D.2 NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs.
In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C.
CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.
FACTS: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the
Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his
employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a
vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death was receiving a
monthly salary of US$850.00.
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances,
funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death of
Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount
of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen
Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is
registered.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in
this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's
Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo
the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits.
The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and Employment, after
hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979, ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and
severally the following:
I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent in Philippine
currency as death compensation benefits;
II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral expenses;
III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees.
It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen Board within
ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979, the Ministry rendered its
decision in this case as follows:
In her complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued that the amount of
compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel is registered,
which is Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board issued the
questioned Order.
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the law
of Singapore should not be applied in the case considering that their responsibility
was not alleged in the complaint that no proof of the existence of the Workmen's
Insurance Law of Singapore was ever presented and that the Board cannot take
judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore.
The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of Singapore
ought to be applied in this case.
After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter, we rule in the
affirmative. Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion which, to our mind, is
more appropriate and perhaps acceptable in the regular court of justice. Nothing is
raised in their motion but question of evidence. But evidence is usually a matter of
procedure of which this Board, being merely a quasi-judicial body, is not strict
about.
It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the
course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of
cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and
proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our
considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to
cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen
Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of
this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for
benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the
law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see
no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on technical
grounds as movants herein would like us to.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law of Singapore should be applied in the case at bar.
RULING: YES.
In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management Co. (PTE) and the
late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C" of the Supplemental Complaint, it was stipulated that:
of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst on
board any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other time, the
EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention, including hospital
treatment, also essential medical treatment in the course of repatriation and until
EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such illness or injury incapacitates the
EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as
determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such
illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct
compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the
limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the
Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever
is greater.
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon B.
Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of
petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered
P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of Restituta C. Abordo
and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with Singapore Law, the National Seamen Board is
justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen Board
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-
employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas
employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime
laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice
and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure particularly of evidence
applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply."(Oromeca Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Social Security
Commission, 4 SCRA 1188).
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
D.3 EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs). ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and
deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for OAB, in Riyadh,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula vitae of qualified applicants
for the position of "Computer Specialist." In a facsimile transmission dated November 29, 1993, OAB
informed EDI that, from the applicants' curricula vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the
position of "Computer Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to the terms and
conditions of employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00
(USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate dispatch.
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract that granted him a
monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salaryhis employment contract
stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated
USD 600.00 only. However, through the assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran
USD 850.00 a month.
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated through OAB's
July 9, 1994 letter, on the following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on your salary
and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency[,] vide OAB letter
ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993.
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions (non-submittal
of daily activity reports despite several instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final pay, and
on the same day, he executed a Declaration releasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise,
towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994, against ESI/EDI, OAB,
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National
Capital Region, Quezon City for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudi Arabian law may apply?
RULING
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local
recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A
contract freely entered into is considered law between the parties; and hence, should be respected.
In formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to
the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine ofpresumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us.
Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due to incompetence and
insubordination or disobedience.
This claim has no merit.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that the employer
should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.
Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the
requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for
termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with
the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the workers to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission.The burden of proving that the termination was for a
valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer.
D.4 HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSES ARCILLA v. MA. LOURDES TEODORO
G.R. No. 162886, 11 August 2008, THIRD DIVISION, (Austria-Martinez, J.)
FACTS:
- Ma. Lourdes Teodoro initially filed w/ the RTC of Catanduanes an application for land registration of 2
parcels of land therein. She alleged that she purchased the subject lots from her father, PacificoArcilla,
as shown by a deed of sale, w/ the exception of the commercial building constructed thereon. Prior
thereto, she also alleged that Pacifico acquired the lots by virtue of the partition of his fathers estate.
Lastly, she presented an affidavit of quitclaim executed by the heirs of Vicente Arcilla, Pacificos
brother, in the latters favor. This case was transferred to the MTC of Virac, Catanduanes in view of
the expanded jurisdiction of the said court, as provided under R.A. 7691.
- In their opposition, the heirs contended that they are ownerspro-indiviso of the lots, including the
building and other improvements thereon, by virtue of their inheritance from their deceased parents,
spouses Vicente and JosefaArcilla. Contrary to Teodoros claim, the lots were owned by their father
who has purchased the same from Manuel Sarmiento in 1917, as evidenced by several tax
declarations. In moving to dismiss the application, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest sought
to be declared as the true and absolute owners of the pro-indiviso subject lots and its corresponding
registration and issuance of certificate in their favor as they had been in its possession since 1906.
- When the trial ensued, Teodoro subsequently filed a motion for admission of her certificate against
forum shopping, contending mere oversight and inadvertence in her failure to comply with the
requirement of attaching the verification and said certificate to her complaint. The heirs filed a motion
to dismiss (MD) the application for Teodoro for failure to comply w/ the mandatory requirement is a
ground for the petitions dismissal upon motion and hearing. MTC dismissed the MD and confirmed
Teodoros ownership and registered the 2 lots in her name. RTC affirmed in toto on the ground of the
appeals lack of merit. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was denied. CA also denied the
appeal and its MR.
ISSUES:
(1) Was the belated filing of a sworn certificate of non-forum shopping in substantial compliance w/ the
mandatory requirement?
(2) Is the certificate of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country covered by the Rules of Court
(ROC)?
RULING:
(1) YES. Under the attendant circumstances in the present case, the SC cannot uphold petitioners
contention that respondent's delay of more than 2years and 3 months in filing the required certificate of
non-forum shopping may not be considered substantial compliance with the requirements of SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; that respondent's
reasons of oversight and inadvertence do not constitute a justifiable circumstance that could excuse
her non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the above-mentioned Circular and Rule; that
subsequent compliance with the requirement does not serve as an excuse for a party's failure to
comply in the first instance.
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court provides: Certification against forum shopping. The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint /other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief/in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint/initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint/other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance w/ any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, w/o prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
This Rule was preceded by Circular No. 28-91, w/c originally required the certification of non-
forum shopping for petitions filed with the SC and the CA; and SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94,
w/c extended the certification requirement for civil complaints and other initiatory pleadings filed in all
courts and other agencies. In Gabionza v. Court of Appeals: Circular No. 28-91 was designed to
serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.The same guideline still applies in interpreting what is now
Section 5 Rule 7 of the ROC.
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for
these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.However, it is
equally settled that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities.Rules of procedure should
be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.Moreover, the emerging trend in our
jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities.
It must be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the
objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum shopping.In Uy v. Land Bank of the
Philippines:The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not
unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements,
there were special circumstances/compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the
case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the
reinstatement of the petition. De Guia v. De Guia was cited in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian
Reform in holding that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification
against forum-shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on the merits pursuant
 to its inherent power to suspend its own rules on grounds of substantial justice and apparent
merit of the case.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in
proceeding to decide the case on the merits, as herein respondent was able to submit a
certification of non-forum shopping. More importantly, the apparent merit of the substantive
aspect of the petition for land registration filed by respondent with the MTC coupled with the
showing that she had no intention to violate the Rules with impunity, as she was the one who
invited the attention of the court to the inadvertence committed by her counsel, should be
deemed as special circumstances/compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.
In addition, considering that a dismissal contemplated under Rule 7 Section 5 of the ROC, as a
rule, a dismissal w/o prejudice, and since there is no showing that respondent is guilty of forum
shopping, to dismiss respondent's petition for registration would entail a tedious process of re-filing the
petition, requiring the parties to re-submit the pleadings w/c they have already filed with the trial court,
and conducting anew hearings which have already been done, not to mention the expenses that will
be incurred by the parties in re-filing of pleadings and in the re-conduct of hearings. These would not
be in keeping with the judicial policy of just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
(2) YES. There is no merit to the heirs contentions that the verification and certification subsequently
submitted by respondent did not state the country/city where the notary public exercised her notarial
functions; and that the MTC simply concluded, without any basis, that said notary public was from
Maryland, USA; that even granting that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were
notarized in the USA, the same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for
failure to comply w/ the requirement of Section 24 Rule 132 of the ROC that the notarized document
must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines who
is stationed in the country in w/c a record of the subject document is kept, proving/authenticating that
the person who notarized the document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.
From the foregoing provision, it can be gathered that it does not include documents
acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For foreign public documents to be admissible for any
purpose here in our courts, the same must be certified by any officer of the Philippine legation
stationed in the country where the documents could be found/had been executed. However, after
judicious studies of the rule, it basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the
official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of
the Philippines/of a foreign country. This is so because the provision explicitly refers only to
paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have
included the same. Thus, the contention that the certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was
defective, as it did not bear the certification provided under the provision, is devoid of any merit. What
is important is the fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer
clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and will not commit forum shopping.
Lopez v. Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present case because the Rules of Evidence w/c
were in effect at that time were the old Rules prior to their amendment in 1989. The rule applied
in Lopez, which was decided prior to the effectivity of the amended Rules of Evidence,was Section 25,
Rule 132, to wit: Proof of public or official record An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25 Rule 132 became Section 24
Rule 132; and the amendment consisted in the deletion of the introductory phrase "An official record or
an entry therein," which was substituted by the phrase "The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19. Thus, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court now reads as follows:
Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides: Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service
under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts
or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers
of the Philippines or of a foreign country. The SC agrees w/ the CA that had the Court intended to
include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section
24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.
In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25 Rule 132 were made applicable to all public/official
records without any distinction because the old rule did not distinguish. However, in the present rule, it
is clear under Section 24 Rule 132 that its provisions shall be made applicable only to the documents
referred to under paragraph (a), Section 19 Rule 132.
D.5 Wildvalley Shipping Co. Ltd., vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by private respondent Philippine
President Lines, Inc., arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore.Upon the completion of the
loading and when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzardel Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot
of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas
through the Orinoco River.He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11, 1988boarding it that night
at 11:00 p.m.
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together
with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the
vessel left the portat 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was
under way.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel at mile
172.The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result
of the shallowness of the channel.Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations.These occurred at 4:12 a.m. It was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge.The
master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the channel. He
then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis,
Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River,thus obstructing the
ingress and egress of vessels.As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by petitioner
Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of
Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance
Company was dismissed.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA reversed the trial courts decision and dismissed
petitioners complaint.
ISSUE: WON Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.
HELD:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former
falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Where the foreign law sought to be
proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the
testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and
Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to testify on the existence of theReglamento General de la Ley
de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for eight
years. As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco
River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into the office of the harbour masters.
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the manner provided by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
 The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the GacetaOficialof the Republic of
Venezuela. A photocopy of the GacetaOficial was presented in evidence as an official publication of the
Republic of Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented
as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they
are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1)
It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement is
not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a
document in a foreign country.
It is not enough that the GacetaOficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the
officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the public
document. No such certificate could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule
requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.At this juncture, we have to point out
that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence
of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the
grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual
presumption.
The Court finds that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. Hence, the shipowner is
not liable because the hiring of such pilot is compulsory.
D.6 DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as GERMAN
AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ) HANS PETER PAULENZ and ANNE NICOLAY vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS, Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration
Branch, National Labor Relations Commission, and BERNADETTE CARMELLA MAGTAAS,
CAROLINA DIONCO, CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, MELVIN DELA PAZ, RANDY TAMAYO and EDGARDO
RAMILL
FACTS: On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, capital of
what was then West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries "common interest in promoting the
technical and economic development of their States, and recogni[zed] the benefits to be derived by both
States from closer technical co-operation," and allowed for the conclusion of "arrangements concerning
individual projects of technical co-operation." While the Agreement provided for a limited term of effectivity
of five (5) years, it nonetheless was stated that "[t]he Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive
periods of one year unless either of the two Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to
its expiry," and that even upon the Agreements expiry, its provisions would "continue to apply to any
projects agreed upon x xx until their completion."
On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon,
and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. This
Arrangement affirmed the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called,
Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to "enable
Philippine familiesespecially poor onesto maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable
quality."It appears that SHINE had already been in existence even prior to the effectivity of the
Arrangement, though the record does not indicate when exactly SHINE was constituted. Nonetheless, the
Arrangement stated the various obligations of the Filipino and German governments.
In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for
SHINE. The Philippines designated the Department of Health (DOH) and the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) with the implementation of SHINE. For their part, the German government
"charge[d] the DeustcheGesellschaftfrTechnischeZusammenarbeit (GTZ)& GmbH, Eschborn, with the
implementation of its contributions."
Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE on various
dates between December of 1998 to September of 1999. The employment contracts of all six private
respondents all specified Dr. Rainer Tollkotter, identified as an adviser of GTZ, as the "employer." At the
same time, all the contracts commonly provided that "[i]t is mutually agreed and understood that
[Dr.Tollkotter, as employer] is a seconded GTZ expert who is hiring the Employee on behalf of GTZ and for
a Philippine-German bilateral project named Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment
(SHINE) which will end at a given time."
In September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project
Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as
proposed salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different
from her predecessors. The dispute culminated in a letter dated 8 June 2000, signed by the private
respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and copies furnished officials of the DOH, Philheath, and the director of
the Manila office of GTZ. In the letter, it was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its
original purpose to facilitate the development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health
insurance program and strengthening local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and
new initiatives on the premise that community and local government unit schemes were not sustainablea
philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolays lack of understanding of the purpose of the project. Private
respondents further alleged that as a result of Nicolays "new thrust, resources have been used
inappropriately;" that the new management style was "not congruent with the original goals of the project;"
that Nicolay herself suffered from "cultural insensitivity" that consequently failed to sustain healthy relations
with SHINEs partners and staff. The letter ended with these ominous words: The issues that we [the
private respondents] have stated here are very crucial to us in working for the project. We could no longer
find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and
appropriately.
In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter, all similarly worded except for their
respective addressees. She informed private respondents that the "projects orientations and evolution"
were decided in consensus with partner institutions, Philhealth and the DOH, and thus no longer subject to
modifications. More pertinently, she stated: You have firmly and unequivocally stated XXX that you and the
five other staff "could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be
addressed immediately and appropriately." Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is now
imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible.
Taken aback, private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their earlier letter was not
intended as a resignation letter, but one that merely intended to raise attention to what they perceived as
vital issues. Negotiations ensued between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the
private respondents received a letter from Nicolay, informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts of
employment on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of
confidence and trust."
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Named as respondents
therein where GTZ, the Director of its Manila office Hans Peter Paulenz, its Assistant Project Manager
Christian Jahn, and Nicolay.
GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign
acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was opposed by private respondents with
the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune from suit from the DFA, and
that it was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the SHINE Project and entered
into the contracts of employment.
The LA issued an Order denying the MTD. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a private
corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a
certification as to its diplomatic status.
GTZ filed with the LA a "Reiterating Motion to Dismiss," again praying that the MTD be granted on the
jurisdictional ground, and reprising the arguments for dismissal it had earlier raised. No action was taken by
the LA on this new motion. Instead, the LA rendered a Decision granting the complaint for illegal
dismissal. The Decision concluded that respondents were dismissed without lawful cause, there being "a
total lack of due process both substantive and procedural [sic]." GTZ was faulted for failing to observe the
notice requirements in the labor law. The Decision likewise proceeded from the premise that GTZ had
treated the letter as a resignation letter, and devoted some focus in debunking this theory.
Notably, GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the LAs Decision or elevate said decision for
appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari
filed with the Court of Appeals. The CA promulgated a Resolution dismissing GTZs petition, finding that
"judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for[,] [t]he appropriate remedy of the petitioners
[being] an appeal to the NLRC x xx." A motion for reconsideration to this Resolution proved fruitless for
GTZ.
The Court required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition. The OSG took the side of GTZ, with the
prayer that the petition be granted on the ground that GTZ was immune from suit, citing in particular its
assigned functions in implementing the SHINE programa joint undertaking of the Philippine and German
governments which was neither proprietary nor commercial in nature.
The arguments raised by GTZ and the OSG are rooted in several indisputable facts. The SHINE project
was implemented pursuant to the bilateral agreements between the Philippine and German governments.
GTZ was tasked, under the 1991 agreement, with the implementation of the contributions of the German
government. The activities performed by GTZ pertaining to the SHINE project are governmental in nature,
related as they are to the promotion of health insurance in the Philippines. The fact that GTZ entered into
employment contracts with the private respondents did not disqualify it from invoking immunity from suit, as
held in cases such as Holy See v. Rosario, Jr., which set forth what remains valid doctrine:The mere
entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can
only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in
the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity,
or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
ISSUE: WON GTZ can enjoy the Federal Republics immunity from suit.
RULING: The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in
Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the State may not be sued without its consent."
The doctrine is available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local
State, necessary as it is to avoid "unduly vexing the peace of nations."
If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would be no
doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said State had
consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought against GTZ.
Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as "the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany," a depiction similarly adopted by the OSG. Assuming that characterization is correct,
it does not automatically invest GTZ with the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. The distinction lies in
whether the agency is incorporated or unincorporated.
Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it must be
ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its
consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the government agency
impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated.
An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical personality, like the
Social Security System, the University of the Philippines, and the City of Manila. By contrast, the
unincorporated agency is so called because it has no separate juridical personality but is merged in the
general machinery of the government, like the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the
Government Printing Office.
If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable
if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such
functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued.
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the
original charter of the incorporated government agency.
It is useful to note that on the part of the Philippine government, it had designated two entities, the
Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), as the implementing
agencies in behalf of the Philippines. The PHIC was established under Republic Act No. 7875, Section
16(g) of which grants the corporation the power "to sue and be sued in court." Applying the previously cited
jurisprudence, PHIC would not enjoy immunity from suit even in the performance of its functions connected
with SHINE, however, governmental in nature as they may be.
Is GTZ an incorporated agency of the German government? In truth, private respondents were unable to
adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that GTZ was a "private corporation," and the Labor Arbiter
acted rashly in accepting such claim without explanation. But neither has GTZ supplied any evidence
defining its legal nature beyond that of the bare descriptive "implementing agency." There is no doubt that
the 1991 Agreement designated GTZ as the "implementing agency" in behalf of the German
government. Yet the catch is that such term has no precise definition that is responsive to our
concerns. Inherently, an agent acts in behalf of a principal, and the GTZ can be said to act in behalf
of the German state. But that is as far as "implementing agency" could take us.The term by itself does
not supply whether GTZ is incorporated or unincorporated, whether it is owned by the German state or by
private interests, whether it has juridical personality independent of the German government or none at all.
GTZ itself provides a more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own official Internet website. In the
"Corporate Profile" section of the English language version of its site, GTZ describes itself as follows:As an
international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwide operations, the federally
owned Deutsche GesellschaftfrTechnischeZusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH XXX.
GTZs own website elicits that petitioner is "federally owned," a "federal enterprise," and "founded in 1975
as a company under private law." GTZ clearly has a very meaningful relationship with the Federal Republic
of Germany, which apparently owns it. At the same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not
through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine corporations can
be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government.
This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting
petitioners argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is "an implementing
agency." The above-quoted statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an "implementing
agency of the Federal Republic of Germany," yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under
private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website, also makes reference to GTZ and describes it
in this manner:x xx Going by the principle of "sustainable development," the German Technical Cooperation
(Deutsche GesellschaftfrTechnischeZusammenarbeit GmbH, GTZ) takes on non-profit projects in
international "technical cooperation." The GTZ is a private company owned by the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Again, we are uncertain of the corresponding legal implications under German law surrounding "a private
company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany." Yet taking the description on face value, the
apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but
owned by the Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation without original
charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that "[e]very corporation
incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity x xx to sue and be sued in its corporate name."
It is entirely possible that under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly GTZ itself has not been
vested or has been specifically deprived the power and capacity to sue and/or be sued. Yet in the
proceedings below and before this Court, GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has not
consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.We adhere to the rule
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines, and following the most intelligent assumption we can gather,
GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by
virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued. At the very least, like the Labor
Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, this Court has no basis in fact to conclude or presume that GTZ enjoys
immunity from suit.
____________________________________________________________________
This absence of basis in fact leads to another important point, alluded to by theLabor Arbiter in his rulings.
InHoly See v. Del Rosario, We stated then:In Public International Law, when a state or international agency
wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a
determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is
immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues
a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion."
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure
an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. XXX
It is to be recalled that the LA, in both of his rulings, noted that it was imperative for petitioners to secure
from the DFA "a certification of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges
including immunity from suits." The requirement might not necessarily be imperative. However, had GTZ
obtained such certification from the DFA, it would have provided factual basis for its claim of immunity that
would, at the very least, establish a disputable evidentiary presumption that the foreign party is indeed
immune which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual evidence. We do not see why
GTZ could not have secured such certification or endorsement from the DFA for purposes of this case.
Certainly, it would have been highly prudential for GTZ to obtain the same after the LA had denied the MTD.
Still, even at this juncture, we do not see any evidence that the DFA,The office of the executive branch in
charge of our diplomatic relations, has indeed endorsed GTZs claim of immunity. It may be possible that
GTZ tried, but failed to secure such certification, due to the same concerns that we have discussed herein.
Would the fact that the Solicitor General has endorsed GTZs claim of States immunity from suit before this
Court sufficiently substitute for the DFA certification? Note that the rule in public international law quoted in
Holy See referred to endorsement by the Foreign Office of the State where the suit is filed, such foreign
office in the Philippines being the Department of Foreign Affairs. Nowhere in the Comment of the OSG is it
manifested that the DFA has endorsed GTZs claim, or that the OSG had solicited the DFAs views on the
issue. The arguments raised by the OSG are virtually the same as the arguments raised by GTZ without
any indication of any special and distinct perspective maintained by the Philippine government on the issue.
The Comment filed by the OSG does not inspire the same degree of confidence as a certification from the
DFA would have elicited.1avvphi1
The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with
satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within
proper bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint
against it.
As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could
have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiters decision been a "patent nullity." Since the Labor Arbiter acted
properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZs claim of immunity, we cannot see how the
decision could have translated into a "patent nullity." As a result, there was no basis for petitioners in
foregoing the appeal to the NLRC by filing directly with the Court of Appeals the petition for certiorari. It then
follows that the Court of Appeals acted correctly in dismissing the petition on that ground. As a further
consequence, since petitioners failed to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision, the
same has long become final and executory. All other questions related to this case, such as whether
or not private respondents were illegally dismissed, are no longer susceptible to review, respecting
as we do the finality of the Labor Arbiters Decision.
A final note.This decision should not be seen as deviation from the more common methodology employed
in ascertaining whether a party enjoys State immunity from suit, one which focuses on the particular
functions exercised by the party and determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in nature. The
nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer
for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our
Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent;
hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an
instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant.Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this
decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or
agency.
D.7 Catalina vs. POEAs Administrator
Facts:Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Intl Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment
corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Intl Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Texas and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
On June 6, 1984, BienvenidoM.Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf
and on behalf of the 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an
"Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims
arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-555).
The complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited
foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various
projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya,
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine Government, all the
individual complainants signed standard overseas employment contracts with AIBC before their departure
from the Philippines. These overseas employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant
terms and conditions.
PART B
(1) Employment Position Classification :
(Code) :
(2) Company Employment Status : The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on : provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines with a 3 years
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :
(6) Basic Hourly Rate : yr period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) : Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law.
Months and/or
Job Completionxxxxxxxxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set out in Part B of this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as
maybe deemed necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee's
service with cause, under this agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the services of the Employee under this Agreement
because of the completion or termination, or suspension of the work on which the Employee's services were being utilized, or because
of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such work, or by change in the type of construction of such work. The Employer
will be responsible for his return transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most expeditious air route, economy class
accommodation.xxxxxxxxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation
leave with pay. This shall be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service will be computed on a pro-rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every year of service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the
employee failed to avail of such leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which said sick leave is granted.
11. BONUSA bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and payable only upon satisfactory completion of this
contract.
12. OFFDAY PAYThe seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work is performed on this
day, all hours work shall be paid at the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable only when the laws of the Host
Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin
Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as
the Labour Law for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August 16, 1976. Some
of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are
as follows (italics supplied only for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-
five per centumthereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty per centum thereof for hours worked during the night
which shall be deemed to being from seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in the morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.. . .an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work
on his weekly day of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage
shall be paid to him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to
150% of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service with his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a
period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruitin respect of the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the
other party thirty days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and fifteen days' notice in
respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract without giving the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation
equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of
his employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each year of the first three years of service and of one month's
wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruitin
proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the Philippines at the time of the
filing of these cases which they filed after 1 year from the termination of their employment contract.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment
contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of
the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted
to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC
and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: a claim
arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the
expiry of the contract, it appears that their suit has prescribed. Plaintiff contends that the prescription period
should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a
contract.
prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1
ISSUE:whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a
Ruling:As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such
as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is suigenerisin Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as
procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of limitations
of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian
law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in
Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the
country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign
statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing
statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based
on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one
form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the
forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153
[1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said
Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it.
There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to
Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propriovigoreinsofar as it
ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy (Canadian
Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the
parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed
the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, The SC read the overseas-employment contracts in question as adopting
the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed (Cheshire, Private International
Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the
parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by
them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of
a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to
the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the
foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in
the contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703,
[8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and
Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected by
giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp.
465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction
(Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered in
that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486 (1982), the "Employment
Agreement," between Norse Management Co. and the late husband of the private respondent, expressly
provided that in the event of illness or injury to the employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance
with and subject to the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or
the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the
place of registry of the vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at the time of his
death, granted a better compensation package, SC applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of
the contract.
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We
find no such abuse of discretion.
D.8 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)
Argued February 27, 1930 Decided May 5, 1930
Facts:Dick, a citizen of Texas, brought this action in a Texas court against Compania General Anglo-
Mexicana de Seguros S.A. (Compania General) a Mexican corporation, to recover on a policy of fire
insurance for the total loss of a tug (tugboat). Jurisdiction was acquired through garnishment, by the
issuance of ancillary writs against the Home Insurance Company and Franklin Fire Insurance Company,
which reinsured parts of the risk which it had assumed in relation to the tugboats coverage through
contracts with the Mexican corporation. Service was effected to the garnishees, New York corporations, by
serving their local agents in Texas appointed pursuant to Texas statutes, requiring the appointment of local
agents by foreign corporations seeking permits to do business within the state.Attorneys were appointed for
the garnishees by the trial court. But there is no contention that jurisdiction in personam over it was
acquired. Dick's claim is that, since the obligation of a reinsurer to pay the original insurer arises upon the
happening of the loss, and is not conditional upon prior payment of the loss by the insurer, the New York
companies are indebted to the Mexican company, and these debts are subject to garnishment in a
proceeding against the latter quasi in rem, even though it is not suable in personam.
The garnishees concede that the inability to sue the Mexican corporation in Texas in personam is
not material if a cause of action against it existed at the time of garnishment and there was within the state a
res belonging to it. But they deny the existence of the cause of action or of the res.Their defense was that
this suit was not commenced till more than one year after the date of the loss. The policy provided: "It is
understood and agreed that no judicial suit or demand shall be entered before any tribunal for the collection
of any claim under this policy unless such suits or demands are filed within one year counted from the date
on which such damage occurs."This provision was in accord with the Mexican law to which the policy was
expressly made subject. It covered the vessel only in certain Mexican waters. The premium was paid in
Mexico, and the loss was "payable in the City of Mexico in current funds of the United States of Mexico, or
their equivalent elsewhere." At the time the policy was issued, when it was assigned to him, and, until after
the loss, Dick actually resided in Mexico, although his permanent residence was in Texas. The contracts of
reinsurance were effected by correspondence between the Mexican company in Mexico and the New York
companies in New York. Nothing was in fact done in Texas.
Garnishees contended that, since the insurance contract was made and was to be performed in
Mexico, and the one-year provision was valid by its laws, Dick's failure to sue within one year after accrual
of the alleged cause of action was a complete defense to the suit on the policy; that this relieved the
garnishees of any obligation as reinsurers and that they owed no debt to the Mexican company subject to
garnishment. To this defense, Dick demurred on the ground that Article 5545 of the Texas Revised Civil
Statutes (1925) provides:"No person, firm, corporation, association or combination of whatsoever kind shall
enter into any stipulation, contract, or agreement, by reason whereof the time in which to sue thereon is
limited to a shorter period than two years. And no stipulation, contract, or agreement for any such shorter
limitation in which to sue shall ever be valid in this state."Trial court ruled in favor of Dick. On appeal to both
Court of Civil appeals and Supreme Court of the state, both courts treated the policy provision as equivalent
to a foreign statute of limitation; held that Article 5545 is related to the remedy available in Texas courts;
concluded that it was validly applicable to the case at bar, andaffirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The garnishees appealed to this Court.
Issue: (1) WON the Texas state courts correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case; (2) WON Texaslaws
should be applied

Held: (1) NO. Doubtless a state may prohibit the enjoyment by persons within its borders of rights acquired
elsewhere which violate its laws or public policy, and, under some circumstances, it may refuse to aid in the
enforcement of such rights. But the Mexican corporation never was in Texas, and neither it nor the
garnishees invoked the aid of the Texas courts or the Texas laws. The Mexican corporation was not before
the court. The garnishees were brought in by compulsory process. Neither has asked favors. They ask only
to be let alone. We need not consider how far the state may go in imposing restrictions on the conduct of its
own residents, and of foreign corporations which have received permission to do business within its
borders, or how far it may go in refusing to lend the aid of its courts to the enforcement of rights acquired
outside its borders. It may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to
anything done or to be done within them.
It is true that a state may extend the time within which suit may be brought in its own courts if, in doing so, it
violates no agreement of the parties. And, in the absence of a contractual provision, the local statute of
limitation may be applied to a right created in another jurisdiction even where the remedy in the latter is
barred. In such cases, the rights and obligations of the parties are not varied. When, however, the parties
have expressly agreed upon a time limit on their obligation, a statute which invalidates the agreement and
directs enforcement of the contract after the time has expired increases their obligation and imposes a
burden not contracted for.
It is true also that a state is not bound to provide remedies and procedure to suit the wishes of individual
litigants. It may prescribe the kind of remedies to be available in its courts and dictate the practice and
procedure to be followed in pursuing those remedies. Contractual provisions relating to these matters, even
if valid where made, are often disregarded by the court of the forum, pursuant to statute or otherwise. But
the Texas statute deals neither with the kind of remedy available nor with the mode in which it is to be
pursued. It purports to create rights and obligations. It may not validly affect contracts which are neither
made nor are to be performed in Texas.
(2) NO. The Texas statute as here construed and applied deprives the garnishees of property without due
process of law. A state may prohibit and declare invalid the making of certain contracts within its borders. It
may prohibit performance within its borders. Even of contracts validly made elsewhere, if they are required
to be performed within the state and their performance would violate its laws. But, in the case at bar,
nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or
required to be done in Texas. All acts relating to the making of the policy and contracts of reinsurance were
done in Mexico or in New York. And all things in regard to performance were to be done outside of Texas.
Neither the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for any purpose except by Dick in the bringing of
this suit. The fact that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas is without significance. At all times here
material, he was physically present and acting in Mexico. Texas was therefore without power to affect the
terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon and to seize
property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of property without
due process of law.
D. 9 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague
Facts:Ralph Hague died of injuries he suffered when a car hit the motorcycle on which he was riding as a
passenger. The accident occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin which is immediately across the Minnesota
border from Red Wing, Minn. Both drivers in the accident were residents of Wisconsin as was Hague, who
resided in Hager City which is one and one-half miles from Red Wing, his place of employment for the 15
years immediately preceding the accident. He commuted daily to work from Wisconsin.
Neither driver had insurance. Hague, however, held an insurance policy issued by Allstate
Insurance Co. The policy, which was delivered in Wisconsin but did not specify any applicable law, covered
three automobiles and included uninsured motorist coverage capped at $15,000 per covered vehicle.
After his husbands death but prior to the filing of the instant case, Hagues wife moved to Red
Wing, Minnesota. Subsequently, she married a Minnesota resident and established residence with her new
husband in Savage, Minn. At approximately the same time, a Minnesota Registrar of Probate appointed
respondent personal representative of her deceased husband's estate. Following her appointment, she
brought this action in Minnesota District Court seeking a declaration under Minnesota law that the $15,000
uninsured motorist coverage on each of her late husband's three automobiles could be "stacked" to provide
total coverage of $45,000. Petitioner defended on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist
coverages could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law, since the insurance policy was
delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved were Wisconsin
residents at the time of the accident.
The Minnesota District Court disagreed. Interpreting Wisconsin law to disallow stacking, the court
concluded that Minnesota's choice of law rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting
stacking. The court refused to apply Wisconsin law as "inimical to the public policy of Minnesota," and
granted summary judgment for respondent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court. The court likewise
interpreted Wisconsin law to prohibit stacking. The court emphasized that a majority of States allow
stacking, and that legal decisions allowing stacking "are fairly recent and well considered in light of current
uses of automobiles." In addition, the court found the Minnesota rule superior to Wisconsin's "because it
requires the cost of accidents with uninsured motorists to be spread more broadly through insurance
premiums than does the Wisconsin rule." Finally, after rehearing en banc, the court buttressed its initial
opinion by indicating "that contracts of insurance on motor vehicles are in a class by themselves," since an
insurance company "knows the automobile is a movable item which will be driven from state to state." From
this premise, the court concluded that application of Minnesota law was "not so arbitrary and unreasonable
as to violate due process."
Issue: Whether the Minnesota court is correct in applying Minnesota law.
Held:Yes. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Minnesota has a significant aggregation of contacts with the
parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that application of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair, and, accordingly, the choice of law by the Minnesota Supreme Court does not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
First, the decedent was a member of Minnesota's workforce. The State of employment has police
power responsibilities towards non-resident employees that are analogous to those it has towards residents;
as such employees use state services and amenities and may call upon state facilities in appropriate
circumstances. Also, the State's interest in its commuting non-resident employees, such as respondent's
decedent, reflects a state concern for the safety and wellbeing of its workforce and the concomitant effect
on Minnesota employers. That the decedent was not killed while commuting to work or while in Minnesota
does not dictate a different result, since vindication of the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee is an
important state concern. Nor does the decedent's residence in Wisconsin constitutionally mandate
application of Wisconsin law to the exclusion of forum law. Employment status is not a sufficiently less
important status than residence, when combined with the decedent's daily commute across state lines and
the other Minnesota contacts present, to prohibit the choice of law result in this case on constitutional
grounds.
Second, petitioner was at all times present and doing business in Minnesota. By virtue of such
presence, petitioner can hardly claim unfamiliarity with the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise that the
state courts might apply forum law to litigation in which the company is involved. Moreover, such presence
gave Minnesota an interest in regulating the company's insurance obligations insofar as they affected both a
Minnesota resident and court-appointed representative (respondent) and a longstanding member of
Minnesota's workforce (respondent's decedent).
Lastly, in addition to the other contacts, respondent became a Minnesota resident prior to
institution of the instant litigation. She subsequently moved to Savage, Minn., after marrying a Minnesota
resident who operated an automobile service station in Bloomington, Minn. Her move to Savage occurred
"almost concurrently," with the initiation of the instant case. There is no suggestion that Mrs. Hague moved
to Minnesota in anticipation of this litigation or for the purpose of finding a legal climate especially hospitable
to her claim. The stipulated facts, sparse as they are, negate any such inference. Her bona fide residence
and subsequent appointment in Minnesota as personal representative of her late husband's estate
constitute a Minnesota contact which gives Minnesota an interest in respondent's recovery, an interest
which the court below identified as full compensation for "resident accident victims" to keep them "off
welfare rolls" and able "to meet financial obligations."
D.11
Facts: Defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew
members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning
when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When
they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape
plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her.
Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an
accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the
Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and
Allah but she did not cooperate. In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
 On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind her, her
superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned
her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make a
statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return
her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a
later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid
of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge, to
her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her,
together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery;
(2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with
the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.
Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help
her while her case is on appeal. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed
the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause. On November 23, 1993,
Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country
manager.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the outset. It
maintains that private respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights occured in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the
law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicticommissi rule
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.
Issue:
What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or
more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation
Ruling:
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of
facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process
of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The purpose of
characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
The starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative
fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or point of contact.
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law. These test factors or points of contact or connecting factors
could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular,
the lexsitus is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has
been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex
loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lexforithe law
of the forumis particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not
going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lexfori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given
case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship
and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment.
The SC are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondents assertion that although
she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely
testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on
her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious
charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point
of contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying
the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act
with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her,
she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.
For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury
to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the
situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicticommissi, modern
theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just
results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the
State of the most significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given
the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus,
the relationship between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not
based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant
contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant
(herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and the
place having the most interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine
law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal
issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in
Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioners
insistence that since private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and
proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter. As aptly said by private respondent, she has no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is
based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.In her Amended Complaint and
subsequent pleadings she never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly held by
the respondent appellate court, considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of
the law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of
Saudi Arabia is.