!
The second law of thermodynamics formulated by Carnot says that every self-contained system, i.e.
fully isolated and connected with others in no way, approaches its most probable state, which is total
chaos. In accordance with this principle, all self-contained systems disintegrate eventually, become
disorganized and die. This process is called amortization in engineering, ageing in biology, destruction in
chemistry and breakdown in history. The degree of uncertainty is measured by entropy. Applying the
notion of entropy, we can express the second law of thermodynamics in the following way. Entropy of a
self-contained system does not decrease. In other words, a self-contained system cannot be regulated by
itself.
Living behind the iron curtain and then building the image of enemy in the face of the entire
civilization, the USSR actually existed in closed space, the end of which is historical collapse, according
to S. Carnot. The second law of thermodynamics does not rule out the possibility of local entropy
decrease even in closed systems, that is it allows local organization but at the expense of more intensive
destruction of the rest. Local adjustment of a certain part of a self-contained system is only possible if the
remaining part will be more disorganized. The summary order will not increase.
POURING CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF ENTROPY INTO MILITARY INDUSTRY
(ACTUALLY BUILDING A STATE IN THE STATE), KGB, GLOBAL WORLD STRATEGY, THE
USSR ESTABLISHED A POWERFUL MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX ON ACCOUNT OF
OTHER EXPENSE ITMES. THAT LED TO THE ACCELERATION OF ECONOMIC COLLAPSE
AND CONSEQUENLY TO THE USSR COLLAPSE.
Ashby says, "When a system grows big and the difference in size between a part and the whole
becomes considerable, it often happens that properties of the whole differ a lot from properties of parts."
Such a process generates emergent properties that seem to contradict properties of elementary phenomena
constituting a complex one. For instance, all stones fall down but it is not improbable that a group of
stones can be found in an avalanche that lift up exactly due to the complex system of collisions in the
process of falling down.
WITH ECONOMY DYING, DISCOVERY AND BARBAROUS EXPLORATION OF LARGE OIL
DEPOSITS AND CURRENCY RECEIVED FROM THE SALE OF THIS OIL BY NO MEANS
RESULTED IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC SITUATION IN GENERAL.

16
The USSR collapse can also be explained in terms of physics. As we know, the transition from
laminar (organized) flow to turbulent (disorderly) one is expressed through Reynolds number that has the
following form.
Vdb
Re = -----------------------
m

where: V - is the fluid velocity,


d - is the diameter of the pipe
b - is t he density of the fluid,
m - is the fluid viscosity.
Overwhelmingly, planned economy is similar to this model, i.e. the planned work turns into chaos at
a certain stage. If we take that transition to chaos is expressed through Reynolds number, then fluid veloc-
ity and the diameter of the pipe is the plan execution time and its absolute value, viscosity is the team play
of all units of facilities, density is equipment, machinery, material etc. SINCE ALL CONTROL PA-
RAMETERS ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN ON ONE CERTAIN LEVEL, THE TRANSITION
TO CHAOS IS INEVITABLE.
Cyberneticists mention inefficient management system and considerable "background noises" in the
course of information transmission bottom-upwards among main causes of the downfall of the Roman
Empire. The most important thing in control systems is the closure of control process proceeding from the
feedback principle.
Control exists only where connection exists that begins at the control object and ends at it as well.
The function of this connection, according to Norbert Wiener, "is to control the mechanical tendency for
disorganization, in other words, to cause a change of the usual direction of entropy in time and space."
There is always a closed relation loop. If it cannot be observed directly, there is delay, probably a very
long-term one. But it is to continue, to close, otherwise control loses its meaning, otherwise there is no
control.
The above-mentioned is illustrated by the following data demonstrating a sheer incomprehension of
the root of the Communist regime control in the last years of the USSR. "48 Politburo meetings and 42
meetings of the CC Secretariat were held in 1984, with 3,760 Politburo resolutions passed, 529 of them at
the meetings and 3,231 by absent voting. The CC Secretariat passed 5,452 resolutions, including 980 at
the meetings, and 4,471 by absent voting. Committee worked on the Party Programme, fuel and energy
complex, Food Programme, secondary schools reform, on Poland, China, Afghanistan, foreign policy
propaganda, consumer goods etc.
During the year 225,000 copies of various office mail were received by the CC. The number of
letters reached more than 600,000."
Here are extracts from Politburo resolutions passed in 1985.
"On the celebration march, 1 May, 1985 (4 April, 1985 ).
On preparation and progress of spring sowing (11 April, 1985).
On technical upgrading of Gorky motor works (6 May, 1985).
On increasing demand in grain use (6 May, 1985).
On uniform, food and weapon supplies for the Sandinista army (6 May, 1985).
On the results of the meeting of the CC secretaries of fraternal countries - Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance members (23 May, 1985).
On retail prices of fruit juices and bakery yeast (1 August, 1985).
On the plan of economic and social development of the USSR for 1986 and 12th five-year-plan (29
August, 1985)
in 1985, Politburo passed 4,112 resolutions, 241 joint resolutions of the CPSU Central Commit-
tee and the USSR Council of Ministers. In addition, 5,512 resolutions were passed by the CPSU CC
Secretariat."
We can easily see that both the content and unsystematic character of those resolutions were to lead
the country to a dead-end. NOT A SINGLE CIVILIZED COUNTRY DOES NOT AND CANNOT
HAVE SUCH A BUNCH OF GOOD-FOR-NOTHING CONTROL ACTIONS ON THE HIGHEST
LEVEL OF HIERARCHY SYSTEM, FOR IT CONTRADICTS COMMON SENSE. Gazing at these
crazy figures, one involuntarily remembers the words of N. Khruschev, "We built a system allowing any
fool rule the country." However, he meant quite the contrary by saying so.

17
Despite the rigidity and centrality of the USSR management system, in the last decades, it has been
inadequate to the numerous large - and small-scale processes in the country. One of the basic cybernetic
laws formulated by Ashby was broken, "The variety of control actions corresponds to the diversity of the
controlled object."
THE RESOLUTIONS OF VARIOUS LEVELS LIVED A LIFE OF THEIR OWN, DIFFERENT
FROM THAT OF THE COUNTRY. A number of reputable scientists assert that the main source of the
situation was the absence of a mechanism of realization of different resolutions. IN OUR OPINION,
THIS IS A DELUSION, AS THERE COULD BE NO SUCH MECHANISM, GIVEN THAT
SITUATION WITH CONTROL OBJECT AND CONTROL ACTIONS. The determined control system
come into obvious conflict with the practically probabilistic control object, which entailed a deep system
conflict (remember a traditional cybernetic example, Grey's "turtle" or Calbratson's "car").
Active interference of the party in the scientific sphere led to the regress in the big science. Large
scientific institutions with centuries-old traditions were headed not by the leading scientists but by
functionaries loyal to Lenin's cause. Party bodies interfered actively in the election in the academies of
sciences of the USSR and republics. All this led to the gradual but inevitable decline in the prestige of
science.
The USSR "big brother" model began to fail. Whereas there were 83% of Russians in the state, they
made up merely 52% by 1985, which resulted in more and more frequent grudges against the "big
brother".
Intellectuals of science and technology and art also made their contribution to the process of the
USSR collapse. The famous playwright V. Rozov remarked that "intellectuals play a suspicious part
sometimes." Here is the viewpoint of the editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta V. Tretyakov, 1999.
"First. In 1991, the Russian intellectuals betrayed their country that was called the Soviet Union then,
as well as all its peoples, by not qualifying the December overthrow of the rightful president of the USSR
as an overthrow and the USSR liquidation as a coup d'etat.
Second. In 1993, the Russian intellectuals betrayed the idea of democracy by not qualifying the
illegal disbanding and shooting of the duly elected parliament of the country as a coup d'etat.
Third. In 1996, the Russian intellectuals again betrayed the idea of democracy as self-determination
of the people and the idea of liberalism as availability of alternatives, by marching under the banner of the
absence of alternatives to the candidate that clearly embodied economic and political dead end.
Fourth. Every day, in the period from the beginning of cooperative movement and to 17 August, 1998
the Russian intellectuals betrayed themselves, intellectually serving the authorities in all its bends
including the most lascivious ones for a recompense that was small by the measures of the authorities but
enormous compared to the living standard of the people. That way the way the Russian intellectuals sold
freedom of thought for a piece of bread and involvement in the power.
Fifth. The Russian intellectuals betrayed the great Russian idea, the idea of social justice (its
utopianism is obvious, its idealism is quintessence of mentality of noble, common and Soviet
intellectuals), the left idea. Roughly speaking, the Russian intellectuals betrayed their people by
separating their own satiety from that of the people, moreover turning a blind eye to the people's poverty.
The sixth betrayal also took place, though "inside the circle", when the intellectuals of the highest
ranks betrayed many millions of intellectuals, such as teachers, librarians, college professors and
scientists, by separating themselves as "the cultural elite" from their fellows through property."
The author deems it his duty to add to the words of Tretyakov the attitude of the intellectuals in
question towards the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict. In a few words, it was unrestrained and unreserved
support they showed to Armenian separatists against the insults directed at the Azerbaijan people! They
thirsted after blood, moreover, Azerbaijan blood. Sometimes we felt dread for Russia that had such
intellectuals and remembered the well-known Stalin's intellectuals that had been, according to Khruschev,
"bribed by Stalin".
The trifle the Armenians gave them could not even be called a bribe, as the Armenians believed they
did not deserve more!
A quite amazing and original interpretation of the USSR collapse was suggested by Regis Debray,
one of the most outstanding representatives of the world culture phenomenon called "Paris intellectuals".
Here is his interview.
"'In your book Empires Against Europe, the downfall of the Soviet Union.'
'Yes, because it seems to me that the USSR lost its competitiveness in the sphere of production of
symbols. The point is that the USSR stopped producing a sufficient amount of songs, films, music, film
and fashion stars thereby losing the opportunity to form symbolic imagination of the people.'

18
'What is the exact reverse of the first years of the Bolshevist revolution?'
'Nearly the entire world imagination in the 1920s depended on revolution. The whole Bolshevist
agitation and propaganda was uncommonly dynamic. Just remember Eisenstein, Mayakovsky.'
'Even political practice of the Bolsheviks was extremely symbolic.'
'I think that exactly was the reason why America won the competition with the USSR without
increasing either missile production or number of divisions. The Soviet leaders failed to understand that
the nature of relations between strength and power itself had changed. Roughly speaking, a tank division
cannot rival rock-n-roll. The latter is stronger. The USSR politicians did not see that because Marx had
not either. Marx believed that ideology is the reflection of basis, which is quite wrong. Ideology is a
creative and dynamic force. People in dreams and so they need films, songs, music and so one, in short,
they need elements of culture which the USSR produced no longer. I wrote in 1984 that Communism was
gone and the USSR would fall apart. I saw that the material forces of the USSR are those of the 19th
century.'
'The period of industrial revolution?'
'Exactly. Of the first one, not third, computer revolution. Therefore, it was clear that the USSR would
be over and done soon.'"
And here, Debray is undoubtedly right.
Art, especially motion pictures, used to inspire the Soviet people in the thirties. Such films as Jolly
Fellows, Volga-Volga, Tractor Drivers, A Rich Bride, Hearts of Four, Musical Story and many others
were truly phenomenal. People would go to watch them as if to a feast. Those films were like drugs.
People thought of the future happiness and on the whole took little interest in camps. Meetings with
famous actors were remarkable events to be remembered till the end of one's life. Such film actors as M.
Zharov, I. Ilyinsky, L. Orlova, M. Ladynina, L. Tselikovskaya, L. Smirnova, P. Aleynikov, I. Pereverzev,
Y. Samoylov and others, were idols of the public. Charming songs of love and friendship were spreading
all over the country, hummed by millions of Soviet people. We thought we were flying towards the bright
future but ended up nowhere. However, it became evident much later!
Angelina Stepanova, the People's Artist of the USSR, wrote, "I had two beloveds killed by the Soviet
power, Fadeyev for loving it too much, and Erdman for hating it."
"It was not in 1991 that the USSR broke down. Not even in 1985. The collapse of the Empire began
when we forgot our heroes and turned them into nothing. Those supermen that did prodigies of valour in
the hottest furnace for human persons, in the war.
Let us ask the first young passer-by we meet in the street, like ten or fifteen years ago, "What do you
know about those who fought in Formosa in 1951? About those who sank Japanese ships in the Yangtze
mouth in 1938? Or those who set American Supersabres on fire in the sky over North Korea? Or those
who knocked down Israeli Skyhawks and Phantoms in the haze heat of Sinai in 1973?" If you are
fortunate, silent amazement will be an answer.
By 1985, thousands of unknown heroes lived in the Soviet Union, and each example could become a
torch firing millions of hearts with pride for the Empire. Could become a light, an example for youth. A
source of indomitable martial spirit. Those were the heroes we lost so foolishly and uselessly,"
Kalashnikov writes. Kalashnokov's style provokes objections, being too defiant, but shows the eye of the
problem quite right. The USSR lost its inspiring heroes it had had in the thirties, like Papanin, Chkalov,
Serov, Stakhanov, Schmidt etc. Several generations of the Soviet people heartily tried to be like them.
Those lights went out in the time of Gorbachev! Furthermore, files were opened on each of them, funny
stories were told about them! A spiritual vacuum formed that began filling with some surrogate, in
accordance with the "nature abhors a vacuum" principle.
Alexander Goryanin is quite convincing in his interpretation of the USSR collapse without going
deep into underground processes (that rather concern ideology). The unshakeable USSR was gone all of a
sudden. We did not draw a lesson from the rapid downfall of the Soviet system. This downfall had neither
economic nor foreign policy foundation, as many may assert. The reason was that the system had
suddenly become boring for the majority of the USSR active population and lost its supporters at the
crucial moment. The system had overlooked the latent processes of separation of the society from the
power. Being dull-witted, it could not take into account that fact that the share of brainworkers (together
with their families) reached one third of the USSR population. That the eroding skepticism tends to
penetrate rapidly into all social and educational groups. That nationalism had not disappear, moreover, the
closed lid of ideology does not let it escape in the natural way. And so on. It had become a sign of
dullness by the mid-eighties in any social layer without exception not to express contempt for everything
Soviet, even the positive that undoubtedly existed in the USSR in the sphere of science, industry, social

19
sphere, education, the positive being too closely intertwined with Soviet oddities and falsehood. The
people had never been too trustful towards officials and this distrust had become total by the 1980s. Quite
veracious statements of the Soviet propaganda were interpreted as common lies. Even the CPSU members
were telling anti-Soviet anecdotes, listening to foreign radio channels and believing them whole-
heartedly. Such attitude came into fashion, and fashion is an almost irresistible power. Those sentiments
rarely broke to the surface, being still controlled by inertial fear. In the conditions of remaining strict
censorship, passive oppositionists did not suspect that they had actually turned into majority. Intoxicated
by their rare far-sightedness, they were certain that the society would remain stagnant and Communist
and therefore it was pointless to stock their necks out, you can't break down walls by beating your head
against them. The abolition of censorship by Gorbachev equaled to the elimination of the fear factor.
Gaining their liberty, the mass media hurried to help the society realize the degree of it unanimity and
desire of getting rid of everything Soviet. The rest is well-known. The Communist power had nothing to
oppose many millions of democratic marchers in Moscow and many thousands of them in provinces. The
rest was finished during the first free election against the background of emptying shop counters. The
USSR lost its legitimacy in the eyes of its own population and as a consequence crumbled with almost
total public indifference.
An indirectly, but rather effective way of destruction of Russia and therefore the USSR as well was
alcohol.
According to G. Tabachnik, in 1986, a group of members of Novosibirsk department of the USSR
Academy of Sciences sent the following letter to the West, "A public opinion poll was conducted in 1913
in the provinces of Central Russia, which showed that 43% of men in those provinces were total
abstainers. The poll was re-conducted in the same regions in 1979 and showed 0.9% of total abstainers.
99.4% of our men drink. 90% of women were total abstainers in 1943, in 1979 there were 2.4% of them.
97.6% of our women drink. Female alcoholism is the shortest way to our end.
In 1913, the number of total abstainers among underage young men and women made up 95%. In
1979, they made up already less than 5%."
Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf concerning the policy in the territories of East Slavs, "No hygiene, no
vaccination for them (Slavs), just vodka and tobacco." It appears that the USSR carried out this
recommendation of Hitler; it was difficult to deal serious problems the system created for them and they
did for the system in their turn. A VICIOUS CIRCLE APPEARED.
The actions Yeltsin and his both public and shadow team took also furthered the USSR collapse. By
eliminating Gorbachev as a politician, Yeltsin eliminated everything that concerned him, including the
USSR, which could not but affect the general process of the destruction of the USSR.
A. Agafyan writes in his article Cutthroats with Epaulets published in Duel newspaper, "In the period
of Gorbachev, Barannikov, the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs GUBKhSS where Yerin
had come as well, was appointed the first deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan, and Yerin
became his counterpart in Armenia. Earthquakes and ruins in Transcaucasia, corpses in Spitak and
Leninakan. Then Karabakh - Baku, the escape of Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Armenians from
Azerbaijan. A BUREAUCRATIC TANDEM OF BARANNIKOV AND YERIN WAS FORMED
(highlighted by the author)
Barannikov was sick on 19 August, 1991. His first deputy Yerin reigned in the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. He was called by B. Pugo, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs and asked if he knew about
State Emergency Committee and how the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs intended to carry out its
decisions. Yerin answered that the Ministry was subordinate to the Russian government and would follow
its line. Pugo softly hinted on the liability for disobedience to a Soviet ministry and when Yerin asked for
permission to leave, said after him thoughtfully, "Maybe you are right" (instead of arresting him on
spot!). AS WE CAN SEE THEY DID NOT TALK ABOUT THEIR OATHS AND MOTHERLAND,
JUST THE LEADERSHIP (highlighted by the author). It is no surprise that in a phone conversation with
the first deputy of B. Pugo, V. Trushin, "Yerin was rude, though he had always expressed pointed
outward regard and servility. THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF RUSSIA HAD
ACTUALLY GONE OUT OF CONTROL OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
OBEYED THE ORDERS OF THE FIRST LEADERS OF RUSSIA (highlighted by the author). "The
army had long come over to Yeltsin, and after losing the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Gorbachev
remained alone. All that accumulated and led to the Belavezha Accords," Trushin declines the
responsibility. Ex-minister Kulikov explains that by the example of 1993 events as "a very complex
psychological factor due to which even the best trained general cannot withstand the situation. Dozens of

20
general and officers were at a loss and hesitated as to whether to execute (illegitimate) commands or not."
What a turn-up!
Yerin managed to pay off his debt to Pugo. Ivanchenko, Yerin and Yavlinsky went to arrest him.
(Anyone including Yerin could not answer what Yavlinsky needed that for). Being an operative agent,
Yerin suggested that he go to the negotiations on his own, since Pugo would not resist, taking into
consideration their normal relations. And then he could say to him calmly, in a matter-of-fact way, "I am
sorry, Boris Karlovich, but it is time for you to go (to prison)." Here are an extract concerning Yerin from
B. Yeltsin's President's Notes. "Victor Yerin. I believed him like myself. Later I happened to get to know
him better and I found a serious, clever and contrite man. I do not even mention his respect in militia, his
professional skills. He is a remarkable man" Yerin himself thinks so. "I chanced to work under the
guidance of Y.M. Primakov. We had had good relationship before, both having worked in the Security
Council of Russia, and everything remained the same after my transfer to that service. We had a
conversation once with the new head of foreign intelligence service V.I. Turbnikov, as to whether I was
appropriate there. He replied, "Do not worry and work, you are our man now".
A curious company, isn't it? Let us observe that all of them were "Caucasian"! And something more.
Fatekh Vergasov writes, "In the summer of 1991, Arkady Volsky together with Vadim Bakatin, Gavriil
Popov, Anatoly Sobchak, Nikolay Travkin, Eduard Shevardnadze, Alexander and Yegor Yakovlev were
establishing the organizing committee of the United Democratic Party. The conspirators, most of which
were still the CPSU members, prepared the documents secretly suggesting that those curious should
inquire of Kryuchkov." Volsky dealt the Karabakh issue in a similar or slightly different company, in the
same secret way, the author has no doubts in that.

After the USSR collapse the "Caucasians" "castled" in the following way.
Before the USSR collapse After the USSR collapse
Yerin Minister of Internal Affairs of Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia
the Armenian SSR
Lobov second secretary of the Secretary of Security Council of Russia
Armenian CPSU CC
Primakov head of the Council of Head of Russian intelligence service,
Nationalities of the USSR, the main South Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Prime
Caucasus ideologist of Gorbachev Minister of Russia etc.
Mikhaylov deputy head of the CPSU Minister of Nationalities of Russia
CC Department, Gorbachevs
representative in Baku in January 1990
Kulikov commander of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia
Ministry of Internal Affairs Armed Forces
in Transcaucasia and Northern Caucasia
Barannikov - deputy Minister of Head of the Federal Security Service of
Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan Russia
Polyanichko second secretary of the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia
Azerbaijan CPSU CC, head of the
republican organizing committee on
NKAO of Azerbaijan
Volsky head of the Committee of Head of Industrialists Council of Russia
Special Administration of Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast

As we can see, all the "Caucasians" took high official posts after the collapse of the USSR. A
question suggests itself, why? Had they put out the flame of separatism with their activity in hot points or
made a considerable contribution to the preservation of the USSR? As a matter of fact, everything was
quite the reverse; they all can be ranged on the principle of Mendeleyev's table, according to their
"specific contribution" to the destabilization of the situation in the region and the breakdown of the

21
USSR. So why did those former comrades, then gentlemen, receive so much attention? Because they
appeased Yeltsin in every possible way, explicitly or implicitly, to the detriment of the USSR!
Certainly, the West contributed to the USSR collapse as well. Nuclear explosions in Japan, military
preparations and the notorious speech of Churchill in Fulton on 11 March, 1946 with the appeal for a
crusade against the Soviet Union were the beginning of the cold war.
American Congress passed Public Law 86-90 as early as in 1959, according to which the USA were
to split the "Soviet monster" into 22 states.
One thing is interesting. The USSR did collapse, yet Public Law 89-90 was not abolished, which,
according to Alexander Drozdov, allows to draw the only possible conclusion that Washington plots
further disintegration of Russia.
In June 1982, the US President R. Reagan said to his colleagues at an unofficial meeting in Versailles
that "the main enemy we are combating is Kremlin" In 1995, B. Clinton declared at the meeting of
Joint Chiefs of Staff, "there will be only one empire, the USA"
E.A. Tarasov, Ph. D, a people's deputy of the RSFSR, convocation of1990-1995, suggests his view of
true causes and consequences of the USSR collapse in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 March, 1999
"The loss of old ideological and geopolitical guidelines and the gradual transformation of the party,
state and intellectual elite into a conglomerate of greedy consumers wishing to turn power into the source
of their enrichment on account of redistribution of people's property in their own favour;
the emergence of dozens of thousands of new-born businessmen due to the "restructuring reforms"
carried out from above, who were offensively dubbed as "new Russians" and formed a special clan of so-
called oligarchs. The activity of those "mutants", in whose hands huge sums of money concentrated,
presents entails the destruction of production and control of the country, placing it into total dependence
on Western transnational companies and financial structures;
antinational propaganda in mass media, especially on TV, financed by the new class of proprietors
and Western organizations;
integration of largest countries led by the USA in a single block of "seven" in the beginning of the
1970s, this block concentrating basic financial power of the world and aimed against the USSR as the
main obstacle on the way to the unrestricted world control in the form of "new world order"; mass
recruiting of pro-Western "influence agents" inside the country and understatement of the imminent threat
of unleashing a new kind of war against our Motherland, financial, psychotropic, or demographic one."
Here is an extract from Postwar Military Doctrine of America by head of the CIA Allen Dulles.
The former head of the CIA Allen Dulles wrote in 1945, "The war will be over and everything will
settle, come right somehow. And we will give everything we have, all gold, all material power to make
fools of people! Human brain, human conscience are changeable and by planting chaos there, we will
imperceptibly substitute their values for false ones and make them believe in those false values. How? We
will find supporters and allies in Russia itself. Episode by episode, the large-scale tragedy of the most
unruly people on earth will unfold, the final irreversible extinction of its self-consciousness. In literature
and art, for instance, we will erase their social essence, discourage artists from creating images from
studying the processes going deep in people masses. Literature, theaters, cinema, all this will depict and
praise the meanest human feelings. We will support and raise the so-called "artists" that will inculcate and
ram into human conscience the cult of sex, violence, sadism, treachery, in a word, every kind of
immorality. We will create chaos and disorder in state control. We will imperceptibly but actively and
continuously favour petty tyranny of officials, bribery and unscrupulousness. Bureaucracy and red-tape
will be made virtues. Honesty and decency will be mocked and become an unwanted survival of times
past. Rudeness and impudence, lies and deceit, inebriety and drug addiction, animal fear of one another
and shamelessness, betrayal, nationalism and enmity between peoples, first of all enmity and hatred
towards the Russian people, all this will be skillfully and imperceptibly cultivated to flourish like double.
And few, very few will guess or realize the situation. But we will make such people helpless and object of
mockery, we will find a way to smear them and mark them as scum of society. We will take spiritual
roots out, debase and destroy the basis of national morality. We will undermine generation after
generation. We will start working at people from childhood, from youth, biggest stakes will always be
placed on the youth; we will demoralize, corrupt, deprave them. We will make them cynic, vulgar and
cosmopolitan."
It is amazing how this plan was one-for-one put into practice! It is hard to find such an incident in the
history of the mankind, when one side confronting the other managed to realize its destructive plan so
seamlessly, without a single shot! The CIA chief Allen Dulles was undoubtedly talented.

22
In the beginning of the 1990s, the cold war, the last great confrontation of the century ended, the
Soviet Union collapsed. What was the part of the USA, the main rival of the USSR in the cold war, in
those events? This matter is concerned in the memoirs of President George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, his
national security adviser modestly titled A World Transformed. Having devoted their whole conscious
life to the struggle against the USSR, they mastered to the full extent the strategy and tactics of
"Communism containment". The entire US policy has been built around this objective for many decades.
The authors sincerely admit that coming to rule the administration in 1989, they did not even dream of the
total and final victory in the cold war. And there it was, that victory. The memoirs are quite frank about
how amazed and stunned Washington was, watching the self-destruction of the USSR after the August
1991 events.
Surely, the US leader were not mere spectators of a historical drama. Skilled professionals rigorously
and confidently used every small chance to gain points in the global competition. The USSR perestroika,
according to the authors, offered a possibility of step-by-step weakening of the enemy of America. Bush
speaks quite warmly about Gorbachev, however the policy of the US president was guided not by his
emotions but by good judgement. Every initiative of Gorbachev was interpreted by Washington as merely
another pretext for pressure increase and demand of new concessions from his part. The administration of
Bush and Scowcroft did not hurry to make response concessions, trying to impose American rules of the
game on the USSR. That was the reason they denied Gorbachev large-scale economic assistance that
(who knows?) could help stop the wave of disintegration in the spring and summer of 1991. Such a
strictly pragmatic approach of the West played a significant part in the failure of Gorbachev's attempt of
reforming the USSR by evolution. Officially, the US administration supported Gorbachev but at was
playing a double game. Bush and Scowcroft make no secret that they did not mind Yeltsin, who was
propelled by the urge to get rid rather of Gorbachev than of the USSR, dismantling the Soviet Union
"brick by brick". Anything different was unlikely to be expected from the politicians whose entire career
was associated with American-Soviet confrontation.
Was that outcome inevitable? Washington had undoubtedly done its best to weaken and exhaust
Moscow but, as the memoirs demonstrate, it was not Americans but we ourselves that broke the USSR
down. We think that Bush rather sincerely defined his role as follows, "I was extremely lucky to be given
the honour of being President at that time."
So, the end of August 1991, Gorbachev has just returned from Foros. Scowcroft described the whole
situation in his peculiar laconic, almost epigrammatic manner as follows.
"The unsuccessful coup d'etat sped up the process of disintegration of the Soviet power in the centre,
particularly the power of the CPSU that had been discredited even more, end eventually the power of
Gorbachev himself. It also became a sign for the growth of influence of the Soviet republics and for
Yeltsin's rise to the political Olympus. How much the unsuccessful coup had affected the relationship of
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, became clear after Yeltsin banned Gorbachev from the meeting of the Russian
Federation Supreme Council on 23 August. Yeltsin used every opportunity to humiliate Gorbachev and
made it clear who was at the helm then. The meaning was obvious. The era of Gorbachev was over."
Bush writes about it in a different way, he is anxious and distressed, "Although Yeltsin called to
return Gorbachev to power, as he was required to do, he was acting too tough after the attempted coup, in
my opinion. I know that they were not particularly warm to each other, however sometimes Yeltsin was
downright scornful to Gorbachev who was weaker politically. He could be a bit milder and kinder, since
Gorbachev was receding to the background."
The events started that led to the total collapse of the USSR, as we know. There were moments when
the US president had to literally clutch at the arms of his chair, as the process was too rapid. The Baltic
republics were the first to split off. Bush says, "Gorbachev kept on refusing to recognize the Baltic
countries, insisting that it was the mission of the People's Deputies Congress, but the situation was
already disadvantageous. Russia had recognized them, and Yeltsin made a request for us to do the same.
For the sake of saving Gorbachev as politician and developing Soviet-American relations, I hoped
that he would grant independence to the Baltic republics before the West did it. The more he waited, the
stronger the impression grew that new tension would emerge. I wanted to avoid both international and
domestic political pressure on Gorbachev, which was bound to follow the recognition of independence of
the Baltic countries by the US. Nor did I want to make the impression that he and his supporters had been
influenced by any one. I believed that it had to be said (and understood) in the Soviet Union and,
whatever happened, we would give them enough time for them to free the Baltic countries. I intended to
use our backstage influence in order to work easily at the procedure of reforms that we and the whole
world wanted to see there."

23
Further, Bush writes, "In the following months, the main subject of discussion inside the
administration remained the question about what we wanted to see in Russia and in the former USSR
republics and the best way to use the considerably increased influence of the reformers there, while we
could do that. What is better, a number of independent republics or economically weak centre with some
kind of federation? Personally, I believed the perfect alternative would be division of the USSR into
different states, none of them possessing the dreadful power of the USSR."
Brent Scowcroft writes, "Though I did not touch on that question directly at the meeting of the
National Security Council, I reckoned that it would be better for us if the USSR collapsed. That was not
the perfect decision economically, however the collapse would be beneficial to us in the settlement of our
high-priority security issues, since the military threat we are facing now would be divided. At the same
time, I do not think that this should be the official policy of America. Such a position would almost
guarantee a long-time hostile attitude of majority of Russians citizens that constitute the majority
population in the Soviet Union."
The problem of the USA was to maintain the independence of Ukraine and at the same time not to
spoil relations with Gorbachev thus making themselves additional troubles. Here is an incident described
by the US president.
"Mikhail was obviously anything but pleased with the reports on our tendency to recognize Ukraine,
which had unfortunately leaked to the press already after my meeting with some Ukraine-born
Americans. He complained that "The USA seem not just to be trying to influence the course of events but
also to interfere in it." He pointed out that even if most republics declared their independence that would
not stop them from participating in the formation of the Union.
He pointed out that if Ukraine withdrew from the Union, then Russians living there and other non-
Ukrainians would be made citizens of the foreign country. Besides, the Crimea (that had been a part of
Russia until Brezhnev returned it to Ukraine) threatened to "revise its status" as a part of Ukraine if the
republic gained independence. Yeltsin supported the return of all territories to Russia, including those in
Kazakhstan, Ukraine and other republics. "If the process is launched," he warned, "it will be catastrophic
for Russia, Ukraine and the rest of the world." I assured Mikhail that we intended to cooperate but
welcomed independence as a shield against radicalism in Russia and Ukraine. I never tried to puzzle him
or Yeltsin or interfered in their internal affairs."
Brent Scowcroft specifies, "After the CIS formation agreement reached on 8 December, Yeltsin
zealously worked at the completion of the USSR disintegration. He actually started that process when he
appeared together with Gorbachev at the meeting of the USSR Supreme Council after the unsuccessful
coup. The aim of his attacks was rather Gorbachev than the USSR. Was it a long-standing challenge of
Yeltsin, as many consider, or was he just using the unexpected opportunity due to the weakened positions
of Gorbachev and the attempted coup?
It was hard to watch Yeltsin taking the Soviet Union away from Gorbachev stone by stone and giving
most of them to Russia. Finally, Gorbachev controlled merely a bit more than General Shaposhnikov, the
commander of the Soviet Army, whose forces were rapidly distributed among the former republics. The
time of Gorbachev was over; however he did not deserve such a shameful end."
Here is the end. On 21 December, Bush remembers, "in Alma Ata, all republics except the Baltic
ones and Georgia signed the declaration on participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States.
There was nothing left of the Soviet Union."
It seems that what the US president remembered best was Gorbachev's phone call to Camp David on
Christmas to congratulate George and Barbara, Gorbachev told that the USSR president had his own
resignation lying on the table in front of him, that there must not be any cataclysms in the former USSR,
that Gorbachev was passing power and the "nuclear case" with dignity and that Bush (and America) can
celebrate Christmas without worry.
"You are going to have a very quiet Christmas night. As for Russia again Let me tell you that we
are to do our best to support it. I will try my best to support it. But our partners should do the same and
make their contribution to supporting and assisting it."
Those were the final words of Gorbachev in that conversation. Bush comments, "That was the voice
of a good friend, the voice of a man that will be rewarded by history in full measure.
There was something very important in that call. That was the voice of history. During the
conversation, I actually felt as a part of historical process. It was a significant event, a kind of
fundamental turning point. Lord, we are so lucky in our country, we have been blessed to have Your
grace."

24
And here is Brent Scowcroft's view of the events. "So, everything was over. Actually, I could never
guess that something like that would happen in my life. It petrifies me, it is so hard to believe. Not that I
did not see what was going on. I had already got used and kind of stopped noticing Gorbachev constantly
defending himself but the signs of a rapid breakdown after the unsuccessful coup were obvious/ The
events themselves defined a clear trend; the point is rather impossibility for one to realize immediately
that such a epoch-making can really happen.
My first reaction to the final descent of the flag over Kremlin was sense of pride for the part we had
played to achieve this. We had been working hard to move the USSR in this direction, moreover so that it
would not cause an explosion in Moscow all the more a global disaster, which is not very unexpected in
history at the time of agony of great empires. We contributed to the search of the most favourable way out
of this great drama, but the key figure of final scenes was rather Gorbachev himself."
Mr. Bush should not have to distinguish himself in the work at Gorbachev, since it made no
difference to Gorbachev which US president to lie under. He had had eleven meetings with US
presidents, five with Reagan and six with G. Bush.
During the division of the postwar Europe, Stalin met the US presidents, Roosevelt and Truman,
twice.
We know today that at one time CIA intentionally caused vacuum situation in certain developing
countries, where KGB agents were sent and afterwards, considerable gratuitous financial aid was
rendered to those countries for their "loyalty to socialism", which adversely affected the USSR economy.
A dispute began once at the debate in the US Congress concerning new grain supplies to the USSR.
Where is logic? Why should we feed the USSR if it spends all its money on tanks against America? The
then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger answered sagely, "They better sit in their tanks satiated. That
would be safer. Otherwise shooting can hamper the dollar attack."
The influential newspaper Christian Science Monitor wrote in August 1989, "The great dollar attack
on the USSR is developing successfully. 30,000 nuclear warheads and the biggest army of the world
equipped with up-to-date weapon proved incapable to shield the territory of the country against the
pervasive dollar that had already eliminated half the Russian industry, finished off the Communist
ideology and corrupted the Soviet society. The USSR is incapable of resisting any longer, and experts
predict its downfall in the nearest two or three years We should do justice to the great plan worked out
in a draft form by President Taft, polished by President Roosevelt and consistently carried out by all
American president in merely 50 years instead of the scheduled 100 years."
We can say today that the forecast made by Christian Science Monitor in August 1989 was brilliant;
at the present time, Russia is so stuck in dollar that it is afraid of its downing, as it immediately affects its
economy.
And of course, the CIA was watchful.
The memoirs of the ex-head of the CIA Robert Gates From the Shadows were published in the West.
Gates worked in Langley as five presidents replaced one another, from Nixon to Bush. Gates makes it no
secret that the CIA furthered the USSR collapse directly and indirectly. At the same time, Gates is self-
critical to admit that the CIA "overlooked the signs of the near breakdown of Communism in the early
eighties and turned out to be unprepared for the problems that followed, such as separatism, nationalism
and terrorism in the republics, ethnic conflicts and lack of control over the nuclear potential of the former
Communists."
According to the journalist D. Radyshevsky, "many political analysts and researchers of the cold war
argue that in the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s, the CIA continued intentionally (or
unintentionally, as Gates says) to exaggerate the potential of the Soviet Army in its reports to the White
House (that reminds us of the CIA report made thirty years later on the presence of mass destruction
weapon in Iraq that actually was not there). It was the exaggerated idea of the Soviet military threat that
made the Americans to boost the arms race and work out the programme of "star wars", which resulted in
the economic crash of the USSR that had overstrained itself in the attempt to keep up with the USA."
Sometimes it was awkward actions of the Soviet leaders that provoked new rounds of arms race. The
journalist I. Martynov writes, "In 1955 an infinite number of long-range bombers flew over the American
military advisers at the aviation parade in Tushino. In reality, those were the same few bombers that just
turned around over Moscow and returned to Tushino several times. As a result, the US Congress urgently
allocated huge funds to "fill the deficiency in heavy bombers". Similarly, the elite intelligence officers
swallowed the "satellite" bait. After launching the first satellite, Khruschev convinced the Americans that
the USSR was able to easily produce intercontinental missiles in any amount."

25
The author has certain doubts concerning American intelligence officers swallowing the bait. It is
well-known that both the CIA and the military industrial complex of the USA have always tried to
exaggerate the military power of the USSR to get as many military orders as possible. So, that is a big
question as to who it was that swallowed the bait!
According to the recent discoveries, Pope John Paul II contributed to the USSR collapse in his own
way. Pope John Paul II and the US president Reagan concluded a secret agreement aimed at the
overthrow of Communism. Besides, a regular exchange of exclusive information was arranged between
Vatican and the CIA. This sensation can be found in the book by Bernstein and Politi His Holiness: John
Paul II & the History of Our Time published by the American "Doubleday" publishing company.
It was not accidental that in the spring of 1981 American secret services succeeded, as the authors
of the book believe, in establishing the fixed connection between Pope and White House. In the following
six years, Pope personally met the then head of the CIA Casey and his deputy Vernon Walters. Pope John
Paul II regularly received classified data of the American intelligence and materials prepared by the
analysts of that department. The Americans, in their turn, received valuable information from Pope
concerning the processes in the socialist countries.
Major General of KGB V. Shironin writes, "In the beginning of the eighties, Z. Brzezinski submitted
to the Department of State "The plan of the game. Geostrategic structure of warfare between the USA and
the USSR". Brzezinski wrote, "to decentralize the Soviet empire is to cause its collapse Any
considerable decentralization, even just in the sphere of economy, will strengthen potential separatist
sentiments among the USSR citizens of non-Russian nationality. Economic decentralization will
inevitable entail political one."
What were the foundation of Brzezinski's conclusions? First of all, demographic trends demonstrating
weakening of the commanding situation of the Russians. In the seventies statistics showed that the
Russians no longer made up the majority of the Soviet people. The further decrease of the share of the
Russians was inevitable, according to Brzezinski. By 1980, the Russians numbered 48% among eighteen-
year-olds, other Slavs making up 19%, Muslims 13% and other 20%. According to his forecast for 1990,
the number of the Russians would drop to 43%.
"Where is the actual dividing line between the Russians and other nations, given the intensive
merging of nations of the recent decades?" Brzezinski asked the US Department of State Policy Planning
Council. And he answered it himself, directly indicating the USSR regions to become the field of the
future ethnic conflicts, "Real conflicts can first of all break out in the Baltic republics densely populated
by the unwelcome Russians, in Byelorussia and Ukraine culturally kindred to Russia, and especially in
the Caucasus and Central Asia."
The famous "Heritage Foundation" research centre (established in 1973 on the initiative of large-scale
business representatives) worked out the so-called "liberation doctrine" specially for Reagan. It
considered the USSR as an empire formed by "four concentric circles spreading from the centre to
periphery". It was suggested that the US president should formulate the strategic aim of the doctrine as
the final disintegration of the Soviet empire."
There are other documents confirming the strategy of the White House that aimed at removing the
main geopolitical rival of the USA from the globe. They demonstrate the secret aggression against the
USSR, the direct intervention in the domestic affairs of our country. In particular, it became known that in
the beginning of 1982 President Reagan together with the group of closest advisers started developing the
offensive strategy on the disintegration of the "Soviet empire". The aims and means of that global
offensive were determined in the series of classified National Security Decision Directives (NSDD)
signed by the president. What did those directives say? Here is the main point of some of them.
- in March 1982 NSDD-32 demanded "neutralization" of the Soviet influence in the Eastern Europe
and taking secret measures and other methods of supporting anti-Soviet organizations in that region;
- in May 1982 Reagan signed he directive in eight pages that defined the US economic strategy
towards the USSR. It contained guidelines for certain departments of the president administration and the
emphasis was laid on "using" weak sides of the Soviet economy. The aim was to undermine it by means
of the forced involvement of Moscow in technology race;
- in November 1982 NSDD-66 declared that the aim of the US policy was to undermine the Soviet
economy by attacking its "strategic triad", i.e. basic industries that form the foundation of the Soviet
economy;
- finally, in January 1983 Reagan signed NSDD-75 setting the aim of "fundamental changes in the
Soviet system."

26
The new NSDD-75 prepared for the US president Reagan by the Harvard historian Richard Pipes
suggested escalation of hostile actions against Russia. "The directive made it clear", the American
political analyst Peter Schweizer writes, "that our new goal was no longer coexistence with the USSR but
changing the Soviet system. The directive was based on the conviction that we have enough power to
change the Soviet system by means of external pressure."
The former US president Reagan admitted once that only after Pope had approved the new "crusade
against the USSR" in the beginning of the eighties, the grand global campaign had become possible
which ended with the defeat of Moscow. Further revelations of Reagan show that the most important
landmark of that crusade was October 1986 when his meeting with Gorbachev was held in Reykjavik.
Reagan had not revealed details of those conversations but later, French journalists managed to find out
something. This is how it happened.
In May 1993, Gorbachev was on a private visit in France and answered questions on the possible
"foreign assistance" in the liquidation of the USSR. At first, he said that foreign influence had had its
place but as an objective factor, domestic trends prevailing. However finally he let something out, which
caused a rather curious headline in Figaro newspaper, "We should do justice to Ronald Reagan."
According to Figaro, in the interview, Gorbachev acknowledges for the first time that at the meeting
with Reagan in Reykjavik he had actually thrown the USSR on the mercy of the USA. Here are his
words, "Reykjavik was really a tragedy, a great one. You will soon learn why. I think that the process
would not have started but for such a strong personality as Ronald Reagan At that summit meeting, you
know, we went so far that there was no turning back already"
It should be noted that French journalists, while highly estimating the role of Reagan who acted as a
mediator in the meetings of Gorbachev and John Paul II, clearly underestimated the role of Pope who had
been leading the so-called "eastern policy" in those years.
And moreover, the most ardent opponent of the USSR Brzezinski headed the activity of Columbia
University Russian Institute up to 1976. It was the Soviet studies centre A.N. Yakovlev attended, as well
as some of the activists that were to become main participants of the events of perestroika.
The Chinese researcher Fan Isin in his article Gorbachev and the USSR Collapse writes that the first
and last president of the USSR, complaining of the humiliation he had suffered from Yeltsin, conceals his
major humiliation. The US Secretary of State Baker arrived in Moscow immediately after the Belavezha
Accords and talked to Yeltsin for four hours, after which deigned to meet the USSR president. Well, the
Moor has done his duty, let him go.
In January 1990, Baker said openly, "The circumstances are such that Gorbachev will not survive
The danger facing him is not to be overthrown by means of a palace revolution but the cause of it will be
the streets."
According to Richard Ovchinnikov, Bush said to his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft in
private, "I can hardly keep myself from declaring, 'Wouldn't it be great if the Soviet empire broke down?'
But it is not very pragmatic or smart, isn't it?"
Alexander Drozdov, Foreign Intelligence Service Colonel in retirement and the head of "Namakon"
research centre, explains the logic of the US actions in his own way. "I will answer the question with a
question in detail. Do you know what the Soviet Union that fell apart in 1991 not because of atmospheric
precipitation at all was? I can explain. It was not so much "smithy and recreation" as in our favourite film
A Prisoner Girl in the Caucasus, as 22 trillion dollars of mineral reserves explored by the Ministry of
Geology of the USSR by 19090. Are you impressed by the price of the issue? And what is the USA? Just
6% of the planet population spending, however, about one third of natural resources. The stable trend of
the direct dependence of America on minerals import is evident. Note that those minerals unfortunately
lie in other countries, which defined the logic of the American policy towards the rest of the world."
This is surely a simplified approach to the US international policy; however the utmost importance of
the above-mentioned factor is beyond any doubts. The US policy towards Baku is another confirmation of
the fact. "Friendship is friendship, business is business," Putin said concerning Byelorussia, implying the
separation of friendship and economy. "Oil is oil, Karabakh is Karabakh," say the US diplomats in Baku.
Even the above-mentioned information makes it evident that the US contribution to the disintegration
of the USSR was considerable. But the most dreadful thing for the USSR was that it could not resist that
powerful destructive force; Communist and patriotic slogans were not taken in by the hungry and
deceived people, and the economy that had been based on the export of natural resources was crumbling
slow but steady.
The US allies also undoubtedly did their best to contribute to the collapse of the USSR. In February
1990 the English Independent reported, "Foreign Ministry of Great Britain decided to deny public access

27
to the fifty-year-old document that contained the plans of the English intelligence service on organizing
destabilization in the southern Soviet republics." The secrecy of the document (unlike others that were
declassified in accordance with the rules of time limitation) was extended to 2015 by an appropriate
resolution. The matter concerned a document of 1940. According to the same newspaper, this document
suggested using hostile sentiments among Muslims and other non-Russian nations towards the Russians
with the assistance of the English intelligence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan," A. Drozdov writes.
The head of the KGB V. Kryuchkov testifies that the competent authorities of the USSR knew about
the US plans. "We were flooded with the information on profoundly alerting plans of some countries,
especially the USA, concerning our state. For instance, some of them alleged that the population of the
Soviet Union was too large and should be reduced in different ways. Even appropriate calculations were
given, according to which it was efficient to reduce the Soviet population to 150-160 million people. The
period of 25-30 years was set. The territory of our country, its bowels and other wealth were to become
the common property of certain world countries as "universal values", that is we were sort of share these
"universal values."
Even opponents of Putin admit the fact that he managed to "assemble" the country after Yeltsin's
lawlessness when, following Yeltsin's suggestion, the regions of Russia "had been swallowing as much
sovereignty each as they could" and close friends of the Family could steal as much as they could. Today,
the regions of Russia can "swallow as much sovereignty" as Constitution allows, and oligarchs are asked
to "share". However, this undoubtedly health-improving activity does not mean at all that the question on
the disintegration of Russia has been closed for all times. Oil prices can change a lot and the powers that
be (and that do not sit in Russia) are always eager to divide someone or to unite someone, otherwise they
get bored!
B. Clinton said in his annual presidential report in 1994, "After Second World War we learned the
lessons of the past. Facing the new threat of totalitarianism, our great nation has taken the challenge of
time. We chose the way of development of international relations, reconstruction of security and
leadership structures. The determination of the previous generations to defeat Communism by means of
forming new international structures allowed to create a more transparent, secure and free world. THIS
SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE INSPIRES US FOR A NEW STAGE OF THE LONG-STANDING
DIFFICULT STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE WON IN THE COLD WAR
(highlighted by the author)."
Other outstanding political figures of the US express themselves more clearly. Brzezinski said
toughly during one of his lectures, "Russia will be split and warded" and in October 1997 suggested
dividing Russia into three parts, European Russia, Siberian Russia and Far East Republic. "Decentralized
Russia is a real and desired possibility," said Brzezinski.
Another famous politician H. Kissinger says. "I would prefer chaos and civil war in Russia to the
trend of its reunion in a single centralized and powerful state."
Western mass media regularly publish articles concerning claims; claims of Germany on Kaliningrad
region, claims of Finland on a part of Leningrad region and Karelia, claims of Estonia on a part of Pskov
region, claims of the US on the greater part of Siberia. Such voices can sometimes be heard even from
China! So Russia should not relax in connection with this problem!
During the trial of State Emergency Committee, Shenin said, "Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich in
the Belavezha Pushcha did what Hitler had failed to do in 1941-1945."
The naive reasoning that Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevich destroyed the USSR with their
Belavezha Accords is the last and probably the most naive myth of Soviet ideologists. Those three
furthered the downfall of the USSR but were not by any means the chief culprits but rather the finale of
the process. If the heads of the "seven" gather together with all their ministers and officials they would
not be able to change political systems in their countries no matter how much they may wish, for their
countries have stable statehood based on law standards and strong economy.
State Duma of Russia took the decision on the denunciation of the Belavezha Accords. Only naive
politicians may believe that they can easily destroy or build again a great state by signing an agreement or
voting. Historically, the USSR has been doomed since the day of its formation.
Well, paraphrasing the great Englishman, Churchill, we can possibly say that "those who do not
regret the collapse of the USSR are heartless; those who dream to restore it are brainless."
There are many questions concerning both variants, though.
The things socialism gave to the peoples of the USSR is discussed now and will be discussed for a
long time. But let us cite some facts that are not disputed but accepted as reality. A century of socialist

28
policy transformed the Russian giant into an economic dwarf. These are the words of the head of
Economic Analysis Institute A. Illarionov. Speaking about a century, he means the post-Soviet period as
well and calls it socialist with a criminal shade. He writes, being launched by the tsarist governments in
the First World War in 1914-1917, continued by Provisional government in 1917 and then by Soviet
governments from 1917 to 1990 and by the governments of the independent Russia in 1991-1999, the
socialist economic policy has led to an unprecedented catastrophe. The economic giant that was Russia in
the beginning of the century has turned into a dwarf barely distinguishable in the world map. The 20th
century appears to be lost for Russia in many ways.
Several years ago it was hard to imagine that economically, our country would yield not only to the
USA, China, Japan, Germany, India, France, Great Britain, Italy but also Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia,
Canada, Spain and South Korea."
For some reason that they know alone, Communist ideologists always compare the development of
peoples before and after the 1917 coup, ascribing the natural development to Communism. The global
element of this comparison is the economy the Communists left after 70 years of their rule. Oil producing
and oil processing industries, the basic source of currency supply, are in a grave condition. So are mining,
metal and other industries. 53% of the territory of Russia are assessed as ecologically unfavourable.
According to the estimates of Western experts, dozens of trillions dollars are required for the
rehabilitation of industry of the former Soviet republics. The only sphere the Soviet power succeeded in is
creating opportunity to eliminate the earth ten times with its nuclear-missile potential. As M. Thatcher
observed, "The USSR is Upper Volta with missiles."
And the last thing; what global sacrifice was the USSR and Communist ideology in general worth?
The list of the USSR "feats" is given by Yuri Afanasyev, a member of the Russian Academy of
Natural Sciences, rector of the Russian State Humanitarian University, "At the same time, we are quite
right to consider those events (the question is not the invitation of Russia to the celebration of the 50th
anniversary of the allies landing in Normandy - Author's remark ) as the direct participation of the USSR
in the Second World War (and not only in the Great Patriotic one) and for this purpose, for instance, to
arrange the following fact in the order: the Soviet-German "parade of the winners" in Brest in autumn
1939, the war of aggression in Finland, then occupation of the Baltic countries, West Ukraine, West
Byelorussia, Bessarabia and North Bukovina in 1940, Stalin congratulating Hitler on each of the
"victories" the latter gained in Europe until June 1941; toasts to Fuehrer's health in Kremlin, and more
generally, the actual participation of the USSR in the war on the side of Germany against the Western
allies till the mid-1941. That prewar row could be continued with the postwar one: the annexation of half
Europe by the Soviet Union, capture of several bridgeheads on other continents; such landmarks of the
process as Berlin (1950), Budapest (1962), Prague (1968), Afghanistan (1969), later Tbilisi, Vilnius,
Baku, Moldova (under Gorbachev), and then Tajikistan, Abkhazia and in a new but similar fashion:
Azerbaijan, Georgia (under Yeltsin) and quite recently, Chechnya."
Y. Felshtinsky writes that "Comrade Molotov and Comrade Ribbentrop had a nice conversation on
13 November, 1940 in Berlin. The place was bomb shelter in the building of the Imperial Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Why did the two ministers talk in a bomb shelter? Because the British aviation was
ruthlessly bombing Berlin that night. The night before, Comrade Molotov had a meeting with Hitler.
They did not go down into a bomb shelter but "due to the possible air raid alarm, the talks were stopped
and rescheduled."
At peacetime in the 20th century, 170 million people were annihilated in different states of the world.
110 million of them or about two thirds account for the Communism-oriented countries.
So, "Communist regimes killed 110 million people." This phrase appeared in "Izvestiya" on the eve
of the anniversary of the 1917 events that had shaken the world indeed and that had been referred to as
nothing but the Great October for a long time in our history. Far from prejudice and bias of powerful
mortals, time impartially and cruelly assesses the events the country has endured in this century that is
close to its end. It puts everything in their right place, drastically changing characteristics of persons and
phenomena we have been trained to by the monopolist ruling party for seven decades.
Referring the October revolution or, as they call it now, October coup, to the most significant events
of our century, of very complicated and contradictory events, we would like to remind what and how was
happening then in reality and what consequences it had.
This scary information is given in the book Open Wound by Per Almark, a famous Swedish politician
who once headed People's Party and was a member of the Swedish government as deputy prime minister.
Per Almark is the first of European authors to apply demographic data of Rudolf Rummel from the

29
Hawaiian University who has devoted his entire life to the collection of information on mass murders on
earth.
Genocide caused almost four times more human victims in the past century than the rest of the wars
in the 20th century. The Communist leader of Cambodian regime Pol Pot is the "absolute leader" in mass
murder in the relation to the population size and the time of his rule. Annually, he killed 8.16% of
Cambodians. 0.42% of the population was exterminated in the USSR but the nightmare lasted for many
decades.
Per Almark makes a special emphasis on the actions of the Soviet
Union, calling it the "state of GULAG". "Many citizens," he writes, "were
killed just for belonging to the wrong social class. Those were (had to be)
bourgeoisie, aristocrats, wealthy peasants. Others suffered for belonging to
the wrong nation or race, such as Ukrainians, Black Sea Greeks, Volga
Germans; others for bad political "fractions" (Picture 2).
At the same time, we should not forget, as the West tries to do, that it
was THE USSR THAT DEFEATED FASCISM. As D. Granin says, yes,
Soviet commanders fought dreadfully, generals did not spare soldiers, military strategists did not spare
Soviet towns and civilian population, and 26 million people were killed, according to the official
information, but at the cost of incredible efforts, THE SOVIET PEOPLE SURVIVED AND WON.
No matter how much blockbusters about the Second World War Hollywood may shoot praising the
allies, it cannot erase the truth about the war!
Returning to the main issue of the chapter, the causes of the USSR collapse, let us point out that the
above-mentioned causes alone (and the list is far from being complete) demonstrate that the USSR was
doomed and Gorbachev's perestroika financed the process in the worst possible way. Not any Chinese or
other way would not have helped the USSR for many reasons, at least because the multinational USSR
was not like China, and a Russian is not like a Chinese in many ways, but the most important point is that
Chinese socialism, as Dan Chiao Ping said, is "Socialism with Chinese peculiarity, where peculiarity pre-
vails"
The Soviet socialism also had much peculiarity and it differed sharply from the Chinese one, and not
in a better way.
The process also started so rapidly because politicians that were very far from the systematic analy-
sis of politics had been ruling in Kremlin. THE AUTHOR IS NOT SURE WHETHER AFTER READ-
ING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ON THE CAUSES OF THE USSR COLLAPSE, THEY WILL
FULLY UNDERSTAND THE ESSENCE! Gorbachev chose his staff very "carefully". When he
appointed the alcoholic Yanayev with his trembling hands the USSR vice president, one of the deputies
asked him, "We are all in God's hands, Mikhail Sergeyevich. If anything happens do you see Yanayev as
President of the country?" Yanayev answered himself without ceremony, instead of Gorbachev, "My wife
is pleased with my health!" "It would be more interesting to know the opinion of Gorbachev's wife of her
husband," the deputy continued.
And all this was happening before the eyes of millions of Soviet people!
It is dreadful to think what kind of people were ruling the superpower in the last years of its exis-
tence!
AND NOW, AFTER COMPREHENDING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED, THE MAIN QUESTION
ARISES. COULD THE BLOODY BLOW ON BAKU ON 20 JANUARY, 1990, AS THE POLITICAL
AND MILITARY LEADERS OF THE USSR SAID LOUDLY, PREVENT OR AT LEAST SLOW
DOWN THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR, AND IF IT COULD, THEN FOR HOW LONG?
WHICH OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF
THE USSR WAS SOLVED BY INTRODUCING TROOPS IN BAKU ON 20 JANUARY, 1990?
THE ANSWER IS DEFINITE AND DOUBTLESS. NONE OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
FACTORS THAT FURTHERED THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH
THE INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS IN BAKU ON 20 JANUARY, 1990, FOR BAKU HAD INSUF-
FICIENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEIGHT TO INFLUENCE THE LARGE-SCALE EVENTS
IN THE USSR.
WE SHOULD EXTEND THE QUESTION. EVEN HAD GORBACHEV BROUGHT TROOPS IN
ALL LARGE CITIES OF THE USSR AND DECLARED EMERGENCY SITUATION IN THE
WHOLE COUNTRY, THAT WOULD HAVE MERELY SPED UP THE BREAKDOWN; ECONOMIC
COLLAPSE WOULD HAVE OCCURRED IN SEVERAL MONTHS AND FAMINE WOULD HAVE
BEGUN - THE USSR HAD ALREADY BEEN DOOMED!

30
THE INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS IN BAKU ON 20 JANUARY, 1990 HAD DIFFERENT
AIMS.
BUT WE WILL CONSIDER THEM LATER!

The beginning of Karabakh separatism in modern history

The narration on the last blow from the Empire, the events of 20 January, 1990, will be incomplete
unless we dwell at least briefly on the events that preceded the introduction of troops in Baku, since they
were used by Gorbachev to explain the very introduction of troops.
A new period came in the long-suffering history of the USSR, Gorbachev came to power and the
doomed USSR began taking great strides towards its collapse.
In this situation, Azerbaijan was to face new tragic events in the "family" of peoples headed by "big
brother". Bloody separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh began.
Few people remember the systematic and crafty initiation of the Karabakh problem in Armenia.
In accordance with the USSR government resolution, a high-capacity chemistry complex was to have
been built in Kazan by 1992. Armenian officials in the CPSU CC and the USSR State Planning
Committee managed to get the authority to move the construction to Abovyan.
In the end of the eighties, a non-governmental ecology committee was established all of a sudden,
which organized protest marches against the construction of that complex under the following slogans.
"Crystal air is the wealth of Armenia", "The air of Armenia is the future of Armenia" etc. And suddenly
(or as if suddenly), these slogans disappear, replaced by those supporting separatism in NKAO,
"Karabakh is a test of perestroika!", "Moscow, redress the injustice!" etc., and the ecology committee is
transformed into the Karabakh committee.
Separatism in NKAO began under social slogans.
One of the chief arguments of Karabakh separatists was that the number of Armenians in NKAO was
decreasing in terms of percentage points.
That main PR-argument of the Armenian side was a big lie, though it is still unfortunately used by
them to deceive the international public opinion. The percent was falling indeed; however the reasons
were quite different from those given by Armenian ideologists.
So what is the true point of the problem?
Let us review the official statistic data for 1959-1970.
The Armenian population increase in the Azerbaijan SSR made up 9.38% in 1959-1970 and 1.66% in
1970-1979.
In absolute figures, the number of Armenians rose from 442,000 to 475,000 in 1959-1970, i.e. by
7.47%. The Armenian population increase in the Georgian SSR made up 2.12% in 1959-1970 and 0.05%
in 1970-1979.
Thus, the Armenian population increase in the Muslim Azerbaijan in terms in the period from 1959 to
1970 of percentage points exceeded that in the Christian Georgia 6.6 times!
Any literate reader familiar with the basics of arithmetic can clearly see that the ethnic factor of the
Armenian argument is ruled out.
THEY ALSO HUSHED UP ANOTHER FACT. BIRTH RATE IN NKAO WAS HIGHER THAN IN
ARMENIA AND DEATH RATE WAS LOWER.
Such are the facts, which are known to be hard to get away from unless you stick to "If the facts are
true, the worse for the facts!" principle.
Note that the information was taken from Moscow and Armenian sources.
To be impartial, we should add that against the background of different demographic situation with
the number of Armenians in Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Armenian population rate was falling in both
republics.
And there is a clear reason for that, not ethnic at all. It is well-known that there was latent
unemployment in the Soviet time, especially in mountainous regions. Many teachers, doctors and other
specialists from those regions could not find them job in their home places. That was also the case in
NKAO. After graduating from colleges in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, they would move to Russia
and settle there, finding job and, what is more important, prospects. Note that they went not to Armenia
but Russia! They appeared in Armenia much later when seized power there by terror.
It should be remarked that in the Soviet period, the Armenians were the second most socially mobile
nations after the Russians, changing their place of living. But whereas the Russians did that mainly by the
call of the party and government, the migration of the Armenians was of social nature. They were well

31
aware of the economic situation in certain regions of the USSR where they believed they could have some
prospects. In the sixties, a considerable number of Armenians moved to the southern regions of Russia,
Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Many Armenians from NKAO can still be found there; they migrated there
long before the notorious events.
The former chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers E. Alikhanov told to the author that
in the sixties, when Ministry of Oil Industry was established in Moscow, the republic received the
proposal on the voluntary transfer of Azerbaijan Communists to work in Moscow. However, none of the
Azerbaijan candidates wished to move to Moscow. One Russian specialist (Zaytsev) and over twenty
Armenian specialists gave their consent.
The above-mentioned facts clearly demonstrate that ARMENIAN PROPAGANDA GAVE ETHNIC,
ANTIMUSLIM SHADE TO THE COMMON EVERYDAY PRINCIPLE "FISH LOOKS FOR DEEPER
WATER, MAN FOR BETTER PLACES TO LIVE".
And finally, the main question. Did the population of Armenia and NKAO increase after the well-
known events? It did, in terms of percentage points; both Armenia and NKAO became monoethnic, all
other nations being driven away from there. However, the picture is different, considered in absolute
figures. While they moved from there in a civilized way in the Soviet time, THEY RUN SCATTER IN
ALL DIRECTIONS after those events!
The ideology of the Karabakh separatism was handsomely designed "infringement of the rights of the
NKAO Armenians" in the Azerbaijan SSR. All mass media in the USSR began trumpeting about that and
articles appeared in foreign periodicals. Well-known persons of the country began, mildly speaking,
express their discontent in this regard.
Social problems of the Karabakh Armenians and NKAO were discussed by all mass media of the
USSR. Moscow "democratic beau monde" was particularly zealous in this task. Their brightest
representative Yegor Yakovlev considers the problems of the old national policy. In particular, he says in
"Moscow News", 11'1989, "they spoke of the united family of Soviet peoples, actually setting
obstacles of cultural exchange, difficulties were created for children studying in their mother tongue.
Such was the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh where many-sided and traditional ties with the fraternal
Armenia were broken." A former advocate of Leninism, then anti-Communist, supporter of Karabakh
separatists, Yegor Yakovlev does not mention a word of the innocent victims of Khodjaly! Such attitude
was typical of Moscow "democratic beau monde".
Official organs did not remain aside.
The CPSU CC resolution on NKAO said that social sphere was neglected, Leninist principles of staff
selection and arrangement were roughly violated, and the rights of NKAO Armenians were impaired, and
so on. And that was the simple truth, though it was not the way the CPSU CC interpreted it but quite the
contrary.
Here is the official information from the Archive of the Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party Central
Committee.
"In 1983-1984, the organization of party activity department of the CP CC prepared the research on
the NKAO officials, establishing the facts of flagrant violation of the party principle of their selection and
arrangement, especially in relation to ethnic Azerbaijanis.
This alerting trend was brought to the notice of the department administration and the supervising
secretary of the Central Committee; it was not however taken into account, which had an important part
to play in the future course of events in NKAO, especially in 1988," writes R. Akhundov, 1984-1985.
Regional committee of the party violated Leninism principles and the CPSU policy, did not observe
the norm of ethnic minority in many issues.
There is not a single Azerbaijani in:
- the administration of the regional committee of people's control;
- the administration of Askeran district committees of the party and Komsomol, though the district
was organized in 1978 and formed by the regional committee;
- in the administration of Gadrut district committees of the party and Komsomol;
- in the administration of Gadrut district executive committee.
Equality is broken in staff arrangement in:
- in the administrations of the regional committee, regional executive committee and its departments,
regional council of trade unions, the regional committee of Komsomol and other organizations;
- in many collective farms, state farms and other organizations with multinational staff;
- leadership of some industrial facilities with multinational staff.
Certain carelessness and negligence are observed in:

32
- admittance to the CPSU and VLKSM;
- nomination for different awards;
- election of the panel for solemn occasions and of some delegations going outside the region;
- in election of members of district city committees and Komsomol, as well as bureau of party and
Komsomol organizations;
- installation of telephones in Stepanakert (only 56 out of 1,344 in Azerbaijan flats) and other
settlement.
The lack of visual agitation in the Azerbaijani language is observed in many establishments, even
signboards are absent in some of them.
- the correlation of deputies is broken;
- other nations are treated preferentially.

Speechesatplenarysessionsandpartyactivistsmeetingsin Askeran district, 1980-


1981
N Type of meeting Date Totality of Of them,
speakers ethnic
Azerbaijani

1 Plenary session 27.12.80 10 -


2 Plenary session 30.08.80 10 1
3 Party activists 19.07.80 9 1
4 Plenary session 7.01.80. 9 1
5 Plenary session 20.02.80 10 1
6 Party activists 19.01.80 10 1
7 Plenary session 19.02.811 10 1
8 Party activists 7.01.81 9 -
9 Party activists 10.04.81 10 1
Total 94 7

From the Archive of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee

According to the party principles, all the above-mentioned was indeed a flagrant violation of the party
regulations. However, despite the assertions of the CPSU CC ideologists, everything was quite the
reverse, it was Azerbaijanis in NKAO whose rights were impaired.
The assessment of the social situation in NKAO was also false, superficial and unscientific. "Let us at
least remember the process of emergence and development of the Karabakh movement. Why did the
people raise the question on joining Armenia? Because the saw that the leaders of Azerbaijan were
leading the region to a dead end, trying to cut the natural cultural ties of the Armenian population with
Armenia, putting obstacles in the way of the Armenian-speakin intellectuals. Al this is the reality! All this
is true! Travelling around the country, I had never seen such neglect to the fate of the people as in
Nagorno-Karabakh," wrote A. Volsky on 15 January, 1989 in his article "Peace for the Karabakh Land"
published in "Pravda".
That was the lies of a "man of a thousand faces", the former party organizer of Likhachev plant, An-
dropov's economy adviser, the bloody representative of Gorbachev in Karabakh, the double-dealer repre-
sentative of Yeltsin in Chechnya, the honorary leader of oligarchs (turning to be their betrayer in the hour
of need), a double or triple (depending on the situation) agent of secret services, from the KGB to the FSB
(Federal Security Service) of Russia (not a complete image, though, there still versions possible),
Comrade-Mister, the head of the Committee of Special Administration of Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast, A. Volsky.
The table shows the social data on the USSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Armenian SSR and NKAO

33
As we can see, the key figures illustrating the social situation in NKAO were better than in
Azerbaijan and Armenia and a bit worse than in the USSR on average. It gets especially pronounced
when compared with Armenia.
Let us remember the well-known documentary of the Armenian film studio broadcasted on the
Central Television Channel several months before the Karabakh events and demonstrating the extreme
poverty in the settlement situated 30 km from Yerevan.
Doctor of Historical Studies S.V. Vostrikov (Smolensk), who wrote several articles about the
"suffering" of the Karabakh Armenians, writes in his article "Karabakh knot as a conflictogenic factor of
Transcaucasia", "Considerable disproportion of the levels of social and economic development became an
important conflictogenic factor. THE POINT WAS NOT THAT THE ARMENIANS OF NKAO LIVED
WORSE THAN THEIR AZERBAIJAN NEIGHBOURS. QUITE THE CONTRARY, THE LIVING
STANDARD OF THE FORMER WAS BETTER IN MANY PARAMETERS THAN THAT OF THE
LATTER (highlighted by the author). However, the NKAO Armenians knew well how they brothers
lived in Armenia and naturally supposed that they would be able to improve their welfare considerably by
gain-ing independence. The living standard of Armenia (excelling Azerbaijan considerably in most per
capita indices of welfare) kind of guided them." Armenia did not guide the NKAO Armenians, for leaving
the region, they mainly went not to Armenia.

Table
Name AzSSR NKA U Arm
O SSR SSR
Quantity of hospital beds per 10,000 97.7 101.7 1 86.2
person (pieces) 38.4 29.1 30.1 2
Number of doctors of all specialties per 4 38.6
10,000 person 93.5 122.7 2.7
Number of paramedical personnel per 93.5
10,000 person 6 13 1
Number of public libraries per 10,000 5 15 14.7 4.1
person 3 11.2 3.8
Number of clubs per 10,000 person 20 35 4. 2.9
Quantity of film projector units per 8 39
10,000 person 74.3 92.5 4.
Coverage of children by preschool 8 87.8
institutions (percent from the size of the 10.9 14.6 5.
corresponding population group) 4 13.7
Number of students in the first shift 5
(percent from the total number of students) 12.2 14.6 7
Housing resources per 1 citizen (square 9.2 14.6 13.1
meter); 7 15.0
in rural area 8.2
in urban area
1
4.9

1
4.3
1
6.1

Source: Statistic information of the State Planning Committee


Karabakh Armenians excelled their "brothers" from Armenia in many ways, which shows that their
life in Azerbaijan was not that bad at all. It was not accident that after the well-known events Karabakh
Armenians easily seized power in Armenia getting their yesterday "brothers" under and did not looked
like an oppressed people!

34
The editorial in "St. Petersburg University" journal, N21 (3517), 20 October, 1999, titled "Particular
Perplexity of a Voter, or In Defence of the Nonpartisan General Secretary", gives a deep analysis of
social problems and ethnic relations citing NKAO as an example. It is a pity that editorial did not appear
in the beginning of separatism problem, it was much more relevant then. "It is easy to destruct our
society. It is already oversaturated with electricity like a fireball, ready to explode at a slightest touch.
Especially at a touch upon national strings. It is hard to think of that war in NKAO but we must not hush
it up either. It was clear from the very start that the Karabakh knot cannot be undone on the current legal
level. This is a political dead end, to go out of which a certain law-making way should be walked. Is it
sensible to interpret this emergency situation as a national tragedy of the Armenian people and demand
the immediate change of the NKAO status?
Surely, social living conditions are difficult there. But let us look at the centres of the countries,
Yerevan, Baku, Tbilisi. How do - no, not sales or consumer service workers - simple workers of an
engineering plant, for instance, live there? I can answer. Its is hard life on the verge of poverty, amid half-
legalized Soviet theft. Not only now but for many decades. And generally speaking, give me such a place
in our state where a man living on his wage could easily earn his daily bread without being humiliated by
authority? There is no place like that. However, it does not mean that we all are to bring forward some
ultimatums, snatch sporting guns and antihail units and shoot one another down as fast as possible. We
have already passed that in accordance with Marxism-Leninism and cannot recover so far. Would not it
be better to advance in a civilized way, in conformity with the general law of complex system dynamics,
according to the method of small perturbations, not deviating too much from the equilibrium? Otherwise,
it is a failure, a disaster like the one we observe in NKAO."
The authors of the article do not or do not want to understand that the separatists from NKAO
WISHED EXACTLY TO DESTRUCT OUR SOCIETY AND LEAD IT TO A CATASTROPHE TO
ACHIEVE THEIR OWN AIMS.
When the Soviet mass media and central authority of the USSR spoke in unison about social
problems in NKAO, the impression was that Azerbaijan and its capital Baku lived in clover, while the
population of NKAO hardly managed to make both ends meet.
Major Soviet economists made their contribution to this interpretation, arguing that Azerbaijan had
always been in preferential economic conditions in the USSR but that had not influenced the economy of
NKAO properly. Aganbegyan, Sitaryan, Volsky and others were particularly zealous in such statements.
Let us cite the facts. 23.3 billion roubles were invested in Azerbaijan industry in the period from 1920
to 1985. Net oil income (taking into account the development of the world oil prices) amounts to over 100
billion dollars. Even if we take into consideration rouble-to-dollar rate set by Stalin (when asked about
rouble-to-dollar rate, he set it as 92 kopecks for a dollar), then oil income alone exceeds the investments
four times. The actual oil income exceeds the investments dozens times. Moreover, if we consider that
80% of the investments turned into a heap of metal scraps and that ecologically, the oilfields are a silent
reproach to the Communist regime, the picture will be complete.
"Builds a bridge, engineer deals every molecule," said one of founding fathers of cybernetics Ashby.
When assessing the things Azerbaijan gave and gained, one should not remember something built
somewhere, for the above-mentioned information clears the issue up.
According to S. Mamedov, in the period from 1913 to 1988, industrial production increased 99 times
in the Azerbaijan SSR, 220 times in the USSR on the whole, 369 times in Byelorussia and 563 times in
Armenia, although Azerbaijan had much better starting position than Byelorussia and Armenia. There
was no relation between awards, orders, challenge banners and living standard. The population of
Azerbaijan considerable excelled that of the Baltic republics both in received orders and in the poverty
level 8-10 times, since national wealth turned not into national values but into orders and medals, various
banners etc.
We should stress it once again that in the seventies, owing to the personality of H. Aliyev, currency-
consuming equipment was delivered in Azerbaijan. Owing not to the nobility of the Soviet power (leaders
of other republics could not use it for some reason) but to the personal qualities of H. Aliyev.
We should deduct the damage Armenia inflicted on Azerbaijan from the investments made in it in the
Soviet period.
Had been the position of the Soviet Moscow impartial and fair, Armenia would not have been able to
inflict so much damage on Azerbaijan.
One can often find naive reasoning that oil was cheaper than mineral water and oil price rise would
have solved all problems. Even if world oil prices had been fixed, Azerbaijan would have not benefited
much, there existing Politburo, State Planning Committee of the USSR. And this is comprehensible, as

35
the formation of republican budgets had not economic but political basis ("there is a Politburo resolution",
"we must first of all help the cradle of revolution", "Moscow will be made a model city", "relatives often
come to see the population of this republic, we want to make it model" and so on).
It so happened that the extremity of the situation in the years of the Soviet state formation, Great
Patriotic War and economy development each time required intensification
of deposits exploration exceeding acceptable bounds several times. All this
was accompanied with considerable lag in facilities construction, formation
of the appropriate industry, capital renewals, formation of the social
complex.
The intensity of operation of oil producing facilities and the low rates of
their renewal are demonstrated by the fact that the initial cost of basic assets
decreased 2.5 times today, 80% of oil wells have worked through several
lives and are virtually unfit for efficient exploitation.
The emphasis was laid not on the systematic drilling-out and improved
oil deposit development but on the rapid extraction of most actual reserves, which inflicted the
irreversible damage on the bowels. The Soviet principle of spending as little means as possible on
producing as much oil as possible has led to a natural end.
Oilfields of Baku were considerably destroyed during the war. World oil production in 1941-1945
was analyzed to make the full assessment of the degree of breakdown. Experts integrated data on the
USA, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Romania, Mexico, Argentina, Columbia, Trinidad and Tobago,
Germany, Bahrain, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Hungary and Japan. This data is given in Picture 3 in the form of
relation of oil production in 1945 to that in 1940. As the chart shows, oil production in a number of
countries remained on the level of 1941; these countries are Romania, Argentina, Columbia, Trinidad and
Tobago, Bahrain, Peru, Hungary and Japan. In some countries, oil production increased; these are the
USA, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia. It increased most noticeably in Venezuela, the
USA and Iraq. The example of Azerbaijan is dreadful, the country having lost half oil production in the
years in question. And that destruction was not natural but man-made. Romanian oilfields had been
occupied by the German and the Soviet army by turns, and still they suffered much less than those in
Baku.
The model of oil production development in 1945 versus that in 1940 demonstrates that oilfields of
Germany and Azerbaijan underwent fundamental destruction. However, whereas important industrial
facilities of Germany were destructed by incessant bombardments of the allies and occupied afterwards,
oilfields of Baku were destroyed by terrible loads on favoured oil pools of Absheron! It is astounding that
the eventual results were equal in both cases! In Germany, oil production was 1 million tons per year in
1941, while in Azerbaijan it amounted to 24 million tons per year. Take into account that not a single
bomb fell on Baku oilfields and no serious diversions were made. That is the cost Azerbaijan oilfields and
bowels had to pay for the confrontation with petrochemical industry of Germany headed by the ingenious
scientist patronized by Hitler himself, Fischer, and oil refining industry of Europe occupied by the
fascists!
Baku oilfields were neither bombed nor occupied, but they were damaged the worst in the world.
Stalinist regime proved to be much more terrible than numerous bombings and occupations. The model of
oil production development in 1945 versus that in 1940 demonstrates that OILFIELDS OF GERMANY
AND AZERBAIJAN UNDERWENT FUNDAMENTAL DESTRUCTION. HOWEVER, WHEREAS
IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES OF GERMANY WERE DESTRUCTED BY INCESSANT
BOMBARDMENTS OF THE ALLIES AND OCCUPIED AFTERWARDS, OILFIELDS OF BAKU
WERE DESTROYED BY TERRIBLE LOADS ON FAVOURED OIL POOLS OF ABSHERON! IT IS
ASTOUNDING THAT THE EVENTUAL RESULTS WERE EQUAL IN BOTH CASES! IN
GERMANY, OIL PRODUCTION WAS 1 MILLION TONS PER YEAR IN 1941, WHILE IN
AZERBAIJAN IT AMOUNTED TO 24 MILLION TONS PER YEAR.
All this caused grave environmental problems in the republic.
In more than century-long period of oil production in Azerbaijan, a complex of deep social and
ecological problems formed here that hinders positive processes in the republic, adversely affecting the
life and mood of the people and causing serious political tension recently.
Social and ecological tension in Baku and on Absheron peninsula is especially alerting, as major oil
producing, oil refining and petrochemical facilities are concentrated there in a small territory, with their
dense network of extended communications crossing the area of residential communities, public centres,
national parks, recreational zones. The centre of the city, a large amphitheatre with the area of 30,000

36
hectares, is encircled by the wide ring of 20,000 hectares of field territories, lifeless masout-covered
lands, numerous polluted reservoirs. For many decades, the share of means for social development of the
republic made up less than 5% of the total amount of capital investments. As a consequence, considerable
number of families lives in shabby repair houses in the gas-polluted field territory. All Slavic towns that
had been damaged were restored after the war. However, the hell of ecology of Absheron peninsula was
not rehabilitated even in part.
The situation is particularly tense in Baku and Sumgayit. Those cities became most ecologically
unfavourable in the country. Atmosphere is exposed to serious pollution. Industrial facilities annually
disperse to the air over 550,000 ton of detrimental substances containing sulphur and fluorine compounds,
nitrogen, hydrocarbons, chlorine and fluorine. There are 798 ton of detrimental substances dispersed to
the atmosphere per square km in Sugayit, 217 ton in Baku, which is 20 times more than in the republic on
average. Concentration of some high-toxic substances exceeds the accepted standard two or three times,
which accounts for the high sickness rate and children's mortality of the population.
The analysis carried out by the Radiation Research Sector of the National Academy of Sciences of
Azerbaijan demonstrates that "the capacity of oil production making up 10 million tons per year, about
161 ton nitrogen oxides, 2,658 ton sulphur oxides and 9,877 ton carbon oxides are dispersed to the
atmosphere from electric power systems in thermochemical preparation and processing alone. These
figures do not include detrimental substances ejection in burning of flare gases. Oil production increase
and more advanced processing will entail three- or fourfold increase in the ejection of detrimental
substances into atmosphere."
The sphere of protection of water resources is in complete disorder. Over 1 billion cubic meters of
crude sewage is poured into the Caspian Sea. The crude sewage bring such detrimental substance as
chlorides, sulphates, nitrates, oil products, phenols, surfactant species, organic and other pollutants. Their
concentration in the bay of Baku, on Sumgayit seaside and other parts of the Caspian water area exceeds
the allowed standard several times. According to the calculations of experts, 100,000 ton oil products,
1,000 ton phenols, 1,500 ton copper, 7,000 ton zinc and other harmful substances are poured into the
Caspian annually through the Volga, Kura, Terek and Samur alone.
Professor Kasymov estimated that up to 11 billion cubic meters of polluted waters get into the
Caspian annually, the figure including up to 10 billion cubic meters from the Volga, up to 0.7 billion
cubic meters from the Kura. These waters are kind of "tincture" of pesticides, domestic and industrial
waste from the facilities of Tbilisi and Rustavi. The table gives the data on the quantitative and qualitative
sewage disposal into the Caspian in 1995 in the area of activity of Baku Ecology Committee.
"Trend" new agency reported that according to the head of "Isotope" special facilities B. Guseynov,
55% of the territory of Baku and Sumgayit and 37% of the territory of Absheron are exposed to
radioactive contamination. The chief sources of radioactive contamination are the waste left after the
withdrawal of the Soviet Army and radioactive waste from the Armenian nuclear station. Radioactive
waste from the latter has been disposed in the occupied territory of Azerbaijan and amounts to over 30
tons. 150 points of nuclear-waste disposal left after the withdrawal of the Soviet Army have been found in
Gazakh alone.
The process of construction and operation of treatment facilities is unsatisfactory either. The full
capacity operation of the largest water-protective object in the republic, Big Baku Ductwork, has not been
provided so far.
41.8% of 8,641,000 hectares (which makes 3,610,000 hectares) is exposed to erosion, 36% of
1,520,000 hectares of irrigated area is saline. More than 7,000 hectares in Absheron have been ruined;
7,200 hectares of once fertile lands are polluted and subject to revegetation. There are 80 dumps for
domestic and industrial waste in Baku alone. Due to the lack of organization in waste and sewage
disposal of facilities and communal services, ground-water level has risen, over 10,000 hectares are
watered and swampy. A striking example of negligence toward nature is the current difficult situation in
Lokbatan residential area surrounded with numerous man-made lake full of domestic waste. Many years
of discharging domestic and industrial waste have made the lakes Beyuk-Shor, Chukhur-Dara, Ganly-Gol
and other turn into catch pit and burst their banks, polluting the adjacent area.
Academician V. Gadjiyev said that "the flora of Azerbaijan includes over 800 species of medicinal
plants, 825 contain essential oils, 200 - rubber, more than 200 - tannin, 460 - dye-stuff, 400 - vitamins,
600 - alkaloids. 150 species of fruit and berry plants are spread in the territory of our republic. Once
forests made up 25-20% of the Azerbaijan territory, but their area has reduced to 11% by today. 225
hectares of valuable forest lands and more than 70,000 hectares of small and big shrubs have been ruined
in the republic in the last 25-30 years."

37
According to expert calculations, the realization of the full complex of measures on environmental
sanitation in Baku, revegetation, biological recovery, draining and cleaning of settling lakes, construction
of drainage systems, cleaning of the Caspian bay, including special technical equipment for the building
organizations, requires dozens of millions dollars. The situation is aggravated by the lack of free area for
the development of Baku, which forces to use agricultural lands of Absheron peninsula for these
purposes.
Over a billion tons of oil was produced in Azerbaijan in the period of the Soviet power. There are
many countries in the world that have produced dozens times more oil than us. But if we compare the
ecological situation, the condition of Azerbaijan is poor.
Deputy Minister of Economy O. Akhverdiyev said to "Trend" news agency that 600,000 hectares of
once fertile land are so saline that they could not be used in agriculture any more. Other sources tell us
that swampy, eroded and residual lands can be found virtually everywhere today. They have recently
taken space photographs of our croplands through special optical filters. When the films were developed
and prints were made, scientists lost their tongue, seeing that every hectare was covered with many layers
of waste dust
According to many experts, landscape diversity produces a favourable effect on ethnos and allows the
people to express its own diversity. In this regard, Azerbaijan is unique. The estimation of the diversity of
Azerbaijan allows us to be included in the elite of world countries. However, a centralized administrative
system has a particularly sensitive impact on such countries as ours. Depriving the people of freedom
closely related to the natural diversity, the system deprives it of the future.
THE SOCIAL SITUATION IN NKAO SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AGAINST THIS
GENERAL BACKGROUND, FOR THE SITUATION IN NKAO LOOKED NOT THAT BAD AS
COMPARED TO THE REPUBLIC ON THE WHOLE.
HENCE A NATURAL QUESTION. WHY SHOULD HAVE NKAO FLOURISH AGAINST SUCH
GENERAL BACKGROUND?
Was the social situation in Nakhchivan better than in NKAO? Did Azerbaijan cotton growers who
toiled under trying conditions live better than NKAO? Was the everyday life of Balakhany oil workers
better than that of furniture makers from NKAO? Such comparisons are endless. As was mentioned
above, despite enormous subsidies (unofficial information says that Armenia ranked first in the USSR in
subsidies), the social situation in Armenia (with the exception of Yerevan that was prospering on account
of shadow economy) was not better than in NKAO.
AND FINALLY, MOST IMPORTANTLY, WAS IT AZERBAIJAN THAT BROUGHT
COMMUNISM TO THE PEOPLES LEADING ALL PEOPLES, INCLUDING THAT OF NKAO, TO
THIS DISMAL SOCIAL SITUATION? WAS IT NOT AZERBAIJAN THAT SUFFERED FROM
COMMUNISM THE WORST OF ALL IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, WHICH COULD NOT BUT
AFFECT NKAO? RHETORICAL QUESTIONS ARE THESE!
Familiarizing with this information, any impartial reader will understand that the Karabakh
Armenians by no means reminded a people "oppressed by Azerbaijan", as virtually as Soviet mass media
asserted.
This information is quite sufficient to assess the situation in NKAO as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR.
The CPSU CC was familiar with all this information as well but it was ignored completely as
inconvenient for the authors of resolutions on NKAO. The CPSU Central Committee officials had the
cheek to phone to different departments of the Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party Central Committee
asking to send more critical information on the political and social situation in NKAO. Clearly, they were
not interested in other materials giving an objective assessment to the situation in NKAO.
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED INFORMATION DEMONSTRATES THAT LOUD
DECLARATIONS OF OVERALL "RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT" IN THE AZERBAIJAN SSR MADE
BY THE ARMENIANS WERE A BIG LIE AND THE FIRST LARGE-SCALE ACTION OF BLACK
PR IN THE USSR AFTER THE BEGINNING OF GORBACHEV'S PERESTROIKA.
The then deputy head of the USSR KGB Philipp Denisovich Bobkov writes in connection with the
Karabakh separatism, "In two or three months, I met the former first deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers of Armenia in Moscow. He was in retirement. Kirokosyan spent much time explaining why the
Karabakh problem was to be solved in the Armenians' favour and gave ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS
(highlighted by the author).
'We need land badly'
I was surprised.
'Why?'

38
'Armenians leave Armenia because they have no land.'
'And where do they go?'
'Stavropol, Siberia, Centrail Russia.'
'Is it that bad?'
'Well, the nation gets scattered. We need land to stop Armenians from moving to other regions of the
Soviet Union.'"(Armenia still occupies considerable amounts of territory, however the nation continues to
move as far from those lands as possible. - Author)
When the events began, one of the ideologists of Karabakh separatists, Igor Muradyan, said,
"Armenia will not survive without new territories, it needs new agricultural lands."
"We are like in prison cell!" exclaims Sylvia Kaputikyan.
"Gorbachev! Give us our land back!" these words are heard at all meetings in Armenia.
Armenian clergy did not remain aside either, speaking about the ethnic persecution of the Karabakh
Armenians, thereby adding ethnic factor to the separatist movement. But that was not truth either.
The truth also becomes clear, if we familiarize with the appeal of Catholicos of all Armenians dated
12.06.1988, given in the book "Destiny" by G. Shakhnazarov (pp.50-52, in Armenian). "It is no secret
that not all of our lands belong to us yet. But there will come the time to conquer them and populate them.
In the last 40 years, the Armenians have returned the land of their fathers. They make up 60%. The
territories in Krasnodar and Stavropol regions are gradually coming out of the Russian control There
are 80% of our land in Armavir (Northern Armenia) (the Armenian name for Rostov region - A.
Alekperov) so, if we are sensible we will populate Rostov region as well There is no reason to
worry, we have the support of the Russian Church and many our followers of high rank. I believe that
480,000 Armenians in Moscow do mean something. My dear children, buy houses slowly persuade the
local population to move, take root in your home land The USSR is breaking down now, and soon we
will be furthering the downfall of Russia It is time for a crusade against those who has driven away our
long-suffering nation from its land! Echmiadzin - 12.06.1988."
In "The Gulag Archipelago", 1991, v.5, p.223, A.I. Solzhenitsyn writes, "When the Hitlerites seized
our South, the number of volunteer battalions (in Vlasov's army - Author) increased again with a
Georgian, an Armenian, a Northern Caucasian and 16 Kalmyk ones There were almost no Soviet
guerillas in the south." The USSR was believed to be on the brink of defeat then, and the considerable
number of Armenian battalions was getting ready for the process of division of the USSR. In Gorbachev's
period, it became clear in several years after his rise to power that the USSR would collapse and the
formation of Armenian battalions began again to occupy another's land. The perspicacious A.I.
Solzhenitsyn could not fail to comprehend that, and yet he chose to protect Karabakh separatists.
These facts (that are by far not solitary ones) finish any reasoning of Karabakh separatists and their
heralds on lofty matters of the Karabakh movement. THE CHIEF AND SOLE AIM OF ARMENIA WAS
AND IS ONLY SEIZURE OF THE LANDS NOT BELONGING TO THEM!
Fine statements of different circles and persons about spirituality, demography, social problems and
so on were intended for the civilized world that is known to overreact to such problems and is very far
from a deep analysis.
This was also observed by an Israeli publicist Robert David. He expressed his opinion after his visit
to Yerevan and Baku in May 1991, "NKAO would not have sawn the branch it was sitting on without
being stirred up from outside. It was the Armenians, the nation with a huge sisterhood in the USA, that
played the part of a Trojan Horse in the Soviet camp, which surely has its reason. Nagorno-Karabakh was
the first ulcer of the nationalistic plague. It did not occur to anyone that if at one moment the Armenians
needed national self-determination rights most of any other rights, they could use it freely in full measure,
moving from NKAO to Armenia. However, they desire to move together with the territory they live in!
Without the territory, they do not want to go. So, territory is most important for these people and not self-
determination. The Armenians already have independence. How many times can one nation gain it?"
The main political slogan of the Karabakh movement was "Miatsum!" "Miatsum!" the shouted in
Khankendi, "Miatsum!" they cried in the Theatre Square in Yerevan, "Miatsum!" echoed Russian
democrats, "Miatsum!" screamed headlines in the Soviet press, "Miatsum!" flashed on the screen of
central TV channels; everything seemed to have melted in some kind of miatsum ecstasy!
And no one remembered in that ecstasy that "miatsum" means "reunion", Reunion is Anschluss,
Anschluss is War, War is A TRAGECY FOR PEOPLES!
No one remembered that the enslavement of Europe by the fascist Germany had begun with
"miatsum", with Anschluss of Austria and Sudeten.

39
In October 1987, the first meeting of "Karabakh" Committee took place in Pushkin Park in Yerevan.
It was convened by the leaders Igor Muradyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan. The combat hymn played at that
meeting "Karabakh needs living idols today" with a rather warlike ending "We will overcome death and
fear of prison to save our Karabakh". On 25 January, 1988, after those meetings, first hundreds of
refugees began arriving in Azerbaijan that had been driven from Kafan and Megri regions of theArmenian
SSR. Three months later, 24 February, 1988, first blood was shed in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict;
two Azerbaijanis were killed in NKAO.
The eviction of Azerbaijanis from Armenia has a long history.
The process started in the Soviet Union, in Stalin's times.
THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, RESOLUTION N4083, 23 December, 1947. Moscow,
Kremlin. On the resettlement of collective farmers and other Azerbaijani population from the Armenian
SSR to Kura-Araks lowland of the Azerbaijan SSR. sup. 10.03.48 N754
The chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I. Stalin. Execute secretary of the USSR Council of
Ministers Y. Chadayev
The USSR Council of Ministers found it necessary to supplement its first resolution with N547
resolution dated 10 March, 1948. The second document suggested further development of the resolution
adopted on 23 December and was again signed by Stalin. It intensified the measures on the resettlement
of Azerbaijanis. The first part of 23 December, 1947 resolution read that from 1948 to 1950 100,000
collective farmers and other representatives of the Azerbaijan population living in the territory of
Armenia were to be voluntarily moved to Kura-Araks lowland of the Azerbaijan SSR, 10,000 of them in
1948, 40,000 in 1949 and 50,000 in 1950.
Vazghen I was unfair to Stalin, saying that "the period of Stalin's personality cult was a disaster for
everyone. Leninism, the true Socialist doctrine was distorted. I wish Lenin had not died so early, he could
live long!"
The period of Stalin's personality cult was indeed a disaster for everyone, including the Armenian
people. However, Stalin shared the same ideas on the eviction of Azerbaijanis with the then leader of
Armenia.
After Gorbachev's rise to power, Armenia continued Stalin's cause with renewed strength. The proper
process of eviction have never stopped but it became definite in the time of Gorbachev.
The ideology of that process was briefly but essentially expressed by S. Kaputikyan, "Turks,
especially their Azerbaijan wing, are to be broken all the time. The struggle against every Azerbaijani is
to be conducted on the level of a state programme." Hitler used to say something like that about Jews!
This appeal of the weak-sighted lady was heard all over Armenia, both by the authority and informal
groups.
Leaflets and posters were hanging throughout Armenia, at bus stops, on the gates, in house blocks
where Azerbaijanis lived, with the full support of the authorities.
"People of Armenia!
Do not ever forget the bloody days of 1915, the terror brought by Talat pasha, Enver pasha, Jamal
pasha! Live and remember!
Everyone who calls himself Armenian!
Drive the Turks from our land!
Do not give them water from Armenian springs!
Do not give him bread baked with the hands of Armenian woman!
Turks, out of our city!"
A corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of Armenia Rafael Kazaryan spoke before
many thousands of marchers during the meeting in the Theatre Square in Yerevan in the beginning of the
events, "For the first time in decades, we have a unique opportunity to clear Armenia." He repeated one-
to-one the words of Ribbentrop about the Jews.
His appeals, like those of Kaputikyan, were heard and their mass realization began.
On 12 November, 1988, in the town of Spitak, the first secretary of Spitak City Committee of the
Communist Party N. Muradyan, the first secretary of the regional executive committee of the Communist
Party F. Abuchyan, the head doctor of the region R. Bagdaryan, Judge E. Nazaryan, the head of militia V.
Sarkisyan, public prosecutor Arakisyan with several armed bearded man evicted Azerbaijan families from
their flats and administered "justice". 36 persons died, unable to endure refined tortures. 70 children at the
age from 5 to 12 were immured alive before heir parents' eyes in the prepared pipe of 20 meters length
and 1.5 meters diameter. Another 27 Azerbaijan children were taken away in the unknown direction.

40
"The eviction of Azerbaijanis in Shauman settlement of the Armenian SSR was carried out with the
participation of the chairman of the village Soviet and other officials," even "Pravda", the newspaper far
from sympathies towards Baku, wrote on 7 January, 1989.
Even the earthquake in Armenia on 7 December was used by the Armenian authorities to suit their
filthy ends. Entire Azerbaijan villages were extinguished and that was accounted for the earthquake.
That earthquake was also used against Azerbaijan by well-known forces. It was disgusting when
famous journalists of Moscow wrote that people in Baku were celebrating the Armenian earthquake in the
squares. During the "round table" in Baku, where the situation in the region was steadily discussed, the
commandant of the special region Colonel General Tyagunov suddenly began reproaching the Azerbaijan
people for "gloating over another's woe". That shocked both the participants of the round table and the
TV audience. Colonel general as a common agent provocateur!
History of the mankind knows many earthquakes that took hundreds of thousands of human lives;
however we do not know any single case when such a tragedy was used as black PR action against other
people!
"The whole Russia was supporting Armenian people," remember KGB agents Vladimir Lutsenko and
Valery Khmelev, "but few know that militants shot our paratroopers in the back when the latter were
standing in cordon around the earthquake source. Extremists had begun arming themselves by that time."
Not just arming themselves.
According to the materials of the Azerbaijan Republic Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing
Citizens State Committee, petty groups were organized in Spitak after the destructive earthquake from
among the activists of the Armenian "Karabakh" terrorist organization. They were engaged in car theft,
embezzlement of medicines coming to the Yerevan "Zvartnots" airport from all around the world, pillage
of shops in the damaged cities, removing watches, jewellery, money etc. from the corpses.
Such facts are also confirmed in Russian sources.
Victor Nikolaev writes about the earthquake in Spitak, "'Don't move! Don't move or I'm shooting!'
Right off the bat, the tunnel sight of the captain spotted shadows that had slipped behind the building
ruins. Battle experience is for ever. 'Get down, everyone! Mugs to the ground! Arms to the sides, legs
apart!'
Fighting, constrained wheeze and certainly foul words for a minute. Then four single shots from
Kalashnikov and here they are - two thrashing about in convulsions, four screaming excitedly interrupting
one another, 'Doncha shoot, noo! Bin goin' to bury our sis Doncha shoot, we're lyin''
After being replaced, Victor and other men were thinking of one and the same thing, remembering the
opened coffin, ripped up belly of a dirty woman and a pile of jewellery in it. Those inhuman monsters had
been taking gold so hastily that they had cut off swollen fingers and ears together with rings and
earrings."
The KGB agents Vladimir Lutsenko and Valery Khmelev write, "A considerable amount of different
kind of weapon was supplied to Armenia under the guise of humanitarian aid to the victims of the
earthquake in Spitak."
Alexei Vaschenko echoes, "Many Armenians came to Armenia from France to take part in the
Karabakh conflict, in which many mercenaries also participated. The Armenian community rendered
humanitarian aid to the victims of the earthquake in Spitan and Leninakan, delivering weapon and
ammunition together with that humanitarian aid." This is how the natural disaster was used!
The earthquake in Spitake cleared up some other things as well. Broadcasts of "Vremya" programme
began every day with report on the support some or other Russian region rendered to Armenia, which was
only welcome. But something stunned us and we understood that there was something wrong in Russia.
On 3 June, 1989, 23:14, a train crash occurred due to the explosion of the gas pipeline near Ufa, on
Novosibirsk - Adler and Adler - Novosibirsk routes, with the trains being occupied mainly by children
that had been going to summer sea resorts and back from there. 1,100 people suffered. 40 children died of
wounds and burns in just one day, according to the Central Television. The rest was silence. NOT A
SINGLE OUTSTANDING RUSSIAN PUBLIC FIGURE, WRITER, SCIENTIST ETC. BROUGHT
FORWARD ANY INITIATIVE ON THE ASSISTANCE TO MORE THAN 1,000 OF VICTIMS, THE
MOST OF WHICH REMAINED DISABLED! INSPITE OF THEIR BEING RUSSIANS! The head of
the USSR Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov did not appear on the site of the tragedy either, though he had
refused to leave Armenia during the earthquake in Spitak.
Dozens of thousands Russian soldiers coming home from the Afghan war, the war that had not been
theirs, needed everything. Instead, as they would say themselves, they had the impression that AFTER
THE AFGHAN WAR THEY CAME TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

41
Another striking example of such attitude to their own people was G. Starovoytova. The aid of the
president of Russia Yeltsin, G. Starovoytova took absolutely no interest in the Russian affairs, constantly
lobbying for the interests of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Armenian sources, during
meetings with a number of outstanding politicians (M. Thatcher, F. Mitterrand, V. Havel, L. Walesa, A.
Kwasniewski, D. Baker, J. Carter, B. Ghali and others), she always raised only the Karabakh issue.
To the detriment of Russia, Starovoytova took part in lobbying for the transfer and further
reconstruction of two Armenian churches of St. Petersburg and the adjacent buildings and areas under the
jurisdiction of Moscow and Nor-Nakhchivan eparchy of Armenian apostolic church. had it depended on
G. Starovoytova, she would have transferred Russia itself under the jurisdiction of Armenia!
David Petrosyan writes that "in 1988-1989 G. Starovoytova took part in more than 40 symposiums,
conferences and workshops held by large research centres and international organizations, where she
defended the self-determination right of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, up to the formation of an
independent state;
- in the same period, she delivered lectures in ethnography, ethnopsychology and ethnic conflicts in
more than 20 prestigious universities of the USA, Great Britain, Canada and other countries, continuously
citing the example of the self-determination demand of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians as the most
indisputable;
- in mass media of over 20 countries, G. Starovoytova published interview and articles, reasoning the
self-determination right of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, up to the formation of an independent
state."
As we can see, this is a rather impressive record of service in anti-Azerbaijan activity of a Russian
deputy and public figure, which is totally out of place, for Russia never declared war on Azerbaijan
officially! Another natural and important question arises. What has G. Starovoytova done for Russia?
Fighting Communists. And as became clear after her murder, on finding a featherbed, she got into
criminal business (according to the report in the Russian press, her capital at the moment of murder
amounted to a million dollars).
In this connection, we can remember the following extract from "Anna Karenina". "Here am I too,"
said the old prince. "I've been staying abroad and reading the papers, and I must own, up to the time of the
Bulgarian atrocities, I couldn't make out why it was all the Russians were all of a sudden so fond of their
Slavonic brethren, while I didn't feel the slightest affection for them. I was very much upset, thought I
was a monster, or that it was the influence of Carlsbad on me. But since I have been here, my mind's been
set at rest. I see that there are people besides me who're only interested in Russia, and not in their
Slavonic brethren." Time has made some amendments in this brilliant description of the Russian mass
conscience, now the Armenians are a headache of Russia. Perhaps, the recipe of the great old man, Count
Tolstoy, is applicable to the today's Russia? Perhaps, it is time indeed it dealt its own problem? An
amazing country is Russia! One would understand it neither by means of common sense, nor by means of
common economic calculations!
Here are the results of the deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia.
Over 230,000 our compatriots were driven from 185 Azerbaijan villages in Armenia. Up to 31,000
houses, 165 collective farms and state farms were pillaged, considerable amount of livestock was taken,
216 persons were killed, 1,154 injured, hundreds of brave sons of the people were tortured and had their
eyes put out.
Here is the list of Azerbaijan victims in another ethnic purge in Armenia.
- 2 persons were killed by doctors in a hospital;
- 3 persons died due to failure to assist sick person;
- 35 persons were killed in tortures;
- 41 persons died of battery;
- 11 persons were burned alive;
- 2 persons had their heads cut off after tortures;
- 4 persons were killed and burned;
- 1 person was hung;
- 3 persons were drowned;
- 7 persons were run over with cars;
- 16 persons were shot from firearms;
- 49 persons froze to death in mountains trying to escape;
- 8 persons were kidnapped and are missing;
- 1 person was killed with electricity;

42
- 10 persons died of heart attack due to the shock, including one pregnant woman.
In total, 216 people were killed, including 57 women, 5 infants and 18 children of different age.

The number of internally displaced people in the regions of dislocation (%)


Regions, cities Number %
Agdam 22,812 3.7
Agdash 3,501 0.5
Agjabedi 33,747 5.5
Absheron 17,660 1.2
Baku and adjacent regions 130,350 21.3
Barda 67,486 11.0
Beylagan 22,528 3.6
Bilasuvar 29,299 4.8
Alibayramly 4,656 0.7
Fizuli 37,590 6.1
Goranboy 5,916 0.9
Ganja 14,438 2.3
Khanlar 5,174 0.8
Imishli 36,882 6.0
Gazakh 6.202 1.0
Mingachevir 19,153 3.1
Neftchala 3,183 0.5
Saatly 14,240 2.3
Sabirabad 21,289 3.4
Sumgayit 48,199 7.9
Sheki 6,010 0.9
Terter 17,880 2.9
Yevlakh 13,024 2.1
Other regions 38,856 6.3

Total 610,070 100

Source: UNHCK Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR.


1996 Statistical Overview; Geneva, July, 1997.
The surviving refugees from Armenia have undergone inhumane ordeal.
"Heart-rending scenes: a young Azerbaijan woman with a tiny girl in her arms and a boy clutching at
the hem of her skirt. They were crossing a snow-covered mountain pass. An old teacher, whose face bore
bitterness besides the common-for-all expression of stupefaction, for he had told children of some
fundamentals of life that had crumbled n a flash right before their eyes. Azerbaijan peasants from the
villages Lermontovo and Fioletovo where their neighbours were Russian Molokans, whose old-fashioned
beards and even manner of speech they adopted. Faces, many faces of people driven like lambs to the
slaughter heaven knows why and by heaven knows whom. A great sacrifice offering to the funeral pyre of
the Soviet Union began," Ksenya Myalo writes in her book "Russia and the last wars of the 20th century.
On the history of the downfall of the superpower", in the second chapter "Break".

43
Armenia was the first in the modern history of the USSR to put into practice "no man, no problem"
aphorism of Stalin, by evicting all Azerbaijanis from Armenia.
The USSR mass media again hushed up this tragedy of the Azerbaijanis.
The head of Z department of KGB Vladimir Lutsenko and head of a section Valery Khmelev write,
"Somehow, no one has said so far, for instance, that in the Armenian village of Gukark happened almost
the same that had been in Sumgayit. They taunted Azerbaijanis, killed them, pillaged houses."
No doubt, the well-informed intelligence officers Lutsenko and Khmelev tell half-truth, whereas such
cases require precision, a woman cannot be a bit pregnant, you know. The precise figures are the
following. 26 people were killed in Sumgayit, 216 people were killed in Gukar and Masis regions of
Armenia.
Armenian "initiative" of dealing ethnic issue was adopted in different regions of the USSR, and "the
process started".
On 2 June, 1989, at the first congress of the USSR people's deputies, the first secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia S.G. Arutyunyan reviewed the eviction of Azerbaijanis
from Armenia. "AS OF 1 JUNE, 1989, THERE IS NOT A SINGLE AZERBAIJAN FAMILY IN
ARMENIA" (highlighted by the author). In a little more than a decade the same statement will be made
by the "president" of "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" R. Kocharyan.
Armenian extremists "successfully" solved two problems, they both evicted all Azerbaijanis from
Armenia with the silent consent of Moscow, and created an explosive situation in Azerbaijan.
In January 1988, the following leaflet from Yerevan was spread in NKAO. "It is time to conduct
general party, trade union and Komsomol meetings at major facilities, in collective farms and state farms
of the region, with the agenda including the issue of reunion of Karabakh with Motherland. The spirit of
glasnost and democracy is to become an impulse for an open and honest discussion of this issue. Excerpt
from resolutions of these meetings must be certified with appropriate seals and sent to the CPSU CC, with
signature of participants attached."
And fabricated excerpts and records were surely sent to Moscow in an enormous quantity!
This trick had already been tested in Khruschev's time. When the latter began the struggle against
personality cult, under the slogan of cleaning of personality cult and with the name of Baghirov
mentioned, they began collect signatures for becoming a part of Armenia.
Khruschev understood their intentions well and nipped them in the bud. But in the time of Gorbachev,
it all was greeted in Moscow and the bloody drama started.
Before the beginning of the bloody events in Azerbaijan, many Armenian writers and public figures
were welcome visitors of the USSR officials of different ranks.
"On 8 January, 1988, an Armenian delegation arrived in Moscow. It was received by Politburo
member Petr Demchev who confirmed that the "movement is neither anti-Soviet nor nationalistic."
After that, Gorbachev invites Z. Balayan and S. Kaputikyan in Moscow and receives them. Returning
from Moscow to Yerevan, they immediately set for a big meeting in the Theatre Square and declare that
"Gorbachev deeply feels the problems of Karabakh population"
None of the members of Gorbachev's Politburo knew the depth of the problem to make proposals.
Nor did they want to know, realizing too well that the General Secretary and his closest circle took pro-
Armenian stand, which was quite sufficient for them.
The "depth" of comprehension of the conflict by Gorbachev's associates can be demonstrated with the
following examples.
In February 1988, the CPSU CC secretary V. Dolgikh, who had been sent to Yerevan from Moscow
to examine the Karabakh conflict on the spot, said the following in one of his speeches, "What have you
got to argue about with their Azerbaijanis, being long-time neighbours and Muslims as well."
As it became known, when G. RAzumovsky was in Baku he was sure that NKAO had been given to
Azerbaijan by Khruschev just at the time he had given the Crimea to Ukraine.
Party and state officials that had always been clear in expressing their opinion on "socialism with
human face" and "grin of capitalism", suddenly became too much like Aesop in relation to the Karabakh
events, for one had to guess what they meant after each their statement.
There were the following words in Gorbachev's address to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia,
"to raise the question of transferring NKAO from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR" and
further without comments on this. And it meant nothing but that there was a problem but no solution to it
yet.
On 8 February, 1988, signatures are collected in Stepanakert with demands to transfer NKAO from
the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR.

44
Baku thinks that it takes a resolute step that however ends with a total failure. A dreadful blow on the
Azerbaijan statehood was administered willy-nilly by the second secretary of the CC of Communist Party
of Azerbaijan Vasily Konovalov. Moderately intelligent, moderately weak-willed, always hiding his own
opinion under quotes of Marxism-Leninism, checking his every step up with Moscow, he was the first to
cross the line of fire of the blossoming separatism, without even realizing that.
On 11 February, 1988, a big delegation of high-ranking officials from Azerbaijan arrived in
Stepanakert. The delegation was headed by the second secretary of the CC of Communist Party of
Azerbaijan Vasily Konovalov. He was accompanied by representatives of security agencies of Azerbaijan
- KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, public prosecutor's office, Supreme Court etc.
The meeting was attended by representatives of the bureau of regional committee of the party headed
by the first secretary Boris Kevorkov and of the bureau of city committee of the party headed by the first
secretary Zaven Movsesyan.
Konovalov was the first to speak. His speech was full of Communist quotes and ended as follows.
"We know each of the organizers by names and promise to isolate them from society. Wisdom of the
people, including activists, comes to the condemnation of this separatism. Karabakh has always been
flourishing as a part of the republic; it was, is and will be an inseparable part of Azerbaijan. "
Kevorkov actually repeated the words of Konovalov, "Be sure, Karabakh was and will be an
inseparable part of Azerbaijan, this is the only way we see the future of our people" and somehow
remembered mixed marriages.
Several trained participants spoke after him, expressing their perplexity at the "actions of some
extremists" in a studied voice. The headmaster of School N10 A. Pogosyan complained that the school
roof is leaky and that people should do real work instead of collecting signature. The chairman of the
furniture plant trade union M. Shakhramanyan said that in the Great Patriotic War Azerbaijanis and
Armenians had defended Motherland together and would continue living together and different emissaries
would not stop them. It was evident that all speakers had some studied unenthusiastic tone.
Then, all of a sudden, the head of motorcade 2718 of Stepanakert transport association Maxim
Mirzoyan appeared on the rostrum. Here are some extracts from his speech.
"My father once wrote foul words about Hitler on Reichstag walls. Now they write such words about
my mother Karabakh With your consent, Comrade Konovalov, a spring is being built in Shusha
symbolizing the coat of arms of Turkey, a member of NATO Signboards in Armenian completely
disappeared from Shusha. There are those in Azerbaijani, Russian and even English, though Englishmen
do not come here. But perhaps, you want them to come like in 1918? Everyone knows how it ended for
the Armenians Baku is getting fat, Stepanakert is getting sick" and so on.
It was clear that he was a well-trained PROVOCATEUR, a kind of local Ighityan! A provocateur that
was to define the mood of the audience like a litmus paper. The panel grew agitated, beginning to realize
what was going on. Konovalov tried to calm down the panel. The suddenly limp Konovalov addressed
the speaker with the words, "What are you suggesting?" "A referendum," snapped Mirzoyan and came
down from the rostrum. THE MOMENT OF TRUTH CAME. It was the moment when much if not all
depended on Konovalov and his resolute actions. It was the moment when bright speeches were requited,
giving numerous facts on the provocative activity of domestic and foreign forces in the region that had
been breaking peace in the region. It was the meeting where it should have been declared that most strict
measures would be taken right after the meeting against those violating Soviet laws. The USSR still
existed and such measures were within the frame of the Constitution. According to one of the
eyewitnesses, Konovalov rose up and addressed the audience peacefully, "We should not strain the
situation but seek a compromise solution!" THAT WAS THE FIRST MISTAKE OF KONOVALOV!
After him, Kevorkov threw some unintelligible remark, "We will stay a part of Azerbaijan anyway!" The
audience realized that Baku representatives wavered and a turning point came.
The first to speak was V. Sarkisyan, who attacked Kevorkov and secretary of the city committee
Mirzoyan, swearing.
A member of the regional committee, the director of Carshelkokombinat R. Atayan mounted the
rostrum, took some piece of paper out of his pocket and said, "This is the speech I received from you, but
I myself support referendum" and left the rostrum.
No sooner had the next speaker, the party organizer of Stepanakert Pedagogical Institute B. Farajev,
reach the rostrum than the entire audience started catcalling him immediately, as if at a command; people
were shouting, bellowing, stamping their feet, waving their fists. The well-known joke "The difference
between democracy and democratization is nearly the same as between a canal and canalization" suited
there perfectly well.

45
Farajev was desperately looking at the panel. Instead of supporting the speaker and enter a fierce
debate with provocateurs who were still in minority, Konovalov stood up and left the room. He was
followed by the members of the panel. THAT WAS THE SECOND MISTAKE OF KONOVALOV!
To support the "results" of the meeting, many thousands of marchers gather to conduct a
demonstration in Stepanakert the next day. The marchers demand that Konovalov speak, whereas the
latter demands that the demonstration be broken up, demands a phone call to someone in Moscow, that is
makes an impression of a totally lost person.
According to one of the CC employees who witnessed those events, the head of administrative
department of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee M. Asadov suggested conducting new
meeting of the active, inviting ministers that had their own departments in NKAO, organizing an
alternative meeting of Azerbaijanis living in Stepanakert, Shusha and adjacent villages, in one word, so as
not to miss the initiative. And he was right!
As for Konovalov, he kept on saying the same, that the situation should not be strained! THAT WAS
HIS THIRD MISTAKE! Just the opposite, such behaviour of the delegation only continued to strain the
situation!
Instead of gathering forces and striking the chief ideological blow on the centre of the dawning
separatism, Stepanakert, Konovalov organizes such a meeting in Askeran and Gadrut to restore his
reputation. THAT WAS HIS FOURTH MISTAKE!
According to Armenian sources, during the meeting of activists in Stepanakert A. Karapetyan, known
in Karabakh as "Dashnak Ago" laid chickie and rushed to Askeran to tell the news about the failure of the
delegation from Baku.
That gave them opportunity to prepare for the arrival of the Baku delegation. Hardly had the meeting
begun when the director of Nakhchivan state farm Y. Israelyan and the headmaster of the secondary
school A. Avanesyan forced their way to the stage.
The former said that he could not solve any problem in Baku without a bribe, so, he would not submit
to Baku any longer. The latter declared that he had already dug his grave and would fight for the reunion
with Armenia to the end. They played the same part as Mirzoyan in Stepanakert. In Gadrut region, the
delegation was met by a crowd blocking the road, and the delegation returned to Baku.
Both in Askeran and in Gadrut region, the pitch was set by the "mobile group" from Stepanakert. The
most active members of that group were obviously not from among the local population. It became clear
afterwards that they had been emissaries from Yerevan.
Baku lost the opening of the fierce confrontation with Armenia. It is generally known that when you
play against a skilled opponent, it is very hard to correct opening mistakes. Both Baku and Moscow knew
that NKAO separatism had been initiated by Armenia!
The author by no means blames Konovalov for all that happened in Stepanakert, since it was rather
his misfortune than fault. Before he arrived in Baku, he had supervised the Baltic republics, which he
knew nothing about, as the head of a branch in the CPSU CC.
Proteges of Moscow in republics performed mainly gendarme functions and had little interest in their
long-standing problems. Konovalov was worried about the Karabakh problem nearly as much as the
health of his mother-in-law; however he was rather concerned about his political career. His peasant mind
realized that something uncharacteristic of the USSR political life was going on. Moscow did not express
its attitude towards the events clearly, which could not but alert him and affect his actions.
Nothing human was alien to Konovalov, as it often was the case in the USSR with the "hands of
Moscow".
According to one of Konovalov's employees, when Konovalov was leaving Baku his belongings
hardly went into three carriages, as bribes then were taken in the form of furniture, refrigerators, carpets,
paintings, jewellery etc.
When Vasily Nikolaevich arrived in Baku for the first time, he had only his party membership card,
appointment resolution and a travelling bag.
On 12 February, the first meeting took place in Stepanakert, the participants of which demanded
annexing NKAO to Armenia. These meetings became days-long.
It became evident immediately that those meetings were not spontaneous as the Armenian side tried
to show to the public; they were well considered and organized as a deep echelon system.
"This is confirmed with numerous facts, in particular, TV and radio appearances of certain
individuals on the eve and during the events, purposeful rumours and conjectures, long-term preparation
of well-tested mass manifestations on the pattern of American shows (dramatized strikes, organized
transfer of people masses, dividing thousands and hundreds of thousands people into groups of five, ten,

46
hundred, moving to the targets at the command; provocative performances with blood-stained clothes of
allegedly killed people, and demonstrating a corpse of a man that actually was dead drunk). That required
years, directors and experts with experience in provocations of the world scale."
These lines are an excerpt from the official document of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central
Committee. The same estimation to those demonstrations was given by the Baku Armenian Karen
Brutents, deputy head of the department of CPSU CC, the representative of the Karabakh Armenians in
the CPSU CC, who visited NKAO on Gorbachev's instructions.
"Conversations were held against the background of the continuous meeting outside, which resonated
the agitation. I felt good organization in the rhythm of the meeting, in the regular food supply, alcohol ban
(though there were two attempts to deliver it in the city), in the lack of violations, finally in the night
watches at the regional committee. It was clearly the doing of "initiative groups" and their leaders
The party organization was guided. That is also demonstrated by the fact that on 17 March, 1988,
after mass manifestations and the resolution of the regional Soviet, the plenum of the party regional
committee passed the following resolution. "Expressing the expectations of the Armenian population of
the autonomy, the will of the overwhelming majority of the Communists of Nagorno-Karabakh, we ask
the Politburo of the CPSU CC to consider and give an approval to the issue of annexing Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to the Armenian SSR, thereby correcting the historical mistake made in the
beginning of the 1920s in the determination of the territorial belonging of nagorno-Karabakh."
Both the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party and the ardent advocate of
Karabakh separatists have the same opinion of those meetings. Meanwhile, all Soviet and foreign mass
media were shouting about spontaneous public disturbance.
A new stage of the organized separatism, strikes began.
Totally, there were 10 strikes in the regions in 1988-1989. 1988: 22 February - 2 March, 15 March -
17 March, 24 March - 5 April, 12 May - 13 May, 23 May - 24 July, 12 September - 9 October, 14
November - 7 December. 1989: 13 February, 6 March -13 March, 3 May - 21 August. In other words, the
region actually did not work for two years and still did not live worse than when it had worked. This
means that the "strikers" had good sponsors, since such a large-scale action costs dozens of millions
dollars.
The Central TV Channel many times showed interviews with the "strikers" but not a single
correspondent asked them the obvious question, "What do you live on?"
On the eve of 14 February when the first demonstration was held in Stepanakert, the first black PR
provocative action appeared from the separatist side, which was immediately covered by the USSR mass
media. The head of the department of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Asadov had
allegedly said at the regional committee meeting that "hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis are ready to
burst into Karabakh any time and make a slaughter there." He certainly had never said anything of the
like. Afterwards, such provocative actions became usual practice of the Armenian side, and publication of
them - usual practice of the Soviet mass media.
Collection of signatures among the NKAO population, then demonstrations, then strikes and finally,
on 21 February, 1988, the regional Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in Stepanakert
passed the following resolution. 110 voted for and 17 against the secession from Azerbaijan and joining
Armenia.
The address to the presidiums of Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan and Armenia was also passed with
the request to approve the resolution. On 27 February, all facilities stopped working in Stepanakert. A
meeting was held in the city under the slogans, "We need neither bread not water, we need only our
mother Armenia!", "Never again with Azerbaijan!"
Everything was following the well-thought out plan of Armenia.
After those events, the Centre decides to take some "measures". On 19 February, 1988, 160 military
servicemen of the special motorized militia battalion dislocated in Tbilisi were sent to NKAO by the
order of the minister of internal affairs Alexander Vlasov. They were armed with plastic shields and
rubber truncheons, with strict instructions on when to use them. Most funny, the officers with
government-issue weapon were not recommended to take it into the city.
Those soldiers were crowding together, looking at what was going on with fear!
On 25 February, 1988, Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information organized
a phone conversation between M. Gorbachev and G. Pogosyan. The employees of this organization were
the first to appear in NKAO (so, Gorbachev was well aware of all details of the events), according to its
head. As the press reported, "both sides were satisfied with the conversation". The authorities of Baku
were not let into the details of it.

47
The intensity of separatist actions after the conversation did not wane, moreover, it considerably
increased.
On 29 February, 1988, M. Gorbachev spoke at the meeting of Politburo, "There was a clash between
Azerbaijanis and Armenians in Karabakh, two Azerbaijanis were killed. Leaflets spread in Yerevan,
"Stop the meetings, Armenians, take weapons and kill the Turks". There was one long-range shot at the
headquarters of the Soviet Army. BUT I SHOULD SAY THAT EVEN WHEN HALF A MILLION
PEOPLE CAME OUT TO THE STREETS OF YEREVAN, THE ARMENIANS MAINTAINED
DISCPLINE ON A HIGH LEVEL (highlighted by the author)." In other words, continue your rallies, kill
Azerbaijanis but do maintain discipline on a high level!
Speaking on Azerbaijani and Armenian television on 26 February, 1988, with the information on
Askeran events, the deputy public prosecutor of the USSR Katusev directly pointed the address of the
murderers. The killed people were Azerbaijanis, however the Armenian black PR worker and Stepanakert
began talking of 6 Armenians and closed coffins were carried around the city, which was immediately
broadcast by the Central Television.
On 9 March, 1988, the first secretaries of the Armenian and the Azerbaijan Communist Parties
Central Committees Demirchan and Baghirov spoke in the Central Committee of the CPSU. On 10
March, 1988, "Pravda" wrote that "the leader of our party" M.S. Gorbachev also spoke at the meeting,
saying that "the most important thing now is the consistent realization of Leninist principles of national
policy and consolidation of friendship between the Azerbaijan and Armenian peoples" Gorbachev
concluded, "Any aggravation of the situation can throw us back from the uneasy achievements of
friendship between peoples our country has reached in the seven decades of its existence."
In that particular situation, when Armenia openly laid territorial claims to Azerbaijan and evicted
Azerbaijanis from Armenia, such twaddle of Gorbachev could mean only one thing - go on, just be
careful, which was further realized by Armenian extremists.
NKAO separatists were so confident in their impunity that they made Demichev, the member of
Politburo and the USSR minister of culture, a sick old man, who came to Khankendi on a visit, sleep on
two armchairs in the accounting department of the party regional committee.
That weak-willed man was scared of everything and everyone.
K. Brutents remembers about their joint visit in Stepanakert. "And that happened. However, before
coming out of the regional committee building and rise to the stage (15 or 20 meters), he halted. Petr
Nilovich was standing in front of the door, obviously scared. His face was grey, even white, and he said,
"They are going to catcall me now." Then he walked the distance to the rostrum, though not too
confidently. He was met with cries, "Lenin, Party, Gorbachev!" Demichev told them of Gorbachev's
appeal, said some more phrases, turned round sharply and walked towards the awaiting cars without
looking back. Getting in the car, I heard the rally shouting in reply to something Pogosyan has said, "We
don't believe! We don't believe!"
The USSR KGB officers confirm Brutents' impressions. "Georgy Razumovsky and, for some reason,
minister of culture Petr Demichev arrived in Stepanakert. None of them even knew what to talk to the
rally about. Both in modern musquash caps, strict and unapproachable. We saw how much they were
scared. They were always hiding in the regional committee. We hardly persuaded Razumovsky to speak
before the rally. He unsuccessfully tried to persuade them to break up."
It should be pointed out that Gorbachev sent to NKAO either those who sympathized with the
separatists or indifferent and weak-willed ones who were easy meat for separatists.
Those who would come from Baku for civilized negotiations were immediately violently attacked by
the separatists.
On 18 March, 1988, the plenum of Nagorno-Karabakh regional committee of the Azerbaijan
Communist Party made the decision on annexing NKAO to Armenia.
K. Brutents writes in his memoirs, "I visited A.N. Yakovlev on 24 February. He told that several
hours ago Gorbachev had received (as far as I understood, with Yakovlev's support) the poetess S.
Kaputikyan and the writer Z. Balayan. According to Yakovlev, the conversation impressed Mikhail
Sergheyevich and allowed him to perceive the problem of Artsakh (the ancient name for Nagorno-
Karabakh) for the first time and he felt sympathy for it. Yakovlev, who seemed to share this approach
himself, encouraged me."
On arriving in Armenia, S. Kaputikyan spoke on Armenian television, sharing her impressions from
her meeting with Gorbachev, "The conversation lasted about four hours When Comrade Gorbachev
noticed that we often repeated the words "Nagorno-Karabakh", he said, "I think this word means
"Artsakh"" Isn't it a call for action?!

48
One could not be more clear! Gorbachev and Yakovlev stuck to this position all their time in power,
which in many ways determined the following events.
K. Brutents remembers, "I informed A. CHernyayev (the very Chernyayev who declared to the whole
USSR that Islamic fundamentalism gained a foothold in Azerbaijan), Gorbachev's aid, about my intention
and asked for support. Anatoly Sergheyevich called back very quickly and said that Gorbachev "blessed"
me for such a step and entrusted me with telling the rally that a) the previous decision qualifying
demonstrations and the entire movement as "nationalistic" and "extremist" was cancelled; b) a committee
would be established to consider the desires and claims of the Karabakh population, the committee would
consist not of officials but of impartial authoritative public figures."
That new decision of Gorbachev was the first departure from the common USSR principles: not to
solve political problems through meetings and not to demand anything from the authorities but only
welcome them.
Gorbachev actually gave the Karabakh separatists carte blanche.
They realized that quickly and continued their cause with renewed strength.
K. Brutents remembers further, "Returning to Moscow from the actually vain but very instructive trip,
I reported its results and my impressions to M.S> Gorbachev.
1. The mood in Nagorno-Karabakh covers wide sections of the population and is actually shared by
the party activists and even the heads of the party organization;
a) they are convinced that only outside Azerbaijan can they normally develop and be preserved as an
ethnic group in the given territory."
Gorbachev's message where the previous decision qualifying demonstrations and the entire
movement as "nationalistic" and "extremist" was cancelled and a committee was to be established to
consider the desires and claims of the Karabakh population, consisting not of officials but of impartial
authoritative public figures, gradually turned into the belief that only outside Azerbaijan can they
normally develop and be preserved as an ethnic group in the given territory. That was the first official
docking on the anti-Azerbaijan orbit Moscow - Stepanakert.
During the visit of the head of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev in the United States of America in
December, his spouse Raisa Gorbacheva met the representatives of "Dashnaktsutyun". The famous
journalist T. Chaladze writes, "In the Caucasus, that meeting had the same effect as the one that would
obviously be produced by some message of the following kind, "The head of the state visited Rudolf Hess
in "Schpan-dau" and had a long and friendly conversation with him at breakfast." For "Dashnaktsutyun"
is an organization having a wide foreign network everywhere representatives of Armenian diaspora live
and was banned as nationalistic. However, after the top-level reception a report appeared in the Soviet
press that for the first time since the anti-Soviet mutiny in 1921, "Dashnaktsutyun" party would have its
own central office, publishing organ and information centre in Armenia."
D. Furman and S. Asenius write, "whereas nationalistic mentality with its trends for self-deceit and
mythologems considered the return of the Turkish Armenia as a distant and hardly achievable task, to get
Nagorno-Karabakh with the assistance of Moscow seemed quite realistic." And that was getting more and
more realistic after Gorbachev's each step on the Karabakh problem.
In March 1988, the high party authorities changed in Armenia and Azerbaijan ("due to health
reasons"), K. Demirchan and K. Baghirov were correspondingly replaced with S. Arutyunyan and A.
Vezirov.
The same month, "Karabakh" committee appeared on the political stage with the blessing of A.
Yakovlev, immediately declaring its support for Gorbachev's perestroika, in the process of which the
Karabakh issue was to be solved.
On 24 March, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
Council of Ministers passed the resolution "On the measures to accelerate economic development of
NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR in 1988-1995". That meant nothing but encouragement to move from the
current stage and go further!
The Armenians needed not any other blessing from the head of the country!
"Ostankino" dares to take an uncommon step (surely, with a certain purpose) and secretly prepares a
programme titled "Nagorno-Karabakh. Thinking aloud" where mainly Sumgayit events were considered.
The programme was not announced in advance to stop Baku from taking preventive measures. It was
suddenly broadcast in prime time in April 1988, as a special issue, and Baku suffered a powerful
information blow.
After numerous speeches of the Armenian leader, Baku was looking forward to the first appearance
of Vezirov on TV. Finally, it happened. In the conversation with his old friend Anatoly Lysenko, Vezirov

49
spoke of mafioso groups in Azerbaijan for a whole hour, showing in gestures how we were to fight them,
of friendship between peoples, of the unused potential of Socialism etc.
The Karabakh issue was touched upon just in passing, like an unfortunate misunderstanding in the
process of perestroika, that would end soon with a strong handshake of both sides.
Vezirov obviously appealed to the Moscow intellectuals. It should be said that the most difficult and
irresistible problem for Baku was the attitude of intellectuals and democrats in the period of perestroika,
since their position was unambiguous and stable pro-Armenian.
Those democrats included committed ones, and those who hated Muslim world, and those who were
sincere in their assessment of the events. However, none of them actually understood what was going on
in the USSR. Even if there were few who did, they did not want to. Vezirov had many friends among the
intellectuals of Moscow and was sure of their support. But he was mistaken.
As we were told, A. Vezirov tried to convince the representative of Interregional group G. Popov
("one of the darkest and most repulsive figures of that period of the Russian history", according to
Legostayev) in something for a solid hour, while the latter listened to him with a bored look and clearly
wanted to end the conversation as soon as possible. Other democrat deputies had the same look while
listening to Vezirov.
Even if some of them were genuine democrats they were Christian ones. After the well-known
events, Baku understood what it meant.
With regard to anti-Azerbaijan statements of Moscow intellectuals in press in the beginning of the
events, Baku believed that they had simply been misled by Armenian separatists and soon would realize
the meaning of what was going on and change their attitude to the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict.
A certain amount of time passed and it became evident that if someone was naive, it was Baku.
Moscow intellectuals knew everything about the matter but nevertheless they did not change their attitude
a bit.
Dmitry Bykov described the liberal intellectuals in connection with the events in the USSR and
Gorbachev's attitude to them precisely and neatly, "One thing is clear. Instead of condemning definitely
any nationalism, any attempt to put national interests before universal ones at the very start, Gorbachev
considered national interests a demonstration of freedom and endured all this, trying to save his face
before the liberal intellectuals. I must say that I have never seen anything more disgusting than liberal
intellectuals in my life. They are the very scoundrels and cowards described by Blok, who cheerfully fuss
around the fire, putting more slivers into it, and then start to yell, "We're burning!" The crudest
nationalism had full attention and respect of a considerable part of Russian liberals in the end of the
eighties. Gorbachev failed to take a definite and sound position in this issue. " We can only add that when
the favourites of liberal intellectuals made a slaughter in Khodjaly, liberal intellectuals should have shout
in unison, "We're burning!", if they had had a bit of decency. But they pretended that nothing happened!
And they were bought again, for umpteenth time, both by wholesale and retail!
In the Soviet period, liberal intellectuals expressed their loathing for Communists at their kitchen get-
togethers and in the time of Gorbachev's perestroika the Karabakh events made them shift all their bilious
hatred (they always have to hate someone) to Azerbaijan that had suffered from the Soviet power much
more than these liberal intellectuals who had lived not that bad owing to their unscrupulousness.
There is an essay on the site of A. Goryanin. "1987. Rallies in Stepanakert. What is that? Glasnost
together with the speech of Avel Aganbegyan in Paris yielded its bitter fruit. Shall we gather in the first
harvest? NKAO should belong not to the Azerbaijan SSR but to the Armenian SSR. The existence of the
USSR is actually forgotten somehow. Have we ever seen something like that before? Perhaps, after 1918-
1920? Oh, sorry, my fault, it happened once. In 1978. A fight during dancing with a lethal outcome.
Comrade Andropyan (mother's maiden name) came and everything faded away of itself (?) somehow. In
1987 there was no such Andropyan. But there they are, Bonner-Sakharov, Starovoytova and other
vociferous crowd of human rights activists (Sheynis, Batkin, Oskotsky). Abkhasiz, Central Asia, North
Caucasia are looking and biting on that already. Happy first conflict! Ethnic one. Something Hitler
dreamed of. Could he ever poke his nose here without a hope for an ethnic issue? Newspapers TV
screens are swarming with Korotich, Bella Shkurkova, Natan Rybak, Shatrov. "Ogonyok, Moscow
News, Noviy mir and Drujba narodov" Repentance, View, Fifth Wheel! Grossman, Konetskym
Zhvanetsky. And here it is Askeran (two Azerbaijanis, first victims of "miatsum"). And here it is
Sumgayit, disorders, pillage and rape of Armenians. Yakovlev (democrap) in Yerevan, Ligachev
(conservative) in Baku. Historical excursions of both sides. "Stone of Mashtots or trace of the hoop of
Shakh Ismail's horse", who will win?"

50
Everyone has a right for their own view of the Karabakh events without insulting peoples, which is
what the author of this essay does, saying certain names. He skilfully covered the liberal intellectuals who
actively interfered in the Karabakh events. We can add that that circle of persons not only took pro-
Armenian position, which they had a right for, but also repeatedly made insulting statements about the
Azerbaijan people.
On 18 July, 1988, the meeting of the USSR Supreme Council Presidium was held where the problem
of Nagorno-Karabakh was discussed. H. Aliyev remembers, "Remember the meeting of the USSR
Supreme Council Presidium (the part where the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh was discussed - Author).
Gromyko remained silent throughout the whole meeting. Gorbachev, a member of the Supreme Council,
never let him even open his mouth. He was acting like the secretary of a district committee at the
collective farm party meeting, interrupting anyone, suppressing everyone. With 2 years of perestroika left
behind, he was never tired of speaking about new mentality, pluralism, democracy. Yet, his behaviour
remained that of a dictator."
The first secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh regional committee of the party Ghenrikh Pogosyan
spoke at that meeting, emphasizing the impossibility for NKAO to further remain a part of the Azerbaijan
SSR. Gorbachev did not interrupt him. He did not receive the appropriate rebuff from anyone. Everyone
was saying that the USSR borders were unchangeable but that they nevertheless felt sympathy for the
Karabakh Armenians. The scenario was that human feelings of the Karabakh separatists were
understandable but the USSR Constitution must not be changed.
At the same meeting the resolution was passed on allocating 400 million roubles (about 600 million
US dollars) subsidy for Nagorno-Karabakh, which was unprecedented aid at that time.
Stepanakert immediately "responded" to that aid by hanging a big poster at the entrance to the city,
"The demand for the reunion with Armenia is not a demand of a hungry stomach but that of a yearning
soul." Yet they took the money.
Social "problems" that had been worrying the Soviet public so much were forgotten.
It was well-known then how to fight separatism and associated terrorism. An effective method was
found after many years of unsuccessful struggle against Irish separatism. All economic channels to
separatists were blocked and they were virtually defeated.
Gorbachev was also well aware of that, so were those who had to know that duty-bound.
However, there was totally different approach to the Karabakh separatism, material and other aid to
separatists after the beginning of the movement both from the state and from private individuals being
increased manyfold!
The meeting of the Presidium was broadcast on the Central Television of the USSR and caused
compassion of the Soviet people for Karabakh separatists; they knew the worth of the USSR Constitution
that said one thing, while different things happened in reality.
None of the Soviet mass media or famous politicians then paid no attention to the fact that all the
chief demands included in the regulations of "Krunk" and voiced at the meetings in Stepanakert in the
beginning of the separatist movement, at the 18 July meeting of the USSR Supreme Council Presidium,
HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT! Only several years later, though in a different aspect, "Zerkalo mirovoy
pressy" N7, 27 February - 6 March, 1991, wrote, "Meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Council on 18 July, 1988. In July 1988, a resolution was passed reduced to the support of economic and
cultural development of NKAO including its economic and cultural relations with Armenia. That was
very important in February and might have helped to ease the tension but in July, the resolution was
lagging behind the changes in people's minds and therefore was almost useless." The statement is correct
as a fact but it is far from reality as it fails to estimate the depth of the processes in NKAO. All talks of
cultural, economic and similar demands of the Karabakh separatists were just a cover for the main thing,
the occupation of the Azerbaijan territory by Armenia! They had a clear and intelligent way of measuring
their steps with the dynamics of Gorbachev's perestroika, taking into consideration the specific character
of the time. Gorbachev began his perestroika with glasnost, continues with criticism of everything and
everyone and consistently did away with the CPSU as the only political power in the USSR etc. And the
process started moving from one place to another! Karabakh separatism developed according to the
similar scheme. Their demands toughened as the disorders grew; when Gorbachev's process started
Armenian unleashed direct aggression against Azerbaijan. Vezirov made another strategic mistake. It was
Volsky and not Vezirov who invited first secretaries of Azerbaijan and Armenian Communist Parties
Central Committees A. Vezirov and S. Arutyunyan to NKAO; and Vezirov agreed to come. In March
1988, S. Arutyunyan was appointed first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee.
On 15 June, 1988, the new first secretary Suren Arutyunyan conducted the session of the Supreme

51
Council of Armenia where he approved the annexation of NKAO to Armenia; on 27 July, 1988, feeling
his duty complete, he arrived in NKAO together with Vezirov, where A. Volsky demonstrated who was
the host in NKAO, treating Vezirov like a honourable guest, speaking of some projects that he had
arranged with Moscow, of additional investments in the region, and, the most important thing, of the new
intensity in the development of economic and cultural relations with Armenia.
On 12 September, 1988, an organized crowd in Stepanakert attacked the district public prosecutor's
office, demanding release of all who had been detained recently and attempting to punish the public
prosecutor's office employees that escaped from the building under convoy of armed guards. Stepanakert
was left without the "eye of the state" and disorders began against Azerbaijanis; 125 Azerbaijan houses
were burned in Stepanakert and 200 were pillaged.
In the late September 1988, more than 12,000 Azerbaijanis were evicted from Stepanakert.
On 16 November, 1988 deforestation began in Topkhane near Shusha, as Kanaker aluminium plant
started an illegal construction of a timber shop. The authorities in Baku responded with a march of
protest. That authorized meeting made a strange impression. The well-trained speakers spoke as if the
main problem in the "united family of peoples" was preservation of forest in Topkhane. Karabakh was set
on fire by separatists, blood was flowing, Azerbaijanis were driven away from NKAO, while speakers at
the meeting were talking of the valuable trees in Topkhane and some of them sharing nostalgic memories
of childhood spent in that forest.
On 1 December, 1988 Gorbachev met representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Here are some of
his statements at the meeting, "party and Soviet organs in both Caucasian republics lost control of the
events", "not just confusion but unscrupulousness some of party activists shifted from
internationalist positions ", "the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh became a convenient cover for anti-state
activity", "under the guise of demand of fair solution of the Karabakh issue an open struggle for power is
going on", "anti-perestroika forces, corrupted elements" Gorbachev demanded change "the position of
all our staff in key issues", "staff decides everything", "it is necessary to conduct uncompromised
struggle against those who provoke people disorders, sow rumours, stir up ethnic hatred", punish those
who discharge "people according to their ethnicity". And finally, "there should be neither "winners" nor
"losers".
Vezirov spoke to Gorbachev as if his heart was breaking, "Armenia has unilaterally annexed
Nagorno-Karabakh!" and heard a jeer in response, "If they annexed it unilaterally, then you release it
unilaterally, too."
Gorbachev's aid G. Shakhnazarov attacked Vezirov physically, in literal sense.
According to eyewitnesses, G. Shakhnazarov seized Vezirov at the sleeve of the jacket and cried out,
"History will not forgive you. Today, you have trampled an entire people!"
An old friend of Vezirov, a well-known publicist A. Kiknadze writes in his book "Baku Horseshoe",
"Vezirov said in a conversation with Gorbachev, "The events are unfolding threateningly fast. The
leadership of Azerbaijan deems it necessary to declare the state of emergency in the regions bordering
with Armenia and also in NKAO where armed assaults on our villages became more frequent."
Gorbachev answered, "I agree, but our comrades suggest declaring the state of emergency in Baku as
well. What do you think about it?" Vezirov: "We should not do it by any means. Blood will be shed"
"Free-tongued, Gorbachev curses the separatists and promises emotionally, "You can rely on my full
support and assistance."
When the time comes for that support and assistance, when the ice floe starts sinking, Mikhail
Sergeyevich will take a step aside, break his promises and betray."
The author knew well the remarkable publicist, deep and polymathic analyst and, most importantly, a
very decent man Alexander Kiknadze and is grateful to his for remembering the author of these lines
among other Bakuvians in his sincere book "Baku Horseshoe". And not only in that one. And the author
is more than convinced that Vezirov consulted Kiknadze about the personality of Gorbachev and that
Kiknadze certainly told him about Gorbachev's both personal and political unreliability. The author
remembers the predictive estimates Kiknadze gave in the fifties to political and sports figures, scientists,
journalists, sportsmen, the estimates that were inevitably bound to be confirmed afterwards. "He is not
just a great scientist, but he is also a man that loves his Motherland infinitely!" Kiknadze said about
Khudu Mamedov. Time showed that he had been right! Kiknadze could not but figure Gorbachev our and
share his finding with his old friend!
On 24 December, 1988 a famous civil activist Academician Andrey Sakharov visited Stepanakert. He
poured all the bile he had accumulated in the exile in Gorky on Baku. He repeated all his accusations
against the USSR in Stepanakert, only then they were directed against Azerbaijan.

52
Shaghen Mkrtchan writes in his book "Artsakh" (Yerevan, "Ayastan", 1991), "The great humanist
Sakharov also visited Karabakh and its capital. He saw no difference between Czechoslovakia of 1968
and Karabakh of 1988, between Berlin wall and Lachin road, between self-determination right of Baltic
countries and that of Artshakh." Shaghen Mkrtchan does not finish. "The great humanist Sakharov"
directly called in Stepanakert for "the armed struggle against the oppressors."
"The old and helpless Sakharov was in cold blood stirring up a war in Nagorno-Karabakh, but as soon
as someone dared to make an objection, a swarm of his sensitive associates began put the "aggressive
majority" to shame, and that majority shyly hid again," Information and Technology Centre of Central
Committee of the Russian Federation Communist Party writes. It should be said that the centre made a
precise observation of this peculiarity in the discussion of the Karabakh problem at all Soviet forums. A
democrat and anti-Communist, A. Sakharov writes to Gorbachev concerning NKAO, "A people that
denies another people its right of self-determination cannot be free itself. Marx, Engels and Lenin said
that." At that time the author used to listen to "Western voices" that did not conceal their sympathy when
commenting his speeches in Stepanakert. It was clear that the informational blow Sakharov struck at
Baku was comparable to that Baku received after Sumgayit events.
Baku took "counteractions" common for Soviet propaganda. Some scientists and Heroes of Socialist
Labour were speaking on local TV, throwing mud on Sakharov from all their hearts, though not to the
point. Fortunately, those broadcasts were not seen anywhere except Azerbaijan itself. Informational
blockade can sometimes be useful!
Owing to the efforts of Sakharov's wife Y. Bonner-Alikhanyan, this tradition was continued; after
Sakharov's death, on 19 July, 1991 a delegation of the First International Academician Sakharov
Congress headed by the vice speaker of the House of Lords of the British Parliament Caroline Cox visited
NKAO. Baroness Cox, who has visited Nagorno-Karabakh over 30 times since then, more than her
family estate, continues to protect the "self-determination right of the Karabakh Armenians" actively and
persistently, both internationally and in the parliament of Great Britain.
Though the leaders of England say that Caroline Cox does not express the official attitude of the
English government, her opinion is not reputed. So much like the policy of good old England!
The powerful Armenian propaganda reached actually all corners of the world. After meetings with
Gorbachev, a slogan was heard at the meetings in Stepanakert, "Lenin - Party = Gorbachev. Hitler - Stalin
- Ligachev" . In Yerevan, before many thousands of marchers, the secretary of the CPSU CC Yakovlev
called the separatism of Stepanakert "national-liberation movement". For the sake of objectivity, let us
say that this behaviour of Yakovlev was openly pointed out by A. Mutalibov at the congress of people's
deputies.
The main ideologist of this doctrine and the entire perestroika was the secretary of the PSU CC
Alexander Yakovlev, this defrocked ideologist (according to N. Zenkovich).
Vladimir Lutsenko was the head of Z department of the USSR KGB; Valery Khmelev took the post
of the head of a section at the same department. According to them, Z department was engaged in ethnic
issues. Information on ethnic issues in Russia and the USSR was stored here. They received requests for
aid and information from the Central Committee of the Party, Ministry of Justice, Supreme Council and
other offices. Both of them were on official business in Azerbaijan and Armenia those days.
"'How could the leaders of the country, having both Z special department and historical experience,
miss the brewing conflict between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians?' they were asked.
'Both Politburo and the Supreme Council knew that the conflict was brewing,' they replied. 'We
submitted all the appropriate information. However, no measures were taken before the first open actions
in Stepanakert, though there was that alerting march in October 1987 from Abovyan to Yerevan.
Thousands of greens expressed their protest against the construction of a nuclear power plant and
operation of "Nairit" chemical plant. Calls for taking Karabakh from Azerbaijan could be heard as early
as then. When people with posters, red flags and banners saying "Lenin, Party, Gorbachev!",
"Independence for Karabakh!" appeared in the streets of Stepanakert, Politburo decided to act in old
fashion, that is, if there is a problem, officials should be sent.
No matter what officials, what is important is the fact of sending them.
Georgy Razumovsky and, for some reason, minister of culture Petr Demichev arrived in Stepanakert.
None of them even knew what to talk to the rally about. Both in modern musquash caps, strict and
unapproachable. We saw how much they were scared.
They were always hiding in the regional committee. We hardly persuaded Razumovsky to speak
before the rally. He unsuccessfully tried to persuade them to break up. But the crowd did not want to.
People got down on their knees and asked independence for Karabakh.Razumovsky retreated, he and

53
Demichev got in the car and rushed to Baku. They had packed so quickly that Razumovsky even forgot
his coat in the regional committee, so then they had to come back for it from Baku, almost 300 km.'
'Surely, you reported all disorders to Moscow. What kind of answers did you receive from Kremlin?'
asked the correspondent.
'After Sumgayit events, a meeting of Politburo was held in Moscow. A closed one. After which
Yegor Ligachev went to Baku and Alexander Yakovlev to Yerevan. However, one of them suddenly said
that Karabakh was a historical territory of Armenia, while the other said just the opposite, no borders
revision, Karabakh would stay a part of Azerbaijan. We do not know who handed over the information on
the decision made at the closed Politburo meeting, but the fact remains. Every week, memos were sent to
Gorbachev with detailed description of the situation and the KGB proposals on the settlement of the
conflict. They were signed by V. Kryuchkov. Sometimes the memos were prepared together with the
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice. Alexander Yakovlev happened to sign such a document
once. But Mikhail Gorbachev appended the following instructions on all of them, "Make your
proposals""
Armenia made its proposal at the very start and Gorbachev and his circle realized it stringently!
In his book Diary of the Aide of the USSR President, chapter 1 On the Bumps of Perestroika, 9
October, 1988, A.S. Chernyayev writes, "On Friday, Gorbachev sent for me and Shakhnazarov. He kissed
him congratulating on the occasion of his 64th birthday. We talked about the coming trip to the UN, and
to Kuba and London as well. Then in passing, we made Kvitsinsky the head of the International
department of the Central Committee instead of Dobrynin. And suddenly he burst out concerning
Karabakh. He stood up in front of us, while we were sitting, and said, "I want it to be humanly, for the
people start talking to one another again, I don't want blood there There are corrupted figures.
Demirchan (the first secretary of Armenia) gathers his folks, Baku mobilized its forces, Armenian
intellectuals are broke, with nothing to suggest, nothing that could help to solve the whole thing. BUT I
DON'T KNOW THE SOLUTION MYSELF. IF I DID I WOULD NOT CONSIDER ANYTHING THAT
WE HAVE NOW OR ANYTHING THAT HAS FORMED ALREADY AND SO ON. BUT I DON'T
KNOW!" (highlighted by the author) Then he mentioned Aliyev's case and said that they were digging
and the case promised to be more serious than that of Rashid." This conversation of the three sworn
enemies of Azerbaijan contains important information. The man, who has full authority in a superpower
and necessary information from the whole world, does not know how to solve a problem in his state and
tells that to the strong and aggressive side, Armenia. Only those too far from politics can doubt if
Shakhnazarov immediately reported about that conversation to the Armenian side through his own
channels.
V.I. Boldin writes, "He (Gorbachev - Author) did not trust even Shakhnazarov in everything (yet he
consulted him on every issue - Author), often complaining that solutions on the Karabakh problem leaked
to the Armenian diaspora
After the leakage of extremely important foreign information from one meeting of Security Council
and became known to those it concerned, Gorbachev charged V.A. Kryuchkov with investigating the
circumstances and also ordered that aids and advisers should not attend the Security Council meetings any
more."
According to the memoirs of V.A. Kryuchkov, the leakage of important information, to the Armenian
diaspora as well, continued and he hints at certain persons who were close to Shakhnazarov.
Knowing about the pressure exerted upon the actually defenceless Azerbaijan, the General Secretary
has no solution but relies on Armenian intellectuals. He realized that whereas he had no solution, others,
lower in ranks, would always have solutions of local issues under the pressure and owing to the bribes of
the powerful Armenian lobby in the USSR, which formed a whole anti-Azerbaijan system in total. He
was well aware that unlike Yerevan, Baku had no support either in the USSR or in the world. The lack of
a clear position of the USSR leaders on the Karabakh problem put Baku in a desperate situation, as the
leaders of the republic pinned all their hopes on the Centre. For Yerevan, it meant that no position is a
position, too!
The numerous facts of constitutional abuses, months-long strikes in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh,
eviction of Azerbaijanis from their long-occupied places, disarmament of Soviet military units and
seizure of their weapons, formation of armed groups, unpunished murders and many other things but
the head of the state has no solution! And all this happens within the limits of a united state! A conclusion
suggests itself for the Armenian side after receiving this important information: go on, margin of safety
has not been reached yet, Gorbachev is not going to take any steps! And they went on and on, even on a

54
larger scale! Not only did the Armenian side understand but also was informed in detail on all subtleties
of the situation and modified its actions accordingly.
Baku felt the danger and sounded the alarm, though without informing the public, which was quite in
the manner of socialist "friendship" of peoples.
KGB Lieutenant Colonel Aydyn Abdullayev wrote, "In the course of 1987, Stepanakert department
of the KGB informed Baku about the actions of Yerevan emissaries and activity of "Krunk", including the
party leaders of NKAO Armenian districts. (Among the four NKAO districts, Mardakert, Martuni, Gadrut
and Shusha, only the latter was Azerbaijani.) The republican KGB reported to the Soviet KGB and of
course to the leadership of Azerbaijan. The USSR KGB as usually reported to the CPSU CC. Baku
department of the KGB received no guidelines from there, except one "Do not interfere". Requests from
the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party had the same response, "Do not take any
measures!"
The passive position of Moscow and Baku led to what was bound to happen. On 12 July, 1988, the
session of the district Soviet of people's deputies of NKAO made a decision on the secession from the
Azerbaijan SSR.
With regard to that session, A. Yakovlev said to the Azerbaijan side, "The Armenians are a proud
people, we can consider the application of the NKAO deputies later, when dust settles in Yerevan." But
everything was only beginning!
In full accordance with Gorbachev's style, a resolution was passed by the CC Politburo, which said
that borders of the republics were unchangeable and "the problem of perestroika should be finally
resolved". Everyone could interpret this resolution in their own way but it was in favour of the Armenians
on the whole, since for the first time after Lenin and Stalin, the Centre made some concessions and
actually suggested that the republics should decide the problems themselves, thereby cancelling the
common notion of the "friendship of peoples".
The head of the USSR KGB V. Kryuchkov knew the point of what was going on in Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh better than anyone. He knew everything, owing to the information from abroad and
Azerbaijan KGB as well.
However, his speeches are full of general meaningless words. "Vyshka" wrote on 9 September, 1988,
"He said, "The KGB has the information that the secret services, anti-Socialist centres of imperialistic
states are carefully watching the ethnic relations situation in our country They have recently increased
their efforts in stirring up nationalistic, chauvinistic and separatist sentiments in different regions with the
purpose of undermining the unity of the Soviet state, weakening its economic and defensive power, and
even direct inspiration of extremism and mass disorders."
Incorruptible and high principled Soviet generals (not all of them were like Lebed), who tried to fight
separatism in NKAO, immediately became objects of persecution and terrorism. And most painfully, the
supreme command did not protect them.
Major General Yuri Kosolapov was appointed the first commandant of the state of emergency region
in NKAO. His first order banned all mass actions, closed anti-Constitutional "Miatsum" movement, all
unofficial organizations and their publishing organs. Persons without NKAO registration were to leave
Nagorno-Karabakh within three days. Curfew was declared in the region. Mass media were censored,
censorship being carried out by a representative of the military commandant's office. Major General did
not add anything on his behalf, the whole order was based on the emergency provision. No sooner had he
issued the order than the USSR people's deputies Vachagan Grigoryan and Boris Damyan began hunting
him. They told him directly that they "will throw you out of here". And they did. Three days later
Kosolapov were transferred to another place to continue his service.
Kosolapov was replaced by Land Forces General Vladimir Safonov who showed himself as a
principled supporter of the state on the very first day of his arrival.
Several attempts on his life were committed by separatists in Stepanakert itself but he escaped death.
They tried to get at him in Rostov where he live permanently but killed by mistake his neighbour Colonel
Blakhotin.
Separatists have a powerful front in Moscow, on the highest political and state level, so they could get
away with all their illegal actions."
On 1 March, 1988, "Krunk" social political organization was established in NKAO, headed by the
director of Stepanakert building materials complex Arkady Manucharov, "for the purpose of controlling
national liberation movement of the Karabakh Armenians". Before that, law-enforcement agencies had
conducted a complex inspection of the facility and grand larceny had been discovered. Manucharov was
arrested for his economic crimes. The arrest was made by the USSR public prosecutor's office. And then

55
suddenly the USSR Prosecutor General Sukharev received a phone call from the ideologist of perestroika,
secretary of the CPSU CC A. Yakovlev, demanding to release Manucharov as an innocent victim of
Azerbaijan intrigues. An interesting connection, isn't it? A member of the high leadership of the country
and an ordinary provincial thief
Sukharev promises Yakovlev to consider Manucharov's case carefully.
Another call follows after a while; Yakovlev reminds of his request and hears in response that it is
impossible, since Manucharov's guilt is proved and unquestionable.
Nevertheless, Manucharov was soon released. It is unknown who else of the USSR leadership could
call Sukharev. And that was not a single case. Two aids of the secretary of the CPSU CC Alexander
Yakovlev, Valery Kuznetsov and Nikolay Kosolapov dealt all problems of Armenia and caused problems
for Baku.
The well-known writer Alexander Kabakov, who took an insulting position towards the Azerbaijanis
in the conflict (just read the sentence, "Two cliffs are hanging over the gorge. To the right is Shusha, the
city where Azerbaijanis live today."), had nonetheless to admit that mafia had been running the
"democratic" movement in NKAO. "There was plenty of underground wealth. Businessmen of shadow
economy controlling hundreds of thousands and having distant and high relations lived next to the people
deprived of basic conveniences. It is sufficient to say that the money returned after the arrest of one of
them (Manucharov - Author) would be enough to pay month wages to hundreds of people. Capital gave
those "godfathers" actual power. The frauds could compromise honest Karabakh people (?! - Author)
fighting for the awakening of national self-consciousness."
Soon, those "fighting for the awakening of national self-consciousness" and mafia organizations
merged.
Lieutenant Colonel of "Vympel" special operations group Erkebek Abdullayev remembers, "On 18
January, 1989 the major part of people from "Alfa" and "Vympel", a "speckled berets" platoon, a special
operations company of the Soviet Army were urgently redeployed to Karabakh. I was in that composite
detachment. In Stepanakert, we were given the list of seventeen activists, thirteen of whom were later
seized and sent to Rostov by helicopters. They were released in 30 days." Here it is!
"Soviet Karabakh" published a provocative and hateful article against the Azerbaijanis wrote by the
future "president" of NKR A. Gukasyan. In accordance with the clause 2 of the emergency provision, the
author of the article was arrested and transported to Russia. Next day "Pravda" wrote, "Deputy editor-in-
chief of "Soviet Karabakh" A.A. Gukasyan was arrested by administrative order in Stepanakert for
rousing national hatred." The same appeared on Central Television. A high-ranking official of the
Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee spoke on the Azerbaijan TV and said that "Moscow
would nip such attacks on the friendship of peoples in the bud." Two weeks later Gukasyan was released
and he appeared at a meeting in Stepanakert like a hero with new filthy statements against the Azerbaijan
people.
On 23 March, 1975, the first secretary of LKSM CC of Nagorno-Karanakg Yasha Bablyan read a
poem in public, in which nostalgia for "Armenian" lands in Turkey was felt. He was discharged and
banished from Karabakh for that. Public readings of such poems stopped. Such were the government
actions in Brezhnev's time of stagnation.
By the direct order of Gorbachev, General A. Makashov put his own life and lives of his family
(General remembered that afterwards in an interview to "Komsomolskaya pravda") and arrested five
leaders A. Akopyan, K. Vartanyan, S. Ghevorkyan, V. Manukyan and L. Ter-Petrosyan. By the personal
directions of Gorbachev, they were given thirty days of administrative detention and were forwarded to
Butyrka.
In those thirty days Butyrka turned into a centre of Karabakh separatism. Journalists were devouring
every word those "great martyrs" uttered.
Western TV channels showed portraits of those "great martyrs" against the background of Butyrka
every day, presenting them just as fighters for freedom of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Appeals signed
by them were spread both in Armenia and in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The authority of the prisoners became incredible. "If you are not with "Karabakh" committee you are
not a patriot," the entire Armenia would say.
Whereas extremism in Armenia and Karabakh was reaching its peak, the chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov received the newly-elected president of Armenia Ter-Petrosyan and
said that "Armenia was and will be a fraternal republic of the USSR" and allocated it additional means.

56
In those years, following the political course of Gorbachev, the USSR Council of Ministers under the
leadership of N. Ryzhkov adopted a number of resolutions that withdrew NKAO from the economic
territory of Azerbaijan.
On 24 March, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the
Council of Ministers passed the resolution "On the measures to accelerate economic development of
NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR in 1988-1995", providing measures of social economic and cultural
development for all regions of Armenian communities in the Azerbaijan SSR, including Baku (?!) .
By those resolutions, the Centre stressed its special treatment of the Armenians living in Azerbaijan.
There were a considerable number of regions in Azerbaijan with much worse social economic
development than in NKAO. The resolutions caused indignation in Baku, while pro-Armenian
"democrats" in Moscow mocked Gorbachev who "had given a piece of sausage instead of freedom."
On 12 January, 1989, a special form of government was introduced in NKAO, Committee of Special
Administration that legalized all unlawful acts of the separatists.
Numerous meetings gradually transform into disorders and gangster attacks. Law enforcement groups
are inactive. On 11 July, 1989 a new "support group" arrives in NKAO from Yerevan, and the situation
becomes sharply aggravated. "Rallying brigades" make blockages on the roads guarded by "duty groups".
In the course of clearing one of such blockages near Stepanakert, 19 servicemen of the Soviet Army were
injured, some of them seriously. Gunmen ambushed three Azerbaijanis in Stepanakert. Two were killed,
one wounded. The USSR mass media hushed up these facts.
Abroad, active propaganda was under way. In July 1989, a medal was produced in Venice, with the
map of Armenia together with NKAO and Nakhchivan on the head. The reverse had the following words,
"Oh Armenian people, your salvation is in your unity", "We are few but we are Armenians", "Karabakh is
our Artsakh". Many copies of this medal were given to foreigners, especially outstanding ones. In the
time of Shevardnadze, it somehow got in Soviet embassies abroad and spread everywhere. 16 years have
passed and the trick is repeated. Fake, empty "money" of NKR is issued in Switzerland for the same
purposes.
In September 1989 highways to Shusha district of NKAO populated by Azerbaijanis were totally
blocked.
Armenian support for the NKAO separatists did not make them wait long. In November 1989, a little
more than a month later, numerous attacks on Azerbaijan border villages from the territory of Armenia
were registered. Gunmen from Armenia landed in Khanlar and Shaumyan regions of Azerbaijan.
Moscow acted simultaneously with the separatists. On 13 January, 1989, on the initiative of Ryzhkov,
the USSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution "On measures related to the introduction of Special
form of government in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast". First of all, the USSR Council of
Ministers obliged to distinguish the rates of social and economic development in NKAO as special ones
(detached from the Azerbaijan SSR). That was undoubtedly Sitaryan's doing.
NKAO Department of the Interior was placed under the direct authority of the USSR, thereby giving
the NKAO separatists permission to evict all Azerbaijanis, since there was no one left to protect them.
Nagorno-Karabakh territorial edition and production department was formed by the order of
Goskomstat of the USSR.
On 6 May the USSR Council of Ministers passed another resolution approving withdrawal of
industrial facilities and organizations of NKAO from the authority of the Azerbaijan SSR and passing
them under the authority of facilities of Russia.
A resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers subsidized and realized on a most tight timetable the
construction of Yerevan - Goris radio relay link. That high-capacity relay station provided broadcasting of
Armenian TV programmes in Stepanakert and actually in the whole NKAO. At that moment it was a
deadly informational blow on Baku.
On 12 January, 1989, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council establishes the Committee of
Special Administration of NKAO headed by A. Volsky. Thus, NKAO was actually withdrawn from the
administrative authority of Azerbaijan. At the same time, the activity of the regional committee of the
party and regional Soviet of people's deputies was temporarily suspended, working apparatus of these
organizations being subordinated to the Committee of Special Administration. Volsky describes his
arrival in NKAO, "1988. Gorbachev called me and said, "Here are Ligachev, Razumovsky and
Chebrikov. They insist that you should go to Karabakh" I pressed for a personal meeting and asked what
the reason for this exile was. And he answered, "You know, Arkady, you are too excited about some
people, not everyone likes that. You refused to go to MGK when Yeltsin was removed, you refused to
speak at the plenary session I respect you, but comrades still insist." I grew hysterical and said that I

57
would rather work at a plant but you know Mikhail Sergeyevich, he can persuade anyone. So I found
myself in Karabakh."
We are convinced that Volsky lies, so easily and almost theatrically describing his appointment in
NKAO. Everything was much more serious, better-thought and purposeful. He was not appointed by
Gorbachev, who was nothing but a hand, but by the LODGE, and his strategy in NKAO was worked out
in minute detail!
From 16 September, 1988 to February 1990 Volsky was the representative of the Supreme Council of
the USSR and the CPSU CC in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the chairman of the Committee
of Special Administration of NKAO. His first order was to open the episcopacy of Armenian Gregorian
Church that immediately became the official centre of separatism in NKAO. It sent its messages about
"the suffering of NKAO Armenians and the destruction of Christian monuments by the official authorities
of Azerbaijan" to many Christian institutions. On the recommendation of Aganbegyan, Volsky gathered
expert economists in Stepanakert where they prepared a number of economic documents completely
withdrawing NKAO from the economic territory of Azerbaijan. Those documents were sent to the deputy
of Nikolay Ryzhkov, Voronin, who approved them. Volsky's activities did not go unnoticed by the
separatists and he was elected a people's deputy of the USSR in NKAO by 97% of votes - a very Soviet
result, indeed. He was then automatically elected a member of the Supreme Council and the Committee
of Armed Forces in the matters of defence and state security, where he dealt with the problems of the
separatists again.
On 19 May, 1989, the NKAO issue was discussed at the meeting of the Politburo Ethnic Relations
Committee.
The meeting and the resulting documents played nearly the crucial part in the Karabakh problem. The
documents of the committee (advocated by A. Yakovlev and G. Shakhnazarov) were approved by
Gorbachev and became the foundation of all following numerous committees and meetings on different
political levels devoted to the Karabakh issue.
THOSE DOCUMENTS HAD NO WORD IN THEM ABOUT SEPARATISM AND THE WORD
NATURALLY DID NOT APPEAR IN ANY OF THE SUBSEQUENT ONES CONCERNING THE
KARABAKH PROBLEM!
The documents with some reservations were the ideological guarantee of the Karabakh separatism
from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism.
In June 1989 the first congress of the USSR people's deputies decided to establish the Nagorno-
Karabakh Committee of the USSR Supreme Council. A month later, 20-27 July, 1989, that committee
was operating in NKAO. The document it worked out in full accordance with the documents approved at
the meeting of the Politburo Ethnic Relations Committee on 19 May, 1989 was unique in its content,
condemning some virtual extremists from both sides. However, the document said, on the whole, the pain
of the Karabakh people (naturally, Baku was to blame for that) was understandable, in connection with
which a number of recommendations were given to Baku for the purpose of improving the political and
social situation in the region.
Based on this document, the resolution "On the measures of stabilization of the situation in NKAO"
was passed by the USSR Supreme Council on 28 November, 1989. The decision was made to establish
the NKAO republican committee and resume the activity of the regional Soviet of people's deputies,
abolishing the Committee of Special Administration of NKAO.
Thus, the document drawn by Gorbachev, Yakovlev and Shakhnazarov at the Politburo Ethnic
Relations Committee followed all formal procedures and stuck a crushing blow on the integrity of
Azerbaijan.
Smoothly, the decisions of Moscow completely withdrew NKAO from the authority of Baku.
The results did not take long to appear. In summer 1989, Armenian armed groups launched the
operations on the eviction of Azerbaijanis from Karabakh, shifting from elimination of individual citizens
to the attacks on settlements and communities. Special efforts were concentrated on the destruction and
blocking of economic and transport infrastructures ensuring life activity of the Azerbaijani population.
The attacks were carried out by mobile combat teams dispersing in Armenian settlements after operations.
Automatic arms were widely used in the course of operations, beginning from autumn heavy artillery
(100 mm KS-19 cannons) and missiles ("Alazan"), improvised small-calibre mortars, and explosive
devices were used.
In the very beginning of the conflict, the political heavyweight Y. Primakov actively joined the
process and immediately conducted a "small Armenian council" in Moscow. He remembers in this
connection, "Before speaking at the meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council, in spring

58
1989, in Moscow, I met two actual leaders of the Karabakh movement. I am not talking of those who
pretended to be such, sitting far from Stepanakert and sometimes playing instigators but never risking
their lives and avoiding the flame of the fire they kindled. Robert Kocharyan and Maxim Mirzoyan
arrived for a meeting with one the leaders of the CPSU CC. After conversations in the Old square, they
asked Nami Mikoyan, a close friend of my late wife, to arrange a private meeting with me, the then
chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR.
There were also my friend and fellow student, an observer of "Izvestiya" Kostya Gheyvandov, N.
Mikoyan and her son, then already famous musician Stas Namin. The good hostess was my daughter
Nana who inherited this wonderful trait from her mother."
In warm private atmosphere, blows on Azerbaijan were prepared, no doubt, for all the mentioned
participants of that little council, as the further events showed, were fervent "hawks", except perhaps the
musician Stas Namin who was obsessed by the idea of demonstrating the mummy of Lenin to the
whole world for currency.
Soviet and then Russian military had a considerable part in the Karabakh events.
"In the last decade," wrote Komsomolskaya Pravda, "nearly 150 Russian generals and admirals
committed misdemeanours that come under Criminal Code. But only a few of them have been convicted."
Now, there are 1,380 generals and admirals in the Russian army. It seems that nearly every tenth of them
allowed criminal acts. No such thing has ever happened in the entire history of armed forces.
N22 in the list is the name of Colonel General Fedor Reut, the commander of the Russian group of
troops in Transcaucasia. He was accused of organizing delivery of weapons, equipment and ammunition
to Armenia (Clause 286) in 1992-1996
Compare: when there were over 3,030-3200 generals and admirals (1970-1980) in the Soviet Army,
criminal proceedings were instituted only against 17 officers, 12 of them for "serious oversights in
service". That thievish army helped to Karabakh separatists in every possible way. They were well aware
that in this case they were playing up to Gorbachev and his team, sticking to Christian factor, acquiring
relations in the Ministry of Defence where the Armenians were quite influential (Reut's case was stopped
owing to the unprecedented pressure of these forces and, most importantly, to a decent material
remuneration). At that time, Baku could rely only on honest and incorruptible generals. There were few of
such, but there they were. General Rokhlin paid with his life for the exposure of illegal weapons supply.
Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin wrote in the beginning of the conflict, "This year (1990 - Author)
organized militarized groups ("armies") formed in the territory of Armenia, which were armed with small
arms, rocket weapon and artillery systems taken from DOSAAF. Ministry of Internal Affairs and the
Soviet Army units The government of the Armenian SSR was obliged to take measures on banning
gangster formations, their full disarmament and armoury liquidation, to propagate inadmissibility of
violent measures in settlement of any conflicts. However, this did not happen."
Meanwhile, the geography of provocations against Baku expanded On 14 January, 1990 Lezghins
living in north-eastern regions of the republics organized meetings demanding self-determination and
separation from the Azerbaijan SSR. It became clear later that Armenian trace and the trace of secret
services (former KGB general Sterligov) was left here as well. The friendship between A. Sakharov and
R. Gamzatov played its certain part.
In the south of the country, the well-known forces tried to raise the Talyshs against the Azerbaijani.
Instead of calling people to defend Motherland, Vezirov and his team pretended that nothing special
was going on and that a turning point was about to come.
NKAO separatists began forming armed units. K. Myalo writes, "Against this background, self-
defence groups that had appeared in Karabakh as far back as in autumn 1988 (when the regional staff of
self-defence forces of Artsakh was formed of the commanders of all groups) began to merge into platoons
and companies. In the beginning of 1991 and at the end of 1992 there were about ten of them in
Karabakh, uniting over a thousand volunteers. Thus, Karabakh was the first of all so-called "self-
proclaimed states" took a step towards organization of regular army, making a precedent soon to be
followed by Transdniestria and Abkhazia."
Mercenaries from all over the world started gathering in NKAO.
Ogonyok writes, "The first stage of mercenary recruitment (from the beginning of the conflict in 1988
to till the USSR collapse in the end of 1991) was mainly connected with the Armenian foreign diaspora
and its organizations. First reports on soldiers of fortune in Karabakh appeared in summer 1989. Mass
media reported about ASALA (secret army of liberation of Armenia) with headquarters in Beirut, which
had started preparing subversive groups for terrorist actions in Azerbaijan."
The USA and Europe also hurried to help Armenia and Karabakh separatists.

59
A powerful impetus was given to the Armenian side by the meeting of the Armenian Catholicos with
the US president Reagan who promised to do away with the "evil empire" and saw the Armenians as
allies in his plans. Catholicos was speaking about the "suffering of the Karabakh Armenians."
At the most strained moment of the Armenian-Azerbaijan confrontation, Bush Sr. sent his son and
grandson to Armenia. He clearly and unambiguously supported the Armenians then, which inspired
Gorbachev in many ways, since the attitude of the Americans was equal to law for him.
On 19 July, 1989, the Senate of the US Congress unanimously approved the resolution expressing
"the US support for the expectations of the Soviet Armenian people about the peaceful and fair settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute."
On 19 November, 1989, the US Senate adopted a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh, "Due to the
fact that 80% of the Armenian majority living in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast are concerned
about due to the fact that the Soviet government qualified the murders of Armenians on 28-29
February, 1988 in the city of Sumgayit as disorders, due to the fact that at first, the people and
government of the Soviet Union took positive measures consisting in the establishment of the
Committee of Special Administration of NKAO, due to the fact that the Committee proved to be
inefficient to further, in the course of bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union, the fair settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that would actually reflect the people's views on the subject."
The US Senate continued to strengthen its anti-Azerbaijan position in the course of time.
It should be noted that it was hard to understand such an attitude of the US Senate towards
Azerbaijan, both humanly and politically, and in any other aspect.
The following table shows the number of executions performed by law and by Lynch law from 1884
to 1889 in the USA.

Ye Executions performed by law Executions performed by Lynch law


ar
18 103 219
84
18 108 181
85
18 83 133
86
18 79 123
87
18 87 144
88
18 98 175
89
Source: "Criminal Crowd", KSP+ Publishing House, Institute of Psychology of
Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998, Moscow.

Today, we have the impression that in their attitudes towards Azerbaijan American senators returned
to the 1880s and judge it not by international laws but by some principles that only they alone know and
lynch Baku on every occasion. At the same time they do not give a damn about the doings of the
Armenian side in Azerbaijan, as the US Senate has not ever passed a single resolution against Armenia
yet despite the political disorder in that country.
On 7 August, 1989, at the UN Human Rights Subcommittee meeting in Geneva, the USSR received
the recommendation to conduct a referendum in NKAO "with the purpose of determining the will of the
majority population in the regions"
On 17 January, 1990 the European Parliament passed a resolution appealing the European Council of
Foreign Ministers and the Council of Europe to support the Armenians before the Soviet government and
demanding immediate assistance for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 18 January, 1990, a group of
American senators sent a letter to Gorbachev calling for the reunion of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.

60
The US Senate resolved to "continue to support and encourage the efforts on the restoration of
Armenia, to encourage President Gorbachev and continue the dialogue with the Armenian representatives
at the Congress of people's deputies" and included the passed resolution in the draft bill on assignations
for 1990 fiscal year as an amendment.
O. Platonov states that "the "fifth column" of traitors to the country was formed in the USSR, which
was a part of Interregional deputy group and "Democratic Russia"."
According to Platonov, A.D. Sakharov and Y.G. Bonner became an important element of the US
influence agents network in the late 1960s. Their unrestricted praises for the Western political system and
biased criticism of the Soviet one by means of propaganda financed by the CIA had a significant role to
play in the cold war of the West against Russia. The former physicist that had broken up with science (by
the way, it has been discovered recently that the initiators of thermonuclear researches were not I.Y.
Tamm and A.D. Sakharov but a young soldier, who even had no secondary education by then, Oleg
Lavrentyev. In his letter to Moscow, he set forth brilliant ideas related to thermonuclear research. -
Author), and his wife, a daughter of frenzied Jewish Communists, took a major place among other public
figures and anti-Russian dissidents, turning into some kind of symbol of opposing historical values of
Russia, the banner of the struggle for its dismemberment and humiliation.
Hundreds of people that constituted the staff backbone of the USSR destructors and of the future
Yeltsin's regime passed the training of influence agents in the network of Krieble Institute offices and
similar establishments. Among them were G. Popov, G. Starovoytova, M. Poltoranin, A. Murashov, S.
Stankevich, Y. Gaydar, M. Bocharov, G. Yavlisnky, Y. Boldyrev, V. Lukin, A. Chubays, A. Nuykin, A.
Shabad, V. Bokser, many shadow people from Yeltsin's circle, in particular, the manager of his election
campaign in Yekaterinburg A. Urmanov, as well as I. Vityutin, M. Reznikov, N. Andriyevskaya, A.
Nazarov, outstanding journalists and TV men.
The author is far from such radical estimates of Platonov, but one fact is striking. Platonov, an
undoubtedly talented writer, hushes up this fact, for some reason, it seems. All the people he mentions
and mildly accuses of commitment and active participation in the USSR collapse, were ardent advocates
of Karabakh separatists and enemies of the Azerbaijani people. IN OTHER WORDS, THE CLOSE
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO EVENTS ("HIDDEN" CORRELATION), THE USSR
COLLAPSE AND NKAO SEPARATISM, ARE NOT OF PROBABILISTIC NATURE BUT A
DETERMINISTIC LAW, LIKE NEWTON'S LAW OF UNIIVERSAL GRAVITATION.
The law has a clear logic meaning: supporting NKAO separatism, the above-mentioned people
certainly realized that they thereby contribute to the USSR collapse.
THUS, AZERBAIJAN UNCONSCIOUSLY FOUND ITSELF IN A PARADOXICAL AND
ACTUALLY DREADFUL SITUATION. PROTECTING ITS OWN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, IT
STOPPED IN THE WAY OF POWERFUL FORCES STRIVING AFTER BREAKING DOWN THE
USSR, WHICH WAS FULLY USED BY KARABAKH SEPARATISTS.
According to the minister of foreign affairs of Latvia, from 1985 to 1992 the West (first of all, the
USA) invested 90 billion dollars in the "process of democratization in the USSR". The money was used
to pay for the services of right people, to train and pay influence agents, to buy necessary equipment,
instructors, literature etc.
No doubt, some of these means got into the pocket of Karabakh separatists.
American press raised to defend Karabakh separatists. For instance, "Time" wrote on 23 October,
1989 concerning the events in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it, "One side fairly demands that what
belongs to it by right be returned, while the other resists piling up lies and not disdaining to use any
means, including a political crime, a blockade. Strange enough, the judge still favours the boxer in the
green corner with the image of half-moon." Isn't this informational terrorism?
Of course, the omnipotent CIA was wide awake, realizing well that interesting events shaking the
USSR were beginning there.
"Novoye vremya" and "Or" report that recently declassified materials of the US CIA say that the fact
of recognition of Karabakh as a historical part of Armenia has never been doubted by this organization.
For instance, according to "Novoye vremya", Karabakh chronology prepared by the CIA in August 1990
begins with the preamble, "In 1921-1931 the new Soviet government turns Nagorno-Karabakh, a
historical Armenian territory, into an autonomous region inside the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan." The
1988 CIA research mentions Karabakh as the cultural and religious centre of Armenia. It says, "Karabakh
has been Armenian for millenniums. Even when some other parts of Armenia were under Persian and
Turkish influence." In the very 1988 the CIA made an attempt to analyse the reasons of anti-Armenian
policy of the Azerbaijan state. The conclusion was that the reason for the aggression against the

61
Armenians was not the Karabakh issue but the internal frustration of the Azerbaijan society, as a
consequence of the overstrain proceeding from the inability of the state to provide work and education for
the huge young population of the country Hence the difference between living standards of the
Armenians and the Azerbaijanis, and the solution of the problem through aggression. Earlier, in 1978, the
CIA report on the problems of ethnic minorities had almost a recommendation, "The population of
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast are capable to insist more forcefully on their legitimate demand
that the regions should be handed over from one republic to another. Karabakh is a part of Azerbaijan,
though more than 80% of its population is Armenians and the region itself is situated close to the
Armenian border."
This is confirmed, though in somewhat different aspect, by the head of the USSR intelligence
Shebarshin, who writes, "The omnipresent CIA strengthened its residency in Yerevan The provocative
methods used by the Western secret services to further the USSR collapse were also applied to the
destabilization and then disintegration of Russia itself
Continuing the subject of the activities of foreign secret services in Transcaucasia, let us give the
following fact. Among other things, we found out that there was some Monte Avo commander in
Nagorno-Karabakh, an American Armenian, officer who coordinated the actions of the troops in Martuni
region. Under his command, the Karabakh Armenians seized Goradiz, Fizuli, and many other settlements.
People feared him, respected and obeyed him. Monte Avo was killed and buried in Armenia like a
national hero. In the course of time, other cases of direct involvement of foreign experts in the internal
conflicts provoked in the USSR are made public."
This position of senators and the CIA is explained, among other things, by the fact that the USA did
not and do not regard the Karabakh events as separatism and terrorism. Much is cleared up by the position
of Fiona Hill, a specialist from Brookings Institute, famous expert on Eastern Europe, the former USSR
countries and international relations.
Question: Our reader from Azerbaijan sent the following questions. "Why Armenian terrorist
organizations such as ASALA and others are not included in the list of terrorist organizations? How much
does it fit the US government interests to support separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh of the Azerbaijan
Republic? Isn't it time that major world powers stopped their double standard policy?"
Hill: That is a very difficult question, as there is even no accurate definition of terrorism today. The
US actually had no serious discussion of the matter. Of course, we have some notion of terrorism, in
particular owing to the activities of Al-Qaeda. However, a totally different approach is requited to
determine the activities of organizations operating not in the whole world but in some certain place, in
Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Basque Provinces, Northern Ireland. For these organizations are related to
certain ethnic groups and have certain political purposes.
Hill: Methods of terror were used not only for "ethnic purposes", if one can say so. Russia had Lenin.
We could say that he was a terrorist. Of course, he himself did not commit terrorist acts but his own
brother was executed for the organization of the tsar's murder, quite a typical terrorist act. And many
people connected with Lenin in the Bolshevist Party also used terrorist methods. Lenin was not alone,
since many political movements in Russia at the end of the 19th century professed terror. So we can say
that the roots of terrorism lay in the pre-revolution Russia. For the serious ideology of terrorism, exactly
ideology, since terrorist acts had been carried out before in other countries as well, was born in Russia.
Remember Tkachev, Nachayev, Savinkov
That is, modern terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon, it is just using old methods to achieve
some political goal."
The US diplomats never say that, loyal to the following principle "A diplomat has a tongue to conceal
his thoughts", but they actually do that, proceeding from the above-mentioned principles.
The above-mentioned facts that make up merely 1-2% of the totality of similar well-known facts (and
so many unknown ones!) demonstrate that after Gorbachev came to power Azerbaijan was exposed to
many-dimensional aggression of different, sometimes rival forces within a single state. Such an example
can hardly be found in modern history.
Numerous facts of constitutional abuses, months-long strikes in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh,
eviction of Azerbaijanis from their long-occupied places, disarmament of Soviet military units and
seizure of their weapons, formation of armed groups, unpunished murders and many other things but
the head of the state, Gorbachev, who calls NKAO "Artsakh", has no solution! But the chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov had a "solution". Under his guidance, a number of resolutions
were passed that withdrew NKAO from the economic territory of Azerbaijan.

62
As a rule, all central bodies of the USSR always accused Baku of something and then suggested
solving the Karabakh problem in the frames of "Leninist friendship of peoples". If we open any document
on the Karabakh problem issued those years by highest authorities of the USSR, we will see that the
preamble invariably mentions certain shortcomings in Nagorno-Karabakh that were rather inherent in the
USSR on the whole, and all this is followed by general meaningless phrases. The first part of these
resolutions was the chief argument of the forces that supported separatists both in the USSR and abroad.
None of the resolutions has any single reproach against Armenia as the initiator of these bloody
events. At best, Armenia and Azerbaijan were treated equally!
New-sprung democrats kept up with the official authorities. Their hatred for the USSR seemed to
shift to Azerbaijan, as if Baku had been the cradle of revolution and not Petersburg.
Up to a million people gather in the Theater Square in Yerevan, demanding from their leaders the
opportunity to arm and begin a war against Azerbaijan, while Moscow calls them "a handful of
extremists". Under the guidance of the state bodies, all Azerbaijanis are driven away from Armenia, while
Moscow says, "they will be back, that was caused by certain forces standing in the way of perestroika."
Ominous events occur in Sumgayit, while Moscow is talking about "declassed elements". President
of Armenia openly declares that he begins to form the army of Armenia, while Moscow speaks about
some "mafia groups in Azerbaijan and Armenia". Considerable number of well-trained militants from all
around the world, including Russia, arrive in Armenia, while Moscow mentions allegedly "isolated cases
of penetration of suspicious persons in the territory of Armenia". Weapons are taken by force from whole
military units in Armenia, while Moscow calls that "extremist attacks". The list can be continued.
One of the first persons to sense the duplicity of the position of the Centre in the events was Z.
Alizade. He writes, "In general, the analysis of the CPSU CC policy in the Karabakh issue allowed to
draw one of the two following conclusions. 1) There was no planned policy at all, the spontaneity of the
events running before the reflections of the strategists from the CPSU. Decision-making mechanism
moved obviously more slowly than the events. 2) The CPSU CC was breaking down the Soviet Union
intentionally. Paradoxical as the latter theory may seem, a series of decisions taken by the Centre, which
were allegedly aimed at the stabilization of the situation in the autonomous oblast and resulted in
something totally opposite, does not rule it out at all."
All Azerbaijanis are evicted from Armenia and NKAO, blood is shed, while Karabakh separatism
receives considerable support from the West. Finally, when Gorbachev came to power they realized that
their demands and their opinion would be considered!
Neither Moscow nor Washington would not take into account the chief aim of Karabakh separatists
and the forces behind them, which they undoubtedly were aware of, the destruction of the USSR, the
subsequent chaos and the occupation of Azerbaijan territories in this uneasy situation.
Kseniya Myalo describes the ideology of Karabakh separatists proceeding from the general Armenian
ideology. It is so closely entwined with the general system that any shortening can distort its meaning. So,
we give it unabridged.
"In the 12 years that have passed since that time, the generation of then children grew up. For this
generation, both Sumgayit and all that happened afterwards are events of the remote past, moreover, the
events that occurred in the different country, not theirs. It is therefore difficult for them to sense the
connection between those events and the "iron ring around Russia's neck", and it is even more impossible
to imagine what an acute trauma for the social, still imperial, consciousness was the fact that the first
impetus for the destruction of the power had been given by Armenia. For Armenia was traditionally
regarded as Russian-centric and, on the whole, that was in accordance with the main historical trend,
though did not reflect the entire complexity of the issue.
The other side of the issue was thoroughly analyzed by the young Russian philosopher (and Slavophil
of German orgin) Vladimir Ern. Almost simultaneously with Sergey Sazonov, the minister of foreign
affairs of the Russian Empire, who submitted his report on the Armenian issue to the Council of Ministers
in 1916, which proceeded from the concept of a cloudless Russian-Armenian alliance, he reflected a
different aspect of the problem in his essay "Autonomous Armenia" (1915), which has been unfortunately
forgotten and not considered with due attention.
Considering the project nurtured by some part of Armenian intellectuals, which provided not
annexing Turkish Armenia to the Russian Empire (in case if the latter won the war) but granting it special
autonomous status, Ern drew the following conclusion. That quite crafty plan expressed the hidden desire
of some part of Armenian intellectuals to increase independence from Russia, however without losing the
opportunity to use its power for defence, if necessary. They did not think how destructive for the saving

63
Russian power such games could be, and were guided not by the interests of the victims of a brutal
genocide at all.
"Certainly, those poor people need no "autonomy"," Ern wrote. "They would be happy if they were
not robbed, raped, burnt and killed any more in the literal, physical sense of the world (as we know,
Armenians and Azerbaijans enjoyed equal rights in both in Azerbaijan and NKAO, which cannot be said
of the Azerbaijanis in Armenia. - Author). "Autonomy" is for those who are not content with the
relatively wide rights that the Russian Armenians enjoy. Armenians in Russia have the absolute freedom
of conscience, full church autonomy, secondary education in mother tongue and full political equality
with the native Russian population. The advocates of "autonomy" are not satisfied even with that. If so,
they want to have more rights than the Russian population itself enjoy in the Russian state."
IT WAS THE TREND (highlighted by the author) was declared in the Karabakh movement, whereas
the actual (which one? - Author) but particular problem in the row of many ones, which the huge
multinational state was facing, became the occasion and excuse for stirring up anti-imperial and anti-
Russian sentiments. The Karabakh movement gave the impetus to the organization of national People's
fronts that (at the time when they still considered some or another variant of preserving the USSR) put
forward the characteristic demand for more rights for the title nation than those used by the rest and first
of all by the Russians who immediately became the embodiment of the "imperial evil". Nothing could
have had more destructive power. As Ern wrote, "STRIVING AFTER THE ADVANTAGE NOT
POSSESSED BY THE WHOLE POPULATION OF THE EMPIRE IS ANTISTATE AND
SEPARATIST IN ITS CORE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW STATE FORMS ARE TO
BE THE AFFAIR OF THE WHOLE RUSSIA, PASSING THROUGH THE NATIVE POPULATION
OF RUSSIA TO THE PERIPHERY, AND NOT VICE VERSA (highlighted by the author)."
There is nothing to add. The concept of the Russian philosopher and Slavophil of German orgin
Vladimir Ern and the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Empire Sergey Sazonov concerning the
Armenian claims in those years remains as relevant as more than a hundred years ago.
Since no one robbed or killed the Armenians in NKAO, new arguments were invented in modern
history, such as social, demographic, cultural etc. problems.
BUT THE CHIEF AIM BOTH THEN AND NOW, AFTER MORE THAN A HUNDRED YEARS,
IS INVARIABLE - THE OCCUPATION OF OTHER TERRITORIES IN THE PROCESS OF
DESTRUCTION OF THE COMMON STATE!
Different forces got immediately involved in Karabakh separatism, both in the USSR and abroad.
Those forces had different political interests but Baku had no common interest with any of them.
IT WAS GETTING CLEAR THAT AZERBAIJAN WAS FACING TERRIBLE ORDEALS, BEING
CHOSEN AS A TRAINING GROUND FOR ARMENIAN SEPARATISTS, DIFFERENT FORCES,
INCLUDING WESTERN ONES, THAT STRIVED AFTER THE USSR COLLAPSE, PERESTROIKA
AND DEMOCRATIC FORCES THAT WERE ASSERTING THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE OF
THE KARABAKH PROBLEM, PARTOCRATS WHO WANTED TO LOOK LIKE DEMOCRATS,
AND SO ON. IN MODERN HISTORY KARABAKH SEPARATISTS MANAGED TO GIVE THEIR
MOVEMENTS THE CHRISTIAN FACTOR AS WELL. ALL THESE FORCES ENCIRCLED
AZERBAIJAN THAT WAS LEFT TOTALLY ALONE.

Sumgayit provocation organized by external forces as a powerful informational blow on


Baku

Sumgayit events were a powerful informational weapon in the hands of Armenian separatists directed
against Baku. They had nearly crucial influence on the international public opinion, as a result of which
Baku was left all along in the beginning of the well-known events. And to-day, after more than ten years,
this issue is not completely clear, though many things started to clarify gradually owing to the principle of
interests and the new facts that leaked to the press.
The model of Sumgayit events was brilliantly built in public right before the Sumgayit events by C.
Pashayan. On 12 December, 1985, the Armenian congressman C. Pashayan made the following statement
in the meeting room of the US Congress, "AND TODAY, I AM STANDING HERE CONDEMNING
ANY KIND OF TERRORISM, ESPECIALLY ARME-NIAN TERRORISM. AT THE SAME TIME, I
MUST SAY THAT AS LONG AS ITS REA-SON IS UNFAIRLY DENIED, THE KGB AND THE
COMMUNIST PARTY, WHICH ARE EVIDENTLY COMMITTING THIS TERRORISM, WILL
HAVE FUEL FOR THIS FIRE" (highlighted by the author).

64
All accents are so clear in this statement that there is no need for any comments. Every-thing and
everyone is mentioned, the CPSU, the USSR KGB, and Armenian terrorists! It is not accidental that the
famous writer Bunich rates the events in Sumgayit and Baku among the main undisclosed secret historical
events that occurred at different times in the USSR. Here they are.
1. Who brought Bolsheviks to power and why?
2. What was the fate of the tsar family?
3. What happened to Lenin in January 1924?
4. By whose order was Kirov murdered?
5. How did the catastrophe of 22 June, 1941 happen?
6. What happened to Stalin himself in February 1953?
7. What happened to Lavrenty Beria a year later?
8. How many of the "spies" annihilated by SMERSH were innocent victims?
9. Who blew up "Novorossiysk" battleship?
10. Who published Solzhenitsyn abroad and flooded the USSR with his books?
11. Who provoked the slaughter in Vilnius? In Sumgayit? In Baku? In Tbilisi?
12. Who organized the channels for the party funds to flow abroad
13. Who initiated and unleashed the Chechen war?
14. Who finances "economical" election campaigns of today's Zyuganovs?
Even Victor Nikolaev, who, judging by his publications, hates the Azerbaijanis vehemently just like
Lebed, expresses his puzzlement concerning Sumgayit events through the words of his character. He
writes in his book "Alive in Help", "In the evening, the group of officers that had arrived from Shamkhor
got their berths in officers dormitory. Overinstructed by the local command, they gathered in the room of
the blokes from the Interior Ministry for the deplorable sizing up. The commander, Captain Slavka
Krivoshapka was so legendary personality that heroic stories about him were spread in the entire
Transcaucasia. In two years he was contused twice in Sumgayit. Slavka became convinced there that
hatred is brought up in man fastest of all and forgiveness has the longest way to go. He was thrown into
that most Russian city in the south of the country where the slaughter could not be explained with any
imagination of the government. He could not understand how such a disaster could happen in the city
with the secret centre of the Ministry of Defence, a missile unit, a large steel works dubbed "mailbox", a
large chemical complex, a frontier unit, strongest family relations among the local population, not a
smallest attempt being made to prevent or stop it."
Being a military man, Captain Slavka Krivoshapka reasons quite logically but common sense is not to
be sought in Sumgayit events, since a different logic was used there.
The terrible events in Sumgayit were an amazing paradox, the result of merging of different dark and
often rival forces. The resultant became a horrible brand craftily stamped upon the Azerbaijan people by
the Armenian propaganda.
Dmitry Furman and Ali Abasov write in their book "Azerbaijan Revolution", "Sumgayit is the first of
the dreadful events in the modern Azerbaijan history, which is almost impossible to clarify, for in a
society run by unofficial mafia relations and corruption, policy is actually to a great extent carried out by
the shadow powers, plots and provocations and is even more interpreted through them. If we add Moscow
striving to hush up Sumgayit events to "appease" the society, the Armenians striving to blow them up,
presenting them as the continuation of the 1915 genocide, the Azerbaijanis striving to shift all the blame
on the Armenian provocation, blowing up the mysterious role of one of the most active participants of the
disorders, a Sumgayit criminal worker E. Grigoryan, we will have to admit that the truthful picture of
Sumgayit events is unlikely to be ever recollected. But it is clear that the combustible mass of newcomers
from villages, bearers of the traditional mentality that acquires a specific lumpen criminal shade in urban
conditions, who formed lower classes of the urban society, exploded in Sumgayit (by itself or someone
threw a match). The mass was increased in Azerbaijan by the dozens of thousands of peasant refugees
from Armenia (unlike the urban and intellectual Armenian population in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis of
Armenia were mainly peasants, since Azerbaijan intellectuals who appeared there used to move to
Azerbaijan), who had been deprived of all their belongings and suddenly found themselves in big towns,
not knowing what to do, disoriented and resentful. (Later, Nagorno-Karabakh refugees joined them.)"
They are certainly right, Sumgayit events are among the most mysterious ones in the USSR history.
However, as time passes, much of them, like in most of such events, begins to clear up. The world-
famous writer Eduard Topol shares his opinion concerning Sumgayit events with Tenghiz Gudava, Radio
Liberty.

65
"It was a provocation. I am deeply convinced in this. I began my journalist career in Sumgayit,
Sumgayit was built by international Soviet workers. People with permanent good job do not go anywhere,
you know, they do not discover America, just like none of European physicians or scientists went to
America as poor people did. Poor people went there and built a wonderful country, the same was with
Sumgayit. Different people from all around the country came there under the slogan of "High-powered
Construction". I worked in that paper, writing of an Armenian today and of an Azerbaijani tomorrow. We
had five columnists in the editorial office, two and a half of us were Jews, one Armenian woman, one
Azerbaijani, and we were of the same age and completely equal in everything. And when I heard that then
everything had started with Sumgayit, with disorders, slaughter, it was terrible, a nightmare, all my
friends were in that hell. When I was 20 and worked in Sumgayit, I was keen on mountain tourism,
alpinism. I remember once - it was either 50th anniversary of the Soviet power or some other holiday - we
went on foot, we went across Nagorno-Karabakh, I myself, with my feet, went across the entire Nagorno-
Karabakh. We came out of the forest, descend to a village, Martuni, Madrasa, if you know these names.
Villagers saw a file of people coming, they could not make out our faces or else, but when we approached
to any of them, no matter if it was Azerbaijani or Armenian village, we were met by women with pitchers
of wine and bread in their hands and always welcome. They would say wonderful words to us in
Armenian, in Azerbaijani There was, I say this because I went there and drank wine both in the
Armenian and the neighbouring Azerbaijan village, there was no enmity"
A correspondent mentioned to the famous writer Leonid Zorin, "In your autobiography "Proscenium"
you wrote about the happiness of life in Baku." "Baku was an amazing city. A huge, with one and half a
million population and extremely homelike at the same time. A home city, you were a part of its family
everywhere. Special magic it is the South, you see. A kind of Soviet Gascony. Life was much colder
"far in the north, in Paris". But there, in Baku, on one hand, you have siesta and time passes not so
rapidly, on the other hand, incandescent passions. All those humpbacked streets flying to the boulevard,
to the sea, to the sunny masout wave... But the main wealth here is people. The moron disease,
nationalism, was unknown to this city. In my team boys of six nationalities played shoulder to shoulder.
Not without reason was it always said with a challenge in Baku, "Nationality: Bakuvian". Then it all was
gone
Yes, everything is not the same. There was Sumgayit, there was Karabkh. The virus walking over the
planet reached this home."
It is well known from where different viruses were and are delivered in Azerbaijan!
K. Myalo writes of tragic events, including Sumgayit, "The so-called "ethnic conflicts" unfolded in
the USSR in quite a stable orderly society, in the conditions of quite decent incomes, and also, which is
important, quite a high level of education of the overwhelming majority of the population. To shift from
the heavy-weight statistics that distinguished the infamous stagnation period to the sharp dynamics,
drastic means should have been applied and they were found.
First of all, it was general and conscious involvement of criminals in the disorders, thugs whose task
was to shed the first blood in such ways that were to make people freeze with horror. It was the case in
Sumgayit, Ferghana, Osh and later, during the Georgian-Abkhazian war, Shevardnadze actually legalized
using of criminals as the impact force of the state.
Drugs were widely used to form agitated crowds and to involve youth, almost teenagers in them
(which in the Soviet time secured that militia will not use firearms against thugs)
Considerable part of financing had shadow sources.
They paid for the work of ideologists and those who provided informational cover, raising a clamour
for militia about every victim (though you could count them on the fingers of one hand). While the thugs
were doing their work, nationalistic intellectuals diligently toiled in their sphere, forging new historical
myths about someone's birth rights and slogans to attract wide masses that had nothing to do with the
disorders but that on the contrary were driven by the most noble feelings, patriotism, humility for the
distortion of the national history and indignation at the violence caused their congeners."
It is a clear and very meaningful model, but it has one big fault. It is not illustrated with facts, without
which it remains uncertain.
If we gather facts concerning the strategic component of this model and place numerical coefficients
before each factor (which is easy given modern methods of formalization of some or other process), much
will be clear, including certain moments of Sumgayit events.
"Sumgayit events are a tragedy of the mankind in the modern history. It is another genocide of the
Armenian people," deputy Ighityan said at the congress of people's deputies.

66
Such statements are a part of the strategy of Armenian ideologists. After every certain period of time
Armenia needs a new "genocide". The events in Turkey in 1915 were presented as "genocide" by
Armenian ideologists. To refresh this problem in modern history and raise the Karabakh issue, Sugayit
events were used.
Finally, here is the comment of the first president of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov in "Molodezh
Azerbaijana" concerning Sumgayit events, "Peace was not included in the plans of the organizers of the
bloody performance under a number of conventional titles one of which is "struggle for self-
determination of Artsakh Armenians". They needed a large-scale massacre. An the evil nationalistic
plan worked soon. Panic was artificially raised among Azerbaijanis in Kafan and other regions, causing
them leave Armenia under the threat of death. It was in May 1988. In November, the same year, not a
single Azerbaijani was left there. The republic was ablaze those days. First fires of confrontation flared
up We managed to suppress conflicts in Ganja, Baku. But we failed to stop Sumgayit events. What had
to happen happened."
Such a vague explanation, unlike the clear Armenian interpretation.
The author is sure that had Sumgayit events failed for some reasons, it would have inevitably
happened in some other place in Azerbaijan, with inevitable victims among the Armenian population. It is
one of the most important elements of Armenian "genocides".
In 1985-1990 the chairman of the CPA CC Party Committee R. Akhundov remembers his
conversation with Bobkov in Stepanakert, "In the course of a common sluggish conversation about the
events in Stepanakert Bobkov suddenly asked me, "What is your projection of the further actions of the
Armenians?" I thought and answered, "I think they will undertake some provocation in one of Azerbaijan
towns." "Which one?" continued Bobkov. I mentioned one of Azerbaijan towns, Sumgayit did not occur
to me as I had always associated it with Komsomol past. Bobkov became thoughtful and did not comment
on this. He never returned to the subject."
Many documents and facts that became known after more than 15 years demonstrate that Sumgayit
events (certain politicians from Gorbachev's circle agree) were arranged by the Centre together with
Armenian separatists and not without assistance of the KGB. The Armenians have always had strong
positions in this organization, we should say.
For instance, according to the memoirs of former Soviet officials, one of the chief participants of anti-
Khruschev conspiracy, the head of the USSR KGB, was the first to familiarize the first secretary of the
Armenian Communist Party CC Zarobyan with the plan of the conspiracy. And according to the
Chairman of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council M. Iskenderov, when the Azerbaijan
delegation arrived in Moscow, it did not know what issue would be discussed at the plenary session of the
CPSU CC. The KGB knew well whom to rely on in dirty work
In the course of time, many obscure aspects of Sumgayit events begin to clarify gradually.
K. Myalo writes, "Then, in Baku and Sumgayit, for the first time in my life and rather close I got
familiarized both the technique of roundups (this is exactly the way Russians will later be driven away
from Chechnya, with the complete silence of the "international community") and organization of pogroms
I was yet to see again in Ferghana Valley. As early as then, basing on that dreadful experience, hourly
chronicle of the events, I drew the following conclusion, which has not been refuted so far, in my opinion.
MASS POGROM WITH BIG BLOOD AND CHILLING VIOLENCE SCENES (THAT IS, WHAT
CAN BE QUALIFIED EXACTLY AS POGROM AND NOT A FIGHT OF SEVERAL PEOPLE) IS
NEVER SPONTANEOUS BUT ORGANIZED. QUITE POWERFUL POLITICAL FORCES ALWAYS
STAND BEHIND IT, USING IT AS AN EFFICIENT MEANS OF ACTIVATION OF A SCPEIAL
WEAPON, THE WEAPON OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS. ON SUCH A SCALE AND IN SUCH A VAST
AREA AS THE COLLAPSING (OR, MORE ACCURATELY, PURPOSEFULLY DESTROYED)
SOVIET UNION, IT HAS NOT BEEN USED ANYWHERE ELSE EXCEPT IN YUGOSLAVIA
NEARLY AT THE SAME TIME (highlighted by the author)."
Many anti-Muslim articles were written by A. Krukilin, but an interesting fact is that there is one
remarkable phrase in another libellous article written by him in "Literaturnaya gazeta" on 14 March, "The
CC was informed twenty times about the disorders being organized!... The force that provoked the
disorders is very serious. It should be found in the top circles. Moreover, found, exposed and punished,
regardless of ranks and titles."
That force operated actually in the entire area of the USSR, in a different way in different regions, in
accordance with the situation in each of them. Sumgayit was a perfect training ground for these forces, in
many senses.

67
A member of Politburo, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov told Gorbachev roundly, "Mikhail
Sergeyevich, it is time we stopped pretending as if everything that is going on in the party and the county
now was spontaneous. It is evident that there are special centres and people arranging all these dangerous
processes. We must speak of them openly, saying their names."
As time passed chief personalities of that time began to speak on many events, including those in
Sumgayit.
The first sensational statement was made by the ideologist of perestroika A. Yakovlev concerning
Sumgayit events. In 1992, in "Moscow News" A. Yakovlev said that THE EVENTS IN
TRANSDNIESTRIA HAD BEEN INITIATED BY THE KGB (highlighted by the author).
He said the same in March 1993 on Azerbaijan TV, "Echo of Sumgayit", "Sumgayit events were
organized by the USSR military industrial complex and the KGB."
He repeated that word-by-word ten years later.
"Despite some decrease in the influence of secret services in the times of Khruschev, they naturally
were not idle. The regime (about in the second half of Khruschev's rule) could not find again another way
out but to strengthen security agencies. Any expression of protest was suppressed in most ruthless way.
Punishing bodies heartened up, making up new opportunities for themselves. In some cases they
provoked unrest and conflict situations themselves to prove their own utility. That was the case in the
times of Khruschev in Novocherkassk. THAT WAS THE CASE IN SUMGAYIT (highlighted by the
author), Vilnius, Riga in the period of Perestroika."
Another striking fact. His recently published memoirs "Whirlpool of Memory" devoted to the period
of perestroika contain not a single word about the events in Nagorno-Karabakgh and around it. Not a
single word! As if there had been no such events and he had not been one of its key figures. We are
deeply convinced that there are some reasons for it. Yakovlev realized in what a dirty game he had been
used and actually disassociated himself from his previous views and actions, trying to whitewash himself.
These statements A. Yakovlev made concerning Sumgayit events had nothing to do with the
assistance to Baku. He realized well that certain forces in the KGB, which were unable to stomach him,
hit him with his actions as the ideologist of perestroika.
That sensational statement of the chief ideologist of perestroika, one of the main patrons of Nagorno-
Karabakh separatists, who used Sumgayit events many times in those years to justify the Armenian point,
dots all i's in Sumgayit events. As a matter of fact, it was clear even then but this though belated
confession is quite remarkable.
"Voice of Armenia" wrote on 18 May, 1993, "It is useful for us to remember that Alexander
Yakovlev and his circle had a significant part to play in the stimulation of the Karabakh process
(collection of signatures in Karabakh etc.). The same people changed their position sharply after
Sumgayit, Kirovabad and Baku and opposed the legitimate demand of the Armenians confirmed by the
results of the Karabakh referendum. Now, like Margaret Thatcher, they advocate the integrity of
Azerbaijan."
The famous financier George Soros said in "Znamya", June 1989, that the provocations against
Armenians in Azerbaijan, in particular in Sumgayit, had been arranged by mafia.
Y. Ligachev was of the same opinion. He said in an interview to Azerbaijan TV, "Sumgayit events
were organized by mafia groups."
In that case, the following question arises. Was there mafia in the USSR that was capable of
arranging something like that and not related to the CPSU or the KGB? The business of "red mafia" and
their connection with the CPSU or the KGB became public after the downfall of the CPSU.
"Mafia is armed bourgeoisie," I heard that from one Columbian political emigrant in Kuba; the
similar scenario was about to be staged in the Caucasus, with the only difference that the Soviet
specificity inevitably supposed an especially large-scale involvement of secret services."
There is another interesting fact concerning Sumgayit events. We all remember well that A. Sakharov
in all his speeches demanded careful investigation of Sumgayit events. Academician Sakharov demanded
that the USSR General Prosecutor Sukharev in public give explanation as to how Galkin who headed
Sumgayit events inquiry committee of the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office "had buried the investigation
of pogroms in Sumgayit."
"People will not be appeased with any half-measures, any talks of friendship between peoples. If
someone could doubt that before Sumgayit, then after this tragedy no one has any moral opportunity to
insist on preservation of the territorial belonging of NKAO to Azerbaijan," A. Sakharov exclaimed.
But then he suddenly fell silent and stopped demanding. He must have understood that a thorough
investigation of the tragedy would not be in favour of his pets.

68
He was well aware of the KGB methods and as he received the information he began to realize the
point of what was going on.
"February 1988. Mass disorders in Sumgayit (Azerbaijan) due to ethnic reasons, numerous victims. A
special unit of the USSR KGB ("Vympel") was dispatched to the site," veterans of "Vympel" remember.
It was for some reasons that Vladimir Galkin who had headed Sumgayit events inquiry committee of
the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office became General of counterintelligence afterwards, so it is obscure
what forces he had represented under the cover of the Public Prosecutor's Office.
"Agentura.ru" tells of one incident with the participation of Vladimir Galkin.
"A former officer of foreign intelligence Galkin arrested in the USA.
A former officer of the USSR foreign intelligence Vladimir Galkin was arrested by the FBI agents in
New York on 29 October. He had worked in T department (scientific and technological intelligence). Let
us remind that Vladimir Galkin arrived in the USA among the delegation of Russian militia to purchase
police equipment. By that time, he had been retired for five years and was the general director of
"Knowledge Express" firm. Submitting documents for visa, Mr. Galkin did not hide his association with
the foreign intelligence up to 1992. He had never been to America before. He was accused of the attempt
of obtaining information on the American "strategic defence initiative" at the scientific symposium in
Cyprus in 1991. According to the case documents, Mr. Galkin offered 30,000 dollars to the "Data General
Corporation" employee for three reports on star wars.
According to the documents submitted to the court by the public prosecutor, Galkin was charged with
the collection of information on strategic defence initiative of the USA. With this purpose he allegedly
tried to enter a deal in the territory of a third country with some Indian citizen Aluru Prasad who in his
turn showed interest in the star wars programme. Prasad was arrested and appeared in court. But the trial
was suspended in the summer 1995 due to procedure complications.
On 15 December, Vladimir Galkin was released. Moscow asserted that the FBI had drawn Klinton's
administration into a blatant provocation and only Chernomyrdin's interference allowed the Americans to
"save their face". However, the USSR Department of Justice said that the decision to withdraw
accusations against Galkin had been made by the government proceeding from national interests.
Meanwhile, since the moment of Galkin's arrest, Foreign Intelligence Service has been threatening
with retaliation and the Federal Security Service director Nikolay Kovalev, as he himself told yesterday,
even ordered drawing the list of future prisoners and demonstrated the paper to the official representatives
of the FBI and the CIA in Moscow. Moreover, Foreign Intelligence Service accused the American secret
services of ungentlemanly behaviour, saying that the trap set for Galkin contradicted professional spy
ethics. Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the immediate and unconditional release of the prisoner.
Finally, Moscow said that Galkin's case would impair the bilateral relations if court did not acquit him.
Vladimir Galkin himself told journalists immediately after his release that the FBI agents had tried to
incline him to betrayal but received a resolute refusal.
By the way, two days after Galkin's release, Harold Nickolson was arrested in the international airport
of Washington."
Colleague veterans immediately rose to support the intelligence officer ("the are no former
intelligence agents").
IMA Press
20.12.1996
KGB VETERANS WARN THEIR WESTERN COUNTERPARTS THAT THEY CAN BECOME
HOSTAGES IN THE COLD WAR BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
MOSCOW (IMA Press)
On 20 December, the president of the Russian KGB Veterans Club Valery Velichko circulated an
appeal on the behalf of the members of this organization to former intelligence officers of NATO
countries, many of whom have their business in the CIS republics. They can be the first to suffer moral
and material damage, becoming hostages in the cold war of intelligence services. Its beginning, according
to the authors of the appeal, is indicated by the recent arrest of a former KGB officer Vladimir Galkin in
the USA. Though the appointment of Anthony Lake, a professional and not a politician, to the post of the
CIA director inspires optimism, veterans of the invisible front should use their influence all together for
such a situation not to happen again.
As we can see, Sumgayit events were investigated by a talented and versatile personality and
Vladimir Galkin could have easily dot all i's had he wanted to. Had he wanted to!
How can we compare Sumgayit events with the attempt of obtaining information on star wars from
the only superpower in the world?!

69
There was no need for such an important person as Galkin to expose Akhmedov the lunger and shoot
him. A sledge-hammer to crack nuts!
Andrey Cherchenko, a correspondent of "Pravda" wrote ambiguous articles on Sumgayit events. It
was hard to make out from them who was to blame the most for all that had happened. Building his quite
logical models of the events, at the same time he mentioned some mysterious forces to make his model
seem complete, like the scientists who, unable to fully explain some or other phenomena in their research
and leaving that for the future, would introduce a conventional "demon" into the process at a certain stage
of it, after which the entire process cleared up. When Chernenko inserted his own "demon" in his
reasoning, everything took its right place; the essence of the "demon" was not explained, though. At the
same time, we should point out, unlike the Armenian side, he did not see the local authorities as the
organizers of these events.
In connection with Sumgayit events, the further fate of Chernenko is of a considerable interest. "How
have you come to secret services?" asks him Valery Beresnev. "I was called to the Central Committee
where I received the appropriate proposal. I accepted it."
He rose to Major General of state security and then, by invitation of the governor Valentina
Matviyenko, became vice-governor of Petersburg and the most mysterious person in Smolny.
As we can see, two witnesses of Sumgayit events had similar fates!
Stepashin Sergey Vadimovich made a breathtaking career in the time of Yeltsin and later of Putin, in
1988-1990 took part in the operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs troops in "flash points" of the
USSR, Baku, Ferghana, Sumgayit, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sukhumi. You will find not a single word
concerning his actions in Sumgayit in Baku in the well-known days in any of his numerous interviews.
Victor Nikolaevich Nikolaev. A member of the Russian Union of Writers. Born in 1958 in
Kazakhstan. Did his military service in the Air Forces of Moscow military district. Graduated from high
military school in Kurgan, special intelligence, and Military Political Academy in Moscow. Major in
reserve, holder of the Red Star. In 1987-1989 fought in Afghanistan. Performed contingency tasks in
Sumgayit, Stepanakert, Karabakh, and Tbilisi. In a conversation with Valentina Maystrenko he speaks of
many things but not a word about his "contingency tasks in Sumgayit, Stepanakert, Karabakh, and
Tbilisi".
Special units of Red Banner Caspian Fleet also took part in Sumgayit events. Captain 1st rank Y.Y.
writes, "I stayed three weeks in Sumgayit. German Alekseyevich (the future deputy director, the head of
the FSB Constitution Protection and Antiterrorism Department Vice Admiral Ugryumov German
Alekseyevich) came there, though we permanently kept him informed of the events through the
communication line. He wanted to see everything with his own eyes to take an accurate decision." His
decisions and proposals remain a secret.
The part of T. Gdlyan in Karabakh and Sumgayit events is unknown yet. We knew of his close
relations with "Krunk" leaders and "Karabakh" society. And the commonly known fact is that those years
Gdlyan had considerable political influence (a people's deputy of the USSR and the Armenian SSR) and
considerable capital (according to the Moscow lawyer I. Reznik, during his "exploits" in Uzbekistan he
used to confiscate valuables even from distant relatives of suspects).
In connection with the events in Sumgayit, Gdlyan raised all Zelenograd, the Soviet Silicon Valley,
and became a people's deputy of the USSR and the Armenian SSR on the wave of anticorruption struggle,
support for Karabakh separatists and condemnation of Sumgayit events.
His methods were imitated by Stepan Mikoyan, the son of A. Mikoyan, who tried to make his way to
a deputy mandate. S. Mikoyan unfolded heavy activity in the Soviet mass media condemning Sumgayit
events and demonstrating his wild fantasy in that. Then he hurried to Yerevan for a deputy mandate but
Yerevan preferred Starovoytova, Gdlyan and Ivanov, since they were reputed to be tough democrats then,
though turned out to be bribers later.
Any cat is out of the bag somehow. According to numerous sources, Gdlyan was placed on the
political stage by the head of the USSR KGB Fedorchuk, which explains many things.
Some day we will find out what circles in the KGB he was related to (there were different groups
there, as far as we know), what tasks he performed. And that will clarify much, including Sumgayit
events.
As became known later, the KGB also had agents among democrats. The general public today is
familiar with the materials demonstrating the relations of the leaders of national independence struggle -
Prunsken, Landsbergis, Chepaytis in Lithuania, Druk in Moldova, the future president of Estonia Lennart
Meri and many others to the state security services that fostered them for their numerous purposes. There

70
were such fighters for independence in Azerbaijan as well, which has been repeatedly reported in the
local press and concrete names have been given.
The participation of such local "democrats" is Sumgayit events is not ruled out.
When Gorbachev was being appointed General Secretary at the Politburo meeting, the then head of
the KGB Chebrikov said a mysterious phrase, "intelligence entrusted me with advising the candidacy of
Comrade Gorbachev M.S. for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU CC. You must understand that
the voice of intelligence, the voice of our activists is the voice of the people as well." No one has given
unambiguous interpretation of Chebrikov's words so far.
As an example of the systematic approach to information processing a story is often quoted about a
journalist of the early 20th century who lost all his money playing cards and, to pay back his debt,
decided to sell to the foreign intelligence service the plan of military units disposition, names and posts of
the command. Of course, the counterintelligence arrested the amateur spy but when the information he
possessed was shown to the representative of General Staff the latter were shocked for the information
was precise and classified. In the progress of the inquiry the journalist pleaded guilty and proving his
repentance shared his method of learning "state secrets". He turned out to have read local newspapers in
his trips to regions, being especially interested in society columns, "In the district town N the commander
of the 17th hussar regiment quartered here Colonel V., Chief of the regimental staff Colonel M. attended
the wedding ceremony of Lieutenant K. and so on and so forth".
What if we apply this universal method based on "hidden correlation" principles to Sumgayit events
and trace who else besides Galkin, Chernenko, Stepashin, Nikolaev and many other USSR secret service
agents received high appointments so quickly and why?
A question arises. What services did participants of Sumgayit events obtain so quick promotion for?
They did not man any breaches in Sumgayit (besides, there was no such thing there), did not stabilize the
situation in the region, or revealed the real picture of the events. What services then?
They could not obtain so quick promotion for exposing the lunger Akhmedov who had killed one
man and for killing him, "by law" though (on 18 November, 1989 Akhmedov was sentenced to death as
the result of his trial in Moscow and immediately executed by shooting), could they?
We are sure that the results would be very interesting!
The response of the KGB did not take long to appear, as it was expected.
Chernenko said to the journalist Valery Beresnev, "I had to see all flash points in the USSR as
"Pravda" correspondent, from tragedy of 1986 in Alma Ata and to Sumgayit, Tbilisi, Baku I hate to
seem obscurantist but it is obvious today that the political leadership of that time encouraged (by action or
inaction) involvement of ultranationalists in the open social processes. That was a fatal mistake that led to
numerous tragedies and death of hundreds of thousands people." So, Chernenko repeated what he had
said over ten years earlier.
By saying that, the KGB agent Chernenko makes a transparent allusion to A. Yakovlev, the ideologist
of perestroika, and his team. He is not alone in this; Yakovlev was accused of such actions by many high-
ranking KGB officers and not by hints but directly.
The former head of the KGB V. Kryuchkov recalls Yakovlev, "in the Caucasus, he "sympathized"
with Armenia, but in reality provoked it to oppose Azerbaijan, straining the situation with the Karabakh
problem. In general, he always spoke of Azerbaijan with evident aversion"
This is confirmed by other sources. According to former high-ranking officials from the Central
Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party, the leaders of the CPSU CC did not support NKAO
separatists and the counterparts from Baku received the name of the chief enemy of Azerbaijan in the
CPSU CC, Alexander Yakovlev.
"In February 1993," Kryuchkov continues, "a big article of mine was published in "Sovetskaya
Rossia" where I told of his (A. Yakovlev's - Author) activities in detail. By the way, I did not call him an
influence agent there but I think that the conclusion was obvious. I directly said in one part of the article
that I have no questions on the matter." Kryuchkov said that A. Yakovlev had been recruited by the CIA
during his study in Columbia University. The head of General Staff S. Akhromeyev confirmed that the
military intelligence had had nearly the same information as the KGB. Gorbachev kept silence as ever on
these accusations against the "ideologist of perestroika". V. Boldin remembers that "once, signing the
Politburo resolution on Yakovlev's trip to Spain or some other country, he said half in joke, "It seems that
the resident calls him there."
Kryuchkov writes in his memoirs, "He was undergoing training in the USA, Columbia University and
was noticed in establishing relations with American secret services. However, then he managed to present
the case as if he had done that to take the opportunity of obtaining important information for the USSR

71
from a closed library. Be as it may, but Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov once told me directly, "Yakovlev is
anti-Soviet!"
In the fifties, a photograph was published in the emigrant "Russian Voice" newspaper, portraying A.
Yakovlev and O. Kalughin (a high-ranking intelligence officer, traitor to the country) in the company of
CIA agents.
Platonov asserts something like that, "We do not know exactly what pieces of silver and how much
were paid to influence agents by the masters of the world backstage, but it is clear that these agents
sharply became more active in the mid-eighties. In particular, on the initiative of G. Arbatov (the director
of the USA Institute) closely related to the Western circles and with the direct assistance of Gorbachev,
A. Yakovlev returns and immediately takes the key position in orchestrating anti-Russian processes. He
gathered around himself a number of odious personalities who played a dramatic part in the history of our
country: V. Korotich, Y. Afanasyev, Y. Yakovlev, G. Popov, Y. Primakov, G. Arbatov. The circle was
very narrow at first but Gorbachev's stable support made them confident."
Such accusations against the "fathers of perestroika" were at different times voiced by Ligachev,
Bobkov, Yazov, Varennikov, Achalov and many others.
When A. Yakovlev declares that Sumgayit events were the doing of the Soviet secret services, we
must certainly pay due attention to this statement. It should be admitted that it requires certain courage to
make such a statement. At the same time, it is a simplified approach to the problem. The statement does
not relieve Yakovlev of the responsibility for the disorders in the country, the ideologists of which were
Yakovlev himself and his boss Gorbachev. Was it not clear that along with genuine democrats, dubious
and mafia forces would pour into the organizations of democratic movement Yakovles established all
around the country? Was it not clear that the supporting separatism would lead to slaughter? Was it not
clear that the main weapon of Armenian separatism would be terror? Was it not clear that all ulcers of the
Soviet society, which could not be cured easily, would come to the surface? And finally, was it not clear
that foreign secret services become active after having waited for such a moment for decades?
Lumping all the blame for Sumgayit events onto the KGB alone, Yakovlev tried to whitewash
himself, choosing an easy but clearly naive way! It would be more logical and truthful for him to reveal
the entire chain of the organizers of Sumgayit and similar events, from his home CPSU CC and to the
KGB. The author has no doubt that the USSR secret services were active in Sumgayit. In that case, why
were Gorbachev and his team inactive? The author knows for sure that several hours after the beginning
of Sumgayit events Gorbachev was informed, moreover, he received the information through different
channels. In that case, why were the troops inactive, like it was later in Baku? They were not subordinate
to the KGB, were they? Something is wrong, some link is missing here!
A link is missing because all sides are to blame for creating the situation where it was hard to build a
hierarchy system without comprehensive information.
It is clear today that to put the plans into practice, BOTH SIDES NEEDED CERTAIN CHAOS; THE
DIFFERENCE WAS JUST IN THE SCALE OF IT FOR EACH OF THEM. GORBACHEV WANTED
A CONTROLLABLE ONE. It was not accidental that in the beginning of perestroika Gorbachev jumped
up from his seat and cheerfully clapped his hands at a meeting of the congress of the USS people's
deputies, when deputy Travkin said, "Everyone here says that we should not let the gin out of the bottle.
We should not let him out, we should push him out! Seventy years have passed; everyone is in their own
bottle asleep." Speaking to Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi, Gorbachev says, "We are stormy now.
But it will do us good." At the well-known meeting in the USSR Supreme Council, after Sumgayit events,
when asked by an Azerbaijan deputy, "Is it possible that Sumgayit events were organized by certain
forces?" Gorbachev answered with irritation, "No one organized anything, the troops were just several
hours (?! - Author) late, that's all!" Nobody reminded Gorbachev that Baku, where considerable number
of Russia military was deployed, is in 20 minutes' journey from Sumgayit, the nearest military base in
Nasosny is in 5-7 minutes. Furthermore, since 1989 near Baku, in Pereshkul (a little to the south of
Sumgayit; two detachments of the KGB special units were located in Azerbaijan, Pereshkul), an assault
combat brigade withdrawn from Afghanistan had been deployed. So, it was totally strange how it all
could take hours.
The point was that according to the scenario, the troops were to be brought in the town when all
would have been over, which happened in practice. A controllable chaos was what they needed!
This theory is indirectly confirmed by Anatoly Mostovoy who has carried out his own journalist
investigation concerning Sumgayit events. He speaks rather of Gorbachev's uncertainty, though.
"The first report on the disorders, somewhat traditionally softened, came the same day, first in the
daily summary of operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then as a special report several hours later

72
through the KGB channels. General Secretary was informed an hour later. By that time, the report folder
had swollen with the forecasts of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs experts, who knew the
possible dynamics by the example of Novocherkassk, Ferghana, and Alma Ata. The summary reported
first nine deaths, mass pogroms, the impotence and escape of the local authorities, which meant that the
process was snowballing, becoming irreversible. The experts from the KGB Constitution Protection
Department insisted on immediate adequate measures. They knew the meaning of a precedent and its
provocative role in the multiethnic Caucasus.
Receiving the information, M. Gorbachev contacted Baku. He seemed reluctant to take upon himself
the responsibility for making a decision. Moreover, for the possible consequences.
"I think that Azerbaijan comrades will manage themselves," he concluded. "They have enough forces
and means."
Another summary reached Kremlin in the morning of 28 February. 20 deaths at least. The local
authorities are unable to control the situation. The information came from the Sumgayit KGB department.
The KGB alone was still doing its professional duty, though the head of the office and most employees
were Azerbaijani. But they were people who had been in the first flash points of the USSR, including
Afghanistan. They knew the price of national-criminal freedom.
Even then Gorbachev brought himself to take some steps. The minister of internal affairs received the
order to take measures on stabilization and liquidation of the flash seat of the conflict. The head of the
KGB was to provide assistance with all available forces and means."
Gorbachev's behaviour in the emergency situation in Sumgayit was rather suspicious. He needed
something different than the immediate stabilization of the situation.
GORBACHEV NEEDED CERTAIN DEGREE OF CHAOS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WEST
THE DIFFICULTY WITH WHICH HE, THE EPOCH PERSONALITY, OVERCOMES ENORMOUS
PROBLEMS CARRYING OUT HIS PERESTROIKA. BESIDES, HE BELIEVED THAT THIS
CONTROLLABLE CHAOS WOULD ABSORB HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS. HE DID HIS BEST
TO ORGANIZE MASS MARCHES TO SUPPORT GORBACHEV AGAINST THE OLD
ESTABLISHMENT. HOWEVER, HE WAS MISTAKEN AND THE PROCESS TOOK A DIFFERENT
TURN.
HIS OPPONENT NEEDED MAXIMUM CHAOS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY, SO THAT
GORBACHEV AND HIS PERESTROIKA COULD BURN IN IT. THEY REALIZED THAT THEY
WOULD INEVITABLY LEAVE THE POLITICAL STAGE WITH THE BRAND OF SLUGGARDS IF
EVERYTHING REMAINED QUIET.
The two situations two sides were striving after now coincided in one thing, and then disagreed,
which in many ways determined the contradictory behaviour of Moscow politicians.
Chaos became a powerful political weapon.
It was not accidental that Sandro Viola wrote concerning the State Emergency Committee, "The
trump card in the hands of conspirators was the chaos the country was plunged into."
In Radio Liberty programme devoted to the 10th anniversary of August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev
opens some details of that confrontation in the Radio Liberty Moscow studio, "After 1989 of free
elections, when 35 secretaries who had all possible and impossible resources (the Soviet period, after all)
failed, including the candidate for Politburo membership Solovyev, all of them! You should have heard
the talk after all elections and their results! I could not have them sit down and begin conversation.
Because, you know, the situation was like that, General Secretary says to be quiet, and we all begin
working. Give your opinion, a different one, so to say A totally controllable process, you see,
democratic one, though, because our Politburo was democratic.
But that was not the case them. I say, "What is wrong? What is that? We should be proud, it is a
victory. People have supported perestroika. See, we have had the election, 10-15 persons for a place. And
the results are 86% of deputies are Communists." And then I hear in Politburo, "What kind of Communist
are they?" Oh, it is so? So, you are Communists, those who failed are Communists, but not those elected,
is it so?
The establishment felt that democracy, glasnost is when it is discussed openly, people ask questions
in public It is what it all began with. After 1989, the part that had not accepted perestroika started
consolidating."
Naturally, they consolidated against Gorbachev and his perestroika and any unrest in the country was
like manna from heaven for them.
The depth of discord between those forces and Gorbachev is expressed by Yegor Ligachev three
years after the State Emergency Committee coup in an interview to "Al Estampa".

73
Question: Was there a split between you and Gorbachev, in particular concerning nationalism
manifestations?
Ligachev: Yes, they were the third item in our disagreement, they most serious one. When the
conflict began in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988 we met very often and argued much. Of course, he was very
worried. But he continued to speak of extremist forces and did not want to take any measures to restore
the order. We know the result, thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands refugees, dangerous tension
for the entire USSR.
Question: Do you think it is Gorbachev's fault?
Ligachev: I only say what I used to say then. The real danger for perestroika is not conservatism but
separatist antisocialist nationalism splitting the country. I know that Gorbachev agrees with me not, too.
But the underestimate of this point in the course of several years was fatal
It is clear that Ligachev's supporters welcomed Sumgayit events, since they realized that these events
were a blow upon Gorbachev's perestroika, but they believed that the collapse of the USSR was still far.
Pozkov remembers that when he advised Oleg Semenovich Shenin to the post of the leader of the
Russian Communist Party, Gorbachev felt hurt and said sharply, "Do you want to leave me alone with
those bitches?" and nodded somewhere aside.
The forces that opposed Gorbachev that time are well characterized by Sandro Viola in the article
"The Day when Communism died in Moscow".
"But who were those people who planned the conspiracy and led the course of the coup d'etat in the
first hours of 19 August, 1991, each from his own study? To answer this question, it is necessary first to
have the idea about the Soviet leaders who came to power in the period from the early sixties to the late
eighties. Alexander Solzhenitsyn called that 30 years period "the period of reverse selection" that led to
the formation of the interlayer of the most illiterate and unqualified leaders in modern history.
The class of "stone butts" formed in the depth of party bureaucratic establishment which stuck to its
privileges tight, was cynical, unable to cope with the disorders in the totally shattered political system.
However, "the phenomenon of Gorbachev" that emerged in that swamp has nothing in common with the
mediocrity and sclerotic conservatism of the people on the crest of power in the USSR. Mikhail
Gorbachev and his friends, who had appeared downstage and felt possible and probably near end of the
system, made up the pitiable minority in the Central Committee and Politburo. The level of their
grounding hardly went beyond the average coefficients typical of representatives of the Soviet hierarchy;
nevertheless they felt intuitively that the foundation of the state and the party had collapsed. They felt
deeply hurt with the political, economic and spiritual degradation of the Soviet Union. They intended to
take necessary measures to improve the situation. Apart from that small group, the other two or three
hundred people in whose hand state power rested can be compared to pathetic fragments of the Lenin
system. In the period between 1985 and 1990, they all were together with Gorbachev and "perestroika".
They hoped that something would be able to give the existing system new breath, new energy. However,
the timid, random and ambiguous actions of Gorbachev resulted in the USSR collapse (unrest in the
Baltic republics and in the Caucasus, general poverty and even famine in some regions). It was then that
they plucked all their courage and decided to act. In other words, to restore the situation that had existed
before Gorbachev came to power."
The situation was complicated by the fact that in the chaos different departments acted in their own
way according to their interests, no matter what groups they were members of, and the adversaries did not
disdain to use any means. Gorbachev speaks concerning the tenth anniversary of the coup in Radio
Liberty studio, "Then the definite talk about the staff began. Much was to be changed. The names of
Kryuchkov, Yazov and all aged over 70 were voiced. The staff should be changed due to the changed
objectives. And it turned out that all this had been taped. When Kryuchkov turned on the tape, Yazov, so
to say, got worked up and agreed to take part in that (the State Emergency Committee coup - Author)."
The holy of holies of President of the superpower is tapped.
Boris Yeltsin writes in his book "President's Notes" concerning the State Emergency Committee
coup, "The putsch was extremely contradictory from the beginning to the very end Interests of two
departments clashed The military industrial complex wanted a real, full-fledged thundering putsch to
make the world believe in the power of the Soviet tank again. The KGB wanted the clearest, elegant shift
of power."
His is not the first confession of Russian politicians about the clash of interests of different powerful
departments belonging to one and the same group. Naturally, given the air of mystery about Sumgayit
events, a question arises. What were the common points and differences of these departments in
Sumgayit?

74
It is striking that in this deadly struggle, as the further events showed, either side could not clearly
determine the limits of the chaos they needed, as a result of which either side created chaos in the country,
believing that it was outsmarting the other. None of them had a well-thought system, they were catching
each other at mistakes and the country was forgotten!
Certain forces furthering the USSR collapse knew well what and what for they were doing in
Sumgayit. "Why such a convinced anti-Semite as Cossack ataman Petr Krasnov did not allow a single
pogrom of Jews in 1918-1919 in the territory of the Great Don Army he was in charge of? Because he
saw that looting and pogroms, whoever they may be committed against, are the shortest way to shatter
state interests, to the general chaos and disorganization," Sergey Markedonov writes.
That was the first large-scale all-USSR experiment on the organization of the collapse of state
institutions leading to the general chaos and disorganization. And that suited both certain forces in the
CPSU CC, the KGB and Armenian extremists.
The details of the Sumgayit-like operations are opened by the former KGB general O. Gordiyevsky
who defected to the West, "In January 1959, Shelepin established a new misinformation D department
(later called A service) with a little more than 50 employees initially. It was headed by General Ivan
Ivanovich Agayants up to his death in 1968.
He worked as a resident in Tehran from 1941 to 1943, in Paris from 1946 to 1949 (under the
pseudonym of Avalov), then headed the Western Europe department KI, Ministry of State Security and
the KGB. Agayants's appointment as the head of the department was obliged to his preparation of a series
of false memoirs and other literary works, including the "memoirs" of General Vlasov "I Am Choosing
Gibbet", the equally false Ivan Krylov's "My Career in the Soviet Supreme Command" and the imaginary
correspondence between Stalin and Tito published in "Karfur" monthly, in which Tito confessed his
Trotskyist sympathies
One of the first objects of Agayants as the head of D department in 1959 was West Germany that the
KGB strived to show as controlled by neo-Nazis. To test one of the "active measures" before realizing it
in Germany, Agayants sent a group of his agents to a village nearly in 50 km from Moscow with
instructions to draw swastika, write anti-Semite slogans and overturn tombs under the cover of dark. KGB
informants reported that though the incident had worried the most villages, a few of them were inspired to
imitate the KGB provocation, committing anti-Semite acts on their own initiative. In the winter of 1959-
1960 Agayants successfully used the same tactics in the FRG as well. Agents from East Germany were
sent to the West with guidelines to desecrate and demolish Jewish memorials, synagogues and shops and
draw anti-Semite slogans. Local bandits and neo-Nazis quickly joined the KGB campaign. Anti-Semite
acts were registered by the FRG authorities between the Christmas Eve of 1959 and the mid-February of
1960. Then the campaign abruptly stopped but the international reputation of the FRG was fairly
undermined. West German politicians and religious leaders bowed down with shame in public. New York
Herald Tribune summarized the reaction of the most foreign press with the headline Bonn Unable to Get
Rid of Nazi Venom.
"There has been a special D department in the KGB since 1959," M. Heller confirms, "which sole
task is "misinformation". The legendary founder of the department, General Ivan Agayants, is the author
of a part of numerous well-known operations. For instance, he orchestrated neo-Nazi and anti-Semite
actions in 20 cities of West Germany, in Oslo, Paris, Vienna, London, New York, Milan in 1959." The
scale is impressive!
It is amazing how accurately Agayants methods were applied to Sumgayit, of course, considering
local situation and time factor.
Agayants has undoubtedly left followers, in the "long-suffering" country as well.
President of Russia V. Putin also confirms the fact that there are still questions to ask the KGB
concerning its actions in different anti-constitutional campaigns in the USSR. Here is his interview to
"Kommersant-Vlast", 21 August, 2001.
When asked, "Were you worried (concerning the KGB involvement in the State Emergency
Committee putsch - Author)?" he answered, "I was scared. It was actually, such a breakdown in the
life, with a crunch On returning from the GDR, I saw that something was wrong in Russia, but it was
only in the putsch days that the aims I had had when I had started working in the KGB crumbled. Of
course, it was fantastically hard to go through, since I had spent most of my life there. But the choice was
made."
Spontaneous disorders mean that it is difficult to find elements of organization in the events; all
elements are as a rule not connected with one another and do not make up a whole. As for Sumgayit
events, it was found out late that there was a considerable number of disorder elements, i.e. it was nothing

75
but a controllable chaos (we know as a fact that well-to-do Armenians withdrew all their savings from the
bank and left the city several months before the beginning of Sumgayit events).
The behaviour of the crowd in Sumgayit was calculated with mathematic accuracy (the KGB was
particularly interested in the problem at all times), we have the events but not the entire picture! In the
process of simulation these events, other specific circumstances were taken into account, too.
"Crowd," Tarde wrote, "is a heap of heterogeneous elements, unfamiliar with one another. As soon as
a spark of passion, jumping from one to another, electrifies this disorderly mass, the latter assumes
something like a sudden self-generating organization. Isolation transforms into connection, noise
transforms into something monstrous striving after its aim with unreserved persistence. The majority
came here driven by plain curiosity but the fever that gripped a few suddenly captures everyone's heart
and everyone is striving after destruction. A man that came here just to prevent death of the innocent is
one of the first to catch the striving after manslaughter, and more amazingly, is not surprised at this at
all." We can add that there were people in this crowd who had endured hellfire in Armenia!
"The author of these lines," Z. Alizade writes, "happened to visit that temporarily "closed" city with
the lecture group of "Knowledge" Society ten days after the pogrom and meet the workers of engineering
shop of the aluminum plant. They all, Amrenians, Azerbaijani, and Russian, asked indignantly, "Who had
done that? What do we, workers, have in common with it?" Amo, a worker, Armenian, thanked his
Azerbaijani neighbours who had hidden him and his family from the thugs, accused "mafia" in Armenia
and Azerbaijan, but said that he would not stay in Sumgayit. Sumgayit workers spoke of strange young
men that had been turning the crowd on. Who those strangers were, whether it was true or just a fancy's
child, I did not know then and do not know now, after more than ten years, either."
No, it was not a "fancy's child". Those days Sumgayit was flooded with different provocateurs. O.
Kulish, D. Melikov wrote in their article "Black Seeds Will Not Sprout" in "Soviet Industry", 27 March,
1988, immediately after Sumgayit events, "Many of those we managed to talk to tell directly of a whole
chain of provocative actions designed to embitter people, sow panic, distrust. Take, for instance,
hysterical screams of the man who told the crowd in the square in Sumgayit the horrible story of his
family allegedly tortured by "Armenian murderers". When the competent authorities dealt with the
"victim" they found out that he was by no means a peaceful inhabitant of Kafan he had been pretending to
be, but a previously convicted recidivist, homeless sponger without dependents."
The authors of the articles should not have put the expression "Armenian murderers" who were
responsible for the murder of 265 Azerbaijanis in quotes, but the confirmed fact is Sumgayit was indeed
flooded with such provocateurs those days.
A witness of Sumgayit events, William Rusyan rmembers, "At the height of Sumgayit pogroms, not
suspecting anything (there was no information on pogroms in Baku), I drove from Baku to work in
Sumgait, as usually, by my "Zhiguli". On the way I was surprised to see tanks, since they were not
frequent guests there. It was even worse in Sumgayit, shooting, a burning bus, dead people lying. You
would think that any sane man's reaction is quite evident, to leave the place as soon as possible. But I
drove to the plant! I cannot say why, it did not even occur to me that there might be a threat for me.
Director saw me and was terrified, "Don't you know that they are killing all Armenians?" I asked, "Why?"
"I don't know," he answered, "I'll give you three armed guys to accompany to Baku." I should say that
even in the Soviet time guns were not rare in Sumgayit. Murders happened sometimes, but for money as a
rule, not for nationality. One of my companions sat behind the wheel, I sat in the backseat between two
armed guys. We got to Baku safely, without incidents. Director insisted that I should not come to work
for two weeks for safety reasons and generally should not appear outside in the troublous times. To
support me, he even sent me food with his driver. That was great moral assistance, for I was not in
material need, being a rather well-to-do man. It became clear later that my friends had realized the danger
facing me better than I had myself. About two weeks later director called me and said that it seemed that
everything was quiet in Sumgayit and that I could get down to work. Destiny spared me that time. I
appeared in Sumpayit at the height of the pogroms and left unharmed. And, frankly speaking, I drew no
special conclusions. My Azerbaijani friends treated me well as ever, and that reassured me. It did not
occur to me that next day I could meet other, strange Azerbaijanis, for whom I would not be a friend, but
just an Armenian, enemy. And I was not the only one who thought so, was I?" William Rusyan wrote this
in Yerevan and surely could not tell the whole truth, but even so it demonstrates the attitude of native
Sumgayit population to the events.
After careful study of the actions of Convent, Napoleon said, "Les crimes collectives n'enegagent
presonne" (mass crimes are irresponsible).

76
All the elements of this controllable chaos in Sumgayit were arranged so that they could strike the
strongest possible blow on the image of Baku.
And so it happened in practice. Baku suffered a powerful informational blow after which it could not
recover for a very long time.
V. Yudenko gives his assessment to the events that happened after Brezhnev's death, including
Sumgayit events, "Brezhnve's death mush have become a kind of sign for the Western forces which had
declared the cold war and for which the Second World War was not over in 1945. The CPSU CC
apparatus was concerned with the struggle for power at that time and the country was left without
supreme authority. Immediately after that the first provocation took place, the incident with the Korean
aircraft carrier in 1983. The Western mass media blew up an unprecedented hysteria at once and inclined
the public opinion against the "evil empire". This foulest play ever seen has been naturally refuted a
thousand times. TV-6 broadcasted a British documentary some time ago that demonstrated clearly the
involvement of the CIA in that incident. But then it had its impact, the aim was achieved and the entire
public opinion was against us. Then Gorbachev was frightened with SDI, star wars and we allegedly had
nothing to respond with. Then Rust landed in the Red Square thereby casting some doubt on the country's
defence capacity. (It is even pointless to prove that Rust's venture was a planned action.) And then it all
developed, Sumgayit, digging tools, Lithuania etc. Everyone knows that, and the readers can easily
continue. The only diagnosis of all those events is provocation. Such version, such interpretation of the
events has right to life. Howeve, more importantly, he sees a large international provocation in Sumgayit
events but not by any means Azerbaijan trace.
THE AUTHOR FINDS DIFFICULTY IN DRAWING UNAMBIGUOUS CONCLUSIONS FROM
THE ACTIONS OF THE ADVERSARIES IN THAT MUDDY TROUBLED POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT CREATED BY GORBACHEV, SINCE THAT REQUIRES MUCH MORE FACTS.
HOWEVER, THE MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS AND REPROACHES UNEQUIVOCALLY
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE KITCHEN WHERE SUMGAYIT EVENTS WERE STEWED WAS
NOT SITUATED IN BAKU. BOTH THE CPSU CC AND THE KGB WERE IN MOSCOW AND THE
CENTRES OF THE COLD WAR WERE FAR FROM BAKU.
THE CONCRETE PARTICIPANTS OF SUMGAYIT EVENTS WERE NOT LEADING BUT LED.
We can say that they suffered for someone else's mistakes.
The deputy head of the KGB Philipp Denisovich Bobkov describes the beginning of Sumgayit events
as follows, "Unlike other towns of Azerbaijan where passions had been restrained and people had not
been allowed into the streets, not less than five thousands people gathered before the city committee of
the party in Sumgayit. The tension reached its climax when Azerbaijanis from Kafan region of Armenia
appeared in the square and told of the pogroms Armenians had committed in the regions where mainly
Azerbaijanis had lived. Oil was poured on the flame by the appearance of the poetess Sylvia Kaputikyan
on the Armenian TV, who told about her meeting with M.S. Gorbachev in Moscow, and then by the
message from Yerevan. The message reported that the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Soviet Armenia
A.N. Katusev had said that he knew about the two deaths in Azerbaijan and that according to his
information, there were no Armenians among the victims. Katusev, a clever, strong-willed and quite
diplomatic man, could not but make this statement before the raging crowd in the Yerevan square." It is
hard to say how sincere this reasoning is, but it is striking that he completely rules out the Azerbaijan
trace, while the Armenian side, the Soviet mass media and different kinds of democrats were trumpeting
that all over the world.
It should be pointed out that Yakovlev did not speak of the Azerbaijan trace in Sumgayit events
either, i.e. both adversaries were trying to clear up everything between themselves.
Moreover, there undoubtedly was a need in such a determining action as perestroika, though a
different, systematic and controllable one, and to complete it successfully, all basic departments of the
country should have interacted accurately and realized reforms according to a single plan, everyone
should have done what they were meant to do. Instead of that, intrigues began both among the basic
administrative bodies of the USSR and inside them. The administrative bodies of the country started
crossing up one another, while chief politicians of the country, as it became clear from their memoirs
later, furiously hating one another were happy about every failure of colleagues. They reminded Roman
senators in the period of the downfall of the Roman Empire. In that situation, Sumgayit events were a
general occasion for disobedience and a balm for their bleeding wounds.
The Armenian side kept and keeps on saying that the leadership of Azerbaijan had connived at
Sumgayit events. IT IS HARD TO INVENT A GREATER LIE. IN THE BEGINNING OF THE

77
EVENTS BAKU SUFFERED SUCH A POWERFUL INFORMATIONAL BLOW THAT IT CANNOT
RECOVER SO FAR.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE ARMENIAN SIDE WAS WELL AWARE OF THE ORGANIZERS OF
SUMGAYIT EVENTS BUT IT WAS MORE USEFUL FOR THEM TO SHIFT THE BLAME ON
BAKU, WHICH THEY WERE DOING WITH THE SILENT CONSENT OF THE TRUE CULPRITS.
THIS MODEL SUITED ALL SIDES.
K. Brutents writes in his memoirs, "Sumgayit gave the Karabakh problem A NEW DIMENSION
(highlighted by author). It made the conflict acute, with the extreme zeal of the sides and increasing
readiness for violent methods of solution. In these conditions, THE NEXT LOGICAL STAGE OF
CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT BECAME WAR (highlighted by author), and it was not far off.
Meanwhile, the central authority continued to stick to its guns with amazing and even desperate
stubbornness, probably already realizing the hopelessness of its line."
This important confession of the advocate of Karabakh separatists causes the following questions.
WHO NEEDED THE WAR? WHO HAD BEEN PREPARING FOR IT FOR DECADES? WHO HAD
BEEN HANKERING AFTER THE NEIGHBOURS' LANDS? WHO HAD BEEN NURTURING
HATRED FOR THE NEIGHBOURS EVEN IN THE SOVIET TIME? IT WAS DEFINITELY NOT
AZERBAIJAN!
Some time after Sumgayit events, the head of Sumgayit, head of the Azerbaijan KGB department and
the first secretary of Azerbaijan.
Did the head of Sumgayit D. Muslimzade who had been on the crest of his political career need these
events?
The authorities of the republic were controlling the situation with great difficulty; the events like
those in Sumgayit meant the end of their political career; so it happened.
In February 1988, the regional council of Bagorno-Karabakh demanded passing the oblast to
Armenia. "To exhort them," remembers V. Huseynov, "first the second secretary of the Central
Committee of Azerbaijan Communist Party Konovalov arrived, then the first secretary Baghirov. But they
were simply driven out of the meeting room It is generally known and is confirmed by the entire
Baghirov's circle that he had always been ready for negotiations with the separatists and panicked at
bloodshed; Sumgayit events were a tragedy to him."
Baghirov was a decent but weak-willed leader. The day before the pogrom, Sumgayit was visited by
the first secretary of the Communist Party Kamran Baghirov and the deputy chairman of the Council of
Ministers Gasan Seyidov. In the evening, they attended a meeting with the citizens in the large chemists
club. The audience flooded the officials with questions and accusations, "They are occupying Karabakh.
Why don't you take any measures?" "Azerbaijanis are driven away from Armenia, why don't you take any
measures?" and so on. One began reading the list of killed Azerbaijanis in Armenia. The situation grew so
strained that the leaders of the republic had to escape through the backdoor and literally flee to Baku.
Baghirov never entered the dialogue with the people, he was a weak polemist. Another tragedy of
Baghirov was the lack of his supporters in the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR.
According to one member of the Bureau, at an "amicable" dinner, Karen Brutents literally insulted
Baghirov in the course of discussion on the Karabakh problem. Baghirov's "comrade-in-arms" were
laughing in their sleeves and nobody opposed Brutents.
Looking ahead, we should say that the lack of supporting team was the weakest point of Baghirov, as
well as of Vezirov and Mutalibov.
Vezirov could not have such by definition. Mutalibov's comrades-in-arms waited impatiently for the
moment to take his place.
Z. Todua writes, "By the night of 14 May, 1992, the crowd of marchers in front of the parliament had
thinned out considerably. When the advices "to use power" became too importunate, Mutalibov came up
to the window and said to his retinue, "You say that those persons down there are not the people, that the
people supports us. Let us assume that. But show me at least twenty or thirty people that would speak in
our support. Where are our supporters? Exactly. They are not here."
Mutalibov never brought himself to call the troops to disperse the marchers; it was both his strong
and weak point, while as we know, weakness influences the situation faster in politics. So it happened, on
15 May he left Baku again as politician for ever!
Returning to the most important point, let us note that the strategic mistake of the Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR members was also that they tried to shift the blame for the
events on D. Muslimzade in full accordance with Communist principles, instead of trying to find out the
truth. Afterwards, this ostrich policy painfully hit the political positions of Baku (later, People's Front of

78
Azerbaijan chose the same easy way. Coming to power, they arrested V. Huseynov for his participation in
January events, declaring him nearly the only one to blame for them).
We should say that Sumgayit Armenians realized that something strange was going on. None of them
wanted to go to Armenia.
Nikolay M., an officer of the special unit of the Red Banner Caspian Fleet, a participants of Sumgayit
events, remembers, "The saved Armenians were asked where they wanted to move, to mention familiar
people that could receive them and sent them there. It was amazing that all Armenians asked to send them
to Russia, mainly to Krasnodar region, Rostove region, Chaltyr, there is such Armenian settlement near
Rostov. And none of them wanted to go to Armenia!"
This is confirmed by another participant of the events, the then chairman of the Party Committee of
the Azerbaijan SSR Community Party Central Committee R. Akhundov, who says that about three
thousand Armenians gathered in the club demanded organized resettlement to Krasnodar and Stavropol
regions, and no one wanted to go to Armenia.
We know today that certain forces chose Sumgayit for some reasons.
The public is well familiar with the events in Novovcherkassk in Khruschev's times but few know
that something like that happened in Sumgayit in 1963. There was no bread in the petrochemical city, and
even potato, according to one of the city's heads.
During the November celebrations, unrest began in the city. The marchers began crying out anti-
government slogans and burning portraits of Politburo members. There were fierce clashes with militia
that resulted in human casualties. The order was restored by the military units that entered the city several
hours later.
Dmitry Furman writes, "the industrial centre with a lot of hazardous work conditions and such
ecological situation that there was a popular joke in Azerbaijan as if citizens of Sumgayit could even
survive in gas chambers." In his book published long before Sumgayit events, I. Zemtsov depicts
Sumgayit as a horrible city with lumpen population and enormous crime rate, "Since the foundation of
Sumgayit in 1947, 11,108 people have been severely injured. During those years, 6,000 people died
through violence, more than was born in Sumgayit in 1972." In 1963 a spontaneous uprising of lower
classes occurred in Sumgayit due to the food shortage.
The KGB was undoubtedly well aware of this all.
The famous journalist S. Perets recalls his conversation with Kalinichenko. "Why do you think trials
on Sumgayit die out?" Kalinichenko asked turning his face with unhealthy knobby skin to me. And he
answered himself constantly blinking his light water-transparent eyes, "When the victims realized at the
trial that Grigoryan is Armenian, all, you see, all of them renounced their evidences. You say there is a
video. Yes, there is. By the way, the video alone shows him polishing off six people But for the court
video is like air, sorry Not a proof in full accordance with Criminal Code Well, they gave him 14
years. And it's rather doubtful that it won't be reduced. Akhmedov was shot just for one corpse So we
can't go on any more" Kalinichenko waved his finger under my nose. "No-no And generally, you
ever thought, why the cameramen on the roofs? Did they knew the root? Have you ever thought?.."
In the first days of Aumgayit events and after them Armenian propaganda trumpeted all over the
world about hundreds of killed and wounded in Sumgayit.
Without even knowing, Brutents exposed one of the greatest propaganda provocations of the
Armenian side. He writes in his memoirs, "There was an explosion in Sumgayit, 31 deaths, 6
Azerbaijanis, the rest are Armenians." His figures are unquestionable.
The head of the KGB Z department Vladimir Lutsenko and the head of the section Valery Khmelev
write, "Somehow, no one has said so far, for instance, that in the Armenian village of Gukark happened
almost the same that had been in Sumgayit. They taunted Azerbaijanis, killed them, pillaged houses."
No doubt, the well-informed intelligence officers Lutsenko and Khmelev tell half-truth, whereas such
cases require precision, a woman cannot be a bit pregnant, you know. The precise figures are the
following. 26 people were killed in Sumgayit, 216 people were killed in Gukar and Masis regions of
Armenia.
Armenian separatists realized pretty well who and how was orchestrating Sumgayit events and they
were willingly cooperated with these forces, as it met their interests. The main thing for them was to show
the Azerbaijan people as a savage avenger for Karabakh events which were naturally shown as a
liberation movement. And they made it seem that the authorities had been preparing for these events in
advance. With this purpose, different rumours were spread, some of which are even improper to write
about.

79
In his interview to "Izvestia" the deputy General Prosecutor Katusev said, "Different fabrications
continue to hamper the investigation. In particular, rumours are spread that on the eve of mass disorders
lists of Armenians were drawn in the city for their physical annihilation, that metal bars and other objects
were specially manufactured at the facilities. That the employees of communication centres intentionally
turned off telephones in Armenian flats. And so on. To check up this information, investigators
interrogated a large number of Sumgayit citizens, workers of facilities, employees of housing
departments, communication centres and other services. And none of those declarations was confirmed."
It was not accidental that Grigoryan, alias "Pasha", Armenian by origin, was the first to kill several
Armenians in Sumgayit.
One of "Krunk" leaders A. Manucharov said, "We will make them shoot at us!" Brutents recalls, "At
the meeting of intellectuals in NKAO the headmaster of a musical school screamed hysterically, "You
(Moscow - K.B.) don't think of us as of people, we are a herd for you. Well, shoot, shoot" It was a
well-trained battle cry of separatists.
Churchill used to say, "Nothing is as inspiring as the fact that you were shot at and missed." Perhaps,
it is even more inspiring when you call for that loudly and openly, knowing that no one is going to shoot
at you!
In Sumgayit events Grigoryan showed how to do this but he was not shot at either then or later.
Doctor of law, the chief scientist of the Military Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Internal
Affairs Yuri Antonyan determines motives of terrorists as follows, without saying names. "The only
motive of terrorists is striving after power.. And do not forget that as more corpses as possible are
welcome to them, corpses of their own people. It is profitable to them, it is what they want! That inclines
public opinion in their favour. And it suits them if their terrorist acts cause repressions"
P. Lukimson writes in his book "Sumgayit through the Eyes of a Jew", "The cameramen who were
coolly shooting the events from the first minutes of the pogroms remain anonymous. In several days all
European TV channels broadcasted these tapes. " Well, what happened in Sumgayit is clear even through
the eyes of a Chukchi.
That dreadful film about Sumgayit events, the core of Armenian propaganda of these events, was
demonstrated in all countries of Europe and America. You can imagine the power of this informational
impact on Baku.
Maksud Ibrahimbekov who saw the film in Sweden tells, "The breathtaking visual series is
supplemented with not less terrifying audio one. One of the characters described from the screen to the
dumb-founded Swedes the scene of the murder of his friend Misha and his wife, which he had naturally
witnessed. After heads of Misha and his wife were cut off, thirty Azerbaijanis pounced on their young
daughter. They raped her in turns, then cut into small pieces, lit the fire in barbecue, prepared and ate with
gusto human shashlik kebab. You can't imagine what we have to suffer from these beasts!" said the
eyewitness Gabrielyan in conclusion."
Maksud Ibrahimbekov said that after watching this disgusting thing he had not recovered for several
days.
The epilogue of this picture could be the words of A. Makarov from his article "Reflections in the
Time of Trouble" published in "Sovetskaya Kultura" on 29 December, 1988, "We all, journalists, writers,
propagandists made a dramatic mistake, not mourning properly the victims of Sumgayit nationwide,
regardless of their Armenian nationality, just as innocent Soviet people. We did not curse the instigators
and murderers, again regardless of their Azerbaijani nationality, but generally as scum of the earth."
"Pravda" published the appeal of Y. Yevtushenko to the Armenian and the Azerbaijan peoples to stop
the bloodshed INITIATED (highlighted by the author) in Sumgayit. It was another provocation of the
poet against Baku, since the bloodshed began in Armenia when hundreds of thousands Azerbaijanis were
driven from long-occupied places.
After Sumgayit events and in the following 2-3 years, continuous meetings were held near the
Armenian church in Moscow not far from Vagankovo cemetery. The authorities of Moscow created all
conditions for these meetings; organizers received a permanent permission for meetings. There has never
been such a case in the USSR. The marchers were protected "against Azerbaijan provocations" by
Moscow militia. By the order of Mayor's office, the head of Moscow militia Major General Petr
Bogdanov regularly came to check up whether the marchers had any problems. Moscow intellectuals and
representatives of foreign embassies were also invited to the meetings. Representatives of the French
embassy were habitues of these meetings. Ardent speeches were said, the Azerbaijan people was called
fascists. Nuykin spoke at the meeting, "Representatives of this butcher people shoud be evicted from
Russia." Starovoytova proposed introducing a special form of administration of Azerbaijan railways.

80
Chernichenko proposed introducing direct presidential administration in NKAO etc. At one of these
meetings, professor of philology from MSU, NKAO native Grant Episkoposov spoke. He condemned
Sumgayit events and continued, "The Azerbaijani are to apologize for Sumgayit, and in that case, to avoid
further bloodshed, we can enter a dialogue with them." Professor was catcalled and a strapper pulled his
off the rostrum, after which he had a heart attack. The marchers demanded one thing, "Blood for blood!"
The meetings were attended by political and public figures, scientists, writers, famous artists,
Voznesensky, Yevtushenko, Bykov, Okujava, Fazxil Iskander, Asadov, Chilingarov, Kvasha and many
others, some of the made speeches. The world's major TV channels broadcasted lengthy fragments of the
meetings. They continued several years and struck a powerful informational blow on Baku.
The official bodies of the USSR did not stay aside either. Karakozov, Gdlyan and Ivanov from the
USSR Prosecutor's office arranged more than an hour's long programme on Leningrad TV where
Sumgayit events were shown in horrible scenes and the Azerbaijan people was insulted. There was no
trial yet, but they were already talking of execution.
A friend of ours who studied for Doctor's degree in Leningrad at the time recalls that he was ashamed
of attending the institute after that programme, as everyone was turning away from him.
It happened in practice; on court order several people were executed by shooting for Sumgayit events.
Dozens of thousands people were killed in the course of ethnic clashes in the entire area of the former
USSR, but we can hardly remember anyone executed under court sentence. Such "attention" was paid
only to the participants of Sumgayit events, thereby stressing the exceptionality of these events against
the background of the blazing USSR.
The second secretary of the Central Committee of Armenian Communist Party O. Lobov, later the
secretary of the Security Council of Russia, who was eggs expert prior to his political career, says
concerning Sumgayit events, "The same sharp estimate is to be given to Sumgayit vandalism We
should give the people of Nagorno-Karabakg an opportunity to live without the dictate of the Soviet
republic To arrange a kind of presidential administration."
He was speaking of the same things on Petersburg, Yekaterinburg and many other Russian TV
channels.
"Russian secret services trained Aum Shinrikyo militants and Kremlin was aware of the fact, while
the secretary of the Security Council O. Lobov was patronizing them and was on friendly terms with the
head of that sinister sect Asahara. Asahara paid 20,000 dollars for the training of each militant. This
money was transferred from Japan to Russian bank accounts and mysteriously disappeared."
Mysteriously, did they?
In an hour's long programme on RTR channel on 24 January, 2004, they said that members of the sect
had been amazed at the paternal care of Lobov. With his assistance they purchase everything they wanted
in Russia, even helicopters.
When Aum Shinrikyo showed its true face Lobov said, "Russian secret services should have warned
me about the activity of this organization." Even if you, Lobov, were fooled, which is rather doubtful,
why do you try to make fools of others?
The writer Sero Khanzadyan in all his interviews and publications alleged that about 450 Armenians
had been killed in Sumgayit and he saw the corpses with number tags on the hands with his own eyes in
the morgue. "Fascist monsters burst into the city hospital and maternity hospital, found Armenian new-
born children by tags and threw them out of windows, and disembowelled Armenian women in labour."
He was echoed by Yelena Alikhanyan-Bonner who told even more terrible "facts" on all TV
channels. It is improper to write what he was saying but her words spread in many Soviet mass media,
terrifying Soviet people! Her husband A. Sakharov was keeping up with her. And there is endless number
of such examples.
As we can understand from A. Lebed's books, Sumgayit events became his starting point for revenge
to the Azerbaijan people. In one of his books he writes, "Then, in February and March 1988 an
unpredictable, unexpected, savage, bloody and mean page of Motherland and my personal biography
started. The most grievous fact is that meanness, immorality and unscrupulousness proceeded from the
people who took high posts in the state Sumgayit smelled of medieval sadism, animal, inhuman
brutality often mixed with stupidity"
Some provocateurs arrange a large provocation, some catch it up, and others make their career on it.
A common picture!
The Azerbaijan people was stabbed in the back in Sumgayit events by the member of Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Council, poet Rasul Gamzatov. Definitely taking pro-Armenian position, together

81
with A. Sakharov he demanded the Gorbachev should call the events in Sumgayit the genocide of
Armenians.
The moon is floating above the silent sea,
And its night waves are telling me
That you, Baku, for better or for worse,
Are my beloved blood brother for good.
And you and I will never be apart,
We share one fate, we share one heart.
And let the Caspian rejoicing surf
Sing of our eternal brotherhood.

Rasul Gamzatov, "Baku"

He wrote that about Baku in cloudless days. He also wrote sincere and beautiful words for the song
"Cranes". When listening to this song, one believes in immortality of human soul. But R. Gamzatov wrote
no such words for the human souls wasted on 20 January, 1990 in Baku. He wrote no word about that at
all!
Owing to the Armenian propaganda, every time Azerbaijan was mentioned in different political or
business circles it was clear that all present were aware of Sumgayit events and naturally in Armenian
interpretation.
Sumgayit events became the basic point in assessment of Karabakh separatism in the CPSU CC; they
were invariably mentioned in all speeches and resolutions,
Vladimir Lutsenko was the head of Z department of the USSR KGB; Valery Khmelev took the post
of the head of a section at the same department. According to them, Z department was engaged in ethnic
issues. Information on ethnic issues in Russia and the USSR was stored here. They received requests for
aid and information from the Central Committee of the Party, Ministry of Justice, Supreme Council and
other offices. Both of them were on official business in Azerbaijan and Armenia those days. They recall,
"After Sumgayit events, a meeting of Politburo was held in Moscow. A closed one. After which Yegor
Ligachev went to Baku and Alexander Yakovlev to Yerevan. However, one of them suddenly said that
Karabakh was a historical territory of Armenia, while the other said just the opposite, no borders revision,
Karabakh would stay a part of Azerbaijan. We do not know who handed over the information on the
decision made at the closed Politburo meeting, but the fact remains."
A serious adjustment should be made here. Ligachev avoided public statements on the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan. Being a stable partocrat, he proposed different party methods: to expel the
organizers of separatism from the party, to carry out re-registration of NKAO Communists, to disband
party organization of the striking facilities and so on.
The last Soviet Prime Minister V. Pavlov is right about Ligachev, according to Ligachev's aid Valery
Legostayev, writing in his book "August from Within" (Moscow, 1993), "In 1986-1988 he probably had
more power than Gorbachev or Yakovlev." Nevertheless, he did not take a firm position on condemning
Karabakh separatism; like Gorbachevm he did not support them but he did not condemn them publicly
either!
The most important thing in this distribution of roles among the representatives of the higher echelons
of power was different. It was generally known that the honest partocrat Ligachev represents the most
conservative layers of the CPSU and has no influence in perestroika processes. Western politicians and
mass media were also unfavourable to him. As a matter of fact, he did not plan any activity in Baku; he
conducted some closed meetings where he mainly proposed fighting "Aliyev's heritage" and went away
as unnoticed as he had come.
Another pair of shoes was the chief ideologist of perestroika, the man whose opinion was considered
by the whole world. Yakovlev's behaviour in Yerevan was totally different from that of Ligachev in
Baku. He spoke at crowded meetings, condemning Sumgayit events, supporting Karabakh separatists,
gave numerous interviews to representatives of Western mass media, arranged meetings with intellectuals
etc.
Unlike Ligachev, Yakovlev said unambiguously, "Karabakh movement if not separatism but striving
after freedom and democracy". Sumgayit events were defined by him as a "genocide of the Armenian
people" (he will declare later, when the tension is gone, that the events had been organized by the KGB).
A CPSU CC official, a member of the NKAO Committee of Special Administration V. Sidorov
expressed in "Argumenty i Facty" his opinion which became standard, "Another concept began to

82
consolidate in the public conscience of the Azerbaijan population by means of mass media, speeches of
intellectuals and the republic's leaders. It says that the protests of Karabakh population are insulting for
the Azerbaijani, that the demands for reviewing the borders are an insult to the national honour,
encroachment on the sovereignty etc. Sometimes these speeches, even made by the chief executives,
sounded simply hysterical, calling to defend every inch, every bush of the home land by all means All
this caused so hysterical atmosphere in the republic and the events in Sumgayit became possible." In
other words, Sumgayit events were a logical result of the processes developing in the republic. It is hard
to make up a more provocative interpretation of Sumgayit events!
Provocations of party officials of different levels, from Politburo members to rank-and-file
functionaries, against Baku, concerning Sumgayit events, became usual practice.
The closest aid of Gorbachev and political provocateur A.S. Chenyayev writes in his memoirs about
the events of the late 1988, "They began burn APCs in Baku, even tanks, killed two Russian soldiers,
carry green flags and Khomeini's portraits along the streets, calling to arrange "Sumgayit" for all
Armenians in Azerbaijan."
Another curious scene. At that time, the author was in Thessalonica with the USSR national chess
team on chess Olympics. One day, the interpreter of the chess delegation (and an intelligence officer by
many signs) approached the author and said with evident gloating delight, "Do you know that the entire
Baku is covered with Khomeini's portraits?" It was actually impossible to call to Baku from Thessalonica
that time and the sports commentator of Mayak radiostation Naum Dymarsky showed priceless assistance
to the author; he connected the author with Baku through the Moscow studio. The author spoke to many
friends of his who heard of Khomeini's portraits from him for the first time. When the author returned to
Baku his wife confessed that in the time of her conversation with Thessalonica a tank convoy had been
passing their house.
The well-known propaganda system was working perfectly; misinformation was spread by the aid of
the USSR president and common squeaker.
Naturally, the US Senate did not stay aside from Sumgayit events. On 19 November, 1989, the US
Senate adopted a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh, "Due to the fact that 80% of the Armenian majority
living in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast are concerned about due to the fact that the Soviet
government qualified the murders of Armenians on 28-29 February, 1988 in the city of Sumgayit as
disorders, due to the fact that at first, the people and government of the Soviet Union took positive
measures consisting in the establishment of the Committee of Special Administration of NKAO, due to
the fact that the Committee proved to be inefficient to further, in the course of bilateral discussions
with the Soviet Union, the fair settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that would actually reflect
the people's views on the subject." As clear as it could ever be! Few knew of this resolution then, but its
meaning became evident on 20 January, 1990, when the USA "sympathized" with the barbaric action of
Gorbachev.
As we mentioned above, Sumgayit events played the part they had been meant to, becoming a
powerful informational weapon in the hands of Armenian separatists. They had nearly crucial influence
on the international public opinion that definitely sided with the Armenians. It could not be different with
that interpretation of the events!
The world mass media kept on saying "Sumgayit, Sumgayit, Sumgayit!" The great physicist Albert
Einstein once expressed a deep thought, "It is easier to split an atom than to change a stable stereotype."
For so many years, Baku cannot change this stereotype of Sumgayit events. We should admit, though,
that Baku makes no special efforts in this direction.
The Armenian side presented Sumgayit events in full accordance with Goebbels.
"Single out subjects for hatred," he taught.
"The more monstrous the lie, the easier it might be to make believe it!"
Sumgayit events are and will be for a long time spoken of by the international community, inflicting
enormous damage on the Azerbaijan people. Meanwhile, no one actually remembers now of the
monstrous lie mass media spread in the first days of the events, which struck a horrible informational
blow on Baku. "Big lie gives time advantage and no one will remember it afterwards," Hiter used to say.
The word "Sumgayit" remains on the international stage, terrifying Western citizens.
"To suggest an idea to a considerable number of people, it should be repeated again and again."
More than 90% of all Armenian sites mention Sumgayit events in some or other way.
These three principles formed the model of Sumgayit events.
They sowed their lie all over the world.

83
The speed of the process increased in geometrical progression. Every Armenian informed several
dozens of citizens in the country where he lived, and each of them informed a dozen of others in their turn
etc.
We should admit that Sumgayit information action was carried out by the Armenian side with great
skill and by means of up-to-date information technology.
According to the former director the CIA R. Hillenkoetter, "80% of intelligence information come
from common sources such as books, magazines, scientific and technological reviews, photographs,
commercial analysis data, newspapers, radio broadcast, an also general information from persons that
have a view of the affairs abroad."
The above-mentioned sources of information are chief and sole for a common, far from intelligence
citizen of any country.
Many of these information sources reflected Sumgayit events in some or other way, mainly negative
for Baku. Even in such a magazine as "Sovetsky Tsirk" (Soviet Circus), N8, 18 February, 1989, Andrey
Sakharov found it possible to speak of Nagorno-Karabakh problems and Sumgayit events. "That's a real
circus!" an inexperienced reader might say. And he would be mistaken. Speak everywhere possible and
sound as tough as possible; it is the notorious principle of the notorious gentlemen!
And it should be pointed out that considerable means were invested in this propaganda action.
The following example shows how necessary and expensive this action is. According to FAGCI, the
USA expenditure on development and acquisition of information struggle means increased four times in
the last 15 years and now rank first among all military programmes expenditure.
"There is more powerful weapon than slander, it is truth," said Talleyrand. However, in our age, truth
costs money, preferably green.
The author worked for a long time as a scientific consultant in a large foreign engineering company
and associated with many marketing, system analysis, oil and gas production, oil and gas pipeline
construction and other specialists who had been in Baku at different times. In easy conversations, in
different atmosphere, the author would ask as if casually (Monte Carlo method - a casual question amidst
a long conversation) how and to what extent those gentlemen were informed of the eviction of
Azerbaijanis from Armenia, the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku, Khodjaly events, Sumgayit events,
of the fact that after Sumgayit events raging crowds in Volgograd, Tyumen and even Leningrad had been
smashing up the buildings of local party bodies, of the events in Srebnitsa where Serbs killed 2,700
Muslims, of the eviction of Meskhetin Turks from Uzbekistan, as we know, 56 people died in disorders in
Ferghana on 6 June, including 43 Turks, 355 Turks and 136 Uzbeks were wounded. 147 Turk houses
were burned.
For many years, the author gathered and classified these materials. The results were striking. Over
50% of the respondents knew about Sumgayit events, of course in the negative aspect concerning Baku
and not the Centre. Not less than 2% knew about the other above-mentioned events only vaguely.
That was the blow Baku suffered because of Sumgayit events for which it was the last to blame!
On 16 March, 2001 Armenian "Mediamax" reported that the representative of the Union of Armenian
Businessmen Ovsep Seferyan, while speaking at the press conference in Yerevan, had not ruled out the
possibility of establishing an Armenian-Azerbaijan joint venture plastic production company in
Sumgayit
Ighityan was also engaged in this black PR. During Sumgayit events, he, the USSR people's deputy,
called the Azerbaijan people fascists at the congress of the USSR people's deputies. Ten years after
Sumgayit events he says to the BBC correspondent, "We should say: let us deal trade. Let us deal
tourism. Let us begin to associate! Once I said at a meeting attended by a lot of Caucasians: look, let us
make the Caucasus one of the best places on the earth. And we could do that!" Yesterday he called for
annihilation of the Azerbaijan people after having seized 20% of its territories and made a million people
refugees in their own land, today he just calls for friendship instead of showing repentance!
On the next day after the establishment of such "joint venture plastic production company in
Sumgayit" mass media of the world reported that despite the Azerbaijan "atrocities" in Sumgayit, the
Armenian side expressed its good will again and agreed to cooperate in that city. The world is reminded
again of the Azerbaijan "atrocities", while the Armenian side receives new political dividends for its
"nobility". It would be a grand PR action! However, dear gentlemen from Armenia, new time has come!
Only such political pervert as Ighityan can imagine joint tourism when the Armenian side will show
the tourists the ancient Azerbajan town of Shusha and speak of it as of Armenian one!
So, what is the total residue of the above-mentioned reasoning?
First and most important, it is the tragedy of innocent people killed in Sumgayit.

84
Second. The tragic Sumgayit events, for the first time in the USSR, occurred in the territory of
Azerbaijan and the local authorities could not resist the powerful external forces that had orchestrated the
pogroms. They undoubtedly have their share of blame for the events.
But is Japan alone to blame for the nuclear bombs the Americans dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki for the first time in mankind history? Even if the Japanese had made every effort, could they
have prevented that action of the Americans?
As considerable lapse of time passed, Sumgayit events can be accurately formalized, at least for their
qualitative assessment, in the following form: S = F (X, Y, Z), where S characterizes the grievous results
of Sumgayit events, X characterizes the participation of different local forces in them, Y characterizes the
participation of different perestroika forces, and Z characterizes the participation of different forces
furthering the USSR collapse. This model of Sumgayit events built on the basis of content analysis of
considerable number of materials devoted to the period of Gorbachev's perestroika is unquestionable
today. The question is how to place coefficients before the parameters characterizing different political
forces that were active in those years? That requites access to other materials that, in out opinion, are to
be found in the future and all coefficients will be placed according to their "contribution" to these events.
Hot on the traces of Sumgayit events, the Soviet and world press discussed only S, the parameter
characterizing the grievous results of Sumgayit events, X, the parameter characterizing the participation
of different local forces in them; i.e. the entire informational blow fell on Baku.
FINALLY, EVEN IF ALL POWER BODIES IN AZERBAIJAN WORKED LIKE CLOCKWORK,
SUCH EVENT WAS TO OCCUR ANYWAY, IF NOT IN SUMGAYIT, THEN IN OTHER PLACE IN
AZERBAIJAN, SINCE THE AIM HAD BEEN CHOSEN, AND NOT BY BAKU!
IT IUS UNQUESTIONABLE TODAY THAT SUMGAYIT PROVOCATION THAT HAS DEEP
AND DIFFERENT ROOTS WAS PRESENTED BY THE ARMENIAN PROPAGANDA IN THE
WHOLE WORLD AS THE DOING OF THE AZERBAIJANI, BOTH ORGANIZERS AND
PERFORMERS, AND THEIR ATROCITIES TO THE ARMENIANS. THE CIVILIZATION SIDED
WITH THE ARMENIANS, WHILE THE GUILTY WELL-KNOWN FORCES IN THE USSR AND
THE ARMENIAN SIDE THAT RECEIVED AN ENORMOUS INFORMATION ADVANTAGE
WERE SATISFIED WITH EACH OTHER. THE EVENTS SUITED THEIR INTERESTS AND, MOST
IMPORTANTLY (IT IS NO SECRET TODAY), BROUGHT THE WAR CLOSER, WHICH
ARMENIA HAD BEEN PREPARING FOR.

Gorbachev's planned blow was inevitable and predictable

Many years arguments have been going on in Baku among politicians and journalists. Did Baku know
that Gorbachev would bring troops in the city? Who signed the message with the re-quest to send troops
in Baku?
Such a approach to the problem instead of system analysis of the events preceding the in-troduction
of troops in Baku and the comprehensive assessment of all events is bewildering. There was then, on the
wake of events, and especially there is now enough material to carry out comprehensive analysis and give
the ultimate answer to these and other questions.
For instance, to understand the situation in the higher authorities of the USSR after 22 June, 1941,
Edward Radzinsky drew accurate conclusions and answered many questions con-cerning the suddenness
of the German attack on the USSR, not being a criminal law expert and analyzing Stalin's journal of visits
in 10 days after the beginning of the war. Stalin's secretary Poskeryshev carefully registered there who
visited Stalin in those terrible times and how long the visits took; Edward Radzinsky made use of this
data. It proved to be informative enough to draw certain conclusions.
They mess it up, without going into details, trying to find out who of the officials of that time signed
the telegram, even if someone of them really did it. Did we forget everything after the Second World War
looking for the one who had signed the order to cross the Soviet border? We used to say the only right
thing, that Hitler had attacked the USSR. And we know today that Gorbachev attacked Azerbaijan! And if
someone signed that telegram, we should know that "hero" as the man who sold his Motherland and not
as the chief culprit of the tragic events, as some politicians try to do.
To understand the situation in Azerbaijan that preceded the introduction of troops in Baku, we could
use the entire Azerbaijan as the "journal" of visits and assessment of many other in-formative factors. The
most facts that we know today were known even then and if there had been the desire, future events could
have been predicted then. History do not like subjunctive mood, though.

85
We are going merely to use the facts that regularly appeared in open press, it will be enough to have
the idea.
SO, HERE ARE THE FACTS PRECEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS IN BAKU ON
20 JANUARY, 1990.
O. Platonov writes, "Gorbachev's membership in Trilateral Commission is to be referred to January
1989. The meeting of chief architects of the Soviet perestroika and "brothers" who had been working "for
the good" of the "Universe architect" and "new world order" took place in Moscow. Trilateral
Commission was represented by its chairman David Rockefeller (and also the head of the Council on
Foreign Relations), Henry Kissinger, Georges Berthoin, Giscard d'Estaing, and Y. Nakasone. The side to
be converted to the faith of the world backstage was rep-resented by M. Gorbachev, A. Yakovlev, E.
Shevardnadze, G, Arbatov, Y. Primakov, V. Med-vedev and some others. As a result of secret talks, joint
agreements on joint activity were worked out, the nature of the activity itself was clear to few, though.
However, everything clarified in the end of the same year, when Gorbachev together with the same
comrade-in-arms had a meeting with President G. Bush in Malta. "Many experts tend to believe that
Malta was the place of those fatal agreements between Gorbachev and Bush, which led to the USSR
breakdown and cata-clysms in the countries of Eastern Europe."
On 25 September, 1989, the USSR Council of Ministers passed resolution 795-193, on the basis of
which the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs passed its resolution 169 on 18 October, 1989, on privileges
for the persons who had made "official trips in Baku, Azerbaijan SSR, the region with special situation."
Here is an example of such certificate.
Certificate
This is to certify that . actually was on official trip in the
period from 199. in the city of Baku, Azerbaijan SSR, region with special situation.
On the basis of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution 795-193 dated 25.09.89 declared by the order
169 of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs dated 18.10.89, Comrade is entitled to all
established privileges.
First deputy head of Chief Bureau of Criminal Investigation
of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Major General Y.I. Lagoda
Several questions arise concerning this resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers. Why the
Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict became the object of so close attention, while the entire USSR was literally
blazing? Why was Baku singled out from the vast region of the conflict? Why is Yerevan not mentioned
in that resolution, though there was an attempt of capture of "Zvartnots" airport there, as well as
provocations at the nuclear power station ("Vympel" arrived in Yerevan to provide its safety), several
Soviet soldiers and officers were killed etc.?
And most importantly, why was this resolution published three months before the invasion of the
Soviet troops in Baku?
Similar resolution was adopted concerning Chernobyl disaster fighters, but it was adopted AFTER
THE EVENT!
Intelligence officers of the prewar years asserted that Stalin had been watching Hitler's intentions to
unleash the war against the USSR by the European prices of mutton and sheepskin coats. If Hitler
intended to attack the USSR, sheep was to be slaughtered, mutton prices were to drop and prices of
sheepskin coats, so necessary for the German army in the cold Russia, were to rise!
With such an informative certificate (it contained much more information in it than sheepskin coats),
the appropriate bodies in Azerbaijan could have drawn appropriate conclusions, if they had wanted. BUT
THEY DID NOT!
Misinformation about the situation in Baku was caught up by all Soviet mass media. Provocative
misinformation also infiltrated the ranks of the Soviet Army, which naturally strained the situation in
Baku even more.
It is well-known that at first the commander of the Caspian Fleet Lyaschenko V.S. tried his best not to
interfere in the political situation in the republic. But he immediately received a "stimulating injection".
Captain 1st rank Y.Y. from the special unit of the Caspian Fleet recalls, "I will never forget the end of
1989 when I received information through my channels that with the purpose of intimidation of the
commander of the Caspian Military Fleet an attempt on the life of his son was being prepared. His son
was at first a student at Caspian Military School and then transferred to Leningrad. They found him even
then. I immediately reported to German Alexeyevich. Then we quickly got in the car and drove to
Commander's, entered together and reported. He clutched at his heart, "Mates, he's my only son! How can

86
I help?"We thought over all variants, chose the best, and planned a nice and safe operation. The attempt
did not occur."
Isn't it nice? Father is to protect his son! Afterwards Lyaschenko walked on tiptoe before the special
department, since he understood what he was meant to do!
Such provocations were not single, it was a mass phenomenon. In connection with the events in
Baku, Nikolay Medvedev writes, "I remember the book by Anton Ivanovich Denikin "The way of a
Russian Officer" where he tells of the revolt of 1905, "On the ground of the embarrassment of the
authorities, a phenomenon grew that was not akin to the military sphere: organization of secret officer
societies, not for political purposes but for self-defence I know about three of such societies. Due to the
terrorist threats against high military commanders, officers in Vilno and Kovno registered well-known
revolutionaries of the city, warning them secretly about the prepared punishment The situation in Baku
was more simple and undisguised. The open meeting of garrison officers adopted and issued the
following for general information, "In case of murder of a single garrison soldier or officer, leaders and
founders of revolutionary organizations, besides criminals, are responsible first of all. Criminals shall
know that they will be caught and killed from now on. WE WILL STOP AT NOTHING TO RESTORE
AND MAINTAIN THE ORDER (highlighted by the author)."
The Soviet officers in Baku were different. Naturally, some of them had many friends among the
civilian population of Baku. They told their friends about the above-mentioned open meeting of garrison
officers. High-ranking officials from the well-known subdivision of the Soviet Army arrived in Baku and
were speaking about some terrorists from People's Front of Azerbaijan who had been arranging terrorist
acts against the military and their families. They insisted that the military should take their families off to
Russia, though they did not provide dwelling space and did not promise to render employment assistance
(afterwards these "refugees" were shown on Central TV Channel where they told terrible things in
habitual voice). Then several trained officers spoke, reminding their colleagues of their duty to the
country and in conclusion a general and undoubtedly provocative resolution was adopted.
Here is the description of the garrison meeting in Shamkhor airborne forces regiment that had been
withdrawn from Afghanistan three months prior to the meeting. In the regiment that had been ruthlessly
killing in Afghanistan, the regiment the officers and soldiers of which had been ruthlessly killed by
Mujahidins. The meeting is described and commented by its participant Victor Nikolaev in his story
"Alive in Help", chapter "Do You Remember, Major"
"Today's necessary and therefore anxious general meeting of the complement of all five garrison units
was postponed from 10.00 a.m. to 04.00 p.m. The command did not inform us of the reason of this
change but the officers' wives and children who gathered in the previously fixed 10.00 a.m. made the
general atmosphere seem somewhat prethunderstorm with their agitated half-whisper and clamour and
frequent slaps to bring the fidgety offspring to reason. Families living in garrison ramshackle "Khruschev
buildings", families of paratroopers, aircraft and helicopter pilots, artillerists and signallers who were
deployed to do their state duty on the left shoulder of Nagorno-Karabakh AO (with your head strictly to
Russia) all the same already knew the reason of frustration of the vitally important meeting in the officer
club of paratroopers.
The chief shock that wrung the hearts of the officers was the message received an hour later, "The
memorial house of Marshal Bagramyan burned to ashes in Chardakhly village." (By the way, it is well-
known that Bagramyan made the same strategic mistake near Kiev as Pavlov, sending over a hundred
thousand soldiers and officers to death. Stalin had Pavlov shot but forgave Bagramyan who was
supported by Beria, despite the tough demands of the military command to punish him. The same case
was when Khruschev had Baghirov executed but made Mikoyan one of the country's leader, though he
was even bigger criminal. - Author). Chardakhly was the home village of Marshal. It was situated in the
territory of AO, 12 km from the garrison, in the mountains rising almost from the landing strip. Victor
knew the memorial house by two natural for every officer visits due to the tender respect for the
commander whose firm uncompromising demand in the war was not to send a company to attack if it had
less than 50% of Russian soldiers
Karine, an elderly, lean, intelligent Armenian woman who was not spoilt by frequent visits worked
there. She told him from the heart everything she knew about Marshal, including the information on his
genealogy up to the sixth generation. Victor then left the hospitable house with dolma-filled stomach, a
bit drunk and convinced that the hostess was at least granddaughter of Marshal Bagramyan and a doctor
of history. With womanly cordiality, in a low voice, with long pauses, as if not daring to confide it to
Victor, she told him that he was serving in a very uncommon place, nearly a holy land.
"Many of your brother soldiers are lying here. I have right to say so."

87
Karine fell silent eyeing the saucer.
"Hundreds of Russian soldiers are lying here rammed in common graves. Your brothers, robbed and
crippled, are lying there."
It happened on 9-12 January, 1918 at Shamkhor - Dallar station-to-station block, Transcaucaisan
Railway.
Up to a thousand armed Transcaucasian Tartars in the trenches on either side of the railroad shot the
soldiers in the carriages. There were five wrecked trains under Shamkhor bridge, three military, one
passenger and one that turned into a heap of deformed metal. Corpses of Red Guard soldiers were
scattered all around, some of them charred. Not one hundred of corpses of Russian soldiers farther, in the
river canon. All the dead were crippled beyond recognition. My old men who saw all that had their hair
standing on end. It was Shamkhor Babi Yar, undisclosed so far
("Karine, an elderly, lean, intelligent Armenian woman who was not spoilt by frequent visits worked
there", these words remind of a lean, intelligent in a way, Goebbels. Victor Nikolaev stuffed with dolma
reminds a German burger of the thirties when all speeches of Hitler and Goebbels were perceived through
stomach, "I promise you much bread and butter" - Author)
Today, an hour before the meeting, small groups of officers were already shifting their feet at the club
entrance and humming in a low voice till received the command to enter. Everybody was waiting for the
arrival of paratrooper group from Chardakhly. People were also worried about Karine's fate. The local
head of the special department, outwardly harmless, always thoughtful and friendly young major, was
also standing there, in the circle together with the garrison commander and commanding officers
"Comrades officers! Attention! Comrade Colonel!" the crowded officers club of paratroopers was
filled with ringing silence. Never in the time of peace had the people been so disciplined and fit. Men
looked withdrawn like before a battle. Women looked overmotherly. Children shrank between parents
and were making eyes right and left like little mice. The legendary commander of the legendary Red
Banner landing regiment, famous all over Russia was standing on the rostrum
The audience livened up appreciably, voices became louder, a child burst out crying. Then the
commander of the regiment asked the officers to help find seats for the newcomers, eight Armenian
families
The commander of the regiment together with the head of the special department of the garrison
opened the facts that alerted the men and frightened the women. The intelligence officer, a brave man,
declassified the facts that the officers had been guessing with heavy hearts. He read the following.
"The Liberation Front of Azerbaijan is addressing Muslim brother (there was no such front in
Azerbaijan, it was made up for that meeting. - Author). Jihad against Russian aggressors Holy war
Barbarian Russian Empire We lost all national traditions, national pride because of them We will
build our own free Azerbaijan. With our own army We will come and break Russian laws As long
as we are together, we can bring the whole world to our knees, and this is good property!.." (all slogans of
the People's Front of Azerbaijan spoke about "Soviet empire" and never "Russian empire". - Author).
Due to the gravity of what had been read, demands, advices and requests were brought to general
attention. The Armenians cuddled together like an island cowered and drooped, exchanged strained
glances and pulled up their kids."
Much in the speeches of commanders are one-to-one taken from novels "Russian Forest" by the
forgotten Leonov and "War" by Stadnyuk. But the enemies there were fascists, while at those meetings
citizens of the fraternal republic Azerbaijan that contributed to the formation of the USSR much more
than Armenia were depicted as enemies.
It is quite understandable that after such a meeting military of the regiment saw no difference between
Afghan Mujahidins and Azerbaijanis who were opposing separatists. There are certain reasons why all
Soviet and later Russian publicists who wrote about everyday life of the Soviet Army in the Karabakh
conflict constantly draw parallels between it and the Afghan war, making clear who is foe and who is
friend.
The military who had been defeated and insulted in Afghanistan ruthlessly tried to wreak their hatred
on Azerbaijanis, which was encouraged by the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army.
The most striking fact is that Victor Nikolaev dedicates all this dirty provocative concoction to
"With the blessing of the Right Reverend Benjamin, Bishop of Vladivostok and Primorye, dedicated
to father Alexander Korolenkov." That is the way!
If we compare the meaning of ideological actions of representatives of the central bodies of the Soviet
Army spread in different military units deployed in the territory of Azerbaijan before 20 January, 1990,
we will see a clear ideological model worked out in the corresponding bodies of the Soviet Army. It is

88
IMPLANTING IN THE MIND OF THE SOVIET MILITARY SERVICEMEN HATRED FOR THE
AZERBAIJAN PEOPLE, whose sole "fault" was its struggle against separatism. Common calls of the
Soviet time for friendship and brotherhood between Soviet military and the population of the region they
were deployed in suddenly became quite reversed.
Other USSR state bodies were keeping up with the process, each in its own way.
While the USSR was crumbling and total uncertainty ruled in the country, many high-ranking
officials solved their personal and family problems without taking state interests into consideration at all.
On 29 July, 1989, due to continuous attacks on trains in the territory of the Armenian SSR, the train
movement from Azerbaijan to Armenia was suspended. Nakhchivan ASSR remained in blockade.
The USSR Minister of Railways N. Konarev says in the national press that extremists from the
People's Front of Azerbaijan seat women with children on the railway bed, thus preventing movement of
trains to Armenia. Baku was stunned by such Goebbels-like statement of the minister.
Later, everything clarified. All financial resources of the ministry were concentrated in the hand of
one deputy minister, Armenian by origin, Konarev's family friend. N. Konarev was going to defend
doctoral thesis and one of his opponents and the chairman of the academic council were Armenian. How
could the weak-willed Konarev not consider such surroundings?
Konarev's colleague, the USSR minister of communications issued the order on the subordination of
NKAO communications system to Leningrad regional communications department, without even
informing Baku. The order was so wild and absurd that Moscow had to cancel it on 25 August, 1989.
Such behaviour of the USSR high ranking officials, when they were pushing their personal interests
into the foreground, was systematic, with only few exceptions.
In August 1989 the Azerbaijani V. Huseynov was appointed the head of the KGB of the Azerbaijan
SSR, replacing the Russian Gorelovsky. It caused certain bewilderment, since Moscow had usually not
entrusted responsible posts to persons of native nationality in troubled times.
On 1 December, 1989, the Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR passed the anticonstitutional
resolution "On the reunion of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh". Armenian parliament passed
the resolution "On including the plan of economic and social development of NKAO in the state plan of
economic and social development of the Armenian SSR for 1990."
This resolution and particularly the inaction of Moscow influenced deeply the stability in Baku.
The belief consolidated that Yerevan was acting in unison with Moscow.
"Sovetskaya molodezh", the publishing organ of Latvian LKSM Central Committee, wrote on 1
December, 1989, "The US Secretary of State G. Baker said that the United States would not condemn the
use of force in the USSR if the need arose to restore order, FOR INSTANCE, TO PUT AN END TO
THE UNREST IN TRANSCAUCASIA (highlighted by the author).
According to Radio Liberty, G. Baker expressed the opinion at the press conference in Washington
that such coercive actions could be relevant if clashes broke out between representatives of different
nationalities of the Soviet Union. According to the Secretary of State, in that case the Soviet authorities
might have no other choice but to use force by means of introducing the state of martial law or some other
method. G. Baker emphasized that unlike the use of force to suppress peaceful marches of protest such
measures would have been of totally different nature." It is obvious that speaking of Transcaucasia and
use of force, G. Baker referred not to Armenia, since all branches of authority in the USA supported
Armenia.
On 24 December, 1989, i.e. a month before the villainous action, the Chairman of the USSR Council
of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov said in an interview to the French television about "the intention of the
Soviet leadership to use the army to stabilize the situation in Azerbaijan."
30 December, 1989. The borders with Iran are broken in Nakhchivan.
In connection with this fact, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Council Soviet of Nationalities Rafik
Nishanov said, "This act is in full accordance with perestroika and democratization of the society and a
worthy response to the bureaucrats hampering the intercourse of peoples."
After the introduction of troops, Gorbachev mentioned the demolition of the borders as one of main
causes of the introduction of troops.
31 December, 1989. One of opposition leader said before many thousands of marchers, showing them
a piece of wire, "Azerbaijan has been reunited!"
As a result of this "reunion", Moscow hastily renamed half of the 4th army as border guard, without
even changing the military uniform, and closed the border. Exotic border guard it was; green caps, red
tabs with tanks on them! Officers received only caps but even caps did not suffice for everyone. The

89
same with soldier shoulder straps, half the company with red ones and the other half with green ones.
Afterwards Gorbachev and Yazov considered that "reunion" as an appeal to the destruction of the USSR.
Shortly before the January events, dubious public suddenly poured into Baku from all over the Soviet
Union. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs information, their number made up 4,468 on 22
January, 1990. They were those who committed some offence and were detained. The precise number of
all the newcomers, "Gorbachev's nestlings" naturally remained unknown. The history of Baku had never
known such an irruption of suspicious people.
A deputy of the USSR Supreme Council, composer Arif Melikov writes that he had a firm impression
that the process was somehow controlled by someone. "As I already mentioned above, we had individual
conversations (after 20 January events - Author) with each prisoner in the presence of the prison
administration and a doctor. And here we found out a curious fact. There was a man in the cell, a citizen
of another republic, Russian, who had there for a criminal offence. Having found several such criminals
in different cells, we demanded explanation. It was puzzling that those people easily told, as if boasting,
that they were professional thieves and had arrived in Baku for pillage and that drugs had been found
when they had been arrested. They were Dolgov Victor Petrovich from Kuibyshev, Rodionov Alexander
Ivanovich from Kransodar, Voloshkin Alexander Stepanovich from Kiev. As we can see, a rather vast
geography. The authenticity of their names and surnames has been a mystery for me so far, though."
And he is right. It was one of the ideological elements of provocations against Baku. Suspicious
persons were planted to respectable but illegally arrested citizens of the republic and willingly confessed
all sins "diluting" the general mass of prisoners. Thus, the model was being built that was trumpeted by
all Soviet mass media, "a mass of declassed elements and drug addicts took part in marches and
pickets"
That uncommon process did not receive worthy attention in Baku in the beginning of its development
before the January events.
Speaking in Bureau of the Azerbaijan CP CC on 19 December, 1989, the chairman of the Ethnic
Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Council G.S. Tarazevich introduced the term "self-regulating
territory" in regard to NKAO, continuing Volsky's expression "the people of Karabakh" (many years later
A. Yakovlev already spoke of the Karabakh language). Tarazevich determined the blockade of
Armenia as the chief problem. "We should at any price put an end to this blockade destructing the
friendship of peoples," he said. "This is our principal task." Besides lifting the blockade, Tarazevich
suggested opening Lachin road, which "will give the Karabakh Armenians to enjoy their native ancient
Armenian culture." He finished his speech with an ominous phrase, "The Centre will not allow the further
blockade of Armenia that leads to the collapse of its economy."
The politician responsible for ethnic relations, before whose eyes Armenian separatists are ruining the
very ethnic relations striking blow after blow on its basic concepts, assigns primary importance to the
problem that is far from his competence and threatens Baku in case of negative answer.
Instead of raising the whole layer of the accumulated problems and trying to contribute to this
problem, Tarazevich concentrates on a secondary problem proceeding from the unsolved principal one
and moreover not relating to his competence at all.
It was clear that another major provocateur had arrived in Baku to strain the situation intentionally
and watch for guilty ones in Azerbaijan for some punishment measures.
In the early 1990, officers from "Vympel" and A subdivision of the 7th department of the KGB were
sent to Nakhchuvan for carrying out operational missions.
One of the leaders of the republican Council of Ministers reported to the Central Committee of the
Azerbaijan Communist Party that he had seen officers from Moscow in the halls of the Council. When
asked what they were doing there, they answered that they were trying to find offices for themselves and
their employees.
According to the republic-famous journalist (and the leadership of the republic knew that), a slightly
drunk general he was flying with in the same plain said to him, "Soon we will take severe measures
against you!"
9 January, 1990. While considering the issue of the plan and budget for 1990, the session of the
Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR included plans of social and economic development of NKAO in
the sphere of its influence. No reaction from Moscow followed which strained the situation in Baku even
more.
9 January, 1990. High-ranking officials arrive in Stepanakert from Moscow, Ghirenko, Nishanov and
Zhdanov.

90
They are met with submachine gun shots into the air in the outskirts of Stepanakert. They hastily
escape back to Baku. Later Nishanov will say, "Certain forces wanted to kill me in order to blame the
Armenians then (?! - Author)."
"On 14 January, 1990, one of the heads of the top secret KGB "Alfa" subdivision M. Boltunov arrives
at Baku with his team.
"The KGB "Alfa" special group THAT HAD HAD COMBAT EXPERIENCE IN BAKU
(highlighted by the author) and Vilnius received the governmental order to begin storming the Russian
"White House" on the night of 21 August. These professionals could do everything in half an hour. Only
"major military units" are capable of stopping them," writes the former commander of one of "Alfa"
subdivisions.
It was clear that they had arrived in Baku to carry out serious operations.
"Alfa is a top secret unit of the KGB," writes Boltunov Mikhail, "Alfa is a unique unprecedented
group in our country. There are very few such units in the whole world. "Delta" in the USA, GSG-9 in
Germany, SAS in England, Israeli special units, a group of national gendarmerie in France, Austrian
"Cobra", Belgian special quick reaction squadron, Spanish "GAL". We know that some other countries
also try to form special units for antiterrorist struggle with the active assistance of Israeli and German
experts. Despite the difference in social systems, antiterrorist units in different countries face many
similar problems."
On 14 January, 1990, "Bakinsky Rabochiy" reported that a candidate member of the CPSU CC
Politburo, the chairman of the Soviet of the Union Yevgeny Primakov and the secretary of the CPSU CC
(supervising ethnic issues) Andrey Ghirenko had arrived in Baku. The same day, the Armenian
"Communist" reported that member of the CPSU CC Politburo, and the secretary of the CPSU CC
Nikolay Slyunkov and the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Ivan Silayev.
These two messages contain important information. The ace of undercarpet politics Primakov and
Ghirenko, a kind of Suslov of that Politburo, arrived in Baku, whereas two technocrats who were far from
the problem of the Armenian-Azerbaijan confrontation arrived in Yerevan. Unlike Primakov and
Ghirenko who were "toiling" in the well-known direction, Slyunkob and Silayev were spending their time
in a country house over cognac and pool.
This alone should have alerted Baku. But it did not happen.
"On 15 January, 1990 the KGB special units "Vympel" and "Alfa" were AGAIN (highlighted by the
author) redeployed to Baku."
"When the USSR began crumbling literally before our eyes, "Vympel" was redirected to flash points
blazing up in the territory of the Union one by one, Tbilisi, Baku, Sumgayit, Northern Caucasia The
only place where they did not carry out their combat operations was the Baltic region," writes Dmitry
Lomov, "Reporter".
Lieutenant Colonel of "Vympel" special group Erkebek Abdullayev says, "On 15 January, 1990, the
KGB special groups arrived in Baku. We were accommodated in "Absheron" hotel in the governmental
area and were wearing civilian clothes."
Here is a brief note on the KGB special unit "Vympel" that never budged from Baku.
Sergey Ptichkin writes, "In 1981, by the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU
CC Politburo, on the initiative of the head of the KGB Y.V. Andropov, the KGB special group "Vympel"
was formed. It took place on 19 August.
"Vympel" immediately became one of the top secret units in the Soviet Union. IT WAS TO ACT
ONLY OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY (highlighted by the author). A dual problem was set before the
fighters of "Vympel". There were to be able to destroy any object (or those inside it) in any point of the
earth and to be able to set any object free from the malefactors.
The specific character of the tasks required specific training. It was required to make not only
universal soldiers but almost supermen. A fighter of "Vympel" was to speak fluently several foreign
languages, have enormous physical stamina and remarkable strength, handle all kinds of small and cold
arms skillfully, know demolition techniques perfectly, work with radio station, jump with parachute,
swim under water, have knowledge of medicine on the level of medical assistant.. It is simpler to say
what he did not have to be able to do
So, each "Vympel" fighter could be worth his weight not in gold but in diamonds. The backbone of
the group was composed from the KGB officers. Many of them went through Afghanistan where they had
been fighting in "Vega", "Cascade", "Zenith" special units.
In the ten years of its existence "Vympel" became really universal and probably the best combat unit
in the world with the real experience of a real war."

91
Such was the unit Gorbachev sent to the peaceful Baku!
None of the above-mentioned strict functions of "Vympel" was relevant to the events in Baku. There
was neither the palace of Amin, not armed special groups.
"I have talked to the military. The pogrom-makers could be suppressed by one battalion of specially
trained soldiers. And there were 11,500 soldiers of internal troops in the city in the days of pogroms! The
statement of generals that the troops were blocked in quarters is ridiculous! When they needed to leave
the quarters (on the night of 20 January) they did it. And they did it easily, by breaking down a rickety
fence and to the sweep of the streets across a parking lot, right over cars." This is the opinion of the
eyewitness of the black January, a film director Stanislav Govorukhin.
It is relevant here to clarify the reports of Armenian officials in response to the "invasion" of
"Vympel" in the territory of Armenia. The official statement said, "On 6 May, 1991, training of the KGB
special group "Vympel" was held at Armenian nuclear power station. During the training in complex
situation, the actions of the group in the case of capture of the reactor block were worked through." No
one was injured, only a few people got off with only a scare. But certain forces were hinted that the
Armenian nuclear power station is not to be trifled with!
Armenian officials interpreted common training (that met national interests of Armenia, by the way)
as follows, "According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia, the reactor block of the Armenian
nuclear power station yesterday, 12.40 p.m. by two special actions platoons that had arrived in Yerevan
by helicopters. Yesterday, two villages in Goris regions, Aravus and Kornidzor, as well as Voskepar
village in the northeast of the republic, were bombed from helicopters (?! - Author). According to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia, a full special actions regiment, 800 people with equipment and
officers, arrived in the republic. The government and the armed forces of Armenia adopted the appeal to
the UN Human Rights Commission, declaring the joint action of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Ministry of Defence as interference in the internal affairs of Armenia, and also an appeal to the
people of Armenia, where they call the people not to succumb to panic. Alexander Inskanadryan."
"Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 7 May, 1991. No comment!
In Baku, "Vympel" did not maneuver but acted!
On 15 January, 1990, the presidium of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences appealed to the
scientists of the world to raise their voice against the barbaric annihilation of the Armenian population in
the Azerbaijan SSR. Scientists of the USA, France, Sweden, Austria, Belgium responded to the
appeal They all characterized the events in Baku as a "crime against humanity". But the important point
is that the USSR embassies in those countries helped spread these statements, i.e. it was preparation of
the public opinion in those countries for the actions against Baku.
"Moscow News" report that on 18 January, 1990, the European Parliament demanded that the USSR
leadership should bring troops in Azerbaijan.
"On 18 January, 1990, a part of the KGB special units was sent to Nagorno-Karabakh where the
groups stay till the end of February 1990."
The head of Z department of KGB Vladimir Lutsenko and head of a section Valery Khmelev say,
"Finally, we received the order of the Commander in Chief from Moscow to bring troops in Baku on the
night of 20 January, 1990"
"Did the order refer to your subdivision?" asks the correspondent.
"Yes, it did. Some of our officers had already been in the city."
Let us make it clear concerning that "already". "Alfa", "Vympel" and other special units of the KGB
began "making themselves familiar" with Azerbaijan long before 20 January; they just increased their
presence on the eve of 20 January, 1990.
"After Afghanistan the 15th special unit (a secret group of the KGB - Author) was directed to the
place of its previous dislocation in Chirchik. The 154th detachment remained its part, 177th one was
passed to the brigade of LenVO The 173th detachment took an active part in restoring order in Baku on
20 January, 1990," writes a KGB veteran in Internet.
Lieutenant Colonel of "Vympel" special group E.S. Abdullayev recalls, "In the autumn 1988, the
activists of the People's Front of Azerbaijan managed to gather up to 500,000 marchers in the central
square. Tents were set up before the House of Government, where hunger strikers were sitting. The aim
of the hunger strike was to force the leaders of the Communist Party to resign.
The Azerbaijan government proved to be incapable of resolute actions. It was then that the KGB
special groups "Alfa" and "Vympel" were sent to Baku.
We put on militia shoulder straps. All officers suddenly became privates. We live in the club of the
republican KGB, ate in the canteen there and were soon exposed by the Azerbaijan colleagues that we

92
had happened to meet in Afghanistan. They understood immediately that we had arrived in Baku not
without purpose."
Exactly, not without purpose!
"On 12 January, 1990, airborne troops landed in the airport. The operation was headed by Bakatin
and Bobkov."
Vyacheslav Shironin recalls, "By the order of President, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB
were entrusted with securing the state of emergency. In the second half of January 1990, for second time
in the month, I was going to Baku on business trip by a military transport aircraft.
I was accompanied by a whole team of 100 senior officers of operational subdivisions of the KGB
central apparatus, mainly the employees of the 2nd central committee, experts on fighting foreign
intelligence. Among them were also the officers of the 5th department, they were familiar with methods
of foreign intelligence agencies activity on psychological war in the "Islam front". There were experts on
the problems of economic safety, transport and living facilities as well
I remember the commanders of special combat groups introducing themselves to me in the airfield of
Sheremetyevo, Alexander Miroshnochenko ("Alfa"), Sergey Lysyuk ("Vityaz") and lexander Gorodilov
("Vympel"). In their small groups I noticed with great satisfaction Victor Blinov and Oleg Lutsenko, with
whom we had already taken part in detention of several criminals. We did not know then yet that the trip
to Azerbaijan would drag on for many months and I would have to change officers many times. Those
who arrived in Baku on the first call were Boris Zhirnov and Mikhail Platonov (who became generals
later), Yuri Fedoskin, Anatoly Smirnov, Nikolay Stebnev, Victor Lughinin, Vladimir Voskoboynikov,
Vyacheslav Pelenkov, Vladimir Rybakov, Igor Kuznetsov, Yevgeny Bataman, Victor Rastrusin, Vladimir
Kashin, Vladimir Vasin and other officers of the 2nd central committee and the 5th department of the
KGB, some of its subdivisions. We all had a common cause and our constant motto was the same order,
"Prevent violence, avoid bloodshed!"
An impressive scale! But good intentions remained mere intentions.
There is one question in connection with such irruption of the KGB agents. Has there even been a
case in the USSR history when such an impressive team arrived in any Soviet republic at one time? We
believe there has not.
The heavy activity of the special units of the Red Banner Caspian Fleet in close collaboration with the
KGB was impossible to overlook. They furthered the introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku in every
way.
"Autumn 1988. Special subdivisions of the KGB "Vympel" and "A" are directed to Baku due to the
aggravation of ethnic relations in Azerbaijan. During their stay, the groups are stationed at the ships of the
Caspian Fleet in Baku."
I.A. Ch-v (he conceals his real name, there must be reasons for that) recalls, "On 18-19 January, 1990
a big turmoil began in the Azerbaijan capital Baku. By that time the Special Department of the Caspian
Fleet headed by German Alexeyevich (the "Board of the Federal Security Service of Russia" wrote in his
obituary, "The deputy director, the head of the Constitution Protection and Antiterrorism Department of
the Federal Security Service of Russian Federation, Vice Admiral Ugryumov German Alekseyevich died
suddenly on 31 May, 2001, in the pursuance of his military duty in the territory of the Chechen
Republic") had had quite comprehensive information on the leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan,
their sources of financing, their foreign puppet masters, their short-range plans. We knew the location of
their bases, names of instructors, armament. We knew that the aim of the Front was to make Azerbaijan
split from the Soviet Union. All this information was sent to the higher authority by German Alexeyevich.
But the country's authorities had no right approach to the assessment of the coming and ongoing events.
State security service is a tool of the state; its prerogative is to know and to report. Our special department
headed by Ugryumov was coping with this task quite well in that period. Acting within the frames of law,
we could decapitate the People's Front, isolate the provocateurs, detain politicized criminals, bring
changes against them, arrest and hold them for court. We had plenty of evidence. But we were not
authorized by Moscow (that is what the occupation of the Red Banner Caspian Fleet in Baku, while its
functions included the protection of the southern sea borders of the USSR.)
According to another officer, once German Alexeyevich lost his temper and shouted at two officials
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB who had arrived from Moscow to carry out inspection
in the Caspian Fleet.
"Don't you ever read our ciphered messages?! So it looks like my men risk they lives for nothing? Do
you understand that the collapse of the country has already started? Do you understand that the country
has been set on fire from the south and we gave you this forecast a year ago?!"

93
They answered that Lubyanka was regularly informing Gorbachev and the reports on Azerbaijan
were put on his desk every morning
Immediately after the beginning of Baku events, the militants attempted to seize the arsenal near the
Naval school. We received the warning in time that four trucks filled with armed people were moving in
our direction from the city centre We contacted the command and discussed the tactics within minutes.
We showed our armed people, each of which had his shooting sector, to bearded men with submachine
guns, bullied them a bit And hurried to disappoint them that we had the order to shoot to kill if they
tried to get to the arsenal.
"What are you talking about, captain? We are a thousand and a half, all with weapons."
"Well, be as it may. Five hundred will be killed at once, the rest will think "
We, operatives, worked mainly at night. I had appointments in the city at midnight, at one, two in the
morning"
The above-mentioned demonstrates definitely that the special department of the Caspian Fleet
intentionally exaggerated the events depicting the local population as extremists and themselves as a kind
of heroes risking their lives every single minute. No deep and objective reports were sent to the Centre
revealing the core of what was going on in Baku. They sent for the troops guided rather by their personal
interests than the care about the USSR. Besides, the special department of the Caspian Fleet must have
been missing jollies! In the Soviet time, the Red Banner Caspian Fleet was nearly a health-resort, since
Iran had no fleet on the Caspian and no threats could be expected from it. The high commanders of the
Fleet had built themselves fashionable houses at the seaside and were spending their time fishing (often
poaching) and drinking in baths. When the dark hour of Baku came they probably decided that it was time
they distinguished themselves before the Centre. What if they were awarded or promoted!
Vyacheslav Avtorkhanov, the driver of the head of the Caspian Fleet special department G.
Ugryumov, recalls, "Naturally, we did not come back. German Alexeyevich had a classified document on
him and we could not allow it to come to anyone's hand. We had no weapon. That happened on the
second or third day of the pogroms in Baku, in January 1990." It is clear that this classified document
concerned the internal political situation in Baku and promised nothing good to its citizens. There were
undoubtedly plenty of such documents sent to Baku at that tense time.
"German Alexeyevich Ugryumov was born three years after the end of he Second World War to the
family of a war veteran. Finishing school, he worked at a shipyard. In 1972 he graduated from the
Caspian High Naval School. He served on the Caspian as ship captain," writes Vyacheslav Morozov
about the FSB admiral.
We cannot but notice some insincerity in Morozov's lines, some incompleteness of the thought. Let us
complete it.
He was born, studied, worked, got married etc. Ugryumov in Baku! Basic stages of his life were spent
in Baku that was to become his second motherland. But he "invented puzzling combinations, false
variants, skillfully informing the militants from the People's Front, and the latter "swallowed the bait"
every time; arranged leak of information about the movement of buses and trucks that were going at
totally different time and in totally different direction. He took everyone and everything from Baku
through safe routes. He was the last to leave Baku." Ugryumov continued such activity concerning Baku
in the future.
Russia gave one billion dollars worth weapons to Armenia, while the newly-fledged deputy director
of the FSB, the head of the Constitution Protection and Antiterrorism Department Ugryumov was seeing
to it that not a single submachine gun from Russia could get to Baku.
To be loyal to the oath did not mean to destabilize the situation in Azerbaijan.
As we can see, Baku did not become second Motherland for Ugryumov!
In the beginning of January, 1990, the Armenian side for the first time used re-equipped civil Mi-8
helicopters to fire from the air at the settlements of Goranboy region of Azerbaijan bordering the northern
part of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Before the invasion of the Soviet troops in Baku, from 4 to 10 January, 1990 Gorbachev gave 100
tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft armament of the Soviet Army to Armenia.
9 January, 1990. While considering the issue of the plan and budget for 1990, the session of the
Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR included plans of social and economic development of NKAO in
the sphere of its influence. No reaction from Moscow followed which strained the situation in Baku even
more.
In the beginning of January 1990, there were first cases of firing at Sadarak village with "Alazan-2"
missiles, cannons and mortars. Cannons inflicted heavy damage; shells broke through roofs and attics,

94
exploded inside buildings scattering thousands of small splinters. People were trying to press themselves
against the mountains beyond the range of fire. 11 people were killed, over 50 wounded.
On 13 January, 1990, the Armenians occupied Kerki village in Nakhchivan AR by a sudden assault.
On 15 January, 1990, the armed Armenian infantry was sent to Gushchu village, Khanlar region of
Azerbaijan.
On 19 January, 1990, the Armenians attacked Sadarak village in Nakhchivan.
Armed provocations of Armenian extremists considerably increased, while Moscow was talking
about Azerbaijan extremists.
Troop movement around Azerbaijan began.
13-14 January, 1990. Provocateurs arranged mass disorders in Baku, 50 people were killed.
14 January, 1990. "Karabakh" committee declares military mobilization in Armenia, open signing up
of volunteers for the war against Azerbaijan begins. No response from the Centre.
15 January, 1990. Mayor of Saint Petersburg A. Sobchak, the then "deputy of the Baltic", made the
well-known statement on Leningrad TV in the programme Fifth Wheel. His provocative statement spoke
about "the tragic fate prepared fro 600,000 Russians in Azerbaijan", thereby contributing to the bloody
events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku. His coauthors in this provocation remained unknown.
Owing to Sobchak's efforts, the northern capital was prepared for any sanctions of the Centre against
Baku.
The second tangible blow on Baku, which was logically related to the first one, was struck by
Sobchak at the congress of people's deputies. Together with another Leningrad professor Anatoly
Denisov who got involved in Sobchak's dirty games, he rejected his seat in the USSR Supreme Councilin
favour of Nagorno-Karabakh delegation.
State of emergency and curfew.
It is well-known that in the terms of mass disorders when the situation is out of control of the
authorities, the most efficient method is to declare state of emergency. The world practice shows that this
method is to be used very carefully so as not to harm the conflicting sides, i.e. the balance of power must
not be upset as it naturally leads to the strengthening of one of the sides.
It is what Gorbachev was doing with his asymmetric policy when he declared state of emergency,
thereby strengthening the position of the Armenian side and preparing the blow on Baku.
It is what politicians, the military and intelligence were talking about.
Heinrich Malyushkin, Major General, writes, "Whereas in Azerbaijan state of emergency and curfew
were declared not only in Baku and NKAO but also in adjacent regions, in Armenia, despite the situation,
they were valid only in Goris region bordering with Azerbaijan. This certainly created favourable
conditions for Armenian militants as to freedom of movement and actions along the border."
Vyacheslav Shironin writes the same, "It was only in Baku that we learned about the "area of
responsibility" and we had to get to Nakhchivan by helicopters. While we were flying, my friends and I
wondered why state of emergency had been declared just in several towns of Azerbaijan. In our report to
the command in Moscow, we proposed that it should be at the same time declared in the regions of
Armenia situated along the administrative border with Azerbaijan. For the conditions should have been
equal for both sides and no one should have had advantage. The chief aim of state of emergency is to
disarm the illegal armed formations. But if we disarm, for instance, only Nakhchivan militants, the
Armenian ones will gain advantage.
No one could answer the direct question concerning this issue at the joint tactical meeting in Baku
either. They only said that the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs had made similar proposals to the higher
authorities. As it should have been expected, the question immediately arose in Nakhchivan and was
redirected to me. I had to answer frankly.
"We are going to prove and insist"
We should unfortunately point out that they failed. It was not their fault but their misfortune, since the
local population was losing faith in them, which was of crucial significance in that situation.
Such policy of Gorbachev in declaring state of emergency in the conflict region gave huge advantage
to Armenia. Among other things, all political institutions were functioning there and a considerable
number of Western correspondents were walking freely all over Armenia, sending pro-Armenian reports
to their home offices from the spot. Meanwhile, the state of emergency totally paralyzed political and
social life in Azerbaijan and the republic turned out to be fully isolated from the rest of the world; pieces
of information leaked into foreign press with great difficulty.
As many politicians said, Gorbachev should have brought troops in Armenia and declare state of
emergency there at different stages of developments there.

95
When the deportation of Azerbaijanis from Armenia began on the state level, Gorbachev was
absolutely obliged to declare state of emergency in the entire Armenia. He had all reasons to do it when
murders and mass disarmament of soldiers of the Soviet Army, capture of military supply depots began,
when the attempt of seizing the strategic airport "Zvartnots" was made, when the building the of the
Supreme Council of Armenia was captured. Leaving his post, Mayor of Yerevan Ambartsum Galstyan
said, "I am not afraid that the Communists or Dashnaktsans may come to power. The problem is it is
riffraff that are coming to power."
After the following, it becomes clear what politicians were running the show in Armenia those years,
When asked, "There were many "dark incidents", such as poisoning, murder etc., in the first years of
Karabakh movement. Many criminal cases were filed but the public never found out the truth. Do you
think the truth about them will ever be revealed?", the former head of the KGB of Armenian SSR Usik
Arutyunyan answered, "If there is interest in it, the truth will most likely be revealed. To understand why
the crimes were not solved, let us remember who headed security agencies in that period. In this regard, it
is not so much incompetent minister that is dangerous but the come-and-go people who appeared with
him and who sometimes had criminal past. I was replaced by Valery Pogosyan, and then came Edik
Simonyants, David Shakhnazaryan. But the head of a structure is to understand something by himself and
take competent decisions.
Who came to the security agencies and whom did they bring with them? Let us remember one
director appoint his driver the head of the KGB pretrial prison (I do not want to say any names) where
perfect order had been reigning before him and where there had been no case of a prisoner's death since
the thirties. And now, a man is killed in that perfect pretrial prison! A poet could have been appointed
defence minister; an uneducated man could have become a deputy minister, a driver the head of a pretrial
prison. In one word, the inefficient staff policy of those years played its part." Russian democrats and the
international community, however, called those people "democrats of the new wave fighting for
democracy!"
The former head of the KGB of Armenian SSR Usik Arutyunyan does not write what those people
were doing in the territory of Azerbaijan. To imagine it, though, one does not necessarily have to have
particularly rich imagination!
Gorbachev confined himself to stagy actions, since his chief interests were in Azerbaijan.
Such policy in declaring state of emergency was undoubtedly worked out by the Centre and was one
of the links of the entire strategy to fetter the Azerbaijan people as much as possible, to isolate it from the
rest of the world, to destroy all of its political institutions, i.e. to create most favourable situation for the
crucial blow on Azerbaijan.
16-19 January, 1990. On the approaches to Baku, a large task group was formed with more than
50,000 military servicemen in total number from Transcaucasia, Moscow, Leningrad and other military
districts, from the Navy, internal troops of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. The Bay of Baku and
approaches to it were blocked by ships and cutters of the Caspian Fleet. All officers, warrant officers and
army conscripts of Azerbaijan origin were isolated in the units and subdivisions of Baku garrison. The
republican bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB were being disarmed under the pretext
of inventory of government-issue weapons.
60th and 75th motorized divisions were brought to the southern borders of Azerbaijan with further
deployment.
Two special divisions of the internal troops (Dzerzhinsky and "Don-100") were brought into NKAO,
with Azerbaijan settlements being taken control over; this did not almost concern the Armenians.
January meetings of 1990. There is certain amount of information also in the meetings held on
different levels with the participation of representatives of the Centre, several days before the introduction
of troops. If we study it carefully, we will see that their behaviour at these meetings had much well-
hidden information in it.
Vaghif Huseynov, the head of Azerbaijan KGB, one of the key figures in power who was in the
confidence of the Centre, recalls, "At that time, only Centre had the actual power and actual police force
to prevent large-scale organized or spontaneous disorders. But for the first nine days of disorders in Baku
they did not interfere in anything. There was a considerable contingent of the internal troops of the USSR
Ministry of Internal Affairs in Baku, over 4,000 people. They were inactive alleging that they had not
orders from above.
Vezirov (the first secretary of the CC of the Azerbaijan Communist Party) held a meeting. At the
meeting, the deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Liskauskas said that there had been
warnings about potential pogroms but the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic had been unable to

96
thwart the mass disorders. He also mentioned the facts that militiamen sometimes not only stood idle but
even connived at the pogrom-makers. But after that Liskauskas said firmly, "We need the critical decision
of the Centre on the possible use of force. The internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs
will start operating without such decision!"
After the meeting, I received a phone call from the head of the USSR KGB Kryuchkov. He asked
why the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were not suppressing the disorders. I
answered, "The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs said that nothing would be done without the
appropriate written instruction or declaration of state emergency." I reminded to Kryuchkov the words of
the commander of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Shatalin, "We've had
enough of Tbilisi. It was politicians that made the decision, but it was us that were responsible."
Silence fell. After waiting for a little while, I asked Kryuchkov, "Vladimir Alexandrovich, you will
probably understand me if I ask you what is going on. Thousands of people are being thrown out of
Armenia into Azerbaijan, while the Centre is completely inactive. It is all like a nightmare. And now
people are murdered, burned, thrown from balconies here in Baku, while many hours long meetings are
held, reports are sent to Moscow, there are ambiguous nods and everyone is waiting. But no one wants to
do anything. What is it behind this all?" Kryuchkov replied, "You know as well as I do that decisions are
unfortunately taken too late here, or not taken at all"
Even when one reads these reserved lines, it becomes clear that something dreadful was being
prepared!
N. Ismaylova writes concerning other meetings, "Many things can be said about that days-long
tragedy. I would like to recall one very important day, 14 January, when the then first secretary of the CC
of the Azerbaijan Communist Party convened the Bureau of the Central Committee for an emergency
meeting.
"Mass disorders began in the city yesterday," said Abdurakhman Vezirov, "there are some deaths,
there are some wounded. We have gathered here today to prevent the events from developing."
Judging by the records, the morning meeting was rather confused and emotional, full of inadequate
reaction, spontaneous unreasonable speeches. Someone proposed placing the wounded in the military
hospital, to which the commander of the Baku group of army Popov answered, "We cannot do that. The
military are on the heightened alert, they are to prepare everything for themselves." And no one asks what
the general prepares hospitals for on 14 January. Dialogues with the commander remind theater of the
absurd. Popov: "The armed forces are making some redeployment, putting themselves on the alert."
Vezirov tells him with mild reproach, "Do not consider it polemics, but it would be desirable if I or prime
minister were informed of any redeployment."
The first meeting ended with nothing. The second one was declared along toward evening, with
Moscow visitors and Gorbachev's personal envoy Yevgeny Primakov participating. We know today that
he is one of the most successful politicians, superheavyweight, political ace with imperial background,
supporter of strong government authority, Russian Lawrence of Arabia, fond of Tsvetayeva's poetry, spy
novels by Karr and Georgian toasts. I am giving so many characteristics from the press because nothing
like this could be felt in the personality of the man who virtually conducted the second meeting of the
Bureau. He avoided answering vexed questions, interrupted the speakers rudely.
"The situation is extremely critical," says the chairman of the Supreme Council Elmira Kafarova. "If
we ask for people's help, they demand solving Nagorno-Karabakh issue. As soon as this problem is
settled, mutual understanding will appear. Ayaz Mutalibov, Vaghif Huseynovm Rafik Zeynalov, Artur
Rasizade, Rauf Akhundov and others say the same." Primakov replied, "Don't tell me about Nagorno-
Karabakh! What shall we do with extremists who seized power in Lankaran and Jalilabad? With
extremists in Baku?" They explain him that the only condition those extremists make is stabilize the
situation in Karabakh. Primakov is displeased, "THEY HAVE OVERTHROWN THE AUTHORITY!
WHY DO YOU TURN A BLIND EYE TO THIS? (highlighted by the author). Let us say, there is no
sausage in Moscow and the people overthrow the authority. Shall we say that first we should give them
sausage and then take measures?"
R. Zeynalov: "We have lost popularity with our people because we did not take nationalistic position.
Compare the resolutions of the Central Committees of Armenia and Azerbaijan. A classical situation, an
obedient republic can be ignored and a capricious one can be flirted with." Primakov: "You had better
listen to what the Armenian comrade say." Zeynalov: "The Centre has not ensured our constitutional
standards." "Is the Centre a baby-sitter?" said the angry Ghirenko, "You are talking of what you were to
do yourselves!" Zeynalov: "It is state bodies that are to do something with militants and helicopters."
Primakov asks Mutalibov, "Are you state authority?" Mutalibov: "Rather exhausted one." Primakov,

97
"ARE YOU CONTROLLING THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY?" (highlighted by the author).
And the striking reply of Mutalibov, "Is the situation in the country being controlled at all?"
Many conclusions can be drawn from this meeting, but two ones suggest themselves immediately, the
insolent behavious of the Baku group of army Popov and the unusual behaviour of academician
Primakov.
Such behaviour of Popov at that meeting had some reasons.
In Yerevan, Soviet generals did not interfere with the political events at all but they did it quite
actively in Baku, by Gorbachev's personal order, impudently and unceremoniously.
Vezirov was under great influence of Soviet generals those days. As a rule, he used to fly to Moscow
by the personal aircraft of the commander of the southern direction General of the Army Zaytsev and,
according to eyewitnesses, often consulted the latter on the problems that arose. After the bloody events
of 20 January he escaped to Moscow on a military aircraft.
But most importantly, it is absolutely evident that academician Primakov intentionally arranged a
kind of street shootout at that meeting to distract the participants from the actual assessment of the
situation and forecasting of the future events.
It was one of the well-known and frequently used methods of the KGB. Even then, Primakov knew
the scenario of the following events if not in detail then in general, and it was easy to conceal the actual
principal intentions of Moscow in such "shootout".
Extra couches for "future wounded" are prepared in the hospitals of Baku and the process is observed
by a high-ranking official.
The leadership of the Azerbaijan KGB did not stay aside from those events either.
Vaghif Huseynov, the then head of the Azerbaijan KGB: "The Centre did not inform us about the
forthcoming introduction of troops. HOWEVER, THE KGB HAD A SERVICE CONROLLING RADIO
BROADCASTING. ON 19 JANUARY WE OBSERVED HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY ON THE
FREQUENCIES USED BY THE MILITARY. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE TROOPS WERE
PREPARING TO ENTER THE CITY (highlighted by the author). I met with Elchibey on my own
initiative and told him that it was necessary to take all possible measures in order to avoid clashes
between the population of Baku and the troops. In reply, Elchibey promised me to talk to the leaders of
the People's Front. He called me at five in the evening and said that the leaders of the People's Front had
gone out of his hand, so there was nothing he could do either. Elchibey also said that the Central
Committee and the government were to blame as well. They had driven the situation to the dead end."
The first part of this confession is important for the assessment of the situation at that time.
Vaghif Huseynov: "WE PROPOSED BRINGING IN TROOPS EARLY IN THE MORNING
(highlighted by the author), declare curfew, and inform the population like it had been during the
disorders in Baku in 1988. There had been no problem then, no one had been even injured. But the troops
were brought in at night.
Special units should have been used instead. Why come into Baku by tanks? Police operations are not
a function of the army in any world country. Internal troops are meant for this purpose. It is very
suspicious that they were not used in Baku. We had special units in the Soviet Union that could disperse
crowds of 100-300 people, didn't we? We did, but no one undertook anything. They waited till pogroms
with murders began and introduced troops, even though they had had similar experience in Tbilisi,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan before January events in Baku"
Considering the introduction of troops in Baku as a done deal, Huseynov merely suggested another,
more merciful way of its realization.
Looking ahead, we should say that Vezirov was of the same opinion, judging by his statements.
Mister Huseynov either does not understand or intentionally pretends that he does not understand
Gorbachev's actions. Who knew then or remembered about the bloodless introduction of troops in Baku
in 1988? Virtually no one!
The order was restored quietly, though. But Gorbachev needed not order. HE NEEDED A
CRUSHING BLOODY BLOW ON THE PEACEFUL BAKU FOR EDUCATION OF OTHER
REPUBLICS. It was as clear as day, otherwise it is hard to explain such a large-scale preparation for the
invasion in Baku.
Finally, was the leader of the republic Vezirov aware of the introduction of troops in Baku?
The then deputy head of Azerinform S. Perets recalls the meeting of Vezirov with the first deputy
minister of defence Luzhin shortly before the January events in Baku, "Hardly had Vezirov begun telling
about the meeting in the square when Luzhin rose up and pressed his heavy palms to the fragile table.

98
"Comrade Vezirov!" his deep voice filled the room. "We are well aware of the operational situation.
We are keeping track."
"Very well", Vezirov agreed easily.
But Luzhin did not hear him already, sticking to his guns.
"I am to clear the square by the order of the chairman of the Defence Council!"
"What?" Vezirov asked again still smiling.
Luzhin repeated slowly as if explaining a lesson to a slow-witted schoolboy, "I am to clear the square
immediately by the order of the chairman of the Defence Council!"
"Do you understand what you are talking about?"
"I do understand it perfectly well. I have the order to clear the square and I am going to do that!"
"With what forces?"
"Three thousand paratroopers."
"But there are three hundred thousand people in the square!"
Zaytsev and Tushin (generals of the Soviet Army - Author) did not get embroiled in the squabble.
They simultaneously reached for their glasses of tea without arranging their moves. Perets thought that
they did not completely approve Luzhin but consider it all a done deal.
"Order is order!" Luzhin sounded irritated. "The square will be cleared!"
"Are you so sure?" Vezirov picked up the phone and said to the speaker, "Connect me with Mikhail
Sergeyevich."
It was only then that Perets remembered that Gorbachev was the chairman of the Defence Council.
Hiding in his corner behind the aperture, Perets was waiting for the events to unfold further. He realized
that Vezirov had dared to take an insolent step. A very insolent one.
Everybody in the room was silent. When the phone rang Vezirov stood up. Generals rose as well.
"Good evening, Mikhail Sergeyevich!" said Vezirov. "Sorry to disturb you."
"Good evening, Rakhman," Gorbachev replied, "never mind, I am on the road. What is it there? How
is the situation?"
"Not that simple, in one word."
"You will get help."
"I know. Luzhin is already here. Thank you very much"
"What is the matter then?" Gorbachev began getting annoyed.
"There is a small discrepancy."
"Of what kind?"
"We cannot sort it out who is the political leader of the republic, myself or General Luzhin"
"Do you have other suggestions?"
"Only concerning the timing," Vezirov answered quickly. "We'd better have the square blocked and
let no one in. And in a week when it is empty we will squeeze the rest out."
Luzhin clenched his heavy fists. Brick-red blush flowed back from his face and it became ash-yellow.
"Do what you consider necessary," Gorbachev said stiffly. "Political leader, indeed" and then
asked, "Do you need anything else?"
"Just a minute, Mikhail Sergeyevich," Vezirov closed the receiver with one hand and addressed the
generals, "I AM ASKING YOU AS PROFESSIONALS, HOW MUCH FORCE DO WE NEED TO
BLOCK THE SQUARE AND ENSURE THE ORDER IN THE CITY? (highlighted by the author)."
"About ten thousand people," said Tushin casting an inquiry glance at Zaytsev and Luzhin.
The latter kept silent.
"Ten thousand people, Mikhail Sergeyevich," repeated Vezirov.
(On 20 January, 1990, 30,000 military servicemen were brought in Baku, taking into account that
experience. - Author)
"Organize the reception tonight."
"Thank you, good-bye."
On finishing the conversation, Vezirov settled back in his chair. Then he gave the generals a sullen
look and said, "Begin blocking the square with the available forces. Then arrange the reception and
accommodation of troops. As for the rest, act in accordance with the guidelines. Introduce the
commandant of the special district Tyagunov and other heads of the commandant's office to me
tomorrow."
Saying good-bye, Vezirov saw the generals to the door."
As the dialogue demonstrates, positions of Gorbachev, Luzhin and Vezirov were different in mere
details but coincided in principle. Vezirov was not against the introduction of troops in Baku as a method

99
of solving internal political problems. IT IS RATHER HARD TO BELIEVE AFTER THIS
INFORMATIVE SCENE THAT THE BLOODY INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS IN BAKU ON 20
JANUARY, 1990 WAS NOT COORDINATED WITH VEZIROV AS WELL. IF HE HAD DONE IT
ONCE
Several days before the tragedy of 20 January, a telegram was sent to Moscow. It was signed by A.
Vezirov and suggested "immediate instituting criminal proceedings against the leaders of the marching
extremists that declare anti-Soviet and antiparty slogans and appeals. There are legal grounds for that."
And finally, to what extent were opposition leaders warned about the possible introduction of troops?
According to a member of the government of the People's Front of Azerbaijan Republic Etibar
Mamedov, at the meeting with the leaders of Azerbaijan on 18 January, 1990, the chairman of the USSR
Supreme Council Soviet of the Union Yevgeny Primakov commented on the possible introduction of
Soviet troops in Baku as follows, "THE TROOPS ARE NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE
SEPARATION OF AZERBAIJAN FROM THE SOVIET UNION. WE WILL NOT ALLOW THIS
SEPARATION AT ANY COST." (highlighted by the author)
On this day, 19 January, Dmitry Yazov was in Baku, in the headquarters of the army with Vadim
Bakatin and Yevgeny Primakov. Abdurakhman Vezirov and his gang moved from the building of the
Central Committee to the headquarters from where the future marshal Yazov guided the operation. On
5.00 p.m. V. Polyanichko, the second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party CC, said in a private
conversation with Etibar Mamedov, "The question is settled, the decision is made, nothing can be done.
For the sake of our old friendship, I'd advise you to hide."
On 18 January, the commander of Baku garrison General Sokolov warned Etibar Mamedov, "If we
get the order we will not spare anyone; we are soldiers and will execute the order."
"We suggested taking control over the situation in Baku and other regions. They promised us that
there would be no curfew in Baku and no troops would be brought in. But on 15 January, at night, reports
came on the redeployment of army units with heavy weapons and equipment by air, sea and railway.
Then we started blocking the ways. On the night of 17 January first attempts were made to unblock the
city and bring in troops; marches were held with demands of resignation of the government and the
leaders of the republic that had agreed with the introduction of troops so easily. On 17 January, in the
evening, Y. Primakov said before the building of the Central Committee that the troops were necessary to
protect the people. He was catcalled and left." The famous German political figure O. Bismarck said
concerning one of the speakers in the Prussian chamber in 1898, "He is lying as if wiring!"
17-19 January, 1990. Marches before the building of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee with
demands of resignation of the leaders of the republic. Pickets and cordons on the roads to the city in
protest against the threats of introduction of troops in Baku.
The day before the introduction of troops, officers of Baku Higher Combined Arms School sent the
following telegram to Moscow.
BAKU 128/8109 110 19/1 1420=
BAKU 128/8109 110 19/1 1420=
MOSCOW KREMLIN TO COMRADE GORBACHEV M.S.
COPY TO GENERAL OF ARMY YAZOV D.T=
TELEGRAPH NOTIFICATION
THE OFFICERS OF BAKU HIGHER COMBINED ARMS SCHOOL INFORMS YOU THAT THE
SITUATION IN BAKU IS CONTROLLED BY THE PEOPLE'S FRONT OF AZERBAIJAN
CENTRAL PRESS AND TELEVISION DO NOT ALWAYS GIVE OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON
BAKU INTRODUCTION OF REINFORCEMENT TROOPS IN BAKU AGGRAVATES THE
SITUATION IN CASE TROOPS AND WEAPONS ARE BROUGHT IN THE CITY IT MAY LEAD
NOT JUST TO BLOODSHED BUT EVEN TO FULL ISOLATION OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKING
POPULATION AND ANNIHILATION OF FAMILIES OF BAKU GARRISON OFFICERS AND
SOLDIERS WE BELIEVE THAT POLITICAL METHODS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY USED YET
TO SOLVE THE ACCUMULATED PROBLEMS OF BAKU WE ARE SURE IT IS POSSIBLE NOT
TO TURN BAKU INTO SECOND ROMANIA UNDER INSTRUCTIONS OF THE OFFICERS OF
SCHOOL CHAIRMAN OF OFFICERS BOARD COLONEL A. SAVELYEV HEAD OF POLITICAL
SECTION COLONEL A. RUSAKOV
This telegram is provocative in principle. The introduction of troops in Baku is as if considered
undesirable but at the same time, the telegram alleges that the power is illegally seized by the People's
Front of Azerbaijan (afterwards Yazov often repeated this phrase), families of military servicemen are
under death threat and the bloody events in Romania are mentioned for some reason.

100
In other words, the main proposal does not proceed from the assessment of the situation which always
gives the supreme command full scope.
And curious enough, the telegram was afterwards published!
AND THE RESULT WAS
20 January, 1990. The troops entered the city at night, sweeping away the cordons and shooting those
along them. State of emergency was declared in Baku.
21 January, 1990. The Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR demanded immediate withdrawal of
the troops.
22 January, 1990. Funeral of the victims of 20 January. Up to one million people tool part in it.
It is a small but very important database of events immediately before the introduction of troops in
Baku on 20 January, 1990.
As an example of the systematic approach to information processing a story is often quoted about a
journalist of the early 20th century who lost all his money playing cards and, to pay back his debt,
decided to sell to the foreign intelligence service the plan of military units disposition, names and posts of
the command. Of course, the counterintelligence arrested the amateur spy but when the information he
possessed was shown to the representative of General Staff the latter were shocked for the information
was precise and classified. In the progress of the inquiry the journalist pleaded guilty and proving his
repentance shared his method of learning "state secrets". He turned out to have read local newspapers in
his trips to regions, being especially interested in society columns, "In the district town N the commander
of the 17th hussar regiment quartered here Colonel V., Chief of the regimental staff Colonel M. attended
the wedding ceremony of Lieutenant K. and so on and so forth".
There is such a scene in the immortal novel by K. Siminov "The Living and the Dead". An old
Communist reasons the suddenness of the fascist attack on the USSR and says, "What a sudden attack is
it? If someone quarrels with his wife in our house all neighbours know that at once. But a whole enemy
armada gathered around the country and no one knows anything! And now they are talking of a sudden
attack. I don't get it!"
If no one realized in those years that a large-scale military operation was being prepared against
Azerbaijan, it can mean only one thing. There was not a single reasonable politician in the state
structures, which we doubt, and not a single politician in the opposition who would have reasonably
considered his ardent appeals to the citizens of his country in such a complicated political situation!
In addition to the method of that journalist and the reasoning of the old Communist, we are going to
apply modern technique to this problem.
If we take the probability of every significant event in Baku at that time (for instance, arrival of
Yazov, Bakatin and Bobkov in Baku, movement of the troops in the territory of Azerbaijan, arrival of
high-ranking KGB officers in Baku, sudden activity of the Armenians) as 10% in the year, which is quite
sensible figure in the USSR practice, then the probability of simultaneous occurrence of those events
regardless of one another, i.e. at random fashion, will make up 0.00001% in the year, chief events taken
into consideration!
Such probability borders on that of a large meteorite colliding with Earth!
IN OTHER WORDS, WITHOUT BASING ON ANY STATEMENTS OF ANY POLITICIANS,
ONE COULD BE COMLETELY SURE AT THAT TIME THAT THE TROOPS WOULD BE
BROUGHT IN BAKU.
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DEMONSTRATES THAT THE EMPIRE HAD ALREADY
LAUNCHED ITS MILITARY MACHINE AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO STOP IT WITH ANY
TELEGRAMS. Even if the entire leadership of the republic had expressed their unanimous (which is
unlikely) disagreement with the introduction of troops in Baku, the troops would have been brought in
any way. A cause could have been found easily (for instance, the Centre could have had killed a Russian
family and said that after the Armenians the extremists had gone at the Russians).
In this connection, a number of politicians say that had the people left the streets there would have
been no victims in Baku. But this is a delusion! Had they done so, which would have been right decision,
there would undoubtedly have been less victims among the civilian population but there would have been
ones nevertheless. Soviet soldiers would have been shooting at offices and houses saying that militants
were ambushing there.
There were to be victims in Baku, since it was one of the components of Gorbachev's plan!
THE INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS IN BAKU ON 20 JANUARY, 1990 WAS A WELL-
THOUGHT STRATEGIC ACTION OF THE CENTRE INVOLVING ALL MAIN FORCES OF THE
USSR, BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ONES.

101
THE SCRIPTWRITER AND DIRECTOR OF THAT PREDICTABLE BLOODY EVENT WAS
MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV, THE REST OF HIS CIRCLE BEING VOLUNTARY OR
INVOLUNTARY PARTICIPANTS OF THIS TRAGEDY, SOME STARRING, SOME IN
SUPPORTING ROLES, OTHERS AS COMPROMISER EXTRAS.
Several days before the introduction of troops in Baku, Vezirov had several ways to avoid the
tragedy, death of a large number of innocent people.
In January 1991, when the threat of an assault on the government building emerged in Estonia,
President Edgar Savisaar called the people not to gather in the square in front of his residence. "The duty
of the government," he said, "is to ensure the safety of the citizens, not to put them under bullets."
Allende acted in the same way in Chile in 1973; he removed the defenceless people from squares and
defended his political views in the president palace himself with a submachine gun in his hands.
THE ONLY OPPORTUNITY TO STOP THE BLOODY INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS IN BAKU
WAS FOR THE FIRST SECRETARY SURROUNDED BY THE ENTIRE BUREAU AND
OPPOSITION LEADERS TO DECLARE TO THE MILLION MARCHERS IN BAKU THAT A
DEADLY PERIL WAS IMPENDING OVER THE REPUBLIC AND THAT THE PERIL WAS
COMING FROM GORBACHEV AND HIS TEAM; THAT ALL CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC,
REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS, WERE TO STAND FOR THE DEFENCE OF
MOTHERLAND. THEN HE WOULD HAVE BEEN THE FIRST TO ABANDON KOMSOMOL
SLOGANS AND TO TELL THE PEOPLE THE BITTER TRUTH.
ALL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED TO DEFEND THE HOME
LAND, UP TO THE SECESSION FROM THE USSR.
BUT ONE HAS TO BE A PERSONALITY TO BRING ONESELF TO TAKE SUCH STEPS, AND
VEZIROV'S CIRCLE AND OPPOSITION LEADERS HAD TO BE FIRST OF ALL CITIZENS OF
THEIR COUNTRY AND THEN POLITICIANS TO SUPPORT VEZIROV IN SUCH STEPS IN THE
COUNTRY'S DARK HOUR.
Vezirov chose his own way. He fled!

Gorbachev's bloody blow on Baku, 20 January, 1990

As the cause for the introduction of troops in Baku Gorbachev used Armenian pogroms, which was
actually the case (56 people were killed in those pogroms, including 42 Armenians; just like on 13
January, 1990 in Sumgayit, the first victim was a refugee from Armenia killed by another Armenian).
The head of Z department of the KGB Vladimir Lutsenko and the head of a section Valery Khmelev
write, "What did it come to? There were Azerbaijanis living around Spitak in mountainous regions of
Armenia.
They were thrown out of their houses, often deprived of their belongings. And all those masses of
people moved to Baku. Spontaneously. They were not waited for there. Not every one reached the capital
(some were killed or froze to death in the mountains - Author) but many of them. The most dreadful thing
happened in Baku, when homeless and hurt people began venting their anger on Baku Armenians."
When beginning that multimove provocation, its authors undoubtedly saw clearly the entire train of
further events. They did not care about the fate of Baku Armenians, for the latter were useful for them
merely as living human resources for the world-wide black PR action."
"Pravda" special correspondents A. Gorokhov and V. Okulov were writing those days, "What did it
take to push, like a stone from a steep, a farmer who had run on pain of death from Armenia to the
industrial Baku, a man deprived of his home and, as a rule, with far-from-perfect political training, into
the abyss of unlawfulness? What did it take to provoke outrage from such a man, burning from wrath,
resentful against fate, against the Armenians and finally against the Soviet power?"
There are still many questions about the events to ask those numerous forces that were active in the
city at that time.
When asked why he had not interfered in the events, the commander of the USSR Internal Troops
Colonel General Y. Shatalin who had been in Baku during the Armenian pogroms and had every
opportunity to stop the tragedy answered cynically, "No one asked us to help."
"Could we foresee that explosion?" Vaghif Huseynov asks himself. "Of course, we could. In October
1989, our reference to the leaders of the country and the republic warned directly that crisis could occur in
the nearest two or three months, and an explosion would follow, mass disorders The leaders of the
Soviet Union were aware of that as well."

102
K. Myalo writes, "What can we say about Baku then, a big modern capital city? A pogrom there was
unprecedented in the contemporary history, and here we can speak of superorganization, a powerful
"hand from the shadow" that demonstrated all its ruthlessness on 20 January, 1990, the day of
introduction of the Soviet Army units in Baku. It was accompanied by such "concurrence of
circumstances" that just could not be accidental but had organization of the most brutal mass bloodshed
possible as its object."
Statements of those people representing different political forces and different political beliefs
indicate the most important thing, that is the mysteriousness of the events preceding the introduction of
troops in Baku.
The chairman of the Party Commission of the Azerbaijan SSR CP Central Committee R. Akhundov
says, "On 14 January, 1990, a closed meeting of the Bureau was held to discuss the situation around the
pogroms of 13-15 January in Baku and declaration of state of emergency in Baku and a number of other
regions.
The leaders of the Central Committee (the first and the second secretaries, the chairman of Council of
Ministers of the republic, the head of the KGB) and officials from Moscow (Primakov, Ghirenko and
others) decided to misinform the rest of the Bureau members and said that state of emergency would not
be declared, which turned out to be a lie. To consolidate it, Afrand Dashdamirov was even entrusted with
speaking on television on the behalf of the Communist Party Central Committee, which he did together
with the representative of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhaylov."
At the well-known meeting in front of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, the author came under
fire of Soviet soldiers and heard with his own ears Primakov saying to the marchers the following, "State
of emergency will not be declared in Baku, troops will not be brought in Baku. If you do not believe me,
take me hostage!" According to B. Vakhabzade, Primakov said the same while meeting with Baku
intellectuals and the sheikh. That proved to be a lie.
The author has a firm conviction that Primakov's moves in Baku fully imitated those of his beloved
Y. Andropov during Hungarian events. The USSR ambassador to Hungary Yuri Andropov assured the
Hungarian authorities that troops would not be brought in the country for the purpose of solving political
problems. According to researchers of that period, Andropov was intentionally deceiving the Hungarian
government. Even when tanks were already on the move he still assured the head of Hungarian Council
of Ministers Imre Nagy (who was executed later) that troops were being brought in railway stations so as
not to disturb transportation and some special subdivisions to secure order in military units.
Everyone knows how all that ended.
The truth was as follows.
Dmitry Yazov's testimony to the Prosecutor's office of Azerbaijan says, "On 19 January, 1990 I
was invited to President Gorbachev. Minister of internal affairs was called there as well. The rest of those
present were the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov and the chairman of the
Supreme Council A. Lukyanov. Gorbachev said a dangerous situation had emerged in Baku and that
Bakatin and I were to go there and restore the order. The same day, 5.00 p.m. local time we arrived in
Baku. Here, in the office of the commander of the western direction General N. Popov, we met with
representative of the USSR president Y. Primakov and O. Shenin, the first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP
Central Committee A. Vezirov, discussed the situation and decided to declare state of emergency. On the
night of 20 January, regular troops of the Soviet Army were brought in Baku."
As we can see, the entire top leadership of the USSR was present at the decision making on the
introduction of troops in Baku, just like it was with the introduction of troops in Afghanistan.
Afterwards, one of the butchers of the Azerbaijan people, the USSR minister of defence Dmitry
Yazov recalled, "Gorbachev is a spineless person. He had the army in his hands, as well as the KGB and
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. So what? It was quite possible to stop that turmoil with Nagorno-
Karabakh, wasn't it? But he did not do that. He declared state of emergency in Baku. He invited me,
Kryuchkov and Pugo. We went there but still without a written order. I say, "Give us a written order."
"YOU REALLY HAVE A BEE IN YOUR BONNET ABOUT THAT SCRAP OF PAPER, LATER"
(highlighted by the author)."
He calls the document concerning the fate of hundreds of thousands people, killed and wounded, a
"scrap of paper"!
This evidence of Yazov alone is judicial matter; it seems that the Soviet Army occupied a peaceful
city, killing and injuring hundreds of civilian people, WITHOUT A DULY AUTHENTICATED
WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, I.E. GORBACHEV! As for
Gorbachev's spinelessness, only such a naive soldier as Yazov can think so!

103
His spinelessness was rather selective!
Y. Primakov remembers the process of decision making concerning the introduction of troops in
Baku, "On 19 January, I was in the office of the secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee
Vezirov, together with the latter, when Gorbachev phoned. He said the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Council had made the decision to bring troops in Baku. I told Mikhail Sergeyevich that I could not control
military actions (however, Primakov coped with all other "actions" perfectly well - Author). The answer
followed that minister of defence Yazov and minister of internal affairs Bakatin would depart for Baku an
hour later."
Here is how the local authorities saw the introduction of troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990. The
chairman of the Party Commission of the Azerbaijan SSR CP Central Committee R. Akhundov tells, "On
19 January, 1990, 11.30 p.m., in "Voice of America" (?! - Author) I heard the report that troopswould be
brought in Baku that day. Realizing that there was only 30 minutes left, I ran to the Central Committee,
noticed a flare pot on my way there and believed that the information was true. At the entrance I ran into
the secretaries of the Central Committee G. Gasanov, T. Orujev, the head of department Abdinov and the
aid of the first secretary Saib Kuliyev who were going out. At first, the did not believe what I aid but then
they began worrying and, seeing the light still burning in the office of the chairman of the Council of
Ministers A. Mutalibov, we went there. It was 11.45 p.m. A. Mutalibov was bewildered at hearing the
information and said that it was impossible, that there would be a meeting of the Bureau. However, he
yielded to our persistent demands and contacted Y. Primakov and then Yazov, if I am not mistaken. In the
phone conversation, he told them about our arrival and demands to clarify the situation. Primakov started
talking of the explosion in the television centre and capture of power by extremists. G. Gasanov grasped
the receiver and began accusing them rather sharply of deceit and demanded withdrawal of he troops. G.
Gasanov can tell about this himself much better.
Then firing started and I realized that all our efforts and demands for canceling the introduction of
troops in Baku turned out to be useless. I left the office and came into the street. I saw soldiers laying
metal plates that fixed the doors into the prepared niches in the street doorways of the building of the
Council of Ministers, and trucks blocking the entrance at the gates. We stopped a passing car, drove to
Lenin Av. where buzz and small-arms and heavy weapons firing were already heard. I came back and
demanded that A. Mutalibov should take all measures to stop the troops from entering, which he
promised to do, saying that he was going to contact the USSR Council of Ministers Ryzhkov. For a
moment, the firing died down and I thought that the movement of troops had probably been stopped
indeed. However, the subsequent events left no doubt that it was the beginning of dreadful and tragic
events. Up to 4.30 a.m. I went out and in, called Mutalibov but after he answered that he had done his
best to stop the invasion, I understood that spending the whole night in his office in Vezirov's absence,
Mutalibov had actually assumed the full responsibility and it was pointless to phone him again."
As we can see, the authorities had no unity and solidarity. No one predicted the events, no one knew
what he was to do at that horrible time, finally no one knew where the first secretary, their head was. The
whereabouts of Vezirov at that time remained a sealed book. It is a heart-melting sight, indeed,
Mutalibov, who suddenly found himself lumbered with the full responsibility for the events, calling
Ryzhkov, one of the chief enemies of the Azerbaijan people, which Mutalibov might have been unaware
of.
One of the party officials mentioned by Akhundov above, who asked not reveal his name, said to the
author that it had been the moment that they had realized how skillfully they had been deceived by
Primakov.
Gorbachev tells about Primakov's part ten years later, quite definitely and in detail. In those years,
however, he used to get off with common phrases.
On the tenth anniversary of the putsch of August 1991, the former president of the USSR Mikhail
Gorbachev, "Foros ex-prisoner", visited Radio Liberty studio.
Questions are asked by journalists Fleming Rose, Moscow correspondent of the Danish "Jutland
Posten" and the observer of "Vremya Novostey" Vera Kuznetsova. The host is Andrey Shary.
Mikhail Gorbachev. "First of all, about working out the documents. Our Constitution for one says
(and so did Stalin's and Brezhnev's ones) that Soviet republics are state formations, possess sovereignty,
self-determination right up to separation. But did we have a law about secession from the USSR? No, we
did not. So many constitutional provisions and no law. So a thesis was drawn, certain clauses in the
Constitution on the declaration of state of emergency in a certain situation in the territory of the republic
where something happens, by the way, by consent of that republic. Why did they say in Baku, "Why
could Gorbachev not interfere immediately?" Because we contacted our friends, colleagues, the Supreme

104
Council of Azerbaijan, and they would say, "The situation is under control." And then, when I sent
Primakov there, I said, "There's something wrong going on, the information is quite grave." Primakov
phoned two days later, after his arrival at Baku, "The situation is out of control, Mikhail Sergeyevich. It
can turned out to be bloody events. The authorities have been overthrown in 18 regions of Azerbaijan.
Just swept away. 200 km of the border ruined, and much more" I asked, "What about the Supreme
Council?" "The Supreme Council is isolated. It is inactive. Some are scared and do not move, others are
not allowed. That is why the activity of the Central Committee and the Supreme Council is paralyzed.
That's all. Something must be done." But what could we do? Bring in troops We could not already get
the consent of the Supreme Council. It was just paralyzed. Then, in such situation, we had the right to
bring in troops. I agreed"
Nice, isn't it? One suggests, the other agrees.
Primakov was executing Gorbachev's order in Baku. It was his official mission. But he had also
another secret unofficial post. Vladimir Voronov writes, "In 1991, after coming in the foreign intelligence
service, Yevgeny Maximovich denied stoutly his cooperation with the KGB. "The White Book of Russian
Secret Services" mentions Primakov and says that the latter maintained "long-term official and personal
contacts with the employees of the 1st central department of the USSR KGB." Then rather intimate
information leaks into the press with references to Kalugin, that the future academician appeared in the
KGB papers under the secret alias of "Maxim". Academician got very resentful against Kalugin but did
not argue the statement. Yevgeny Maximovich never hides, though, his close business and personal
contacts with the KGB resident in Cairo Vadim Kirpichenko. Moreover, after settling down in Yasenevo,
Primakov appointed Kirpichenko his personal adviser, actually, first deputy" We cannot rule out the
possibility that he played different roles in Baku.
In accordance with Gorbachev's order, the Soviet Army entered Baku on the night of 20 January,
1990, sowing death and destruction on its way.
A. Karaulov writes, "The armed invasion in Baku was prepared by the Ministry of Defence, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB. The code name of the operation was "Blow". The key role was
given to the special group "Alfa" and the subversive group "A" of the KGB. By Gorbachev's order, the
Soviet power in Baku was being saved by three persons, Dmitry Yazov, Vadim Bakatin and Philipp
Bobkov, the first deputy of Kryuchkov in the KGB. They appeared in Baku a week before that fatal night.
Bakatin called himself, let us say, "General Grigoryev".
Politicians finished their dirty work and the Soviet Army comes to the foreground, staining the last
page of its biography in the frames of the USSR with indelible disgrace.
"Report, Yuri Alexeyevich (the regiment commander of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division Colonel
Y.A. Naumov - Author), what is the matter?" I said.
"Allow me to repeat, Comrade Colonel."
"Well, do repeat!"
"Minister of Defence raised his fist to my nose and said, "You just try to fail to capture it!" Tell
Lebed this!"
"Is that all?"
"Yes, it is!"
"And what is it we are to capture?"
"Well, Baku. There's nothing else here to capture."
Mission: to capture a two-million populated city, a nice and simple task (?! - Author). Baku is in 30
km.
"Ahead!" I ordered.
Ryazan regiment, Kostroma regiment moved to Baku.
We are driven by our trained airborne "chauvinism" ("there are no impossible missions" and "no
one but us"). Aggressiveness and hatred awake (?! - Author)
By 5 o'clock, the regiments occupied the specified regions. Pskov Airborne Division entered the city
from the east, from "Nasosny" airfield. Plus motorized infantry subdivisions manned with hastily called
up "guerillas" from Rostov, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions."
This is how General Lebed describes the "heroism" of himself and the troops he was in charge of. He
commanded the airborne division that entered Baku on 20 January, 1990 and was extremely proud of that
afterwards.
If we replace Russian names with German ones and shift the date to 22 June, 1941, when fascist
generals encouraged their soldiers before the attack on the USSR, it will be hard to tell the difference
between the words of Lebed and fascist generals, unless the latter were more reserved than Lebed.

105
Fascism is the plague of the mankind for all times. At the same time, we cannot say that German
soldiers in the Second World War were uncivilized trash; they were people, dreadfully convinced in their
racial superiority. As for the armed gang called the Soviet Army that invaded Baku, the city which ranked
among the ten best USSR cities according to its basic social and cultural characteristics, it was exactly a
set of trash and alcoholics who did not wash themselves every day and had all but a vague idea about
toilet bowls.
These insects annihilated the best gene pool of the nation.
Far from sympathizing with Baku, Victor Nikolaev writes, "Everything got mized in Baku, the
starting point of unwinding the Transcaucasian spiral. Everything lost its sense in no time. The life, so far
stable and unshakable, given in 1917, became slimy at once and slid like a sand castle on the Caspian
shore. Days sometimes seemed hours, minutes lasted for centuries. There were plenty such detached
companies like Victor's and Slavka's. Army groups protecting the civilian population received tasks five
times a day with utmost certainty, "At your discretion and within your responsibility." Just this, no more,
no less. SO THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS LUMBERED ON THE SHOULDER STRAPS OF
RUSSIAN CAPTAINS, SERGEANTS, SOLDIERS, DAZED WITH INSOMNIA, NOISE,
HYSTERICS, AND LOOTING (highlighted by the author)."
We must add that over 90% of the key personnel of the Soviet Army were Christians; ethnic factor
came to the foreground after the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika.
The situation in the army was also aggravated by Gorbachev's attack on the southern Muslim
republics (the Uzbek case, the cotton case in Azerbaijan etc.).
Gorbachev artificially created the illusion in the citizens, as if it were only sufficient to reveal
shortcomings in those branches to increase living standard in the USSR.
The brass of the Soviet Army undoubtedly knew about these political trends, and so did middle ranks
the majority of whom were miserable people, which by no means favoured their civilized attitude to the
Muslim republics.
The Azerbaijan people had to suffer all this aggression to the full extent in the terrible January days of
1990.
The difference between the invaders that had established the Soviet power in the beginning of the last
century and the present who, according to them, were restoring it was just that the former had appeared n
Baku in armoured cars and the latter in tanks. They could rival in vulgarity, cruelty and immorality.
Lebed's encouragement before the capture of a peaceful city was not accidental. Alexander Lebed
was striving after Baku, to commit "exploits". In his book "My Life and My Country" he writes, "Press
and television were somehow matter-of-factly telling about another slaughter in Baku. Number of victims
was mentioned. The international and Soviet public was somehow drowsily protesting. Officers were
getting more and more amazed day by day, "There is slaughter in Baku but we are still in Tula." I do not
know what efforts Gorbachev was making for a week to stop the bloody discord but then the arguments
were probably exhausted and the formula was recalled, "Airborne troops plus military transport aviation
is equal to the Soviet power in Transcaucasia." On 18 January, the division was alerted." They were in a
hurry to kill the innocent. Tula division will always be cursed in Azerbaijan!
Polotsk and Pskov airborne divisions were keeping up with Tula division, they were as if competing
which one of them would make the Azerbaijan land suffer more.
It turns out that those days the military were arriving in Baku on all kinds of occasion. Yuri Voronov,
the commander of Kirovograd special brigade that performed its task in the territory of Baku, tells, "By
the way, one of my brigade officers was on leave when he heard about our redeployment to Baku and got
there on his own." All-army bloody spirit possessed Baku!
The Soviet power failed to hold out in Transcaucasia and another formula remained in history,
"Gorbachev plus Primakov, Yazov, Bakatin, Lebed and others is equal to the tragedy of the Azerbaijan
people."
It became clear afterwards that General Lebed had begun his disgusting political career with the
bloodshed in Baku.
This scoundrel general will say later concerning the tenth anniversary of the State Emergency
Committee putsch, "I seized Baku twice (?! - Author) but refused to shoot at the defenders of the White
House, at my people." Even then, according to him, the Azerbaijan people was enemy to him.
But the scoundrel general Lebed keeps back the most important and dreadful thing.
V. Platonenko writes, "Answering the questions, Starovoytova expressed her opinion of A. Lebed,
"He is a masterful, honest, ambitious man. There are some gaps in his education that are hard to fill in his
age, hence his undemocratic views. In such situation (it was also demonstrated by the example of

106
Yeltsin), much depended on the people that surround him. Unfortunately, Lebed is surrounded mainly by
stripy Cossacks now I KNOW FOR SURE THAT IT WAS LEBED'S SUBDIVISION THAT KILLED
ABOUT 150 CIVILIANS IN JANUARY 1990 IN BAKU (highlighted by the author)."
Nikolay Anisin adds, "Then again, it was Lebed, not Primakov, that had two hundred people shot in
Baku. Though they say that Primakov was "upset" then."
Baku knows very well how "upset" Primakov was then!
The journalist Y. Ivankova described an expressive exchange of opinions between Lebed and
Primakov that indirectly reminds of the role of those two gentlemen in the events of 20 January, 1990 in
Baku. The conversation turned to Lebed's thesis: centralization of economic and financial management is
the chief source of distrust towards the Centre and can lead to the split in Russia. The tougher
centralization, the stronger centrifugal trends. To illustrate his idea, general somehow reminded prime
minister that they both had been in Baku, "you as a diplomat and I as a general." Y. Ivankova probably
forgets that A. Lebed does not do anything "somehow". He merely reminded Y. Primakov that they both
had blood of Bakuvians on their hands, that is was suggesting bloody friendship taking its origin in the
capital of Azerbaijan on 20 January, 1990.
In Transdniestria, so as not to parade his bloody deeds, Lebed was acting under the alias Colonel
Gusev. While murdering in Baku, he stressed that he is Lebed!
"If it had not been General Lebed (then Colonel - Author) it would have been Ivanov, Sidorov," says
A. Mutalibov on TBC channel. We can agree with one reservation: it is difficult to imagine a personality
that could be worse than Lebed in his attitude to the Azerbaijani!
A friend of Lebed, the chief of staff of the 59th motorized infantry division Yuri Popov became
notorious for looting and particular brutality towards the Azerbaijani in those bloody days. Later, he
developed his "business", vividly describing Azerbaijan "atrocities" on Armenian money in his numerous
interviews.
The same way was chosen by the dishonoured commander of the 175th division Major General
Antonov who had taken part in the introduction of troops in Baku; atrocities of his people, pillage and
numerous interviews about Azerbaijan militants afterwards.
Oksana Gutsalyuk from "Ukraine-Centre" calls Kirovograd special brigade "Kirovograd Bakuvians".
"As was mentioned above, there were also special units among the troops brought in Baku in January
1990. "Black January" left its trace in the lives of Kirovograd special brigade soldiers who took part in
Baku events as well. The aims set before the brigade in the territory of Baku are revealed by the then
commander Yuri Voronov, "On 18 January, 1990 we received the direction of the GRU on the
preparation of our brigade for landing in Baku. The team of 500 people formed within 3-4 days was given
provisions for autonomous activity for the term of a month, including firewood, water, food stuffs,
ammunition Furthermore, about forty aircrafts were allocated for our use, such number of them can
hardly be found in the entire Ukrainian army today. Our aim was to confiscate all the weapons available
in the territory of the Azerbaijan capital, to calm down the population. We did not go into the heart of the
political situation; the command did not give any ideological explanations or guidelines either. The only
thing I know is that just the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict was concerned then and we were to confiscate
all weapons to make the further armed clashes between the two sides impossible"
"The sky of Kirovograd had never seen such a number of military aircrafts taking off every thirty
seconds then, nor has it seen this so far," recalls a participant of "Baku campaign" Victor Gerasimenko.
"It was a unique redeployment operation. Only the guards stayed on the positions of the brigade I
should say that when we would probably have to use weapon, the line immediately moved up, faces
became stern Though we did not fire a single shot during the entire stay of Kirovagrad brigade in
Baku"
We think that the commander of brigade is not completely sincere, as it is rather difficult to imagine,
not a single shot! We should admit, though, that Voroshilov snipers were mainly in the units from the
southern regions of Russia.
Then follows the main confession of the commander of Kirovograd special brigade Yuri Voronov,
"PARADOXICAL AS IT IS, AFTER SEVERAL MONTHS IN BAKU KIROVOGRAD BRIGADE,
ACCORDING TO THE FIGHTERS THEMSELVES, NEVER SAW THE ACTUAL ENEMY BEFORE
ITSELF, BE IT ORGANIZED MILITARY FORMATIONS OR LOCAL "GANGS".
Tanks were crushing people, transport, any obstacles, firing blank to produce more effect and scare
people who were seeing tanks in actions and not in a film for the first time in their lives. BMD-1 was
providing aimed fire at civil vessels in the Caspian bay. BMP-2 was providing fire for effect at crowded
places from 30mm cannon. "Shilka" was burning flats of citizens and demolishing houses. Add live

107
ammunition and you will have the picture of fascists capturing Soviet cities in the Second World War.
The latter were probably even more humane to the civilian population! I nearly forgot another difference
between the actions of fascist and Soviet troops. The former were hanging civilians in squares, while the
latter finished them with bayonets!
The author has searched for a long time for the information on the victims among civilian population
during fascist capturing of Soviet cities. It was found out that several people were killed by stray bullets
when fascists were taking Rostov. The grand master I.Z. Bondarevsky told in the fifties that he had easily
left the occupied Rostov.
In his book "A Missed Chance", the former prime minister of Ukraine Vitaly Masol writes, "The
army was then being exposed to attacks and shocks caused among other things by hasty, unreasoned
internal political actions, was drawn into political struggle and ethnic conflicts. Moreover, it was
repeatedly exposed to risks, unfairly, unjustly, made guilty though guiltless of others' sins: Tbilisi, Baku,
Vilnius, Moscow in the days of the August putsch"
We are ready to agree with such formulation of the issue and consider guilty only the political
leadership of the country, provided that Masol answers the chief questions for Baku. Why did the Soviet
Army refuse to fire in Moscow by the order of putschists, whereas it had been killing civilians willingly
and intentionally, with particular brutality? Why haven't the supreme command of the Soviet Army that
took part in the bloody introduction of troops in Baku repented their doing so far and continue to lie
blatantly that they were "fighting" militants etc.? Without giving answers to these questions, the statement
of Masol and others is incorrect and unacceptable for Baku.
"They were standing," writes L. Junusova, "with joined hands. "Azadlig!" it thundered over
Communist street which will soon lose this name, as well as much that lost sense this night. They did not
retreat before armoured troop-carriers and tanks, whose caterpillars had already been ensanguined with
blood of those crushed on Tbilisi Avenue, XI Red Army square etc. But even these already blood-stained
tanks stopped facing this unprecedented unity. "AZADLIG!"
Our practically unarmed people (what was the use of the weapons of 1941) already stopped tanks of
brown fascism 45 years ago. On the night of January, 20th on Baku streets, combat material of red
fascism was marching, which had been crushing and bending the people of the Soviet Union since
October 1917. It is time we started to tell the people the truth; red fascist terror had begun long before
Stalin and it was no other than V.I. Lenin that wrote for the first time about creation of concentration
camps, as early as in 1918."
The famous film director Stanislav Govorukhin wrote in his article A Rehearsal? in Moscow News,
18 February, 1990, concerning the introduction of troops in Baku, "On the night of 20th the troops
entered the city after all. But the Soviet Army entered a Soviet city as an army of invaders, under
cover of night, on tanks and armoured cars, clearing a way for itself with fire and sword. According to the
military commandant, the use of ammunition this night made up 60,000 cartridges.
On the side of Sumgayit road, a motor car with three scientists from Academy of Sciences in it, three
professors, one of them woman, stood letting a tank column pass. Suddenly a tank left a column, gnashing
caterpillars against metal, ran over car, crushing all passengers. The column did not stop, hurrying to
smash "the enemy who had lodged in the city".
Here is a fragment of the report to the USSR Supreme Council made by the People's Deputy
Chelyshev V.A. on his stay in Baku from 27 January till 31 January, 1990 in connection with the
introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku, "I am afraid that the army "takes the rap" today for the actions
of reservists, the so-called "guerrillas", who behave outrageously, shoot at random, who together with
officers seized the port warehouse, drank and ate too much of the warehouse products.
They were shooting at office buildings (three floors of "Agroprom" have burned down; there was a
fire in State Logistics Committee). They were shooting at the apartment houses near Salyan barracks
(mainly retired officers live at that military station it, including Russian ones), shooting ineptly and
therefore particularly savagely."
Tanks with "guerrillas" were breaking through obstacles, running into crowds of unarmed people,
shooting them from submachine guns. The whole way of the army advancement was been ensanguined
with blood of the killed and wounded people. I am not going not retell those interviews with the wounded
and citizens of Baku I have seen on videotapes. I will refer only to personal meetings with people"
Of course, it is an attempt to protect the Soviet Army against the crimes it committed and to lump all
the blame on reservists. But it is a naive attempt, since even we hypothetically assume that some were
killing and others were watching, responsibility rests with both sides.
Actually, as the numerous facts testify, everyone was killing everyone without choosing!

108
The most important thing in this report is the character of the introduction of troops in Baku and its
"results".
BAKU. NIGHT OF 20 JANUARY, 1990. EVIDENCES OF EYEWITNESSES.
(FROM THE COLLECTION OF D. LEONOV)
ON APPROACHES TO BAKU FROM THE VIDEO TAPE (BAKU FILM STUDIO)
Mamedov Rafik Kerim oglu. 44 Kirov Avenue, 1, born in 1944, Baku, married, 7 children,
Azerbaijani, /., higher military education, captain 2nd rank in retirement (demobilized after getting
injured in Angola), head of the reaction control system, the Ministry of Defence in Baku. The airport,
Bina settlement, recorded by Leonov on 1 February, 1990 from a video film, deciphered on 3 February.
R. Mamedov reported on the events of the night of 20 January, to the department of internal affairs of
Narimanov district of Baku. R. Mamedov's interrogation is carried out on 22 January, 1990 by the
assistant to the public prosecutor of Narimanov district Mamedov. In the evening on 19 January, R.
Mamedov went to the airport to meet the son who was to arrive from Kuibyshev. On his way there, he
saw groups of people talking to one another. Approximately at 1 o'clock in the morning he saw tracer
bullets around the airport. 10 minutes later, two wounded were brought to the airport first-aid post.
Bullets were explosive, shot from Kalashnikov submachine gun. One was wounded in the side and
already dead, the other (Rakhman) was wounded in the shoulder (he was sent to the hospital). Rakhman
asked to help those who had been wounded in the same place where he had been himself. They went to
Bina and saw a fire made of tyres ahead. Saw the military shooting people point-blank. He saw the
wounded being thrown into the canal, crushed with caterpillars. He also saw the wounded being finished
with spades and thrown into the fire. R. Mamedov saw one man receiving a burst of submachine-gun fire
after which (he was still alive) one of the soldiers, "a husky fellow", threw him into the canal smashing
him with a spade. There were no warnings from the military, firing was opened immediately. R.
Mamedov saw tanks moving in the direction of the city crushing motor-cars. One of them ran over the
oncoming Zhiguli, another smashed another Zhiguli that was turning around. When asked by the assistant
prosecutor about the tanks numbers, R. Mamedov answered that it had been possibly Number 391 or 397.
There were no patrol cars in front of the tank column. Soldiers were about thirty or thirty-five years old.
"We stopped a passing car, they did not let us in Mardakan. We returned to the airport. I met my son. The
plane landed 2.55 a.m. Moscow time. Everyone was kept in the airport till 8.00 a.m. (till the end of
curfew, according to the military). R. Mamedov repeatedly asked questions but none of the military
replied, they did not want to talk. Higher officers would turn away and grin, for example, colonel and
major in the airport." As a military expert, R. Mamedov says that both Kalashnikov submachine-guns and
Kalashnikov machine-guns had been used. They humiliated both men and women when searched them
(moving the legs apart with their own). R. Mamedov did not know about the order on state of emergency
issued on 19 January, 1990, and the military in the airport did not inform anyone. When the detained were
let out of the airport after 8.00 a.m., R. Mamedov drove on the road seeing crumpled cars with cabins shot
through. At the interrogation 22 January, 1990, R. Mamedov says that "he is still in the state of shock."
Airport, Bina settlement. Allegation of the wounded Abasov Abas, Baku, Bina settlement, 3 Khagani
Street, Lane 5. Hospital in Maradakan settlement. In the evening of 19 January, 1990, I was walking
home. I saw a crowd along the Bina road and came up to them. Getting into the conversation, I saw tanks
coming. They suddenly opened fire at the defenceless peaceful people. I was wounded in the leg. When I,
an elderly man who had suffered two heart attacks, asked Soviet soldiers to help, they came up and
started to kick me with their feet, turned my face to the ground and searched me. Suffering, I was brought
to the hospital by the inhabitants of Bina. 29 January, 1990. The original has a signature.
Gala. Allegation of the wounded Kuliyev Vaghif, Baku, Mardakan settlement, 20 Vostok Street.
Hospital, Mardakan settlement. On 19 January, 1990, between 10.00 p.m. and 11.00 p.m. tanks appeared
at the filling station in Gala village. Without a warning, they opened fire at the defenceless people. At the
same time, soldiers went out of ambush, they were close and I could make out their faces. They had long
hair, beards, were tall, swore like bargees, shouted, "Turks, ya scum, we'll kill ya all!" They were
punishers; I served myself and know that there are no such soldiers in the ordinary army. I was wounded
that night and a wounded man was lying beside me. A soldier noticed him and stuck a bayonet into his
heart. And then he said to another soldier that they should leave no wounded so as not to leave witnesses.
I say once again those were punishing squads. 29 January, 1990. The original has a signature.
The airport road. Allegation of the wounded Aliyev Nadir, Baku, Buzovna settlement. Hospital,
Mardakan settlement. On 19 January, 1990, I was driving to the airport together with my cousin. Between
12.00 p.m. and 1.00 a.m. shooting started. I witnesses soldiers shooting in the backs of the people running
along the road, people being stabbed with bayonets. The headlights of our car lit faces of the soldiers

109
pretty well. They were very tall, long-haired, bearded. Our car was all shot through. I got four bullets,
three of them in the liver, one under my skin. There was a lad lying together with me in the resuscitation
department, his name was Fuad, he was from GRES settlement. He was wounded with a bullet and
stabbed with a bayonet and died. I saw that night them sending fifty bullets into an already dead man. 29
January, 1990. The original has a signature.
Mustafayev Vaghif Narimanovich, Baku, 28 Builders Avenue, 24, a painter. Salyan barracks.
Recorded by Leonov, 27 January, 1990 at the meeting, deciphered on 28 January (the last four paragraphs
on 4 February). On the night of 20 January, Mustafayev was lying in bed in his studio located in close
proximity to Baku Higher Combined Arms School. He was to be picketing before the school at 2 o'clock
in the morning. At 0.10 a.m. he heard heavy fire and screams. He came up to the window looking on
Sultanov Street. A crowd was running. (At night the gates of the school, the check-point, was blocked by
50-60 people, let us say, from clothes and shoe factories). It was very dark. A friend of Mustafayev's,
Akhverdiyev Ujal Gasan oglu, was also in his studio. The address of the studio is Red East military
station, 96. Mustafayev summarizes the accounts of events told by the detained who were sitting in the
basement together with him later. First, colonel came out of the gates with a megaphone in his hand and
twice warned in Russian that if the people did not disperse, all means would be used. The people did not,
the school was blocked by trucks and people. Then the lighting was put out at the school gates, certainly
not by the blockers, and there is no street lighting there. When submachine-gun fire began, someone of
the picketers threw a Molotov cocktail into a gas tank truck but it turned out to be empty. There was an
explosion but without any result. When the crowd dispersed after the shooting, they began fire bullets at
people. This is what Khalidshakh told Mustafayev. Later, Mustafayev noticed dents on the house and the
asphalt (94 Sultanov Street). They were probably shooting at the asphalt and the bullets ricocheted into
people. Akhverdiyev was the first to run to the nearest gates of the school, Mustafayev followed.
Shooting was heard from the store. At the school gates Mustafayev asked the officer giving commands to
the soldiers to stop shooting. Saying, "You are keeping us from our work", the officer smashed him with
his submachine-gun. The blow got him on the ribs (the bandage was applied by father, a surgeon).
Leonov saw the bandage, as well as wounds on the fingers, on the legs, bruises on the back and the legs.
Moving away from the officer, Mustafayev noticed Akhverdiyev who was lying on the asphalts and two
soldiers were standing over him with submachine-guns at the ready (finger on the trigger). The guns were
not at half-cock and Mustafayev got scared for his friend. For these soldiers, Mustafayev was merely "a
man going from near the school". He was hit on the back with something and heard, "Down!" and he lay
down at once beside Alhverdiyev. They searched him while he was lying on the ground, saying
mockingly, ""Let's run over them with a car Let's finish off one Which one? That bearded or maybe
the other?" The lying people were pricked with bayonets (not too deeply), kicked with boots and
truncheons. They were saying, "We'll show you for Afghanistan!" People were lying with spread arms
and legs ("Legs wider! Arms wider!"). Those lying on the ground blocked the passage through the gates
and when (in about an hour) a car approached the school, they were made stand up ("Hands on the nape!
Run!"). It turned out that there was a third one lying near, in 5-6 meters. The three of them were driven to
the school parade ground. They were searched there ("Down!"), then another six men were brought and
laid by their side. This time they were lying on the asphalt about an hour and a half (i.e. two hours in
total). Mustafayev said, "Shoot me if you want but I can't lie any more, I've got bad kidneys" And they
made him and Akhverdiyev stand against the APC ("Hands on the armour! Legs wider!"), the rest were
lying. The officer allowed Mustafayev stand up. When Mustafayev stood up and the officer went aside, a
soldier from the guard approached (about 15 of the were standing with submachine-guns over the lying
people). "Who's got bad kidneys? Kolya, hit him on the kidneys!" (not all of them had truncheons). And
"Kolya" gave him a powerful blow on the left and then on the right side. (The blows got him over the
kidneys, Leonov says that he saw huge bruises.) Moreover, the soldiers were intentionally stepping on the
fingers of those lying. Leonov saw a corresponding trace. Mustafayev cannot say for sure, though, if that
happened on the parade ground or earlier, at the gates of the school. Their passports were taken away on
the parade ground They were insulted every minute. If anyone said that he had done nothing, he had
just been walking home, a hail of blows followed in response. The command was given, "Up! Hands on
the nape! Close file double march!" They were all lined up at the entrance to the basement of the school.
Then they were searched roughly and hastily (one man got the fly of his trousers torn). The taken was
piled in one general heap (money, personal things). Allakhverdiyev's watch tied to the half-belt and taken
away by a soldier remained with that soldier for good. They were all brought to the basement that was by
no means designed for keeping detainees. A cement room, about 5X5 meter, without lighting and
bathroom unit. They were told to ease themselves right on the spot. So they had to drink little, sips of hot

110
tea, they got half a bucket of it at one time. They received no other food for two days. There was nowhere
to sleep, no plank beds, nothing fit, just floor, ceiling and walls. There was even no air hole. People were
orientating themselves by the feel and voices. Though there were matches and papers, they were not
burned, as there was no air. Since the moment they were thrown into the basement they had been "cared
about" by the 1st year students with submachine-guns. In the afternoon 20 January, an acquaintance of
Mustafayev's, bus driver, was brought there. According to the driver, he was to fly to Moscow that day
and he had the ticket in his pocket. His car was stopped at the main entrance to the school. When
searching, they found the tricolour of Azerbaijan. Mustafayev heard screams of that driver, Nizami,
behind the door of the room where the detainees were kept and is convinced that Nizami was being
beaten. Then he was pushed into the common room-cell, brought the flag there (as a kind of material
evidence?). The students were spitting on the flag, trampling it down, tearing it with bayonets. The man
who came into the "cell" with the students looked like an officer, Mustafayev is sure, but they were
saying themselves that he was sergeant. That "chief" suggested sweeping the "cell". The detainees asked
for a broom. "Here's your broom," he said, pointing to the flag. They were saying to the detainees through
the door, "The city's not yours, the city's taken, now the Russians will live here; everything will be over
by the morning." Mustafayev says, "We were imagining the city being shot." They also said (through the
door as well) that an APC had just been burned in Tbilisi Avenue, "where nine of our people" and another
two were killed. Mustafayev believes that the "information" was based on rumours, since those who told
the news did not leave the place at all. They also said, "If there is another message about victims among
our people, three of you will be shot." And the detainees, kept in the full dark, believed that (they were
locked, not fed, not interrogated, "what if there's war?". The students threatened, "A burst in the upper
part of the door, a burst in the middle and in the bottom" clicking submachine-gun bolts. An hour
before the release, food was brought, potato, meat and brown bread. It means, the detainees said, that they
are going to keep us long. The second day of the arrest was coming to an end when they were finally led
outside so that they could ease themselves under submachine-gun barrels. ("A step aside is equal to
escape, I'll shoot without warning!"). Then they were lined up along the wall in the "cell". They were sent
for by one, asked about the cause of detention and returned their passports. Everyone was suggested
leaving their signature that they had no claim concerning the treatment. And they signed "fearing that
they could just not be released." No one knew what happened to them then. The relatives must have
thought they were dead. Since the detainees were brought to the basement they had repeatedly asked to
notify their relatives, which had always received rude replies and threats of shooting. They were released
in the evening of 21 January.
Shikhaliyev Shakhveddin Shekhnabi oglu. Baku, Vishnevka settlement, pas. 149, 4/65. Salyan
barracks. Recorded by Leonov on 29 January, 1990 (in the accident hospital), deciphered on 4 February.
On the night of 20 Janury, 1990, he was standing in the yard of the hotel not far from Salyan barracks
together with friends. They were talking. Then they heard shots that came closer then. With first close
shot he was wounded in the leg. The fire was opened without warning by soldiers who suddenly
appeared. Whether the shots warning, into the air, Shikhaliyev cannot say. Getting wounded, Shikhaliyev
fell down. He tried to rise and was wounded in the other leg, fell again and started fainting. After first
shots more people were wounded, Shikhaliyev saw them himself. Many ran away. Soldiers were long-
haired, bearded, drunk and swore incessantly. Shikhaliyev was seized by both wounded legs and dragged
"like a dead dog". He was dragged for about 500 meter, it seemed to Shikhaliyev that much time had
passed. He was trying to keep his head safe by clasping it with his hands (Shikhaliyev is a qualified
sportsman, marathoner in the past). He was hurled on the "heap" of bodies; this is how they treated
wounded civilians. One man, wounded in the head, said he was dying and asked some water. A soldier
pressed submachine-gun barrel to his heart and pulled the bolt. The wounded died at once. The soldiers
were saying, "You scum, it's because of you that they disturb us and brought us here." They were
swearing at the wounded. Finally someone said, "Remove the scum from here." Five wounded
Azerbaijanis were dragged to some other place. They, including Shikhaliyev, were dragged by legs, with
heads on the ground, like Shikhaliyev had been dragged earlier. One of the soldiers probably wanted to
dress Shikhaliyev's wounded legs but the commander said that they were to help soldiers first. They were
brought to some basement in Salyan barracks, narrow concrete room (1.5X7-8 meter). There was a dim
light in the dark. Shikhaliyev points out that since the moment he was brought there his conscience had
been confused. He suffered severe pain in the legs. He heard voices behind the wall, they were talking in
Russian and did not come in to the detainees. On the night of 21 January two Azerbaijani military
servicemen came "to the voices" of the prisoners. They said, "Brothers, we'll save you and take you to the
hospital." On 21 January, about 11.00 p.m. all five wounded were seated in BMP or BTR (it was a

111
military vehicle any way) and brought in the hospital. They were given first aid and the same night taken
to the accidental hospital. The doctor said to Shikhaliyev that he had lost much blood and could have died
but for his sportsman's stamina. Shikhaliyev points out that there was no water, no bathroom unit in the
basement, nor were the wounded fed. They constantly heard "endless shooting in bursts."
Nuriyev Ilham Allakhverdi oglu, Baku, 39 Darvin Street, 40. XI Red Army Square (now 20 January
Square). Recorded by Leonov, 27 January, 1990 at the meeting (deciphered on 28 January). At noon on
19 January he was driving in the area of XI Red Army Square by the car of the People's Front of
Azerbaijan. The roads were blocked by buses and cars. They stood there about an hour and a half
restoring order so that motor-cars at least could pass. They opened a passage, 3-4 meter width. The
witness and his friends had the People's Front bands. There were many locals, children, women, a few
young men (about one fifth of all). The witness says that there were no armed people at all, that
"blocking" was a demonstrative action to show that the people did not want the troops enter the city, not
an actual attempt to stop the troops.
Feyzullayev Nijat Latif oglu, Baku, 28 Builders Street, 22, tel. 380514, film director. XI Red Army
Square. Recorded by Leonov, on 30 January, 1990 at the meeting, deciphered on 31 January. Night of 20
January, 0.05 or 0.06 a.m., he remembers the exact time. Feyzullayev heard and saw shooting. At that
time he was not far from Spartak Stadium on Tbilisi Avenue. They were shooting from two opposite sides
with something leaving red trace. It was not ordinary tracer bullets. Every time something like a red
signal rocket flew into the sky. That "rocket" fell to many pieces (a kind of "fireworks"), letting out a
specific sound, "sha-sha-sha" (Feyzullayev imitates the sound like that). There were many such deep-red
"signal rockets". They were firing them from both sides without stopping, so "it wasn't dark at all". At the
same time bursts of submachine-gun fire were heard. "Rockets" crossed in the sky above Feyzullayev.
They were launched both from Salyan barracks and Lenin Central Stadium. After the shooting began
Feyzullayev stopped a yellow Icarus with 5-6 passengers that was going towards the filling station. (At
that time buses in the streets were communication line among picketers). Feyzullayev got on the bus and
informed about the shooting. He said that the "front post" (at the filling station) was to be informed as
well. Now Feyzullayev believes that the shooting he saw at the stadium was intended to distract the
people from other posts. On the night of 20 January the people at the post near the filling station wanted
to go to the place where the shooting was heard. But then women shouted that tanks were breaking the
fence. The shouts came from the fourth floor of the house at the checkpoint. Obviously, so tanks could
enter the city bypassing the pickets. And those who had wanted to go to where there was shooting ran in
the different direction, towards the tanks. Feyzullayev walked alone up Tbilisi Avenue to XI Red Army
Square. Short of the square, he noticed the obstacle the picketers had made of trolleybuses and buses. The
picketers themselves were in XI Red Army Square. At the moment Feyzullayev reached the square, a
tank (BMP) rose to the square from the direction of the 3rd microdistrict. Not having met any obstacles or
resistance on its way (it was not expected from that direction), the tank stopped in between the road to the
3rd microdistrict and the road to the city (Tbilisi Avenue). Feyzullayev saw the tank in about 15 meters.
7-8 people were sitting on the armour, long-haired, 30-40 years old, some unshaven with rust-coloured
bristle. Their faces were totally expressionless, "like puppets". The people were standing on the lawn
around the monument and on the foundation of it. There were no "obstacles" in the square, except for
several motor-cars. There was also a pile of stones brought there by the picketers (small stones, palm-
size). They were not hurled that time. All of sudden, people from the tank (without warning or
explanation) opened fire over people's heads, very low. They were obviously shooting from submachine-
guns with tracer bullets. Then they began shooting at people and killed some. UAZ took the wounded or
killed to the Republican hospital. Before the firing started, the people in the square were saying, "Don't be
scared, they won't shoot!" and when it started they were crying, "Don't be scared, they're shooting blank!"
The firing lasted about two minutes in total. Then the tank drove to the city along Tbilisi Avenue.
Here are extracts from the letter of Ali Huseynov, a citizen of Baku, four days after that terrible night.
"No one is able to describe what was happening on the night of 20 January in Baku, especially in our
districts. I have never seen such a nightmare in any war film. At 11.30 p.m. Rasim and I went up home to
have some tea and then come back. At that time the advancement, artillery preparation began; Agasif
phoned, he said that tanks had come out of Salyan barracks and were moving to us. Soldiers appeared at
the same time as tanks. They were shooting from all sides of the city. About a thousand soldiers were
lining up on the crossroads not far from our place (S. Vasilevich plant). People, the young, women and
children (they did not leave despite the demand of the People's Front of Azerbaijan) were standing along
the streets.

112
"Our" Red Army opened heavy fire from submachine-guns, machine-guns from armoured personnel
carriers. They aimed guns at houses, lighting the windows with searchlights, shooting at flats. How can I
describe what I saw? We, Rasim, Alladin and I were looking through the windows; a bullet got right into
ours.
Now I want to tell about the courage of my people. I saw young men seize burning sticks and rush
towards soldiers under bursts of machine-gun fire. They were falling, taking the sticks again, coming
right to the searchlights and shouting, "Are you inhuman? Why are you killing us?" Ambulances come
and our army shoots at them. Directly. Bullets were raining till morning. They were moving towards the
centre. People came into the streets, blood was flowing in springs; corpses were collected at night under
bullets A Russian woman from our house was wounded, she lives on the tenth floor. In the house
opposite two people were killed in their flats"
Here is one of dozens of thousands evidences of Bakuvians, it is so typical, "Scenes of the bloody
morning of 20 January, 1990 flashed before my eyes. Streets of Baku covered with blood and studded
with corpses. Lines of tanks and APC slowly moving along the streets of the tormented city.
THOUSANDS of carnations showered by Bakuvians on the pools of blood on the asphalt. There was
much of it, blood. I wonder whether there were more flowers or blood. Everything was melting into one
red colour. And I remembered FURY. Dreadful, inhuman fury penetrating each cell of the body and
electrifying it. Soldiers were all around. Russian soldiers. Drunk, stinking, unshaven, unkempt, with
vacant faces, not a host but riffraff. They entered the peaceful city at night, pouring heavy fire on the
streets, without choosing, from submachine-guns and heavy machine-guns from APC, shooting in the
windows of houses, crushing ambulances, shooting at nurses, so very young girls who rushed from their
dormitory to help dress wounds of the people. They were shooting unarmed people. People that were
coming back home from their friends'. They spared neither the old nor children. I remembered the fury.
And shock. We, the Azerbaijani, were the first to face that bloody bacchanalia the civilized, so-called
"Christian world with new thinking" brought and is still bringing to us. When one of those fighting-cocks
stopped me and demanded that I show my documents, the fury inside me broke through. I threw my
passport into his face and spat upon him. I do not remember what I was shouting."

THE USSR PUBLIC TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN


PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICE OF MILITARYPROSECUTOR COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME
OF BAKU GARRISON 26 June, 1990 N COUNCIL OF AZERBAIJAN SSR
432 Comrade Karaev T.E. ---------------------------
(370013, BAKU) --------- Baku

To Your out. N150 27.02.1990

I inform You that on 26 January 1990 in the area of Lenkoran, a group of extremists armed with fire
arms made an attack on the division of airborne troops. The commander of the division Senior Lieutenant
KONOPLEV A.V. was killed.
The group of extremists was dispersed as a result of the applied means; the most active participants of
the armed attack in number of over 40 people have been arrested. Among the ar-rested there was
ABDULLAYEV TARIZI GAJIBALA oglu, born in 1965, native and inhabitant of the town of Lenkoran.
On the same day the arrested were delivered in Baku by helicopter. Before boarding the helicopter,
for the purpose of preventing potential resistance in the process of transportation, the detainees were tied
up with special holds on the necks, in accordance with Instruction of individ-ual training of intelligence
officers.
On the way to Baku, several of the detainees tried to stand up and disentangle themselves from the
ties, in which connection the others fell. ABDULLAYEV turned out to be at the bot-tom. The cause of
death was mechanical asphyxia due to the strangulation of the neck with the loop.
In connection with Lenkoran events proceedings have been instituted.
At present, the investigation is in progress.
The head of the investigating group
of the General military prosecutor's office
Colonel Justice
V. MEDVEDEV

113
A. Fadeyev writes in his novel "The Young Guard" that when fascists executed Oleg Koshevoy he
shouted in the faces of his murderers, "It is not you that are dreadful, dreadful is what gave birth to you!"
Only a man who sold his soul to the devil could write that.
Soviet justice gave birth to such people as Colonel Justice V. Medvedev!
In the war years, fascists suffocated prisoners with exhaust gases spending certain amount of petrol
for that. Application of Instruction of individual training of intelligence officers does not even require
spending any petrol. Improved technique!
Victor Nikolaev who openly supports the actions of the Soviet Army in Baku writes, "Twenty
minutes later Victor was spat over. His Ural braked on the pavement. There was a strange fuss. He
jumped out of the cabin to find out why the handful of people was so agitated. Squeezing himself into the
centre he got it all at one time. An Azerbaijani woman clutched his chest tightly, braying hysterically in a
kind of untranslatable tongue-twisters, endlessly spitting right on his face. No one of those surrounding
her even stirred. Everyone bristled up but kept quiet. They were standing as if rooted in the ground,
glowering. Officers and soldiers jumped up and quickly cooled the common flare by standing up each
beside each of the locals. And then all of them were screaming. The eight Russians were acting clearly by
the order, they did not touch anyone, raised their collars, clenched their fists white and were also yelling
(Azerbaijanis, as Victor Nikolaev says, were yelling with grief but why were "the eight Russians"? -
Author). In about ten minutes everyone was tired of screaming. An elderly Azerbaijani man, breathing
noisily and calming down easily, held Victor's both hands as if afraid that the latter would go away and
began speaking quickly in a mild dull voice, "Don't get angry, son, her son and grandson were killed a
week ago. She though it was you They were in camouflage, too."
The woman pressed her lips together and looked at all officers, crying voicelessly with open eyes.
The elderly Azerbaijani tried to soothe her, telling her something, cuddling her. Poor devils, why is it so
hard for everyone? Is there anyone kind and not sad Warrant officer Lekha sat beside him and rubbed
his shoulder wincing badly now and then. He hurt his when jumping on the fly out of the body, in a hurry
to help Victor.
"Come on, stop rubbing it, it'll only get worse," somehow men started feeling relieved at once. "It'll
be OK by your wedding day."
Lekha stopped immediately and sat with a blank look for several seconds, "But I'm already married!"
The laughter did not die out till the port"
Blood and laughter!
"On returning to the quarters, officers argued until fighting started. For half an hour, they were
grappling with one another, then separating one another. Sashka went hysterical; he was tied up and laid
on the floow. He was still bursting to kill that man and shouted, "What am I to do with it?! I've seen war!
Even in Afghanistan they didn't curse me so" The patrol came run-ning and got it, too. Then Sashka
was weeping violently like a child. The others were also twist-ing their mouths. And then they all tried to
cheer up Sashka awkwardly, poured spirit, taking something with it. Everything was lousy, not in a
human way, not in a Russian way." Yes, it was not in a Russian way, not in a human way!
Son and grandson killed at one time, a maddened woman, clenched fists of Soviet soldiers, fights,
carousals, Homeric laughter and insane spree of the occupants such was the reality Azerbaijan was
facing.
On 25 January, 1990, the author together with his friends was meeting in Bina airport sev-eral foreign
correspondents arriving in Baku. All of a sudden, a huge military car appeared and a lively captain got
out. "Stand here," he commanded to the driver, "I'm going to meet the guys." "It's prohibited to stand
here," the driver objected. "But you will," countered the lively captain. "What if they want me to get out
of here?" continued the driver. "Shoot to kill," finished the lively captain and disappeared in the dark.
It was not an empty threat. On 24 January, 1990, on the 22nd km of Baku-Sumgayit high-way, an
armoured personnel carrier ran over a Zhiguli; Doctor of Chemistry, the head of Or-ganochlorine
Synthesis Institute of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences, Professor Svetlana Hamid gizi
Mamedova and the head of the department at the same institute, Doctor of Chemistry Ibrahim Ismail oglu
Ibrahimov were killed on their way to work.
Here is a cynical and immoral response of the deputy military prosecutor Colonel Justice Klimov to
the death of innocent people.

THE USSR PUBLIC TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN


PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION OF
OFFICE OF MILITARY THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF AZERBAIJAN SSR

114
PROSECUTOR OF BAKU Comrade Abasov M.T. ------------------------------------
GARRISON --- Baku, Narimonov Avenue
28 June, 1990
444 (370013, BAKU)

In response to N1220, 9 June, 1990, I inform You that a criminal case was instituted on 26 February,
1990 based on the death of Mukhtarov Rasim Mustafa oglu.
In the process of investigation, I has been established that on the night of 26 February of this year,
during the curfew, Mukhtarov R.M. was driving Moskvich-412 N I 66-08 A3 motor-car at a speed of 80-
90 km/h along Taghi-zade Street.
The sentry of control post N2 Private OZERNY A.V. came out on the lighted roadway and gave a
warning signal with a baton to stop the car.
However, Mukhtarov did not yield to the demand, moreover, he turned the car directly to OZERNY.
The latter managed to save his life by jumping aside.
Seeing that MUKHTAROV had made an attempt to run over OZERNY, sentries SHUS-TOV and
USACHEV gave warning submachine-gun shots into the air with the purpose to detain the offender;
however, MUKHTAROV did not respond and tried to disappear from the scene of the incident. In this
connection, the above-mentioned persons opened fire at the car and MUK-HTAROV got a mortal
gunshot wound.
On the strength of all the collected evidence, it has been established that Private SHUS-TOV A.Y.
and Private USACHEV I.A. were acting lawfully and in this view, the criminal case against these persons
is closed on the basis of Clause 10 Item 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Azerbaijan SSR for lack
of corpus delicti.
Deputy military prosecutor
Colonel Justice
I. KLIMOV
Even with great reserve, those soldiers that killed an unarmed man and Klimov that de-fends them
cannot be called humans.
Another "record" of the contemporary history was set on 20 January, 1990 in Baku; for the first time
after the fascists, Soviet soldiers were firing at ambulances and said that it had been extremists that had
been shooting.

THE USSR PUBLIC


TO THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
OF THE INVESTIGATING
OFFICE OF MILITARY PROSECUTOR
COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME
OF BAKU GARRISON
COUNCIL OF AZERBAIJAN SSR ----------
21 January, 1990 38 (370013,
--------------------------- Baku
BAKU)

To Your out. N SKES 2006, 9 January, 1990


I inform You that the investigation of the case of the mass disorders in Baku city has established that
individual citizens died at the hand of extremists.
SEMENOV A.V. was killed by extremists from a passing car on the night of 20 January, 1990.
Emergency doctor MARKHEVKA A.V. was killed by extremists on Artem - Baku road.
In similar circumstances, militia officers BOGDANOV Z.Z. and ISRAILOV A.A. were killed and
MIRZOYEV O.M. sustained grave bodily injuries.
The head of the investigating group of the General military prosecutor's office Colonel Justice
V. MEDVEDEV
It seems that talking about extremists, Medvedev meant Soviet soldiers, there can be no other
reasonable explanation.
The Soviet troops were killing Azerbaijani militiamen only for their desire to help their compatriots.
CERTIFICATE
of unlawful acts of military personnel towards officers of internal affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR
Drawn up by Aliyev D.M.
The materials submitted to the deputy investigating commission indicate that after the introduction of
troops in the territory of Baku, declaration of state of emergency on 19-20 January, 1990, military
personnel allowed and continues to allow unlawful acts towards officers of internal affairs of the republic.

115
In particular, on 20 January of this year, approximately at 11.00 p.m., near a call office on Lenin
Avenue, Baghirov Telman Malik oglu, born in 1960, militiaman of the Internal Affairs Department of 26
Baku Commissars district was severely wounded in the heart area and died after being taken to Semashko
hospital. The findings of the commission that investigated the fact of death of Baghirov T.M. indicate that
on 20 January, approximately at 09.00 p.m., in the period of declaration of emergency in Baku, the
security militiaman of the Internal Affairs Department of 26 Baku Commissars district, still wearing
uniform after work, was near the call office on Lenin Avenue by Drujba cinema when he was suddenly
fired upon from automatic arms by unidentified military servicemen, as a result of which he sustained
several grave bullet wounds and was taken to Semashko hospital where he died before he was rendered
medical aid.
The death of Baghirov Telman Malik oglu was recognized as a mortal result of the execution of
official duty.
An extract from the medical record demonstrates that the cause of death of Baghirov Telman Malik
oglu was the bullet wound in the area of chest with injury of the heart.
It proceeds from the review by the results of the official investigation of the fact of death and injuring
of the officers of the 7h Department of the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, that
approximately at 07.00 a.m., 20 January of this year, the task force consisting of Lieutenant Israilov
Agagnazar Araz oglu, born in 19*, Bogdanov Valery Zakirovich, born in 1958, Captain Mirzoyev Oktay
Mekhti oglu and Gurbanov A., while driving a service car in the execution of the official duty at the
intersection of Inglab Street and Tbilisi Avenue, got under automatic arms fire of military details. As a
result, Israilov A.A. and Bogdanov V.Z. were killed and Mirzoyev O.M. had left arm amputated.
The commission regards the death of Lieutenant Israilov Agagnazar Araz oglu, Bogdanov Valery
Zakirovich and the disability of Mirzoyev Oktay Mekhti oglu as a result of the execution of official duty.
The district militia officer of Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs of Baku Captain
Bayramov Imamali Soltan oglu was killed on 31 March, 1990, at 10.00 p.m., near Chermet settlement in
his personal car, Zhiguli N5570 AGC.
The cause of death of Bayramov I.S. was traffic violation on the part of the driver of an APC without
identification signs.
Approximately at 12.00 p.m., the stepdaughter of Safarov Badafar Agamirza oglu, born in 1923,
veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Veteran of Labour, phoned him from Karaev children's hospital and
told that the military were shooting around and the wounded and killed were brought in the hospital.
Safarov B.A. became anxious and drove his personal car Moskvich-412 N A 87-99 AG to Karaev
hospital. He was killed not far from Salyan barracks in uncertain circumstances. His body was found on
20.01.90 in Teze Pir mosque.
The record of the external examination of body established that Safarov Badafar Agamirza oglu, born
in 1923, died as a result of a gunshot in the area of right thigh surface with a rising wound tract.
On 20 January, 1990, at 00.30 p.m., near Nakhchivan hotel, Abulgasanov Ilgar Yusif oglu, born in
1967, militia officer of Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs, was fired on his way home
from work in his personal GAZ-24 motor-car by military details and severely injured, as a result of which
died of a gunshot.
On 20 January of this year, near Salyan barracks, Huseynov Vidadi Alyar oglu, born in 1966, and
Mekhtiyev Musa Isa oglu, born in 1966, militia officers of the internal affairs department of Baku
Underground were severely injured; Sergeant Major of the 4th militia patrol duty company Babayev
Abdurakhman Gajibala oglu was beaten up with truncheon by a military detail on 20.01.90.
On 20 January of this year, traffic regulation officers Sergeant Osmanov T.A., Abdulazizov A.A.,
Allakhverdiyev Y.B. were taken to Salyan barracks in the patrol car 14-10 AGA by a military detail,
beaten up and kept in the disciplinary cell for 3 days.
Apart from the above-mentioned, other cases of unlawful acts on the part of military personnel
occurred in the territory of the republic.
These cases could make up several volumes!
The atrocities of the Soviet troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990 became an "eradication measure".
Before the storm of the TV tower in Vilnius, the commander of "Alfa" Colonel (later General) V.
Karpukhin said, "We must kill as many of them as possible, like in Baku."
(The author of this suggestion, the murderer of Amin, was the head of guards of the Kazakhstan
president Nazarbayev for a long time after the USSR collapse).
The introduction of troops in Baku was also another measure. A member of the Military Council of
Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Major General A. Gritsenko said that "in the

116
assessment of the possible developments we proceed, as a rule, from a precedent. January events in
Azerbaijan were unique", in other words, all state power was thrown on a peaceful city for the first time
in contemporary history.
In connection with this "decade" of the Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, with a sore heart, the author
recalls the decade of Russian culture in Azerbaijan in 1969 in which he took part. The decade was to last
one week but members of the delegation, which were several hundred in number, did not want to leave
the hospitable Azerbaijan and the good hosts did not want to let them go. Who could assume then that this
decade would turn into the bloody "decade" of Baku twenty years later!
The warships of the Red Banner Caspian Fleet also entered the sea "battle"; they tried to sink
merchant ships of Caspian Steamship Company.
"We were convinced that the warships were actually attacking those civilian vessels," writes People's
Deputy of the USSR Arif Melikov. "There were also attempts to sink some of them. Many vessels had
their decks and top-hamper shout through. Cheleken-1, Vodoley-4, Aktau, 40th Anniversary of VLKSM,
Neftegaz-10, Neftegaz-18, Neftegaz-64 were damaged particularly badly. Fire began on the board of
Vodoley-4 whose captain was Yulian Alexandrovich Radchenko. That ship was damaged in three spots."
SOS was broadcast in Baku air, from the bay, for the first time since the Second World War (when it
was sent from the burning Agamali tanker attacked by enemy aircrafts), due to the attack of warships. The
special issue of Rachel daily, 20-26 January, reported that one of the broadcasts from ships "Attention to
everyone!" said in particular,
"Peaceful population of Earth!
On 22 January, the military commandant of Baku ordered using weapons of warships against civilian
ships Before the eyes of the international community their artillery fired at Aktau motor ship, ships
Neftegaz-10, Neftegaz-18, Neftegaz-64, 40th Anniversary of VLKSM, Neftegaz-3."
On 21 January, immediately after the introduction of troops, Yazov holds a meeting to which he
invites the district military commandants of Baku. "When Yazov entered the meeting room with his
entourage, little time passed," recalls one of the participants of that meeting, "till it was impossible to
breathe because of vodka reek. Yazov himself, with red swollen mug, walked staggering slightly, - didn't
sleep the whole night, as he explained. Hardly had the participants taken their seats when Yazov began
reciting a poem. "Whose poem is this?" he asked the audience. "Mayakovsky", someone cried out from
his seat. "Well done," reacted Yazov and continued, "So are we to find and burn down People's Front
organizations."
It became known afterwards that Yazov's poetic burst at the meeting had had some reasons. Instead of
defending Motherland, he wrote poems. Another meeting, late in the evening of 22 January, was held by
the USSR Defence Minister General of the Army D.T. Yazov with a group of Moscow "journalists".
"At present," Yazov said, "about 80 extremist representatives of the People's Front, informals (the
entire USSR swarmed with informals then) have been arrested. Each of them will be dealt individually
and the degree of guilt of each of them will be determined. However, our aim is not to detain everyone
but to crash the established structure of power at all facilities and in all institutions.
It was not a slip of the tongue, I said exactly "power". They were preparing to seize it and very so
convinced in success that declared state of emergency themselves as early as at 11.00 p.m. on 18 January,
before the introduction of troops in Baku. Soviet and party bodies in many districts of the city had
actually lost control over the situation by that moment. A meeting was scheduled for 20 January where
the transfer of power to the People's Front was to be declared.
I will give you figures. According to our estimates, there are about 40,000 militants under arms in
Azerbaijan, with submachine-guns, different rifles, machine-guns and sporting guns. Now, when
informals were detained, the district department of the People's Front was searched and even sets of
military uniform were found, from soldier's to general's. Many extremist informals went underground and
it is not an easy task to reveal them in a city with a two million population."
The ideology of this speech was taken one-to-one from Goebbels's office. "The Czechs kill Germans
in Sudeten, the Polish attacked Germany and destroyed a settlement etc."
More red-faced than usual, he was making contradictory statements, confusing names, districts of
Baku, figures etc. At the end of the press conference he said, "I promise you as a Communist that I will
restore the Soviet power as soon as possible" and left.
Varennikov echoes Yazov. "To our regret, the militants are armed not only with sporting guns and
Molotov cocktail but also with up-to-date submachine-guns, machine-guns and even grenade launchers,"
lied the deputy minister of the USSR Minister of Defence, Commander-in-Chief Land Forces General of

117
the Army V. Varennikov in the pages of "Izvestiya" on 21 January, 1990. He never repeated that again; as
the further events demonstrated, he proved to be more decent than Gorbachev!
The occupying authority was established in Baku occupied by the Soviet troops, as is common in
such cases. Here are the names of the chief occupants.
Dubinyak V.S.. - military commandant of Baku;
Major General Solodkov V.D. - deputy commandant;
Major General Kirilyuk A.I. - deputy commandant for political affairs;
Colonel Sabusov V.V.- head of the staff;
Colonel Lyakh P.I. - deputy administrative commandant;
Lieutenant Colonel Turkin A.M. - deputy head of the staff for aviation;
Colonel Yarovoy Y.N. - communications officer;
Colonel Rubtsov I.N. - commandant of 26 Baku Commissars district;
Colonel Bondarev P.T. - commandant of Oktyabrsky district;
Colonel Korolkov V.N. -commandant of Nasimi district;
Lieutenant Colonel Lisyuk R.I. - commandant of Narimanov district;
Colonel Ponomarev B.V. - commandant of Kirov district;
Lieutenant Colonel Tolmachev V.V. - commandant of Lenin district;
Colonel Buntsev A.P. - commandant of Nizami district;Lieutenant Colonel Stolyarov A.A. -
commandant of Khatai district;
Major Demidov B.A. - commandant of Ordzhonikidze district;
Lieutenant Colonel Dzantiyev K.B. - commandant of Karadag district;
Colonel Boyko M.G. - commandant of Azizbekov district;
Major Tikhonov - commandant Bina airport
Even after the collapse of the USSR, when considerable amount of time passed, none of the above-
mentioned did not repent their doings or at least admitted that there were no militants in the streets of
Baku but only peaceful citizens, thereby taking a part of the blame on themselves!
Quite remarkable is the structure of subdivisions set up in full accordance with war time: deputy
commandant for political affairs, deputy administrative commandant, deputy head of the staff for
aviation, communications officer. The name of deputy head of tank subdivision was kept in secret for
some reasons, the same tank subdivision that had been trampling civilians; the only thing that lacked to
complete the war time set was artillery unit!
Probably, they decided to wait a little with artillery preparation!
However, the main element, armed enemy, was unavailable, so Marshal Yazov used the expression
"People's Front organizations". And where there are "organizations", there is the necessity for rear
services support, aviation, communication etc.
There are many disgraceful pages in the history of the Soviet Army (for instance, Tukhachev's
annihilation of Tambov peasants with chemical warfare, G. Zhukov's order to take the offensive across
minefields) but the invasion in Baku is unprecedented in the world practice (the American army
annihilated the Indians, though, but the latter had at least arrows).
In accordance with the rules of any gangster capture, the occupants immediately paralyzed the city
depriving the authorities of the chance to send objective information about the events in Baku.
When the troops were brought in, as is common for the occupation of the enemy's city which the
Soviet troops deemed Baku, they immediately seized television and General A.I. Ovchinnikov became
boss there, an officer of the Political Department of the USSR Armed Forces, deputy of the USSR
Supreme Council. TV screens were dead for a long time in the republic.
The political analyst Novruzogly managed to obtain the shorthand record of the talks between the
Chairman of the USSR Supreme Council Soviet of Nationalities Y. Primakov and the secretary of the
CPSU CC A. Ghirenko and the head of international relations department of the Central Committee V.
Mikhailov. All three of them were in Baku on the eve of the January tragedy with the purpose of
"stabilizing the situation" in the capital of Azerbaijan. Below is given a fragment of that conversation
which took place on 19 January, 1990 at 06.30 p.m.
"A. Ghirenko: "The population in the regions and towns of Azerbaijan is not to be aware of what is
going on in Baku. The troops are entering the city. There is an order already."
Y. Primakov: "People get all information from television."
V. Mikhaylov: "We must cut the communication."
And the power unit of Azerbaijan television was blown up.

118
Komsomolskaya Pravda interviewed Victor Romanov, a technician, who had miraculously escaped
death, hiding at his friends' and relatives'. He told, "I came to work on 19 January at 07.00 p.m. About
fifteen minutes later, four armed soldiers entered the workshop. They began inquiring about the power
supply diagram, opening cells of communication cables, asked other questions. Then they said,
"Commandant calls you." My workmate and I were led to the basement and under the guard of other
soldiers. They went back themselves. Several minutes later, I heard a muffled explosion. We were not
allowed to go out for about hour. Then they made us change in the military uniforms ("for your own
safety") and convoyed to the nearby building of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council."
The letter of the then first deputy of prosecutor of Azerbaijan SSR M. Babayev to the Chief Military
Prosecutor of the USSR Lieutenant General Justice V.F. Katusev proves the involvement of the KGB
special group in the power unit explosion in the television and radio centre. "The explosion of the power
unit could be arranged and performed as a special measure on preventing unauthorized broadcasting of
materials on behalf of the People's Front, which is confirmed by the KGB inspection record N 125/B, 17
January, 1990, saying that the KGB "works out special measures" on preventing the capture and usage of
the television and radio centre by the representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan. In this
connection, the version about the involvement of the KGB officers in the arrangement of the explosion is
to be checked by the organs of the military prosecutor's office"
The line at that issue was drawn twelve years later by Vyacheslav Morozov. He write in his article
FSB Admiral, "Army units entered Baku (the FSB Admiral Ugryumov was opposed to the introduction of
troops); the government of Azerbaijan regarded it as an act of aggression and began to prepare an appeal
to the people. Ugryumov realized that if the appeal was broadcast, mass disorders would be inevitable (?!
- Author). There would be much blood (?! - Author). He was aware of the meaning and the tone of the
appeal.
The television centre was guarded by troops but members of the government and deputies had the
right of unimpeded access to its territory. THE SPECIAL GROUP OF THE KGB ENTERED IT
UNIMPEDED, TOO (highlighted by the author). Appreciating the people's property (?! There is no limit
to these gentlemen's cynicism. - Author), the officers of A group cut the power cable with one small
charge, switching off the republican television broadcasting for several days. The appeal was not sent,
new blood was not shed (?! - Author)."
The point of the matter is not this moronic concoction but that it is journalists related to the Russian
secret services who have been writing about the true organizers and performers of the explosion in Baku
television centre for more than ten years!
So eloquently, to the entire country, did Gorbachev lie soon after the introduction of troops on the
central television, saying that the explosion had been performed by the People's Front extremists!
Ryzhkov, Primakov, Bakatin, Krtuchkov, Yazov and others alleged the same. All Soviet mass media were
trumpeting to the whole USSR. And here it is, the confession that totally clarifies the issue. There will be
much more such confessions in the future!
In Baku, Bakatin had loyal cutthroats in his special service.
Vladimir Verzhbitsky writes in the article Will the City Be Left without Guard?, "On 1 December of
this year, in accordance with order N 033, 10.10. 2001 signed by the minister of internal affairs Boris
Gryzlov, the detached special motorized battalion of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Russia quartered in Penza will be liquidated.
This subdivision 6556, popularly known as militia battalion, has a glorious battle record. Here are just
several landmarks. 1980 - maintenance of public order during Olympic Games in Moscow, 1985 - the
same task at the XII International Festival of Youth and Students, 1990 - suppression of disorders in Balu
and settlement of ethnic conflict, 1991 - service in Nagorno-Karabakh where the fighters of the battalion
were a "human shield" at the dividing line between the Armenian and the Azerbaijani troops, 1993 -
resistance to extremists in Dagestan, 1994-2001 - performance of special battle tasks in Chechnya and
Dagestan.
The battalion has always been a good guard of the city and the region. Over 100 soldiers went into the
streets of Penza on duty daily. Fighters of the battalion secured carrying out of any mass events. Besides,
it was the only paramilitary structure capable to come to the spot in case of mass disorders."
We are not going to estimate the activity of the "detached special motorized battalion of internal
troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia quartered in Penza"; it is not by any means our aim,
but we know much from the eyewitnesses' evidence concerning its activity in 1990 in Baku, "suppression
of disorders in Balu and settlement of ethnic conflict". This battalion was the "chief striking force" of
Bakatin. It was they who were making numerous arrests and night searches by Bakatin's order. They were

119
noted for peculiar brutality towards the peaceful citizens of Baku. Bakatin was apple-polishing
Gorbachev with his brutality, and the battalion was apple-polishing Bakatin.
Since 12 January, the militia battalion from Stavropol was deployed in Baku, headed by Captain
Edward Nemytko and Captain Edward Golovko who were apathetically watching the disorders. The
battalion got down to "work" after the invasion of the Soviet troops in Baku; it got involved in
racketeering and blackmail, mainly in storehouses, shops, restaurants etc.
It must be said that "Bakatin's nestlings" left a noticeable "trace" in Baku.
Alexey Vasilyev describes this riffraff that occupied Baku.
First, several words about Alexey Vasilyev himself. He served in Chichik, Afghanistan, Baku with
the 8th battalion of the 22nd OBrSpN (detached special brigade, a special unit of the KGB).
"Morning. I walk around the vicinity. Infantrymen are warming themselves at the fire by the tank,
shooting from time to time at the nearby houses, without spirit. They turned out to be "guerillas from
Rostov". Such imposing guys. But not fighters at all Not fighters.
A bearded man comes up to me, he is in charge. "Son, I see you're serviceman, they gave us
submachine-guns, grenades But what are we to do? Oh, you're not even wearing a bullet-proof vest, so
special units need no armour!"
When I look more closely, I get ill at ease. What a scum they have brought in Baku!
The actions of the reservists, Rostov soldiers from Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Sakovsky's battalion,
reeked of some kind of madness. They were running, shouting fervently, shooting at windows and
balconies of dwelling houses, into the air and so on. Finally, soldiers from Salyan barracks opened fire at
them, taking them for militants. And as one would expect, they immediately ran following their nose!
That "host" was gathered again with great difficulty afterwards!
After the night tank attack with infantry support against the civilians of Baku, Armenian servicemen
were taken out of Baku from military airfields, in increased secrecy.
We know today that on 16 January, 1990, by Gorbachev's order, the urgent conscription of reservists
from Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov regions and their redeployment to Baku began.
Numerous eyewitnesses of the events of 20 January, 1990 say that there were a considerable number
of Armenians in the ranks of the Soviet Army that invaded Baku. They were all hastily mobilized from
Rostov and Krasnodar region. At the session of the USSR Supreme Council one of NKAO leader
Dadamyan said that the slaughter committed by the Soviet Army in Baku on 20 January, 1990 was the
punishment for Sumgayit events.
It refers in full measure to Armenian mercenaries in the Soviet Army that invaded Baku.
The first secretary of Krasnodar regional committee of the party Polozkov said in an interview to
Komsomolskaya Pravda that the mobilization for the operation in Baku had been carried out by a group
of high-ranking officers from Moscow.
The local authorities were not admitted to this top secret action.
Salekh bey writes, "Moreover, he did not disdain even the support of so-called zinvors, Dashnak
volunteers recruited to guard the property of Armenian businessmen in Baku. In Baku, soldiers of
Armenian origin arriving from Astrakhan, Port-Petrovsk, Krasnovodsk were held back under different
pretences. Military equipment and ammunition addressed to the Soviet government were delivered by
steamships from Persia and Krasnovodsk which were passed to dashnaks. Mantashev plant and other
facilities of Armenian industrialists were used as weapons depots."
On 20 January, 1990, 70 years later, Gorbachev applied this method again by bringing Armenians
from the southern regions of Russia.
This action caused a sharp protest among the local Russian population which was then hushed up by
the USSR mass media. The aid of the USSR president Gorbachev Chernyayev A.S. says that "after
Lithuania and in connection with the events in Azerbaijan which by the way caused a furious women
march in Krasnodar, Stavropol, Rostov-on-Don, Tuapse, Cossack villages and Russian peasant villages in
protest against the recruitment of reservists sent to "suppress the Caucasus".
At the meeting in the CPSU CC, a worker of a mining face from a mine in Rostov region Leonid
Krivenda was telling with indignation, "We in Rostov region were badly affected by the latest rash order
about the mobilization of reservists due to the state of emergency in Baku. There are killed and wounded
among our conscripted reservists; probably even in 1937 people were not taken in this way, at night, with
militia cars. Our people's reaction is very ambiguous. There were strikes in the mines. Women were
outraged, they crowded the main street. I asked Mikhail Sergeyevich a question, who was the author of
this action, after all, there was no mobilization order and just the resolution on emergency measures to

120
restore law and order in Baku. Who made the decision on mobilization then? He admitted, yes, we
messed it up here, but he never mentioned a definite person that had made the decision."
As early as the next day, 21 January, rotation of the intruding troops began. Rotation in troops is a
common thing. For instance, almost all special militia squads from different regions of Russia have been
in Chechnya, replacing one another. The minimal period of service in Chechnya was not less than half a
year, according to the Russian press. Rotation in the Soviet troops that occupied Baku began on the next
day after the invasion. Eyewitnesses told afterwards that transport aircrafts landed nearly on one another's
tail-ends, arriving and taking off with full boards of soldiers. What was the point of such rapid rotation?
The point was that the organizers of this operation were trying to cover up their tracks sending back those
who had "distinguished themselves" most, among whom were (and there is indisputable proof) ethnic
Armenians, and new ones were brought in instead. After a certain period of time, many officers and
soldiers swore by God that they had not been in Baku on 20 January.
In this respect, the answers of the military commandant of Baku Lieutenant General of internal troops
V.S. Dubinyak to the following questions is rather typical.
"Was there any alternative of the introduction of troops in the city and why did the troops enter at
night, why were not they brought already in the days of Armenian pogroms, why did the introduction of
troops begin at 0.20 a.m., while the resolution on the introduction was broadcast at 5.30 a.m.?"
Dubinyak: "I am not going to answer these questions. I was appointed military commandant after the
introduction of the troops." In private conversations, however, Dubinyak used to say that he had arrived
in Baku after the well-known events with another contingent of forces.
To cover up as many tracks of crimes as possible is the primary and sole reason of such rapid
rotation! It had no military aim.
We saw rapid rotation caused by military necessity in the Chechen war, when military aircrafts were
incessantly landing and taking off in Khankala airport; but they were bringing fresh soldiers, officers,
military equipment, ammunition etc. and taking the wounded, killed and those who had gone insane. A
war was going there.
In his article Baku. 1990 the hack writer of the Soviet Army Alexey Vasilyev writes, "A
submachine-gun burst another one crackle, no, hail of submachine-gun fire Colonel grasps the
flack with spirit fussily and disappears. A stray bullet flies into the window, slightly ruining the interior.
Here it is relaxation on the carpets I try to figure out what is going on. The gates of Salyan barracks
swing open and a tank rolls out of them crushing the wretched barricade, infantry follows in a line. The
infantry does not save cartridges, fires upwards from submachine-guns, stumbling upon the splinters of
the barricade, bullets fly God knows where, the townsfolk scatter."
Mr. Vasilyev's reference to God is irrelevant here; the infantry did not save cartridges, shooting at
civilians!
Provocative information appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda, that "a group of armed militants disguised as
servicemen of the Soviet Army fired upon peaceful passers-by on Lenin Avenue with the purpose to
provoke hatred" The material was signed, "Military commandant of the city Colonel General
Dubinyak." There is a great number of such Goebbels-like examples, adjusted for the locale and period.
The performance of "duty" by the Soviet fascists is demonstrated by the following radio interception.
"I'm picking up 95 people killed
Huh, ten years is nothing to sort out that mess. All the rest slipped in front of our barracks, there's
hospital there, then a building. Yeah, there it is
One civilian box today, they fuckin' banged from a cannon on the bay, damn.
But only three were run over. Just shot down in the morning, firing right at the seaport
They were taking Civil People's Front, those guys had time to fuck off but then I fuckin' struck
with a missile from the gun Only three were run over there
It's quiet now, our guys thrashed the People's Front
'Kerosene, Skachok, I'm Kurgan, over
'It's Skachok-33. Over.'
'You're like fishwives, stop flapjaw on the air, shut up and just report'"
For the first time after Afghanistan, military helicopters Mi-24 were used during the introduction of
troops in Baku in January 1990.
Lebedev's thugs gave a "battle" to civil ships With the shortest possible delay, the division
headquarters planned the operation; I set the mission on the capture of the seaport buildings to the
commander of Kostroma regiment Colonel Y.Y. Savilov.

121
By 7.00 a.m. the regiment had taken the seaport without casualties on either side. The first-class
(build in Finnish shipyards) steamship Sabit Orujev (the vessel that carried oil workers to the legendary
Oil Stones - Author) The mission was accomplished At 7.05 a.m. a ship of Neftegazflot approached
from the sea The commander of the regiment made an instantaneous decision, and four BMD-1
crawled out to the moorings, each sending two hollow-charge grenades onto the ship; the vessel caught
fire."
Primakov and those of his ilk say that servicemen were killed in Baku. It could possibly be the case.
However, they were killed, if they were, not by "militants" but as a result of chaos, unrestrained
debauchery and different internal showdowns. The Chechen war showed that it was the plague of the
Soviet and Russian army.
Alexey Vasilyev cites numerous slippery incidents.
"A burst of submachine-gun fire from our entrance. 'Don't move!' Oh, it's Corporal Radin training.
'But there's someone on the roof, he was aiming at me,' the fighter makes excuses
'Look! Don't shoot without command or attack! Save cartridges!'
The house of the generals was next door from us; it was guarded by a special army group. Colleagues.
I had approached them before and explained that we were near, that their flank was alright, that it was not
desirable that they shoot in our direction.
Was it useful? Try to guess. The fence around the house was of stone, a path with a garden gate
leading to the neighbours, we are behind the gate
'Don't move!'
We do not. Bursts of submachine-gun fire follow, right at us! Who trained them? Naturally, I fall at
once, press my nose against concrete and move backwards like a crayfish to the fence.
I can see the shooters clearly, three UAZ and a group of people against the sky. I could finish them
with one burst. But these are our guys. So I crawl back, cursing to myself. Almost there and then curses
and screams, a Ryazan fellow is wounded. I have to crawl towards him. There is ringing in my ears.
When will they run out of cartridges?
Finally, they did blasted shooters They heard me yell, stopped shooting. I should have given
them a good dressing-down right then, but the wounded
In word, I dragged him to our place, had his wounds dressed. I sent for Ryazan guys. I say, here he is,
take the victim By the way, that victim was given an order in a week, right in the hospital. As for me
I have received a medal recently, though One of my lads plucked a bullet out of the fence in the
morning. A souvenir. But there is ringing in the ear. I went to have a look; there was a trace where a
bullet had ricocheted on the concrete, five centimetres from the spot where my head had been. Er It is
fair to say that it was not guys from the special unit that were shooting, just an antiaircraft defence
colonel, the aide of the antiaircraft defence commander, scared devil
Ural rushes into the neighbouring yard. Fighters land nicely and extend. The commander squats
behind the vehicle and guides his people. Skilful! Napoleon, hell's bells! What does it remind me?
Exactly! The storm of my house by the first company of our detachment. Amusing
Radio station returned to life. So, Corporal Blokhin is on.
'They're shooting at us! What are we to do?'
Censored I put that "counter" by the fence, and now the poor devils are lying under the "friendly
fire". Scared, it is clear, too young Well, frankly speaking, I am scared myself. Wife and child are at
home, I am here It is all hot air, though. Time to check phones. Pick up the receiver at random. 'It's
Rubin, hello?'... Nice voice, the girl is in Moscow, and we are here 'Sorry, Rubin, mistake'
Ffffuck! A burst of fire from the hotel window at the position of the first company. Nothing in
response. We burst into the hotel? What the hell? Who?
We drag a drunken infantry captain from the room on the second floor. Some people should drink
less! No "ghosts" everywhere then.
A burst of submachine-gun fire returned me to the stern reality. In the hall, by the door, a Ryazan
lieutenant showers the Persian carpet with burning cartridge cases Where? At whom?
A message came that "guerillas" had got under fire, taken for militants. Ryazan guys "distinguished
themselves"
Certainly, in such half-drunken situation, when the army was crammed with common riffraff, there
could be losses among the military. It is beyond doubt that they killed one another but Alexey Vasilyev
passes this over in silence. And it is clear why!
This assumption was fully confirmed in Chechnya when hundreds of federal soldiers died at the
hands of their fellow federal soldiers and blatant facts were revealed during trials!

122
A certain Alexey, far from sympathizing with Azerbaijan, says in the Internet, "In the infamous
"Azeristan" (?! The country that reared you - Author), I lived till the withdrawal of the 4th army from
there, i.e. through June 1992. I have seen Karabakh from the beginning, from February 1988. My father
served in the 4th army department till retirement on pension, then worked as a technician in the KGB
Department of the Azerbaijan SSR. We lived next to the military unit in Salyan barracks, OUR OWN
GUYS FIRED UPON OUR HOUSE IN JANUARY 1990 (highlighted by the author. As the text
indicates further, it is the invading troops that he regards as "their own guys")." Meanwhile, at that time
the Soviet mass media were lying in every way that it was militants that had been firing upon the houses
of the servicemen's families near Salyan barracks!
After the Soviet troops finished firing upon the flats of their comrades-in-arms, they raised a red flag
above Salyan barracks that dangled there for about half a year.
When they did not shoot at civilians, the Soviet servicemen acted in Baku like looters and robbers.
The following lines belong to the very eyewitness of the events, "gourmet" Alexey Vasilyev.
"Baku. A beautiful southern city. The city of bazaars, kebab and black caviar (civilized people see
much more sides of Baku - Author).
Ryazan guys sent a parliamentarian, they call us to come and see them. Paratroopers are
accommodated in the hotel next to us. Commanders are sitting in the hall, a soldier in bullet-proof vest
and helmet with a towel over his arm carry around pastry from the bar. A vivid picture
'Radin!'
'Yes, Comrade Senior Lieutenant!'
'Where have you found coffee?'
'Well there was some'
'Get it here! Get everything here!'
A nice life Arabica in clay cups A Bulgarian cigarette Isn't it bliss? They've got a point,
indeed. Why choke down packed meal if there are such reserves here
Evening. In "storerooms", we found vodka, Zolotoye koltso. Confiscation
A message came, somewhere servicemen robbed a provision store. It's bad, indeed, but people must
eat, after all!"
"Nevertheless," specifies Vitaly Tokarev, the deputy commander in charge of policy of the special
radio communication squad that was a part of Kirovograd brigade in Baku, "there were problems in
relationship between servicemen and the local population. They often refused to serve us in shops
alleging that they did not understand Russian, even if we wore civilian clothing." Another impression of
the former political supervisor during his stay in the Caucasian republic was the abundance on the shelves
of local shops. "I saw poverty reigning in Russia, where there was nothing on the shelves but kefir, bread,
dried crust and sea girdle. But here I thought I was brought; several sorts of meat, sausage Besides, I
was very happy with the assortment of books in Russian, I remember that I brought home almost fifty
books, The White Guard, Heavy Sand One could only dream about such books here I think, though,
that the reason of such disparity in living standard between Soviet republics was policy of the then Soviet
leadership. If the ethnic conflict in the Caucasus had been aggravated with insufficient provisions, the
mass disorders would have probably taken a larger scale," writes Oksana Gutsalyuk.
Shopping, so to say!
Lebed recalls, "Among other objects of the sea port, a restaurant was taken (?! - Author), and there
was breakfast for about two hundred persons. Moreover, not just common breakfast, but kebab, balyk,
black and red caviar. And there were soldiers who had lived on packed meal for a week. Agitated with the
battle (if he has to lie, he lies with a bang! - Author), young, healthy and hungry which is quite normal for
that age. Regarding, not without reason, the breakfast as a war trophy, they finished it off clean leaving
only napkins.
..Elderly, dignified, thrifty and wise commanders of administrative platoons and battalions did not fail
to take advantage of the situation to fill up the exhausted reserves for free." These are words of a Soviet
general!
This is Lebed's another lie. No one made such parties in Baku in those terrible days. According to the
director of the restaurant, Lebed rushed into his office and ordered, "Put everything you have on the table,
otherwise I'm blowing the restaurant up!"
It was Lebed's favourite trick in Baku. When an ordinary electric wiring accident occurred, Lebed
burst into the office of the first secretary of Nasimi district A. Jalilov with a gun in his hand and
demanded that electricity be immediately switched on in Armenian flats, threatening to blow up the
transformer vault.

123
It should be said that Jalilov acted with dignity in this situation. He said to Lebed, "Leave my office,
set yourself to rights and then we will talk!"
One of the heads of the KGB top secret unit "Alfa" M. Boltunov, "The fighters did not complain
about the lack of conveniences but when they were accommodated in barracks in Baku and given nothing
but mattresses, even hard-boiled operatives were amazed. They lived in such conditions for three months,
on dry rations. By the way, they were paid the very same 3,50 per day as travel allowance, while the job
was such that they returned to the barracks at night, after midnight, towards morning, hardly the time for
canteen."
M. Boltunov keeps back the most important thing. "Returning to the barracks at night, after midnight,
towards morning", they sorted out their problems, each in his own way. The words of King Cain come to
our mind at this. When Cain suggested that he bring mercenaries in the neighbouring state, the head of
that state protested, "How can I feed this entire horde?" Cain answered, "You just allow them in, and they
will subsist by themselves and solve all their problems."
When the film director Stanislav Govorukhin heard about the events in Baku he went there
immediately together with a cameraman. He says, "Lying in front of me is the accidents log of a militia
station. I turn over the pages: soldiers stopped a passer-by, searched him, took away his money; soldiers
in a tank drove into the shop, broke through, committed a theft; soldiers took a cap from a passer-by;
soldiers broke into a flat, searched for valuables, did not find anything and took the wedding ring off the
lady owner's hand"
It is relevant here to remember that pillage and theft was not something new for the Red and then
Soviet Army. Both officers and privates succeeded in those during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic
War. With rare exception, this phenomenon was not observed in the tsarist army, since officer's honour
was valued there. A totally different spirit reigned among the Reds, suffice it to remember Babel's Horse
Army.
Illegal searches were carried out in civilian houses under the pretence of searching for weapons. Such
searches became general. "Collecting operation information, we used the form of sudden night raids,"
recalls Vitaly Tokarev, the the deputy commander in charge of policy of the special radio communication
squad that was a part of Kirovograd brigade in Baku. "We searched car parks, garages, checked cars in
fleets of taxis early in the morning Sometimes we had to go too far, to withdraw weapons from basic
military training classes, paramilitary guard, confiscate flare pots on cutters and ships" writes Oksana
Gutsalyuk.
After many years, a number of representatives of this riffraff continue to get dividends from Baku
events, each in the way he can.
There are even such deranged servicemen who glorify their "feats" in Baku on 20 January, 1990 in
poems and songs, and naturally not for free.
"Ten years ago, Captain Yurin spent this very day, 13 January, in Baku Together with other
soldiers Igor prayed to God for Yazov to give the order to set out. The songs written under the impression
of those days are performed by Igor very rarely. Just in the circle of close friends. "I believe that we form
exactly such a circle now," said the singer at his concert in Samara.
However, as a man that experienced the ordeals of service in a "flash point", Igor did not put
emphasis upon military subject in his songs.
Sniper, Bright Stars of Baku, Notes from Squad 13 and Creeping in the Field are the only songs
devoted to war performed by Igor at the concert." What a bastard a man should be to praise death of
peaceful citizens!
Igor Yurin is not alone. Olga Yegorova writes in her essay Poems and Songs of the Sniper Denisov,
"Colonel of special mission unit Vasily Nikolaevich Denisov, in the antiterrorist group Alfa since 1980,
sniper, writes poems and songs about the events in Afghanistan and Baku in January 1990. Vasily is quite
satisfied with his record album issued in 1997. Next year is the 25th anniversary of his unit and he plans
to issue a magnetic album devoted solely to the group and the events they have taken part in, Afghanistan,
Baku, Ordzhonikidze"
It is well known that killing another victim, snipers make a notch on the buttstock. We wonder if the
notches the sniper Denisov made in Baku on 20 January, 1990 will be described in his poems.
In January 1990, after the invasion of the Soviet troops in Baku, the battalion of the Soviet troops
under the command of Vadim Orlov was redeployed from Ganja to Jalilabad. Vadim Orlov declared to
the citizens of Jalilabad that he had been elected the chairman of the town executive committee (at least
it is what he said to the correspondent) and ran the show in the town for two months.

124
The activities of Soviet servicemen in Ganja and Jalilabad are well known in Azerbaijan, whereas the
eight years of service in Azerbaijan was beneficial for Vadim Orlov himself.
Here is an excerpt from Delovoye Obozreniye.
Orlov Vadim Ivanovich, born in 1953 in Nizhneturinsk, Irkutsk region, to the family of a professional
soldier. Graduated from Kiev Combined Arms School, Frunze Moscow Combined Arms Administration
Academy. Was in command of a regiment, the chief of staff of a division in Kaunas, from 1993 to 1998
commander of 104th airborne brigade. In 2001 graduated from General Staff Academy. Elected in the
House of Assembly of Ulyanovsk region in 1996. A member of State Duma of the Russian Federation
since 1999. Chairman of the People's Party of Russia regional department. Awards: For Services before
Motherland Fourth Class, Red Star, Daniil of Moscow for the construction of the Prophet Elijah temple.
We wonder what he has done in Azerbaijan to receive so many awards in the new Russia.
And finally, the most curious thing. Correspondent Tatyana Zadorozhnaya asks Vadim Orlov, "What
clothes is more comfortable to you, a general's uniform or a business suit? Who takes care of your
wardrobe?"
"I put on military uniform when very grave issues are on the agenda. I am not retired from the Armed
Forces, I am in Putin's reserve. I like uniform, I am proud of it but a civil suit still becomes a deputy.
Once I helped two Armenians, excellent tailors, leave Azerbaijan; they opened their own tailor's shop and
make clothes fit for my nonstandard figure."
In this connection, Ils etaient cinq, a French film of the fifties, comes to our mind. At the end of the
war a Petainist sets free several de Gaullists and tells them, "Don't forget about me in the new France!"
The Armenians did not forget about Mr. Orlov in the new Russia! One should think that they provide not
only clothes for him!
There were such thugs among the servicemen of the Soviet Army that should be tried for ethnic
crimes by International Court of Justice in the Hague.
The chauvinist M. Polikarpov writes in his Sacrifice, "So, on 15 July, the group of four volunteers
headed by Pretzel was redeployed near Olovo to replace the Russian group located there. We were
leaving for fifteen days. Generally speaking, our group was to consist of five persons but the "magician"
disappeared quickly. So did his name. Besides Prentzel, Troll and I, there was Denis, a painter, about
twenty-three years old. He had arrived in Bosnia several days before me. Denis had already had combat
experience restoring order in Baku in January 1990 with the intelligence company of an airborne unit. HE
HAS HIS OWN BONE TO PICK WITH THE MUSLIMS (highlighted by the author)."
The resolution of the commission says that several victims of 20 January were finished with bayonets.
It is no doubt that the thug Denis was among those who finished peaceful citizens with bayonets.
And there were a lot of such scum as Denis!
Natalya Mozgovaya writes, "Who are you?" asks a spectacled soldier guarding the entrance to
Homesh (Israel - Author). The figure of a moustached bloke in a black gangster bandana rose in front of
him out of the dark.
The picture is full with a leather sleeveless jacket exposing strong tattooed forearms and fingerless
gloves. "Help from Nagorno-Karabakh," the former commander of a special mission company Sergey
Kulikov straightens M-16 on his shoulder."
This is followed by the idle talk that it is only strength that the Arabs understand.
We can imagine what this thug had been doing in Nagorno-Karabakh!
The Soviet troops had no restraint in Baku, meanwhile the armament of the Soviet Army was being
seized in Armenia in volume. As one would expect, after the crime of Moscow, the GPU of the Soviet
Army and the Soviet mass media entered that bloody game.
Here is one of the scenes arranged by the GPU of the Soviet Army immediately after the introduction
of troops in Baku; the author witnessed it.
In one of Baku streets, engines of BMP are growling powerfully, bursts of submachine-gun fire are
heard somewhere, some people are letting out heartrending cries.
The communications officer of the Soviet Army Colonel General K. Kobets (a big thief, as it was
found out later, he was convicted in the new Russia) surrounded by some people with microphones is
standing on the armour of a BMP shouting something. Against the background of that noise and roar,
correspondents are asking him something, he is answering. An impressive picture! The author approached
one intelligent-looking (and he proved to be such) officer and asked, "What is going on?" "Can't you
see?" he grinned. "A reportage on street fights!" and he went aside. Military tension was imitated at every
turn in Baku; any everyday conflict with patrol was regarded as an attempt of armed attack. Patrols
usually strolled about the city with a soldier who had a radio transmitter; as soon as any problem emerged

125
with citizens, an alarm was sent over the radio, "To Cloud - Thunderstorm!" and several minutes later a
group of soldiers would appear who began shooting into the air at once.
These - even hard to choose a definition for them - people even had no mercy upon the memory of the
killed civilians; they used to put a submachine-gun beside the bodies and took photos, passing them for
militants in such a disgusting way.
The GPU of the Soviet Army knew its stuff! After the introduction of troops all Soviet mass media
were involved in the political provocation, and the Central Television, newspapers Izvestiya, Pravda and
Krasnaya Zvezda distinguished themselves in the general chorus. One had an impression that they were
issued by Goebbels's office, judging by the scale of the lies in their reports. Authors began to appear in
those newspapers that had never been published there before. The editor-in-chief of Izvestiya, a repeated
deputy of the USSR Supreme Council from Azerbaijan Laptev and, as became clear later, one of
Gorbachev's lackeys, turned the paper into a provocative "front leaflet" from Baku. Even a front
correspondent appeared, clearly from secret services, a certain Igor Andreyev who did his best to conceal
the truth about the events in Baku.
The republican-famous criminalist Rovshan Aliyev exposed the Goebbels-like trick used by
ideologists of the Soviet Army. Two issues of Krasnaya Zvezda were published, with one and the same
number and date, to hide the crimes, one for the USSR and another for Azerbaijan with the description of
the events in Baku.
Baku considered it as a common provocation but it was not so at all. This was a well-thought strategy.
In the late eighties, Krasnaya Zveda was the chief source of military and political information for the
Americans, with 75% references being made to that newspaper. By comparison, only 16% were made to
the main USSR newspaper, Pravda. Moscow was well aware of these figures.
On 20 January, 1990, TASS announced, "As was reported before, as a result of unlawful acts of the
extremist forces of the People's Front, anti-Soviet groups that had tried to suspend the constitutional
bodies of the Azerbaijan SSR from power, the situation in Baku became aggravated..."
On 22 January, 1990, Pravda wrote such filthy lines, "The allegations of the People's Front leaders
that there were victims among women and children as a result of the measures on state of emergency are
of explicitly provocative nature. We should repeat once again that it is an ill-intentioned lie! Its aim is to
prejudice the population against the Soviet Army and law enforcement bodies."
The powerful misinformation did its part; a Londoner interviewed in the street said on BBC, "No
sooner had they begun building a normal state than this misfortune came. Gorbachev had no choice." This
misinformed Englishman actually condemned those crushed by the Soviet tanks!
When the final figures on the victims among the civil population during the introduction of troops in
Baku became definite, the director general of TASS Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko did his best to conceal
those figures from the West.
Concerning the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku in his original programme Namedni, video tapes
of which spread afterwards all over Europe, L. Parfenov said that "the crowd in the square kept shooting
back" (?! - Author), "there is a guerilla war in Baku" (?! - Author), "terrorists brow up the television
centre in Baku." Perhaps he was right in the last statement, since it was proved that the power unit of the
television centre had been blown up by a special group from the KGB.
The author remembers well how much hope for a better future after the tragedy of 20 January, 1990
was in the reaction of Baku to Seven Days programme which told the truth about the events in Baku in
those terrible days. But the programme suddenly disappeared from broadcasting, so a remarkable
television journalist, the mighty Tikhomirov. The reason became clear many years later. As could be
expected, it was Gorbachev's doing.
Oleg Dobrodeyev, the director of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company, answers the
questions of Tatyana Malkina, "Naturally, I have been in that up till now. Speaking of driving levers that
the state can use, I cannot compare the current situation even to Gorbachev's period which is commonly
called the most liberal one today. I will never forget them closing Seven Days, where I was director and
editor-in-chief, after my business trip in Baku in January 1990. It was closed exactly after that and after
the materials we had brought from there."
Instead of assisting foreign journalists to come in Azerbaijan and to tell and show the whole world the
atrocities of the Soviet troops, the head of the Azerbaijan KGB V. Huseynov arranged a full-scale chase
for foreign journalists to please Moscow. The only welcome guests were the official central press media
and television that were lying in unison on the Central Television and in the central newspapers. The
materials of those who tried to write the truth, like Rozhnov, were not published. On 20 January of this
year French correspondents Daniel-Claude Jeanen, Dominique Dudouble, Stefan Bantura, Michel Peinard

126
were detained by the State Security Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR in Nakhchivan for the violation of
rules of entry and movement in the frontier zone.
Photojournalists of Sigma and Gamma Alain Noges and Vlastimir Nesic and employees of BBC
radiocorporation Benjamin Brown and Rory Peck were also detained.
Officers of the Azerbaijan KGB smashed all equipment of the Estonian correspondent A. Ruassar and
took away all photos.
After Suleymenov's departure, his assistant Almast Yesikov was to continue to collect documents and
evidence of eyewitnesses which Suleymenov needed. Immediately after Suleymenov's departure, on 31
January, 1990 Yestikov was arrested by the 4th department of the KGB and sent to the pre-trial prison N3
in Mardakan settlement. He was arrested in Apsheron hotel where he stayed. All his documents, camera,
film footage, personal belongings were confiscated. Poorly thought-out as it might be, democratization of
all authority bodies was going on throughout the country, whereas the leadership of the Azerbaijan B
acted like in the fifties or sixties.
After the well-known events pro-fascist elements such as Andrey Nuykin, Leonid Gozman, who had
been waiting for the chance for along time, appeared on the stage. Gozman said, "We are guilty of having
been guided by primitive instincts when choosing side in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict. We ignored
the fact that the other side is different people. My position is pro-Armenian, I apologize to the
Azerbaijani, but I cannot but agree that Azerbaijan is a whole dark power." There are different people in
any nation, including that represented by Gozman. The author for one cannot agree either that Leonid
Gozman is a bugger unless Gozman declares that himself. Over 30 anti-Azerbaijan articles were written
by the journalist Andrey Pralnikov concerning the events in the region and his impartiality is lamentable
indeed. But here is what he writes in Moscow News 4.02.1990 in his article Lull in Karabakh, "The limit
of cynicism is the fact that both the killed pogrom-makers and accidental victims of street skirmish and
chaotic shooting on 20th and the following days are buried side by side in the so-called Alley of
Shekhids." Such lines insulting the cherished and sacred memory of SHEKHIDS could be written only by
such a complete scoundrel as Andrey Pralnikov from Moscow News whose editor, Loshak, was also a
scoundrel!
D. Mishin and A. Lisitsina start up a selection of materials filled with various dirt words against the
Azerbaijan people in article We Are in Karabakh for So Many Day. It is instantly published by the mass-
media of Armenia, but it is so mean that any other newspaper publishes it, except Leningrad Smena, on
22 March, 1991. Appearance of such fascists and geeks as Leonid Gozman, Andrey Pralnikov and the
like (there were plenty of them) was not accidental. In the Soviet time they used to weight their actions
with the party line and expressed their views only in their kitchens in a low voice, hating it and at the
same time feeling animal fear. In Gorbachev's time of lawlessness they immediately used their stinking
talent in the situation when nothing threatened them already. Azerbaijan was in a difficult situation and
had no time to beat off blows from different directions. And nuykins, gozmans, pralnikovs and the like
made use of it.
And as often happens in such cases, as the further events shown, these people do not represent anyone
except for themselves. No sooner had Y. Kiselev appeared in Moscow News and given Loshak a little asy
kick in the butt than the latter instantly disappeared from the editorial staff with nobody defending him.
Concerning the activity of these gentlemen, it is a pity that there was no one in Baku to outbid those
bastards, since they cost very cheap at that time, even cheaper than prostitutes!
Leningrad documentary film makers changed their ways as well; in the Soviet time they used to shoot
films about the revolution, Lenin's places and Leningrad blockade. After changing their ways, they made
a documentary about Karabakh events A Merry Trip of Real Men where they tell with explicit sympathy
about the bloody deeds of Karabakh separatists. A film about Karabakh events was also made by the
Latvian film director Pondnieks, within the same trend but with Baltic reserve. Nevzorov's documentary
on the events does not make it clear who is to blame; so it seems that some set the USSR on fire and
others are bad at putting it out! One famous documentary film maker said once, "A good man will never
make a documentary film director." Generalization is always inconsistent but the Karabakh selection
confirms that statement! We should only add that A Merry Trip of Real Men deserves the Hague
Tribunal.
Regrettable enough, we should also sat that Vezirov's team was not particularly concerned about the
anti-Azerbaijan articles in the Soviet mass media, as they were all more concerned about another issue,
publishing anti-Aliyev articles in the Soviet mass media.

127
The start was given by the filthy slanderous article by Alkady Vaxberg in Literaturnaya Gazeta
"responses" to which came and were all immediately. Many years later it was found out that it was an
action paid from Baku.
A provocative article by H. Aliyev's fellow countryman V. Efendiyev appears in Pravda, Aliyevism,
or Lamentation over Sweet Times. After the publication of this article H. Aliyev receives the following
letter, "Dear Heydar Aliyevich! The article Aliyevism, or Lamentation over Sweet Time published in
Pravda and signed with my name is a provocation and rude fabrication I have never signed" Naturally,
Pravda never published a disclaimer. It appears in the distant Washington Post.
The organizer of that article, one H. Aliyev's favourites in the recent past, was well-known then,
which he did not hide, though.
In his tale novels that appeared in that period, Neznamsky relates the negative phenomena of the
Soviet time to Aliyev.
Before the introduction of troops in Baku, Gorbachev made a provocative phone call to Aliyev. H.
Aliyev recalls, "On 19 January, the day before the tragedy, Gorbachev called me all of a sudden. It was
our first conversation after 1987 and it passed on a higher pitch. Gorbachev said that there were disorders
in Azerbaijan and that I was to blame for them. He said that I am to blame for the fact that the Soviet
power had actually been overthrown in the republic and therefore I should have taken urgent measures to
influence the events. He threatened that if I had not done it they would have kept me in check. And they
would set things right in Azerbaijan any way On 21 January after the meeting in the permanent mission
I tried to contact Gorbachev. They did not connect me. Then I said say to Kryuchkov, Ligachev,
Yakovlev and Razumovsky. They all said that I was committing a crime. I answer it is you that are
criminals. Time will come and you will answer for everything In general, it is no wonder that they all
were against my return to Azerbaijan."
The call was nothing else but an attempt to involve Aliyev in the dirty anti-Azerbaijan business.
H. Aliyev's manly response to Gorbachev's provocation followed without delay.
On the day following the introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku, taking a great risk, Aliyev
resolutely condemned the introduction of troops at the press conference in the Azerbaijan permanent
mission and accused Gorbachev in the violation of the Constitution. On 9 February Aliyev had a meeting
with the journalist Andrey Karaulov and a Washington Post Moscow correspondent David Remnik and
gave them a detailed interview in which he repeated his accusations against Gorbachev.
Washington Post Moscow correspondent David Remnik writes concerning that press conference, "In
the late January, when Aliyev was on holiday in Barvikha, he heard of the tragedy in Baku. At the press
conference in the Azerbaijan permanent mission in Moscow Aliyev criticized Kremlin sharply for the use
of the armed forces in Baku. Excerpts from Aliyev's speech were published in the West and, more
importantly, returned to the Soviet audience through short-wave radio. "It was the first time in my life
that I spoke in protest against the establishment publicly," said Aliyev who began his career as an
operative agent of the KGB and officer and whose courage is comparable to that of the late Andrey
Sakharov." The comparison to Sakharov is not proper, since he has never been threatened by anything,
with the West defending him with might and main.
V. Huseynov says concerning the events of 20 January, "In October 1989 I met with the People's
Front leaders, the future president of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey and Etibar Mamedov. I asked them
then, "Why don't you want to follow the pattern of the people's fronts of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia? I
can seek election to the Supreme Council within the frames of the Constitution and existing laws, too."
They alleged that every country had its own peculiarities. "And generally speaking, one cannot gain
independence without shedding blood. Yes, we do know there will be victims! But those will be victims
in the name of freedom!"
"Do you assume responsibility for the future victims? Are you leading the people to bloodshed
consciously?" I exclaimed. "Yes, we believe that the more blood is shed the stronger is the unity of
courage and ideology of the nation," was their reply.
In the period from 23 to 26 January, 1990 (we do not remember the precise date), the author together
with R. Guliyev secretly came in the flat of B. Allakhverdiyev in Yasamal where Elchibey was hiding.
They first thing Elchibey said (we remember it clearly) was, "How could that happen? Was the Soviet
Empire capable of that?" Elchibey did not say any tumid words like those V. Huseynov mentions; it was a
profoundly shocked man. Another thing should be pointed out here. The future conversation made it clear
that the People's Front leader had failed to forecast the further events in the republic, there was a total
discrepancy in opinions.

128
In this connection we recall another incident related to Elchibey. One day after the January events, R.
Guliyev came to the author's well into the night and, well aware of the latter's friendly relations, said that
it was necessary to find the public prosecutor general I. Ismaylov urgently, as Elchibey might be arrested
in the morning.
Ismayklov was awaken and said that he was aware of those intentions but neither he nor the public
prosecutor of Baku would authorize Elchibey's arrest.
And we recall with a sore heart R. Guliyev, the speaker of the parliament already, said to Elchibey
publicly, "You wretched, even your relatives did not vote for you at the presidential election!"
There can be no life-time friends in politics, indeed, but only life-time interests which change, too,
though!"
Olzhas Suleymenov writes, "I fell in love with Azerbaijan long ago. I saw this country in the
seventies, in the early eighties, it was flourishing and poetically excited. Anniversaries of Nizami, Fizuli,
Days of Soviet Literature All those trips took place in summer and therefore the image of that land is
rich green, flowers, fountains, pomegranate champagne, tanned friendly faces. I saw winter in Baku only
once. In the black January of 1990. Motor-cars crushed by tanks together with people"
Azerbaijan will always remember that Olzhas Suleymenov arrived in Baku on 22 January, 1990, sick,
with a fever, to show moral support which Baku needed most.
Azerbaijan should always remember that one of the few who raised their voice in defence of
Azerbaijan in the winter 1990 was Yulian Semenov.
In 1998 Ochag newspaper was published in Tallinn which had a certain part to play in the truthful
estimate of the events in Azerbaijan. When the Azerbaijani arranged a march in Tallinn in protest against
the introduction of troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990 and the authorities tried to break it up, the
incumbent President of Estonia Arnold Ruytel rose to defend the Azerbaijani.
It should be necessarily mentioned that there were officers both in the KGB and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan who opposed the occupation forces without fear of being brought to
responsibility by the military prosecutor's office.
One of the officers told the USSR minister of internal affairs Lieutenant General Vadim Bakatin at
the protest march of the Ministry of Internal Affairs employees, "As the senior investigator, I will arrest
you since you shed the blood of my people."
The famous composer, deputy of the USSR Supreme Council Arif Melikov showed operational
efficiency and courage in the January events.
We recall him entering a discussion with Gorbachev while most of other deputies preferred to keep
silent. He passed the materials on the January events by the phone from Baku to Baltimore Sun (the
USA), El Pais (Spain) and a number of other publications, and also to the English radio on 26 January,
1990.
According to eyewitnesses, People's Artist of the USSR Rashid Beybutov also entered a tough
discussion with Gorbachev shortly before the January events, as if anticipating the disaster.
A. Gajiyeva writes, "The events were already unfolding in Baku, tanks were standing by the theatre.
On 1 December, 1988 Gorbachev gathered members of parliamentary commissions of Azerbaijan and
Armenia, deputies to discuss Karabakh issue. At that meeting Rashid Beybutov said to Gorbachev, "I
have to go through a chain of tanks to get into my theatre." Gorbachev answered, "But these are our
tanks!" Rashid says, "These are not our tanks, these are your tanks! Karabakh issue must be solved now
and immediately, otherwise blood will be shed!" Rashid was telling later, "My mind was kind of jammed
at that moment. I repeated several times on end, "Otherwise blood will be shed!" As if someone was
making me say these words" When he came back to Baku he was very sad and said once, "They will
put me out of their way."
Rashid Beybutov loved Karabakh ardently. "They call me everywhere a merry boy from Karabakh,"
it was one of his favourite songs!
It is not accidental that those who were in power then and devotedly looked into the eyes of
Gorbachev and Vezirov keeping silence about their deeds continue to use their position in power even
today to take revenge upon Beybutov's family.
In January 1991, in the year of the bloody events, the writer Anar characterized Gorbachev as
follows, "During my meetings with Gorbachev I found him a versatile, clever and ingenious politician.
He is undoubtedly not a cruel person by nature. But he so to say knows on which side his bread is
buttered and it is not easy to guess his true intentions I say again, not being a cruel person, to my
opinion, he sometimes justifies if not authorizes rather brutal and bloody actions (Tbilisi, Baku,
Lithuania). President needs the army now more than ever and I think he can justify any of its actions,

129
even such ones he would not approve as a man and not as a politician. Naturally, human life is not a trifle
for him but at the same time it all is not an inappropriate price for him as a politician to achieve some
aim." In our time of pluralism of opinion, such opinion has right to exist, too.
Azerbaijan documentary film makers headed by R. Fataliyev accomplished, we dare to say, a real feat
those days when they risked their lives to film the bloody events of 20 January, 1990.
The author has seen many video tapes made by them.
A courageous deed was made by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme
Council E. Kafarova who brought a video tape of the bloody events in Baku in her bag to Moscow where
it was demonstrated to representatives of the world mass media.
Doctors of Azerbaijan proved to be loyal to Hippocratic Oath; they risked their lives to save wounded
civilians.
There have always been persons in Russia, too, who expressed their opinion that differed from that of
the authorities.
The famous Moscow film director Stanislav Govorukhin wrote in his article A Rehearsal? in Moscow
News, 18 February, 1990, "If the troops entered the city not to defend it, then why? Two millions of Baku
citizens understood it as follows. The tanks entered the city to punish the people demanding sovereignty.
And the punishment would be exemplary to teach the other republic not to try it. Well, in that case, the
military expedition in Baku proved clearly that an empire can be held up with bayonets even today."
A fragment of the statement of independent experts of the public military organization "Shield" says,
"To the Chief Military Prosecutor Katusev A.V. In the city of Baku on 19-25 January, 1990 a military
crime was committed under the general guidance of the minister of defence Yazov. We ask You to
institute criminal proceedings against the guilty ones."
"The USSR armed forces were used in Baku not with the purpose of defence against external
aggression but against the people. The punitive operation is a prearranged slaughter of innocent people
with application of means of warfare banned by the international law. The USSR minister of defence,
who headed the operation and allowed the possibility of committing military crimes by the army
personnel, thereby committed a military crime that falls within Clause 6 of the International Military
Tribunal, as well as clauses of the Azerbaijan SSR Criminal Code concerning crimes against person
(Section 3). Criminal cases are to be initiated against other persons from among the army staff that
committed military crimes. Material damage inflicted on the citizens of Baku, its institutions and
organizations is to be repaired by the USSR Ministry of Defence. They same sources are to pay indemnity
and benefits to the families of the victims, medical treatment and rehabilitation of the wounded and
disabled."
A. Yevstigneyev,
Captain 1st rank of reserve,
Candidate of Science;
G. Melkov,
Captain 2nd rank of reserve,
Candidate of Law;
B. Murasov,
Lieutenant Colonel of reserve
(Moscow News,
N32, 12 August, 1990)
After the bloody introduction of troops in Baku, the "grounding" of that act appeared. This is how
Gorbachev "grounds" the introduction of troops in Baku, "Attacks on military servicemen, weapons
depots, law enforcement bodies became more frequent. These events took a particularly dramatic form in
Baku, pogroms, murders, banishment of innocent people from their homes and the republic.
The activity of extremist forces in Azerbaijan was becoming more and more antistate,
anticonstitutional and antinational.
Lawful authority bodies were forcibly removed from office in a number of regions, administration
structures were wrecked.
Engineering facilities were destroyed along hundreds of kilometers of the state border. The mission of
a forcible assumption of power in the republic was actually no secret.
It could not go on. Alongside with profound compassion for the innocent victims, fury and
indignation at the criminal actions, brutal violence and vandalism, violation of the law were rising in the
country.

130
The Soviet people fairly demanded that the leadership of the country take resolute measures to restore
law and order and ensure safety of people's lives.
As you already know, by the resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council state of
emergency was declared in Baku and the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Soviet Army
entered the city.
They captured key objects, took state institutions under control, resolute measures are being taken
against the pogrom-makers, organizers and instigators of the disorders. Fire arms and ammunition are
confiscated from criminals.
To my deep regret, there are victims. Military units were met with fire by the terrorists in some places
and had to use weapons in response.
Disaster came into someone's house today. I present my sincere condolences to those families.
The duty of the state is to put a stop to the lawlessness and inhumanity, to suppress firmly the
criminal actions of the extremists who lost human face and are ready to make sacrifice for the sake of
their personal ambitions, vested interests and striving after power.
The duty of the state is to return peace and safety to the people, to give the peoples of both republics
the opportunity to develop freely and democratically, work and live safely, raise children.
The soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army and internal troops perform their duty defending the
USSR Constitution and Law (several years later the same "duty" in relation to civilians will be performed
by the Russian troops in Chechnya. - Author).
The leadership hopes that the measures taken will be understood and supported by all peoples of our
country."
Does he not remind you Goebbels who grounded the attack on another country in the same way,
perverting all facts? The Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl had his reasons to compare Gorbachev to
Goebbels in his interview to Newsweek and argued his comparison quite
clearly. Gorbachev raised no public diplomatic scandal and "swallowed" it
quietly.
"People lie freely with their mouths but the grimaces they make at it
still tell the truth," Nietzsche wrote. But it was about people, not
Gorbachev. Speaking on the Central Television about the events of 20
January, 1990 in Baku, he lied both with his mouth and face.
This man lies both about important and small things!
In his appearance on NTV on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Victory, he tells his liveliest
recollection of those years, "I worked since the age of thirteen. We ploughed on cows. I will never forget
the sight, the cows were crying!" And here he lies again, not about cows which were probably crying,
indeed, most likely because of some ocular disease, but about the liveliest recollection of the war year!
V. Boldim writes, "Mikhail Sergeyevich often recollected the difficult war years but did not much
like to tell that the occupants that had stayed in their home made them cook for them and Mikhail had had
to pluck geese and chicken for Hitlerites' table for hours. Gorbachev did not tell about the atrocities of the
fascists but the moment when a Kalmuck that had been cooperating with the Germans had beaten him
with a whip became etched in his memory. He often recalled that unfriendly act towards the future
president of the USSR." Gorbachev's liveliest recollection was those years was that whip and not cows,
since a lash is a much more down-to-earth that cows' tears!
Gorbachev used to say that he did not serve in the Soviet Army and lied again! "He was the director
of provision store," his namesake Galkin tells. "Exactly, I am not confusing anything. It is impossible to
confuse Probably this is why his military service has always been hushed. He was ashamed. For he
(Gorbachev - Author) did not perform exploits but was in charge of cereals, canned food and sausage,"
writes Moskovsky Komsomolets, 28 June, 2004.
S.I. Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language says, "Terror - physical violence up to physical
destruction, towards political opponents."
Gorbachev acted like a true terrorist that did not retreat before blood of innocent people on 20
January, 1990 in Baku to hold political power, to preserve the USSR. He acted like a follower of Lenin
and Hitler. "Terror is a means of conviction," Lenin said. "Terror is the most efficient political means,"
said Hitler.
According to the common confession of various political forces in Baku, the chief ideologist and
performer of the January action in Baku was Yevgeny Primakov.
Primakov, another Gorbachev's closest associate at that time, writes in regard to the January events,
"In connection with the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation is Azerbaijan became sharply

131
aggravated in summer 1989. On 16 July the foundation conference of the People's Front of Azerbaijan
was held; the latter skillfully used the resentment among the people masses and was openly laying hands
on power both in the capital and in the periphery, establishing its own bodies of administration"
after the election you have only one step to the separation. We cannot and will not allow that
happen"
Those were terrible days. Over a hundred Azerbaijanis, mainly militants, were killed at the
introduction of troops, but there were also victims among the civilians when the troops fired back to the
windows out of which bullets came. The army cased in armour lost 38 people, too."
The well-known expression is relevant here, "He lies like an eyewitness."
Here are the results of Gorbachev's barbaric introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku on 20 January,
1990.
Picture 4 gives the scheme of the invasion of the Soviet troops in Baku.
Here is an extract from the resolution of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Council commission on
the investigation of circumstances and causes of the tragic events related to the introduction of the Soviet
troops in Baku on 19-20 January, 1990.
"On the night of 20 January, on the basis of the resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Council signed by M.S. Gorbachev, introduction of troops was carried out and state of emergency was
declared in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku.
The resolution was passed in violation of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR, Constitution of the
USSR and international law standards.

The introduction of troops in Baku was accompanied by mass acts of violence on the part of the
military, as a result of which hundreds of civilians were killed, wounded and illegally subjected to
repression, heavy damage was inflicted on the state, public and personal property. In its brutality, this
criminal act outstripped actions of the troops in Tbilisi (April, 1989), in Vilnius (January, 1991) and is
one of shameful pages of the Soviet history, such as intrusion into Hungary in 1956, into Czechoslovakia
in 1968.
Over 2,000 written statements, hundreds of spoken messages have been submitted to the commission.
To verify them, over 2,500 persons have been interrogated, over 250 examinations of scenes of actions
and objects, 286 ballistic, automatic technical, merchandising, engineering examinations have been
carried out, 94 certificates on forensic medical examination of corpses and also the conclusion of military
experts have been received, a considerable quantity of audio and video data has been collected.
2,517 inquiries have been made in various state, administrative and law bodies, as well as public
organizations and military department of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR. The inquiries made in the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council and the CPSU Central Committee remained without response.
On the basis of the starting material, the commission prepared the statement on the preliminary results
of its work approved on 11 February, 1990, at the meeting of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR
Supreme Council where the flagrant violation of Clause 119 Item 14 of the USSR Constitution on the part
of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council expressed in the declaration of state of emergency in
Baku without the consent of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan was discussed; the issue was raised
concerning personal responsibility of the persons that had authorized this unlawful resolution and
performed the direct guidance of the introduction of troops in Baku allowing use of antihuman, brutal
methods that had led to tragic consequences; the demand was voiced for the formation of a deputy
commission of the USSR Supreme Council on the given event.
The commission established the following.
1. The situation in the republic on the eve of the events.
The main reason of the sharp aggravation of the social and political situation was the activization of
Armenian nationalists in NKAO and Armenia with the purpose of separation of NKAO from the republic
which violated the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Republic and its territorial integrity. The highest bodies
of the state power of the USSR and the republic, as the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Soviet
republic, did not show firmness, resolution and consistence in performance of their constitutional
responsibilities. It shattered confidence of the Azerbaijan people in the governing bodies and led in 1988
to the formation of a mass people movement to protect the territorial integrity of the republic and its
sovereignty.
The purposeful anti-Azerbaijan activity of the Committee of Special Administration of NKAO
headed A. Volsky furthered the radicalization of the people movement. The puppet leadership of the

132
Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee represented by A. Vezirov and V. Polyanichko did not
manage and did not wish to mobilize the population and all forces to defend national interests.
On 19 January the USSR Supreme Council adopted the disastrous resolution "On the declaration of
state of emergency in Baku". The population was not notified of the planned use of troops and of the
beginning of the regime in advance. State of emergency was put into operation almost immediately, at
12.00 a.m. on 20 January, 1990. At 7.27 p.m. on 19 January Azerbaijan television was already disabled.
At 12.20 a.m. 9 citizens were killed by the military. The reservists and servicemen of Armenian
nationality were particularly notable for their brutality. Only at 7.00 a.m. 20 January, after the barbaric
intrusion into the city, killing all peaceful people that had come along, crushing transport vehicles, firing
buildings, ambulances, the military authorities declared state of emergency on the radio.
2. The consequences of unlawful actions of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the KGB of the USSR in Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan.
By the moment state of emergency was declared to the population 82 people had been killed and 20
fatally wounded (all deceased in hospitals) by the military. In the following days, 21 people were killed in
Baku, 8 people were killed in Neftechala where no state of emergency had been declared and in
Lenkoran. 131 people were killed in total in January 1990 as a result of the unlawful introduction of
troops. Only 42 people of them were participants of pickets, 9 people were killed at the attempt to render
medical aid to the wounded after the breach of blockade, 6 people were killed in motor-cars during
transportation of the wounded to medical institutions (including ambulances), 17 were killed as a result of
firing upon motor-cars and city transport in other parts of the city. Those people did not know about the
state of emergency, went on their personal affairs. 7 citizens were killed in their houses and flats by
bullets when the military fired upon dwelling houses on their way, 19 people were killed near their houses
when they went out to learn what was going on in the city. Facts of death of 5 people have not been
established.
82 of the examined 92 bodies had gunshot wounds, in 9 cases injuries inflicted by blunt objects, in 2
cases injuries inflicted by cut and thrust objects, in 1 case strangling with a loop.
By the positions of exit perforations in the body, it has been established that in 44 of 82 cases of
gunshot wounds shots were made from behind. Wounds in the head - 29, in the body - 39, in the limbs -
4, in different areas of the body all at once - 10 cases. In all 9 cases of injuries inflicted by blunt objects it
has been established that military vehicles rolled over the bodies with caterpillar tracks; one body was
crushed into a mash, 2 people could not be identified.
Out of 131 killed: male - 124, female - 7. Males - 7 under ages; married ones left 159 orphans;
workers - 78, employees - 24, students of colleges - 12, student of vocational schools - 2, schoolchildren -
4, pensioners - 3, temporarily unemployed - 6. By nationality: Azerbaijani - 117, Russian - 6, Jew - 3,
Tartar - 7; 7 people were killed in the execution of official duty: 5 officers of bodies of internal affairs, 2
ambulance personnel. Specialists have established that bullet produced particularly damaging effect
(MZV-13, displaced centre of gravity increasing its damaging effect).
In the regions of Azerbaijan 744 people were wounded. 460 of them underwent forensic medical
examinations, among them 375 on the basis of the resolution of the investigating group of the USSR
public prosecutor's office, the rest at the suit of the commission and the injured themselves. The most
wounds are gunshot. 176 people, including 21 women, were registered as disabled as a result of the
wounds.
The military destroyed and damaged about 200 houses and flats, 88 personal motor-cars, fire emerged
in 5 flats and property was destroyed with incendiary bullets.
3. Conclusions and suggestions.
1. Responsible for the criminal actions of the Soviet troops in Azerbaijan are M. Gorbachev, Y.
Pimakov, A. Ghirenko, D. Yazov, V. Kryuchkov, V. Bakatin, V. Varennikov and other high ranking
officials of the political and military bodies of the former Soviet Union.
2. The internal reasons of the tragedy were the inability to realize the objective and irreversible nature
of the national liberation processes and democratic changes in Azerbaijan, isolation from the mass people
movement on the part of the leadership of the republic. The direct liability for this rests with A. Vezirov,
V. Polyanichko. The moral responsibility rests with E. Kafarova, A. Mutalibov, I. Ismaylov, A.
Mamedov, V. Huseynov. The opposition bears political and moral responsibility: N. Panakhov, E.
Mamedov, R. Gaziyev and others. They were aware of the possibility of introduction of troops but took
no appropriate warning measures to remove the people from the line of march of the troops.

LIST OF DEATHS IN BAKU ON THE NIGHT OF 20 JANUARY, 1990,

133
ACCORDING TO THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH OF THE
AZERBAIJAN SSR (according to the Ministry of Public Health of Azerbaijan)
N Name Gend Year Nationalit Cause of
er of birth y death
1 Abbasova Farida femal 1952 Azerbaija Wound in the
Nariman gizi e ni area of chest

2 Abdullayev Zakhid male 1959 Azerbaija Gunshot


Abdulla oglu ni wound left side of
the head
3 Agaverdiyev Aslan male 1952 -"- Gunshot
Aliakram oglu wound in the area
of stomach
4 Agakishiyev Shakir male 1960 -"- Gunshot
Khandash oglu wound in the area
of chest and
stomach
5 Alimov Ramiz male 1958 Tartar Gunshot
Kharisovich wound in the area
of left side of
chest
6 Allakhverdiyev male 1967 Azerbaija Gunshot
Ruslan Kamil oglu ni wound in the area
of chest
7 Babayev Fuad male 1967 -"- Gunshot
Yaver oglu wound in the neck
8 Babayev Isabala Ali male 1967 Azerbaija Gunshot
oglu ni wound in the head
9 Bakhshiyev Elchin male 1965 -"- Gunshot
Mirza oglu wound in the area
of chest and
stomach
1 Bessantina Vera femal 1973 Jew Gunshot
0 Lvovna e wound in the area
of stomach
1 Bogdanov Valery male 1960 Russian Wound in the
1 Zakirovich neck and chest
1 Buniat-zadeh Ulvi male 1960 Azerbaija Gunshot
2 Yusif oglu ni wound in the head
1 Garayev Ilgar male 1959 -"- Gunshot
3 Alioglu wound in the area
of the head
1 Gasimov Abbas male 1966 -"- Gunshot
4 Mamed oglu wound in the
waist
1 Gasimov Yusif male 1948 -"- Gunshot
5 Ibrahim oglu wound in the head
1 Geybullayev Elchin male 1968 Azerbaija Gunshot

134
6 Suyaddin oglu ni wound in the area
of the left side of
stomach
1 Guliyev Sakhavat male 1940 -"- Gunshot
7 Balay oglu wound in chest
1 Gojamanov Aliyusif male 1933 -"- Gunshot
8 Bilal oglu wound in the area
of chest
1 Abulfazov Mirjalal male 1955 -"- Traumatic
9 Mirsalekh oglu shock, right side
ribs and shoulder
blade fracture
2 Azizov Khabil male 1968 -"- Numerous
0 Kommuvar oglu head and chest
fractures (APC)
2 Alekperov Azer male 1967 -"- Blunt gunshot
1 Nasib oglu wound in the neck
2 Aleskerov Zaur male 1969 -"- Blunt gunshot
2 Tasim oglu wound in the head
2 Aliyev Bayram male 1950 -"- Asphyxia,
3 Madat oglu chest and stomach
compression, ribs
fractures
2 Alizadeh Faik male 1953 -"- Perforating
4 Abdulhuseyn oglu gunshot wound in
the stomach
2 Akhmedov Ilgar male 1965 -"- Gunshot
5 Gumbat oglu wound and left
eye aperture in
the head
2 Zulalov Isfandiyar male 1963 -"- Gunshot
6 Aghil oglu wound in the area
of right temple
2 Ibrahimov Ilgar male 1976 -"- Gunshot
7 Rashid oglu wound in the
chest
2 Isayev Rauf male 1963 -"- Gunshot
8 Sultanmajid oglu wound in the
forehead
2 Isayev Fakhraddim male 1963 -"- Gunshot
9 Khudu oglu wound in the area
of chest
3 Ismaylov Tofik male 1956 -"- Gunshot
0 Babakhan oglu wound in the area
of chest
3 Israilov Aganazar male 1960 -"- Gunshot
1 Araz oglu wound in the head
3 Yusubov Oleg male 1944 Azerbaija Gunshot
2 Kerimovich ni wounds in the

135
chest and stomach
3 Kazimov Aflatun male 1958 -"- Gunshot
3 Gashim oglu wounds in the
chest and stomach
3 Kerimov Oktay male 1962 -"- Gunshot
4 Eyvaz oglu wound in the
front of the
stomach
3 Mamedova Larisa femal 1975 Azerbaija Gunshot
5 Farman gizi e ni wound in the area
of chest
3 Mamedov Vidadi male 1937 Azerbaija Gunshot
6 Uzeyir oglu ni wound in the
neck, grave blood
loss
3 Mamedov Ibrahim male 1961 -"- Blunt trauma
7 Behbud oglu of hip bones and
limbs
3 Mamedov Mamed male 1959 -"- Gunshot
8 Yarmamed oglu wounds in the
head and body
3 Muradov Mehman male 1961 -"- Perforating
9 Asad oglu gunshot wound in
the chest
4 Mustafayev Mahir male 1968 -"- Gunshot
0 Vaghif oglu wound in the left
side of chest
4 Nasibov Allakhyar male 1952 -"- Blunt gunshot
1 Iskender oglu wound in the
chest and left arm
4 Nasirov Yanver male 1957 -"- Blunt gunshot
2 Shirali oglu wound in the
chest
4 Nischenko Andrey male 1972 Russian Stab and cut
3 Alexandrovich wound in the area
of the front of the
neck
4 Poladi Salekh male 1968 Azerbaija Gunshot
4 Aligulu oglu ni wound in the head
4 Salmanov male 1963 -"- Gunshot
5 Sharafaddim Muzaffar wound in the head
oglu
4 Mamedov Jabrayil male 1939 -"- Gunshot
6 Huseynkhan oglu wound in the
chest
4 Gasanov Ali male 1954 -"- Perforating
7 Khudaverdi oglu gunshot wound in
the head
4 Gasanov Mehman male 1964 Azerbaija Gunshot

136
8 Ibrahim oglu ni wounds in the
chest, stomach
and right arm
4 Gasanov Saib Nasib male 1949 -"- Blunt gunshot
9 oglu wound in the head
5 Gashimov Israfil male 1964 -"- Gunshot
0 Agababa oglu wound in the
stomach
5 Huseynov male 1952 -"- Numerous
1 Alimardan Abil oglu perforating
gunshot wounds
5 Huseynov Nariman male 1975 -"- Numerous
2 Veli oglu gunshot wounds
in the area of
chest
5 Aliyev Zakhid male 1963 -"- Gunshot
3 Bayram oglu wounds in the
right hip
5 Rustamov Rovshan male 1961 -"- Numerous
4 Mamed oglu gunshot wounds
in the area of the
entire body
5 Mirzoyev Elchin male 1961 -"- Numerous
5 Huseyngulu oglu gunshot wounds
5 Tokarev Vladimir male 1953 Russian Gunshot
6 Ivanovich wound in the
trachea
5 Markhevka male 1958 -"- Gunshot
7 Alexander Vitalyevich wound in the
chest
5 Abilgasanov Ilgar male 1967 Azerbaija Gunshot
8 Yusif oglu ni wound in the
stomach
5 Ismailov Rashid male 1959 -"- Gunshot
9 Islam oglu wound in the
stomach
6 Eminov Vafadar male 1965 -"- Gunshot
0 Osman oglu wound in the
stomach
6 Aliyev Namik male 1965 -"- Gunshot
1 Kamil oglu wound in the
stomach
6 Mamedov Sakhavat male -"-
2
6 Nasibov Allakhyar male 1952 -"-
3 Iskender oglu
6 Aliyev Zabulla male 1946
4 Kheyrulla oglu

137
6 Agahuseynov male 32 -"-
5 Agagasan
6 Yesemchuk Boris B. male 47 Russian
6 years
6 Abbaskuliyev Sabir male Azerbaija
7 Rzagulu oglu ni
6 Mirzoyev Vaghif male Azerbaija
8 Samed oglu ni
6 Gayibov Alesker male -"-
9 Yusif oglu
7 Babayev Shamil male -"-
0 Samed oglu
7 Babayeva Suriya femal Azerbaija
1 Latif gizi e ni
7 Khanmamedov male 1975 Azerbaija
2 Baba Makhmud oglu ni
7 Khanmamedov male 1939 -"-
3 Baba Magomed oglu
7 Guliyev male 1960 -"-
4 Movlanverdi Aliverdi
oglu
7 Mamedov Ibish male 1961 -"-
5 Behbud oglu
7 Oktay, Medical male 22- -"-
6 Institute student 25 years
7 Gasanov Muzafar male 1939 -"-
7 Gazanfar oglu
7 Mirzoyev Azad male 29 -"-
8 Aliheydar oglu years
7 Ismaylov Javad male 28 -"-
9 Yusif oglu years
8 Aliyev Khalgai male 1969 -"-
0 Yusif oglu
8 Moyerovich Yan male 1961 Jew
1 Maximovich
8 Atakishiyev male 1961 Azerbaija
2 Bakhruz Tofig oglu ni
8 Mamedov Eldar male 1966 -"-
3 Zeynal oglu
8 Allakhverdiyev male 1962 -"-
4 Ilham Ajar oglu
8 Rzaguliyev Sabir male 1969 -"-
5 Rzagulu oglu
8 Rzayev Azad male -"-
6 Allakhverdi oglu
8 Isayev Mushfig male -"-

138
7 Agali oglu
8 Kuliyev Vidadi male 5th -"- -"-
9 Vaghif oglu year
student
9 Gajiyev Mubariz male 38 -"-
0 Magamed oglu years
1952
9 Orujiyev male -"-
1 Shamsaddin Abdulgasan
oglu
9 Hamidov Izzat male 1930 -"-
2 Atakishi oglu
9 Javanshir Ilkin male 1933 -"-
3 Zulfugar oglu
9 Novruzov Tofig male 1935 -"-
4 Heydar oglu
9 Ismaylov Ramiz male 1949 -"-
5 Islam oglu
9 Abdulgasanov Ilgar male -"-
6
9 Yefimovich Boris male 1954 Jew
7 Vasilyevich

UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS
9 Girl, 16 years
8
9 Male, 25-30 years Numerous
9 gunshot wounds
in the left side of
the stomach
1 Male, 23-30 years Gunshot
00 (unidentified) wound in the head
1 Male, 25-30 years Severe injury
01 (unidentified)
1 Male, 25-28 years Gunshot
02 (unidentified) wounds in the
back side of the
chest
1 Upper part of a right Unknown
03 arm
1 Male, 35-45 years -"- Gunshot
04 (unidentified) wounds in the
head and body
1 Male, 35-45 years -"- Gunshot
05 (unidentified) wounds in the
head and body
1 Babayev Rahim male 197 -"-

139
06 Vaghif oglu 0
1 Corpse of an
07 unidentified male,
nearly 60 years
"Kill them all, God will recognise His own," Papal legate Amalrich answered in 1209 when crusaders
asked how to distinguish Catholics from Cathars.
In the course the well-known events in Berlin on 17 June, 1953, when a real threat of a third world
war emerged, from 35 to 70 people (according to different sources) were killed dur-ing the introduction of
the Soviet troops.
The introduction of troops in Baku turned out to be more bloody and brutal than that in
Czechoslovakia, when 80 people were killed and 722 wounded.
Baku "record" number of victims in the introduction of troops is an "achievement" of Gor-bachev.
Le Monde correspondent in Moscow Bernard Guetta wrote about the tears in the eyes of the General
Secretary M. Gorbachev looking at children bodies in Spitak.
However, he would not notice those he had killed in Baku!
Then I answered to my friend,
"Wind, you can make trees bend

you ascend and you descend,


you have seen so much, I thought
There's one place you've never been to.
It's Baku you haven't seen!
If you've never seen Baku,
all you've seen before is nought!"

Robert Rozhdestvensky
If You've Never Seen Baku

If only had Robert Rozhdestvensky seen Baku on 21 January, 1990! He might have responded
somehow. It is hard to believe, though!
In connection with the tragic events of 20 January, 1990, we recall a scene from the immortal film by
G. Chukhray The Forty-First. The heroine (I. Izvitskaya) and the hero (O. Strizhenov) hold a keen
political discussion. And all of a sudden, the heroine gives the hero a slap in the face. First reaction of the
hero was pain, bewilderment, astonishment, since nothing had pointed to it, and second, now more
intelligent, was hatred.
Something like that could be observed in Baku. Gorbachev's barbaric blow was so unexpected that
for the first moment people could not believe what had just happened. Everything seemed to be a terrible
nightmare, for Gorbachev was striking a blow on the offended party! Then the realization of Gorbachev's
deeds came and was followed by hatred. Unlike the hero of the film, the Azerbaijan people will keep
hatred for the USSR and its last leaders headed by M. Gorbachev for ever.
Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote on 2 June, 1990, "After the introduction of troops in Baku and
declaration of state of emergency there, the public opinion poll showed that 70% of Bakuvians supported
the secession of the republic from the Soviet Union and only 10% wanted Azerbaijan to remain a Soviet
republic."
One of Azerbaijan's oldest oil workers told me with profound sorrow, "From September 1941 and till
the end of 1942 I lived in a small hut at Balakhany oil field (outside Baku) and hardly went home. In my
section of the field half of operating wells were constantly blowing out and I was afraid of leaving them
even for a short time - the chokes wore out quickly because of appearanceof significant amounts of sand
and an accident could happen at any moment. Sometimes it seemed to me, especially at night, that I was
going mad, for I began talking to the wells, "Some more, my darling, some more oil, our Red Army needs
it, the Soviet people needs it". Little did I know then how the Soviet people, the Red Army would respond
to me and my land on January 20, 1990. What that jerk Gorbachev was doing when we gave everything
for the victory?" "Plucking hens for fascists," I answered. Annoyed, he looked at me thinking I was
joking. When I explained that this is common knowledge, he said just two words in Azerbaijani, "Sozum
yoxdur!" (I have nothing more to say) and said no more on the subject.

140
Gorbachev's meanness and brutality towards the Azerbaijan people can be seen in the fact that the
introduction of troops against civilians after the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was not
considered a tool of preserving the existing regime, it was a different time. Gorbachev made an
"exception" for Baku. Primakov recalls, "I was at the meeting in Politburo where Gorbachev told that
Ceausescu, writhing in hysterics (it had happened when Warsaw Treaty still had existed), made a request
to bring in troops in Romania immediately. But it was not 1968 marked by the tank columns march on
Prague but 1990 and everything was confined only to informing the higher Soviet leadership on
Ceausescu's appeal; nobody of the present even asked himself about the possibility of military
interference in Romania."
In case of Baku, the situation was quite the reverse. Nobody of Gorbachev's circle even asked himself
about the efficiency of such rogue action, though it was 1990.
Even Primakov himself, when asked, "You said that policy should be more active. What does it mean
in respect to the countries of the Central Europe, Poland in particular? What kind of activity is implied?"
answers, "No tanks, certainly. If you have doubts of such kind you should not worry, Russia is not going
to do that."
These two facts are extremely informative indicating the attitude of these gentlemen to identical
events but for different peoples!
What other facts proving the evident attitude of these, not misters yet but not comrades already,
Gorbachev and Primakov towards Baku and the Azerbaijan people do we need?
"Birds have gone away!" A. Vezirov said with emotion when visiting one of the regions of
Azerbaijan shortly before the January events, hinting to the abundance of pesticides in Azerbaijan. In
continuation of "bird" matter, let us add that instead of harmless birds "vultures have flown in!"
In 1968 when Soviet tanks entered Prague, Czechs were chanting, "Lenin, wake up, Brezhnev has
gone insane!" They still believed Lenin. After Soviet tanks rushed in Baku sowing death and destruction,
people in Azerbaijan did not already believe anyone and anything that was Soviet.
In his book Diary of the Aide of the USSR President A.S. Chernyayev writes, "21 January, 1990. By
the way, Lenin's death date... But it does not look like it. Yesterday morning, the situation in Azerbaijan
was SECRETLY (highlighted by the author) discussed in Politburo. At the same time the decision was
made to hold the party congress in July." The details of that "Last Supper" will surely sooner or later
become known to the Azerbaijan people.
But one thing is clear even today. They were undoubtedly discussing ways to hide the committed
crime and the truth from the international community.
As one would expect, Gorbachev's action was supported by many major Western mass media and
politicians.
Below are the most typical statements of political figures, representatives of international
organizations, mass media about the situation in Azerbaijan (from 18 to 28 January), i.e. the time
immediately before the introduction of troops in Baku and the time after it. The range of these statements
fluctuates from the firm disapproval of the introduction of troops in Turkey to supporting Gorbachev and
more reserved position.
Washington Post (USA), 18 January, 1990 "The reaction of the White House to Gorbachev's
resolutions unambiguously demonstrates that the American point of view of Moscow's troubles had
undergone some evolution and is now notable for tolerance and diplomatic tact. "We do understand the
necessity of restoring order in the situation when order is disturbed," said the spokeswoman of the White
House Marlin Fitzwater.
Canberra Times (Australia), 18 January. "Probably more than in any other part of the Soviet Union,
the ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan reveals the hopelessness of uniting within the frames of one empire
peoples with such racial, religious and cultural differences, and probably, Azerbaijan more than anything
else is an illustration of the difficulties Gorbachev faces in his attempt to preserve that empire."
New York Times (USA), 19 January. "This decision of the Soviet leadership taken after 50 people,
according to our information, had been killed during the clashes between the Azerbaijani and the
Armenians, was firmly approved by various representatives of the Soviet society from different regions of
the country polled at the bus stop by the central air terminal where they were leaving the city or arriving.
..But the situation in Azerbaijan became so dangerous that Gorbachev had no choice but to give the
order to bring troops in that region."
New York Times (USA), 22 January. "Sending troops to restore order in the southern Soviet
republic Azerbaijan, President Mikhail Gorbachev got involved in a prolonged occupation which, his
supporters are afraid, can become his home Afghanistan.

141
Moscow will probably manage to contain the events in Azerbaijan but it will be difficult to steer
this republic, especially because the still existing People's Front of Azerbaijan promises to mobilize the
gloomy people to mass strikes and civil disobedience actions. Even now, the disorders in the southern
republics affect adversely the Soviet economy noted for a high degree of planning and specialization.
The turmoil in Azerbaijan might become an effective means of mobilization of Russian nationalists
which are already talking with growing anxiety about the danger of being absorbed by the rapidly
increasing and menacing Muslim population in their own country."
BBC correspondent M. Saxsmith (London), 19 January. "According to the editorial in Sunday
Express, "frankly speaking, Gorbachev had no choice except sending troops. But, as Great Britain in
Northern Ireland, he can possibly find that it is easier to bring in troops than to withdraw them." Sunday
Telegraph calls Transcaucasia "Soviet Lebanon".
Osservatore Romano (Vatican). "Fierce centralized political, economic, cultural and linguistic
suppression on the part of Moscow that was accompanied by imposing "state atheism" has brought to
fierce nationalism in the frames of which religious identity assumed the role of cultural and ethnic
reunion. That I what is going on in the forms that sometimes assume so sharp conflict character these
days."
Iomiuri (Tokyo), 23 January. "After the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted the tough
resolution demanding withdrawal of all troops from Baku within two days, actually "ultimatum" for
Moscow, events in Azerbaijan developed into the confrontation between M.S. Gorbachev's administration
and this Transcaucasian republic. According the Constitution of the USSR, a Soviet republic has no right
to decline a Resolution of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council. But the Supreme Council of the
Azerbaijan used the clause of the republican constitution approved in November 1989 saying that
"preference is given to the republic laws the Union laws" as a legal basis to render the Resolution
unlawful.
According to the local sources, the republican authorities have already begun preparation for carrying
out of a national referendum on the secession of Azerbaijan from the USSR."
"The actions of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR," Moscow correspondent of Tokyo
Shimbun points out, "mean that ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus have entered a new stage, developing
into the confrontation between the Kremlin and the national and state structure of Azerbaijan. Besides, in
the situation when on the eve of the forthcoming plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the
counterattack of conservative groupings gains strength, the above-mentioned resolution will inevitably
strike even more serious blow on the foundation of M.S. Gorbachev's power."
New York Times (USA), 20 January. "Since the very beginning of ethnic clashes in Transcaucasia
between the Armenians and the Azerbaijani, Bush administration, when considering Gorbachev's
situation, have been feeling helpless and at the same time profoundly concerned."
The English Guardian was impartially covering the events in Baku; its correspondents had been
invited by the opposition despite Vezirov's fierce resistance.
Turkish mass media and politicians also showed important and priceless support to the Azerbaijan
people concerning the January tragedy.
New York Times (USA), 24 January, on the reaction of Turkey. "According to diplomats and
officials, the local authorities are displeased with the USA and other Western countries supporting the
Soviet intervention in Azerbaijan, alleging that these responses are based on double standard or the total
lack of standards and reflect, as a government employee had it, "political and religious bias" towards
Muslims. Thus, the Soviet action has driven a wedge between Washington and its close ally.
As the crisis was getting aggravated, the Turkish officials expressed growing indignation at the
Western estimate of the causes of the conflict, as in their opinion this estimate is biased."
Statement of Turkey representative in NATO U. Unsal.
1. Turkey expects the countries members of NATO to pay the same attention to the events in
Azerbaijan as they do to "nationalistic movements" in the Soviet Baltic republics and to confirm thereby
that the alliance does not pursue double standard policy.
2. Western mass media reflect only the viewpoint of the Armenian side. Turkey believes that the
approach of the Azerbaijani side is also of great importance. The West cannot draw the right conclusion
based on unilateral information.
3. Despite the serious concern about the events in Azerbaijan, Turkey believes that they are internal
affairs of the Soviet Union.

142
According to the newspaper, representatives of other members of the alliance did not express their
attitude towards Unsal's statement. Observers believe that "such silence is explained by the fact that the
countries have not yet determined their position on Azerbaijan's problem."
Anatolia Agency (Turkey), 24 January. "Minister of foreign affairs Mesut Yilmaz stressed in his
speech that "the longstanding discord between the Azerbaijani and the Armenians has resulted in the
confrontation between the Azerbaijan people and the Soviet Union leadership. The unlawful actions that
led to the declaration of state of emergency and then to bloodshed are no secret. Everyone is well aware
that the source of the events is Armenia's claims on Azerbaijan lands, as well as use of force and
provocations aimed at the realization of those claims." Pointing out the pro-Armenian position of Western
mass media, Yilmaz said that "we continue to regard these events as an internal affair of the USSR. It
does not mean, however, that we are going to remain indifferent to the Azerbaijan people which lives
across our borders with the Soviet Union and is close to us in cultural respect and with which we want to
keep good relationship."
Turkish Daily News published the editorial of Ilnur Chevik under the headline West Applauds
Suppression of the Azerbaijani. In particular, it says, "When the Soviet tanks and troops crossed
Czechoslovakian border in 1968 the Western countries responded to it with rage and expressed their
protest to Moscow Now, some time later, the very Red Army made its way to Azerbaijan, killing
Azerbaijani nationalists, while the West that has always been talking of human rights is applauding it
loudly."
The Turkish observer Mehmet Ali Birand, speaking of the events in Azerbaijan, writes in Milliyet
that "Moscow has lost Azerbaijan for a long time." The sensitivity of Ankara concerning the events in
Azerbaijan, he points out, is symbolized by the fact that after an hour and a half conversation between the
minister of foreign affairs Mesut Yilmaz and the USSR ambassador to Ankara a three lines-long
statement was issued. Our message is as follows. "Yes, these events are your internal affair. We do not
interfere and watch it with compassion. But if you continue to suppress the Azerbaijani and shed their
blood we will not keep silent."
Turkish Daily News, 25 January. "As everything is falling apart, the Western and Eastern countries
have come together to form a "Christian union" against the Islamic community which numbers about 1.5
billion people. Using theses of perestroika and glasnost for propaganda purposes, the USSR says that it
observes human rights but at the same time resorts to double standard. The USSR is tolerant towards
Christians but pursues tough policy in regard to Muslims. There is danger that the number of victims
might increase up to 4,000 people. The Western Europe, the USA and the Christian church supports the
slaughter of a Muslim people."
The plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee convened immediately after the
January events also demonstrated silent consent with Gorbachev's actions.
TASS reports. On 20 January the meeting of the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central
Committee was held, where the current situation in the republic was considered. The attention of party
committees is concentrated on taking all necessary measures to prevent escalation of tension and stabilize
the situation in the republic. The plenum decided it necessary to analyze the causes of the events deeply
and comprehensively.
The Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee expressed its condolences
concerning the human victims. Three days of mourning has been announced in the republic.
Due to the discharge of Comrade Vezirov A.-R.K. from the post of the first secretary of the
Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, the management of the Bureau work is entrusted to the
Bureau members Comrades Mutalibov A.N., the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan, and
Polyanichko V.P., the second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee."
Gorbachev had accomplices in Azerbaijan as well. At the plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party
Central Committee convened immediately after the January events, on of the party officials said, "Many
emotions have been vented from this rostrum, we are all horrified. Our international Baku is covered with
blood. I condemn bloodshed. We should have warned the people, but who is to blame? Isn't it ourselves?
Aren't we the coathors of this tragedy? You say that the troops must go away. But it is an illusion,
comrades, that we will be able to hold power in our hands, since extremists have formed such forces that
they might begin terror in the city tomorrow."
This speaker voiced the position of Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee.
Numerous attempts of individual members of the plenum to condemn the Centre for this bloody
action were firmly suppressed by the presidium. We should say that materials of that plenum have also
disappeared mysteriously.

143
None of the Bureau members came to the funeral of shekhids on 22 January to lead the funeral train.
it was only on 27 January (seven days after the tragedy!) that the condolences of the Central Committee
was published in the official state newspaper Bakinsky Rabochiy. The party elite did nothing even to
arrange the funeral, nor did the city committee of the party, the Central Committee, the Council of
Ministers; everyone stepped aside.
Here is the estimate of A. Vezirov's activities made by the commission set up immediately after the
bloody events of 20 January. Below are the basic points of that document.
"The commission set up by the plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee held
on the night of 25 January, 1990 checked the activities of Comrade Vezirov A.K. in the post of the first
secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee."
"Virtually deceiving the members of the Bureau of the Central Committee, Vezirov assured before his
trip to the meeting of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council in January 1989 that any new compromise
on Nagorno-Karabakh issue was out of question.
In reality, it was his unprincipled consent that gave the official start to the idea of establishing the
Committee of Special Administration of NKAO.
At the meeting of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council on 12 January 1989, he said, "The
appointment of Comrade Volsky A.I. to the post of the representative of the CPSU Central Committee
and Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council in NKAO was undoubtedly a useful action. But in our
opinion, the potential of the representative were not used to its full extent, among other things, owing to
the limitation of his actual authority, the small size of the apparatus, and first of all to the open resistance
to his activities on the part of the corrupted and nationalistic forces in NKAO.
Nevertheless, we can consider the right direction of the compromise found. But we should go
further
That is why we support the establishment of a temporary committee or organization bureau to
administer the region by the resolution of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council and Presidium of the
Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council."
On his return from Moscow with the adopted resolution on the establishment the Committee of
Special Administration of NKAO, Comrade Vezirov A.K. held an urgent meeting of party activists of
Baku to make an impression that his activity was approved. The meeting was announced as republican in
the press, and the resolution of Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council dated 13 January,
1990 was actually post factum.
Then he took the course for the reduction of involvement of republican bodies in the problem of the
autonomous oblast. "We should begin to forget NKAO in the press etc. and work," he said at the meeting
of the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on 9 March, 1989. The orders
followed, "If only I hear that even one deputy minister or a minister deals with NKAO issue, I am
telling you, we will dismiss that minister. And you will receive a reprimand, and so will the heads of the
Council of Ministers and the ministries for the deviation from the course. Let us establish the following
order. Each of the secretaries sends for his subordinates and says that no one should call to NKAO
without him I want the ministers and other comrades to know that no one but secretaries and the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers should contact the leadership of NKAO and discuss matters."
That virtually relieved the republican bodies and Vezirov personally of the responsibility for the
solution of NKAO problem. However, time proved the short-sightedness and fallibility of such approach.
Nationalistic and extremist forces in the autonomous oblast made use of the republic's actually total lack
of influence on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and consolidated their positions by putting more
pressure on the Committee of Special Administration.
The economy of NKAO was actually out of control of the republican bodies, relations with the oblast
were broken on all levels, and an alternative unconstitutional and anti-Soviet body of authority was
established in its political structure, National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
At the meeting of the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on 5 December,
1988, the issue "One urgent measures on solving the problems of citizens that were forced to leave their
habitual residence" was discussed with participation of the deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers Comrade Scherbina B.Y. Comrade Vezirov A.K. said, "I am not sure whether we should ask for
assistance of the fraternal republics. I think they all have many problems of their own So we should
rely solely on ourselves I assure Boris Yevdokimovich it is our attitude, we do not ask anything from
the country unless we are really dying."
As a result, the resolution passed by the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central
Committee on the given issue did not solve primary problems of refugees, shifting the responsibility for

144
their settlement on the local party and Soviet bodies, orienting to render the refugees temporary
assistance.
During the year and a half of Comrade Vezirov A.K. in the position of the first secretary of the
Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, 80% first secretaries, every sixth second secretary,
every tenth secretary of city and district committees of the party were replaced, as well as a quarter of
senior officials of party committees, every third chairman of executive committees of city and district
Councils of people's deputies, many heads of ministers and departments.
In 1988, 14 people were co-opted to the posts of first secretaries of city and district committees, in
1989, after party conferences, another 14 of first secretaries and 16 other secretaries and party committess
were co-opted.
As a result of such approach, many important positions turned out to be occupied by incompetent and
insufficiently experienced in political and party activities and even casual employees that did not enjoy
the people's confidence
At the April (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee he said, "Active solutions of specific
social and economic issues, upholding internationalist positions and general interests of the party and the
state helped us recover, return the confidence of masses, win them over to our side. And the people
followed us. The evidence of it is the results of the election of the USSR people's deputies. 98.5% voters
took part in the poll."
Without a shadow of confusion, Comrade Vezirov A.K. called upon the central party publications,
departments of the CPSU Central Committee for summarizing the experience of conducting elections in
the republic.
His individual decision to use force in Jalilabad region on the night of 29 December actually
frustrated the session of the Supreme Council.
Knowing for sure about the forthcoming introduction of troops in Baku and the possible use of
weapons by them, Comrade Vezirov A.K. concealed it from the most members of the Bureau of the
Central Committee. On 19 January, maintaining somehow one-way communication with the secretaries
of the Central Committee, he never informed them of the introduction of troops at night. Thereby the
opportunity to remove the people from street posts was ruled out and the tragic fate of many of them was
predetermined.
Displaying criminal cowardice, Comrade Vezirov A.K. actually fled from the republic at its tragic
moment, disgracefully leaving his people to the mercy of fate."

R. Akhundov
T. Kocharli
Members of candidate members of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central
N. Kush
Committee
L. Rasulova
Y. Rustamov
Chairman of the Auditing Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party
M. Kaziyev
Central Committee

The author was not a Communist and does not believe he has the right to estimate party documents
deeply but one thing about that document is evident. It is an attempt to lump all responsibility on one
man. This stereotype worked out by the Communists through many years, to find the chief and sole
culprit, worked out that time, which was the last one in the history of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.
To be impartial, the author deems it necessary to add the following to the resolution of the
commission.
In the late forties one of the first postwar contests among the republics of Transcaucasia and
Moldavia took place in Baku. Basketball match between the national teams of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
As was common those years, the audience surrounded the basketball pitch in a narrow circle supporting
teams all together. It was an uncompromising fight point to point. Suddenly two Armenian players started
arguing rather sharply about some moment of the match. A third played ran up to them at once and said in
Russian for some reason, "You can curse me, you can beat me, but I'm begging you, just play. Don't
forget it is Azerbaijan we're playing against!" This expression was a model of actions against the
Azerbaijani in any circumstances!

145
Armenia used this model in this conflict in contemporary history as well. The authority and the
opposition were leading an uncompromising struggle between themselves, quarreling, fighting, killing
each other but unlike Baku, neither forgot that they were "playing" against Azerbaijan!
The situation was different in Baku those years. The struggle between the authority and the
opposition here was much more vehement than that against the Armenian aggressors. Here is one
example typical of that period. The author happened to spend several evenings at supper with one of the
opposition leaders, as our common friends had arrived from Moscow. During these suppers he picked all
representatives of the authority to pieces with bare hatred. And it is significant that the author did not hear
any wordy speech about Armenian aggressors, not a single time in all those evenings, just in passing!
Afterwards, that politician turned from a radical oppositionist into a "goody" oppositionist when he got
completely lost.
L. Yunusova characterized A. Vezirov with one very precise phrase in those years, "He is not a man
of stagnation period, no, he is from pre-stagnation times."
Just like most Komsomols by birth, Vezirov was not stranger to populism, but even that populism
was kind of obsolete.
Alexander Kiknadze writes in his book Baku Horseshoe, "When he (Vezirov - Author) worked in
Kirovabad, he used to invite Pahmutova and Dobronravov, Niyazi and Fikret Amirov, Yan Frenkel and
Muslim Magomayev, Rashid Beybutov and Josef Kobzon to the parties he arranged. They responded
without thinking too much Dmitry Kobalevsky wrote in his book, "I would be happy if such song days
as in Kirovabad were held in other cities and towns of the Soviet Union and if every city had such House
of Music."
Many of those above-mentioned responded to the invitations from Kathmandu. Ballet of Bolshoi
Theatre of the USSR with its director Yuri Grigorovich, Rashid Beybutov Song Theatre, Azerbaijan
Dance Group, artistic collectives and sporting teams from many Soviet republics have been there.
"Vezirov says hello to you," Robert Rozhdestvensky called me. "You should see with your own eyes
what he has done in such a short time. He did invite you, why are you still at home?"
He tried to return to those model cultural actions of the Soviet times after he had been appointed the
first secretary in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijanis are driven away from Armenia in volume, shooting can already be heard in NKAO,
while Vezirov talks about computerization of motor-cars, necessity of building baths, suggests planting
chestnut trees, calls upon the party officials to come to dance together with their wives etc.
At the meeting with intellectuals of Baku he says that he arranged that a big group of writers,
composers, artists etc. should soon arrive from Moscow. And in his every speech, like Senator Cato,
Vezirov mentioned mafia forces in Baku.
Friendship of peoples was sacred to him. He hugged one Armenian at the radio manufacturing plant
and exclaimed, "We have been brothers for a hundred and fifty years, so let us continue being brothers!"
Yelena Bonner-Alikhanyan recalls the meeting in Baku, "In December 1988 a group of Muscovites
together with Sakharov was with a visit in Transcaucasia. Meeting with the first secretary of the
Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. Vezirov has been giving us a lecture on Azerbaijan-
Armenian friendship for two hours on end, as if he was on stage. Andrey Dmitriyevich broke through his
roaring voice of a real speaker with a great difficulty. We told why we had come. He did not seem to
notice, began about friendship again, "We are fraternal peoples."
Alexander Kiknadze writes in his book Baku Horseshoe that when Vezirov came to work in
Azerbaijan, the Central Command of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation addressed him with the
following words, "We highly appreciate Your contribution to the settlement of Afghan issue and
assistance to the servicemen of the Armed Forces in the period of Your service as ambassador in
Pakistan" Little time will pass and they will "thank" him in the full measure, he would wish it had
never happened! In one word, VEZIROV WAS NOT THE KIND OF MAN AZERBAIJAN NEEDED
AT THAT DIFFICULT TIME. Instead of adjusting to the troubled time, he was trying to use the
determined administrative methods of the Soviet time, i.e. was dealing with totally different matter.
Certainly, Vezirov, with his theatrical policy, was most responsible of the events on the Azerbaijan
side. But a natural question arises here. Where were the rest of the republic's leaders? Why didn't any of
them stand out? Why didn't his circle put the weak-willed Vezirov in his proper place and take the lead?
Because everyone was playing their own game and tried to frame another!
We all know that history does not bear subjunctive mood. What would have happened if H. Aliyev
had been in power those years? It is hard to give a comprehensive answer to this question but one thing
leaves no doubt, there would have been no such nightmare!

146
In September 1990, after comprehending what had happened, the first deputy head of the Azerbaijan
KGB Yevgeny Dybrovin voiced the official stand of the leaders, the leaders of this organization, let us
stress it, on the events of 20 January in Baku.
"Most active representatives of the extremist wing of the People's Front led the people to barricades
and fled themselves. They are to be liable for that. And their liability before the families of the victims is
even greater. Some of those "leaders" have been arrested, the rest managed to escape. It does matter to us
whether they might resume their previous activities, so we are taking measures to find them. As for Etibar
Mamedov, Rahim Kaziyev, Khalil Rza, Magomed Gatami, the investigation of their cases is complete." It
was not the stand of most rank-and-file Azerbaijan KGB agents. Some of them rejected it openly, some
left the organization in protest. According to Dubrovin, there are no one to blame except those mentioned
above!
By the way, none of the outstanding political figures and scientist functionaries (we emphasize,
scientist functionaries) declared in those tragic days, "I am first of all an Azerbaijani and then a
Communist" In the bloody January days of 1990 some of them burned their party cards before TV
camera, others returned them but in several months they took their cards back, now without TV cameras.
As Leyla Yunusova said wittily, "the totally ruined Communist Party rises like Phoenix from the ashes of
the burnt party cards."
But it did not rise. After 20 January it lost the remaining authority once and for all; even the
insignificant handful of loyal Communists lost their faith in the Party. It was the reason why even the
weak-willed Mutalibov disbanded it with a stroke of the pen and it all passed unnoticed and ordinarily.
The great mistake of the new first secretary Mutalibov was his trying to keep up depressed mourning
mood of the population of Baku after 20 January, 1990. All his speeches had rather mournful and meek
about them; he never finished them with an appeal for further struggle, for confrontation. He was not with
the people, but with its grief, which undoubtedly affected his future career.
In this difficult situation, the Chairman of Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council
Kafarova E.M. was acting with dignity. In her radio appearance on 20 January, 1990 she voiced her
resolute protest against the fragrant violation of the republic's sovereignty and declaration of state of
emergency in Baku. Kafarova E.M. said bindingly that the authority bodies and administration of
Azerbaijan had not made any decision about the declaration of state of emergency and had never given
their consent to such a decision.
There were then and there are still now questions about the tragic events of 20 January to ask the
opposition leaders.
According to Z. Alizade, when at the meeting of the People's Front of Azerbaijan on the events of 20
January, 1990 one of the People's Front functionaries said, "Gentlemen, we should admit our defeat" he
was immediately called a KGB agent. It was a pet maneuver of that time. If you are not a radical, then
you are a KGB agent!
On 20 January, 1990, there were heroes who were far from politics but were the first to rise on the
way of tanks, while there was no leader either in the authority or in the opposition who "would be the first
to stand out". One of the opposition leaders says that "the people were driven to face tanks by his
"double" from the KGB", another does not hide that he had been imperturbably having tea at his
accomplice's, etc.
The famous physicist Enrico Fermi, living in the safe America during the Second World War, said
that "it is impossible to stop science" when the Americans dropped nuclear bombs on Japan. On 20
January, 1990 when peaceful people were being crushed by Soviet tanks, one of the opposition leaders I.
Gambar, having tea in a safe place, said that "it is impossible to stop the process of collapse of the Soviet
empire".
L. Yunusova writes concerning the events of 20 January, 1990, "A member of the board of the
People's Front Sabir Rustamkhanly asks in his article (Azerbaijan, 24 February, 1990), "Who could
imagine that the army would enter the city without state of emergency being declared That all branches
of armed forces would be thrown onto the city with two-million population. Who could imagine that the
people leading political struggle would be represented by an armed gang preparing a coup d'etat That
neither children, nor women or men would be spared. Who could imagine that the game would be played
on the level of the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Council Who could imagine that the
army meant to defend the people against the external enemies would be so ruthless to its own people?" If
such thoughts did not occur to you, moreover, if you foresaw such course of events, then You are
definitely out of your proper place. You can be an excellent writer and not realize that if personally your
books are published, personally you and your family are not in a camp or killed, that does not mean the

147
state we live in stopped being totalitarian, fascist, antinational and its policy and army are not directed at
the suppression of its own people
If they did not surmise it, did not realize it, then they have no idea of the existing system, political
situation in the country. If they do not understand, if they are unaware, then they are not ready to confront
it. That is why, in my opinion, they deserve criticism and condemnation. They, who spoke for the people,
gained its endless confidence and failed to save it."
She is unquestionably right.
Embarking on the path of politics, one should always remember that one assumes enormous
responsibility for the fates of the people who followed and believed; words like "who could imagine" do
not relieve a politician of his responsibility, moreover, they increase it.
We should point out with great regret that the reaction of the official Turkey to the bloody
introduction of Soviet troops in Baku was rather difficult to understand in the beginning. We must repeat,
the official Turkey! In particular, after the introduction of Soviet troops in Baku in January 1990, Turgut
Ozal who was then on official visit in the USA said that "Turkey should not interfere in these events,
since it is a different country". At least, this is what Panorama, N1 (35), July 1993 wrote. As they say, a
word dropped from a song (about brotherhood) makes it all wrong. Meanwhile dozens of Turkish
correspondents risked their lives getting into Baku in various ways to cover these tragic events
impartially. Dozens of thousands of common Turks gathered for marches in support of the Azerbaijan
people.
We are obliged to Gorbachev for the bloody events of 20 January. But why were these events not
condemned definitely and unambiguously by different political forces, intellectuals and finally, why did
Russian Orthodox Church not say its word of condemnation?
Speaking on the action of NATO in the former Yugoslavia, Patriarch Alexius said, "NATO bombs
are alleged to have writings on them, "Here is your orthodox holiday's gift". It is a blasphemy!" Yes, it is
blasphemous indeed if there was ever such writing. But is it so? For this is what the Serbian propaganda
asserts that has adopted much from Goebbels's. Alexius, however, does not mention a single word about
the fact that there were orthodox crosses on the Armenian tanks that crushed and killed the civilian
population of the Azerbaijan Khojaly, and the images were broadcast on the Central Television.
We have questions on the bloody events in Baku to ask the European Parliament as well. Moscow
News wrote those years that the European Parliament demanded introduction of troops in Azerbaijan on
18 January, 1990. Many things remain unclear in the matter, there could be certain facts kept secret!
There were and there still are today questions to the US President Bush Sr. One of the most
mysterious talks between Gorbachev and Bush took place in Malta, the place where the well-known the
Order of Knights of Malta had been founded that had long since been considered the centre of the world
Freemasonry. The Turkish newspapers Turk, 1 December, 1989 and Gunaydin, 3 December, 1989 were
saying directly that Azerbaijan's problems had been also touched upon at the meeting of the USA and the
USSR leaders in Malta. The meetings took place on the board of ships, against the wash of the waves, so
to say. There was a mini-delegation of Armenians inside Gorbachev's delegation: Shakhnazarov,
Aganbegyan, Sitaryan. It is difficult to say anything definite without knowing the subject of those talks;
as time passed, though, it was clear that it was after Malta that Gorbachev's attitude to Azerbaijan
toughened, which leaves little doubt as what that mini-delegation had been doing there.
H. Kasparov also "contributed" to the interpretation of the bloody events in Baku on 20 January,
1990.
In 1989 the author was invited to Chess Olympics in Thessalonica to deliver lectures on
computerization of chess lessons and witnessed numerous interviews given by Kasparov to foreign
journalists about the events in Sumgayit, all the blame for which he laid on the Azerbaijani side. He spoke
every evening on Greek TV channels from anti-Azerbaijan stand, virtually saying noting on chess, for
which he actually had come to Thessalonica.
Despite his numerous anti-Azerbaijan statements, he had no problem in Baku in the well-known
difficult days. He could have moved from Baku with his relatives whenever and wherever he wanted;
still, having close contacts with the KGB and not wishing to dramatize the situation in Baku, he chose a
different way.
The head of Z department of the KGB Vladimir Lutsenko and the head of the section Valery
Khmelev write, "The Kasparovs, for one, Garry, his wife, mother, grandmother were first secretly (?! it
was well-known to all chess players of Baku - Author) taken out to the KGB health resort Bilga. Then,
with every precaution measure, to the airport and sent to Moscow by special flight (?! it was one of the
shuttle flights used to throw special mission units in Baku - Author) on Tu-134."

148
This artificial incident was later spread through all information channels and inflicted serious
informational damage on Azerbaijan.
Whether Kasparov wanted or not, in the bloody events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku he acted in
unison with the red-brown forces.
In future, Kasparov spread his anti-Azerbaijan activities all around the world. Wherever he arrived
with whatever purposes, be it participation in chess competitions, lectureship, competition with computers
etc., he would never "forget" about Azerbaijan.
i magazine, N19, 19 May, 1999, writes that in the late April 1990 Garry Kasparov took part in the
two major scientific conventions in the USA where he delivered two lectures: one in Stanford, on the
limits of human potential in sports, and the second in Oregon under the code name Chess, Politics and
Computers. According to the magazine, in this "lecture" the account of the tragic events in Baku in
January 1990 was interwoven with the assessment of the recent events in Kosovo.
"When the end of the Soviet Empire drew closer, the Communist government made the last attempt to
hold control in its hands, inspiring ethnic clashes and mutinies. One of the bloodiest conflicts emerged
between Azerbaijan and Armenia concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. Tragically, this conflict was not
confined to disputes and discord but turned into a genocide against the Armenians in several large cities
of Azerbaijan which reached Baku It is too bad that I did not have a chance to return where I had been
born and where my father, my two grandfathers and grandmother are buried. Some expected me to leave
the USSR immediately after that terrible event The empire crumbled losing its national territories but
my place is the country of my mother tongue and until I am made to leave I will stay there. Of course, I
love Armenia and Israel very much and I have been doing my best to assist the Armenians in their fair
struggle for Karabakh and I continue to support my people living in Israel in every way"
When living in Baku, living like a prince, we should say, no one ever heard a single word of love for
Armenia or Israel from him, at least not in public; he swore his love for Azerbaijan then. At one of
Komsomol congresses of Azerbaijan he said, "This blessed land raised me and set me on my feet If we
liken the political word to a game of chess, then it is hard to find a better Grand Master than H.Aliyev."
There are plenty of such statements of his about Azerbaijan.
Kasparov needs Azerbaijan no longer, for he got everything he wanted here at his time. Now he is
interested in Jewish and Armenian lobbies, since their positions in the world are quite strong, and he has
always been striving after strength and benefit!
As for his relatives' graves, including that of his uncle which he did not mention, Leonid Veinstein,
very decent and respectable man, one of founders of KVN TV show in Azerbaijan, they are all right, they
are well-attended, while Kasparov shows his interest just for effect!
In any civilized and not even very civilized country, the mass death of civilians, like that in Baku
during the intrusion of the Soviet troops, would result in setting up an authoritative all-Union
commission. It was not set up, according to A. Melikov, though, it was the blame of the local authorities
that hasted to set up one of their own. As one would expect, it proved to be inefficient and neither the all-
Union or international community considered its opinion. It is well-known that the authority of
commission member is one of the primary conditions of recognizing its results.
Afterwards, instead of showing repentance or at least seeking some compromising approaches to the
January tragedy in Baku, Gorbachev and his henchmen arranged a dirty show against Baku, spitting in the
soul of the Azerbaijan people and insulting the memory of those killed during the intrusion of the Soviet
troops into Baku in January 1990.
It was finally evident that this man who had sold his soul to the devil hated the Azerbaijan intensely
and did not feel guilty of his deeds, moreover, on the contrary was proud of them. He did not even
pretend, for the sake of propriety like Primakov did, to be upset about the innocent victims.
The author remembers well that as soon as the live broadcast of the first congress of the USSR
people's deputies opened on 25 May, 1989 began and the official opening was announced, an
unannounced deputy mounted the rostrum and suggested one minute's silence in remembrance of Tbilisi
victims. And the present, though not all at once and not even all, rose. Then Sobchak, a famous writer
Vasilyev and others put that issue on the agenda. Like many citizens of the republic, the author expected
Azerbaijan deputies make Gorbachev discuss the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku at the next congress
of the USSR people's deputies at any cost, event attempting to wreck the congress. Unfortunately, it did
not happen, as Gorbachev stopped all weak attempts of Azerbaijan deputies to raise the issue and they
gave it up ("They want to discuss the death of Azerbaijanis and do not want to discuss the murders of
Armenians," Gorbachev said provocatively.). He sent his toadies to the rostrum who sold him out
afterwards, which is hardly blameworthy, for it is exactly the case of two birds of a feather!

149
At that time, however, they were playing the part Gorbachev had given them.
Minister of internal affairs of the USSR Vadim Bakatin exclaimed at the congress provocatively,
"Recently, another barbaric crime against the Armenian people has been solved. Bodies of twelve
Armenian disabled were found in vicinity of Ganja, the murder has been solved, offenders arrested." It
was a blatant lie, since no one ever murdered any disabled in Ganja! Thanks for not saying "babies"!
Amazing enough, when delivering his speech, Bakatin resembled Goebbels, both outwardly and by his
manner of speaking!
"The authorities keep silent," Gorbachev interrupted Bakatin, "but at the same time the Central
Committee admitted itself that nothing could change unless Azerbaijan was cleared of People's Front
extremists. They all have been terrorized from top to bottom. They demanded holding at gunpoint the
chairman of the Supreme Council of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, who is a woman by the way,
that she signed the document on the secession of Nakhchivan from the USSR"
"They did not keep silent, Mikhail Sergeyevich," minister of internal affairs of the USSR continued,
"for instance, they protested rather loudly when Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council declared state
of emergency in Baku. So it is not silence. It is a stand that fully coincides with that of the People's Front
extremists."
Minister of defence Dmitry Yazov suddenly said in his report, "On the eve of Baku events, gangsters
robbed arsenals of frontier posts In other place, they stole 133 submachine-guns, 500 grenades, huge
amounts of ammunition In Agdam Azerbaijanis attacked the radiolocation platoon. They tied up the
soldiers, took 40 submachine-guns and disabled the radiolocation station"
Members of the People's Front of Azerbaijan did seize certain amount of weapons from the Soviet
Army but militants both in Armenia and NKAO seized virtually all armament that was in their territory.
Still, even if Azerbaijanis attacked the radiolocation platoon in Agdam, tied up the soldiers, took 40
submachine-guns and disabled the radiolocation station, does it mean that it was necessary to kill the
innocent citizens of Baku?
After Yazov's words Azerbaijani deputies left the meeting room. It is a pity! They should have tried
together to pull Yazov down from the rostrum; that would have been a token gesture!
Meanwhile, Yazov continued, "I wish they were not leaving, I would like to remind to them of the
downright sacrilege when 150 graves were dug for 49 bodies. All this was done to decline the
responsibility. Well-thought rumours that pursued propaganda purposes were broadcast and pulished
immediately." Isn't he a scamp, even insulting the memory of the dead!
Watching from his helicopter the murder of Baku civilians, Yazov did not even know the exact
number of the killed! Or he rather knew but lied.
One had the impression that those villains regretted only not having killed half of Baku!
"In 1990 reports appeared in the Western press that in the thick of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict a
group of Islamic fundamentalists had tried to seize a depot not far from Baku," a correspondent inquires
from the officer who was in charge of nuclear weapons storages at that time, calling him "S". "I know
nothing about this," the officer answers. It is well-known who arranged such "leakage" of classified
information if necessary. And it used to happen in the past, this "leakage", or rather "canard", worked.
Due to the leakage, American senators, not without pressure on the part of the Armenian lobby, took
up a provocative stand on the events of 20 January; they were immediately supported by the adventurer
(according to many Russian journalists) academician Y. Velikhanov. Moscow News wrote on 4 March,
1990 about the concern of American lawmakers about the fate of about 100 nuclear weapons stored near
Baku. In this connection Academician Yevgeny Velikhanov argued that "the presence of strategic objects
in the area of Baku was of quite great importance in the decision on the introduction of troops."
The author remembers well Velikhanov appearance on the Central Television in the seventies; he was
drawing some diagrams and said that SDI was another bluff of the American military, as he served the
CPSU Central Committee hard and foot. Then SDI turned out to be the technology of the future and
Velikhanov changed into a toady of American senators.
"Some people can breathe in any conditions by depriving others of oxygen," believes Stepan
Korshunov in his article Amphibian Academician devoted to Velikhanov.
In those tragic days of Baku Academician Y. Velikhanov was among those who deprived Baku of
oxygen.
The USSR was falling apart. Virtually all republics had nuclear weapons and some of them (e.g.
Ukraine and Kazakhstan) had means of its supply in broad strategic direction. However, troops were not
brought in any of the Soviet republics for this reason; if there were problems, they were solved in a
civilized way.

150
When it became clear that it would not be able to hide the crimes of the Soviet Army from the
international community, Moscow made a decision due to the mass death of civilians in Baku to send a
joint group of investigators of the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office, Chief Military Prosecutor's Office
etc. The group of 39 people was to investigate the crimes committed by the servicemen of airborne forces
in the territory of Baku on 19-20 January, 1990, mainly Lebed's division. The impressive team of law
enforcement bodies arrived in Baku:
Abramov I.P., deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR, Frolov, deputy Military Prosecutor of the
USSR, Provotorov V.G., the head of department of Chief Prosecutor's Office, Kislykh G.V., deputy head
of the KGB investigating department, IvanovV.I., the military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military
district, Maximov V.V., head of the General Maintenance of Public Order Department of the USSR
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Klimov N.A., deputy military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military district,
Oreshkin G.I., senior operative officer at large of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and many others.
But such an impressive composition of justice team that arrived in Baku proved to be another big
bluff, the mountain has brought forth a mouse!
According to one of the heads of the Azerbaijan SSR Public Prosecutor's Office, investigators had
ready sheets titled "The list of crimes committed by the servicemen of airborne forces in the territory of
Baku on 19-20 January, 1990". Materials about hundreds killed and wounded, racketeering, theft, pillage
etc. were collected in accordance with this list. All these materials made dozens of volumes. Even a quick
overview of those volumes demonstrated (which was confirmed in private conversations by some of these
investigators who still had their shame) that all officers of arms of the Soviet Army that had occupied
Baku was to be arrested and convicted. What was the result of this action in practice? Nothing! NOT A
SINGLE SERVICEMAN WAS PUNISHED!
Here is an example of "investigation" of the events of 20 January, 1990.
The reply of the deputy military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military district Colonel Justice I.
Klimov to the people's deputy of the USSR Melikov A.D characterizes the attitude of the Soviet justice to
the January events.

MILITARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE TO THE PEOPLE'S DEPUTY OF THE


OF RED BANNER TRANSCAUCASIAN USSR comrade MELIKOV A.D.
MILITARY DISTRICT Public Prosecutor's Baku
Office of the USSR ______ 7 February,
1990
N70, Tbilisi

Referring to Your letter of 5 February, 1990, I inform You that the units of the Soviet Army and
internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs did not intrude into Baku on the night of 20
January of this years but were brought in to secure the state of emergency de-clared by the Resolution of
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council, 19 January, 1990.
The military units and stations located in the city of Baku were blocked in the mid-January by motor-
cars and other vehicles and also numerous groups of people.
During the introduction of troops in Baku as well as unblocking of the military, the city military
personnel was exposed to an organized attack on the part of extremist militants, which resulted in the
death of servicemen. With the purpose of repelling the armed attack, the service-men were forced to open
return fire.
There were no cases of looting, i.e. stealing personal belongings of the killed and wounded,
committed by servicemen.
Criminal cases of the offences committed by servicemen (stealth of state property, motor transport
offences) are undergoing investigation with the purpose of solving the issue of bringing the guilty ones to
criminal liability.
Deputy military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military district
Colonel Justice I. Klimov
The only question is whether there is more lie, hypocrisy or insolence in this reply! All volumes, 69
out of 108, the most important of them, were thievishly taken out to Moscow and safely hidden there. It
appears that this action had far-reaching aims of revealing the truth and hiding it safely. Later, a
message flashed in the Russian mass media that during the presidential elections in Russia Yeltsin's

151
people had used those materials to curb Lebed's election enthusi-asm. Different people parted with Baku
in different ways. Yesenin said his tender and gentle good-bye to Baku with love.
Good-bye, Baku! So, I shall never see you
And I'm afraid of fate, my southern land.
The heart is under hand and it's so near.
And now I feel two simple words: my friend.
Good-bye, Baku! Oh, Turkic sky, good-bye!
The blood is very cold, I'm weak, you see
But I can promise you, I'll keep in mind
The tender wave of Caspian great sea.
Good-bye, Baku! Good-bye, my simple song
For the last time I'll hug my friend, I'll stroke
His head. It's like a golden rose. So long
It'll nod to me in choking lilac smoke
Taking rest in the suburb of Baku in 1924, surrounded by hospitable Bakuvians, Yesenin wrote 46
poems which were published in Bakinsky Rabochiy.
Parting with Baku, the Soviet troops said their good-bye leaving devastation and blood. They insulted
the memory of those Soviet soldiers and officers that had saved, as we are firmly convinced, the mankind
from fascism and whose memory had always been cherished in Azerbaijan.
Let us say several words about the Soviet and then Russian Army in connection with the gangster
action of the Soviet Army in Baku on 20 January, 1990.
"Western journalists often write that Marshal Yazov was the last USSR minister of defence. They
allege that the latter firmly managed the four-million army, the largest group of troops in Europe, ocean
fleet They say Saposhnikov got a crumbling army. "Aren't you hurt with such estimates?" the
correspondent asks Yevgeny Shaposhnikov.
"As is commonly known, truth is in the middle. By the time I was appointed the USSR minister of
defence, the army had already been infected by devastating trends: the abolition of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization, withdrawal of our troops from the countries of the Eastern Europe, the dubious use of
troops in BAKU (highlighted by the author), Tbilisi, Vilnius with the higher political bodies of the
country dissociating themselves from those actions, the useless introduction of army units in Moscow in
August 1991, acquisition of sovereignty by the subjects of the USSR with demands of immediate
consideration of the status of the Armed Forces deployed in their territories, attempts of infringement by
individual deputies (including the military ones) on the undivided authority under the flag of
democratization, the uncertainty of the further fate of the party and political bodies after the abolition of
Clause 6 of the USSR Constitution. All this was going on in the conditions of the thesis of building
"renewed democratic socialism with human face and Communist prospects" declared by the political
leaders of the country.
This is what he says after ten years. But then, after the introduction of troops in Baku, when he
became minister of defence of the crumbling USSR, he threatened Turkey with a nuclear bomb in case if
it interfered in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, which was not its intention any way.
It was expected that after Air Marshal Y. Shaposhnikov became Commander-In-Chief of the CIS
Allied Forces, some captatio benevolentiae would follow on the part of the new generalship of the army,
since its guilt before Azerbaijan was so great! But what happened was quite the reverse; Shaposhnikov
declared the southern direction, including Azerbaijan, as the primary threat for the CIS! When occasion
offered, he depicted Azerbaijan as the enemy of Russia and threatened Baku insolently.
Always smiling not very sanely, the "patriot" Marshal Shaposhnikov (his disgusting smile used to
disappear when he threatened Baku), did not conceal that he was ready, as soon as the order was given, to
carry out any punishing actions against Baku again, and he did carry them out on his own initiative.
It was the Commander-In-Chief of the CIS Allied Forces Air Marshal Y. Shaposhnikov that gave the
secret order to the 366th regiment to neutralize firing-points and defensive fortifications of the
Azerbaijani, thereby paving the way to Khojaly for the Armenians. According to Financial Times, 22
May, 1992, in response to all military manoeuvres of Turkey, Commander-In-Chief of the CIS Allied
Forces Air Marshal Y. Shaposhnikov said firmly that "the involvement of a third party in the conflict
(Armenian-Azerbaijan one - Author) is fraught with the beginning of a third world war."
Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, one of the major Turkish foreign policy experts, Professor of international
relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, writes in his article From Hostility to the Controlled Rivalry.
Russian-Turkish Relations a Decade Later, 17 December, 2001, "Another structural complicating factor

152
in the Russian-Turkish relations is the spreading and probably systematic instability in the neighbouring
regions where both countries declare their important, in case of Russia vital, interests. There was at least
one situation caused by the invasion of Armenian in Azerbaijan in April 1992 when they were on the
brink of war. It was then that Russia resorted to an open nuclear threat to restrain Turkey, when Marshal
Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, the commander of the CIS Armed Forces, warned of the danger of a "third world
war" in case if Turkey interfered in the conflict to assist the Azerbaijan armed forces to repel the
Armenian attack."
No one was surely going to get involved in that conflict directly and even in that case there would
have been no third world war. It was just Marshal tried to toady before Gorbachev without a moment's
hesitation and worked off the Armenian money he had been paid!
Many, though not yet all, facts of Y. Shaposhnikov's biography are gradually become clear and so is
his position.
The ever-smiling minister Shaposhnikov was bought lock, stock and barrel and hooked by the
Armenians. Literaturnaya Gazeta wrote on 13 May, 1992, "On 3 October, 1991 minister of defence Y.
Shaposhnikov signed Order 171. Chief of Support Services of long-ranged aviation Lieutenant General G.
Karakozov took up a new appointment, the head of Chief Trade Administration of the CIS Armed Forces
(from the rear to the advanced position in theft! - Author)."
"The former head of Chief Trade Administration of Moscow garrison explained that on 2 December,
1991, at the verbal direction of comrade Karakozov G.A. he gave the purchasing order for imported
furniture (Renaissance dining room suite, D-10 bedroom suite, Giaconda upholstered suite, 710 dining
room suite, Philipp office suite, Mona Lisa upholstered suite) with total cost of about 200,000 rouble he
is aware that the above-mentioned furniture is purchased for comrade Shaposhnikov Y., which was
confirmed in the course of the given checkup by comrade Karakozov as well." It is as clear as day that
this is just the visible tip of the corruption iceberg!
Later, the mortal enemy of Baku turned out to be involved in theft in Aeroflot and to maintain close
relationship with Armenian businessmen, as Russian newspapers wrote.
After the USSR collapse the baton of provocation against Baku was picked up by minister of defence
of Russia P. Grachev, giving 1 billion worth armament to Armenia with Yeltsin's consent.
That is the continuity of the Soviet army!
At 11.00 p.m. on 27 April, 1920 parliament adopted the resolution on passing the power to the
Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee. At the same time a leaflet was spread in Baku.
"Attention! Attention! Attention! Moscow, to Lenin.
Provisional Military Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijan Soviet Independent Republic that
came in power of the will of the revolutionary proletariat of Baku and working peasantry of Azerbaijan
Having no opportunity of restraining the pressure of external and internal counterrevolutionary gangs
by our own efforts, the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan requests immediate actual support by
sending Red Army detachments."
This leaflet was spread on the night of 28 April, 1920 and the advanced units of the army had already
reached Baku.
On 19 January the USSR Supreme Council adopted the disastrous resolution "On the declaration of
state of emergency in Baku". The population was not notified of the planned use of troops and of the
beginning of the regime in advance. State of emergency was put into operation almost immediately, at
12.00 a.m. on 20 January, 1990. At 7.27 p.m. on 19 January Azerbaijan television was already disabled.
At 12.20 a.m. 9 citizens were killed by the military. The reservists and servicemen of Armenian
nationality were particularly notable for their brutality. Only at 7.00 a.m. 20 January, after the barbaric
intrusion into the city, killing all peaceful people that had come along, crushing transport vehicles, firing
buildings, ambulances, the military authorities declared state of emergency on the radio. By the moment
state of emergency was declared to the population 82 people had been killed and 20 fatally wounded (all
deceased in hospitals) by the military.
The Soviet power in Azerbaijan began with lies and provocations and ended in the very same way!
Bodies of the civilians killed by Gorbachev's order in Baku were still warm when he said to foreign
journalists instead of showing repentance, "Any attempts of establishing an Islamic state in Azerbaijan
will be opposed with force. We will act with responsibility but resolutely."
One way or another, he will lie all the years following the January events. Now he said that the
introduction of troops had been an act of opposition to the attempts of stablishing an Islamic state in
Azerbaijan, then he said that he had brought troops in Baku to protect the Armenians, and then he will say
that he had been restoring Soviet power in Azerbaijan and saving Vezirov from gibbet. In his last

153
interview to Radio Liberty more than 10 years later he suddenly said that he had brought troops in Baku
on the insistence of Primakov who had been there at that time.
Twelve years later, Gorbachev recalls the January tragedy, "Well, things like this happen to everyone
and perhaps everyone can get into such situations," he says to Azerbaijan film makers calmly, almost
philosophically. "We phone to Baku, they report that the situation is under control. But the situation is
such that some emergency measures should be taken. I send Primakov Yevgeny and Ghirenko Andrey
there. Primakov says, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, we must take urgent measures." I send for the minister of
internal affairs Bakatin. I say, "We must contact minister of defence, make suggestions." He answers,
"We cannot act just on the word, give us Presidential Resolution. Right. Well, we kind of had a talk. I say,
"Let's adopt the Resolution then." Resolution was adopted, right there, officially. I made a speech before I
made my mind about it. Well, it was all consciously. The Azerbaijani cursed me. So, you know, it is like
that, once you pledge, don't hedge. And it is always a tragedy, especially for contrite people."
After shedding blood like water in Baku, Gorbachev speaks about "pledges" and "hedges" instead of
saying words of repentance. This leopard marked by the devil, will never change his spots.
The former head of the Azerbaijan SSR KGB Vaghif Huseynov, now a citizen of Russia, says
something like that. "Corpses were still lying in the streets of Baku," says V. Huseynov with some strange
sarcasm more then ten years after the events he took an active part in, "when bosses of the democratic
opposition began overwriting history. "The intrusion of the vast contingent of units of the Soviet Army
and internal troops into Baku was accompanied by particular brutality and unprecedented atrocities. As a
result of the massacre of civilians and unlawful introduction of troops, 131 civilians were killed, 744
wounded, 841 illegally arrested Servicemen ruined and burned 200 houses and flats," the official
Azerbaijan version of the tragedy has been saying for years. Not a single word about pogroms and other
"inconvenient" details of those events." Well, it is the then head of the Azerbaijan KGB V. Huseynov
who has to speak publicly "about pogroms and other "inconvenient" details of those events" and reveal
them. As a authorized representative of the Centre, he knows much about secret special operations carried
out in Baku in those days.
There are many questions to ask V. Huseynov about the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku.
According to the former head of the Azerbaijan KGB, General I. Huseynov, and Colonel I.
Makhmudov, it was in V. Huseynov's presence that important documents concerning the events of 20
January, 1990 in Baku were destroyed.

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL To the Chairman of the Investigating


SECURITY of the Azerbaijan Republic Commission of the Azerbaijan Republic
21 December, 1991 Supreme Council
Baku Comrade Abasov M.T.

We refer to Your inquire: in the period of the events of January 1990 the actions in the line of the
former KGB were guided by deputy head of the former KGB of the USSR Comrades Bobkov F.D.,
Pirozhkov V.P., Agayev G.Y.
These actions involved a large group of the USSR KGB agents sent on the mission to the Committee
of the republic.
There are no materials available in the archive of Ministry of National Security concerning the
actions carried out by the USSR KGB in the period of the January events of 1990.
Minister Major General I. Huseynov
During the period from 1 January, 1990 ciphered telegrams "On the situation in the republic" were
sent from the State Security Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR to the KGB of the USSR. At the direction
of the former chairman of the Azerbaijan KGB Comrade Huseynov V.A. all these ciphered telegrams
were destroyed as confirmed by Act 524, 17 February, 1990.
Head of the 8th department of the MNS of the Azerbaijan Republic Colinel I. Makhmudov
23.12.91

As we know, "manuscripts don't burn". Most important documents do not burn completely either.
There is always something left somewhere somehow; what remains always gives a chance to get to the
truth. Such documents often rise from their ashes like Phoenix! Gorbachev used to say many times that
the documents concerning the pact concluded by Ribbentrop and Molotov had disappeared; however,
when they were really necessary, especially for the Baltic countries, the documents were immediately

154
found, though not all, and the remaining doubts concerning the nature of that pact were dispersed. At
present, the positions of the politicians who are guilty of Baku events are quite strong in Moscow; so they
"cannot" those important documents there. The author is convinced that the time will come when those
people are relegated to oblivion, which is soon, and most of these document will see the light. The most
striking example is the tragic execution of 22,000 Polish officers in Katyn. A. Yakovlev recalls that he
had asked Gorbachev to find those documents dozens times and received the invariable answer, "How can
I find them for you?" though he had known perfectly well that those documents were kept in the General
Department, in a top secret folder. Later A. Yakovlev will wonder, "Why was he lying to me?" It was
Lebedeva who chanced to come upon the tracks of those documents. They were found in the convoy
troops of NKVD.
Here is a small but very informative reference, an echo of the January events. The record of "Region"
Joint-stock Company and "Sistema" joint-stock financial Corporation, Sergey Gorshkov, says, "The
foundation of "Region" research centre was in many ways a blind imitation of the similar structure in
"Most" group and a tribute to fashion (how can there be "grey eminence" and election staff without a
research centre?) Vaghif Huseynov was probably recommended to the post of the head of this centre by
Gusinsky on the tip of F. Bobkov. We can speak with a certain confidence about close relations between
Huseynov and Bobkov that transformed into some kind of dependence of the former from the latter in the
period of the introduction of troops in Baku (Bobkov went to Huseynov then). Just like in "Most", THE
BACKBONE IS COMPOSED OF SECRET SERVICE OFFICERS (highlighted by the author)."
Gleb Pavlovsky writes in his article Gefter and Old Things, "The analysis of Perestroika requires that
we recall its nasty details (much pettier in their meanness than Baku crushed by Gorbachev with the
authority of Sakharov and us all)." Pavlovsky is probably right. But for the sake of justice, we should first
analyse thoroughly Gorbachev's more important mean acts to which Gleb Pavlovsky fairly relates the
tragedy of the Azerbaijan people, 20 January, 1990, and then pass to smaller ones. But that would require
a scientific research institute!
In a number of his interviews Gorbachev hints unambiguously that the primary person responsible for
the January events in Baku was Primakov. But it is a lie; such large-scale operation could be planned and
realized only by the first person of the state, while the rest, including Primakov, were performers. The
point is not that. Gorbachev cannot forgive his ex-friend and political comrade-in-arms for the latter's
giving him away carefully to Yeltsin and succeeding in many things.
Then Primakov gave away Luzhkov to Yeltsn, and finally all of them to Putin, which ensured him a
high post in the government, and immediately began spinning intrigues against Prime Minister Kasyanov.
We can see that he left Gorbachev far behind in the art of mischief-making, which is a deadly blow for
the latter who got used to betray and re-betray himself!
Besides, it is quite possible that Primakov obscurely divided the means received in his time from the
Gulf countries before the war, and Gorbachev still had open questions.
On 13 October, 1837, in the course of Russian-Iranian war of 1826-1828, the Russian troops under
the command of the governor of the Caucasus Ivan Fedorovich Paskevich took Erivan (the present-day
Yerevan) by assault. According to historians, there were no victims among the civilian population. The
title of Count of Erivan was granted to Paskevich to commemorate the victory.
On 20 January, 1990, the Soviet troops sent by Gorbachev under Yazov's command took the peaceful
city of Baku, killing and wounding several hundreds of civilians, for which the Azerbaijan people granted
Gorbachev the "title" Bloody Gorbachev.
Certain Western circles wanted to improve Gorbachev's image by awarding him Nobel Prize but they
were discomforted with the mass murder of civilians in the USSR, which could not but shock them. After
having been awarded Nobel Prize in Peace, Gorbachev sent his representative, as had been agreed, to
receive it, and the chairman of Nobel Prize Committee declared publicly that Gorbachev was awarded the
prize "for the foreign and not home policy". That was probably was of the most disgraceful procedure in
the history of Nobel Prize Committee after awarding Hitler Nobel Prize in 1938. Awarding Hitler and
Gorbachev Nobel Prize is indelible disgrace in the history of Nobel Prize Committee and two of many
mysterious events in the history of the mankind.
It is pertinent to note that the KGB was also trying to improve its image in every possible way those
years. In 1990, after the bloody events in Baku, even Miss KGB was elected, a beautiful Lieutenant girl.
Azerbaijan will never be able and should not forgive or justify 20 January, 1990. Never. Those who
were in power then are responsible for it. "I think," M.S. Gorbachev said, "that we can never and should
not forgive or justify what happened in 1937-38. Those who were in power then are responsible for it."
These words might just as well be related to the events in Baku and to M.S. Gorbachev himself first of all.

155
Having done much work on collection of materials concerning the crimes of the Soviet troops in
Baku, the commission failed to get the results of its work both to the Soviet and international community.
One had the impression that the heads of the commission were playing some political games far from the
point of the matter.
The famous composer Arif Melikov also did great work collecting facts of the January events and
releasing innocent people who had more or less taken part in them from prison. He gives a precise
estimate of the work of the commission.
"The Investigating Commission of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Council is a special issue. In
three years, it did not publish a single serious document. The issue of its establishment was discussed in
Moscow by the deputy corps of Azerbaijan. They were arguing for a long time what kind of commission
should be established to analyse the causes of the invasion, the form of its realization, all consequences
promptly. Had the commission brought the entire truth to the international community, its resolution
could have become the indictment against all who had authorized and performed that barbaric action.
I demanded that the commission should consist not only of deputies and other representatives of
Azerbaijan but also deputies of the USSR Supreme Council, other republics, that independent lawyers
from the Soviet Union and foreign countries should be involved in its work and that it should be
established under the aegis of the USSR Supreme Council. Many of our deputies agreed with me in the
lobby and private conversations but when the leaders of the republic opposed my demand no one
supported me.
Executing the guidelines of the Centre, the leaders of the republic restricted the scale of this
commission to the republic and the deputies from Azerbaijan that had agreed with these conclusions
found or invented excuses, saying that "we are the most interested people and do not need any outside
help."
We would not like to comment upon the activities of the heads of that commission. It is the
prerogative of history!
In full accordance with the well-known saying, "Mistrust first impulses; they are nearly always
good", some time after the intrusion of the Soviet troops in Baku, some politicians and journalists
considerably moderated their attitude to those responsible for the tragedy in Baku.
It was with a sore heart that we read in foreign press that certain political circles had invited
Gorbachev to Turkey where he had been received by high-ranking statesmen.
And finally, having killed hundreds of people in Baku, Tbilisi, Vilnius, in flash points, Gorbachev
took loving care of his own safety and health.
V.I. Boldin recalls General Secretary's concern about his health.
"Once in winter of 1983 he suddenly said, perplexing me, "You know, I'm going to die soon"
Mikhail Sergeyevich was staring somewhere into vacancy consumed with his sad musings.
"Why such mysticism? Or have doctors frightened you?"
"My father died at this age, I have the same symptoms."
I knew well that he was not ill at all then, still quite strong, as for blood pressure, atherosclerosis and
other cardiovascular diseases, these are troubles of virtually everyone, especially those who like to sit in
the chair and make a good meal. He was very suspicious about his health. When he was young he
received treatment in Zheleznovodsk and always made doctors find things he had not. He had keen
appetite and if he abstained from something, it was rather due to overeating, necessity to control weight.
About two times a week he used to have fasting days. Special sour cream curds were cooked for him and
he had to hold out for a day." It is really a mystery of the twentieth century how such a hypochondriac
and faint-hearted man who could not control either his wife or daughter, or granddaughter, or his inner
circle, managed to rise to the height of power in the USSR!
The famous and undoubtedly talented lawyer Henry Reznik writes concerning the intention of Baku
to institute criminal proceedings against Gorbachev for the events of 20 January, 1990, "Interpol will tell
them to get lost! There is such a notion as period of limitation. They accuse Gorbachev of abusing his
authority, don't they? But, I beg your pardon, thirteen years have passed since 1990, while the period of
limitation is ten years!"
After such words the image of Reznik as a courageous fighter for justice faded somehow. The Jew
caught and hung Eichman for monstrous crimes against the Jewish people even after 30 years. And they
continue to search for surviving Nazi criminals responsible for the genocide of the Jewish people all over
the world! They are right, since there is no period of limitation for such crimes!
Another statement concerning Gorbachev's crime is more encouraging. The head of international law
department at MGIMO Yuri Kolosov said in his interview, "The situation is like that of Pinochet or

156
Zavgayev. Gorbachev is virtually a citizen of a different state for Azerbaijan. Clearly, he will not come
running to surrender to the Azerbaijani authorities. To try Gorbachev, Baku should reasonably make a
request to Moscow to extradite the suspect. However, there are no appropriate bilateral agreements on
extradition between Russia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is not a member of European Convention on
Extradition that Russia joined. So Azerbaijan (with indeed powerful evidence of Gorbachev's guilt) can
only declare him wanted through Interpol. And then, if Mikhail Sergeyevich goes somewhere outside
Russia, Interpol might catch him" Well, if it must be Interpol, let it be Interpol. It might as well be
through sexual minority league! If only Gorbachev appeared before the court in Baku!
Gorbachev's granddaughter was marrying. The wedding party was organized by "Patel et Chabot".
Roasted hazel-grouses, elk lips, red and black caviar were served to the guests, and the highlight of the
gastronomic performance was a triple deck wedding cake a meter and half of height. The newly married
couple will spend their honey moon in Italy. None of the invited honoured guest appeared, since
Gorbachev is long used "archive" material; only sometimes Putin uses his relations with foreign political
figures established owing to the betrayal of the USSR interests.
But those young people that had been killed by Gorbachev's order are lying in the Alley of
SHEKHIDS and many of them, unlike Gorbachev's granddaughter, had no time to know what love,
wedding, family mean.
A SON DOES NOT ANSWER FOR HIS FATHER'S SINS, NOR DOES A GRANDDAUGHTER
FOR HER GRANDFATHER'S. BUT THE CURSE OF THE AZERBAIJAN FOR 20 JANUARY, 1990
WILL ALWAYS HAUNT THE GORBACHEVS!
GORBACHEV HAD MADE HIS BLOODY CONTRIBUTION, SAID HIS BLOODY WORD IN
THE BEGINNING OF THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJAN CONFLCT ON 20 JANUARY, 1990,
WHICH INFLUENCED CONSIDERABLY THE TEMPORARY OUTCOME OF IT.
BUT GORBACHEV'S WORD WILL NOT BE THE LAST, AS THE LAST WORD WILL BE
SAID BY THE AZERBAIJAN PEOPLE, AND IT WILL BE SOON!

Gorbachev's reasons to bring troops in Baku

Gorbachev's perestroika entered the crucial stage; the USSR was breaking down, and Gorbachev
("my fingers are all thumbs," he says to his inner circle) feverishly searches for a way out of the crated
situation.
In the beginning of January 1990, at the session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee
M.S. Gorbachev declare, "1990 is a crucial year. If we do not change the situation with supply, we should
leave!" By this time Gorbachev took the credit to the amount of 40 billion dollars from the West, having
brought the USSR debt to 85 billion dollars, but none of the primary problems was solved; shelves were
empty in shops and basic products were rationed.
From the beginning of 1990 and till the end of March in the country, according to the official
information, while the figures were actually considerably higher, more than two thousand meetings were
held in which more than 7.5 million people took part. And, virtually, at all of these meetings its
participants cursed Gorbachev and his perestroika; Gorbachev's political rating was rapidly falling to
zero.
On 18 November, 1988 the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR proclaims sovereignty of the
republic. Its example is followed by Lithuania and Latvia. Soon the Balts declare their intention to seek
full independence. The same is declared by Moldova, Georgia and Armenia.
On 22 November, 1988 the Armenian parliament was actually dismissed, and Armenia was seized by
separate militarized groups.
On 10 January, 1990 "Unity" organisation in Moldova declared the separation of Tiraspol from the
Moldavian SSR and its joining Russia.
Unrest began in Central Asia, separatism in Georgia and Moldova started to gain in strength.
Republics that were parts of Russia started to demand more independence from the Center.
The empire disintegration becomes real. For edification of other republics, Gorbachev chooses Baku
and strikes his blow on it.
After more than ten years after Baku events first, and the author is convinced, not last, accounts of the
events by their participants appeared.
Participants of these events reflect on the purposes of the introduction of troops in Baku on 20
January, 1990, the commander of Kirovograd special mission brigade Yuri Voronov and the deputy
commander in charge of policy of the special radio communication squad that was a part of Kirovograd

157
brigade in Baku. Voronov says: "PUTIN'S CURRENT ASPIRATION TODAY TO KEEP CHECHNYA
AS A PART OF THE FEDERATION IS SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THE POSITION OF THE THEN
SOVIET ADMINISTRATION (highlighted by the author), though then, fortunately, the situation did not
lead to war. And then, having signed the agreement on the Soviet Union disintegration, they simply
betrayed us, who had been protecting its integrity..."
"We protected the civilians," repeats Vitaly Tokarev, the deputy commander in charge of policy of
the special radio communication squad that was a part of Kirovograd brigade in Baku, "not knowing
repeats what to expect next minute. Despite all warnings and threats in our address, we never shot, they
were ours, Soviet people, after all... In my personal file, there is a record that I took part in the
performance of the combat task on maintenance and restoration of public order in Azerbaijan. But after
all, it is not a job for army, it is for law enforcement bodies! AS EARLY AS THEN I REALIZD THAT
THIS STATE WAS DOOMED, POLITICIANS NEEDED NEITHER ARMY NOR THE STATE ANY
MORE... (highlighted by the author)"
Let us pay attention, neither of them mentions any structures of the People's Front or armed
formations but and concentrates on the disorders which really took place and which militia should have
been dealing with. And their main conclusion is significant, "As early as then I realized that this state was
doomed; politicians needed neither army nor the state any more..."
Alexander Urzhanov writes in 2002, "The Soviet regime is dying but tries to show the past power
even in convulsions. Having given freedom to the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries, Moscow is not
going to give independence to the Soviet republics. The greatest anxiety is inspired by the unrest in the
Baltic republics. GORBACHEV TRIES TO KEEP THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AS PARTS OF A
MORE LIBERAL BUT NEVERTHELESS SOVIET FEDERATION. IN THE MIDDLE OF JANUARY
THE SOVIET TROOPS BRUTALLY SUPPRESSED MARCHERS IN BAKU (highlighted by the
author). No less than a hundred people were killed (and probably much more)".
L'Express writes, "IN THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETIES OF THE LAST CENTURY
MOSCOW QUITE OFTEN RESORTED TO THE TACTICS OF KINDLING SEPARATIST
CONFLICTS IN ORDER TO STRUGGLE AGAINST THE BEGINNINGS OF INDEPENDENCE
MORE EFFECTIVELY. THE NEIGHBOURING AZERBAIJAN GOT ITS PENNYWORTH FOR IT
(highlighted by the author)."
Armenia is in the front line of destructors of the USSR (according to all serious political analysts),
and Gorbachev strikes his blow on Baku.
David Kalatozishvili writes in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "In his endeavour of modernization of the state,
Gorbachev committed one but the most important error which led to the destruction of the foundation of
the Soviet Union. He initiated or at least actively supported the "idea of equalization rights of the Soviet
and autonomous republics."
Let us begin with Georgia. There is a firmly established opinion in the Russian public consciousness
that the actual disintegration of Georgia was the result of its attempts to withdraw from the Soviet Union.
"Georgia got what it deserved with its separatism," such is the verdict of the Russian public.
Let us take another example, Azerbaijan.
If we recall how the events in the geopolitical triangle Moscow - Baku - Yerevan developed, it is
impossible not to discover an amazing phenomenon (let us call it GORBACHEV PHENOMENON for
convenience - Author). There were no anti-Soviet, anti-Russian actions in Azerbaijan (unlike Georgia).
Many politicians and experts remember that Azerbaijan not only agreed to sign the treaty of alliance but
had already formed the delegation which intended to go to Moscow to sign this document. And it would
have if not for the putsch on 19 August."
Meanwhile, Armenia not only refused flatly to sign the Treaty of alliance but made the decision to
hold a referendum on the secession from the USSR.
Isn't it strange to see on which side the sympathies of Moscow were (and remain to be), given the
development of events after the USSR collapse?
"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." There
are no dreams in politics, only pragmatism. And the pragmatism is such that both Gorbachev and
afterwards Yeltsin, solving their problems, struck blows on Baku, IRRESPECTIVE OF ITS RELATION
TO THE USSR AND, LATER, RUSSIA.
Everyone remembers Vezirov's abasing himself publicly before Gorbachev, trying to please him in
everything. All of Gorbachev's orders, overwhelming number of which was harming Azerbaijan, were
nevertheless carried out by Vezirov implicitly. Doctoring at elections of people's deputies in Azerbaijan
reached monstrous figures solely to please Gorbachev.

158
A.Mutalibov adhered to the same course as well. 74.9 % of the Azerbaijan voters "took part" in the
referendum deciding the fate of the USSR held by Mutalibov in March 1991 (more than in the RSFSR
(74%) but less than in Central Asia). The preservation of the Union was supported by 93.3 %, opposed to
by 5.8% (in Baku the Union was supported by 85.3). However, Nakhchivan did not participate in the
referendum.
Virtually none of Gorbachev's decrees and instructions was carried out in Armenia, including the
decree on disarmament of militants.
Nevertheless it did not change Gorbachev's attitude to Azerbaijan for the better in any way.
GORBACHEV'S LONG PLANNED BLOW ON BAKU DID NOT DEPEND IN ANY WAY ON
OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. It was "GORBACHEV PHENOMENON".
This "tradition" was continued after Gorbachev by the president of the democratic Russia Yeltsin,
having transformed "GORBACHEV PHENOMENON" into "YELTSIN PHENOMENON"... When
Yeltsin was threatened by impeachment, president A.Elchibey sent him a telegram of support which,
according to the memoirs of his comrades-in-arms, Yeltsin did not even read.
The deadly struggle for power began between Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
As some documents are declassified and the memoirs of politicians of those times are published, it
becomes clear that bringing troops in Baku on 20 January, alongside with his chief aim, Gorbachev also
pursued his personal interests. There were no resources already to consolidate his power, since the
Warsaw alliance was crumbling, the economy of the USSR was rapidly collapsing, the debt of the USSR
has increased to the record amount, leaders of the republics were all glancing towards Yeltsin more and
more often and openly, army and secret services were going out of hand.
In Radio Liberty programme devoted to the 10th anniversary of the putsch of August 1991, the
president of Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev says, "Spring of 1990. And after that elections are held,
and Boris Nikolaevich is elected by three or four voices. He starts to develop this sovereignty, to struggle
for independence of Russia. From whom? I cannot understand so far. Here. Everyone says, "Russia will
be free and independent!" I see. From the Soviet Centre."
And Yeltsin achieved his aim.
After Yeltsin's speech in the RSFSR Supreme Council the resolution on denunciation of the Treaty of
alliance was put to vote, "Following by the Declaration of the RSFSR state sovereignty and in accordance
with Clause 109 Item 15 of the Constitution, the Supreme Council resolves to denounce the agreement on
formation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics approved by the first congress of Soviets of the
USSR on 30 December, 1922 in the city of Moscow."
The resolution on the secession of Russia from the Union was passed without discussion and even
without "stir in the hall". On 12 December, 1991 at 13:28:31 Russia left the USSR in accordance with the
law, leaving in it five republics of Central Asia.
Y. Battering and others write, "The working record of the session of Politburo on 7 March, 1990 (i.e.
several weeks after the January events in Baku - Author) where, on the insistence of Mikhail Sergeyevich,
among others, the issue of presidency was discussed. A.Lukyanov's arguments are of particular interest;
he obviously wanted to intimidate everyone with possible consequences of introduction of presidency
institute. Unlike Gorbachev, he foresaw the danger of such step to the integrity of the country when
leaders of the Soviet republics might demand introduction of presidential post in their republics as well.
These warnings caused irritation in Gorbachev. "Stop, don't try to scare us," he interrupts the speaker,
"we should respond at full throttle so that they could feel They forgot all restraint."
called for discretion, "Why such haste? Why is it necessary to do it now, cannot we just to
postpone it?" "We must show them their proper place," Gorbachev points out sharply.
"They forgot all restraint show them their proper place," Gorbachev meant opposition, and first of
all Yeltsin who was already breathing down his neck, and it was necessary to try to leave the pursuers
behind, to fix the political space that was tearing apart.
The extraordinary III congress of the USSR People's Deputies was convened on 12 March, 1990 for
the realization of this idea. One of Gorbachev's comrades-in-arms, a member of Politburo in charge of
ideology issues, V.Medvedev recalls, "We approved the urgent election of President at the congress rather
for pragmatical than principled reasons, besides, the constitutional norm provided national elections."
That is, he actually admitted that Gorbachev violated the Constitution.
He decided to show his ways of showing one one's proper place in Baku.
The same thought is expressed by Valery Boldin, the head of the administration of the USSR
President in August 1991.
"The correspondent asks, 'How did the State Emergency Committee coup arise?'

159
'If you remember, having returned from Foros, Gorbachev said a significant phrase, 'I am not going to
say everything.' he was not lying. All that State Emergency Committee matter began not in August 1991
at all but much earlier. It all began with the tough confrontation of two presidents, Soviet and Russian.
Yeltsin had not forgiven Gorbachev for the banishment from Politburo in 1987. Having headed Russia, he
started to shatter the Soviet Union actively. Yeltsin realized that Russia had a too heavy load and if it
started to reduce budget payments, the subsidized republics like Tajikistan or the Baltic ones just would
not survive. And that was the case. Feeling that he was losing his foothold, IN THE BEGINNING OF
1990 GORBACHEV SENT FOR A GROUP OF MEMBERS OF POLITBURO AND THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, ALL THOSE WHO JOINED THE STATE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE AFTERWARDS
(INCLUDING KRYUCHKOV, YAZOV, BAKLANOV), AND RAISED THE ISSUE ON THE
DECLARATION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY (highlighted by the author. Familiar, isn't it?).'
'It was not a slip of the tongue, was it? In the beginning of 1990, not 1991?'
'No, it was not, in the beginning of 1990. All those invited by Gorbachev then supported the idea of
state of emergency, especially considering the increase of nationalist, centrifugal trends in the Baltic
countries and Transcaucasia. AND WE, GORBACHEV'S ADMINISTRATION, STARTED WORKING
OUT THE CONCEPT OF STATE OF EMERGENCY (highlighted by the author). But it was never
developed in 1990, mainly because the situation remained stable on the whole, excluding the April events
of 1989 in Tbilisi. And in 1991 it was so strained that a match was enough to explode it all. Gorbachev's
authority was getting more and more ephemeral; he could do nothing without Russia. Feeling that
Gorbachev was losing power, Yeltsin started to act more intensely. During the discussion of the new
Treaty of alliance he was virtually giving the law to the republican leaders. And the latter not only
considered his words but also followed his pattern in independence. Yeltsin was taking the lead more and
more confidently, Gorbachev getting mad with the lack of information. Eventually, Gorbachev
understood that Yeltsin's separate negotiations with the republican leaders would result in his complete
discharge from power, and stirred up the activity of security agencies on the declaration of state of
emergency.'
Gorbachev Mikhail entry in History, biographies of ROL Encyclopaedia gives the same estimate of
the political situation of that period:
"However, in internal policy, especially in economy, signs of serious crisis emerged. Foodstuffs and
convenience goods deficiency rose. From 1989 there was THE PROCESS OF DISINTEGRATION OF
THE SOVIET UNION POLITICAL SYSTEM WAS DEVELOPING AT FULL SPEED. THE
ATTEMPTS TO STOP THIS PROCESS BY FORCE (IN TBILISI, BAKU, VILNIUS, RIGA) LED TO
THE EXACT REVERSE RESULTS, STRENGTHENING CENTRIFUGAL TRENDS (highlighted by
the author). Democratic leaders of Inter-regional deputy group (B.N. Yeltsin, A.D. Saharov etc.) gathered
mass meetings in their support. In the first half of 1990 virtually all Soviet republics declared their state
sovereignty (the RSFSR on 12 June, 1990)."
As we can see, problems had already been grave by the beginning of 1990, and they were growing in
a geometrical progression. Gorbachev decided to show muscle and to carry out a local experiment on the
declaration of state of emergency.
Gorbachev decided to try out his plans, including personal ones, in Baku, which quite complied with
his attitude to the Azerbaijani, and he could operate in unison with the Armenian diaspora in the West, a
part of his plan as well.
It is not impossible that Gorbachev's action in Baku on 20 January, 1990, as well as his entire pro-
Armenian stand on Nagorno-Karabakh, was in some or other form paid by the Armenian lobby abroad.
Recent publications demonstrate that the Armenian mafia was Gorbachev's chief assistant in the
underground realization of the Soviet gold. During the existence of the USSR this information was
classified. These relations of Gorbachev's undoubtedly had important part to play in his attitude to the
Karabakh events. Alexander Mosyakin writes, "Gorbachev's perestroika that marked epoch-making
revolutionary changes was announced in 1986. But it had dumbfounded the world one year earlier when
the Soviet Union had unexpectedly taken out 297 tons of gold, nearly crumbling the world precious
metals market. To understand the shock suffered by business circles, it is necessary to know, that in the
pre-Gorbachev 1984 the USSR exported only 10.1 tons of gold, and had been taking it out in dozens tons
for the previous twenty-two years, in accordance with the market condition and the quotas discussed with
the business community. Frightened Western bankers PERSUADED MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KREMLIN THROUGH THATCHER
NOT TO SPRING SUCH SURPRISES ANY MORE (highlighted by the author), and in the following
two years the export of the Soviet gold was back to normal. But then it started to increase again, and

160
suspicious firms trading precious metals and gemstones began to appear simultaneously in different
countries, strings from which led to Moscow. One of them got spotted in America. The former CIA agent
Richard Palmer says, "There was "gold case of 1988" in the USA. In that case two Armenians figured
who had founded a firm dealing with gold and diamonds. This firm employed about hundred Russian
masters on diamonds polishing, and its management had established good contacts with POLITICIANS
(highlighted by the author) in California and police. They had bought considerable amount of real estate
and opened many bank accounts." It was Golden ADA, the firm we know today for the diamond swindle
of the century; then it was headed, withou