G.R. No.

L-75697

VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI
ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA
COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:

Herein petitioner filed a petition on September 1, on his own behalf and purportedly on
behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected assailing the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as
the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10,
1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the
local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade
in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of taxes is invalid in the promulgation of PD NO. 1987

RULING:

NO. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve.
It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the
constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as
to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given practical rather than
technical construction.

Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and
oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in
 force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is
subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority
which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in
general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the
need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie
industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged
statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO FOUNDATION INC.,

CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A.
BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL
M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK,
KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE,
SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C. PACALSO ALIAS KEVAB, BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY
C. GIRON, URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS BA-YAY, EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, CARMEN
CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE MONDOC, petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM,
PRESIDENT, BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO
POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD.,
ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents.

FACTS:

On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow
Agreement with private respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld
Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro
Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation centers.
The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the
actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay.

The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition[17] for
prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which was filed on April 25, 1995 challenging, in
the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement
and Joint Venture Agreement between public respondent BCDA and private
respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.
ISSUE:

Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under
Section 12 of RA 7227 are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.

RULING:

NO. As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges given
to Subic SEZ consist principally of exemption from tariff or customs duties, national and local
taxes of business entities therein (paragraphs (b) and (c)), free market and trade of specified
goods or properties (paragraph d), liberalized banking and finance (paragraph f), and relaxed
immigration rules for foreign investors (paragraph g). Yet, apart from these, Proclamation No.
420 also makes available to the John Hay SEZ benefits existing in other laws such as the
privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw
materials free from taxes, duties and other restrictions; tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax
credit, and other incentives under the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987;and the applicability
to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the Philippines.
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of
SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained.
The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension
of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. Neither does the same grant of
privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of
Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation
or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is
the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to
exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being
as broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for
specific tax exemptions, or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from
local taxes.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Public
respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provision.
Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.

G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:

In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling
bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business
of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and
Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the
corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the
4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A)

Petitioner complied under protest to avoid its business being closed. Plaintiff then filed a
complaint praying that judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000,
as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and that
the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum of P5, 891.45 paid under protest,
together with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further praying for such other relief
and remedy as the court may deem just equitable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila are constitutional and valid.

RULING:

YES. With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention the
Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations
enumerated therein, We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right
granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. In the case of Coleman
vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was elucidated as follows:

An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or
otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are
being delivered free, or whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of Griffin,
without first obtaining written permission from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be
deemed a nuisance and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin, does not deprive
defendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or
purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even
if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is
not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right
to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected
from it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
 G.R. No. L-31156 February 27, 1976

PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN, LEYTE, THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, ET AL., defendant
appellees.

FACTS:

On February 14, 1963, the plaintiff-appellant, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the

Philippines, Inc., commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte for that court to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264.1 otherwise known
as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well
as to declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27, series of 1962, of the municipality of Tanauan, Leyte,
null and void.

The Ordinance 23 levies and collects from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a
tax of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked, and Ordinance 27
levies and collects on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of
this municipality a tax of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of
volume capacity. Aside from the undue delegation of authority, appellant contends that it allows
double taxation, and that the subject ordinances are void for they impose percentage or specific
tax.

On October 7, 1963, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered judgment "dismissing
the complaint and upholding the constitutionality of [Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264] declaring
Ordinance Nos. 23 and 27 legal and constitutional; ordering the plaintiff to pay the taxes due
under the oft the said Ordinances; and to pay the costs."

From this judgment, the plaintiff Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which, in turn, elevated the case to Us pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 2, Republic Act No. 2264 an undue delegation of power,
confiscatory and oppressive?

Whether or not ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose
percentage or specific taxes?

Whether or not Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 unjust and unfair?

RULING:
 NO. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty,
belonging as a matter of right to every independent government, without being expressly
conferred by the people. It is a power that is purely legislative and which the central legislative
body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of the government without
infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception, however, lies in the case of
municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Legislative powers may be
delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern. With that, it cannot be
said that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 emanated from beyond the sphere of the
legislative power to enact and vest in local governments the power of local taxation.

NO. Undoubtedly, the taxing authority conferred on local governments under Section 2,
Republic Act No. 2264, is broad enough as to extend to almost "everything, accepting those
which are mentioned therein." As long as the text levied under the authority of a city or
municipal ordinance is not within the exceptions and limitations in the law, the same comes
within the ambit of the general rule, pursuant to the rules of exclucion attehus and exceptio
firmat regulum in cabisus non excepti

NO. The tax of one (P0.01) on each gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity
on all softdrinks, produced or manufactured, or an equivalent of 1- centavos per case, cannot
be considered unjust and unfair. An increase in the tax alone would not support the claim that
the tax is oppressive, unjust and confiscatory. Municipal corporations are allowed much
discretion in determining the reates of imposable taxes. This is in line with the constutional
policy of according the widest possible autonomy to local governments in matters of local
taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax Code (PD No. 231, July 1, 1973).
Unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, courts will go slow in writing off an
ordinance as unreasonable. Reluctance should not deter compliance with an ordinance such as
Ordinance No. 27 if the purpose of the law to further strengthen local autonomy were to be
realized.

ACCORDINGLY, the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise

known as the Local Autonomy Act, as amended, is hereby upheld and Municipal Ordinance No.
27 of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, series of 1962, re-pealing Municipal Ordinance No. 23,
same series, is hereby declared of valid and legal effect. Costs against petitioner-appellant.