Reviewer in Criminal Law I

Reviewer in Criminal Law I
Luis B. Reyes
By: Princess Joie Macalinga
A.
What is Criminal Law?
Criminal Law is that branch of public substantive law which defines crimes, treats of their
nature, and provides for their punishment. It is a branch of public law because it belongs
to that species of law which governs the relationship between the government and its
citizens. The purpose of criminal law is the protection of the public, and the suppression
of crime and the punishment, if not the suppression, of the criminal class. (22 CJS 1).
What is a Crime?
A crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or
commanding it.
Dual Nature. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character:
a. As an offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order; and
b. As an offense against private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of
treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part
of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private
person injured by the crime). (Nuguid v. Nicdao, 502 SCRA 93)
History of the Penal Code.
a. Code of Kalantiaw
b. Spanish Kodigo Penal
c. Correcional Code
d. Committee headed by Anacleto Diaz (AO #94).
What are the sources of Philippine Criminal Law? (A-S-P)
a. Act no. 3815 or the Revised Penal Code as created pursuant to Administrative Order
No. 94; enacted January 1, 1932; based on the Spanish Penal Code, US Penal Code,
and Philippine Supreme Court decisions.;
b. Special Penal Laws;
c. Penal Presidential Decrees issued during Martial Law.
Why jurisprudence or court decisions are not sources of criminal law?
Court decisions are not sources of criminal law because they merely explain the
meaning of, and apply the law, as enacted by the legislative branch of the government.
Who has the power to define and punish crimes?
The state has the authority, under its police power, to define, punish crime, and
to lay down the rules of criminal procedure.
Is the power of the law-making body to enact penal legislation absolute?
No. The power of the law-making body to enact penal legislation is subject to
limitations. Namely, those provided in:
(1) Sec. 22, Art. III No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted;
CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIWER: PJM 1

(2) Sec. 14 (1), Art. III No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
What is an ex post facto law?
Ex post facto law is a law which operates retroactively. One that punishes an act or
omission done before the effectivity date of the law.
What is bill of attainder?
Bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.
Why bill of attainder and ex post facto law prohibited in the Philippines?
A nation like ours with an entrenched bill of rights or a written constitution will
not allow something that will prejudice the rights and interest of its people.
Noticeably, it is also prohibited not only in Section 22, Art. III of the Constitution
but also in Articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which read as:
Article 21, RPC. No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by
law prior to its commission;
Article 22, RPC. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favour
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule
5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Suppose on May 14, 1932, A bought .45 caliber pistol to B. Said transaction is without
any papers. Later on, A attended a town fiesta and met with his friends. They had a
drinking spree, A, who is already drunk at that time, took his gun and fired towards a
vacant lot. C get mad on A because of the said incident and when RA 10591 or the
Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act had been passed, C filed a
case against A for violation of the same. Will the case prosper?
The case will not prosper. No criminal liability would attach to such possession of
said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit. A must be absolved.
As clearly stated by the SC, in the case of People v. Jabinal,1 no one should be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable. The
latter was strengthen by Sec.22, Article 3 of the Constitution, No ex post facto law or bill
of attainder shall be enacted.
What are the two theories in Criminal Law?
The two theories involved are Classical Theory and Positivist Theory.
Under the Classical Theory, the basis of criminal liability is human freewill and the
purpose of the penalty is retribution. Man is a moral creature with an absolutely free will
to choose between good and evil. Hence, it establish a mechanical and direct proportion
between crime and penalty. Remarkably, is the scant regard of the Classical Theory to
human element.
On the other hand, under the Positivist Theory, man is constrained to do wrong, in spite
of or contrary to his volition because of his social environment. Herein, crime is a natural
and social phenomenon, as such, it cannot be checked by the abstract principle of law.
1
People v. Jabinal ,Facts: Jabinal was appointed as Secret Agent and as PC Provincial Commander. Regard thereat,
an authorization to bear a firearm was issued to him. In 1964, he was accused for using cal. 22 without first
securing necessary permit. TC, Jabinal is liable.
Revised Penal Code is based mainly on Principles of the Classical Theory.
What are the constitutional right of the accused?
1. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of property (Sec. 11, Art. 3);
2. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. (Sec.12 (1), Art.3);
3. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (Sec. 12 (2), Art. 3);
4. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (Sec. 12 (3), Art. 3);
5. All persons, except those charged with offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not required. (Sec. 13, Art. 3);
6. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(Sec. 14 (1), Art. 3);
7. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to have speedy, impartial, and
public trial; to meet the witnesses face to face; and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Sec. 14 (2), Art. 3);
8. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. (Sec. 16, Art. 3);
9. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (Sec. 17, Art. 3);
10. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment
inflicted; (Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3);
11. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Sec. 21, Art. 3).
Can the accused waived all his rights?
No. There are rights of the accused which may be waived and rights which may
not be waived.
Those rights which may be waived are personal in nature. It includes, the right of
the accused to confrontation and cross-examination. Meanwhile, those rights which may
not be waived involved public interest which may be affected. It includes, the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Article 1. Effectivity Date. January 1, 1932

Article 2. Application of its provisions.
Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of
this code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters, and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction,
against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine Ship or Airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
Obligations and Securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction to these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise
of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
What is Philippine Archipelago?
Philippine Archipelago, as used in Article 2 of the RPC, pertains to Article 1 of the National
Territory. Thus,
The National Territory comprises the Philippine Archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction; consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains;
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions form part of the internal waters
of the Philippines.
What are the three Scope of Application and Characteristics of Criminal Law? Distinguished. (G-
T-P)
(a) General (Who);
(b) Territorial (Where);
(c) Prospective (When).
(a) General
Criminal Law is said to be General in nature as it is binding on all persons who live or
sojourn in Philippine territory as provided in Article 14 of the new Civil Code. Certain
exceptions to the general application of criminal law are well-established in law and
jurisprudence namely those provided in:
(1) Treaties or treaty provisions;
(2) Laws of Preferential Application; and
(3) Exemptions under the principles of public international law.
Example of Cases under General Applicability of Law
Supposed A, an American, was apprehended for illegal possession of firearms. During
the trial, he contended that as an American it is his constitutional right to keep and bear
arms without any need of applying and securing a government license. Is As contention
correct?
As contention is bereft of merit.

A will be correct if he committed the same in the USA and/or if he is a head of
state and diplomatic representative who, by virtue of the customary law of nations, are
not subject to the Philippine territorial jurisdiction.
It should be noted that the Philippines is a sovereign state with the obligation and
right to uphold its laws and maintain order within its domain, and with general jurisdiction
to punish persons for offenses committed within its territory, regardless of the nationality
of the offender.
Criminal Law is binding whether you are a Filipino Citizen or Foreigner or someone
who is temporary residing in the Philippines. This is because, in the latters stay here they
are also protected by our laws.
U.S vs. Sweet
GR no. 448, September 20, 1901
Facts:
Sweet was an employee of the US Army in the Philippines. He assaulted a prisoner of war
for which he was charged with the crime of physical injuries. Sweet interposed the
defense that the fact that he was an employee of the US military authorities deprived the
court of the jurisdiction to try and punish him.
Issues:
a. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner
of war is an offense under the Penal Code;
b. WON, if it is an offense under RPC, will the Civil Tribunal has jurisdiction over
him even if he is a military character.
Rulings:
a. Yes, it is still consider an offense under the Penal Code regardless of its inclusion in the
Spanish Code of Military Justice.
b. The case is open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought
before them for trial, unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary.
Silverio Valdez v. Antonio Lucero and Celestino Jimenez

GR no. L-246
Facts:
Valdez is a member of a recognized guerrilla and hence a member of the US Armed
Forces in the Philippines, in North Luzon. On January 17, 1945, he killed Juan Ponce with

bolo, dagger, and other weapons. Hence, the Fiscal filed the case and Valdez has been
detained as a provincial prisoner in Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
Issue:
WON the civil courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
Ruling:
- Even in times of war, the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the military
courts or general court-martial over soldiers of the Philippine army, provided, that in
the place of the commission of the crime no hostilities are in progress and civil courts
are functioning. (Valdez vs. Lucero, 76 Phil 356).
Reminder:
- Civil Courts have jurisdiction over murder cases committed by persons subject to
military law;
- The civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the military courts or general courts-
martial over soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
- Jurisdiction of Military Courts: over those service-connected crimes; Art. 54 to 70;
Art. 72 to 92; and Art. 95 to 97 of the Articles of War and those under Sec. 1 of RA
7055
- Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over members of the AFP: Sec. 1 of RA 7055, Members
of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized
under the RPC, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless
of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be
natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the
offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court is service connected.
Supposed, military court take cognizance of the case. What law will apply?
When the military court takes cognizance of the case involving a person subject
to military law, the Articles of War apply, not the RPC or other penal law.
Supposed, A was convicted for a crime before the Court Martial. Not satisfied with the
penalty imposed, B, the petitioner, filed a case before the RTC. Will the case prosper?
No. A court-martial is a court and the prosecution of an accused before it is a
criminal, not an administrative case. Therefore it would be under certain
conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the accused for the same offense,
because the latter would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Up to what period the military commission does holds its jurisdiction?
A military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war
continues. This includes the period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to
the effective date of a treaty of peace.
War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as
in the time of war. (Kuroda v. Jalandoni).

Is the general application of the criminal law absolute?
No. There are cases where our criminal law does not apply even if the crime is
committed by a person residing or sojourning in the Philippines. Thus, the
exceptions provided in Article 2 of the RPC and Art. 14 of the nCC.
Article 2, RPC. Except as provided in treaties and laws of preferential application.
Article 14, nCC. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.
Examples of Cases falling under the exceptions of General Applicability of Criminal Law
Antonio Trillanes, Jr. v. Oscar Pimentel, 556 SCRA 471
- All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or
hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
Liang v. People, 335 SCRA 1252
- Liang is not covered by the immunity because the commission of a crime is
not part of the performance of official duty. Slandering a person is not
covered by the agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of
a crime such as defamation in the name of official duty.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
A diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State for
all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted, and
punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On
the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy functional immunities, that
is, only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the
fulfilment of its purposes.3
Rule in International Law
A foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. 4
Principles of Public International Law
2
Liang v. People. Facts: Liang, an economist for the ADB, was charged of grave oral defamation before MTC of
Mandaluyong City. He claimed immunity from prosecution on account his status as a consultant of the ADB
pursuant to the agreement on immunity from legal process between the government and the ADB.
3
Id.
4
Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438
Persons exempt from the operation of Philippine Criminal Law by virtue of the
principles of public international law include (a) Sovereigns and other chiefs of State; (b)
Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges daffaires.
It is a well-established principle of international law that diplomatic
representative and their official retinue, possess immunity from the criminal jurisdiction
of the country of their sojourn and cannot be sued, arrested, or punished by the law of
that country.
It is well-settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an
ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which
he is accredited. However, if there is an agreement between the mother of the consuls and
to our consuls that they are immune from suit then that will be the time consuls be
exempted.
Suppose, A, consul, was to take a deposition in a hotel in Singapore. After the
deposition, the deponent approached the As daughter and requested that certain parts
of the deposition be changed in consideration for $10,000.00. The daughter then
persuaded A, who later on agreed. Will the crime be subject to the RPC? If so, what
crime or crimes have been committed?
Yes. Falsification.
Normally, the taking of the deposition is not the function of the consul, his
function being the promotion of trade & commerce with another country. However,
under the Rules of Court, a consul can take depositions or letters rogatory. Therefore,
there is a definite provision of the law making it the consuls function to take depositions.
When he agreed to the falsification of the deposition, he was doing so as a public officer
in the service of the Philippine government.
Under the threefold liability rule, the wrongful acts or omissions of a public
officer may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liability. Even if the Ombudsman
may no longer file an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned
or retired, the Ombudsman may still file criminal and civil cases to vindicate the officials
alleged transgressions. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539).
Laws of Preferential Application
Exempt a person or class of persons from the general operation of the law.
(a) Sections 58 and 59 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempt persons below 18 years of age
from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Article 202 of the
Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under P.D. No. 1619 and from any imposition of
death penalty other special laws notwithstanding.
(b) Republic Act 75 embodies the protection and recognition of the immunities, rights,
and privileges of duly accredited diplomatic representatives as enunciated under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
(c) Parliamentary Privilege from arrests for members of the Congress as provided under
the 1987 Constitution.
(b)Territorial

As a general rule, the Revised Penal Code are enforceable only within the Philippine Territory.
Since crime is defined by the law which prohibits it, it is essentially territorial. The force and
effect of the law defining and prohibiting it cannot go beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
State. (Intraterritorial Application).
What are the two modes of application of Criminal Law?
(a) Intraterritorial Application; and
(b) Extraterritorial Application.
Extraterritorial Application of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 2 of the RPC list certain exceptions to the territorial application of the Philippine
Criminal Law. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall apply against those who
(a) Should commit an offense while on a Philippine Ship or Airship;
(b) Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands.
(c) Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the
obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;
(d) While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of
their functions; or
(e) Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined
in Title One of Book Two of this Code.
Qualified universal jurisdiction of Philippine courts for crimes punished under the Human
Security Act. Section 58 of the Human Security Act (Republic Act no. 9372) provides for the
extra-territorial application of the law against those:
(1) Individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit, conspire, or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act
inside the territorial limits of the Philippines;
(2) Individual Persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine airship;
(3) Individual Persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or
diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official
capacity;
commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippine descent, where
their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime; and
commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
Republic Act no. 9851 vests universal jurisdiction to Philippine courts over crimes in violation
of the said law. Section 17 of RA No. 9851 provides that the State shall exercise jurisdiction
over persons, whether military or civilian, suspected or accused of a crime defined and
penalized in this Act, regardless of where the crime is committed, provided, any one of the
following conditions is met:
(1) The accused is a Filipino citizen;
(2) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or
(3) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.

Maritime criminal jurisdiction. The Philippines observes the following rules for crimes
committed on board a merchant vessel.
(1) If the vessel is on the high seas, jurisdiction over crimes committed on board the vessel
shall belong to the State where the vessel is registered.
(2) If the crime is committed on board a Philippine vessel while the latter is on the territorial
jurisdiction of another State, jurisdiction belongs to the courts of the said State. The
Philippines is following the English Rule which enunciates the authority of local courts of
the country where the vessel was at the time of the commission of the crime committed
on board the said vessel. The other rule, the French rule, enunciates that crimes
committed on board a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the country
of the State within the territorial jurisdiction of which they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory or when the safety of the state
is endangered.
(3) If the crime is committed on board of a vessel while the latter is on the high seas and the
vessel is not registered in any country, any State may assume jurisdiction over the same
because such vessel is considered as a pirate ship for want of registration in any state.
(4) Jurisdiction over crimes committed on board of a foreign military vessel belongs to the
sovereign of the said warship.
What rule will apply over crimes committed on maritime zones or interior waters of the
Philippines?
As far as jurisdiction or application of the RPC over crimes committed on maritime zones
or interior waters, the Archipelagic Rule shall be observed. Any crime committed in interior
waters comprising the Philippine archipelago shall be subject to our laws although committed
on board of foreign merchant vessel.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished
in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, for those limits, though neutral to war,
are not neutral to crimes. (People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil 19).
Suppose, A, a vessel is not registered in the Philippines and in any country when a crime was
committed thereat while sailing at sea. Then later on, said vessel entered our territorial
waters. Will the Revised Penal Code apply in this case?
Yes. In the case at bar, the vessel involved is not registered in any country, hence, it
is considered a pirate ship. Being a pirate ship, any State may assume jurisdiction over the
same.
And in the Philippines, we apply Sec. 15, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which have the phrase, in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law. And under International Law, a vessel which is not registered in
accordance with the laws of any country is considered a pirate vessel. And piracy is a crime
against humanity, in general, such that wherever the pirates may go, they can be prosecuted.
Hence, the crime may be regarded as an act of piracy as long as it is done with intent
to gain.

Continuing crimes on board a foreign vessel which entered the Philippine territory. When a
vessel comes within three nautical miles drawn from the headlands which embrace the
entrance to the Manila Bay, she is within the territorial waters. The Philippine courts have
jurisdiction. (US vs. Bull, 15 Phil. 7)
Possession of opium on board a foreign vessel in transit is not triable by Philippine courts
because the vessel is considered as an extension of its nationality, but said courts acquire
jurisdiction when the tins of opium are landed from the vessel in Philippine soil. (US vs. Look
Chow, 18 Phil. 573)
Smoking opium on board a foreign merchant vessel within the Philippine territory. This
constitutes breach of public order because it causes to produce its pernicious effects within
our territory. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed on board merchant
vessels anchored in Philippine jurisdictional waters. (People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729).
Transitory crimes may be validly tried in any territory where the offense was in part
committed. The court wherein any of the crimes essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a
continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed. (Yalong v. People, 704 SCRA 195). Republic Act 9208, also
known as Anti- Trafficking in Human Person Act of 2008 punishes acts of human trafficking
committed across national borders which may be considered as transitory crimes.
Instances where a foreign country may not apply its criminal law even if a crime was
committed on board a vessel within its territorial waters:
(1) When the crime is committed in a war vessel of a foreign country, because war vessels
are part of the sovereignty of the country to whose naval force they belong.
(2) When the foreign country in whose territorial waters the crime was committed adopts
the French Rule, which applies only to merchant vessels, except when the crime
committed affects the national security or public order of such foreign country.
Reminder:
- A vessel is considered a Philippine ship only when it is registered in
accordance with Philippine laws.
- Under International Law, as long as such vessel is not within the territorial
waters of a foreign country, Philippine laws shall govern.
Prospective
Penal Law is said to be prospective in nature, as it cannot make an act punishable in a
manner in which it was not punishable when committed. Whenever a statue dealing with crime
establishes conditions more lenient or favourable to the accused, it can be given retroactive
effect. This exception cannot apply if the accused is a habitual criminal and whenever the law
specifically states its non-application. (see Art. 22, RPC)
Is the prospective application of penal law absolute?

As provided in Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code, crimes are punished under the laws
in force at the time of their commission. Hence, penal law cannot make an act punishable in a
manner in which it was not punishable when committed.
However, there are exceptions to the prospective application of penal laws. Whenever a
new statute dealing with crime establishes conditions more lenient or favourable to the accused,
it can be given retroactive effect. Though. This exception cannot apply if the accused is a habitual
criminal and whenever the law specifically states its non-application. (see Article 22, RPC).
Effects of repeal of Penal law.
a. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shall be applied, except
when the offender is a habitual delinquent or when the new law is made not applicable to
pending action or existing causes of action;
b. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be applied;
c. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act which was penalized under the
old law is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated.
Suppose Juan was prosecuted for and convicted of a violation of an ordinance. While the case
was pending appeal, the ordinance was repealed by eliminating the section under which the
accused was being prosecuted. What will happen to the case?
The repeal is absolute.
Where the repeal is absolute and not a re-enactment or repeal by implication, the offense
ceases to be criminal. The accused must be acquitted.
Rules in the construction and interpretation of the penal law.
1. Penal laws are strictly construed against the government and liberally in favour of the
accused.
- May be invoked only where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its
interpretation. Where the law is clear and ambiguous, there is no room for
the application of the rule.
- It is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation
or application of the law must be made in favour of the accused. Laws should
not be interpreted in such a way that the interpretation would result in the
disobedience of a lawful order of an authority with the jurisdiction to issue
the order. (Gidwani vs. People, 713 SCRA 756).
2. Pro reo principle.
- The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws is to
resolve all doubts in favour of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt,
rule for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee
that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is
established beyond reasonable doubt. (Intestate Estate of Manoliya Gonzales
vda. De Carungcong v. People, 612 SCRA 272)
3. Principle of lenity.
- Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.
- The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of
a penal statue, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is

favourable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which
is more lenient to the accused. (Intestate Estate of Manoliya Gonzales vda.
De Carungcong v. People, 612 SCRA 272)
4. In the construction or interpretation of the provisions of the RPC, the Spanish text is
controlling because it was approved by the Philippine Legislature in its Spanish text.
B.
Article 3. Definition. Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies.

Felonies are committed not only by means of dolo but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent, and there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
What are the elements of felonies?
1. There must be an act or omission;
2. The act or omission must be punishable by the RPC;
3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of
dolo or culpa.
Suppose Juan entertains the idea of killing Pedro, will he be punished for having a criminal
thought?
No. The act must be external, because internal acts are beyond the sphere of
penal law. Hence, a criminal thought or a mere intention no matter how immoral or
improper it may be, will never constitute a felony.
Thus, even if Juan entertains the idea of killing Pedro, as long as he does not
commence the commission of the crime directly by overt act, Juan is not criminally liable.
What are the classifications of felonies according to the means by which they are committed?
(Both must be of voluntary acts free, intelligent, and intentional act).
1. Intentional felonies;
2. Culpable felonies.
What is intentional felonies?
Intentional felonies refers to those act or omission of the offender that is
malicious. That he has the intention to cause an injury to another. The act performed is
with deliberate intent. (dolo)
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of
both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
What are the requisites of dolo or malice?
1. Freedom;
2. Intelligence;
3. Intent
Freedom. Is an element of voluntariness; that you are doing an act based on your own free will.
Thus, a person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force is exempt from criminal

liability and a person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear/greater injury is
likewise exempt from criminal liability. (Article 12, RPC)
No criminal liability flows from an involuntary act.
Example: Killing his wife and injuring his father while the accused was sleepwalking. Under the
special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendants own wife whom he
dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his
father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking his guests, whom
he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, there is lack of motives for
the accused to voluntarily commit the acts complained of and the motives for not committing said
acts (People v. Potenciano Taneo, G.R. No. 37673, March 31, 1933, 58 Phil. 255, 257).
Exempting circumstances for lack of freedom. Those who have acted without freedom are always
deemed exempt from criminal responsibility:
(1) Compulsion of an irresistible force (Art. 12, par. 5)
(2) Impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury (Art. 12, par. 6)
Intelligence. Discernment. Determine the morality of human acts, capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. An element of voluntariness (Down syndrome. Mental
retardation).
Exempting circumstances for lack of intelligence. Under the Revised Penal Code the lack of
intelligence of the accused exempts him or her from criminal responsibility:
(1) Insane and imbecile persons (Art. 12, par. 1)
(2) Children fifteen years old and under (Republic Act 9344)
(3) Children over fifteen years old and under eighteen who acted without discernment (Republic
Act 9344)
(4) Persons who acted through mistake of fact.
Intent. Criminal Intent. An act with malice. A mental state, the existence of which is shown by the
overt acts of a person; a state of mind which willingly consents to the act that is done, or free will
choice, or volition in the doing of the act; it means the act is voluntary, and that it proceeds from
a mind free to act. Criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act unless the
contrary shall appear.
Specific Intent. An example of which are intent to gain for robbery and theft; intent to kill
for attempted and frustrated homicide. (Intent to kill is presumed in homicide and murder and
that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption).
Mens rea. The mental element of a crime. In crimes by dolo, mens rea will refer to the
requirements of freedom, intelligence, and intent while doing the act or omitting to do the act.
Elements of Criminal Intent (How can we show if criminal intent do really exist)
1. As to the weapon used, if the weapon used is lethal;
2. Part of the body wounded or sustained injury
3. Circumstances surrounding the incident
4. Utterances made by the offender in inflicting the injuries.
The use of a gun against another person denotes an intent to kill. (Araneta v. CA)
Illegal Discharge of Firearms: Pointing of a gun without intent to kill.

What is culpable felonies?
Culpable felonies refers to those act or omission of the offender that is not
malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
But the said act, though without malice, is punishable in a lesser degree which
the Penal Code qualifies as imprudence or negligence. (culpa)
In crimes by culpa, the mental element of the crime refers to the requirements of
freedom, intelligence and imprudence, or negligence or the lack of foresight or skill while
doing the act or omitting to do the act.
What are the requisites of culpa or fault?
1. Freedom;
2. Intelligence;
3. Imprudent, Negligent, or Lacks of foresight, or Lacks of skill.
Imprudence Negligence
-deficiency of action - deficiency of perception
-if a person fails to take the necessary precaution - if a person fails to pay proper attention and to
to avoid injury to person or damage to property, use due diligence in foreseeing the injury/damage
there is imprudence impending to be caused, there is negligence.
-involves lack of skill - involves lack of foresight
Why is culpa or negligence being punished?
The raison d etre for so doing is that a man must use common sense, and exercise due
reflection in all his acts. It his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent. He is responsible for such
results as anyone might foresee.
Suppose Juan who was not a medical practitioner, tied Petra and wrapped her feet with rags
saturated with petroleum and thereafter set them on fire. Juan is trying to help Petra as the
latter suffers from ulcer. However, instead of easing or curing the pain he injured Petra. Will
Juan be held liable?
Yes. While there was no intention to cause an evil but to provide a remedy the defendant
was liable for physical injuries through imprudence. Hence, a person who caused an injury,
without intention to cause an evil, may be held liable for culpable felony.
With the permission of the victims parents, accused, together with the other accused,
proceeded to subject the boy to a treatment calculated to drive the bad spirit from his body.
Unfortunately, the strange procedure resulted in his death. The liability arises from their reckless
imprudence because they ought to know that their actions would not bring about the cure. They
are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder (People v.
Eutiquia Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 267, 279).
What is mistake of fact?

It is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused injury to
another. He is not, however, criminally liable, because he did not act with criminal intent.

An honest mistake of facts destroys the presumption of criminal intent which
arises upon the commission of a felonious act. It will delete criminal intent. In mistake of
fact, the act done by the accused may be a justifying circumstance (but is not a justifying
circumstance).
What are the elements of mistake of facts as a defense? (A-I-M)
1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them
to be;
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful;
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused.
Case Sample: Mistake of Fact. US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488
Facts: Ah Chong before going to bed, locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the
door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called
out twice, who is there, but received no answer. Fearing out that it was a robber, he leaped
from bed and shouted, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise moment, he was
struck by the chair that had been placed against the door and believing that he was being
attacked, he fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
Ruling: Ah Chong is acquitted, because of mistake of fact. Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed
them to be, Ah Chong would have been justified in killing the intruder. As provided in Article 11,
paragraph 1 of the RPC, the ff do not incur any criminal liability:
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights provided that the following
circumstances concur:
a. Unlawful Aggression;
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
While his wife was cooking, accused heard somebody threw stones at his house. He took a
revolver and went down. He heard a noise and saw a black figure rushing with hands uplifted.
In the belief that the figure was an outlaw, he shot at him and killed him. He was charged of
murder and was convicted by the trial court. He claimed that he had shot the victim by mistake.
Is he criminally liable? No. His ignorance or error of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith,
and this rebuts the presumption of malicious intent accompanying the act of killing (see People v.
Pambaya Bambayabao, G.R. No. L-29481, October 31, 1928, 52 Phil. 309).
People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257. Error in personae not Mistake of fact.

Facts: A and B were instructed to arrest C, a notorious criminal and escaped convict, and if
empowered to get him dead or alive. Proceeding to Cs house and seeing a man with his back, A
& B simultaneously fired at him. The man turned out to be an innocent man. Is A & B entitled to
use mistake of fact?
Ruling: No. A & B are guilty of murder.
In order for mistake of fact to be used, the mistake must be without fault or carelessness
on the part of the accused. The accused were at fault when they shot the victim in violation of the
instructions given to them. They were also careless in not verifying first the identity of the victim.

In mistake of fact, the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful. Thus, in
error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victim, the principle of mistake of fact does not
apply. When the accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a defense.
Meanwhile, A & B found no circumstance whatever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, A & B had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves and could even effect a
bloodless arrest. In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the
captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is determined to fight the officers of the
law that killing him would be justified.
Thus, lack of intent to kill the deceased, because his intention was to kill another, does
not relieve the accused from criminal responsibility.
Suppose A wanted to kill B by shooting him with a pistol. Thinking that the person walking in
dark alley was B, A shot the person. It turned out that the person killed was C, the brother of A.
A had no intention to kill C. Will A be liable for the death of C and may properly invoke mistake
of fact as a defense?
A will be liable for the death of C and he cannot invoke mistake of fact as a defense. Since
the act and intention of A in firing his pistol are unlawful, A cannot properly invoke the principle
of mistake of fact in his defense. Lack of intent to kill the deceased, because his intention was to
kill another, does not relieve the accused from criminal responsibility. He having acted maliciously
and 17illfully.
Suppose Juan hurled a bomb to the President, however, it was the supporters who get killed. B
died while C, D, and E incurred less serious physical injuries. Juans counsel contended that he is
guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence not murder. Is the contention correct?
No. In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, Juan
acted with malice. Therefore, Juan is liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act. This is in
accordance with Article 4, RPC. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
It should be noted that in criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional. And in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary that neither
malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene. Where such intention exists, the act should
be qualified by the felony it has produced. Lastly, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Guillen)
Difference of Mistake of Fact and Error in Personae.
While mistake of fact relieves the accused of criminal liability, mistakes in the identity of the victim
(error in personae) do not exempt the accused from criminal liability because he is responsible for
the direct and natural consequences of his wrongful act, even if it be different from that intended.
Kinds of crimes.
a. Mala in se wrongful from their nature (theft, rape, homicide intrinsically evil);
b. Mala prohibita wrong merely because prohibited by statute such as illegal possession of
firearms (RA 8294). Intent to commit the crime is not necessary, it is enough that the
prohibited act is done freely and consciously. Act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes
the offense.

Mala In Se Mala Prohibita
Nature: are those acts that are inherently evil or Nature: are those prohibited by special penal
wrong; or wrongful from their nature. laws. They are violations of mere rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society. The only
inquiry involved herein is, has the law been
violated. Criminal intent is not necessary. Not
inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden.
As to criminal intent: criminal intent is an element As to criminal intent: Criminal Intent is immaterial
but still requires intelligence and voluntariness of
the act.
Stages of execution is taken into consideration: Stages of Execution: it only knows one stage,
attempted, frustrated, and consummated consummated.
Good faith is a defense, unless the crime is the Good faith is not a defense.
result of culpa.
As to degree of Participation: all acts are As to degree of Participation: is not taken into
penalized, the degree of participation of the consideration. All who participated in the act are
offender is taken into consideration. (Principal, punished to the same extent.
Accomplice, Accessories)
As to mitigating and aggravating circumstances: As to mitigating and aggravating circumstances:
They are taken into account in imposing penalty. They are not taken into account.
As to what laws are violated: Generally, the RPC As to what laws are violated: Generally, special
laws.
Suppose, Juan was driving his automobile on a road in front of electoral precint no. 4 in Capiz.
He was called by his friend, B. Juan then alighted from his automobile and approached B. A did
not leave his revolver in his automobile, because there were many people in the road. While
inside the fence, surrounding the polling place, C, a representative of Department of Interior,
took possession of the revolver. Is Juan guilty of violating the Election Law even if he does not
have an intent to violate the same?
Yes. The law which Juan violated is a statutory provision, hence, the intent with which he
violated is immaterial. It may be conceded that Juan did not intend to intimidate any elector or to
violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver
inside of the polling place, he committed the act complained of and he committed it 18illfully.
Election law does not require for its violation that the offender has the intention to
intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election. The rule is that in acts mala in
se, there must be a criminal intent but in those mala prohibita, it is sufficient that the act
prohibited was intentionally done.
It should be noted that in those crimes punished by special laws, the act alone,
irrespective of its motives constitutes the offense. When the doing of an act is prohibited by a
special law, it is considered that he act is injurious to public welfare and the doing of the
prohibited act is the crime itself. (People v. Bayona)
Accused was the Election Officer of Alaminos, Pangasinan. Together with the other accused,
they were charged of decreasing the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., from 6,998 votes to 1, 921 votes (as disclosed in the total number of votes in 159 precincts).

Accused admitted that she had announced the figure 1921 instead of 6998. Garcia claimed good
faith as a defense.
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even
if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with
the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes
that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has
been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) of the Election Code are mala in se. For
otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be
punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of
time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law
to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing
the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice
and intent to injure another (Arsenia Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006,
484 SCRA 617, 623).
Consented sex is not an admissible defense in the case for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic
Act 7610 for lascivious conduct.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA
7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The
language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish [t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child
who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection (Michael
John Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643, 651).
Petitioner was caught in the airport travelling with a box containing shabu. Charged and
convicted with violation of Republic Act 9165, he claimed inter alia that he was not aware of
the contents of the said box. Is defense meritorious?
No. It bears stressing that the act of transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum
because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act
is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an
individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond
his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the
evidence for the prosecution. It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are
eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony (Ho Wai Pang v.
People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011).
Note:
Dolo is not required in crimes mala prohibita.

In those crimes which are mala prohibita, the act alone irrespective of its motives,
constitutes the offense.
Good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses in crimes mala prohibita.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
Estrada is challenging the plunder law. One of the issues he raised is whether plunder is a malum
prohibitum or mala in se.
Held: Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
crimes constituting plunder are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder.
i. While intentional felonies are always mala in se, it does not follow that prohibited acts
done in violation of special laws are always mala prohibita;
ii. Even if the crime is punished under a special law, if the act punished is one which is
inherently wrong, the same is mala in se, and therefore good faith and the lack of criminal
intent are valid defenses; unless it is the product of criminal negligence or culpa.
iii. Where malice is a factor, good faith is a defense.
Distinguished intent from motive.

Intent.
- Intentional state of mind and a determinative factor of the criminal liability.
- An essential element of a crime and must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt;
- It is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result, by an overt
act.
Motive.
- Is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result;
- Not an essential element of a crime, and hence, need not be proved for
purposes of conviction;
- Essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant. It will
then be immaterial when the accused has been positively identified.
- How can we prove motive?
We can prove motive through the wounds inflicted by the victim, the
words uttered by the offender before and after the occurrence of the
crime, the testimony of witnesses on the acts, and the statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense.
- When will be motive significant and relevant?
When there are no eyewitness to the crime and where suspicion is likely
to fall upon a number of persons, motive is relevant and significant. If the
evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of motive is essential.
- WON proof of motive alone is sufficient to support conviction?
No. The existence of a motive, though perhaps an important
consideration, is not sufficient proof of guilt. Mere proof of motive no
matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no
reliable evidence from which it may be reasonably deduced that the
accused was the malefactor.

Even a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take the place
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, lack of motive may be an aid
in showing the innocence of the accused.
Motive for the issuance of a bad check is not a defense for violation of BP
The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.
The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act
proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been
breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are
unavailing (see Isidro Pablito Palana v. People, G.R. No. 149995, September 28, 2007, 534
SCRA 296).
Felonies by omission are also voluntary acts such as the following:
a. Anyone who fails to render an assistance to any person whom he finds in an uninhabited
place wounded or in danger of dying (Art. 275, par. 1).
b. Any officer entrusted with collection of taxes who voluntarily fails to issue a receipt as
provided by law (Art. 213, par. 2b).
c. Every person, owing allegiance to the Philippines, without being a foreigner, and having
knowledge of any conspiracy against the government, who does not disclose and make
known the same to the proper authority (Art. 116).
Reminder:
- Mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime, mere silence and
failure to give the alarm without evidence of agreement or conspiracy is not
punishable. (People v. Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil. 353)
- No criminal liability flows from a lawful act.
- Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime when there is no law
punishing it.
- Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. The act itself does not make a man
guilty unless his intentions were so. (US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil 489)
- Actus me invite factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my
will is not my act. (US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil 489)
- Offense. Term used for infractions of the law punished by Special Statutes.
- Compulsion. Must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for
escape or self-defence. The force must be irresistible to reduce the actor to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death/serious bodily harm if the act is not done.
Threat of future injury is not enough.
Article 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal Liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Inapplicability to culpable crimes.
Article 4 applies only in crimes committed by dolo. It has no application in crimes

committed through culpa or through negligence or reckless imprudence. The provision enunciates
the basic principle that one who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether intended or not.
What are the elements of Article 4 paragraph (1)? People v. Iligan; People vs. Pugay; Calimutan
v. People
1. That an intentional felony has been committed;

2. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the felony committed by the offender.
What is the rationale of par. 1 of Article 4?
It is found in the doctrine el que es causa, de la causa, es causa, del mal causado. (He
who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).
Suppose, Juan, who tries to retain the possession of his bolo, which was being unlawfully taken
by Pedro, accidentally struck Petra (bystander) at the breast. Will Juan be held liable?
No. First, the law allows a person to use the necessary force to retain what belongs to
him. When a person has not committed a felony, he is not criminally liable for the result which is
not intended. Second, Article 4 is not applicable to injuries arising from a lawful act.
Hence, Juan, who was only defending his possession of the bolo and did not even try to
wound the person who tried to wrench it from him, is not liable to the injuries resulted thereof.
His conduct was perfectly lawful. The wounding of the bystander was caused accidentally and
without malicious intent. (People v. Bindoy, 56 Phil 15)
What are the causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender intended
to do? (Criminal liability for unintended consequences of criminal conduct)
1. Error in Personae or Mistake in the identity of the victim;

2. Aberratio Ictus or Mistake in the blow; and
3. Praeter Intentionem or the act exceeds the intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than
that he intended.
Error in Personae.
- Mistake in the identity of the victim
- When the offender actually or intentionally inflicted wound to a person,
whom the act was intended, but turned out to be a different person. Herein,
the criminal liability of the offender is not affected.
- Two persons are involved here at.
Juan, with intention of assaulting Pedro, mistook Petra for the latter and inflicted on
her a mortal wound with a bolo. Charged of homicide, Juan claimed that since he was
not able to kill the person intended to be killed, he should have been relieved of criminal
liability. Is he correct?
No. His mistake in killing one man instead of another cannot relieve him from
criminal responsibility. The fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man is not to
be considered as a mitigating circumstance. (People vs. Gona, G.R. No.L- 31962, March
15, 1930, 54 Phil. 605, 606).
Aberratio Ictus.
- Mistake in the blow.
- It occurs when the offender delivered the blow at his intended victim but
missed and instead such blow landed on an unintended victim.
- The situation generally brings about complex crimes where from a single act,
two or more grave/less grave felonies resulted. Namely, the attempt against
the intended victim and the consequences on the unintended victim.
- Resulted due to imprecision, three persons are involved. One offense
committed because there is only a one single act.
Accused shot his former girlfriend with his revolver. However, the bullet hit another
person instead. Due to proper medical attention, the victim did not die. Accused denied
liability for the injury which the victim sustained. Is the accused criminal liable?
Yes. The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another,
does not alter his criminal liability (People v. Ramon Mabug-at, G.R. No. L-25459, August
10, 1926, 51 Phil. 967, 969).
Praeter Intenionem.
- Greater injury.
- Where the consequence went beyond that intended or expected.
- This is a mitigating circumstance (Art. 13, par. 3) (When there is a notorious
disparity between the act or means employed by the offender and the
resulting felony.
Incensed with wrath and anger beyond his control, accused picked up a piece of wood
nearby and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of
severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he had done, accused picked her up in his arms
and brought her to their home. Soon his wife died. Is he criminally liable for parricide?
Yes. The fact that the accused intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical
injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and more serious crime
committed (People v. Jaime Tomotorgo, G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 238,
246).
Accused reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the lower back portion of the
victims head. The victim fell after he was shoved by one of the accused. He was able to
go home after that. Later, he was found lying unconscious on the kitchen floor,
salivating. The autopsy confirmed that he died of myocardial infraction.

In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural
and logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is
different from the one he intended; el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado
(he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Thus, the circumstance
that the accused did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt
him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said
condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal
Code (Amado Alvarado Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 171951, August 29, 2009, 597 SCRA 392,
407).
Praeter Intentionem. People vs. Cagoco
Facts: Cagoco struck Yu Lon with his fist on the back part of the head. Yu Lon then fell
backwards and his head struck the asphalt pavement. Later on, Yu Lon died. Cagoco then
contended that he cannot be convicted of murder when he did not intend to kill the
deceased.
Ruling: Yu Lons death was the direct consequence of defendants felonious act of striking
him on the head. If Cagoco had not committed the assault in a treacherous manner, he
would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the
deceased and since Cagoco did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder,
because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance.
Supposed Juan died due to hazing, would Pedro and Petra the accused in herein case be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem?
No. Mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem should not apply in this case.
It is settled that if due to hazing death occurred, the offense would be homicide but the
penalty is reclusion perpetua instead of reclusion temporal.
Example of instances where an accused is criminally liable for the unintended

consequences of a criminal act:
Accused whipped his sons with a stick which was later broken by the furious whipping.
He then brought them outside the house, tied them to a coconut tree and continued
beating them with a thick piece of wood. They walked back to the house after the
beating. One of the boys collapsed, lost consciousness and died. Charged of killing the
boy, accused claimed that he was merely disciplining his erring children.
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that
which he intended to commit, it is indispensable (a) that a felony was committed and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime
committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt accused, in beating his son and
inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. The child expired as a direct
consequence of the beating. The criminal liability of the accused for the death of his son
is clear (People v. Noel Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011, 658 SCRA 367, 377).

Peeved by the persistent demand of the victim for food, accused took a fire band and
applied it to his neck. The deceased ran to the place where people were gathered and
told that he was wounded and dying. He raised his shirt and showed them a wound in
his abdomen below the navel. He had undergone a medical treatment but he took out
the drainage from his wound and died of peritonitis.
It is a basic principle that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be
responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts a wound with
a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a
consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its
criminality to prove that other causes co-operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed,
it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which
are of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any
case, must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in contemplation of
the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But, however, this may be, the
rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine
would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of the medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be
easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and
thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape
conviction and punishment (People v. Juan Quianzon, G.R. No. L-42607, September 28,
1935, 62 Phil. 162, 168).
Accused strangled his wife with a piece of rope. The wife died and a case for parricide
was filed against accused. He claimed that the death of his wife was not due to the
strangling but to her weak heart condition.
It should be noted that the heart failure was due to the fright or shock caused by
the strangling, and consequently, the defendant was responsible for the death,
notwithstanding the fact that the victim was already sick. Had not the defendant
strangled the deceased, the latter, notwithstanding her illness, would not have died. In
other words, the defendant directly caused her death (see People v. Aniceto Martin, G.R.
No. L-3002, May 23, 1931).
Examples of cases where man creates in another persons mind an immediate sense of danger,
which causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man
who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries.
The accused declared a hold-up after boarding a jeepney. Two passengers jumped of the
jeepney. One of the passengers died because of the injuries she sustained after jumping
from the vehicle. Charged of robbery with homicide, accused claimed that they should not
be held responsible for the death of the passenger who jumped from the jeepney. Are they
criminally liable for the death of the said passenger?
Yes. If the victim jumped out of the jeepney, it must have been because she was in mortal
dread that the accused would shoot her. As fear gripped her, she, in desperation, thought of
scampering out of the moving jeepney. The rule is that if a man creates in another persons
mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and, in so

doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for
the resulting injuries (People v. William Page, G.R. No. 3707, June 7, 1977, 77 SCRA 348, 355).
The twin accused run amuck inside the train. Because of the rampage that they have caused,
most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed
everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. Several cases of murder, frustrated
murders and attempted murders were filed against the two accused later. Are they
criminally liable for the resulting injuries to the victims?
Yes. Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. The rule is that if a man creates in another mans mind an
immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he
injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result (see People vs. Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17,
1975, 62 SCRA 17).
The accused rose up in rage, moved towards the victim, with a big knife in hand, and
threatened to stab him because of his insubordination. When the accused approached
within a few feet away from the victim, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and
immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be
seen no more. Is the accused criminally liable for the death of the victim?
Yes. As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned there
can be no doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted
solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible
for his own death. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any
reasonable person under the same circumstances might have done the same. As was once
said by a British court, If a man creates in another mans mind an immediate sense of dander
which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result (see People v. Calixto
Valdez, G.R. No. L16486, March 22, 1921, 41 Phil. 497).
Instances when there is no felony committed.
a. When the act/omission is not punishable by the RPC;

b. When the act is covered by any of the justifying circumstances enumerated in Article 11.
If the death was due to the malicious or careless acts of the injured person or a third person
The accused is not liable for homicide. One is accountable only for his own acts and their
direct, natural, or logical consequences, and not for those which bear no relation to the initial
cause. (Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 10).
The offended party is not obliged to submit to surgical operation.
Offended party is not obliged to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results
of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled the offended party and he must abide by the

consequences resulting therefrom without aid from the party. The felony committed must be the
proximate cause of the resulting injury.
Reminder:
- One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the
consequences which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether
foreseen or intended;
- One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of
ones illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences.
- A felony is an act or omission punishable by the RPC. The felony committed
by the offender should be one committed with malice, because par. 1 of Art.
4 speaks of wrongful act done different from that which he intended.
- If the wrongful act results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight,
or lack of skill of the offender, Article 4, RPC will not apply. The liability of the
offender should be determined under Article 365, which defines and
penalizes criminal negligence.
- Any person who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger,
which causes the latter to do something resulting in the latters injuries, is
liable for the resulting injuries. The victim is impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation, the assailant is responsible for the resulting injuries. It is not
necessary to touched the body of the offender.
- It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does
not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. (Lumantas v. Calapiz, 713 SCRA
337).
- When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in
favour of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Abellana
v. People, 655 SCRA 683).
What is proximate cause?
Is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury & without which the result would not have
occurred. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181) In laymans term, proximate cause sets into
motion all other causes, without which a crime will not be committed.
For an accused to be held responsible to the resulting injury, the felony must be
the proximate cause of the resulting injury. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181)
Sample cases:
Accused assaulted the victim with a bolo while the latter was descending from the stairs.
The victim was wounded in the forehead which caused him to fall down. After he fell
down, accused threw a rock over his right clavicle. The victim suffered serious physical
injuries on account of the assault. Several days later, he died. The doctor certified that

he died of tetanus secondary to the infected wound. Is the accused criminally liable for
the death of the victim?
Yes. Accused is responsible for the natural consequences of his unlawful act
(People v. Gerardo Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947, 78 Phil. 458, citing People vs.
Borbano, 76 Phil. 702.)
Accused hacked the victim by a bolo, hitting him on the right palm of his hand. The
victim ran away from the accused but was overtaken by the latter who hacked him
again on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo. The victim was brought to a
hospital. The dispute between the two was settled. A few weeks after, the victim was
rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, he
had lockjaw and was having convulsions. The attending physician found that the latters
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. The victim died in the said hospital after
being diagnosed of tetanus. Is the accused criminally liable for the death of the victim?
No. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra)
And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused
the victims death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded
to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and
its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javiers death with which the petitioner had nothing to do
(see Filomeno Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988,
157 SCRA 1).
Accused stabbed the victim a sharpened bamboo on January 23, 2002. The victim was
taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he was treated as an out-patient. On
February 14, 2002, he was brought to the San Lazaro Hospital. He died two days after.
The doctor was able to determine that he died of tetanus infection secondary to stab
wound. Is the accused criminally liable for the death of the victim?
No. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and
the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe
tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the
symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in
Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and
those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred
percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab wound was
merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the
proximate cause of Cruzs death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his
death. However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of
slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound
he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of
guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the

latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight
physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder (see
People v. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011).
To hold the accused responsible for the resulting death of the victim, it should be medically
established that tetanus developed from the injuries inflicted by the accused and that the
possibility of an efficient intervening cause from the time injuries had been inflicted until death
ensued is remote. The Supreme Court took judicial notice that a severe tetanus infection has an
incubation period of less than 14 days.
When felony not deemed proximate cause of the injury. The felony committed is not the
proximate cause of the resulting injury when
a. There is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting
injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of
the accused;
b. The resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. (Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 10)
Is the accused be still held liable for the result, if there is a neglect of the wound or there is an
improper treatment of the wound?
Yes. The neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment, which are of
themselves consequences of the criminal act and which might naturally follow in any case, must
in law be deemed to have been among those consequences which were in contemplation of the
guilty party and for which he is to be held responsible..
Unskillful and improper treatment may be an active force but it is not a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the criminal act.
Is the accused criminally liable for the consequences which originate through the fault or
carelessness of the injured person?
No. Persons who are responsible for an act constituting a crime are also liable for all the
consequences arising therefrom and inherent therein. However, they will not be held liable to
incidents entirely foreign to the act executed, or which originate through the fault or carelessness
of the injured person, which are exceptions to the rule not arising in the present case.
Resulting injuries are not the direct, logical, and necessary consequence of the prohibited
conduct. In the following cases, the injury is not the direct, logical, and necessary consequence of
the felony committed, because the felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting
injury.
a. If slight physical injuries be inflicted by A upon B, and the latter deliberately immerses his
body in a contaminated cesspool, thereby causing his injuries to become infected and serious,
A cannot be held liable for the crime of serious physical injuries. (US vs. De los Santos, GR no.
13309)
b. The accused struck a boy on the mouth with the back of his hand. Later, the boy died. Death
might have been caused by a fever prevalent in the locality, not by the blow on the mouth.
The accused who gave the blow was not liable for the death of the deceased. (People vs.
Palalon, 49 Phil 177).
c. The accused struck a child, who was seriously ill with fever for three weeks, upon the thighs
with a slipper, pushed and dragged him, throwing him heavily on the mat spread on the floor.

The child died two days later. As the true cause of the childs death was not proved, the
accused was convicted of physical injuries only. (US vs. Embate, 3 Phil. 640).
d. Where medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the times the decedent was wounded to
the time of death, the accused must be acquitted of the crime of homicide. (Urbano v. IAC,
157 SCRA 10).
Supervening event and efficient intervening cause distinguished.
Supervening event, is an event that will not be an excuse to the liability of the accused.
Under which, facts and events transpired after an information was already filed and the accused
has been charged with the crime of homicide, but soon after the victim dies, he may still be
charged for murder.
On the other hand, efficient intervening cause, is an occurrence that can be an excuse to
the liability of the accused. It is the new and independent act which breaks the causal connection
between the original wrong and the injury newly sustained, and by which it may relieve the
accused of the liability for the said injury or loss.
Urbano v. IAC
157 SCRA 10
Facts:
Urbano and Javier had an altercation and due thereof Urbano hacked Javier on his right
palm and on the left leg with the back of the bolo. Later on, Javier was brought to a physician. 22
days after, Javier died. Hence, Urbaon was charged with homicide. Later on, it was found out that
Javier removed the dressing of his wound and worked on his rice field after going to the hospital
because of the hacking incident.
Issue:
WON, the removal of the dressing that resulted to tetanus and later to Javiers death was
an efficient intervening cause that would exculpate Urbano from any liability?
Held:
Yes. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. Herein, if the wound of Javier
inflicted by Urbano was already infected by tetanus, it is more medically probable that it is only
of a mild cause because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of wound. Hence, said wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. And since, we are dealing with a criminal
conviction proof must be beyond reasonable doubt.
What is an impossible crime? Intod vs. CA
As provided in paragraph 2 of Article 4, RPC, there is an impossible crime when any person
performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means. Thus, the act intended by the offender is by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment. There must be either legal impossibility or physical impossibility.
Provided further in Article 59, RPC, when the person intending to commit an offense has
already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not
produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to
produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of

criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
What are the elements of impossible crime?
1. That the act performed would be an offense against persons/property;
2. That the act was done with evil intent;
3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means employed is either
inadequate or ineffectual;
4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the RPC.
What are the felonies against persons? (HAIR-DPPM)
1. Homicide
2. Abortion
3. Infanticide
4. Rape
5. Duel
6. Parricide
7. Physical injuries
8. Murder
What are the felonies against property? (CRAB-MUST-C)
1. Culpable Insolvency
2. Robbery
3. Arson & Other Crimes Involving Destruction
4. Brigandage
5. Malicious Mischief
6. Usurpation
7. Swindling & other deceits
8. Theft
9. Chattel Mortgage
Legal Impossibility and Factual Impossibility. Distinguished.
In the case of Intod v. CA, 215 SCRA 52, Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where, (Elements of Legal Impossibility)
1. The motive, desire, and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
2. There is intention to perform the physical act;
3. There is a performance of the intended physical act; and
4. The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
Meanwhile, Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the
man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latters wallet
and finds the pocket empty.
Case Sample for Impossible Crime, Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52

Facts:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandayas house and asked the latter to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and
that Mandaya should accompany them. At 10:00 pm of the same day, all of them armed arrived
at Palangpangans house and fired at Palangpangans bedroom but there was no one in the room.
RTC then convicted Intod of attempted murder.
ISSUE:
W/N Intod is liable only for an impossible crime and not attempted murder.
Held:
Yes. Under Artcile 4(2), RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offence against person or property because (1) the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible; and (2) the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender by its nature is one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be legal or factual impossibility.
Suppose Pedro, knew that Juan owned and always carried a watch. He then decided to rob Juan
of said watch. When Pedro met Juan for that purpose, Juan did not have the watch because he
forgot to carry it with him. Thinking that Juan had the watch, Pedro pointed his gun at him and
still asked for it. Later on, finding Juan telling the truth, Pedro allowed him to go without further
molestation. Is this an impossible crime?
No. It is a rule that an act to be considered an impossible crime it should not constitute a
violation of another provision of the Revised Penal Code. It is of great showing in this case that,
Pedro committed attempted robbery and not impossible crime. It should be noted also that Pedro
pointed his gun at Juan, and such manifestation already constituted at least the crime of grave
threats under Article 282, RPC.
There was an intent to gain on the part of Pedro when he decided to take the watch of
Juan and point his gun to the latter. The crime of robbery with intimidation of person is not
produced not because of a cause or accident other that Pedros own spontaneous desistance.
Hence, if the act performed would be an offense other than a felony against persons or
property, there is no impossible crime.
Reminder:
- In impossible crime, the felony should not be actually committed, otherwise,
he would be liable for that act. Hence, there would be no impossible crime to
speak of.
Judicial Referral.
Article 5. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision and shall report to the Chief

Executive through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the DOJ, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when
a strict enforcement of the provision of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.
What are the elements of the first paragraph, in connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by law.
1. The act committed by the accused appears not punishable by any law;
2. But the court deems it proper to repress such act;
3. In that case, the court must render the proper decision by dismissing the case & acquitting
the accused;
4. The judge must then make a report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
stating the reasons which induce him to believe that the said act should be made the subject
of penal legislation.
What is the basis of paragraph 1, Article 5?
It is based on the legal maxim, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege which means, There
is no crime if there is no law that punishes the act.
What are the elements of the second paragraph of Article 5?
1. After trial, the court finds the accused guilty;
2. The penalty provided by law and which the court imposes for the crime committed appears
to be clearly excessive, because:
- The accused acted with lesser degree of malice; and/or
- There is no injury or the injury caused is of lesser gravity.
3. The court should not suspend the execution of the sentence;
4. The judge should submit a statement to the Chief Executive, through the Secretary of Justice,
recommending executive clemency.
What is Executive Clemency?
It pertains to the power of the President to pardon a person convicted of a crime,
commute the sentence (shorten it, often to time already served), or to reduce it from death to
another lesser sentence.
Suppose A, a trial judge, sentenced B, the accused, to life imprisonment, although the
commission of the crime of robbery with homicide was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and in band. As decision is based on his belief that death should
not be imposed. Is As contention correct?
No. It is a well-settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy,
or morality of laws. Said question focus exclusively within the province of the legislature which
enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves/ vetoes them.

The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with
the constitution to apply them. It is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law,
regardless of their private opinions.
Suppose A, a judge of lower court feels that a doctrine promulgated by the SC is against his way
of reasoning. He then dispose a case in accordance with his personal view. Is As action correct?
No. A may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in
accordance with his personal view, he must first think, that it his duty to apply the law as
interpreted by the SC.
Any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a
sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays, and expenses to the litigants. It should be noted that
Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of the court is to apply the law
disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.
Case Sample:
In People v. Marivic Genosa, 419 SCRA 537, a woman who killed her husband interposed the
defense that she had no criminal liability because when she killed him, she was under a
condition called battered woman syndrome. The Supreme Court defined that a battered
woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical
or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.
Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second
time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman. However, the
Supreme Court did not consider the battered woman syndrome as a justifying circumstance
that will relieve an accused of criminal liability for the crime that she has committed against
her husband. She was convicted of parricide. A year later Republic Act No. 9262 was passed
providing that victims-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
C.
Stages of Commission of Felonies.
Article 6. Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are
punishable.
A felony is committed when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but, which
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
In determining whether the felony is attempted or frustrated or consummated
1. The nature of the offense;

2. The elements constituting the felony, as well as
3. The manner of committing the same must be considered.
Reminder:
- In frustrated felony, the wound inflicted must be a mortal wound or fatal

injury.
- In attempted felony, the act merely begins. It is still in the subjective phase.
What are the stages of development of a crime?
1. Internal Acts
2. External Acts
Internal Acts. Such as mere ideas in the mind of a person, are not punishable even if, had they
been carried out, they would constitute a crime. An example of which, is when Pedro wanted to
kill Juan, but he does not do anything about it or perform an overt act. Hence, Pedros mentality,
no matter how criminal it is, is not a crime yet.
External Acts. It covers preparatory acts and acts of execution. Preparatory acts, ordinarily, are
not punishable. Hence, proposal and conspiracy to commit a felony, which are only preparatory
acts are not punishable, except when the law provides for their punishment in a certain felonies.
(Article 8, RPC). Acts of Execution, they are punishable under the RPC.
Examples of preparatory acts that are punishable
a. Treason (Art. 115)

b. Rebellion (Art. 136)
c. Sedition (Art. 141)
d. Possession of Picklocks (preparatory act to the commission of robbery).
Examples of preparatory acts that are not punishable.
a. Buying poison or carrying a weapon with which to kill the intended victim;
b. Carrying inflammable materials to the place where a house is to be burned.
What are the stages of acts of execution?
1. Attempted
2. Frustrated
3. Consummated
What are the elements of attempted felony?
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony.
3. The offenders act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.
People v. Kalalo: mere fact of intent to kill, shot but missed the victim. Even if no
injuries or only light injuries, the crime committed is still in the attempted homicide.
What are the elements of frustrated felony?
1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
The injury sustained by the victim is serious and could produce death without the
intervention of timely competent medical attendant.
Distinguish attempted and frustrated felonies:
The distinctions between frustrated and attempted felony are summarized as follows:
1. In frustrated felony, the offender has perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony as a consequence; whereas
In attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2. In frustrated felony, the reason for non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator ( immediate medical intervention); On the other
hand,
In attempted felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own spontaneous desistance.
3. In frustrated felony, the offender already passes the subjective phase or the point where the
offender begins the commission of the crime to the point where he has still control over his
acts. The offender has reached the objective phase whereat, he has no longer control of the
stage. While, in attempted felony the offender never passes the subjective phase.
What is an overt act?
An overt act is some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.
What are the elements of overt acts?
1. That there be external acts;

2. Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed. (They
should not be mere preparatory acts, for prep0aratory acts do not have direct connection with
the crime which the offender intends to commit).

Sample Cases:
Accused was caught in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of
cheap goods. He had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from
the wall when he was caught by the policeman. What crime was committed by the accused?
Attempted trespass to dwelling. The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical relation t o a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its
realization and consummation.
The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no
doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter the store by means of
violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to
commit an offense which due to the timely arrival of policeman, did not develop beyond the first
steps of execution. As such, he could only be liable for attempted trespass to dwelling. (People v.
Aurelio Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703)
Accused shot the victim twice but the latter was hit only in his right thigh because the jeepneys
spare tire shielded the other parts of his body. Accused was charged of frustrated murder.
The crime committed is only Attempted Murder. The accused had commenced the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such
as, that the jeep to which the victim was clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire which
shielded the other parts of his body.
Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the
wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted
Murder, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought
about death.
Accused shot the victim once on the right chest which caused her to bleed and lost
consciousness. He was charged of frustrated murder. One of the issues raised concerns the
propriety of conviction for frustrated murder since no medical certificate was presented to prove
the nature of the injuries sustained by the victim. Is the accused criminally liable for frustrated
murder?
No. According to the decision of the Supreme Court, the failure of the prosecution to
present a medical certificate or competent testimonial evidence showing that the victim would
have died from her wound without medical intervention, justified the accuseds conviction for
attempted murder only. Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as
attempted, not frustrated murder. (People vs. Costales, 373 SCRA 269).

Accused was singing in the karaoke bar when the victims joined him. He felt irritated and
insulted as he thought that he was being mocked by the victims. The accused shot the victims
later. One of the victims sustained gunshot wound in his shoulder. He interposed self-defense in
criminal cases for frustrated homicide brought by the victim against him.
The crime committed is only Attempted Homicide. As the wound sustained was not fatal
or mortal since the treatment period was short and the victim was discharged from the hospital
on the same day he was admitted, the crime is only attempted homicide. (People v. Palaganas,
501 SCRA 533).
Supposed a doctor conceived the idea of killing his wife, and to carry out his plan, he mixed
arsenic with the soup of his victim. Immediately after the victim took the poisonous food the
offender suddenly felt a twinge of conscience that he himself washed out the stomach of the
victim and administered to her the adequate antidote. Would this be a case of frustrated
parricide or attempted parricide?
No. Even though the subjective phase of the crime had already been passed, the most
important requisite of a frustrated crime, that the cause which prevented the consummation of
the offense be independent of the will of the perpetrator, was lacking.
The crime cannot also be considered as attempted parricide because the doctor already
performed all the acts of execution. At most, the crime committed would be physical injuries. The
intent to kill which the doctor entertained in the beginning disappeared when he prevented the
poison from producing the death of his wife.
Supposed A was talking with the Chief of Police when he suddenly made a motion to draw his
pistol, but the Chief of Police embraced him and prevented him from drawing his pistol. A then
told his two companions to fire at the Chief of Police, but they could not do so, because the latter
was embracing A. One of his companions fired a shot but the same was not aimed at anybody.
Is A act constituted an overt act of homicide?
No. To constitute attempted homicide the person using a firearm must fire the same, with
intent to kill, at the offended party, without however inflicting a mortal wound on the latter. As
act is entirely possible that at any time during the subjective stage of the felony, the accused could
have voluntarily desisted from performing all the acts of execution.
Reminder:
- The belief of the accused need not be considered. What should be considered
is whether all the acts of execution performed by the offender, would
produce the felony as a consequence.
- If the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal or mortal, then the
crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
- If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s
sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious,
less serious, or slight physical injury.
- Intent to kill is an element of both frustrated and attempted homicide. The
extent of the injury may disclose the presence of the intent to kill. In the

absence of proof either of intent to kill or the extent of the injury or the
period of incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, an
accused can only be convicted of slight physical injuries.
- Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the
occasion of the robbery is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide
which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally the same
regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection
with the robbery.
In the case of Arson.
There are only two stages in Arson, attempted and frustrated.

The rule in cases of arson is that if a portion of the building begins to burn, however small
it may be, it is consummated.
Consummated: In arson, it is not necessary that the property is totally destroyed by fire.
The crime of arson is therefore, consummated even if only a portion of the wall or any
other part of the house is burned. The consummation of the crime of arson does not
depend upon the extent of the damage caused. (People v. Hernandez, 54 Phil 122).
Attempted: When a person had poured gasoline under the house of another and was
about to strike a match to set the house on fire when he was apprehended, he was guilty
of attempted arson. The acts performed by him are directly connected with the crime of
arson, the offense he intended to commit. The pouring of gasoline under the house and
the striking of the match could not be for any other purpose.
If all the acts necessary to burn the building have already been performed, as when the
defendant has started a blaze by burning rags soaked with gasoline placed near the
building but the fire is put out before any part of the building has started to burn, it is
attempted.
After noticing that the thatched roof of his house was on fire, complaining witness got
up to fetch some water with which to extinguish the fire. He saw the accused beside the
house, carrying a stick. He shouted for help, and started to put out the fire, which he
succeeded in doing, after a small part of the roof had burned. In answer to his cries for
help, a neighbor repaired to the place and saw the accused running away. Another
neighbor also came, and on his way to the house met the accused. Is the crime
consummated arson even if small portion of the roof was burnt?
Yes. The crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire
was afterwards extinguished, for, once the fire has been started, the consummation of
the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage cause.
In the case of Rape.
There are only two stages in Rape, attempted and frustrated.
Article 335, RPC. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation;
b. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. When the woman is under 12 years of age

Attempted rape is committed when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled
with the intent to penetrate (intent to have carnal knowledge); otherwise, there can only
be acts of lasciviousness. (People v. Banzuela, 712 SCRA 735).
Consummated Rape: In People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105, the Supreme Court set the
uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, is sufficient. Entry of
the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking
into account the nature, elements, and manner of execution of the crime of rape and
jurisprudence on the matter.
No frustrated rape, in People v. Orita, The requisites of a frustrated felony are:
a. That the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony;
b. That the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of
his victim he actually attains his purpose and from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by
the offender, because he has performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime.
Thus, the felony is consummated.
As to finding of facts of the TC, In People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105: It is a well-settled rule
that the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be
accorded the highest respect because it has the advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth.
Attempted Rape: In People vs. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270, the Supreme Court clarified
that while the entry of the penis into the lips of the female organ was considered
synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia (labia majora, labia minora,
etc.,) the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light
of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just
mere touching in the ordinary sense.
In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of
the requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry
into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime
committed amounts merely to attempted rape. (The penis must be capable of sexual
intercourse ditto hawak pa ng right hand ni campuhan yung organ nya).
In the case of Acts of Lasciviousness
As provided in Article 366, RPC the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are:
a. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
b. That it is done by:
b.1 using force or intimidation
b.2 when the offended party is under 12 years of age
c. That the offended party is another person of either sex.

In the case of Theft
There are only two stages involved, attempted (no unlawful taking) and consummated
(there is unlawful taking).
Article 308. Elements of Theft: Valenzuela v. People, GR no. 160188 (Tide Detergent)
a. That there be taking of personal property;
b. Property belongs to another
c. Taking be done with intent to gain
d. Taking be done without the consent of the owner
e. Taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation
of persons or force-upon things.
Accused and his companion brought out several cartons of tide ultra from SM complex
along North Edsa and boarded them in a taxi inside the parking area. The security guard
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area. When he asked the
accused for a receipt of the merchandise, the latter and his companion reacted by
fleeing on foot, but the security guard fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security
guards of the incident. Accused and his companion were apprehended at the scene, and
the stolen merchandise recovered. Is the crime consummated or frustrated theft?
Consummated Theft. (see Valenzuela v. People, 525 SCRA 306)
In the case of Forcible abduction.

The rule in cases of abduction is that if the offended girl is carried away against her will
with lewd designs, the felony is consummated even if there are no sexual intercourse. If
the act of carrying her away is prevented by some cause independent of the will of the
accused, it is frustrated. If the offender merely started to carry her away but failed due to
some cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance, it is attempted (see
Padilla, 1959 Ed., p.95).
In the case of Estafa. (Panloloko)

Two elements of Estafa:
a. Abuse of confidence;
b. Damage to the offended party
Element of damage is essential before the crime could be consummated. If there is no
damage, even if the offender succeeded in carting away the personal property involved,
estafa cannot be considered as consummated. For the crime of Estafa to be
consummated, there must be MISAPPROPRIATION already done, so that there is damage
already suffered by the offended party. If there is no damage yet, the estafa can only be
frustrated or attempted. (US v. Dominguez, 41 Phil. 408)
Estafa consists of two elementsan act of deceit to defraud another and injury or
damage caused thereafter. Hence, estafa is not consummated unless the two elements
co-exist-fraud and damage. If the offender has not realized the damage because of a
cause independent of his will, even if he has done the fraudulent act, it is frustrated. If he
has not performed all the acts necessary to defraud, it is attempted. (see Padilla, 1959
Ed., p. 100)
The accused, as salesman of the bookstore "Philippine Education Co., Inc." sold on the
morning of January 19, 1920, five copies of Sams' "Practical Business Letters," of the
value of seven pesos and fifty centavos (P7.50), which the accused should have
immediately delivered to the cashier but which he did not deliver, until after it was
discovered that he had sold the books and received their value without delivering it to
the cashier, as was his duty. The accused is guilty of the frustrated offense of estafa,
inasmuch as he performed all the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a
consequence, but which, by reason of causes independent of his will, did not produce it,
no appreciable damage having been caused to the offended party, such damage being
one of the essential elements of the crime, due to the timely discovery of the acts
prosecuted (see U.S. v. Isaac Dominguez, G.R. No. L-17021, February 23, 1921, 41 Phil.
409).
In the case of Robbery.

(People v. Patalin (robbery with rape- yung madami may conspiracy), GR no. 125539;
People v. Tabuso (andyan na si dagul walang conspiracy), GR no. 113708)
There is only two stages involved, attempted and consummated.
Elements of robbery in general and as provided in Article 293 are as follows:
a. There be personal property;
b. Belonging to another person;
c. There is unlawful taking of that property;
d. Taking must be with intent to gain; and
e. There is violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon anything.
Said violence or force upon anything must have a direct connection with the crime
intended to be committed by the offender.
In Robbery, the thing must be taken out of the building to consummate the crime.
In robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. (Obsolete na yung robbery with
multiple rape). (Conspiracy in rape is possible gang rape all of them are liable, except:
pardon by marriage and if one of the malefactor attempt to stop the act of raping).
(Number of victims is not relevant, it is not either an aggravating circumstance). (If in
conspiracy to rob, a rape ensues, is A be held liable who is acting as a look out and located
outside the premises? No. He only agrees to the commission of robbery. He will only be
liable if he saw the act of raping and he did not do anything to stop the congruence).
In robbery committed by a band, there are more than 3 persons armed and acted
together to commit a felony. Evidence of at least 4 armed men committed the felony will
suffice to prove that robbery is committed by a band. (Number of victims is not relevant,
it is not either an aggravating circumstance).
In robbery with homicide, there is an attempted robbery with homicide. (If in conspiracy
to commit robbery, but in the course of robbery a person was also killed. Is A, who is just
acting as a lookout liable? Yes, A is still liable. As a co-conspirator they are equally liable.
But stringently on the fact that liability of A is based on the merit that in robbery, killing is
foreseeable. Settled that if you are going to rob, you have to arm yourself with lethal
weapon).
Delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if
such delay is satisfactorily explained. (People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384)
What is an indeterminate offense?
It is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain. Its nature
in relation to its objective is ambiguous.

In the case of People vs. Lamahang, the final objective of the offender, once he succeeded
in entering the store, may be to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit
any other offense. In such a case, there is no justification in finding the offender guilty of
attempted robbery by the use of force upon things.
The intention of the accused must be viewed from the nature of the acts executed by him,
and not from his admission.
For overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is necessary that their objective be
known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves should
obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality
to serve as ground for designation of the offense.
Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the accused,
and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish
grounds by themselves for attempted crime.
What do you mean by the phrase other than his own spontaneous desistance?
It refers to that amount of desistance coming from another person or coming from an
occurrence of an event.
If there is desistance of the offender.
- There is no attempted felony, the law does not punish him;
- Rison d etre: it is a sort of reward granted by the law to those who, having
one foot on the verge of crime, heed the call of their conscience and return
to the path of righteousness.
- However, desistance should be made before all the acts of execution are
performed.
- People v. Lizada, Spontaneous Desistance of a malefactor exempts him from
criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the
crime committed by him before his desistance.
Article 7. Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated, with the
exception of those committed against persons or property.
What are light felonies?

As provided in Article 7, RPC, Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated, with the exception of those committed against persons or property.
As provided further in Article 9, par. 3, Light felonies are those infractions of law for the
commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, or both, is
provided.
What are the light felonies punished by the RPC? (T-A-M-I-S)

1. Theft
2. Alteration of Boundary Marks
3. Malicious Mischief
4. Intriguing against honor
5. Slight Physical Injuries

D.
Article 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony.

Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law
specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Bilateral Act)
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution
to some other person or persons. (Unilateral Act)
Conspiracy as a crime itself.

As to the manner of incurring criminal liability: an act of one is an act of all;
The offense or felony of one is not necessarily the crime of law; and
Liability is not always similar or pertains to all offender.
How do we prove conspiracy?
a. By direct evidence
b. By state witnesses those persons who are part of the planning or co-conspirator;
c. Implied conspiracy circumstances of the cases. As long as there is unity of purpose and
concerted actions toward particular goal.
d. Conspiracy by implication
e. Circumstantial Evidence
Principles of Conspiracy
A. General Rule: Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are not punishable.
Exception: They are only punishable in cases where the law specially provides a penalty
therefor.
B. General Rule: Even if you conspire but you are not present in the scene of the crime, there is
no conspiracy there is voluntary desistance.
Exception: master mind of the killing; principal by inducement; co-conspirator.
C. Conspiracy to be present:
1. Co-conspirator must be present in the actual commission;
2. If he did not physically participate, there is still conspiracy, due to moral ascendancy
granted by him.
3. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, relationship, and mere passive presence.
Examples of conspiracy and proposal
i. Conspiracy to commit rebellion, coup detat, sedition (Arts. 136, 141)

ii. Conspiracy to commit treason (Art. 115)
iii. Conspiracy in restraint of trade (Art. 186)
iv. Proposal to commit rebellion, coup d etat (Art. 136)
Requisites/ Elements of Conspiracy
a. That two or more persons came to an agreement;

b. That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and
c. That the execution of the felony be decided upon.
Requisites/ Elements of Proposal
a. That a person has decided to commit a felony; and
b. That he proposes its execution to some other person or persons. (If agreed, there is
conspiracy, proposal is absorb).
Reminder:
- For a collective responsibility among the accused to be established, it is
sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them acted in concert, each
doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill their victim, and although
only one of them may have actually stabbed the victim, the act of one is the
act of all. But conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt (quantum
of proof/evidence); existence of probable cause. (People v. Hernandez, 182
SCRA 794)
- It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective.
- Conspiracy may either be express or implied. It is express when the
conspirators purposely met prior to the commission of the crime to agree and
plan the commission of the felony. It is implied when, despite the lack of
express agreement, the conspirators, in view of their individual acts, may be
deemed to be acting toward the same purpose. In implied conspiracy, it is
sufficient if it may be showed that at the time of the aggression, all of the
accused acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design.
- As to when there is conspiracy. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective then on the
part of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law.
What is required is assent to the perpetration of such misdeed. That must be
their intent. There is a need for concurrence of wills or unity of action or
purpose, or common and joint purpose and design. At times, reference is
made to previous concert of the criminal design. Its manifestation could be
shown by united and concerted action. Thus, a conspiracy need not be proved
by direct evidence. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated. The conditions attending its commission and
the acts executed may be indicative of the common design to accomplish a
criminal purpose and objective. If there is a chain of circumstances to that
effect, then conspiracy has been established. If such be the case then, the act
of one is the act of all the others involved and each is to be held to the same
degree of liability as the others. There was an implied conspiracy among the
accused. They were all criminally liable for murder People v. Francisco Arroyo
and Rito Mina, G.R. No. 99258, September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 616, 631).
- When there is conspiracy. From a legal standpoint, there is conspiracy if, at
the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts
of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of intent. Where conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all (see People v. Henry Togahan, et.
al., G.R. No. 174064, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 557).
- Conspiracy cannot be presumed or inferred, if not included in the
information;
- If the crime subject of the agreement is carried out, the conspiracy which they
had before committing the crime will be treated only as a manner of
incurring criminal liability. It is not a separate offense.
D. Instances that conspiracy transcends? (Provided that there is no overt acts done).
a. Mere companionship
b. Mere relationship
c. Mere passive presence
Article 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies, and light felonies.
Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which
in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Article 25 of this Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum
period are correctional, in accordance with the above-mentioned article.
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 22 pesos, or both, is provided.
Penalties to be imposed under grave felonies
1. Capital Punishment : Death

2. Afflictive Penalties : Reclusion Perpetua
Afflictive Penalties : Reclusion Temporal
Afflictive Penalties : Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Afflictive Penalties : Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Penalties to be imposed under less grave felonies
1. Correctional Penalties : Pricion Correccional
: Arresto Mayor
: Suspension
: Destierro
Penalties to be imposed under light felonies
1. Light Penalties : Arresto menor

: Public censure
Article 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this code.
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.

Examples of special laws that RPC is not suppletory
1. RA 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act
Guiding principles
1. General Rule: RPC is supplementary to special laws

Exception: If special law does not provide penalty; RPC will not be suppletory as it is not penal
in nature.
Reminder:
- It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that special legal provisions
prevail over general ones.
- The Revised Penal Code is not applicable to offenses defined and punished
under special penal laws. The Revised Penal Code shall apply to offenses
defined and punished under special penal laws (1) when the special law
specially provides that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall apply to
it and, (2) when the special law used the terminology or adopted the penalties
under the Code.
E.
Justifying and Exempting Circumstances
What is a justifying circumstance?
Justifying circumstances are those where the act of a person is said to be in accordance
with law, so that such person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both
criminal and civil liability.
There is no civil liability, except in par.4 of Art. 11, where the civil liability is borne by the
persons benefited by the act.
General Rule: No criminal and no civil liability
Exception: There is civil liability in paragraph 4, Art. 11, RPC
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree,
provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding

circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making the defense has no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first
and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and
that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage
to another, provided that the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Anyone who acts in the fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.
Section 26, RA 9262 it is an amendment to Article 11 whereas the killing of the husband is
justified if the offender is a battered wife. (Battered Woman Syndrome).
- Do not incur civil/criminal liability despite the absence of the elements
of self-defense (People v. Genosa).
In justifying circumstances, who has the burden of proof?
The circumstances mentioned in Art.11 are matters of defense and it is incumbent upon
the accused, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by
him to the satisfaction of the court.
Hence, if during the arraignment the accused plead not guilty, right away, there would be
a reverse order of trial and the defense need to prove the existence of justifying circumstance, as
the case may be.
Distinguish justifying circumstances from exempting circumstances.
Justifying circumstances are those where the act of a person is said to be in accordance
with law, so that such person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both
criminal and civil liability. There is nothing unlawful in the act as well as in the intention of the
actor. There is no civil liability, except in par.4 of Art. 11, where the civil liability is borne by the
persons benefited by the act. (Art. 11 par. 4. Causing damage to another in state of necessity).
In exempting circumstances, there is a crime but no criminal, and hence there is still civil
liability. The act is not justified, but the actor is not criminally liable. Hence, there are civil liability
except in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Art 12, RPC (Causing an injury by mere accident; failing to perform
an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause).
Paragraph 1 of Article 11. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Paragraph 1. SELF-DEFENSE
What is self-defense?
Self-defense includes not only the defense of the person or body of the one assaulted
but also that of his rights the enjoyment of which is protected by law. Aside from the right to life
on which rests the legitimate defense of our person; we have the right to property acquired by
us; the right to honor which is not the least prized of mans patrimony; right to liberty; and
right to protection of our home.
Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent
upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
Self-defense is inherently a weak defense because, as experience has demonstrated, it is

easy to fabricate and difficult to prove. Thus, for this defense to prosper, the accused must prove
with clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if the evidence of
the prosecution is weak, it cannot be disbelieved if the accused admitted responsibility for the
crime charged (see Fernando Estabas Mahawan v. People, G.R. No. 176609, December 18, 2008,
574 SCRA 737).
Defense of ones life, defense of ones limb, defense of ones right, defense of ones honor, defense
of ones property.
Why is self-defense lawful?
Because it would be quite impossible for the state in all cases to prevent aggression upon
its citizen and even offer protection to the person unjustly attacked. The law of self-defense
embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in mans natural instinct of
self-preservation, to save his person or rights from impending danger or peril.
What are the elements or requisites of self-defense?
1. Unlawful Aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Example of Self-defense
Jose Laurel suddenly kissed Concepcion Lat on the night of December 26, 1909. He was pursued
by Exequiel Castillo, Concepcions lover, and his friends but they were not able to catch him.
Two nights after, Exequiel Castillo confronted Jose Laurel after having him called down from
the parochial building where the latter was watching some show. In the middle of their
altercation, Exequiel hit Jose with a cane in his head which caused him to fall down in sitting
position. Exequiel was about to hit him again with the cane but Jose was able to stab him in
the chest with a pocket knife. Jose Laurel was charged of frustrated homicide because of the
incident. He interposed self-defense. Is the defense tenable?
Yes. From the evidence, then produced at the trial, it is concluded that it was Exequiel
Castillo who, through the mediation of several others, invited Laurel to come down from the
upper story of the parochial building, and that it was he, therefore, who provoked the affray
aforementioned, and, also, it was he who unlawfully assaulted Jose Laurel, by striking the latter
two blows with a cane inasmuch as it is not likely that after having received a dangerous wound

in the left breast, he would have been able to strike his alleged assailant two successive blows
and much less pursue him. It is very probable that he received the said wounds after he had
assaulted Jose Laurel with the cane, and Laurel, on his part, in defending himself from the assault,
employed rational means by using the knife that he carried in his pocket. For all the foregoing
reasons, Jose Laurel must be acquitted and held to be exempt from responsibility on the ground
of self-defense. The case falls within paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the
defensive act executed by him was attended by the three requisites of illegal aggression on the
part of Exequiel Castillo, there being a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Laurel, who,
as we have said, did not provoke the occurrence complained of, nor did he direct that Exequiel
Castillo be invited to come down from the parochial building and arrange the interview in which
Castillo alone was interested, and, finally, because Laurel, in defending himself with a pocketknife
against the assault made upon him with a cane, which may also be a deadly weapon, employed
reasonable means to prevent or repel the same (U.S. v. Laurel, et. al. G.R. No. -7037, March 15,
1912. 22 Phil. 252, 266-267).
Juan Loquenario rocked the boat where Narciso Cabungcal and several others, great majority
of whom were women and among them the appellant's wife and son and a nursing child, son
of a married couple who had also gone in this boat, were riding. Narciso Cabungcal asked him
not to do it because the boat might capsize. However, despite the warning, the deceased
continued rocking the boat which started to take in water. For fear that the boat would capsize
and the passengers might drown, Cabungcal struck him on the forehead with an oar. He fell to
the water but when he appeared on the water, he threatened to capsize the boat. Cabungcal
struck him on the neck with the oar. He submerged and was not seen again. Narciso Cabungcal
was charged of homicide. He interposed defense of relative (of his wife) and of strangers (other
passengers of the boat). Is the defense tenable?
Yes. Due to the conditions of the river at the point where the deceased started to rock
the boat, if it had capsized the passengers would have run the risk of losing their lives, the
majority of whom were women, especially the nursing child. The conduct of the deceased in
rocking the boat until the point of it having taken water and his insistence on this action, in spite
of the appellant's warning, gave rise to the belief on the part of the plaintiff that it would capsize
if he did not separate the deceased from the boat in such a manner as to give him no time to
accomplish his purpose. It was necessary to disable him momentarily. For this purpose the blow
given him by the appellant on the forehead with an oar was the least that could reasonably have
been done. And this consideration militates with greater weight with respect to the second blow
given in his neck with the same oar, because, then the danger was greater that the boat might
upset, especially as the deceased had expressed his intention to upset it. In view of all the
circumstances of the case, in doing what the appellant did was in lawful defense of the lives of
the passengers of the boat, two of whom were his wife and child. The recourse of taking the boat
to the shore was not adequate in those circumstances, because that would require sometime,
whereas the deceased might in an instant cause the boat to capsize without giving time to arrive
at the shore. The appellant having acted in defense of his wife and child and the other passengers
in the boat and the means employed having been reasonably necessary in this defense, while it
was at the cost of the life of the deceased, he is completely exempt from criminal liability (see
People v. Narciso Cabungcal, G.R. No. L-28451, August 1, 1928, 51 Phi. 803).
First Element: Unlawful Aggression

What is unlawful aggression?
Unlawful Aggression is an indispensable requisite, the presence of unlawful aggression is

a condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the
victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.
In the case of People v. Alconga, 76 Phil 366, Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault
or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. In order to consider that an
unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material aggression,
an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have
been made; a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission
of an act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground
that it was committed in self-defense. Hence, Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at
least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind
What are the elements of Unlawful Aggression? (People v. Gamez, 708 SCRA 625)
1. The attack is material;

2. There is an actual or imminent danger in the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-
defense;
3. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon;
4. There must be real and immediate threat to his life, property, or right;
5. It must be continuous
In the afternoon of May 30, 1965, Severino Cabaral told Jose Encomienda that he was sent by
the hacienda owner to tell him that he cannot work in the hacienda and that he will be
removed as tenant. When Jose asked why he was being removed as tenant when it was his
means of livelihood, Severino replied that he had no right to work on the land because it was
not in his name. Severino got angry when he replied that he could not be removed and with his
right hand drew his revolver tucked in his left side when they were about one meter apart.
With his left hand, Jose immediately grabbed the victim's right hand holding the revolver,
causing Severino to lean on the stairway. During their struggle, the revolver fired four times
continuously that with the bolo in his right hand Jose struck the victim's right forearm. When
Severino wanted to get the gun with his left hand, Jose boloed his left arm about one inch from
the left wrist. He shook Severinos right arm downward causing the gun to fall to the ground.
When Severino tried to pick up the gun, he stepped backward and hacked his forehead causing
Severino to fall backward on the stairway, as he (Jose) retrieved the gun to prevent him from
picking it up again and then stepped about two meters backward for Severino might grab him.
Severino died from the injuries that he sustained. Charged of Homicide, he claimed selfdefense.
Yes. Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate

and imminent kind. Here when the deceased drew his gun with his right hand, accused grabbed
with his free left hand the victim's right hand holding the revolver, forced the victim to lean on
the stairs and pinned the victim's right hand also on the stair. During the struggle, the revolver
fired four times continuously and he hacked the victim's right forearm. When the victim tried to
get the gun with his left hand, appellant boloed the victim's left arm and then shook the victim
right arm downward causing the gun to fall to the ground and the victim tried to pick up the gun,

accused stepped backward and hacked the victim's forehead, after which he himself picked up
the gun so as to prevent the victim, from retrieving the same. If the deceased had no intention
to use his gun on the appellant, he would not have drawn it or resisted accused's attempt to
prevent him from using it. There was therefore real danger to the life or personal safety of the
accused (People v. Jose Encomienda y Navarro, G.R. No. L26750, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 522,
535-536).
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression, because
it is required that the act be offensive and positively strong, showing the wrongful intent of
the aggressor to cause an injury. (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA
204, 215).
For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be real danger to life or personal
safety. For this reason, a mere push or a shove, not followed by other acts, has been
held insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression. A playful kick at the foot by way of
greeting between friends may be a practical joke, and may even hurt; but it is not a
serious or real attack on a person's safety (see People v. Teodoro Sabio, G.R. No. L-
23734, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 901, 902).
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and

unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real
aggression. For this reason, an accuseds observation that one of the men was pulling
an object from his waist is not a convincing proof of unlawful aggression. A threat, even
if made with a weapon or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not
sufficient. An intimidating or threatening attitude is by no means enough (see People v.
Bingky Campos and Danny Boy Acabo, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011, 653 SCRA 99,
114-116).
When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or
wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in
retaliation against the original aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the
accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the
aggressor was injured by the accused (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 181354, February 27,
2013, 692 SCRA 127, 145-146).
Mere fact of pointing a gun at a person even no other overt act is made, it is already
considered as unlawful aggression.
There is self-defense even if the aggressor used a toy pistol, provided the accused
believed it was a real gun. The belief of the accused may be considered in determining
the existence of unlawful aggression.
The attack made by the deceased and the killing of the deceased by the defendant
should succeed each other without appreciable interval of time.

In People vs. Alconga, when the aggressor flees unlawful aggression no longer exists,
because the aggressor runs away, the one making a defense has no more right to kill or
even to wound the former aggressor. However, the case would be different if the
aggressor (deceased) retreat just to take more advantageous position to insure the
success of his attack already begun by him, the unlawful aggression is considered still
continuing, and the one making the defense has a right to pursue him in his retreat and
to disable him.
There is no unlawful aggression when there is agreement to fight. Where the fight is
agreed upon, each of the protagonists is at once assailant and assaulted, and neither
can invoke the right of self-defense because aggression which is an incident in the fight
is bound to arise from one or the other of the combatants.
Defense of Property. As a general rule it can be invoked as a justifying circumstance

when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property.
However, even if there is no assault made by the offender (deceased), the owner of the
property may be justified in killing him if the former is already inside the house,
assuming the existence of night time and weapon.
Defense of home. We have the right to protect the sanctity of our home from any
trespassers or malefactors. Even if the thief is unarmed and is not doing any assault to
the house owner, pero nasa loob na ng bahay, owner is justified to kill the thief.
(Nighttime and Weapon). However, it would not be justified if the trespasser went inside
your house during day time and no assault and no weapon are present.
Violent entry to anothers house at nighttime, by a person who is armed with a
bolo, and forcing his way into the house, shows he was ready and looking for trouble,
and the manner of his entry constitutes an act of aggression. The owner of the house
need not wait for a blow before repelling the aggression, as that blow may prove fatal.
The victim assaulted the accused with a pingahan. The accused avoided the blow by falling to
the ground under the bench with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse. Later, a hand to
hand combat ensued and when he sustained several wounds, he ran away. After running a
distance of about 200 meters, accused was able to catch up with him and slashed him with a
bolo which led to his death. (With Self Defense and With no Self-defense)
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the
deceased. The initial stage commenced when the deceased assaulted accused without sufficient
provocation on the part of the latter. During the second stage of the fight accused was no longer
acting in self-defense. That the deceased was not fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply
shown by the fact that he was still able to run a distance of some 200 meters before being
overtaken by accused. Under such circumstances, appellant's plea of self-defense in the second
stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no aggression
(People v. Dioscoro Alconga and Adolfo Bracamonte, 78 Phil. 366, 375-376).
Accused stabbed the victim in his neck after the latter placed his hand in her thigh. Prosecuted
for homicide, she claimed defense of honor. Is the defense meritorious? (No Self-defense)

No. According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this
case, when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the
door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her
consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people,
about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other
dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no
possibility of her being raped. And when she gave the victim a thrust at the base of the left side
of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few
moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive;
and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely
exempt from criminal liability (People v. Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue, C.A. No. 384,
February 21, 1946, 74 Phil. 174, 182-183).
Second Element: Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
What is reasonable in the face of an actual aggression does not depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of the injury and must be judged by the circumstances surrounding the
person attacked who acts under the instinct of self-preservation.
Test in determining the reasonableness of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression.
1. Whether the means employed is reasonable, will depend upon the nature and quality of the
weapon used by the aggressor;
2. His physical condition, character, size and other circumstances, and those of the person
defending himself; and also
3. The place and occasion of the assault.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in
the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger
to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done,
but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury. Hence, there is no need for the equality of
the weapon used- Doctrine of Rational Equivalence.. (People v. Enconmienda, G.R. No. L-
26750, August 18, 1972, 48 SCRA 522, 534).
Accused was challenged to a fight by the private complaint. He tried to pacify him but the
latter threw stones at him. He was able to dock just in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively
retaliated by hitting the left leg of the private complainant with a bolo scabbard. The private
complainant fell to the ground. Accused then continuously mauled the private complainant
with a bolo scabbard, until the latters cousin restrained him. Private complainant sustained
two (2) bone fractures, one in his left leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6)
months for these injuries to completely heal. In a charged of Frustrated Homicide, accused
interposed selfdefense. Did the accused act in self-defense?
No. While the first and third elements of self-defense are present, the second one is lacking.
First, unlawful aggression on the part of private complainant was manifested by his attack upon
the person of the petitioner in throwing a stone at the latter. This sudden and unexpected
assault posed actual danger on the life or limb of the petitioner, prompting the latter to take

steps in his defense. To the mind of the Court, this is an offensive positively strong enough to
be the basis for a defensive action. Second, there is lack of sufficient, if not total absence of,
provocation on the part of the accused. The facts are clear that it is private complainant who
invited the confrontation with petitionerby shouting violent threats at the latter. In arguing
that the means employed was reasonable to repel the unlawful aggression, the accused invokes
the application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, delineated in People v. Gutual, to wit:
It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the
reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend
upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
The very application of the doctrine of rational equivalence, invoked by the accused,
militates against his claim. The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the consideration
not only of the nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender and the assailantbut of
the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis--vis, the unlawful aggression.
Significantly, a perusal of the facts shows that after petitioner was successful in taking down
private complainantthe former continued to hack the latter, who was, by then, already
neutralized by the blow. Clearly, this continuous hacking by the petitioner constitutes force
beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private complainants attackand is therefore
unjustified (Ladislao Espinsosa v. People, G.R. No. 181071, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 446, 450-
455).
Third Element: Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Elements of Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
1. No provocation at all was given to the aggressor by the person defending himself;
2. Even if a provocation was given, it was not sufficient;
3. When, even if a provocation was given, it was not given by the person defending himself; and
4. When, even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate
and immediate to the act of aggression.
Battered Woman Syndrome.
Who is a battered woman?
A battered woman has been defined as a woman, who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered woman exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional
beliefs about the home, the family, and the female sex role.
Meanwhile, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through
the battering cycle at least twice.
To invoke battered woman, the woman must be legally married and/or at least a common
law wife.
Three cycle of violence.
1. The tension-building phase;

2. The acute battering incident; and
3. The tranquil, loving phase.
Tension-building phase minor battering occurs, it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or
another form of hostile behavior.
Acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness, and sometimes
death.
Tranquil, Loving phase the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his
partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again.
Paragraph 2. DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree,
provided that unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed are
present, and provided further that in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making defense had no part.
Who are the relatives that can be defended?
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimate, natural or adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same
degrees;
5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.
Elements or Requisites of Defense of Relatives (U.S. v. Rivera, 26 Phil 138).
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making a defense had no
part therein.
Basis of justification.
The justification of defense of relatives by reason of which the defender is not criminally
liable, is founded not only upon a humanitarian sentiment, but also upon the impulse of blood
which impels men to rush, on the occasion of great perils, to the rescue of those close to them by
ties of blood.
Paragraph 3. DEFENSE OF STRANGER.
Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first
and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and
that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
Elements or Requisites of Defense of Stranger
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
3. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
Basis of justification.
What one may do in his defense, another may do for him. Persons acting in defense of others are
in the same condition and upon the same plane as those who act in defense of themselves. The

ordinary man would not stand idly by and see his companion killed without attempting to save
his life. (US vs. Aviado, 38 Phil 10).
Paragraph 4. Avoidance of greater evil or injury.
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another, provided that the following requisites or elements are present:
a. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
b. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
c. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
Paragraph 5. Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful exercise of right or office.
Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office.
Requisites or elements: (People v. Oanis, 74 Phil 257)
a. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office;
b. That the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
Accused was a police officer looking for an escaped prisoner. While he was at a distance
from his companions, the deceased suddenly appeared before him and hit him with a
stone. When he gained his composure, he chased the deceased and fired warning shots
into the air. After four warning shots, he fired a fifth shot at the fleeing accused as he
was in an act of jumping down into the creek. Thereafter, they saw the deceased
floating in the water. Charged of Homicide, accused interposed fulfilment of duty. Is the
defense meritorious?
Yes. The act thus performed by petitioner and which unfortunately resulted in
the death of the escaping detainee was committed in the performance of his official
duty and was more or less necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully
eluding the officers of the law. To hold him guilty of homicide may have the effect of
demoralizing police officers discharging official functions identical or similar to those in
the performance of which petitioner was engaged at the time he fired at the deceased
Pimentel, with the result that thereafter we would have half-hearted and dispirited
efforts on their part to comply with such official duty. This of course, would be to the
great detriment of public interest (Elias Valcorza v. People, G.R. No. L-28129, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 143, 149).
Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. Some days
afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the
house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance,
and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The
policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did
not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. This peace officer
went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him. Charged of
Homicide, Delima interposed performance of duty. Is the defense meritorious?
Yes, the killing was done in the lawful performance of duty. The deceased was
under the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence,
to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand, which compelled the
policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was
justified by the circumstances (People v. Felipe Delima, G.R. No. L-18660, December 22,
1922, 46 Phil. 738).
To be a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be present in following a superior
order:
(1) That an order has been issued by a superior;
(2) That such order must be for some lawful purpose;
(3) That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
Defendant admitted that he prepared the falsified documents with full knowledge of their
falsity, but he claims the data were furnished him by his immediate chief, deceased Fernandez,
and only in obedience to instructions from him. Is he criminally liable?
Yes. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it
must be a compliance with a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern,
and that the person commanding, act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule, an
inferior should obey his superior but, as an illustrious commentator has said, between a general
law which enjoins obedience to a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which
plaintiff forbids what that superior commands, the choice is not doubtful. (1 Penal Code, Viada,
5th edition, p. 528.) (People v. Luciano Barroga, G.R. No. L-31563, January 16, 1930, 54 Phil. 247).
Defendant Dolores was accused with Wilson of crimes of falsification of telegraphic dispatch,
estafa through falsification of mercantile document and falsification of mercantile document
respectively. Both Wilson and Dolores were employed by San Carlos Milling. The defense of
Dolores was that he did nothing but carry out the order of his superior, Wilson. Is Dolores
criminally liable?
Yes. For the act to be justified, both the person who gives the order and the person who
executes it must be acting within the limitations prescribed by law (People v. Joseph Wilson and
Alfredo Dolores, G.R. Nos. L-30012-30015, March 9, 1929 52 Phil. 919).
The deceased Diego Testor was asked to furnish fish to a constabulary detachment. Testor
brought another kind of fish called kalapion. Sgt. Marten slapped the fish into the face of Testor
who was tied and given him fist blows. Three soldiers also maltreated Testor who died the
following day. Counsel for appellant contends that, in the absence of proof of conspiracy,
appellant should not be held liable for the said crime because he merely obeyed the orders of
his superior. Is the appellant criminally liable for the death of the prisoner?
Yes. Obedience to an order of a superior give rise to exemption from criminal liability only
when the order is for some lawful purpose (art. 11, par. 6, Revised Penal Code). Sergeant Margens
order to have the deceased tortured was not that did not give the sergeant the right to take the
law in his own hands and have the offender subjected to inhuman punishment. The order was
illegal, and appellant was not bound to obey it. Moreover, it does not appear that in taking part
in the maltreatment of the decease, appellant was prompted solely by his sense of duty toward
his superior. What appeared is that he and his companions had a common grievance against the
deceased, because the latter had misappropriated a quantity of fish intended for their
consumption. It was, therefore, but natural that they should all want to teach the deceased a
lesson by making him suffer for the fault he had committed (People v. Dario Margen, G.R. No.
L2681, March 30, 1950, 85 Phil. 839).

In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense has to prove that these two
requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance or
lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification
becomes an incomplete one thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance under
Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. (People v. Daniel Pinto, Jr., G.R. No. 39519,
November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 9, 27).
Shooting an offender who refused to surrender is justified.
Around 6:30 p.m., five fully armed policemen in uniform escorted the deceased in Barangay
Sinasahan, Nueva Ecija to recover the missing flower vase and radio. The deceased, who
was not handcuffed, was between the accused and his companion at the right bench of the
police mobile. Just after the jeep had crossed the PNR bridge and while the jeep was slowly
negotiating a bumpy and potholed road, the deceased suddenly grabbed the other police
officers M16 Armalite and jumped out of the jeep. The accused acted immediately.
Without issuing any warning of any sort, and with still one foot on the running board,
accused fired one shot at the deceased, and after two to three seconds, fired four more
successive shots. The shooting happened around 7:00 p.m., at dusk or nag-aagaw ang
dilim at liwanag. Accused approached the deceaseds body to check its pulse. Finding
none, he declared him dead. Charged of homicide, claimed claimed self-defense and
fulfilment of duty as defenses.
Facing imminent danger, the policemen had to act swiftly. Time was of the essence.
It would have been foolhardy for the policemen to assume that the deceased grabbed the
M16 Armalite merely as a souvenir of a successful escape. Neither did they have much
choice. The shooting of the deceased was an immediate and spontaneous reaction to
imminent danger. The weapon grabbed by the deceased was not just any firearm. It was
an M16 Armalite (SP02 Ruperto Cabanlig V. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28,
2003, 464 SCRA 324, 3377-338).
Distinguished fulfillment of duty from self-defense and from consequence of felonious act.
In lawful performance of duty, the victim need not act in aggression against the police
officer unlike in self-defense. In the case of People vs. Delima, the prisoner who attacked the
policeman with a stroke of his lance was already running away when he was shot, and, hence, the
unlawful aggression had already ceased to exist; but the killing was done in the performance of a
duty. The rule of self-defense does not apply.
The public officer acting in the fulfillment of a duty may appear to be an aggressor but
his aggression is not unlawful, it being necessary to fulfill his duty.
Paragraph 6. Obedience to an order issued for some lawful purpose.
Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.
Requisites/Elements:
1. That an order has been issued by a superior.
2. That such order must be for some lawful purpose.
3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
Case sample:
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan

The President cannot be over or above the law. In our catechism, it is the legality of the law and
not obedient to a man.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Exempting circumstances are those grounds for exemption from punishment
because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any of the conditions which
make the act voluntary or negligent.
The basis of the exemption from punishment is the complete absence of

intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on
the part of the accused.
Kinds of exempting circumstances and their requisites.
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
from criminal liability:
(1) An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
(2) A person under nine years of age.
(3) A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be
criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and
the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family
who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be
committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
(4) Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. (free from criminal and civil
liability).
(5) Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
(6) Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury.
(7) Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful insuperable cause. (free from criminal and civil liability).
Minimum age of criminal responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen
(15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this
Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws (sec. 6, R.A. 9344).

a. Basis for determination of age. The age of a child may be determined from the childs
birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of
these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor (see
sec. 7, RA 9344).
b. Under Sec. 20 of RA 9344, children below the age of criminal responsibility (15 years and
below) shall be immediately released to their parents or guardians or to the childs nearest
relative subject to the appropriate rehabilitation programs to be conducted by the local social
welfare officers.
c. Children above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment shall
be referred to appropriate diversion program (see sec. 22, RA 9344).
(1) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than six (6)
years imprisonment, the diversion program shall be conducted by the law enforcement
officer or punong barangay with the assistance of the local social welfare or
development office.
(2) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the diversion shall be conducted by the local social welfare or
development officer.
Where the imposable penalty for the crime exceeds six (6) years imprisonment,
diversion may be resorted to only by the court (see sec. 23, RA 9344).
Notes:
Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong
and such capacity may be known and should be determined by the records in each case, the
very appearance, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act but also after and even during trial. In short, it is mental
capacity to distinguish what is right and what is wrong (see People v. Duquenia, 68 Phil. 580).
Discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. It means the
mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
d. In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB, fifteen-year old
in the second floor of her familys house in Palatiw, Pasig. The accused arrived holding a
knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. He then undressed BBB and
had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also
had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. He then warned them
not to tell anybody what he did. Charged of rape, BBB claimed exemption from criminal
responsibility because of his minority. Is he exempt from criminal liability? Yes. R.A. No.
9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to
promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing
a system that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-
being through a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision
orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs and
other alternatives to institutional care. More importantly in the context of this case, this law

modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it
changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
previously provided i.e., from under nine years of age and above nine years of age and
under fifteen (who acted without discernment) to fifteen years old or under and above
fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from
criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article
12 of the RPC did presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to
distinguish right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they
cannot be held accountable. The current law also drew its changes from the principle of
restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and
gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention
measures. The Supreme Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 9344 retroactively and
dismissed the cases against the accused (Robert Sierra v. People, G.R. No. 182941, July 3,
2009, 591 SCRA 666, 667-669).
3. Insanity.
a. A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the
burden of establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the
crime was committed. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason
or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs.
Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660). In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting
circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the
act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability. (People v. Honorato Ambal, G.R. No. L-52688, October
17, 1980, 100 SCRA 325).
b. Thus, mere abnormality of mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not
lost consciousness of his acts.
c. Evidence of insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of
the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted. He is presumed to be sane when he committed
it.
Imbecile.
Within the meaning of Article 12 is one who is deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. Moreover, an imbecile,
is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children
between two and seven years of age.
Schizophrenia or Dementia praecox.
It is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy
and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Epilepsy.
Is a chronic nervous disease characterized by fits, occurring at intervals, attended by
conclusive motions of the muscles and loss of consciousness.
4. Explain the tests in determining whether an accused is criminally irresponsible due to legal
insanity.

To determine whether an accused was legally insane during the commission of the crime,
two distinguishable tests are used:
(a) the test of cognition whether there was a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the criminal act and
(b) the test of volition whether there was a total deprivation of freedom of the will. Case law
shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has
failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally
deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying complete deprivation of
intelligence.
This is expected, since a persons volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is
represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by
a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist (see People v. Anacito Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 654)
a. Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the
will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability (People v. Ernesto
Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, June 29, 1981, 105 SCRA 151).
(1) After bumping the victim, accused left but after a few minutes he returned. Without
saying a word and without warning, the accused delivered a stabbing blow with a
dagger which was concealed in his hand. The victim was hit on the right chest. The
victim died and the accused was charged of murder. Accused claimed insanity as
defense. Is the defense meritorious? No. Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts
have established a more stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. In our jurisdiction, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough;
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Every
individual is presumed to have acted with complete grasp of ones mental faculties.
Appellants past does not discredit the facts that (1) he did not act with complete absence
of the power to discern; (2) he was not deprived of reason; and (3) he was not totally
deprived of his will. Inasmuch as the accused failed to present convincing evidence to
establish his alleged insanity at the time he stabbed the victim, he should be held
responsible for the death of the latter (People v. Randy Belonio, G.R. No. 148695, May 27,
2004, 429 SCRA 579, 596- 597).
(2) Accused suddenly grabbed the child by his feet and slammed his head on the cement
floor several times. As a consequence, the young girl was rendered unconscious. The
child died after being brought to the hospital. Convicted of murder for what he did to
the girl, accused pleaded insanity on appeal not for acquittal but merely for the
reduction of his sentence. Is the accused legally insane? No. Whenever the facts of the
case show that accuseds behavior when he committed the crime is such that it creates
doubt as to the voluntariness of his acts, the court should conduct appropriate measures
to determine the mental state of the person. The mere fact that accuseds felonious acts
are so bizarre does not necessarily mean that he is insane or that he should be
immediately subjected to mental examination. Insanity is usually invoked by offenders in
order to seek reduction of their penalty, avoid criminal prosecution or just plainly attract
compassion instead of condemnation. The court should consider the factual
circumstances of the case and whether it was intended for the actual determination of
the defendants mental state or simply to delay or interrupt judicial proceedings or
frustrate justice (People v. Manuel Talavera, G.R. No. 139967, July 19, 2001, 361 SCRA
433, 439-441).
(3) Accused raped private complainant. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned
the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house,
otherwise he would kill her. Accused was later on charged of rape. He claimed insanity
as defense. Is the defense meritorious? No. The fact that the accused threatened
complainant with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him,
indicates that he was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault (People v.
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr., G.R.No. 54135, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 65. 204 SCRA 65,
80).
(4) Accused killed his two children out of rage for his wife whom he believed was having an
affair with another man. When accused realized that his mother and siblings had seen
his two children lying lifeless on the floor, he stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen
knife, to the shouts of horror of his mother and siblings. He tried to end his life by
jumping out the window of their house. He sustained a head injury from his fall but he
and his two children were rushed to Mary Johnston Hospital by his siblings and some of
their neighbors. Once at the hospital, accused received treatment for his injuries but
the two children could no longer be revived. Charged of parricide, accused-appellant
interposed insanity as defense. Is the accused legally insane? No. Accused acted out of
jealous rage at the thought of his wife having an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy
and anger are not equivalent to insanity. There is a vast difference between a genuinely
insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails
to use reason or good judgment in what he does. We reiterate jurisprudence which has
established that only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of
the commission of .the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered (People v. Honorio Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 1010, 632 SCRA 510, 517-
522).
b. A feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious
of his acts. He acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for his acts (People v. Reynaldo Villanueva,
G.R. No. 172697, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 147, 153-155).
c. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. However, not every aberration of the mind or mental
deficiency constitutes insanity. To determine whether an accused was legally insane during the
commission of the crime, two distinguishable tests are used: (a) the test of cognition whether
there was a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act and (b) the test
of volition whether there was a total deprivation of freedom of the will. Case law shows
common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to

turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived
of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying complete deprivation of intelligence.
This is expected, since a persons volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is
represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that the accused failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the defense of insanity. Tested against the stringent criterion
for insanity to be exempting, such deportment of the accused, his occasional silence, and his acts
of laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval
are not sufficient proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the
crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties,
which will not exclude imputability (People v. Anacito Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17,
2004, 425 SCRA 654).
5. Accident
Something that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences. (Pomoy v. People)
a. Accused, a police officer, was charged of shooting the deceased, a master teacher at the
Concepcion College who was arrested for robbery. He claimed that the shooting was due to
accident which happened when the deceased tried to grab his gun. Is the accused criminally
liable?
No. The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing
a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the
part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. From the facts, it is clear
that all these elements were present. At the time of the incident, accused was a member --
specifically, one of the investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the
Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as
investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the
latters cell for a routine interrogation. Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a
law enforcer that accused tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim
suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, accused was duty-bound
to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained person in his
custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in
the vicinity, including accused himself. Accused cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised
all the necessary precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to
others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his
house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working
area. At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to
the deceased, much less kill him. The participation of accused, if any, in the victims death was
limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and

the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -- were
sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of
accused. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latters
culpability (Roweno Pomoy v. People, G.R. No. 150647, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 439 452-
466).
6. Impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. (People v. Del Rosario)

Elements:
1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil greater than or at least equal to, that which
he is required to commit;
2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it.
Note:
Duress as a valid defense should be based on real, imminent, or reasonable fear for ones
life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear.
A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
a. Accused drew seven post-dated checks in favor of Manila Doctors Hospital to apply for the hospital
expenses of her mother. The checks were dishonored for being drawn on account closed. Accused
reasoned out that she was compelled to do so by fear that her mother would be given inhumane
treatment by the hospital if she would not pay the latter. Is her defense meritorious? No. The fear
harbored by the accused was not real and imminent. It is speculative fear. It is not the uncontrollable
fear contemplated by law (Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 221, 230).
7. Compulsion of an irresistible force (People v. Siao)

Elements:
a. That the compulsion is by means of physical force
b. That the physical force must be irresistible
c. That the physical force must come from a third person.
Two kinds of Principal by inducement:
1. Through force, violence, or intimidation
2. Through reward or promise
a. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not
act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not
my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who
acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be
of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat (People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011, 640 SCRA 111, 131).

(1) Defendant Raop admitted his participation in the robbery but he averred that he acted
under duress exercised by his friend, Ernesto Sarip. Raop testified that at six o'clock in
the morning of April 30, 1966, his friend, Ernesto Sarip, went to his house
at Barrio Kalilangan and requested him to accompany Ernesto to the house of the
latter's aunt located at Barrio Lampanosan. At first Raop refused but when Sarip
allegedly threatened him by pointing his rifle at Raop, Raop consented to go with him.
Ernesto gave him a homemade gun called "paliuntod". Then, they went to the victims
house and took the chickens and carabao under the house and killed the victim. Raop
claimed exemption from criminal responsibility on account of duress. Is the accused
criminally responsible? Yes. It is clear that his version of the robbery with homicide
does not exculpate him at all. His counsel de officio argues that Raop acted against his
will. That contention is belied by Raop's admission that he and Ernesto are close friends.
The two were residents of Barrio Kalilangan. Raop did not prove that he acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury. His pretension that he was threatened with a gun by his friends,
Ernesto, is not credible because he himself Raop was armed with a rifle (People v.
Ernesto Sarip, et. al., G.R. Nos. L31481-83, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 666, 673).
(2) At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while AAA and the victim Abad
Sulpacio were sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to rob the place. Inside the house, she saw
and recognized accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Taedo, and heard the latter uttering
somebody will die. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo
where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied. Inside
the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Taedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim,
Roberto Taedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred. The Revo then proceeded towards the
fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales,
Pangasinan. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out
from the vehicle by Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that time
Dick Taedo stayed with her in the vehicle. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the
vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): Make a decision now. Abad has already four (4)
bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl. Lando, Al, Dick Taedo (Dick),
Roberto Taedo (Bet), Marvin Lim (Marvin), Necitas Ordeiza-Taedo (Cita), and Fred
Doe were later charged with the crimes of Murder and of Kidnapping/Serious Illegal
Detention in two separate Information. Al claimed that he was forced to participate in
the crimes. Is Al criminally responsible? Yes. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code,
a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because
such person does not act with freedom. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the
evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must
be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to,
that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must
be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury
is not enough. There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that
he was under duress from his co-accused while participating in the crime that would

suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability (People v. Alberto Anticamara, G.R.
No. 178771, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 489, 508)
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
1. Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy
and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. Pertains to those acts done with freedom,
intelligence, and intent.
2. Absolutory causes are either justifying or exempting circumstances. Other legal exemptions are
provided in different provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
(1) Spontaneous desistance of the person before commencing any elements of the felony.
(2) Accessories exempted from prosecution because of their relationship to the principals of the
felonies (Art. 20, RPC).
(3) Detention or confinement of accused who committed a crime or those afflicted by violent
insanity or ailments requiring compulsory hospital confinement (Art. 124, RPC).
(4) Death or physical injuries inflicted under exception circumstances (Art. 247, RPC).
(5) Trespass to dwelling to prevent some serious harm to himself, or to the occupants of the
dwelling or a third person, or to render some service to humanity or justice (Art. 280, RPC).
(6) Persons exempt from criminal liability for crimes against property on account of their
relationship to the owners of the property (Art. 344, RPC).
(7) Instigation. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the
purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been
held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed
in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to
expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence
of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the
offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The
fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the
latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of
such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the
owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in
carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no
defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a
'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary (see People
v. Chu, 56 Phil. 44, 52-53).
(8) Special provisions of RA 9262 and RA 9344
Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense. Under section 26 of RA 9262, victims-survivors

who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
Status offenses under RA 9344. Section 57 of RA 9344 provides that any conduct not
considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered as
an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
Offenses not applicable to children. Section 58 of the RA 9344 provides that persons below
eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and
prostitution under art. 202 of the RPC, of mendicancy under PD 1563, and sniffing of rugby
under PD 1619, such prosecution being inconsistent with the UN Conventions on the Rights
of the Child; provided that said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and treatment
program.
Exemption from the application of death penalty. Section 59 of RA 9344 provides that the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, RA 9165, and other special laws notwithstanding, no
death penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with the law.
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION DISTINGUISHED.

In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission
of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. Instigation must be made by public officers or
private detectives. Herein, the accused must be acquitted.
Meanwhile, entrapment, the ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping
and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. Entrapment is no bar to the
prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.


Reviewer in Criminal Law I

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CRIMINAL LAW 1 REVIWER: PJM 1

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Silverio Valdez v. Antonio Lucero and Celestino Jimenez

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Article 3. Definition. Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies.

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What is mistake of fact?

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People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257. Error in personae not Mistake of fact.

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Distinguished intent from motive.

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Article 4 applies only in crimes committed by dolo. It has no application in crimes

1. That an intentional felony has been committed;

What is the rationale of par. 1 of Article 4?

1. Error in Personae or Mistake in the identity of the victim;

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Praeter Intentionem. People vs. Cagoco

Example of instances where an accused is criminally liable for the unintended

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a. When the act/omission is not punishable by the RPC;

The offended party is not obliged to submit to surgical operation.

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Stages of Commission of Felonies.

In determining whether the felony is attempted or frustrated or consummated

1. The nature of the offense;

- In frustrated felony, the wound inflicted must be a mortal wound or fatal

What are the stages of development of a crime?

Examples of preparatory acts that are punishable

a. Treason (Art. 115)

Examples of preparatory acts that are not punishable.

What are the stages of acts of execution?

What are the elements of attempted felony?

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What are the elements of frustrated felony?

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

Distinguish attempted and frustrated felonies:

What is an overt act?

What are the elements of overt acts?

1. That there be external acts;

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