Anna Dailey

The Theory-Ladenness of Observation in the Sciences

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that observation is theory-laden due to the inherently subjective
selection of observables, instrumentation used to collect data, language used to describe findings,
and human perception itself. Although it may not be possible for observation to play a neutral
role in science, I assert that observation is necessary and ought to remain involved in science
because its theory-ladenness entails fallibility and not subjectivity.

Introduction

Since Aristotles dissections of animals, observation has played a key role in the
development of scientific theories (Bogen 1). In the most basic version of the Scientific
Method, the first step of making a scientific advancement is to observe the facts. Following
the observations, scientists generalize facts into laws, and then classify laws into theories
(Sankey Lec 1). Although this method may seem reasonable enough, many philosophers have
questioned the nature of observation, wondering if it can be segregated from theory. Philosopher
Thomas Kuhn would say that what scientists observe depends on the theories they accept (Curd
192). This concept has been described throughout the years as Theory-Ladenness.

Where to Start
Selection of observations is inherently theory-laden.

Philosopher Karl Popper is famously known to have commented on the nature of

observation with the following demonstration: Take a pencil and paper, carefully observe, and
write down what you have observed. (Popper 1927). Clearly, the statement is meant to point out
a flaw in the idea that a scientist can start with observations before arriving at theories. If I am
told to observe, I have no idea where to start and what kind of observations to makeDo I
write down the color of the table? The smell of the air? The texture of the carpet? One could go
on and on for hours without ever recording a relevant piece of information. Based on this
example, we can see that it may be unreasonable to claim that scientists first step is objective
observation of facts.
Where do we go from there? We have to decide what method scientists are using to select
the objects and metrics that they observe. The argument of theory-laden observation implies that
the selection of observations made may be influenced by the scientists prior knowledge, the
expectation of what is going to be observed, and the theories that they are working within
(Bogen 1). In Kuhns writing, he exemplifies this concept by proposing a hypothetical scenario
in which Galileo and an Aristotelian physicist observe the famous pendulum experiment. Kuhn
says that the two observers would record completely different data from the observations
because certain metrics have more salience than others, based on the scientists preconceptions
and accepted theories. The Aristotelian physicist would attend to the weight of the stone,
vertical height, and the time to achieve rest, while Galileo would attend to the radius, angular
displacement, and the time lapsed per swing (Kuhn 123). Because they subscribe to different
belief systems or theories, they take away completely different information from the experience.
If scientists in fact use theories to select their observations, they may ignore important
counter-evidence, look in the wrong place for evidence, or misclassify their observations due to
conscious or subconscious expectations. Clearly, this can be problematic for the credibility of
these observations and then theories, leading to fallibility.

Methods of Observation
Instrumentation and method of data collection cannot be truly theory-independent because of the
humans who design, operate, and interpret them.

One counter-argument to the fallibility of observation may be that modern-day

technology and instrumentation prevent scientists from inflicting their theories and biases onto
the data they are collecting. Instruments are designed to produce consistent and objective outputs
so it seems as though their observations should be infallible. However, the theory-ladenness
philosopher would respond to this claim by pointing out that instruments are designed by
humans, many of which have theories in mind that they are trying to prove or theories that they
heavily subscribe to (Chalmers 7). If the instruments are designed to extract data to fit into a
particular theory, how can they be separated from that theory?
In addition, humans operate the instruments and interpret their outputs. Not only can a
scientist subconsciously extract distorted meaning from reading an instrument, but he can also
choose to ignore important data that may seem to be an outlier (Bogen 1). Similarly, the
interpretation of the output of an instrument will vary based on the viewers knowledge about the
equipment and the theory. For example, a student described by Michael Polyanyi interprets the
X-ray image of a patient differently from the main researcher because has had far less exposure
to these types of images. He sees the ribs clearly and notes facts about their shape and density,
when he should be attending to the fainter lines of the lungs underneath (Polanyi 101). To me, it
seems that the methods of data collection and instrumentation must not be objective as long as
they are designed, operated, and interpreted by humans.

Language and Observational Reports

The syntax and word choice used to describe observations may be theory-laden.

I want to bring up another component of this viewpointone that came about later in
what is called the Linguistic turn of this area of philosophy (Bogen 1). Philosophers began to
focus heavily on the composition of observational reports and the idea that the word selection
and phrasing within these reports is oftentimes inseparable from the theories that they are derived
from, and therefore include theory inherently. In other words, if [reports] are to be evidentially
relevant to a theory, [they] must be expressed in vocabulary of that theory rather than in some
theory-neutral language (Curd 1318). In addition, many technical words throughout history
have been invented by the scientist that is attempting to form a theory surrounding those entities.
So if the scientist is using these theory-derived terms to describe his observations, those
observations must inherently be theory-laden. Kuhn describes the tendency for scientists to
impose their own theories on language (what he calls Semantic Theory Loading) by saying
theoretical commitments exert a strong influence on observation, descriptions, and what they
are understood to mean (Kuhn 127). This aspect is only one of many within the linguistic
perspective, but it is the one that is most related to the goal of this paper.

Perception Itself
Perception itself may be theory-laden when we consider pure experience versus interpretation
in the human mind.

The discussion of the potential theory-ladenness of observations leads me to analyze the

nature of human perception as a process. In observing an object, or reading an instrument, some
sort of human pathway receives the output information and transfers it into text or data. After
considering the complications and subjectivity of instruments, one might be tempted to suggest
that scientists eliminate the use of instruments and interpretations entirely, leaving observers
with only their pure experience (Sankey Lec 8). Some may argue that pure experience exists
for individual people because a human observer has more or less direct access to knowledge of
some facts about the world insofar as they are recorded by the brain in the act of seeing
(Chalmers 4). However, I argue that no human sense experience is truly objective.
As I mentioned earlier, every human that is perceiving an object brings with them the
baggage of their previous experiences, educational background, beliefs, and other information
that affects the way they interpret their surroundings. People with different backgrounds or who
subscribe to different theories or paradigms are unlikely to perceive things in the same way. Curd
articulates this point nicely when he says that scientists embedded in competing paradigms
interpret the world so differently that they see different things and what those scientists
observe can never disconfirm or undermine their confidence in their own theory in favor of a
theory of a competing paradigm (Curd 192). If the two people can take away such different
interpretation, then how can we speak of an objective pure experience?
Further, the experience of one isolated person viewing the world includes a significant
amount of interpretation at the neurological level. Using the visual human pathway as an
example, it is clear that the raw visual data received by the retina goes through some level of
processing before the information even reaches the conscious awareness. In a fairly complex but
profound paper by Supr and Lamm, an experiment is described that illustrates this concept
perfectly. In the experiment, electrodes record V1 (main visual area) neuronal activation as
monkeys saccade their gaze to follow a dot on a screen. During some trials, the dot moves across
the visual field and the monkeys eyes do not follow it, implying the visual information does not
reach his conscious awareness. Shockingly, however, the electrodes show the same activation in
the V1 neurons as when the monkeys eyes successfully follow the dot. These findings lead us to
believe that there is some sort of bottom-up processing going on that decides what visual
information is important enough to be brought to the conscious level (Super 304-310).
Applying these results to perception in general, it is clear to me that no conscious perception of
an experience can be considered raw at alleverything has been processed and interpreted
already. Therefore, perception cannot be truly objective and may contribute to theory-laden or
skewed observations.

Proceeding with Caution

 Although we have shown that observation is fallible, I still assert that it ought to maintain
its large role in science. There are many descriptive theories and prescriptive opinions about the
manner in which observation should be used to avoid subjectivity as much as possible. In order
to improve results and decrease skewness and bias, the scientific community should attempt to
standardize as many methods, rules, and guidelines as possible. I think that based on the
pragmatic necessity of observation, it should continue to play a part in science, because the
theory-ladenness of observation entails fallibility, and not subjectivity (Sankey Lec 8).

Conclusion

I argued in favor of the theory-ladenness of observation. To prove my point, I showed

how the selection of observed objects must be inherently theory-guided based on what scientists
are expecting, what they hope to see, their backgrounds, and other factors. I also described the
effects of theory-laden instrumentation and theory-laden language in observational reports.
Lastly, I argued that perception may contribute to the fallibility of observation because the
human experience is inherently biased and ridden with interpretation, because of neuroscience,
background knowledge, and beliefs. Despite these conclusions, I asserted that observation is a
necessary and useful part of science and should be coupled with as much objectivity as possible
for the best results.

Works Cited
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