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had already been much publicized in their town.

This contention has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, our laws do
[G.R. No. 143130. July 10, 2000] not provide for a right to relief for cases arising purely from a breach of one's promise to
marry another, the chapter on breach of promise to marry proposed by the Code
Commission having been deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code apparently because
ELSA NATIVIDAD, et al. vs. RONALD TUNAC, et al. of lessons from other countries, particularly the United States and England, that the action
readily lends itself to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men (Congressional
SECOND DIVISION Record, vol. IV, No. 79, 14 May 1949, 2352).

Gentlemen: In cases where this Court has allowed moral or exemplary damages arising from similar
circumstances, there was found moral seduction or misrepresentation (Gashem Shookat
Basksh v. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115 (1993)); Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (109
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 10 2000. Phil. 629 (1960)). In Baksh, it was held -

G.R. No. 143130. (Elsa Natividad, et al. vs. Ronald Tunac, et al.) [T]hat where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
This case originated in a complaint for damages filed by petitioner Elsa Natividad against representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
respondent Ronald Tunac for breach of promise to marry. The Regional Trial Court, Branch proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
81, Quezon City rendered judgment for petitioner, ordering respondent to pay moral and congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
exemplary damages, but, on appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
It appears that petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury
Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents, petitioners Marino and to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
Clarita Natividad and respondent Eusebio and Elisa Tunac, resided. At age nineteen (19), essential, however, that such injury should have been
the two became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
Pasig City to get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for public policy.
employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked
Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded
in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by (Id., p. 128)
promising to marry her.
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June by his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two
1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, became lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction
1992, Ronald and his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, contemplated by the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where
went to Elsa's house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter. the defendant is in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see
any of these circumstances in this case.

The two families agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 as Elsa's sister had gotten
married that year, and they thought it was not good to have two weddings in a family within In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the
the same year. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after
while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth Elsa's miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of
to a premature baby which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge a relationship gone awry.
from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back to her parents so her
mother could take care of her during her postnatal period. During said period, Ronald For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
occasionally slept in Elsa's house.

It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the
former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that
meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Hence, this

Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became
pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement