Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec.
2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 1 of 10
Art. III, Sec. 2
Who can invoke?
1. People vs. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 43
Facts: Accused-appellant (Chua Ho San) prayed for his acquittal and the reversal of the
judgment finding him guilty of transporting, without legal authority, the regulated
substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further
amended by R.A. 7659. The trial court sentenced him to die by lethal injection. In view
thereof, the judgment was brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
before the RTC. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the charge was amended for illegal
transport of a regulated drug, to which he was convicted. The RTC found the
prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving the charge. It characterized
the search as incidentals to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence, it allowed the
admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted
the futility of informing Chua of his constitutional right under custodial investigation
considering the language barrier, and such irregularity was rectified when the accused
was duly arraigned and actually participated in the trial of the case.
Issue: Can aliens invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the search made was not incidental to an arrest.
There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. From all indications, the search was nothing
like a fishing expedition. Indeed, the likelihood of Chua having actually transported the
items cannot be quickly dispelled. But the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded. The decision of the trial court
was reversed and set aside and the accused-appellant was acquitted of the crime
charged.
NOTES TO PONDER AND HEADBANG ON:
POLITICAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY; SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES; THE CONSTITUTION BARS STATE INTRUSIONS TO A PERSONS BODY,
PERSONAL EFFECTS OR RESIDENCE EXCEPT IF CONDUCTED BY VIRTUE OF A
VALID SEARCH WARRANT; EXCEPTIONS. Enshrined in the Constitution is the
inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the
right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not
merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the
Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizure does not, of
course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even
an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable
from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Verily, the rule is, the Constitution
bars State intrusions to a persons body, personal effects or residence except if
conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure
outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; otherwise such search
and seizure become unreasonable within the meaning of the aforementioned
constitutional provision. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been
deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2)
seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit:
(1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.
2. FCC vs. AT&T, 562 US____ March 1, 2011
Facts: The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make records and
documents publicly available upon request, subject to several statutory exemptions. One
of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law enforcement records the disclosure of
which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.
One of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law enforcement records the
disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.. CompTel, a trade association, submitted a FOIA request
for documents AT&T had provided to the Federal Communications Commission
Enforcement Bureau during an investigation of that company. The Bureau found that
Exemption 7(C) applied to individuals identified in AT&Ts submissions but not to the
company itself, concluding that corporations do not have personal privacy interests as
required by the exemption. The FCC agreed with the Bureau, but the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit did not. It held that Exemption 7(C) extends to the personal
privacy of corporations, reasoning that personal is the adjective form of the term
person, which Congress has defined, as applicable here, to include corporations.
Issue: Do corporations have personal privacy?

Ruling: No, the US Supreme Court rejected the argument that because person is
defined for purposes of FOIA to include a corporation, the phrasepersonal privacy in
Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The protection in FOIA against disclosure
of law enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations.
DNA Testing & Suspicionless Drug Tests
3. Pimentel vs Comelec, GR 157870, 3 Nov. 2008, 570 SCRA 410
Facts: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited
and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug
testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which
will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing: Students of secondary and tertiary schools, Officers and
employees of public and private offices, All persons charged before the prosecutor's
office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test, all candidates
for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Issue: Are the drugs tests required under RA 9165 suspicionless and valid?
Ruling: No. A mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas
of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants
in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled
out and are impleaded against their will. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse
still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
4. Lucas vs Lucas, GR 190710, 6 June 2011
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 2 of 10
Facts: Petitioner filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City. Respondent was
not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to
establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court and obtained a copy of
the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form
and substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has
any objection to the petition to file his opposition. After learning of the September 3,
2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because
petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He
argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the
acceptability of DNA evidence.
Issue: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a search which must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid?
Ruling: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be
stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court.
The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA
testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the
DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a
DNA testing.
Anticipatory Warrants/Service of Warrant/Media Ride-along
5. United States vs Grubbs, 547 US 90 (2007)

Facts: A magistrate judge issued an anticipatory search warrant for respondent Grubbs
house based on a federal officers affidavit. The affidavit explained that the warrant
would not be executed until a parcel containing a videotape of child pornography which
Grubbs had ordered from an undercover postal inspector was received at, and
physically taken into, the residence. The affidavit also referred to two attachments
describing the residence and the items to be seized. After the package was delivered and
the search commenced, Grubbs was given a copy of the warrant, which included the
attachments but not the supporting affidavit. When he admitted ordering the videotape,
he was arrested, and the videotape and other items were seized. Following his
indictment for receiving child pornography, Grubbs moved to suppress the seized
evidence, arguing, inter alia, that the warrant was invalid because it failed to list the
triggering condition. The District Court denied the motion, and Grubbs pleaded guilty.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the warrant ran afoul of the Fourth
Amendments particularity requirement, which, under Circuit precedent, applied to the
conditions precedent to an anticipatory warrant.
Issue: What are anticipatory warrants? What are the requirements/conditions to make
anticipatory warrants valid and constitutional?
Ruling: The court defined an anticipatory search warrant as a warrant based upon an
affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain
evidence of crime will be located at a specified place. The court further held that the
probable-cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be found when the search is
conducted, all warrants are in a sense, anticipatory. Anticipatory warrants are, therefore,
no different in principal from ordinary warrants. They require a magistrate to determine
(1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive will be
on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed. It should be noted,
however, that where the anticipatory warrant places a condition (other than the mere
passage of time) upon its execution, the first of these determinations goes not merely to
what will probably be found if the condition is met. Rather, the probability
determination for a conditioned anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood that
the condition will occur, and thus that a proper object of seizure will be on the described
premises. Two pre-requisites of probability must be satisfied (1) It must be true that if
the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place (2) there is probable cause to believe that the
triggering condition will occur.
6. Wilson vs Layne, 526 US 603
Facts: While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners son in their home, Respondents
invited a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany them. The warrant
made no mention of such a media ride-along. The officers early morning entry into
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 3 of 10
the home prompted a confrontation with petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed
that the son was not in the house. The reporters observed and photographed the
incident but were not involved in the execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never
published the photographs they took of the incident. Petitioners sued the officers in
their personal capacities for money damages contending that the officers actions in
bringing the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant
violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied respondents motion
for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In reversing, the Court of
Appeals declined to decide whether the officers actions violated the Fourth
Amendment, but concluded that because no court had held at the time of the search that
media presence during a police entry into a residence constituted such a violation, the
right allegedly violated was not clearly established and thus respondents were
entitled to qualified immunity.
Issue: Is the service of warrant through media ride along, valid?
Ruling: NO, the service of warrant through media ride along, is not valid. A media
ride-along in a home violates the Fourth Amendment. However, because the state of
the law was not clearly established at the time the entry in the case took place;
Respondent officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
Media ride alongs violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to
bring members of the media or other third parties into their home during the execution
of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the
warrants execution. The Amendment embodies centuries-old principles of respect for
the privacy of the home, which apply where, as here, police enter a home under the
authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in the
warrant. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were entitled to
enter petitioners home that they were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer
with them. The Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a
warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. It is certain that the
presence of the reporters, who did not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist
the police in their task, was not related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the
apprehension of petitioners son. Taken in the entirety, the reasons advanced by
respondents to support the reporters presence publicizing the governments efforts to
combat crime, facilitating accurate reporting on law enforcement activities, minimizing
police abuses, and protecting suspects and the officers fall short of justifying media
ride-alongs. Although the presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant
may in some circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third
parties was not.
7. LA County vs Retelle, 550 US 609 (2007)
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 4 of 10

Facts: Respondents led a 42 U. S. C. 1983 suit, alleging that their Fourth Amendment could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when Los Angeles constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
County Sheriffs Department deputies, who were executing a valid warrant to search a
house but were unaware that the potentially armed suspects being sought had sold the Issues: 1. Are AMLA bank inquiry orders valid and constitutional? 2. Must a bank
house to respondents and moved out, ordered the unclothed respondents out of bed inquiry order under Sec. 11 of the AMLA comply with the constitutional requirements
and required them to stand for a few minutes before allowing them to dress. The District on search warrant?
Court granted the defendants summary judgment. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit found
Ruling: 1. Valid and constitutional, given that the statutory right to privacy will not
that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment and were not entitled to qualied
prevent the courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway upon the fulfillment of the
immunity because a reasonable deputy would have stopped the search upon
requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA or Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy
discovering that respondents were of a different race than the suspects and would not
Act; at the same time, the owner of the accounts have the right to challenge whether the
have ordered respondents from their bed.
requirements were indeed complied with.
Issue: Did the deputies violate the Fourth Amendment? In executing a search warrant,
2. No. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it
what action may an officer take?
contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property.
Ruling: The deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Ofcers executing a search
A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure
warrant may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own
of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the
safety and the efcacy of the search. Upon encountering respondents, the deputies acted
examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-
reasonably to secure the premises. The presence of one race did not eliminate the
bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such
possibility that suspects of a different race were in the residence as well. In ordering
banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on
respondents out of bed, the deputies acted reasonably to ensure their own safety, since
particular details such as the account holders record of deposits and transactions.
blankets and bedding can conceal a weapon and since one of the suspects was known to
own a rearm. There is no allegation that the detention was prolonged or that
9. Safford United School District vs Redding, 557 US__ (2009)
respondents were prevented from dressing any longer than necessary to protect the
deputies safety. Facts: Due to a declaration from another student that Savana Redding, an eighth grader
at Safford Middle School, might have ibuprofen with her, which was a violation of the
Personal Determination and Probable Cause
schools policy, a strip-search was conducted by school officials on Savana. They
searched Savana's backpack but found no evidence of drug use, drug possession, or any
8. Republic vs Eugenio, GR 174629, 14 Feb. 2008
other illegal or improper conduct. They then took the girl to the nurse's office and
Facts: Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations concerning the ordered her to undress. Not finding any pills in Savana's pants or shirt, the officials
award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and ordered the girl to pull out her bra and panties and move them to the side. The
the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner Anti-Money Laundering observation of Savana's genital area and breasts also failed to reveal any contraband.
Council (AMLC). The CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial
Savanas mother then filed suit against the school district and the school officials
transactions of certain individuals involved in the award, including respondent
responsible for the search alleging that her daughters Fourth Amendment right to be
Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the PBAC Technical
free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. However, the district court
Committee, NAIA-IPT3 Project.5 By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the
Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019.6 The search revealed that
initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on
Alvarez maintained eight (8) bank accounts with six (6) different banks.7
rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth
Lilia Cheng, wife of the accused, argues that the AMLA, being substantive penal statute Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It
has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion
investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164. Thus, she concludes, reasonably related to the circumstances.
her subject bank accounts which she and her husband Pantaleon Alvarez jointly owns,
Now the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, hence this petition.

Issue: Can school officials strip-search a 13 year old girl student based on a declaration
of a student claiming to have received drugs from the 13 year old girl?
Ruling: This depends on the facts. But in this case, the Supreme Court held that
Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her
underwear for non-prescription painkillers. The Court reiterated that, based on a
reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband
must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school
officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to
her underwear.
On the liability of the of the school administrators, the Court, however, held that they
were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were
disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth
Amendment right.
Searching Questions
10. Tabujara vs People, GR 175162, 29 Oct. 2008
Facts: The petitioner assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the CA in CA GR 63280
denying its petition for review and directing the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Br. II to
proceed with the trial of criminal cases nos. 99-29031 and 99-29038 as well as the October
23, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insist that the
orders of the court should be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion because the finding of probable cause was based solely on the unseen
statement of Mauro de Lara who never appeared during the preliminary investigation.
Issue: Can the judge base his findings of probable cause on a statement of a witness
whom he did not personally examine under oath?
Ruling: No. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only
upon finding of probable cause personally determined by the judge after the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he/she
may produce and particularly describing the person to be seized. In the case at bar,
Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed May 2, 2000 and
July 4, 2000 orders finding probable cause to hold petitioner liable for trial and to issue
warrant of arrest because it was based solely in the statement of witness de Lara whom
Judge Adriatico did not personally examine and under oath; neither did he asked
propound questions. He merely stated that in the assailed May 2, 2000 Order, he
overlooked that said statements of de Lara, nevertheless, without conducting a personal
examination on said witness, Judge Adriatico still found de Laras allegations sufficient
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 5 of 10
to establish probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirement imposed by the
Constitution.
Particularity of Description
11. Yao et al vs People, GR 168306, 29 Oct. 2008
Facts: Petitioners are incorporators and officers of Masagana Gas Corporation which is
engaged in the refilling, sale, and distribution of LPG products. Private respondents
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation are two of the largest
bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines: GASUL and SHELLANE,
respectively. Petron is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and
distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products, and its
trademarks while Pilipinas Shell is the only corporation authorized to allow refillers and
distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute SHELLANE LPG containers and products.
On April 3, 2003, the NBI filed two applications for search warrant against petitioners
and other occupants of Masagana compound for violation of sec. 155, in relation to sec.
170 of RA 8293 (The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines) for alleged
production, selling, and distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and
bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell without
authority and in violation of the rights of the said entities. On April 22, 2003, petitioners
filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash the two search warrants and on April 30, 2003,
Masagana, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor
Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine. Both were denied, including their MRs. CA
affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue: Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description requirement?
Ruling: Yes. The two search warrants satisfied the particularity of description
requirement.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may
be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The
law, however, does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities;
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for applicants to obtain a search warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described,
the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require
absolute concordance between those seized and those described in the warrant.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie would suffice.

The items to be seized under the search warrants in question were sufficiently described
with particularity. The articles to be confiscated were restricted to a certain enumeration
and the described items are clearly limited only to those which bear direct relation to the
offense (violation of sec. 155 of RA 8293). Hence, the requirement of particularity of
description is satisfied. The indication of the accurate sizes of the Gasul and Shellane
LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
Chain of Custody Rule
12. Lopez vs People, GR 184037, 19 June 2007
Facts: On April 23, 2003, PO2 Atienza, a member of Task Force of the Mandaluyong City
Police Station, while conducting a routinary foot patrol saw petitioner at a distance of
seven meters walking in his direction.
He saw petitioner, walking with head bowed, looking at his hand, which held a plastic
sachet containing a crystalline substance. Thereafter, PO2 Atienza introduced himself to
petitioner as a member of the Mandaluyong police, arrested him, and informed him of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. He then brought petitioner to
the Mandaluyong Medical Center for a check-up. He also confiscated the plastic sachet
and brought it to the police station. He prepared a request and then placed the markings
APAhis initialson the plastic sachet. Ruling: No. In convicting the appellant, the RTC and CA relied on the evidentiary
Issues: 1) What is the chain of custody rule on search and seizure? 2) Does the
presumption of regularity rule apply to chain of custody rule?
Ruling: 1) As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened
to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled
the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented
in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.
3) No. The presumption of regularity does not apply to the chain custody rule. In case at
bar, the courts heavily relied on the testimony of PO2 Atienza and, in the same way,
banked on the presumption of regularity. It bears stressing that this presumption only
arises in the absence of contradicting details that would raise doubts on the regularity in
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 6 of 10
the performance of official duties. Where, as in this case, the police officers failed to
comply with the standard procedure prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the
presumption of regularity.
13. People vs Alejandro, GR 176350, 10 Aug. 2011
Facts: The RTC the appellant John-John Alejandro for violating RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged that he sold shabu to an
undercover police on September 1, 2002. The appellant appealed the case in the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court stating that the
defense already admitted the admissibility of certain evidences against the appellant
and further stated that, in the absence of any motive to do otherwise, the police officers
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Thus, the appellant
raised the matter to the Supreme Court claiming that the RTC erred in convicting him
because the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity of the seized item, with police
having failed to mark and photograph the seized item, therefore, his guilt was not
proven to be beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Is the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed
by the police officers applicable in the prosecution of RA 9165?
presumption that the police officers have performed their duties in a regular manner.
However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. The presumption of regularity is assumed only
when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. If there is any official
act that is questioned, the presumption of regularity is no longer applied. In the case at
bar, it was clear that the officers failed to follow the proper procedures stipulated in
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Simply put, the Court said that since
they were not able to properly mark the evidence, the integrity of the evidence has been
compromised, therefore we can never be fully certain that it was still the same item
seized on the day of the arrest. The failure to follow the procedure is the reason why the
accused was acquitted by the Court because his guilt was not established to be beyond
reasonable doubt.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures
14. Valeroso vs People, GR 164815, 3 Sept. 2009
Facts: On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of
arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found
and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board
a tricycle. He was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was
found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and

Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to have not been
issued to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of
his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom),
some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a locked
cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D.
1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City. On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the same. Valeroso now appeals before the Supreme Court for
acquittal alleging that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if granted would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.
Issue: Should the search be considered incident to a valid arrest? How should within
the area of his immediate control be construed?
Ruling: Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
However there is an exception which is that the search should not be strained beyond
what is needed to serve its purpose.
Furthermore, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either
on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase
within the area of his immediate control means the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed
in the clothing of the person arrested.
In the present case, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, from where
the officers found the weapon, could no longer be considered as an area within his
immediate control because there was no way for Valeroso to take any weapon or to
destroy any evidence that could be used against him. Hence, the warrantless search in
this case could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest.
15. Arizona vs Gant, 556 US 2009
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 7 of 10
Facts: The case involved Rodney J. Gant, who was arrested by Tucson, Arizona, police
and charged with driving on a suspended drivers license. Police arrested Gant in a
friend's yard after he had parked his vehicle and was walking away. Gant and all other
suspects on the scene were then secured in police patrol cars. The officers then searched
Gant's vehicle. After finding a weapon and a bag of cocaine, they also charged him with
possession of a narcotic for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Issue: Up to what extent may a warrantless search on cars be allowed?
Ruling: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent
occupants arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the
vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions. The exception for a search incident to a
lawful arrest applies only to the area from within which (an arrestee) might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Warrantless Arrests
16. People vs Gadiana, GR 184761, 8 Sept. 2010
Facts: Julius Gadiana was convicted by the lower court of possessing 0.09 grams of
shabu in 2 heat-sealed transparent plastic packets.
The prosecutions version of events says that about 3:40pm on 7 Feb., 2004, PO1 Busico,
PO3 Dinauanao, and PO2 Ferrer and three others were conducting a saturation drive
when they chanced upon Gadiana holding the two plastic bags. Thereafter, they
approached Gadiana , identified themselves as policemen, and confiscated the sachets.
According to Busicos testimony, it was Ferrer who prepared and brought the request-
letter for lab examination.
Gadianas version: He denied ever holding two plastic bags. According to him, what
happened was that three of the policemen only passed by him, after which, PO1 Busico
uttered, "This is the one, this is the one. This is very obvious," held appellants arms and
dipped into his pocket.
The forensic report admitted that only the existence but not the sources of the two
sachets was admitted.
Issues: 1) Was the warrantless arrest of the accused valid? 2) Was the prosecution able to
establish the chain of custody?
Ruling: 1) No. PO1 Busico only saw that Gadiana was placing two plastic sachets into
his pocket. This, in itself, does not meet any of the requirements under the rules for
warrantless arrests as provided in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court:

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
2) The Court said, Except for the charge sheet prepared against appellant which stated
that evidence consisted of "two (2) heat-sealed clear plastic sachets containing shabu
with markings JGR-1 and JGR-2," nowhere in the record is a showing that the however, admits of exceptions, namely: (a)Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
marking was done in the presence of appellant or his representatives or that a physical
inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken as required under paragraph
1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reading:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The polices failure to comply with this requirement essentially makes it so that they
failed in establishing the chain of custody. There are exceptions to this requirement, but
prosecution failed to establish justifiable grounds for such exceptions.
Art. III, Sec. 3
17. People vs Racho, GR 186529, 3 Aug. 2010
Facts: On May 20, 2003, appellant was caught possessing a suspected drug during a
police operation. He was charged for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting
or delivering; and, of Section 11 for possessing dangerous drugs. During the
arraignment, he denied liability and pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8,
2004, the RTC convicted him on the first charge but acquitted him of the second. Hence,
he appealed and averred that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after
seizure. He assailed the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 8 of 10
warrantless search. He questioned the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the
ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Issue: Should the confiscated items be considered fruits of the poisonous tree and,
thus, admissible in evidence?
Ruling: The case is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of
the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out
with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription,
arrest; (b) Search of evidence in "plain view;" (c) Search of a moving vehicle; (d)
Consented warrantless search; (e) Customs search; (f) Stop and Frisk; and, (g) Exigent
and emergency circumstances.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must
precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense.
He was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground
for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to
commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would
not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently,
the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither were the arresting officers
impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant.

18. People vs De la Cruz, GR 185717, 8 June 2011
Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007
Decision2 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accused denied selling shabu
to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense of denial and alleged a frame-up
by the arresting officers which was supported by some witnesses.
Issue: Is the non-compliance with said Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, fatal and renders and
accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible? Was the
prosecution able to establish the chain of custody?
Ruling: Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that
no buy-bust operation against appellant ever took place. The prosecutions failure to
submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from
the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
As the Supreme Court stated; In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and
non-compliance with the chain of custody, We cannot but acquit accused-appellant on
the ground of reasonable doubt. The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt. In all criminal prosecutions, without
regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men
who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for
a crime he did not commit
19. Meralco vs Lim, GR 184769, 5 Oct. 2010
Facts: On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering
Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. Copies of the letter were also inserted
in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the
matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By
Memorandum1[3]dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs
Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 9 of 10
Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang
Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt
of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from
unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.
Issue: May an employee invoke the remedies available under the writ of habeas data
where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an
anonymous letter posted thereinimputing to her disloyalty to the company and
calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to informs her of the
details thereof?
Ruling: Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a
quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within
the province of a writ of habeas data. the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.2[16]
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of
the Constitution.3[17] It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for
her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiters.
20. Pollo vs David, GR 181881, 18 Oct. 2011
Facts: On January 3, 2007, an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson David was marked Confidential and sent through a courier service from
a certain Alan San Pascual. The letter-complaint indicated that a certain attorney of
CSC is lawyering people with pending cases in the Commission. Furthermore, the letter-
complaint said that the lawyer is from the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na
division.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in
information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an
investigation and specifically to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna division.
Text messages were also sent informing the employees of the ongoing copying of
computer files.
The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs
(OLA). It was found out that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied
from the computer assigned to and being used by Briccio Ricky A. Pollo were draft
pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals.
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 10 of 10

Pollo, filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the letter-
complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he
lawyering for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a
fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his
computer. He asserted that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of
his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their
sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right
to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure.
upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the
process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective
dispenser of administrative justice. The fact that these documents were retrieved from
the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is
because he had a control of the said computer. The ephemeral nature of computer files,
that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action.

The CSC issued a Resolution finding prima facie case against Pollo and charged him
with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees). He then filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court
of Appeals but it was denied.

Issue: Was the search conducted on Pollos office computer and the copying of his
personal files without his knowledge and consent violate his constitutional right to
privacy?

Ruling: No. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a
facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. However, the constitutional
guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable
searches and seizures.

First, if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, he can be protected of search

and seizure. Justice Harlan of the US Supreme Court noted that the existence of privacy
right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either
in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files.
Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share
with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or
visitors. He described his office as full of people, his friends, unknown people and
that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is
personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, and drafting cases on
appeals. The CSC also had a policy regulating the use of office computers.

Second, a search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at

inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. If, indeed, a CSC employee was
found to be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with pending
cases before the Commission, then such scenario would undeniably cast clouds of doubt