The Geotechnical Baseline Report

as Risk Allocation Tool

Martin Th. van Staveren and Johan G. Knoeff

GeoDelft, Stieltjesweg 2, 2628 CK Delft, The Netherlands

{m.th.vanstaveren,j.g.knoeff}@geodelft.nl
Tel 0031 (0)15-2693583
Fax 0031 (0)15-2610821

Abstract. Today, timely and adequate attention for the risky subsoil is more than ever nec-
essary for a healthy European infrastructure industry. A key succes factor for effective risk
management is the contractual allocation of risks arising from differing subsoil conditions.
Since 2000, the Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR) is applied in a number of Dutch infra-
structure projects. The main objective of the GBR is to provide a clear contractual arrange-
ment for the allocation of the risks arising from differing site conditions.
The underlying philosophy of the GBR is a contractual statement, which is part of most
United States, UK, Dutch and probably other European building contracts. It states that the
owner is ultimately responsible for any soil conditions, which are materially different from
the anticipated soil conditions in geotechnical reports. This philosophy raises the question
about what soil conditions are materially different. The GBR provides the answer to that
question, by serving contractual definitions of the anticipated soil conditions. These soil
conditions can be contractually defined by geotechnical subsoil profiles or geotechnical
baseline parameters.
This paper decribes the proces to draw a GBR. A risk analysis results in the definition of
appropriate contractual baseline parameters. These baselines are the borderlines between
the subsoil responsibilities of owner and contractor. The benefits of the GBR will be illus-
trated by an example from a recent Dutch infrastructure project.
Keywords: geotechnical monitoring, risk management, geotechnical baseline report.

1 Introduction
The dark and unknown subsoil is still a serious risk factor for many infrastructure
projects. The subsoil will literally make or break a project. In the Netherlands
only, failure costs in the entire construction industry are assessed at 3.5 billion
euro per year. In the infrastructure segment the failure costs are assessed at 800
million euro per year (SBR 2003). Given the prominent role of the subsoil in in-
frastructure projects, ground-related failure costs will be at least several hundreds
of million euro per year, in the Netherlands only. For instance, in the Dutch pile
driving industry failure costs are assessed at 100 million euro per year. Extrapolat-
ing these figures to a European scale results into ground-related failure costs of at
least a few billion euro per year.

Robert Hack, Rag Azzam, and Robert Charlier (Eds.): LNES 104, pp. 777785, 2004.


c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2004
778 Martin Th. van Staveren and Johan G. Knoeff

Project Overrun
Planning Costs

Ramspol inflatable dam + 80 % unknown

Tramtunnel The Hague +100 % + 90 %
Stormsurge barrier Nieuwe Waterweg + 50 % + 40 %
Betuweroute freight railway unknown + 65 %
Splay railway Amsterdam Utrecht + 65 % + 25 %
Fig. 1. Planning an cost overruns of a selection of Dutch infrastructure projects.

Figure 1 presents a table with a number of Dutch infrastructure projects and

their overrun of planning and costs (Molendijk and Aantjes 2003)
Many infrastructure projects run out of time and/or budget, because of unfore-
seen behaviour of the subsoil. This situation is not limited to the Netherlands.
Numerous case histories examine that for over a century there has been a repeti-
tion of common reasons, which have led to failure to anticipate geological condi-
tions. This in turn has led to project failures (Fookes et al 2000). In other words,
differing site conditions of geological origin are a main source of construction risk
and associated problems in the construction industry.
What are exactly differing site conditions? Many standardised contract models,
such as the international FIDIC and the Dutch UAV have a so-called differing site
conditions clause. In the Unites States of America two differing site conditions are
defined in the Federal Differing Site Conditions Clause of 1984 (Essex 1997):
subsurface or latent physical conditions, which differ materially from those
indicated in the contract
unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual nature, which differ ma-
terially from those encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of
the character provided in the contract.
With such a definition contractual arrangements appear to be very clear about
which party is responsible for unforeseen ground conditions. But guidelines about
what ground conditions are to be considered as materially different and of a
unusal nature are often quite vague or even lacking at all. Far too many are the
worldwide examples of projects with serious and unfavourable disputes about dif-
ferings soil conditions (figure 2). The US National Committee on Tunneling tech-
nology reported that low level subsurface site investigations led to differing site
conditions claims averaging 28 % of the contract price (Smith 1996).

2 The Geotechnical Baseline Report

The presented difficulty with differing site conditions is not new at all. The first
Differing Site Conditions Clause was already defined and approved by the Presi-
dent of the United States itself in 1926 (Essex 1997). However, in spite of this
clause and its updates over time the effects of disputes about differing site condi-
 The Geotechnical Baseline Report as Risk Allocation Tool 779

tions on the construction industry increased to an unacceptable high level. Already

thirty years ago, in 1974, was mentioned that this type of claims would be a seri-
ous threat to the health of the entire construction industry (Douglas 1974).

Fig. 2. Differing site conditions? Who pays?

In order to stop this unfavourable development the Technical Committee on

Geotechnical Reports of the Underground Technology Research Council of the
United States developed the concept of the Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR)
in the nineteen nineties. It describes basically what type of site conditions are ma-
terially different, by the definition of baselines for the key risk factors in the sub-
soil. Risks associated with conditions consistent with or less adverse than the
baseline are allocated to the contractor. Those risks more adverse than the base-
lines are accepted by the owner. A GBR should have the status of contract docu-
ment.

3 The Geotechnical Baseline Report

in the Dutch Practice
In 2000 GeoDelft, the Dutch knowledge institute on geotechnics, introduced the
concept of the Geotechnical Baseline Report in the Netherlands. Simultaneously,
the GBR concept was applied in a number of Dutch infrastructure projects, such as
the undergound NorthSouth lightrail in the Dutch capital of Amsterdam and the
expansion of the sluices of IJmuiden. This approach resulted in an interactive in-
novation proces on subsoil risk allocation, together with the Dutch construction
industry. The experiences with the GBR in these projects are published by Herb-
schleb et al (2001) and Van Staveren and Litjens (2001) respectively.
780 Martin Th. van Staveren and Johan G. Knoeff

During a workshop in 2001 at GeoDelft in Delft, The Netherlands, more than

40 representives of owners, engineers, contractors and lawyers concluded jointly
that the concept of the GBR fits into the Dutch contracting practice, for both tradi-
tional contracts and more innovatie contracts, such as Design, Build and Mainte-
nance (CROW 2002).
In spite of this promising first results, the GBR is not yet completely accepted
and implemented in the Dutch and international practice. While geotechnical ex-
perts as Morgenstern (2000), Clayton (2001) and Knill (2003) advocate the impor-
tance of geotechnical risk management and a geotechnical benchmark or baseline
approach in particular, others like Hatem (1998) doubt whether the baseline con-
cept is fruitfull at all.
Although clear guidelines for preparing a GBR are presented by the American
Society of Civil Engineers (Essex 1997), the recent Dutch experiences learn that
there is a demand for know how about the Geotechncial Baseline Report. For
this reason GeoDelft developed a model with number of steps to arrive at a GBR.
In this paper this model is presented, together with a case study to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the model.

4 The 5 Steps to Write a GBR

In the next section the process to write a GBR is presented by 5 steps:
Step 1 Depcription of the project
Step 2 Inventarisation of project risks
Step 3 Qualification of project risks
Step 4 Allocation of project risks
Step 5 Writing a GBR
This 5 steps proces is illustrated by an example, the broadening of a highway in
the Netherlands. The example is real project, but for this paper simplefied and
schematised.

4.1 Step 1 Description of the Project

In the first step all relevant information is collected in order to make a complete
inventarisation of the project risks. The objectives of the project in terms of time,
money and quality become clear. At the end of the first step it is known for which
parts of the project a GBR has to be written. The following information is needed:

Project objectives;
Project history;
Project phases;
Project organisation;
Reference projects;
Geological and geotechnical information from literature and existing field tests.
 The Geotechnical Baseline Report as Risk Allocation Tool 781

Example
Rijkswaterstaat, part of the Dutch Ministry of Public Works, is planning to
broaden the motorway A2 from 4 to 6 lanes between the junctions Everdingen and
Empel. In this section, the highway crosses the Diefdijk, a primary water retaining
structure which reduces the inundation damage after a collapse of a main river
dike. This structure has to be renewed. Along the highway a traffic noise barrier
will be build.
A GBR has to be written in order to handle the risks dealing with the broading
of the highway. The reconstruction of the water retaining structure and construc-
tion of the noise barrier is not incorperated in the GBR. The next information was
available for the GBR:
Project description (inclusive phasing and organisation)
results of 36 CPTs
15 oedometer tests (5 steps,
16 triaxial tests (CU, single stage)
maps with groundwater tables
experience from reference projects

4.2 Step 2 Inventarisation of Project Risks

The next step in the GBR proces is the inventarisation of the (main) factors which
may influence the project objectives in a positive or negative way. Especially for
large projects, these factors are not always clear. An inventarisation can be done
using:
Evaluating experiences;
A brain storm session;
A qualitative risk analysis.
Ordinary risks managed with normal quality systems are not inventarised, in order
to limit the number of reasonable risks.

4.3 Step 3 Qualification of Project Risks

In order to determine whether risks are acceptable or not one has to qualify the
project risks. This is possible by qualifying the probability of occurance and con-
sequences after appearance. A simple method is by summarizing and scoring the
different riskcomponents of probability of occurance and consequences (see ex-
ample in figure 3).
For each project specific criteria for the risk scores can be defined.

Continuation of Example
The geotechnical risks were collected by checklists and evaluating experiences. In
a meeting with the client - owner, Rijkswaterstaat, the following items were jointly
considered as dominant project risks with a geotechnical cause:
782 Martin Th. van Staveren and Johan G. Knoeff

Probability of Low risk score High risk score

Risk occurance
Knowledge Little to none Much to intermediate
Period < 3 Months > 3 Months
Way With indications Without indications
Risk consequences
Time < 1 Month > 1 Month
Money (budget) < 50,000 Euro > 50,000 Euro
Quality, safety, image Risk consequences are Risk consequences are
acceptable not acceptable
Fig. 3. Method for qualification of project risks.

1. Large settlements after the road comes into service

2. Problems by driving piles into the ground
3. Instability of the embankment
4. Settlements of the present highway
5. Uncertainty of water pressures
6. Slow long term settlements
7. Influencing existing objects along the highway
8. Unequal settlements
These risks are qualified in the way as described above. The results of the qualifi-
cation of the project risks are given in figure 4. Relative large risks can be found
in the upper right corner. Small risks are situated in the lower left corner. It is
important that the client recognises and agrees on the main (geotechnical) project
risks. Therefore a meeting was organised at the end of step 3.

8
Occurance [risk score]

1
5
7

3 2 6
4

Consequence [risk score]

Minor risk Serious risk Priority risk

Fig. 4. project risks for the A2 highway.

 The Geotechnical Baseline Report as Risk Allocation Tool 783

4.4 Step 4 Allocation of Project Risks

This step forms the heart of the GBR. Geotechnical mechanisms which determine
the project risks are analysed in this step. Key risk drivers and baselines are cho-
sen. A key risk driver is a main and measurable geotechnical aspect or parameter
which determines or drives the project risk. The baselines are the numerical
parameters of the key risk driver to allocate project risks.
The baselines can be determined during a meeting. The client has to make clear
which risks he is willing to accept. The geotechnical experts translate this risk
profile into baselines for the project risks.
Sometimes additional measures have to be taken in order to reduce the risks,
for example additional site investigations and monitoring during construction. An
example for the baselines of the key risk driver consolidation cofficint, which
determines the rate of settlements, is given in figure 5.

Fig. 5. Key risk driver consolidation coefficient.

Continuation of Example:
The main project risk is unacceptable settlements after the road comes into service
(see figure 5). This risk is analysed by considering the subsoil profile and the set-
tlement and consolidation process. Key risk drivers are the thickness of the soft
soil layers, the compression parameters and consolidation coefficients of the soft
soil layers.
Baselines are derived from the results of the cone penetraton tests (CPTs) and
oedometer tests. The baselines for the compression parameters (calculated by the
method Buisman-Koppejan) are the 5% upper and lower limit of the results of
oedometer tests. The baseline for the thickness of the soft soil layers is the layer
thickness (+/- 0.5 m), which is established by a geologist from the geological pro-
file. The baselines for the compression parameters and consolidation coefficient
are pesented in figure 6.
784 Martin Th. van Staveren and Johan G. Knoeff

Cp Cs Cp Cs OCR cv
-8 -7
Clay 20.2-34.9 71.1-163 12.1-16.6 37.9-68.1 1.1-1.2 3.2E -1.3E
-8 -6
Peat 13.3-21.6 34.3-85.6 5.4-9.1 13.7-26.9 1.2-1.3 6.2E -1.2E

Fig. 6. Baselines intervals for the large settlements risk after the road comes into service

The GBR principle works as follows in practice. In case unacceptable large set-
tlements occure after the road comes into service, the contractor is responsible for
the consequences, if the key risk drivers soft soil layer thickness and the compres-
sion parameters and the consolidation coefficient is in between the jointly agreed
baselines. If this is not the case, if one of the key risk drivers is outside its baseline
interval, the client has to deal with the consequences. In summary, if too large
settlements occure due to differing soil conditions, it is now univocal who is re-
sponsible and which party has to pay additional costs and measures.

4.5 Step 5: Writing a GBR

The final step in the GBR process is the reporting phase. In this phase, the results
of the other steps are written down in a contractual document. With this document
it is clear who is responsible for unexpected events dealing with the subsoil. Dur-
ing the construction of the project, the GBR is an effective prevention against time
consuming and expensive legal and claim procedures.

5 Conclusions

The GBR is a simple method to allocate geotechnical project risks within a con-
struction contract. With the presented method it is univocal who is responsible and
who has to pay for additional costs and measures, in case of unexpected events
due to differing soil conditions. Since 2001 the GBR is succesfully used in several
large and smaller Dutch infrastructure projects. The GBR creates more risk
awareness and contractual transparancy about the subsoil. Currently, due to mar-
ket questions, possibilities are investigated to allocate also non-geotechnical risks
with the GBR method, such as the presence or traffic intensities or the presence of
unknown objects below the surface.
European infrastructure projects are often very large, complex and dealing with
a lot of interests. Therefore it is difficult to inventarise and manage the project
risks effectively. It is believed that the Geotechnical Baseline Report is a promis-
ing tool for effective the allocation of (geotechnical) project risks between owner
and contracter. With a well defined GBR the opportunity increases, to realize a
high quality project in time and within budget. If the GBR becomes a true docu-
ment for contract negotiation in the future, reduction of costs might even be possi-
ble, due to an increase in effective subsoil risk management. As a consequence,
reputation of both, client and contractor, will be established.
 The Geotechnical Baseline Report as Risk Allocation Tool 785

Acknowledgements

Special thanks go to the Directie Oost-Nederland of the Dutch Public Works De-
partment Rijkswaterstaat, for the permison to use the case in this article.

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